Alternative history!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi:

Well it's time to delve into my good friend Kyle's favorite past time, "What if?" The reason being I was speculating on what the possible outcomes of a limited Japanese victory in the Pacific would be. Here's the scenario:

FDR is not reelected in 1940 and the US remains committed to ioslationism.
Pearl Harbor occurs, the carriers get nailed and the IJN overruns the Pacific.
Japan is able to build its defensive perimeter and the US is reluctant to assault it.
Peace negotiations begin.

Does the US insist on the return of the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island? Will Japan even consider this, or will this leave her vulnerable to a future war with the US?

Thoughts?

[old_pop2000]

Hi:

Well it's time to delve into my good friend Kyle's favorite past time, "What if?" The reason being I was speculating on what the possible outcomes of a limited Japanese victory in the Pacific would be. Here's the scenario:

FDR is not reelected in 1940 and the US remains committed to ioslationism.
Pearl Harbor occurs, the carriers get nailed and the IJN overruns the Pacific.
Japan is able to build its defensive perimeter and the US is reluctant to assault it.
Peace negotiations begin.

Does the US insist on the return of the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island? Will Japan even consider this, or will this leave her vulnerable to a future war with the US?

Thoughts?

With an electoral count of 449 for Roosevelt to 82 for Wendell Wilkie, I am having difficulty with this alternate history. However, he won the popular vote by 54.74% to 44.78%, so I am still not seeing any possibility of that occurring. But, having said that, ok Wendell Wilkie wins the election.

The question is how would the Wilkie administration handle the issue of Japanese aggression in China and the move south? Would they resist war if PH is attacked, not likely since the congress declares war, even without the president. If he balks, do they impeach, replace him and go after the japanese?

Second issue is the carriers. Which carriers? Saratoga was in San Diego, Yorktown on the east Coast with Ranger. That leaves, Lexington delivering airplanes to Midway and Enterprise returning from Wake Island. I would would guess that Enterprise is the most likely candidate. I believe that the pre-war instructions from Kimmel were that only one carrier was allowed in the harbor at one time, so the Big E has to be it.

Now, with Lexington, Saratoga, and Yorktown available to Nimitz( I assume that does not change) would Nimitz and King act any different? Would the Saratoga be torpedoed in January? Those are some detail questions I would ask?

Japan overrunning the Pacific? Well, they have to take New Guinea and Port Moresby first. However, the army is balking at the second phase of war that being the move down the Solomon's chain and heading towards Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia and Fiji to block Australia. I do not see assets to accomplish this feat for at least one year, possibly two. How does this work out?

Defensive perimeters take time to build and the Japanese has not reinforced or fortified the Mandates yet. Do they go after Midway and the Aleutians to extend that perimeter?

As to the peace negotiations, I go back to whether Wilkie is a pacifist or a warmonger, or just a realist.

Just a few questions that I believe are important.

[old_pop2000]

Wendell Wilkie was actually a democrat turned republican who supported the Roosevelt admistration in its domestic policies. Wilkie campaigned on the idea of more of the same but more of it and more effecient. He supported Roosevelt's European policies of aid to Britain. As far the Japanese, he was just as adamant about the Japanese getting out of China as Roosevelt. However, isolationist ferver was strong in the Congress and the only action that eliminated that was the attack on Pearl Harbor. As long as PH occurs, then the Congress, Republican Party and President Wilkie have to follow the path of war, they have no choice.:D

[john964]

With an electoral count of 449 for Roosevelt to 82 for Wendell Wilkie, I am having difficulty with this alternate history. However, he won the popular vote by 54.74% to 44.78%, so I am still not seeing any possibility of that occurring. But, having said that, ok Wendell Wilkie wins the election.

The question is how would the Wilkie administration handle the issue of Japanese aggression in China and the move south? Would they resist war if PH is attacked, not likely since the congress declares war, even without the president. If he balks, do they impeach, replace him and go after the japanese?

Second issue is the carriers. Which carriers? Saratoga was in San Diego, Yorktown on the east Coast with Ranger. That leaves, Lexington delivering airplanes to Midway and Enterprise returning from Wake Island. I would would guess that Enterprise is the most likely candidate. I believe that the pre-war instructions from Kimmel were that only one carrier was allowed in the harbor at one time, so the Big E has to be it.

Now, with Lexington, Saratoga, and Yorktown available to Nimitz( I assume that does not change) would Nimitz and King act any different? Would the Saratoga be torpedoed in January? Those are some detail questions I would ask?

Japan overrunning the Pacific? Well, they have to take New Guinea and Port Moresby first. However, the army is balking at the second phase of war that being the move down the Solomon's chain and heading towards Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia and Fiji to block Australia. I do not see assets to accomplish this feat for at least one year, possibly two. How does this work out?

Defensive perimeters take time to build and the Japanese has not reinforced or fortified the Mandates yet. Do they go after Midway and the Aleutians to extend that perimeter?

As to the peace negotiations, I go back to whether Wilkie is a pacifist or a warmonger, or just a realist.

Just a few questions that I believe are important.
You forgot Hornet she had just been commishioned when PH went down

[old_pop2000]

You forgot Hornet she had just been commishioned when PH went down
Thank you, but actually I did not forget Hornet. On December 7th, Hornet was in Norfolk fitting out with her squadrons awaiting the delivery of live ammunition for practice. The first carrier landings were not accomplished until the middle of December. She started her shakedown cruise on December 23, 1941. She returned to Norfolk on 31 January. She was ordered to the Pacific by Cominch on 20 February, 1942, sailing on 4 March, 1942. She docked in San Diego on 20 March, 1942. Her air wing, still did not have a complete complement of aircraft, so they operated out of North Island NAS. She drew new F4F-4's, discarded her biplane helldivers for SBD-3's and TBD's. She started carrier qualifications on 23 March, 1942. Her first war mission was the Doolittle Raid on which she sailed from San Francisco harbor on 2 April, 1942.

Do you still think I forgot her?

[Ed Rotondaro]

With an electoral count of 449 for Roosevelt to 82 for Wendell Wilkie, I am having difficulty with this alternate history. However, he won the popular vote by 54.74% to 44.78%, so I am still not seeing any possibility of that occurring. But, having said that, ok Wendell Wilkie wins the election.

The question is how would the Wilkie administration handle the issue of Japanese aggression in China and the move south? Would they resist war if PH is attacked, not likely since the congress declares war, even without the president. If he balks, do they impeach, replace him and go after the japanese?

Second issue is the carriers. Which carriers? Saratoga was in San Diego, Yorktown on the east Coast with Ranger. That leaves, Lexington delivering airplanes to Midway and Enterprise returning from Wake Island. I would would guess that Enterprise is the most likely candidate. I believe that the pre-war instructions from Kimmel were that only one carrier was allowed in the harbor at one time, so the Big E has to be it.

Now, with Lexington, Saratoga, and Yorktown available to Nimitz( I assume that does not change) would Nimitz and King act any different? Would the Saratoga be torpedoed in January? Those are some detail questions I would ask?

Japan overrunning the Pacific? Well, they have to take New Guinea and Port Moresby first. However, the army is balking at the second phase of war that being the move down the Solomon's chain and heading towards Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia and Fiji to block Australia. I do not see assets to accomplish this feat for at least one year, possibly two. How does this work out?

Defensive perimeters take time to build and the Japanese has not reinforced or fortified the Mandates yet. Do they go after Midway and the Aleutians to extend that perimeter?

As to the peace negotiations, I go back to whether Wilkie is a pacifist or a warmonger, or just a realist.

Just a few questions that I believe are important.


Dennis:

This points out most of the problems with alternative history, mainly that writers not historians just pull facts out of the air without understanding the underlying circumstances. To hone the debate further:

1. Whoever beats FDR in 1940 is a dedicated isolationist with no desire to get involved in China.

2. I'm not sure when FDR's policy of aiding Britain kicked in although I'm pretty sure it was in 1940. So let's assume he can't get that through Congress, No Lend Lease, how does this affect US re-armament?

3. The main question being if the US is in an even worse strategic position in mid-1942 and Japan offers peace terms, what does the US demand in return? Will it require all US possessions returned? Will it accept forced early independence of the Philippines? Will it defiantly create it own defense perimeter and gird itself for a long hard war? Personally all indications are that is what the US would do. I'm not sure any president could allow Pearl Harbor to go unavenged. The question is was FDR's determination the key, or was it the defining moment that historians like to point to? From discussions with WWII vets, I think it was the latter.

[Lancer]

Hell, the U.S. may have had an increased use of atomic bombs if it were cornered in a situation where the Japanese refuse any peace treaties, attempt to annex Hawaii, and use it as a staging base for engagements toward the U.S. west coast.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

This points out most of the problems with alternative history, mainly that writers not historians just pull facts out of the air without understanding the underlying circumstances. To hone the debate further:

1. Whoever beats FDR in 1940 is a dedicated isolationist with no desire to get involved in China.

2. I'm not sure when FDR's policy of aiding Britain kicked in although I'm pretty sure it was in 1940. So let's assume he can't get that through Congress, No Lend Lease, how does this affect US re-armament?

3. The main question being if the US is in an even worse strategic position in mid-1942 and Japan offers peace terms, what does the US demand in return? Will it require all US possessions returned? Will it accept forced early independence of the Philippines? Will it defiantly create it own defense perimeter and gird itself for a long hard war? Personally all indications are that is what the US would do. I'm not sure any president could allow Pearl Harbor to go unavenged. The question is was FDR's determination the key, or was it the defining moment that historians like to point to? From discussions with WWII vets, I think it was the latter.
This is one of my pet peeves against alternative history, the failure to review what happened and what could have happened. I like possible alternative courses that could have occurred, not fantasy.

What difference would it have made if the administration in the White House was passive? We did not control the situation, the Japanese did. Could we have backed off on our economic pressure? Would it have made any difference? No, the economic strangulation was not the reason they attacked and started the war. It was the fact that they realized that we were building up our navy and that this was the point in time when they had the best force ratio with us. After this, the force ratio increased in our favor. That is why the war started in 1941.

So, does changing the administration to an avowed isolationist really have a bearing on whether a war is fostered on us. I don't think so. We have to stop the build up of arms, that was started by the Vinson Navy Bill. The real issues of the arms buildup occurs almost five years before 1940 with the failure of the 1935 Naval treaty.

My point is that just stopping Lend-Lease or changing the administration to an isolationist probably would never have assuaged the Japanese from attacking us. Even if we completely withdrew all the economic sanctions and threw China to the wolves.

The problem in 1940 was not the US but the Imperial Japanese Navy and the government that supported it bellicose attitudes. Change that attitude and maybe, things would have been different.

[Kyle Holgate]

the economic strangulation was not the reason they attacked and started the war. It was the fact that they realized that we were building up our navy and that this was the point in time when they had the best force ratio with us. After this, the force ratio increased in our favor. That is why the war started in 1941. .

Many historians would beg to differ with you here, and though I won't say you're wrong can't say I've seen much to support this view. I have seen more evidence supporting that much of the Japanese decision to go to war was due to their projections of when they'd be out of vital supplies and be unable to make war.

[old_pop2000]

At a liaison Conference held on 21 July 1941, The Navy Minister Admiral Nagano stated "Although there is now a chance of achieving victory, the chance will diminish as time goes by.... the United States will probably prolong the [Hull-Nomura] negotiations until it has completed its naval preparations.....Accordingly, with the passage of time, the Empire will be put up with a mounting disadvantage. Moreover, if we occupy the Philippines, it will be easier, from the navy's point of view, to carry on the war"..

Vice Chief Kondo stated "If we don't start war now, we shall be 'gradually pauperized,' until finally we don't have the slightest chance of success. The strength of air power in the Philippines is about a third that of japan now and we must strike before it becomes one half that of Japan. if they further reinforce their buildup, we won't be able to cope with it."

After this conference and these statements, Japan advance into Indochina and this prompted the US response of an oil embargo. The embargo took effect on 1 August 1941. The Navy Ministry made a new assessment of oil supplies and the demand for petroleum. If the embargo continued, the consumption of oil would exceed the supply in the first year of the war. Oil supplies would be exhausted in the middle of the second year of war. This prompted an acceleration in the war preparations. The Japanese Naval Ministry insisted that Japan must "plunge into war". Mobilization of the fleet would be completed by 25 October 1941. After this, everything set in stone, Combined fleet would launch the pre-emptive attack and the war was on.

Pay attention to the timeline. The embargo which threatened their oil supply came after the intent to start the war due to the force ratio between the US and the Japanese, not before. The oil embargo only accelerated the war preparations, but did not initiate them. The decision to go to war was made on the basis of the current favorable force ratio between our fleet and the IJN.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hell, the U.S. may have had an increased use of atomic bombs if it were cornered in a situation where the Japanese refuse any peace treaties, attempt to annex Hawaii, and use it as a staging base for engagements toward the U.S. west coast.


Lancer:

No A-bombs in 1942 OK? No IJN trying to attempt a Hawaiian invasion (totally unable to support the forces ashore). What does a "demoralized" US do if offered terms in 1942? Let's try to stay on the admittedly weak background here?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hell, the U.S. may have had an increased use of atomic bombs if it were cornered in a situation where the Japanese refuse any peace treaties, attempt to annex Hawaii, and use it as a staging base for engagements toward the U.S. west coast.


Lancer:

No A-bombs in 1942 OK? No IJN trying to attempt a Hawaiian invasion (totally unable to support the forces a shore). What does a "demoralized" US do if offered terms in 1942? Let's try to stay on the admittedly weak background here?

[Ed Rotondaro]

This is one of my pet peeves against alternative history, the failure to review what happened and what could have happened. I like possible alternative courses that could have occurred, not fantasy.

What difference would it have made if the administration in the White House was passive? We did not control the situation, the Japanese did. Could we have backed off on our economic pressure? Would it have made any difference? No, the economic strangulation was not the reason they attacked and started the war. It was the fact that they realized that we were building up our navy and that this was the point in time when they had the best force ratio with us. After this, the force ratio increased in our favor. That is why the war started in 1941.

So, does changing the administration to an avowed isolationist really have a bearing on whether a war is fostered on us. I don't think so. We have to stop the build up of arms, that was started by the Vinson Navy Bill. The real issues of the arms buildup occurs almost five years before 1940 with the failure of the 1935 Naval treaty.

My point is that just stopping Lend-Lease or changing the administration to an isolationist probably would never have assuaged the Japanese from attacking us. Even if we completely withdrew all the economic sanctions and threw China to the wolves.

The problem in 1940 was not the US but the Imperial Japanese Navy and the government that supported it bellicose attitudes. Change that attitude and maybe, things would have been different.


Dennis:

Sorry I don't buy that at all and agree with Kyle here. No US embargo or freezing of assets, no Japan ready to go crazy. Why would they? If they can get what they what, why drag the US into a war they can't win? The key factor that kicked Japan into war mode with the US was the oil embargo. Period! Knowing they would only have one year of oil reserves made the Japanese chose suicide.

[Ed Rotondaro]

At a liaison Conference held on 21 July 1941, The Navy Minister Admiral Nagano stated "Although there is now a chance of achieving victory, the chance will diminish as time goes by.... the United States will probably prolong the [Hull-Nomura] negotiations until it has completed its naval preparations.....Accordingly, with the passage of time, the Empire will be put up with a mounting disadvantage. Moreover, if we occupy the Philippines, it will be easier, from the navy's point of view, to carry on the war"..

Vice Chief Kondo stated "If we don't start war now, we shall be 'gradually pauperized,' until finally we don't have the slightest chance of success. The strength of air power in the Philippines is about a third that of japan now and we must strike before it becomes one half that of Japan. if they further reinforce their buildup, we won't be able to cope with it."

After this conference and these statements, Japan advance into Indochina and this prompted the US response of an oil embargo. The embargo took effect on 1 August 1941. The Navy Ministry made a new assessment of oil supplies and the demand for petroleum. If the embargo continued, the consumption of oil would exceed the supply in the first year of the war. Oil supplies would be exhausted in the middle of the second year of war. This prompted an acceleration in the war preparations. The Japanese Naval Ministry insisted that Japan must "plunge into war". Mobilization of the fleet would be completed by 25 October 1941. After this, everything set in stone, Combined fleet would launch the pre-emptive attack and the war was on.

Pay attention to the timeline. The embargo which threatened their oil supply came after the intent to start the war due to the force ratio between the US and the Japanese, not before. The oil embargo only accelerated the war preparations, but did not initiate them. The decision to go to war was made on the basis of the current favorable force ratio between our fleet and the IJN.


Dennis:


That's really nothing more than the IJN version of War Plan Orange. If we have to go to war here's what we will face. I agree that a lot of factors influenced the decision, but bottom line, it was a stalemate in China and a joint materials embargo that pushed Japan over the edge.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Sorry I don't buy that at all and agree with Kyle here. No US embargo or freezing of assets, no Japan ready to go crazy. Why would they? If they can get what they what, why drag the US into a war they can't win? The key factor that kicked Japan into war mode with the US was the oil embargo. Period! Knowing they would only have one year of oil reserves made the Japanese chose suicide.

Have any of you heard the term "economic determinism". This theory was central the ideas of a man, the Japanese had held in high regard. So much so, that they translated his books and made them required reading. It was Alfred Thayer Mahan. One aspect of his theory was the evitability of conflict between two powerful maritime nations. This was the Japanese source of their fatalistic notion that war with the US was inevitable. The war over China was thought to be inevitable by both sides. Mahan 's ideas of naval sea power pushed the IJN to extract higher and higher budgetary considerations over the Army for most of the 1920's and 1930's leading up to the war.

Most of the raw material problems facing the Japanese were requirements that were destined for the IJN alone. The Japanese industry could actually fund the requirements for raw materials, yet the japanese annexed Manchuria, next Jehol then they invaded China. Why! To carve out an empire and relieve themselves of dependency on foreign sources. It was a militarist idea. This attitude was almost certainly pushing them towards a confrontation with the largest power in the region, the US.

But the one pure motive, for starting the war, at the time they chose, was not economic. It was a simply fact that they realized that war was inevitable, based on their logic, and that the balance of forces was in their favor, at this time. This was the only reason for the IJN. The creation of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity sphere was the farthest thing from the IJN's mind, when the decision was made.

Anyway, I shall not attempt to convince anyone, I've made my case. There are books available that present the facts and supporting material that can present the case better.

[Kyle Holgate]

Anyway, I shall not attempt to convince anyone, I've made my case. There are books available that present the facts and supporting material that can present the case better.

Hmm. Let's try to be clear here and be sure I am interpreting this arguement correctly.

What I believe is being said is that the Japanese chose to go to war because of the naval and economic force ratio alone.

Unfortunately you have time to spend on finding supportive arguements and I don't. All I can say in answer, and take it for what it's worth - is that having read The rising sun, At dawn we slept, Eagle against the sun, The IJN in WW2 and probably a dozen other books on the subject I have never heard the naval force ratio as "THE" reason for actually determining to start the war - as in the one thing that made it inevitable (assuming that is what you are saying Dennis). It was piece of their reasoning along with other "pieces" such as the enconimic sanctions and what not brought to a critical boil in the end by the oil embargo. The latter there being what clinched it not what started it.

[old_pop2000]

Hmm. Let's try to be clear here and be sure I am interpreting this arguement correctly.

What I believe is being said is that the Japanese chose to go to war because of the naval and economic force ratio alone.

Unfortunately you have time to spend on finding supportive arguements and I don't. All I can say in answer, and take it for what it's worth - is that having read The rising sun, At dawn we slept, Eagle against the sun, The IJN in WW2 and probably a dozen other books on the subject I have never heard the naval force ratio as "THE" reason for actually determining to start the war - as in the one thing that made it inevitable (assuming that is what you are saying Dennis). It was piece of their reasoning along with other "pieces" such as the enconimic sanctions and what not brought to a critical boil in the end by the oil embargo. The latter there being what clinched it not what started it.
I've read those books, but they do not completely explore the Japanese side. Suggest you read "From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" By Sadao Asado. It is very illuminating. I would agree, that without that book, I would be in total agreement with you, but after that book, I realized that there was more to this story. I would like to hear from all of you, who do read this book. Maybe I am missing something. But, I think most US authors have viewed the Japanese position incorrectly. I could be wrong and am really interested to hear from others who had read it.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hmm. Let's try to be clear here and be sure I am interpreting this arguement correctly.

What I believe is being said is that the Japanese chose to go to war because of the naval and economic force ratio alone.

Unfortunately you have time to spend on finding supportive arguements and I don't. All I can say in answer, and take it for what it's worth - is that having read The rising sun, At dawn we slept, Eagle against the sun, The IJN in WW2 and probably a dozen other books on the subject I have never heard the naval force ratio as "THE" reason for actually determining to start the war - as in the one thing that made it inevitable (assuming that is what you are saying Dennis). It was piece of their reasoning along with other "pieces" such as the enconimic sanctions and what not brought to a critical boil in the end by the oil embargo. The latter there being what clinched it not what started it.

Hi Guys,

That's an interesting point. What if there had been no oil embargo to tip the scales? When would the japanese strike? The avalanche of new ships from teh USN would be taking to the water in the fall of 1942. Not much of a window for success. It's clear from Asada's book, that the Washington treaty infuriated a large portion of the Japanese Navy's officer corps when accepted. They were clearly aware of US production capability and the implementation of the Two Ocean navy bills and at some time in the near future, the Japanese would be facing a numerically superior USN in the Pacific. That would be a powerful argument to strike first. How much "economic determinism" played is unclear. A good portion of the navy had no vision of economic reality. Had Japan gone ahead with the post WW I naval race, they would have exhausted themselves financially and been unable to match the building capabilites of England, let alone the US. Even by 1941, the Japanese industrial base was unable to sustain a concerted war effort in terms of quantity, quality, or technological advancement.

Considering how grossly uniformed the Japanese were about the US, the rationales for are moot. It was the equivalent of national Hara Kiri.

[Kyle Holgate]

I've read those books, but they do not completely explore the Japanese side. Suggest you read "From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" By Sadao Asado. It is very illuminating. I would agree, that without that book, I would be in total agreement with you, but after that book, I realized that there was more to this story. I would like to hear from all of you, who do read this book. Maybe I am missing something. But, I think most US authors have viewed the Japanese position incorrectly. I could be wrong and am really interested to hear from others who had read it.

I'll have to dig up a copy! Not trying to be stubborn here my friend - just asking: What is it about this book that would lead you to believe it without substantiation from other sources? Is it pretty convincing or ???. I know there are plenty of myths about the war that get passed along over and over until they are taken for fact. Some books are convincing enough by themselves to make me change my mind about "facts" - such as Parshall's Midway book. Is this one of those books that stands out by itself enough to make one change their views?

[old_pop2000]

I have never viewed your questioning as stubborn. I believe that this is the first real investigation into the internal workings and decisions of the IJN and the government prior to the war. We have always heard the US side and its interpretation of events. But this is the first exploration, outside of Japan, into the actual events and decision making process using the words of the Japanese leaders.

I hope, that with this book and Miller's new book that more authors will explore the truth about how the Pacific War started and why.

But, have an open mind. Read this book, Miller's new book and see if you believe that this was not just economics, it was naked aggression. You may have a different viewpoint.

[Kyle Holgate]

I have never viewed your questioning as stubborn. I believe that this is the first real investigation into the internal workings and decisions of the IJN and the government prior to the war. We have always heard the US side and its interpretation of events. But this is the first exploration, outside of Japan, into the actual events and decision making process using the words of the Japanese leaders.

I hope, that with this book and Miller's new book that more authors will explore the truth about how the Pacific War started and why.

But, have an open mind. Read this book, Miller's new book and see if you believe that this was not just economics, it was naked aggression. You may have a different viewpoint.

I've been known to be stubborn :cool:. In this case though I concede you're view from this book may well be correct, I'm going to take some convincing to change my mind. Usually one book won't do that, but it's happened! Let's just say I start out skeptical when something seems to contradict a well supported view.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Have any of you heard the term "economic determinism". This theory was central the ideas of a man, the Japanese had held in high regard. So much so, that they translated his books and made them required reading. It was Alfred Thayer Mahan. One aspect of his theory was the evitability of conflict between two powerful maritime nations. This was the Japanese source of their fatalistic notion that war with the US was inevitable. The war over China was thought to be inevitable by both sides. Mahan 's ideas of naval sea power pushed the IJN to extract higher and higher budgetary considerations over the Army for most of the 1920's and 1930's leading up to the war.

Most of the raw material problems facing the Japanese were requirements that were destined for the IJN alone. The Japanese industry could actually fund the requirements for raw materials, yet the japanese annexed Manchuria, next Jehol then they invaded China. Why! To carve out an empire and relieve themselves of dependency on foreign sources. It was a militarist idea. This attitude was almost certainly pushing them towards a confrontation with the largest power in the region, the US.

But the one pure motive, for starting the war, at the time they chose, was not economic. It was a simply fact that they realized that war was inevitable, based on their logic, and that the balance of forces was in their favor, at this time. This was the only reason for the IJN. The creation of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity sphere was the farthest thing from the IJN's mind, when the decision was made.

Anyway, I shall not attempt to convince anyone, I've made my case. There are books available that present the facts and supporting material that can present the case better.

Dennis:

In his book "The Pacific Campaign", Dan van der Vat argues that the Japanese wanted "autarky" which is defined as a closed economy where they would not be dependent on outside sources for raw materials, etc. They saw the imperial powers of the world and being the last to join colonial club, they wanted to have overseas colonies. They also were angry with the perceived slight of the Washington Naval Treaty as an affront to their national honor. Obviously there is no one cause for the war in the Pacific, but Japan's main reason for chosing the time and place to start it were definitely due to the considerations that the nation only had about 18 months worth of oil left in 1941. The oil embargo in July of 1941 was the straw that broke the camel's back. The war in China was stalemated and without the resources of the Southern Resource area as Indonesia, Malaya and Borneo were referred to, Japan could not carry on her war. Surrender or even honest negotiation were unthinkable.

I've not read Miller's book, but will agree that the economic pressures on Japan certainly influenced her thinking, especially in regards to the concept of autarky. But I think that the timing of the start of the war had as much to do with Russia being invaded and on the verge of collapse and Britain no longer being in a position to protect her colonies in Asia. While war appears inevitable in hindsight, Japan did make several attempts to find a diplomatic solution (albeit they were not in good faith or even remotely realistic. Sort of remins me of their half-hearted attempts to end the war in 1945 by negotiation).

[old_pop2000]

The oil embargo and the calculations concerning oil availability were only applicable to the IJN during war. It was calculated that, if the Japanese waited, they would run out of oil in the middle of the second year. However, the oil embargo was a result of their desire to move into Indochina which they knew would spark the war. They also knew that they had to strike in 1941 before the force ratio changed in our favor. The primary reason to strike in 1941 was decided before the embargo, not after.

[Kyle Holgate]

The oil embargo and the calculations concerning oil availability were only applicable to the IJN during war. It was calculated that, if the Japanese waited, they would run out of oil in the middle of the second year. However, the oil embargo was a result of their desire to move into Indochina which they knew would spark the war. They also knew that they had to strike in 1941 before the force ratio changed in our favor. The primary reason to strike in 1941 was decided before the embargo, not after.

I think we're in a quandry here. Dennis has a book I don't that supports the view that the Japanese went to war for reasons dealing with the projected military force ratio of the USN.
Just one book I have handy seems to not necessariliy controdict this, but suggests that what I think is the prevailing view may be more probable - that force ratio was a piece of the reasoning for war, not THE reason.
The Rising Sun, John Toland:

"Japan had secured the bases in Indochina by negotiation with Vichy France, a country recognized if not approved by America, and international law was on their side; the freezing was teh last step in the encirclement of the empire by the ABDC powers, a denial to Japan of her rightful place as leader of Asia and a challenge to her very existance."

The embargo set after this was a serious match set under the Japanese powder They took this as a direct and obvious threat.

Again, from Rising sun...

"Naval Chief of staff Nagano in an audience with the Emporor warned that Japan's oil stock would only last for two years, and once war came 18 months, and concluded, "under the circumstances, we had better take the initiative. We will win"

This is just one book of many that appears to support the Oil+economics+military force ratio position. I don't feel like spending hours to find more to support this view but I can.

So the question to Dennis - why is this book you're mentioning convince you? I have to admit Parshall's book in a single move de-bunked a bunch of things I had previously believed about the Midway battle. And that's a case where a single book changed my opinion in spite of several controdictory texts. Is this the case here Dennis? Is the book you mention that good? What is it that leads you to believe it over other texts which appear to controdict it? Why is this one right and the others are all wrong - there must be something pretty convincing. Maybe I'm just being too skeptical here, but like any scientific theory - if one is held by the majority and someone comes up with an alternate - it takes a bit of convincing! :o (gotta get a copy of that book!!!).

[old_pop2000]

I think we're in a quandry here. Dennis has a book I don't that supports the view that the Japanese went to war for reasons dealing with the projected military force ratio of the USN.
Just one book I have handy seems to not necessariliy controdict this, but suggests that what I think is the prevailing view may be more probable - that force ratio was a piece of the reasoning for war, not THE reason.
The Rising Sun, John Toland:

"Japan had secured the bases in Indochina by negotiation with Vichy France, a country recognized if not approved by America, and international law was on their side; the freezing was teh last step in the encirclement of the empire by the ABDC powers, a denial to Japan of her rightful place as leader of Asia and a challenge to her very existance."

The embargo set after this was a serious match set under the Japanese powder They took this as a direct and obvious threat.

Again, from Rising sun...

"Naval Chief of staff Nagano in an audience with the Emporor warned that Japan's oil stock would only last for two years, and once war came 18 months, and concluded, "under the circumstances, we had better take the initiative. We will win"

This is just one book of many that appears to support the Oil+economics+military force ratio position. I don't feel like spending hours to find more to support this view but I can.

So the question to Dennis - why is this book you're mentioning convince you? I have to admit Parshall's book in a single move de-bunked a bunch of things I had previously believed about the Midway battle. And that's a case where a single book changed my opinion in spite of several controdictory texts. Is this the case here Dennis? Is the book you mention that good? What is it that leads you to believe it over other texts which appear to controdict it? Why is this one right and the others are all wrong - there must be something pretty convincing. Maybe I'm just being too skeptical here, but like any scientific theory - if one is held by the majority and someone comes up with an alternate - it takes a bit of convincing! :o (gotta get a copy of that book!!!).

John Toland's book, Rising Sun, was written in 1969, before the Japanese Historical society had finished their complete history of the war from the Japanese side. Asado's book is new and uses documentation not available to Toland.

However, a better reason is that Toland, along with Fuzzy Theobald was a revisionist. He believed that Roosevelt had known about the attack and wanted it. He made the case by showing that his pre-war actions including the embargo were designed to force the Japanese into war, so he could help England. His information in Rising Sun is designed to set the stage for that belief. Toland had to make the US and Roosevelt the heavy, to make his case of prior knowledge of the coming sneak attack. Prange, Henry Clausen and other including Asado have basically debunked that theory years ago.

That's why I believe Asado. He places the blame squarely on the IJN and their hatred of the US and England after the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty.

[Kyle Holgate]

John Toland's book, Rising Sun, was written in 1969, before the Japanese Historical society had finished their complete history of the war from the Japanese side. Asado's book is new and uses documentation not available to Toland.

However, a better reason is that Toland, along with Fuzzy Theobald was a revisionist. He believed that Roosevelt had known about the attack and wanted it. He made the case by showing that his pre-war actions including the embargo were designed to force the Japanese into war, so he could help England. His information in Rising Sun is designed to set the stage for that belief. Toland had to make the US and Roosevelt the heavy, to make his case of prior knowledge of the coming sneak attack. Prange, Henry Clausen and other including Asado have basically debunked that theory years ago.

That's why I believe Asado. He places the blame squarely on the IJN and their hatred of the US and England after the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty.

I just chose rising sun as a handy reference - as I said there are a lot more supportive texts. Once again - I can't see how one book can completely change the overall view of why the war started. I obviously don't have it and so haven't read it - but I think I am exersising healthy skeptisism here. On Toland specifially - unless he chooses to totally lie or mis-quote people - events still support the "multi-reason" viewpoint for the Japanese starting the war. You've obviously formed an opinon on Toland - how do you know the author of the book you're citing may not have some agenda too? IF (for example) 20 books say one thing and 1 says another, that 1 book had better have some really, really good evidence to support why I should believe it over the others.
I like multiple sources corroborating things when I can find them. I have learned that multiple sources can all be wrong though too - so you could very well be right on the ball here! It's just a big enough about face in what I thought was true for me to find it hard to put a lot of weight into.:cool:

[Ed Rotondaro]

John Toland's book, Rising Sun, was written in 1969, before the Japanese Historical society had finished their complete history of the war from the Japanese side. Asado's book is new and uses documentation not available to Toland.

However, a better reason is that Toland, along with Fuzzy Theobald was a revisionist. He believed that Roosevelt had known about the attack and wanted it. He made the case by showing that his pre-war actions including the embargo were designed to force the Japanese into war, so he could help England. His information in Rising Sun is designed to set the stage for that belief. Toland had to make the US and Roosevelt the heavy, to make his case of prior knowledge of the coming sneak attack. Prange, Henry Clausen and other including Asado have basically debunked that theory years ago.

That's why I believe Asado. He places the blame squarely on the IJN and their hatred of the US and England after the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty.

Dennis:

I was not aware that Toland was that much of a revisionist and like yourself I reject the FDR conspiracy theory regarding Pearl Harbor. What is the title of Asado's book again? Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I was not aware that Toland was that much of a revisionist and like yourself I reject the FDR conspiracy theory regarding Pearl Harbor. What is the title of Asado's book again? Thanks.
"From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States" by Sadao Asado.

I am waiting for Edward S. Miller's new book on the economic aspects of the conflict between the US and Japan prior to the attack on PH.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thanks Dennis, I appreciate that. I am looking forward to Miller's book. If anyone can explain the economics of the pre-war US Japanese dynamic, it's him. He's not just a good historian, he's a good writer as well!

[Kyle Holgate]

"From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States" by Sadao Asado.

I am waiting for Edward S. Miller's new book on the economic aspects of the conflict between the US and Japan prior to the attack on PH.

Typo - Asada not Asado. Just checking for it on That book company named after the largest river in South america. Probably should see if Chris can dig me up a copy first though...

[john964]

Dennis:

I was not aware that Toland was that much of a revisionist and like yourself I reject the FDR conspiracy theory regarding Pearl Harbor. What is the title of Asado's book again? Thanks.
You should read some of the more outrageious PH conspiricy theories. Including one that the RN actully did it using captured japenese aircraft off of british carriers.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You should read some of the more outrageious PH conspiricy theories. Including one that the RN actully did it using captured japenese aircraft off of british carriers.


Kyle:

That is beyond funny. I read an excellent essay that debunks the whole idea of Britain withholding information about PH. Churchill had previously met with FDR and they come to an understanding that the USN would help protect British holdings in the Far East. In fact Churchill pretty much said "We're counting on your fleet". Now does this square with letting the USN's Pacific Fleet get clobbered?

[clacton2]

You should read some of the more outrageious PH conspiricy theories. Including one that the RN actully did it using captured japenese aircraft off of british carriers.


Hi,
There are quite a few of these conspiracy theories flying around, but I think they are all fantasy and do not bear up to any real scrutiny.
Obviously we wanted the U.S. in the war on our side, but I don't think we would have stooped that low.
Jon:eek:

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi,
There are quite a few of these conspiracy theories flying around, but I think they are all fantasy and do not bear up to any real scrutiny.
Obviously we wanted the U.S. in the war on our side, but I don't think we would have stooped that low.
Jon:eek:

Jon:

It is interesting to note that FDR didn't want a war with Japan, he wanted one with Germany. His own admirals told him that the USN would not be ready for a war in the Pacific until late 1942 at best. It is also important to keep in mind that FDR only declared war on Japan. That's all he asked from Congress. Indeed Churchill was a little worried that the US might not go to war with Germany and Italy. Fortunately Hitler and Mussolini saved him the trouble and declared war on the US.

[Kyle Holgate]

Jon:

It is interesting to note that FDR didn't want a war with Japan, he wanted one with Germany. His own admirals told him that the USN would not be ready for a war in the Pacific until late 1942 at best. It is also important to keep in mind that FDR only declared war on Japan. That's all he asked from Congress. Indeed Churchill was a little worried that the US might not go to war with Germany and Italy. Fortunately Hitler and Mussolini saved him the trouble and declared war on the US.

That's one of my favorite alternate history scenarios - Hitler gets a brain cell and does not declare war on the US. Seems not unlike him, he gets in a froth because the Japanese didn't warn him about the plan so he decides to leave them in the cold - and puts out a statement about how dastardly the surprise attack was and that Germany sends condolences to the families of those killed in the attack.

[Ed Rotondaro]

That's one of my favorite alternate history scenarios - Hitler gets a brain cell and does not declare war on the US. Seems not unlike him, he gets in a froth because the Japanese didn't warn him about the plan so he decides to leave them in the cold - and puts out a statement about how dastardly the surprise attack was and that Germany sends condolences to the families of those killed in the attack.

Kyle:

I imagine that FDR would probably try and manufacture a reason to go to war with the other Axis nations. At the very least he could direct the USN to help convoy ships (which they were in fact already doing, but be more aggressive and start sailing all the way to Great Britain. Perhaps even demonstrate that Germany and Japan were closely cooperating (even though they weren't.) But Hitler might by diplomacy have been able to stave off a direct conflcit with the US for over a year.

Another possible scenario for the US is to recognize the Free French under whoever and consider Vichy France an aggressor. Then declare war on Vichy France and invade North Africa. Although selling that to Congress would be difficult. Hitler made it very easy for FDR to get what he wanted, in fact it would be interesting to see if the triple declarations of war helped pull this country even more tightly together? I know from talking to members of family that served, there was a sense of grim unity and absolutely no thoughts of peace.

[asnrobert]

I imagine that FDR would probably try and manufacture a reason to go to war with the other Axis nations. At the very least he could direct the USN to help convoy ships (which they were in fact already doing, but be more aggressive and start sailing all the way to Great Britain. Perhaps even demonstrate that Germany and Japan were closely cooperating (even though they weren't.) But Hitler might by diplomacy have been able to stave off a direct conflcit with the US for over a year.

Another possible scenario for the US is to recognize the Free French under whoever and consider Vichy France an aggressor. Then declare war on Vichy France and invade North Africa. Although selling that to Congress would be difficult. Hitler made it very easy for FDR to get what he wanted, in fact it would be interesting to see if the triple declarations of war helped pull this country even more tightly together? I know from talking to members of family that served, there was a sense of grim unity and absolutely no thoughts of peace.


Here's a thought: if we went to war with Japan but not Germany and Italy, how would that affect Lend-Lease? Would the American public and Congress approve of sending badly needed supplies to those who were not at war with Japan? And with the American fleet badly punished at Pearl Harbor, would we still be using our navy to escort Atlantic convoys?

[clacton2]

That's one of my favorite alternate history scenarios - Hitler gets a brain cell and does not declare war on the US. Seems not unlike him, he gets in a froth because the Japanese didn't warn him about the plan so he decides to leave them in the cold - and puts out a statement about how dastardly the surprise attack was and that Germany sends condolences to the families of those killed in the attack.

Hi,
Fortunately in matters diplomatic, Hitler did not have many brain cells!!
Good for us, bad for him!!
Jon:confused:

[Ed Rotondaro]

Here's a thought: if we went to war with Japan but not Germany and Italy, how would that affect Lend-Lease? Would the American public and Congress approve of sending badly needed supplies to those who were not at war with Japan? And with the American fleet badly punished at Pearl Harbor, would we still be using our navy to escort Atlantic convoys?

Robert:

Interesting thoughts, but I am inclinded to believe that at least some Lend Lease efforts would have continued since the US and Britain were co-belligerents against Japan. I do believe that if we were not at war with Germany, Admiral King would have made sure that the bulk of the US navy was in the Pacific, since the U-boats would not be operating right off of US shores as they did in Operation Drumbeat.

[old_pop2000]

Robert:

Interesting thoughts, but I am inclinded to believe that at least some Lend Lease efforts would have continued since the US and Britain were co-belligerents against Japan. I do believe that if we were not at war with Germany, Admiral King would have made sure that the bulk of the US navy was in the Pacific, since the U-boats would not be operating right off of US shores as they did in Operation Drumbeat.
I would tend to believe that if Hitler did not follow through with his promise to declare war on the US, if Japan attacked us, then that would cause some real problems for the Japanese in the Pacific. However, in reality, his declaration of war, really did not affect Japanese actions in the Pacific. They were Allies in name only, with only a little technical assistance.

I don't see much changing, as King was more concerned about the Pacific, this would only fuel those fires. He was also an anglophobe, so this might have worked to his advantage. He could move all the heavy ships to the West coast, instead of helping the British.

[asnrobert]

Robert:

Interesting thoughts, but I am inclinded to believe that at least some Lend Lease efforts would have continued since the US and Britain were co-belligerents against Japan. I do believe that if we were not at war with Germany, Admiral King would have made sure that the bulk of the US navy was in the Pacific, since the U-boats would not be operating right off of US shores as they did in Operation Drumbeat.


I agree that if Britain still went to war with Japan as they did historically, then we still would have given them Lend-Lease (although perhaps not as much as historically). I think that the Soviets, OTOH, would have been out of luck.

[clacton2]

I agree that if Britain still went to war with Japan as they did historically, then we still would have given them Lend-Lease (although perhaps not as much as historically). I think that the Soviets, OTOH, would have been out of luck.

Hi Guys,
This is really outside my comfort zone of knowledge, so I was just wondering whether some of you clever people could enlighten me as to the following:
I know that Lend-Lease was invaluable to us here in the U.K., but of how much use was it in real terms to the Russians?
Was it more for morale purposes to show we were all in it together and would help each other, or did it have practical value as well. I know they were supplied with lots of trucks which were useful, but how much else of what was sent was really used or useful ( ie: tanks, aircraft etc ) in a meaningful way?
I also know that our servicemen and merchant navy personnel were not treated particularly well on arrival, so were the Arctic convoys nothing more than a useful distraction of the German forces to the Russians? or did they really need the cargoes?
Thanks in anticipation of your replies.
Jon:confused:

[old_pop2000]

Hi Guys,
This is really outside my comfort zone of knowledge, so I was just wondering whether some of you clever people could enlighten me as to the following:
I know that Lend-Lease was invaluable to us here in the U.K., but of how much use was it in real terms to the Russians?
Was it more for morale purposes to show we were all in it together and would help each other, or did it have practical value as well. I know they were supplied with lots of trucks which were useful, but how much else of what was sent was really used or useful ( ie: tanks, aircraft etc ) in a meaningful way?
I also know that our servicemen and merchant navy personnel were not treated particularly well on arrival, so were the Arctic convoys nothing more than a useful distraction of the German forces to the Russians? or did they really need the cargoes?
Thanks in anticipation of your replies.
Jon:confused:
US aid to Russian was of great importance. But we sent them more than finished products like P-39 fighters, studebaker trucks. We sent the foodstuffs, mineral resources.

We sent them $4.6 Billion dollars worth of munitions. Total relief effort was $11 billion dollars. There is no official manifest in the US government for the total list of goods and services. The only list is from the Russian's themselves, developed by a Major Jordan.

A very rudimentary list of goods and services included:

Lathes - 3360
Surface Grinders -6608
Milling Machines -3308


Single engined fighters 1701
Twin engined transports 287
Aircraft Nav. Instu. 4402
Railway Freight Cars -2478

Those are just some of the items we gave them.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Guys,
This is really outside my comfort zone of knowledge, so I was just wondering whether some of you clever people could enlighten me as to the following:
I know that Lend-Lease was invaluable to us here in the U.K., but of how much use was it in real terms to the Russians?
Was it more for morale purposes to show we were all in it together and would help each other, or did it have practical value as well. I know they were supplied with lots of trucks which were useful, but how much else of what was sent was really used or useful ( ie: tanks, aircraft etc ) in a meaningful way?
I also know that our servicemen and merchant navy personnel were not treated particularly well on arrival, so were the Arctic convoys nothing more than a useful distraction of the German forces to the Russians? or did they really need the cargoes?
Thanks in anticipation of your replies.
Jon:confused:

Jon:

Dennis has broken down the Lend Lease material far better than I could. Two points to note:

Trucks, trains and machine tools were probably more useful and vital to the Soviet effort than the tanks and planes sent.

Secondly, while Soviet tanks were superior in most instances to what the US and Britain sent, there was a period from June 1941 to the onset of the Stalingrad campaign where the Russia army was strapped for tanks. Even the less effective US tanks could at least stop gap less active fronts and allow the Russians to transfrer their T-34s and KV-1s to the more critical areas.

[clacton2]

US aid to Russian was of great importance. But we sent them more than finished products like P-39 fighters, studebaker trucks. We sent the foodstuffs, mineral resources.

We sent them $4.6 Billion dollars worth of munitions. Total relief effort was $11 billion dollars. There is no official manifest in the US government for the total list of goods and services. The only list is from the Russian's themselves, developed by a Major Jordan.

A very rudimentary list of goods and services included:

Lathes - 3360
Surface Grinders -6608
Milling Machines -3308


Single engined fighters 1701
Twin engined transports 287
Aircraft Nav. Instu. 4402
Railway Freight Cars -2478

Those are just some of the items we gave them.

Dennis and Ed,
Thanks for that, I appreciate your help.
Jon:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis and Ed,
Thanks for that, I appreciate your help.
Jon:D


It's always a pleasure to correspond with a forum friend.