A comparison of Strategic Bombing in WWII

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi:

I thought I would start a new thread covering the differing experiences of the employment of strategic level bombing in various theaters in WWII. Now the post war study on it definitely poked a few holes in the belief that strategic airpower could win a war. It turned out to be one more club in the bag so to speak. Indeed tactical air was generally more effective than high level long range bombing in affecting the course of a battle and hence a campaign and ultimately the war.

We need to define some terms here. Feel free to amend any mistakes I make:

1. Tactical air: directly attacks a ground target during a battle or in the preparation for one. It can be blurred a bit by interdiction attacks which attack behind the lines, but not as deeply as strategic level airpower.

2. Operational airpower: Used to interdict resources, targets close to the front, but not necessarily in the middle of a battle. Think about the preproratoy bombings for the Normandy invasion that his railyards, bridges, fortifications, shipping. Does contain an element of the strategic in attempting to deny needed resources and the tactical in taking out direct threats to ground forces. Example the battle of the Bismarck Sea. The IJN ships were not sailing to attack any Allied targets, but rather to reinforce their own islands. The attacks against shipping in the Med by both sides to deny logistic support to the ground forces. Usually performed by medium bombers, twin engined fighters.

3. Strategic airpower: The big stick that goes after the heart of an enemy's ability to wage war by attacking industrial targets deep in enemy held territory. The object being to deny your opponent the means to fight, weapons, ammunition, materials and sadly enough morale by targeting the civilian population's will to fight. Also has elements of the Operational use of airpower.

The goal here is to compare the applications of airpower primarily in the Pacific (where it appears that strategic bombing was more effective over a shorter period of time) versus the experience in Europe and the Med.

Dennis feel free to correct any misconceptions here. Enjoy the discussion.

[old_pop2000]

Ed:

This should be interesting. If I might provide some information.

There were two types of airforces; Strategic and tactical. The Eighth was a strategic bombing force which had its own integral escort fighters, as was the fifteenth in the Med. The ninth was a tactical airforce used for assisting ground operations. Within the tactical air force operations, were three kinds of missions; interdiction, close air support, and armed reconnaissance.

In the Pacific, under the commander, Southwest Pacific was the Fifth AF. It consisted of both bomb wings using medium and heavy bombers along with fighter groups. Over time, it evolved into heavy and medium bomb wings, night fighters, troop transport command, photo reconnaissance and day fighter groups.

[Warship NWS]

I will just make a quick comment on this topic of discussing strategic bombing, the results of air attacks on the enemy military and industrial infrastructure were very cumulative in effect. Example, the strategic bombing of Germany caused them to disperse their industry which in turn was greatly effected by tactical interdiction bombing that seriously curtailed their ability to move components for their weapons to to locations where they could be assembled including destroying railways, reducing fuel supplies (which had to be transported itself), destroying barges, hitting transportation network hubs, etc.. There have been many references of how ineffective strategic bombing was by itself but it was not until a far more thorough investigation was done that showed that it all added up together in direct and indirect effects and that the entire assault on the German war machine needed to be looked at overall, not just individual operations or parts of the system that made the most headlines. Combined the strategic and tactical bombing efforts crippled the German ability to wage war.. not just one or the other alone.

Just some thoughts to consider. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

I will just make a quick comment on this topic of discussing strategic bombing, the results of air attacks on the enemy military and industrial infrastructure were very cumulative in effect. Example, the strategic bombing of Germany caused them to disperse their industry which in turn was greatly effected by tactical interdiction bombing that seriously curtailed their ability to move components for their weapons to to locations where they could be assembled including destroying railways, reducing fuel supplies (which had to be transported itself), destroying barges, hitting transportation network hubs, etc.. There have been many references of how ineffective strategic bombing was by itself but it was not until a far more thorough investigation was done that showed that it all added up together in direct and indirect effects and that the entire assault on the German war machine needed to be looked at overall, not just individual operations or parts of the system that made the most headlines. Combined the strategic and tactical bombing efforts crippled the German ability to wage war.. not just one or the other alone.

Just some thoughts to consider. ;)

Chris:

I agree completely. Having read accounts of the production of German war material particularly tanks and aircraft, you can see examples of the disruption caused by the daylight strategic airwar. Also the amount aircraft that Germany devoted to defending the Reich speaks volumes. Those would have been very useful on the Russian front, but for a variety of reasons, the Luftwaffe had keep most of its assets in the West. As an example of using other sources to reach a conclusion I offer this:

If the daylight raids were not that effective, why did Germany build so massive flak towers? We now return to the discussion.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed:

This should be interesting. If I might provide some information.

There were two types of airforces; Strategic and tactical. The Eighth was a strategic bombing force which had its own integral escort fighters, as was the fifteenth in the Med. The ninth was a tactical airforce used for assisting ground operations. Within the tactical air force operations, were three kinds of missions; interdiction, close air support, and armed reconnaissance.

In the Pacific, under the commander, Southwest Pacific was the Fifth AF. It consisted of both bomb wings using medium and heavy bombers along with fighter groups. Over time, it evolved into heavy and medium bomb wings, night fighters, troop transport command, photo reconnaissance and day fighter groups.

Dennis:

I wonder why there was no Tactical airforce per se in the Pacific? Did Fifth AF just allocate resources to the tactical role as needed? And was this more efficient? I wonder if perhaps the sheer size of the struggle in Europe made it necessary to have a separate tactical airforce. Generally most of the fighting in the Pacific was on very small islands and the USN was more than capable of performing the tactical role.

This brings up another question. The USN's use of airpower would primarily fall into the tactical realm with carrier air strikes going after ships and planes. Now when you are attacking an enemy aircraft carrier, is this tactical or strategic? I ask only because of the value of the carrier to project power over vast distances. Sink the carriers and you curtail the enemy's naval operations unless he is within range of land based air. Midway was a tactical victory, but a strategic turning point for this reason.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I wonder why there was no Tactical airforce per se in the Pacific? Did Fifth AF just allocate resources to the tactical role as needed? And was this more efficient? I wonder if perhaps the sheer size of the struggle in Europe made it necessary to have a separate tactical airforce. Generally most of the fighting in the Pacific was on very small islands and the USN was more than capable of performing the tactical role.

This brings up another question. The USN's use of airpower would primarily fall into the tactical realm with carrier air strikes going after ships and planes. Now when you are attacking an enemy aircraft carrier, is this tactical or strategic? I ask only because of the value of the carrier to project power over vast distances. Sink the carriers and you curtail the enemy's naval operations unless he is within range of land based air. Midway was a tactical victory, but a strategic turning point for this reason.
Fifth Air Force consisted of both medium and heavy bombardment groups, fighters etc.

Some of the aircraft were B-24's and B-17's for long range, later to be followed by the B-29's. B-25's and B-26's and A-24's for medium or tactical bombing.

Fighters were P-40 and P-39 to be followed later by P-47's, P-38's and P-51.

Essentially, until the commencement of the bombing of Japan by B-29's, the Fifth was really a tactical airforce, performing strategic bombing mission like attacking ports, shipping, air fields, supply dumps etc.

I would say that an attack on a carrier during an engagement would be tactical.

[Mart]

In the UK, I guess that the issue that's been highlighted as "Strategic" refers to our Bomber Command. People may be aware that the strategy employed by bomber command, was a bit different to the US strategic bombing, at least in the earlier stages.

The role of Bomber Command and of it's head, "Bomber" Harris, are still extremely controversial subjects in the UK and on continental Europe. I think the difficulty in analysing any aspects of the "efficiency" of strategic bombing, in Europe, is so inseparable from the moral issues of mass bombings of cities, that it's hard to discuss. To my knowledge, there was a specific aim, in Bomber Command, to reduce the "will of the population". I know that this issue is continually being revisited but in Europe, it's still a very hot potato. Which, incidentally, is why I'm now keeping out of this conversation.

Maybe people could just bear it in mind though

Cheers

Martin

[old_pop2000]

In the UK, I guess that the issue that's been highlighted as "Strategic" refers to our Bomber Command. People may be aware that the strategy employed by bomber command, was a bit different to the US strategic bombing, at least in the earlier stages.

The role of Bomber Command and of it's head, "Bomber" Harris, are still extremely controversial subjects in the UK and on continental Europe. I think the difficulty in analysing any aspects of the "efficiency" of strategic bombing, in Europe, is so inseparable from the moral issues of mass bombings of cities, that it's hard to discuss. To my knowledge, there was a specific aim, in Bomber Command, to reduce the "will of the population". I know that this issue is continually being revisited but in Europe, it's still a very hot potato. Which, incidentally, is why I'm now keeping out of this conversation.

Maybe people could just bear it in mind though

Cheers

Martin
I believe your ideas and opinions are valuable concerning Bomber Harris and the British bombing campaign. I suspect, if I had experienced the blitz of London, I would want to bomb the Nazi's back to the stone age. It's easy for us, in the US, to throw stones, no one bombed New York. .....But then, who would want to.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Fifth Air Force consisted of both medium and heavy bombardment groups, fighters etc.

Some of the aircraft were B-24's and B-17's for long range, later to be followed by the B-29's. B-25's and B-26's and A-24's for medium or tactical bombing.

Fighters were P-40 and P-39 to be followed later by P-47's, P-38's and P-51.

Essentially, until the commencement of the bombing of Japan by B-29's, the Fifth was really a tactical airforce, performing strategic bombing mission like attacking ports, shipping, air fields, supply dumps etc.

I would say that an attack on a carrier during an engagement would be tactical.

Dennis:

I can live with that analysis. Good post.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I believe your ideas and opinions are valuable concerning Bomber Harris and the British bombing campaign. I suspect, if I had experienced the blitz of London, I would want to bomb the Nazi's back to the stone age. It's easy for us, in the US, to throw stones, no one bombed New York. .....But then, who would want to.

Dennis:

Now wait a minute, it's no longer a trash can, maybe just a jaded version of LA.;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

In the UK, I guess that the issue that's been highlighted as "Strategic" refers to our Bomber Command. People may be aware that the strategy employed by bomber command, was a bit different to the US strategic bombing, at least in the earlier stages.

The role of Bomber Command and of it's head, "Bomber" Harris, are still extremely controversial subjects in the UK and on continental Europe. I think the difficulty in analysing any aspects of the "efficiency" of strategic bombing, in Europe, is so inseparable from the moral issues of mass bombings of cities, that it's hard to discuss. To my knowledge, there was a specific aim, in Bomber Command, to reduce the "will of the population". I know that this issue is continually being revisited but in Europe, it's still a very hot potato. Which, incidentally, is why I'm now keeping out of this conversation.

Maybe people could just bear it in mind though

Cheers

Martin

Martin:

Perhaps too the British strategic campaign had an air of vengance as opposed to effectiveness? I believe that Harris chose the strategy he did based on the strengths and weaknesses of his airforce. It was certainly a less costly campaign then the dayllight one, but in my opinion, less effective. Considering the amount of bombs the US dropped on Japan and Viet Nam, morale stiffens under that kind of attack.

[Mart]

Martin:

Perhaps too the British strategic campaign had an air of vengance as opposed to effectiveness? I believe that Harris chose the strategy he did based on the strengths and weaknesses of his airforce. It was certainly a less costly campaign then the dayllight one, but in my opinion, less effective. Considering the amount of bombs the US dropped on Japan and Viet Nam, morale stiffens under that kind of attack.

Hi Ed

Having said I wouldn't contribute again - here I go again! You may be right. I don't know if any of you listened to "Churchil Confidential". It's now available as an audiobook apparently. Take a look here.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/bbcworldwide/worldwidestories/pressreleases/2008/01_january/churchill_confidential.shtml

If anyone is in doubt - get it!! I listened to it when it came out, and many issues about bombing, retaliaton and so on were discussed. The program, which was a transcript of many of The Wartime Cabinet's meetings, is fascinating, and covers the period up to the near-arrival of US troops to Britain. If you haven't heard this, you've missed something. I took a copy, straight off the radio, when it aired, but if I were to send it to people my computer would just boil. The audiobook is worth getting. It contains discussions of the minutiae of the war, and the various compromises that were needed, that you couldn't even begin to imagine. Fascinating. Best radio program I listened to last year.

Martin :)

[john964]

Dennis:

I wonder why there was no Tactical airforce per se in the Pacific? Did Fifth AF just allocate resources to the tactical role as needed? And was this more efficient? I wonder if perhaps the sheer size of the struggle in Europe made it necessary to have a separate tactical airforce. Generally most of the fighting in the Pacific was on very small islands and the USN was more than capable of performing the tactical role.

This brings up another question. The USN's use of airpower would primarily fall into the tactical realm with carrier air strikes going after ships and planes. Now when you are attacking an enemy aircraft carrier, is this tactical or strategic? I ask only because of the value of the carrier to project power over vast distances. Sink the carriers and you curtail the enemy's naval operations unless he is within range of land based air. Midway was a tactical victory, but a strategic turning point for this reason.
The 5AF did use heavy bombers but a large raid in the Pacific would have been conciderd small in the ETO prior to the 20AF coming online IIRC the largest 5AF heavy bomber raid was done by 120 B24's in late 43. Were as the 8AF and 15AF were conducting raids with over 600 arcraft at the time. The biggest reason is in the Pacific targets out side of Japan are few and far between.

[clacton2]

Martin:

Perhaps too the British strategic campaign had an air of vengance as opposed to effectiveness? I believe that Harris chose the strategy he did based on the strengths and weaknesses of his airforce. It was certainly a less costly campaign then the dayllight one, but in my opinion, less effective. Considering the amount of bombs the US dropped on Japan and Viet Nam, morale stiffens under that kind of attack.

Ed,
I believe that vengeance was a factor, but probably not really a great one ( although Churchill saw it as the only way to hit back at Germany in the early years of the war ).
The fact was that Harris thought he could destroy the will of the German people by mass bombing raids, and thus encourage the downfall of the Nazi party. He also saw it as an effective way to destroy the German industrial output, although again this was to prove somewhat ineffective, especially again in the early years.
Why he thought this has always seemed unclear to me, as if it did not work with us in the U.K. I cannot imagine why he thought it would be different in Germany.
In fact it seems to me that in almost every case where civilian populations were bombed it achieved next to nothing with regard to ending conflicts, other than possibly strengthening the resolve to carry on regardless.
Strangely "Bomber" Harris appears to be equally reviled and revered in this country for his and his command's exploits. He is especially admired by the men who served under him in Bomber Command.
Jon:eek:

[old_pop2000]

I would say that vengence was just one part. Churchill stated towards the end of 1942.


In the days when were fighting alone we answered the question 'how are you going to win the war ' by saying, 'We will shatter Germany by bombing'. ...... We look forward to mass invasion of the Continent by liberating armies, and general revolt of the populations against the Hitler tyranny. All the same, it would be a mistake to cast aside our original thought....We must regard the bomber offensive against Germany at least as a feature in breaking her war-will second only to the largest military operations which can be conducted on the Continent until that war-will is broke

That seems to make it unmistakenly clear, why they went after the Germans with bombing.

On the other hand, he also stated

It is very disputable whether bombing by itself will be a decisive factor in the present war. On the contrary, all that we learnt since the war began shows that its effects, both physical and moral, are greatly exaggerated...

It would seem that Churchill's attitude was ambivalence to the bombing and that that fact, greatly ired the bomber crews.

Area bombing came as a result of the Butt Report which effectively said the RAF crews could not hit anything at night. This led to the reevaluation and the area bombing concept.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed

Having said I wouldn't contribute again - here I go again! You may be right. I don't know if any of you listened to "Churchil Confidential". It's now available as an audiobook apparently. Take a look here.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/bbcworldwide/worldwidestories/pressreleases/2008/01_january/churchill_confidential.shtml

If anyone is in doubt - get it!! I listened to it when it came out, and many issues about bombing, retaliaton and so on were discussed. The program, which was a transcript of many of The Wartime Cabinet's meetings, is fascinating, and covers the period up to the near-arrival of US troops to Britain. If you haven't heard this, you've missed something. I took a copy, straight off the radio, when it aired, but if I were to send it to people my computer would just boil. The audiobook is worth getting. It contains discussions of the minutiae of the war, and the various compromises that were needed, that you couldn't even begin to imagine. Fascinating. Best radio program I listened to last year.

Martin :)

Martin:

Sounds good. Thanks for the info.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The 5AF did use heavy bombers but a large raid in the Pacific would have been conciderd small in the ETO prior to the 20AF coming online IIRC the largest 5AF heavy bomber raid was done by 120 B24's in late 43. Were as the 8AF and 15AF were conducting raids with over 600 arcraft at the time. The biggest reason is in the Pacific targets out side of Japan are few and far between.

John:

Quite true. Generally the islands could be handled by carrier airpower.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,
I believe that vengeance was a factor, but probably not really a great one ( although Churchill saw it as the only way to hit back at Germany in the early years of the war ).
The fact was that Harris thought he could destroy the will of the German people by mass bombing raids, and thus encourage the downfall of the Nazi party. He also saw it as an effective way to destroy the German industrial output, although again this was to prove somewhat ineffective, especially again in the early years.
Why he thought this has always seemed unclear to me, as if it did not work with us in the U.K. I cannot imagine why he thought it would be different in Germany.
In fact it seems to me that in almost every case where civilian populations were bombed it achieved next to nothing with regard to ending conflicts, other than possibly strengthening the resolve to carry on regardless.
Strangely "Bomber" Harris appears to be equally reviled and revered in this country for his and his command's exploits. He is especially admired by the men who served under him in Bomber Command.
Jon:eek:

Jon:

I believe that is true. Harris wanted to fight back and was an apostle of airpower. He used his airforce in the way he thought best. Perhaps the randomness of night bombing may have caused post-war opinion to come down so hard on him? I really think that most belligerents realized that killing civilians was far less productive than destroying factories, but accepted the fact that before the concept/advent of precision delievered munitions, colateral damage was part of the butchers bill of war. Still it was hell on the ground either way.:(

[quantum mechanic]

hello all

i've often read that strategic bombing has never broken the will of the population to fight but i do think it is possible
i don't know if you would consider the german V-2 campaign strategic bombing but i heard that it was in fact on the verge of cracking the will of the population of london to continue the war. Churchill was apparently under some serious pressure to stop the V-2s or treat with Hitler to end the war do to these attacks.
so perhaps?


i have always wondered why the planing of operation market garden seemed to me so out of character and reckless for Montgomery who previously always seemed so excessively conservative and cautious.
was it because the V-2s where so effective at demoralizing england and Churchill was putting Montgomery under pressure to take out these v-2 launch sites?


dale

[old_pop2000]

Quick answer is that it did not really have anything to do with the V-1 Sites. It was simply an attempt to gain a bridge and foothold across the Rhine River, to expedite the destruction of Germany.

Most of the V-1 launching sites were along the French, Belgian and Dutch coast. Montgomery's advance from Normandy should have taken care of those.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Ed,
I believe that vengeance was a factor, but probably not really a great one ( although Churchill saw it as the only way to hit back at Germany in the early years of the war ).
The fact was that Harris thought he could destroy the will of the German people by mass bombing raids, and thus encourage the downfall of the Nazi party. He also saw it as an effective way to destroy the German industrial output, although again this was to prove somewhat ineffective, especially again in the early years.
Why he thought this has always seemed unclear to me, as if it did not work with us in the U.K. I cannot imagine why he thought it would be different in Germany.
In fact it seems to me that in almost every case where civilian populations were bombed it achieved next to nothing with regard to ending conflicts, other than possibly strengthening the resolve to carry on regardless.
Strangely "Bomber" Harris appears to be equally reviled and revered in this country for his and his command's exploits. He is especially admired by the men who served under him in Bomber Command.
Jon:eek:

Hi Guys,

Harris was merely a protege of a number of air power propronents after WW I, such as Trenchard, Douhet, and Billy Mitchell who argued that air power could decisively defeat a nation by destroying teh popul;ation's will to fight much as the blockade of Germany eventually erroded public support of the war. These concepts were entirely untested prior to WW II, but fear of aerial attack lead Britiain to develope radar for early warning.

Airplane and navigation technology simply wasn't up to the task at the start of teh war. Harris couldn't muster a 1,000 plane raid until May of 1942 and he had to put everything he had including training squadrons into the air to do it. Four engine bombers didn't dominate RAF ops until 1943. The Sterling was limited to 500 lb bombs and the twin engine Manchester was a disaster until turned into the 4 engine Lancaster. The US 8th Air Force didn't sustain sever losses until venturinig into German skies by the summer of 1943.

Once properly focussed, the strategic bomber offensive destroyed the Luftwaffe fighter force and crippled German oil production. In the Pacific, mining missions by B-29s in and around the Home Islands would have strangled the Japanese without an invasion or the use of the atomic bomb. Problem was good information about the effectiveness of teh campaign didn't come to light after war.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I would say that vengence was just one part. Churchill stated towards the end of 1942.



That seems to make it unmistakenly clear, why they went after the Germans with bombing.

On the other hand, he also stated


It would seem that Churchill's attitude was ambivalence to the bombing and that that fact, greatly ired the bomber crews.

Area bombing came as a result of the Butt Report which effectively said the RAF crews could not hit anything at night. This led to the reevaluation and the area bombing concept.

Hi guys,

The primary advantage ot area bombing was seen as "dehousing" of the German workers that served them.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi guys,

The primary advantage ot area bombing was seen as "dehousing" of the German workers that served them.

Mike:

The parallel in the Pacifc was the fire bombing of highly combustible Japanese cities. Workers tended to live near the factories they worked in, so you could land two blows at once.