Monty and Mac..... Incompetent or victims

[Warship NWS]

Monty was in charge of MG1944.. he wanted to be the first to Berlin - come hell or high water, and he failed to capture Antwerp to make sure of that.

I will stop there for now.

[JMS]

Monty was in charge of MG1944.. he wanted to be the first to Berlin - come hell or high water, and he failed to capture Antwerp to make sure of that.

I will stop there for now.

Ike was his superior, so I guess he's just as incompetent for not reviewing his subordinates' plans. Same for Bradley, who was unable to control Patton's rush to nowhere in Lorraine, etc, etc. You can't generalise and expect to be taken seriously. The most important port in Europe was Marseille, which is where most of the supplies landed.

The distance from Normandy to the German border is (IIRC) about the same as the Polish border to Smolensk, where the Germans called for a halt, given that allied logistics were better but the footprint larger and railroad not available, the combined offensive had almost ran out of steam when it stopped nearly on the border of the Reich, so the war was not going to end in 1944 no matter how.

[old_pop2000]

Not really, he applied lessons learned the hard way that other had missed completely (Gott, Auchinleck)

I am going to let other offer their opinions and ideas, but suffice it to say, I have documentation, books, maps to back up what I've said.

[keschofield]

... The most important port in Europe was Marseille, which is where most of the supplies landed. ...

Perhaps someone else has specific data on hand to prove this one way or the other, but I believe both Rotterdam and Antwerp were more important ports, in terms of the amount of cargo they could handle, than Marseille by a wide margin.

Also, Antwerp was much closer to the point of the Allied spearhead. I believe even Monty eventually admitted that he erred in not clearing the Scheldt in a timely manner.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Rather than theories, I would like to see some facts pointing back to Monty and showing why it was different from other commanders (Hurtgen forest, Aachen?) who contributed just as much to the stop of the autumn of '44.



Nope, the failure lay with First Allied Airborne Army plan, which was not under Monty's command, being overly cautious (no nightime flights! minimum losses!) and the Guards armoured divsion execution (the famous tea break).

Hi JMS,

As powerful as the Allies were in 1944, there were fairly serious lmitations on them. First, both Britain and the US were essentially out for manpower without dipping into skilled trades needed for production. Montgomery could not afford casualties and the US Army drastically under estimated infantry casualties in Normandy. The few divisions in CONUS in the pipeline were repeatedly stripped of infantrymen delaying their deployment and their combat readiness when they arrived in theater. SHAEF was in a constant battle with Army Ground Forces over man power. AGF claimed SHAEF was well overstrength while SHAEF countered that they had to adminster France and other liberated trerritory. Ike knew he didn't have enough combat power or logistics to mount a broad front attack, but was unwilling to support a single thrust to knock out the Germans out of the war in a few months. One of Weigley's comments in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants" is regarding the postioning of the Allied armies. The smaller, casualty averse Commonwealth component on the left flank had the easiest terrain into Germany while the larger, more mobile US Army on the right flank had the worst terrain.

Whatever their respective military skills, both Montgomery and McArthur were extremely popular with politicans and the public.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Perhaps someone else has specific data on hand to prove this one way or the other, but I believe both Rotterdam and Antwerp were more important ports, in terms of the amount of cargo they could handle, than Marseille by a wide margin.

Also, Antwerp was much closer to the point of the Allied spearhead. I believe even Monty eventually admitted that he erred in not clearing the Scheldt in a timely manner.

Assuming that overland transport is more difficult than sea transport, (especially with the state that continental railway networks must have been in, after being worked over by Allied airpower pre-D-Day) even a less capable port can be "better", if it is closer to the front lines.

[Ed Rotondaro]

quote: "Market Garden was poorly planned -by the Airborne- and executed -by the Guards Armoured division, hardly failures that could be laid at the feet of Monty, except by his choice of subordinates."

I thought Market Garden was thought up by Montgomery. Is not the commander responsible for reviewing his subordinates plans and to be held responsible for their failures? Dutch advisors recommended against the ground plan the British adopted. They had war-gamed the scenario for years.

I do not feel either general was incompetent.

Frank

Campy:

I agree that Browning and Brereton (one of the worst US generals of WWII) are responsible for the overall bad plan at Market Garden. They ignored the advice of their own subordinates including the commanding generals of the 101st and 82nd Airborne as well other competent leaders. Monty's fault lies in accepting a flawed plan for either personal glory or else to use troops that were going to be withdrawn from him if not engaged in combat. Horrocks the British general tasked with linking up with the airborne troops was way out of his depth by this time and not in good health. What makes Market Garden look so bad on Monty's record is that it was entirely the opposite type of operation that he normally fought.

Monty was known for the set piece battle which really was WWI tactics updated with armor and airpower. Everything was in place, supplies stockpiled and each stage meticulously planned. The pace of modern mechanized warfare had outpaced him by 1944. An operation like Market Garden was totally beyond his mindset. Why he agreed to it is still a matter of conjecture unless he wanted to achieve a stroke of arms that would leave its mark on history. Examine Monty's successes in Africa and you will see that he was using a plan already developed by his predecessors and basically waiting for Rommel to attack him. One can see similiarities to Lee versus Meade at Gettysburg here.

[Warship NWS]

Trying to supply 3 divisions of airborne troops via one road against 2 German SS Panzer divisions.. well.. sorry, all the Germans had to do was roadblock or blow up one bridge to dismay the entire operation. As was said in the movie "Knowing how vital the Ruhr is, don't you think the Germans will know that too??". Monty was in charge so the buck stops there. He could have gone against the plan at ANYTIME IMHO.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Campy:

I agree that Browning and Brereton (one of the worst US generals of WWII) are responsible for the overall bad plan at Market Garden. They ignored the advice of their own subordinates including the commanding generals of the 101st and 82nd Airborne as well other competent leaders. Monty's fault lies in accepting a flawed plan for either personal glory or else to use troops that were going to be withdrawn from him if not engaged in combat. Horrocks the British general tasked with linking up with the airborne troops was way out of his depth by this time and not in good health. What makes Market Garden look so bad on Monty's record is that it was entirely the opposite type of operation that he normally fought.

Monty was known for the set piece battle which really was WWI tactics updated with armor and airpower. Everything was in place, supplies stockpiled and each stage meticulously planned. The pace of modern mechanized warfare had outpaced him by 1944. An operation like Market Garden was totally beyond his mindset. Why he agreed to it is still a matter of conjecture unless he wanted to achieve a stroke of arms that would leave its mark on history. Examine Monty's successes in Africa and you will see that he was using a plan already developed by his predecessors and basically waiting for Rommel to attack him. One can see similiarities to Lee versus Meade at Gettysburg here.

Hi Guys,

By this time in the war, the 1st Allied Airborne Army was a formation looking for a mission. The speed of the Allied advance had overrun a number of sites chosen for it's use. A huge investment in equipment, the highest quality leadership and manpower, and officers looking to justify it's existence made saying no very difficult, especially considering the feeling the Germans were on the ropes. One of the amazing untold stories of the German army was it's resilience. Between D Day and Market Garden, the German army suffered the loss of over a million men on the Eastern and Western Fronts. In the space of a couple of weeks, an army in tatters had reestablished a credible front and was able to hold off the Allies.

[keschofield]

... In the space of a couple of weeks, an army in tatters had reestablished a credible front and was able to hold off the Allies...

While no one man can do it alone, to large degree you thank Von Runstedt for the above. He was given almost carte blanche to run things his way (at least for a while). Additionally, the average landser (should be an umlaut over that a - can't figure out how to do it) had more faith in Von Runstedt than any other general or field marshall.