Monty and Mac..... Incompetent or victims

[Warship NWS]

To D, understood, no disagreement there. I still hold Monty responsible for Market Garden - IMHO, his greatest arrogance/glory hound driven blunder which was brought about by his desire NOT to capture Antwerp as rapidly as possible and then arguing with Ike to give HIM all the supplies to drive forward. Monty even tried to circumvent Ike to get his way. Like I said, he wanted victory at all costs - to his men and to the cooperative allied efforts.

That is my few cents based on reading and researching the entire Market Garden operation several times over, and some of his other leadership decisions over the years - so call it my personal opinion if you will. My time is short so I cannot get to involved with a potentially complex topic.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

To D, understood, no disagreement there. I still hold Monty responsible for Market Garden - IMHO, his greatest arrogance/glory hound driven blunder which was brought about by his desire NOT to capture Antwerp as rapidly as possible and then arguing with Ike to give HIM all the supplies to drive forward. Monty even tried to circumvent Ike to get his way. Like I said, he wanted victory at all costs - to his men and to the cooperative allied efforts.

....

My only observation on Monty and Market Garden is that after the war, there wasn't much of a controversy from the senior leaders about the operation. Even Bradley never really takes Monty to task. I wonder if it was because they silently agreed with the plan then after its failure, just kept quiet. As for Antwerp, he had the opportunity to clear the Scheldt and did not take it, so Antwerp is his failure. Seems to me that MG was his attempt at atonement for the "slows" at Antwerp. He failed to order Horrocks and XXX corps to reach beyond Antwerp into Holland which would have cleared the Scheldt. He was more occupied by the narrow thrust idea than the clearing of a vital port. His failure and his failure alone.

[Warship NWS]

To D, it may be just me thinking this which I have no problem with as I have gone where angels dare to tread before. However, I fully believe that Monday dragged his feet about Antwerp on purpose so he could push through Operation Comet - which was his idea prior to Market Garden, just a more complex version of Comet. He wanted to be the first to Berlin.. no matter what. Everything he did, demanded from Ike, or manipulated, lead to that sole objective either indirectly or directly.

As you said, his men paid the price - 1st Airborne division most of all.

[Mart]

To Mart and friends,

I want to be clear that I do not think Monty was a "bad" person and he was quite popular with his troops. My opinion of him in how he treated the "Allied" operations, in terms of being sometimes a "negative" team player, and as an effective general however are much lower.

Hi Chris,

Don't worry. I didn't take any criticism of Montgomery in any personal way. I know that he's a controversial figure, and might even have been completely rubbish! I just felt an irrational duty of honour, on behalf of my grandfather. I knew, when I wrote it, that it wasn't really relevant to the discussion. So, no offence taken, not even in the slightest.

On the actual topic, my guess is that Montgomery was such a complex character, hidden beneath layers of arrogance, legend, rivalry, various levels of competence, and relations with other generals that were way less than perfect, but maybe hard to understood, that the final word on the guy may not be spoken for many years.

Now General Slim - that's a different matter! But, sadly, not the topic of the thread

Take care

Martin

[JMS]

To D, it may be just me thinking this which I have no problem with as I have gone where angels dare to tread before. However, I fully believe that Monday dragged his feet about Antwerp on purpose so he could push through Operation Comet - which was his idea prior to Market Garden, just a more complex version of Comet. He wanted to be the first to Berlin.. no matter what. Everything he did, demanded from Ike, or manipulated, lead to that sole objective either indirectly or directly.

As you said, his men paid the price - 1st Airborne division most of all.

You are wrong on all counts:

1) Antwerp: in contrast to Antwerp, the coast was fortified and manned, so the process couldn't be fast anyway

2) Antwerp: supplies were running out, stockpiles were building up in Normandy because they couldn't be delivered to the front - let me remind you of Patton's words: "my men can eat their belts, but my tanks gotta have gas!"

3) Antwerp: it was not handed over clean and ready. First it needed to be cleared and communications inland re-established. The first date it was going to be operational is November - rainy season in Europe - clouds, water,... so no air-support and the Germans still have the ability to flood areas of the low countries.

4) Op. Comet: not only there's no proof, but his correspondence with Ike is quite clear that the aim was the Ruhr, and only then Berlin, yet his orders as opposed to his commander's intent only covered a bridgehead across the Rhine. Brings up the next point, Ih Ike had given priority to the Ruhr, why was supply not pulled off Patton's army?

5) Ike: he, and Bradley, approved Market Garden - again I would like to see evidence of "manipulation" beyond Monday morning quarterbacking. Ike's priority was the Ruhr.

6) 1st Airborne: The responsibility is not Monty's but Browning's/Brereton's. The division was dropped too far from the target, no attempt was made to fit the whole formation in one lift, no nightime drop. When on the ground they took their time about it. 1st AA and 1st AB leadership where responsible for their destruction.

[keschofield]

...1) Antwerp: in contrast to Antwerp, the coast was fortified and manned, so the process couldn't be fast anyway...
..

Yes, the approaches to Antwerp were fortified, but only against seaward penetration. If Monty had ordered it, his forces could have continued north from Antwerp and then west to clear the northern side of the Scheldt. Fortifications are always vulnerable from the rear.

However, the German troops bypassed and surrounded on the southern shore of the estuary would have taken more effort to clear. This could have been done quicker also. But in both cases, Monty decided to move his forces east to try and cross the Rhine "on the bounce" and be first across.

What nobody, including me, has mentioned before is that the estuary was heavily mined. The port facilities were not heavily damaged ala Cherbourg. The combination of Monty's concious decision to keep on toward the Rhine instead of clearing out Germans to his west, combined with the mines in the estuary is why Antwerp was late on line.

[Warship NWS]

To JMS, I do not appreciate the comment of "Monday morning quarterbacking". I have not criticized your comments, do me the courtesy of not doing so with mine which you have done twice now, the first time I blew it off.

I just recently re-read several online detailed articles, previously read "A Bridge Too Far", read over transcripts with quotes from both Monty and Ike, read over the assaults on Antwerp, etc. I have also, over the years, gone over the battle reports, OOBs, battle maps, AARs, etc..

Ike gave orders to Monty to capture Antwerp as a priority. Monty failed to do this, by his own orders, and in turn came up with HIS plan, no one else thought it up, of Market Garden and for Ike to give HIM priority of supplies (although Ike still wanted to keep Patton moving forward and Bradley "quietly" aided him in doing so). Monty came up with the plan of Market Garden to "shorten the war" (his reason given to Ike) after he thought up the Comet plan, not Browning, not Brereton. They had nothing to do with the idea until AFTER Monty pushed it onto Ike and only AFTER failing to capture Antwerp. If Monty had captured the port - as he was ordered to do - then his excuse of using MK to help "cut off the Germans on the Scheldt" would never have been required and as such he ordered thousands of Canadians to their deaths to cover up for his mistake - which he himself even admittted AFTER MK failed its primary goal of getting him across the Rhine.

Montgomery (now Field Marshall), failed to order Horrock’s XXX Corps to seize the Scheldt. Montgomery was still obsessed with the idea of a narrow thrust deep into Germany, which would carry him all the way to Berlin.

It was a bad mistake on my part – I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp ... I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong ............. In my — prejudiced — view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.

And yes, he was very much responsible for the destruction of the 1st Airborne;

On 16 September ULTRA decrypts revealed the movement of 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer division to Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery on 10 September; however, Montgomery dismissed Smith's concerns and refused to alter the plans for the landing of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem

He could have ordered Bremerton right then and there to alter the plan.. NEVER DID, period.

That is all I have to say on this.. want sources,

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...es_arnhem.html
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/battl...he-scheldt.htm
http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden

These are just a few I have read over regarding the operations and they fall into place with other research I have read over the years. If you can provide links and proof otherswise, knock yourself out so others here can read it rather then just chipping away at my personal opinion of the operation.

It is my opinion that Monty pushed for his own agenda to be first into Berlin and thousands of British, Canadian, and Polish troops paid the price for it, which I have a right to, take it or leave it.

Thanks

[JMS]

Can we go over what your sources say...

Ike gave orders to Monty to capture Antwerp as a priority. Monty failed to do this, by his own orders, and in turn came up with HIS plan, no one else thought it up, of Market Garden

On 30 August 1944, Montgomery ordered Gen. Horrocks of XXX Corps to mount an attack and take Antwerp. Horrocks was on the Seine River at this time.
... On 4 September 1944, XXX Corps reaches Antwerp, and with the help of the Belgian resistance the city was secured and the port facilities were captured intact. The advance was halted at Antwerp...
The Scheldt estuary, which connects the North sea with Antwerp, was 80km long and in Dutch territory. The Germans held both sides of the estuary...
On 17 September 1944, Market-Garden was launched.

Now, and this is not a criticism specifically directed at you, but at the usual US rap on Monty, perpetuated in many books. Antwerp was taken 4 days after orders were issued in that sense, so there's no dragging of feet there, less so if one compares it to the German advance in 1940 over the same terrain.

Why did the advance stop at Antwerp? US sources seem to gloss over this, while explaining in great detail the difficulties facing Patton for lack of supplies. Has anyone bothered to check the logistical realities of the British Army who had just lost its 3&1/2 ton trucks to manufacturing defects? Sure, the Canadian Army was busy with the "smaller" ports, but why? the answer is not to liberate more Frenchmen.

Finally, clearing the estuary required amphibious forces and bridging equipment that was not yet available, even if done in the 15 days up to Market-Garden, supplies are not going to flow out of Antwerp due to German destructions.

Let me quote Ike:

Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery on 5 Sep:
"...my intention is initially to occupy the SAAR and the RUHR, and by the time we have done this, HAVRE and ANTWERP should be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts [ie northern and southern] you mention. In this connection I have always given and still give priority to the RUHR RPT RUHR, and the northern route of advance..."

Moreover, on logistics: http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_18.htm

"General Eisenhower, in mid-September, considered two possible courses of action: the concentration of all resources behind a single blow on a narrow front directed toward the center of Germany (the proposal favored by Field Marshal Montgomery); or an advance along the entire front with the aim of seizing suitable positions on the German frontier where the Allied forces could regroup, establish maintenance facilities, and mount a broad drive into Germany. [10] The first course, often referred to as a "knife-like thrust" to Berlin, was rejected on both tactical and administrative grounds. Logistic resources likewise were lacking for the full implementation of the second course. The Supreme Commander, nevertheless, decided in favor of the second plan, which provided that the Allies push forward to the Rhine, secure bridgeheads over the river, seize the Ruhr, and concentrate on preparations for the final nonstop drive into Germany. Because of the limited logistic capabilities, however, the timing of the Allies' efforts toward the attainment of immediate objectives now became of utmost importance. The implementation of this plan, consequently, required a succession of attacks, first by the 21 Army Group, then by the First Army, and, finally, by the Third Army, with supply priorities shifting as necessary."

"Not until mid-November did the Communications Zone expect its port and transportation situation to improve sufficiently to permit the build-up of reserves, over and above daily needs, in all the army areas."

and for Ike to give HIM priority of supplies (although Ike still wanted to keep Patton moving forward and Bradley "quietly" aided him in doing so).

As mentioned above, it was Ike who took that decision giving priority to the Ruhr (the industrial heart of Germany) over the Saar (a strategic dead-end). Bradley disobeyed his orders and kept supplying Patton, endangering Ike's intent.

Monty came up with the plan of Market Garden to "shorten the war" (his reason given to Ike) after he thought up the Comet plan, not Browning, not Brereton. They had nothing to do with the idea until AFTER Monty pushed it onto Ike and only AFTER failing to capture Antwerp. If Monty had captured the port - as he was ordered to do - then his excuse of using MK to help "cut off the Germans on the Scheldt" would never have been required and as such he ordered thousands of Canadians to their deaths to cover up for his mistake - which he himself even admittted AFTER MK failed its primary goal of getting him across the Rhine.

As shown above, the port was captured in 4 days, but it was not going to be operational for a long time:

"Though the British had captured Antwerp early in September, estimates made later in the month indicated that the port might not begin operating before 1 November."

So the Scheldt is irrelevant to what the allies do in Sept. and Oct. If Eisenhower, as supreme allied commander decides to give priority to Montgomery's 21st AG, then you cannot fault Monty for implementing, as he saw fit, his orders.

[I]
And yes, he was very much responsible for the destruction of the 1st Airborne;
He could have ordered Brereton right then and there to alter the plan.. NEVER DID, period.

Unfortunately, Brereton lay beyond Monty's command span:

"As commander of First Allied Airborne Army, Brereton was directly responsible to the Supreme Commander Allied (Expeditionary) Force, General Eisenhower, for a number of functions. There were a large number of these functions, but among them Brereton was responsible for the supervision of training and allocation of facilities, the development of new airborne equipment, consultation with the commander-in-chief of the AEAF and the commander of Allied naval forces in the Allied Expedition Force to coordinate airborne operations, and the execution of such operations"

Which is why the operation had 2 code names, one for the airborne landings and another for the overland advance.

[Warship NWS]

JMS, I am just going to ask a simple reply for these questions,

What level of responsibility do you place on Monty, if any at all, for the the original idea, planning, and final result of the Market Garden operation? Are you attempting to desolve him of any responsbility and/or trying to lay the failures at the feet of other commanders? Just asking.

Where I seriously fail to see any logic in this is that Monty, at anytime, could have cried foul as it was his own fellow British troops being put into the most jeapordy at Arnhem - and yet he was perfectly fine with the whole planning of the operation, of which he originated. I cannot believe that Ike, Bremerton, or anyone else could have shut him up if he was against any part of the plan.

Personaly, I think you and me are not drawing the same conclusions from the information provided so I will let others toss in their thoughts.

[Mart]

Forgive me.

I have no control over the forum. I like everyone on the forum. I know practically nothing about any of the things you guys discuss. Everyday it's the same. I come onto the forum, and your all talking double-dutch, as far as I'm concerned. But I like it. This the ONLY forum I visit on the Internet.

It's a pleasure to come here - always.

Despite there being a some nice people on the Wargamer, and Matrix forums, I decided long ago that I wouldn't visit them again, and I never have. They can be hateful.

This forum is ALWAYS different. My observations, as an outsider, who's completely pig ignorant, apart from watching the DVD of A Bridge Too Far, is that you are all getting carried away about something that is less than life threatening.

Do me a favour guys, PLEASE, and keep this a nice place to visit.

Uuhh - that's it.

Take care

Martin