HMGs on the modern European battlefield.. how lethal could they have been?

[Warship NWS]

Why bring this up? Simple.. we had a previous discussion about the vulnerability of the BMP-1 to HMG fire through its side armor on the old forums. So, with all of those thousands of light armored vehicles the Russians would have been plowing through Germany if a war started there between the 1960s and 1980s how many of their vehicles would have been seriously vulnerable to the extensively available .50cal HMG? We armed virtually every armored vehicle with this very potent gun but few wargames really consider how lethal this gun may have been to the Russians IMHO by possibly underrating its armor penetration capability even though it was capable of firing a wide range of ammunition. How would it have stacked up to the 12.7mm and 14.5mm HMGs?

Overall.. we hear about the tank guns and missiles on the modern battlefield although they had the shortest amount of combat endurance time.. 40 or so rounds of tank gun rounds or 4-6 ATGMs. These would run out fairly fast in a major armored clash.. and then your down the HMGs at times. How deadly would they have been BEFORE autocannons were widely used by IFVs.. and then after?

With that much lead flying around from the HMGs it would be curious to think of the possible carnage they may have created. What do you all think? Have fun. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Why bring this up? Simple.. we had a previous discussion about the vulnerability of the BMP-1 to HMG fire through its side armor on the old forums. So, with all of those thousands of light armored vehicles the Russians would have been plowing through Germany if a war started there between the 1960s and 1980s how many of their vehicles would have been seriously vulnerable to the extensively available .50cal HMG? We armed virtually every armored vehicle with this very potent gun but few wargames really consider how lethal this gun may have been to the Russians IMHO by possibly underrating its armor penetration capability even though it was capable of firing a wide range of ammunition. How would it have stacked up to the 12.7mm and 14.5mm HMGs?

Overall.. we hear about the tank guns and missiles on the modern battlefield although they had the shortest amount of combat endurance time.. 40 or so rounds of tank gun rounds or 4-6 ATGMs. These would run out fairly fast in a major armored clash.. and then your down the HMGs at times. How deadly would they have been BEFORE autocannons were widely used by IFVs.. and then after?

With that much lead flying around from the HMGs it would be curious to think of the possible carnage they may have created. What do you all think? Have fun. ;)

Chris:

I would say it depends on the angle of attack. If the HMGs are positioned where they can hit the target's vulnerable locations, then they could effectively suppress an armored infantry assault. Of course we would have to consider all the shoulder mounted or even single shot LAW type weapons as well. The HMG aadvantage in this case being range and accuracy over shoulder mounted weapons. Was the US M113 vulnerable to 12.7mm fire? I can't remember what it was initially armored against.

[old_pop2000]

Why bring this up? Simple.. we had a previous discussion about the vulnerability of the BMP-1 to HMG fire through its side armor on the old forums. So, with all of those thousands of light armored vehicles the Russians would have been plowing through Germany if a war started there between the 1960s and 1980s how many of their vehicles would have been seriously vulnerable to the extensively available .50cal HMG? We armed virtually every armored vehicle with this very potent gun but few wargames really consider how lethal this gun may have been to the Russians IMHO by possibly underrating its armor penetration capability even though it was capable of firing a wide range of ammunition. How would it have stacked up to the 12.7mm and 14.5mm HMGs?

Overall.. we hear about the tank guns and missiles on the modern battlefield although they had the shortest amount of combat endurance time.. 40 or so rounds of tank gun rounds or 4-6 ATGMs. These would run out fairly fast in a major armored clash.. and then your down the HMGs at times. How deadly would they have been BEFORE autocannons were widely used by IFVs.. and then after?

With that much lead flying around from the HMGs it would be curious to think of the possible carnage they may have created. What do you all think? Have fun. ;)
How about defining Heavy Machine Guns? The .30 cal. Browning is a LMG when air cooled on a bipod mount but can be a heavy machine gun when in the water cooled when configured on a tripod mount. Organizationally, that maybe how its defined. However, typically, it is by caliber. So we are talking about weapons in the 12.7, 13mm range or the .50 cal. BMG. The range is up to 16mm. Any weapon beyond 16mm is considered a cannon.They have other distinguishing characteristics like the ability to fire HE rounds as opposed to inert bullets, and that they are aimed at destroying material, not people like the machine gun. Of course, many new types of ammunition including caseless have been designed for the heavy machine gun, so its lethality against Light armoured vehicles is increasing.

As to the M113's ability to resist machine guns, its armor was rolled 5083/5086 H32 aluminum armor, with a thickness of 1.5 inches at 45 degrees on the upper front and 1.5 inch at 30 deg. on the lower front. The sides were 1.75 and 1.25 at 0 deg. The rear was 1.5 inch, the top an 1.5 inch at 9 deg. I will defer to Mike, as he will probably know about penetration resistance better than I.

[Ed Rotondaro]

How about defining Heavy Machine Guns? The .30 cal. Browning is a LMG when air cooled on a bipod mount but can be a heavy machine gun when in the water cooled when configured on a tripod mount. Organizationally, that maybe how its defined. However, typically, it is by caliber. So we are talking about weapons in the 12.7, 13mm range or the .50 cal. BMG. The range is up to 16mm. Any weapon beyond 16mm is considered a cannon.They have other distinguishing characteristics like the ability to fire HE rounds as opposed to inert bullets, and that they are aimed at destroying material, not people like the machine gun. Of course, many new types of ammunition including caseless have been designed for the heavy machine gun, so its lethality against Light armoured vehicles is increasing.

As to the M113's ability to resist machine guns, its armor was rolled 5083/5086 H32 aluminum armor, with a thickness of 1.5 inches at 45 degrees on the upper front and 1.5 inch at 30 deg. on the lower front. The sides were 1.75 and 1.25 at 0 deg. The rear was 1.5 inch, the top an 1.5 inch at 9 deg. I will defer to Mike, as he will probably know about penetration resistance better than I.

Dennis:

There are some who consider the Russian 14.5mm to actually be a cannon rather than an HMG, but as you state it depends on definition. I know that the German 15mm was considered a light cannon and was used both on bombers and the ME-109 in WWII. Don't know how effective it was.

[old_pop2000]

Just as a note, the Russian 12.7mm AAMG mounted on the T-90 has a reputed max. penetration using APC of 30-50 mm. However, that is a manual mount and no range is stated. I suspect that those penetration figures would be a 100 meters, like most specifications for heavy machine guns.

[Warship NWS]

Defining HMGs.. this would cover the most prominent MGs of 12.7mm to 14.5mm used by a wide range of vehicles during the Cold War. Anything below that was typically ineffective vs armored targets and anything above typically ended up being autocannons which started at the 20mm-30mm range. Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

Going by likely penetration values and ranges the .50 cal would have been very popular in Poland during the outset of the war in Europe. With the Germans fielding lots of Pz-1 and Pz-II type tanks that were potentially quite vulnerable to the gun.
That modern .50 sniper rifle - looks suspiciously similar to Anti-tank rifles of WW2 era - except for the high powered scope.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Going by likely penetration values and ranges the .50 cal would have been very popular in Poland during the outset of the war in Europe. With the Germans fielding lots of Pz-1 and Pz-II type tanks that were potentially quite vulnerable to the gun.
That modern .50 sniper rifle - looks suspiciously similar to Anti-tank rifles of WW2 era - except for the high powered scope.


Kyle:

That's true, especially when we consider that the .50cal was developed initially as an anti-armor weapon based on the armor of WWI tanks.

[old_pop2000]

Are you referring to the MG 151? This was a 15mm x 95 recoil operated, belt-fed gun rated at 700 RPM. MV of 3150 FPS. There was also a 20x84 version which was considered an autocannon. I have enclosed a drawing of the MG-151, hope it is viewable. Some interesting details:


The 15 mm heavy machinegun (incorrectly named cannon in some sources) was the first of the family to be introduced in service with the Me-109F2 in march 1941. The MG was operated by a short stroke recoil mechanism, both barrel and lock recoiled together and the the bolt is disengaged using a rotating bolts head. The MG 151 used a large capacity bottlenecked case with gave a high velocity to the projectiles around 850-960 m/s. That provided a straight flying path to target and improved the chances of hit. Due the generous muzzle speed the APC bullet could defeat any aeronautical armor in that time, including the mitic "ironclad" ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik. The overall length of the gun was 1917 mm, width 190mm, weight 42,5 kg and it shoot at some 700 rpm.

Hope this helps

[Ed Rotondaro]

Are you referring to the MG 151? This was a 15mm x 95 recoil operated, belt-fed gun rated at 700 RPM. MV of 3150 FPS. There was also a 20x84 version which was considered an autocannon. I have enclosed a drawing of the MG-151, hope it is viewable. Some interesting details:



Hope this helps

Dennis:

Yes that was the weapon I was speaking of. So it actually was an MG? I'm assuming that the 20x84 was a 20mm version?

Oh sidebar, can you recommend any good books on assault rifles, etc. My kids are fascinated by them. The most recent Gun Digest book (7th edition) seems to be a dud from the reviews I've read. Kurt if you have any recommendations chime in.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Yes that was the weapon I was speaking of. So it actually was an MG? I'm assuming that the 20x84 was a 20mm version?

Oh sidebar, can you recommend any good books on assault rifles, etc. My kids are fascinated by them. The most recent Gun Digest book (7th edition) seems to be a dud from the reviews I've read. Kurt if you have any recommendations chime in.
One good book I like is by Ian Hogg, entitled "Military Small Arms of the 20th Century 7th Edition". Sometimes it can be found in the bargain books. Overall, it does provide a wealth of pictures and explanations. Most books by Ian Hogg are good, including his Machine Guns.

Remember that the internet is usually the best spot to keep current on such matters. Books do go out of date within a couple of years, but are good for historical research. I recently purchased my son a book entitled "The Book of Rifles" from the 1960's. It is the best book for collecting and historical research on bolt action rifles and such. Check some of the more popular websites.

[Mike Malanaphy]

How about defining Heavy Machine Guns? The .30 cal. Browning is a LMG when air cooled on a bipod mount but can be a heavy machine gun when in the water cooled when configured on a tripod mount. Organizationally, that maybe how its defined. However, typically, it is by caliber. So we are talking about weapons in the 12.7, 13mm range or the .50 cal. BMG. The range is up to 16mm. Any weapon beyond 16mm is considered a cannon.They have other distinguishing characteristics like the ability to fire HE rounds as opposed to inert bullets, and that they are aimed at destroying material, not people like the machine gun. Of course, many new types of ammunition including caseless have been designed for the heavy machine gun, so its lethality against Light armoured vehicles is increasing.

As to the M113's ability to resist machine guns, its armor was rolled 5083/5086 H32 aluminum armor, with a thickness of 1.5 inches at 45 degrees on the upper front and 1.5 inch at 30 deg. on the lower front. The sides were 1.75 and 1.25 at 0 deg. The rear was 1.5 inch, the top an 1.5 inch at 9 deg. I will defer to Mike, as he will probably know about penetration resistance better than I.

Hi Dennis,

Good point about the definition of a heavy machine gun. When rifle caliber guns were the only game in town in WW I, the water cooled Vickers, Brownings, and others were called heavy machine guns because their water cooled barrels allowed sustained rates of fire over their air colled contemporaries. The introduction of the .50 caliber changed the definition to caliber size. I didn't have time to look, but I really don't know the genesis of the .50 cal. Doctrinally, it's an AA weapon on armored vehicles because the Geneva convention prohibits it's use against personnel. Prior to ATGMs, the .50 caliber gave you reach over infantry weapons for suppression purposes whgich explains it's presence on the M113. It also has the ability to penetrate heavier covier than a rifle caliber weapon. As the M73 and M73A1 7.62mm coax machine guns were totally unreliable, your .50 caliber was all you had below main gun. Its also excellent against light vehicle targets such as trucks. The Israelis though so much of it's suppressive abilites, virtually all of their tanks were equipped with an external .50 cal over the gun tube to suppress ATGM teams. It also served as a ranging weapons on the 106mm recoiless rifle and for the Centurion and Chieftain tanks. To conserve ammo, the .50 cal was used in three round bursts to get the range. The main gun was fired when you hit with the .50 cal.

I believe that the M113 and BMP would be proof against the .50 cal. unless you were firing API at close range. In never saw API in the service and doctrinally always treated A BMP like a tank, worthy of a main gun round. The standard ball round weighs 720 grains but is still just a lead bullet with a copper jacket.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Dennis:

There are some who consider the Russian 14.5mm to actually be a cannon rather than an HMG, but as you state it depends on definition. I know that the German 15mm was considered a light cannon and was used both on bombers and the ME-109 in WWII. Don't know how effective it was.


Hi Ed,

It's my understanding the accepted definition definition between the two is that a cannon round will generally have an explosive filler in round. This of course, accepts AP rounds for autocannon and a smattering of oddities such as the AT rifle bullets that contained a tear gas pellets to inpair the crew.

[Mike Malanaphy]

One good book I like is by Ian Hogg, entitled "Military Small Arms of the 20th Century 7th Edition". Sometimes it can be found in the bargain books. Overall, it does provide a wealth of pictures and explanations. Most books by Ian Hogg are good, including his Machine Guns.

Remember that the internet is usually the best spot to keep current on such matters. Books do go out of date within a couple of years, but are good for historical research. I recently purchased my son a book entitled "The Book of Rifles" from the 1960's. It is the best book for collecting and historical research on bolt action rifles and such. Check some of the more popular websites.

Hi Guys,

I never have read anything bad by Hogg. He's almost the Freidman equivalent for land weapons. Excellent writing style and very informative about artillery, his specialty from the Army. He recently died here just a few years ago and I have been reading his books since the 60's. Yikes, did I just say that! I probably have 8 or 9 books by him including his small arms one you mention. I believe I also have one just on ammunnition.

[Warship NWS]

I believe that the M113 and BMP would be proof against the .50 cal. unless you were firing API at close range. In never saw API in the service and doctrinally always treated A BMP like a tank, worthy of a main gun round. The standard ball round weighs 720 grains but is still just a lead bullet with a copper jacket.

According to the ballistic charts I came across regarding the M2HB .50 the rounds could pierce the side and rear armor of the BMP-1 at around ~500m using AP rounds or around ~250m using ball rounds. The .50 had several AP type rounds including the M2 (black tip), M8 (API - silver tip), and M20 (API-T - silver and red tip). Penetration vs homogenous armor at 500m for the M2 19mm, M4 16mm, M8 21mm. Ball penetration was about ~14mm at 500m. These figures would increase by about 30% at 200m. The BMP-1 had a side armor (as originally built) of 13mm. So the question remains.. how vulnerable would the original BMP-1, or other contemporary APC/IFVs, have been vs HMGs on the modern battlefield? Move up to around 1980+ and then what?

BTW.. thanks for your input Mike. A big tough question would be IF the M2HBs guns that armed many of the NATO AFVs carried M2, M8, or M20 ammunition as part of their loadouts? If not.. then the equation obviously changes as then you would be relying entirely on ball ammunition but even 200m is not out of the question for engagement ranges in a highly mobile battlefield.. especially if your running low on, or out of, main tank rounds or M113s, or other such AFVs, being forced to engage targets. It would have been interesting to see how usefull the M2HB, or any of its derivatives would have been.

I will not that many modern wargames do not allow for ANY penetration of the BMPs by .50 fire.. and this is something I would disagree with and yes, in close range engagements it can make a critical difference.

[Mike Malanaphy]

According to the ballistic charts I came across regarding the M2HB .50 the rounds could pierce the side and rear armor of the BMP-1 at around ~500m using AP rounds or around ~250m using ball rounds. The .50 had several AP type rounds including the M2 (black tip), M8 (API - silver tip), and M20 (API-T - silver and red tip). Penetration vs homogenous armor at 500m for the M2 19mm, M4 16mm, M8 21mm. Ball penetration was about ~14mm at 500m. These figures would increase by about 30% at 200m. The BMP-1 had a side armor (as originally built) of 13mm. So the question remains.. how vulnerable would the original BMP-1, or other contemporary APC/IFVs, have been vs HMGs on the modern battlefield? Move up to around 1980+ and then what?

BTW.. thanks for your input Mike. A big tough question would be IF the M2HBs guns that armed many of the NATO AFVs carried M2, M8, or M20 ammunition as part of their loadouts? If not.. then the equation obviously changes as then you would be relying entirely on ball ammunition but even 200m is not out of the question for engagement ranges in a highly mobile battlefield.. especially if your running low on, or out of, main tank rounds or M113s, or other such AFVs, being forced to engage targets. It would have been interesting to see how usefull the M2HB, or any of its derivatives would have been.

I will not that many modern wargames do not allow for ANY penetration of the BMPs by .50 fire.. and this is something I would disagree with and yes, in close range engagements it can make a critical difference.

Hi Chris,

In my 12 years with tanks and cav in the US, Korea, and Germany, I never saw any .50 cal ammo other than ball. It was not in our combat basic loads of ammunition in either Germany or Korea. It was my understanding that the various AP rounds were too hard on the barrels and recievers of the guns, but an M2 is pretty sturdy. I suspect more that there was little tactical justification for those rounds now and that their production was a needless logistical complication. 500 yards is pretty darn close in tank combat and even a BMP could get lucky at that range with it's 73mm, not to mention a T-62 ot T-64. It's amazing how even seemingly flat gound has folds and dips that can conceal a vehicle the size of a BMP. Because it had an ATGM system, it would be engaged at your max effective range with your main gun. Most European battle positions featured a clearing between two tree lines or a built up area where you maximum engagement range was under 1400 meters. You generally planned to fire 3 or 4 volleys and then laterally displace to see what havoc you had caused. Then you could either re engage or withdraw. A good crew could fire those rounds in less than 20 seconds. That's a lot of rounds into your typical motorized rifle battlion attack formation of 33 or so vehicles, at least on paper. A typical mech company team would have 5 tanks, a tank heavy team would have 10 or 13 tanks (12 if based on a tank company), a cav troop would have 12 tanks and a tank company would have 17 tanks. With the smoke, artillery, and counterfire, I expected 50% hits at that range.

In 2nd ACR, we hoped to catch the the attacking Soviet unit in the flank or rear by platoon or company/troop counterattacks. It was hoped that trhese attacks would tremendously raise the effectiveness of the attacks and lessen our casualties, though roaming around in the space between Soviet echelons of a motorized rifle division in the attack requires timing and good local reconnaissance to prevent you from being caught in between. The inspiration for these actions was drawn from WW II German operations where a numerically superior enemy was defeated by being able to maass combat power from an unexpected direction. Also, the Isareali experience in 73 which showed what it would cost in terms of people and equipment taking a Soviet style attack head on.

In the 80's, we carried about about 70% sabot, 20% HEAT, and a couple of HEP-T or smoke rounds for blocking line of sight on ATGMs or helicopters. An M60A1 could carry 63 rounds, so the drop to 40 with the M1 was not universally cheered because resupply could not alwys be certain. Doctrinally, you would fire sabot at tanks and HEAT at everything esle, but changing ammo would lower your rate of fire as the loader had to find the different time of round and the gunner had to index the ammo type. The concensus would be to fire sabot until you had time to change change ammo.

There were few .50 cals outside of the US Army. The small Dutch and Danish contingents used M113s armed with .50 cals. Some Bundeswehr units used M113s, but the vehicle commander's weapon was usually a rifle caliber MG1. The US M48s in German service carried the M2, but by the late 70s were out of front line service.

[old_pop2000]

In reading about German defensive tactics, they opened up at 600 to 800 meters until the Panther and Tiger were available, then 800-1000 yards. The idea was to fire at the range of the highest probability of hits of the guns. They would deploy a security force who would report the enemy position and strength, slowing or stopping his momentum but withdrawing before his preparatory bombardment. They would establish strong defensive positions on key areas and use obstacles to funnel Soviet attacks into them, stopping them with flanking fire from AT guns and tanks. As the war progressed, the defenses became deeper and deeper. The key was to allow the tanks to move by, then hit the infantry, separating the two forces, then killing the tanks from the flanks or the rear.

[Warship NWS]

Hi Chris,

In my 12 years with tanks and cav in the US, Korea, and Germany, I never saw any .50 cal ammo other than ball. It was not in our combat basic loads of ammunition in either Germany or Korea. It was my understanding that the various AP rounds were too hard on the barrels and recievers of the guns, but an M2 is pretty sturdy. I suspect more that there was little tactical justification for those rounds now and that their production was a needless logistical complication. 500 yards is pretty darn close in tank combat and even a BMP could get lucky at that range with it's 73mm, not to mention a T-62 ot T-64.

Thanks Mike for your input on this topic. That was one bit of information that I was having a lot of trouble verifying, regarding the ammo loads. I am not surprised they stuck with the .50 ball almost exclusively. There is no doubt that you would want to get close enough to test the .50 against an AFV side hull armor, but at least it was an option if teh opportunity presented itself.. which I see as possible in close quarter situations including heavy obstacled terrain.

Was the .50 ever considered a viable option engage APCs/IFVs if the situation required it?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Thanks Mike for your input on this topic. That was one bit of information that I was having a lot of trouble verifying, regarding the ammo loads. I am not surprised they stuck with the .50 ball almost exclusively. There is no doubt that you would want to get close enough to test the .50 against an AFV side hull armor, but at least it was an option if teh opportunity presented itself.. which I see as possible in close quarter situations including heavy obstacled terrain.

Was the .50 ever considered a viable option engage APCs/IFVs if the situation required it?

Hi Chris,

I could see shooting at him with the .50 cal if he and his squad were unbuttoned cross country or dismounting or remounting his squad. Or a close encounter to hit optics, his Sagger, or to distract him. The problem in an M60 series tank is your TC cupola where the M85 is mounted is controlled by hand cranks at either shoulder. If your manipulating the .50cal, you can't use your seperate TC overide (looks like a fighter pilot's joystick) to slew your gunner onto the target for a main gun engagement, so circumstances to use the .50 cal would be very limited. Because he's probably not alone and you want to hit him quickly.

[Warship NWS]

Hi Chris,

I could see shooting at him with the .50 cal if he and his squad were unbuttoned cross country or dismounting or remounting his squad. Or a close encounter to hit optics, his Sagger, or to distract him. The problem in an M60 series tank is your TC cupola where the M85 is mounted is controlled by hand cranks at either shoulder. If your manipulating the .50cal, you can't use your seperate TC overide (looks like a fighter pilot's joystick) to slew your gunner onto the target for a main gun engagement, so circumstances to use the .50 cal would be very limited. Because he's probably not alone and you want to hit him quickly.

If you have remaining tank rounds I could easily see a tank crew using the main gun and coax combination over the .50, no doubt there. With a tank I could see the .50 being used in ambush (where all tank weapons might be able to be put into action to create additional volume of fire) or if tank gun rounds are running short, or out, or if the tank gun barrel was restricted in movement for some reason or if the main gun was engaging a primary target while other targets were available for the .50s. For APC/MICVs however (before the autocannons became more common) the .50s would be their only primary armament. I guess the main point here is how often the .50s would have a chance to engage lightly armored, or even soft skinned, vehicles (infantry obviously would be a viable target but I am trying to determine the vulnerability of lightly armored vehicles to HMGs in this specific topic).. for a tank it would most certainly be a backup weapon but for other vehicles that might be their only feasible weapon. If light armored APCs/IFVs *were* vulnerable to HMGs however, on both sides, it would have been interesting to see how many would have been disabled or destroyed by such weapons either out of ambush, necessity (tank gun ammo exhausted or low, disabled gun, or unable to engage), multiple target engagements, etc..

Thanks again for your responses.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Guys,

I never have read anything bad by Hogg. He's almost the Freidman equivalent for land weapons. Excellent writing style and very informative about artillery, his specialty from the Army. He recently died here just a few years ago and I have been reading his books since the 60's. Yikes, did I just say that! I probably have 8 or 9 books by him including his small arms one you mention. I believe I also have one just on ammunnition.

Hi Mike:

I too have been reading Hogg's books primarily on artillery since the late 1960s starting with the old Ballantine series of Illustrated Histories. Hogg had a wry sense of humor and the ability to make complex subjects very understandable.

I was originally hoping to get a very recent book on modern firearms, but I think Dennis may have hit it correctly. Better to get a good reference book that covers most of what you are interested in and then supplement it with on-line research. With something like modern small arms, the staggering number of new models that come out means that no printed source can keep up unless it is updated and re-published every few years.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Chris,

In my 12 years with tanks and cav in the US, Korea, and Germany, I never saw any .50 cal ammo other than ball. It was not in our combat basic loads of ammunition in either Germany or Korea. It was my understanding that the various AP rounds were too hard on the barrels and recievers of the guns, but an M2 is pretty sturdy. I suspect more that there was little tactical justification for those rounds now and that their production was a needless logistical complication. 500 yards is pretty darn close in tank combat and even a BMP could get lucky at that range with it's 73mm, not to mention a T-62 ot T-64. It's amazing how even seemingly flat gound has folds and dips that can conceal a vehicle the size of a BMP. Because it had an ATGM system, it would be engaged at your max effective range with your main gun. Most European battle positions featured a clearing between two tree lines or a built up area where you maximum engagement range was under 1400 meters. You generally planned to fire 3 or 4 volleys and then laterally displace to see what havoc you had caused. Then you could either re engage or withdraw. A good crew could fire those rounds in less than 20 seconds. That's a lot of rounds into your typical motorized rifle battlion attack formation of 33 or so vehicles, at least on paper. A typical mech company team would have 5 tanks, a tank heavy team would have 10 or 13 tanks (12 if based on a tank company), a cav troop would have 12 tanks and a tank company would have 17 tanks. With the smoke, artillery, and counterfire, I expected 50% hits at that range.

In 2nd ACR, we hoped to catch the the attacking Soviet unit in the flank or rear by platoon or company/troop counterattacks. It was hoped that trhese attacks would tremendously raise the effectiveness of the attacks and lessen our casualties, though roaming around in the space between Soviet echelons of a motorized rifle division in the attack requires timing and good local reconnaissance to prevent you from being caught in between. The inspiration for these actions was drawn from WW II German operations where a numerically superior enemy was defeated by being able to maass combat power from an unexpected direction. Also, the Isareali experience in 73 which showed what it would cost in terms of people and equipment taking a Soviet style attack head on.

In the 80's, we carried about about 70% sabot, 20% HEAT, and a couple of HEP-T or smoke rounds for blocking line of sight on ATGMs or helicopters. An M60A1 could carry 63 rounds, so the drop to 40 with the M1 was not universally cheered because resupply could not alwys be certain. Doctrinally, you would fire sabot at tanks and HEAT at everything esle, but changing ammo would lower your rate of fire as the loader had to find the different time of round and the gunner had to index the ammo type. The concensus would be to fire sabot until you had time to change change ammo.

There were few .50 cals outside of the US Army. The small Dutch and Danish contingents used M113s armed with .50 cals. Some Bundeswehr units used M113s, but the vehicle commander's weapon was usually a rifle caliber MG1. The US M48s in German service carried the M2, but by the late 70s were out of front line service.

Mike:

Thanks for the real world details! You were in the 2nd ACR? Damn good regiment and still kicking ass and taking names in Iraq. I believe they are using the Strkyer instead of tanks and Bradleys?

[old_pop2000]

... 500 yards is pretty darn close in tank combat and even a BMP could get lucky at that range with it's 73mm, not to mention a T-62 ot T-64. It's amazing how even seemingly flat gound has folds and dips that can conceal a vehicle the size of a BMP. Because it had an ATGM system, it would be engaged at your max effective range with your main gun. Most European battle positions featured a clearing between two tree lines or a built up area where you maximum engagement range was under 1400 meters. You generally planned to fire 3 or 4 volleys and then laterally displace to see what havoc you had caused. Then you could either re engage or withdraw. A good crew could fire those rounds in less than 20 seconds. That's a lot of rounds into your typical motorized rifle battlion attack formation of 33 or so vehicles, at least on paper. A typical mech company team would have 5 tanks, a tank heavy team would have 10 or 13 tanks (12 if based on a tank company), a cav troop would have 12 tanks and a tank company would have 17 tanks. With the smoke, artillery, and counterfire, I expected 50% hits at that range.

In 2nd ACR, we hoped to catch the the attacking Soviet unit in the flank or rear by platoon or company/troop counterattacks. It was hoped that trhese attacks would tremendously raise the effectiveness of the attacks and lessen our casualties, though roaming around in the space between Soviet echelons of a motorized rifle division in the attack requires timing and good local reconnaissance to prevent you from being caught in between. The inspiration for these actions was drawn from WW II German operations where a numerically superior enemy was defeated by being able to maass combat power from an unexpected direction. Also, the Isareali experience in 73 which showed what it would cost in terms of people and equipment taking a Soviet style attack head on.......


Mike:

A Soviet tank division would have a reconnaissance outfit leading the division. In my readings of Soviet armor tactics, it might have had a couple of BTR's, BMP's, BRDM-2's with one used used as a command vehicle. Following in the rear, might be four to eight tanks.

Question: How would you have proceeded when initial contact is made? Do you allow the lightly armoured units to move by, and tackle the tanks first, or do you assign the infantry supporting you, to tackle the lightly armoured units with their AT weaponry, and the tanks going after the heavy armor? Would the .50 cal be used after the destruction of the tanks was effected? Very nice posts, BTW.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

Thanks for the real world details! You were in the 2nd ACR? Damn good regiment and still kicking ass and taking names in Iraq. I believe they are using the Strkyer instead of tanks and Bradleys?

Hi Ed,

2nd ACR was my best posting. Great espirit and peolpe. Also served with 4/7th Cav in Korea, and 1/70 and 6/32 Armor at Ft Carson.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

A Soviet tank division would have a reconnaissance outfit leading the division. In my readings of Soviet armor tactics, it might have had a couple of BTR's, BMP's, BRDM-2's with one used used as a command vehicle. Following in the rear, might be four to eight tanks.

Question: How would you have proceeded when initial contact is made? Do you allow the lightly armoured units to move by, and tackle the tanks first, or do you assign the infantry supporting you, to tackle the lightly armoured units with their AT weaponry, and the tanks going after the heavy armor? Would the .50 cal be used after the destruction of the tanks was effected? Very nice posts, BTW.

Hi Dennis,

Your quite right. In movement to contact, a motorized rifle division would have it's lead regiment stretched out as reconnaissance elements. The very tip would be the reconnaissance platoon in BDRMs with the advanced guard company right behind. A platoon on the point with it's company perhaps 2 kms behind, followed by it's parent battalion 3-5 kms behind and the rest of the regiment in column. The theory would be able to move quickly; on contact the lead company would come up to fix you in place while the remainder of the battalion would seek a flank. 122mm SPs would be right behind the lead battalion for direct support. To maintain the momentum, the follow on regiments would by pass the battle. The Soviets wanted follow on echelons to be close, just outside of ATGM range, so they could maneuver left or right.

In our case, we expected the lead element to hit us deployed for a hasty or deliberate attack. As close to the border as we were, I suspect the Soviets had our initial positions pretty well scoped out. Once across, we expected two regiments forward with one back supported by the independent tank regiment of the 8th Guards Army. The reconaissance plattons would be on the flanks looking for holes. I ssuepct the mess or maintenace truck would be using it's .50 cals on the BRDMs that slipped through. : ) About 430 tanks and BMPs in all. The Independent tank regiment had 130 T-62 on it's own. As an economy of force unit, we were to screen VII Corps right flank with 1st AD and 3rd ID to the north. With out squadron tank companies and 155mm batteries, and the air cav squadron, we fielded almost as much fire power as a division, but didn't have the logistical and support base of one. As cav, our frontage was much larger and many battle positions were plaroon sized. The tank company would be held back for counterattacks, though a cav troop had almost as many tanks plus it's own scouts. The added eyes gave it an ability to maneuver better than the tank company.

In intial positions we expected very heavy and accurate artillery, not so much as we feel back. By virtue of our mission, the main enemy thrust was expected against the 1st AD and 3rd ID, but we expected to see a lot of tanks and BMPs anyway. I was never privy to what they really knew, but we planned for the worst.

In defense, the troop would have recon elements forward, a platoon dispersed forward for early warning. Unless tanks were present, ATGMs or artillery would be used against the light reconnaissance assets. The see who showed up next. Most likely a hasty attack from teh ist echelon battalion while the lead company fixes you in place with direct fire and artillery. If you saw tanks then the main show was about to begin. Tanks would take tanks first, the ATGMs were looking for command vehicles and AA units as a first priority. Once the enemy was halted, you would shift laterally to cover the same area with fire for the next echelon and the retaliatory artillery.

You would not let elements by pass you unless ther was another blocking position to take them on. Once past you could, fall on it's rear or flank while it was fring to the front. Then scoot before the next ecehelon showed up and do it all over again. It looked good on paper but once you started to move, things became very fluid Lots of seperated or lost vehicles or elements roaming around in the countryside. Anticipated lots of close in meeting engagements or ambushes. In those cases, your .50 cal might come in handy, but operating it, prevented you from assisting the gunner to get on target.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

2nd ACR was my best posting. Great espirit and peolpe. Also served with 4/7th Cav in Korea, and 1/70 and 6/32 Armor at Ft Carson.


Mike:

You mentioned using the Sheridan in service, but did you also use the M60A2? What you guys called "The Starship"?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

You mentioned using the Sheridan in service, but did you also use the M60A2? What you guys called "The Starship"?

Hi Ed,

I had three M551 Sheridans in my cav platoon in Korea and the M60A2s were gone from service when I reached Germany in 1980. I did see them in Germany on Reforger 77 with 6/32nd Armor. I think only about 6 battalions were fielded.

The M60A2 served about 5 years frontline service. There was a lot of talk about integrating them into regular tank platoons, ie three M60A1s and two M60A2s or having an M60A2 company in each tank battalion for long range AT fire. One interesting idea was to turn them into "tank destroyer" battalions for each infantry brigade in lieu of the M113 TOW ATGM vehicles they were to get.

Problems with the A2s were maintenance headaches with the turret, most battle areas prevented it from firing at it's capable range, and slow rate of fire versus the density of vehicles it expected to face. Thermal sights and the silver bullet on the M60A3 made it a much better combat vehicle.

[old_pop2000]

Mike:
In establishing your primary fire positions for the platoon, did you investigate and designate an alternative firing position for every tank. After firing a certain number of rounds, would a tank back out and move to the alternative firing position? Or would it assess the situation and move based on the opponents response?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:
In establishing your primary fire positions for the platoon, did you investigate and designate an alternative firing position for every tank. After firing a certain number of rounds, would a tank back out and move to the alternative firing position? Or would it assess the situation and move based on the opponents response?

Hi Dennis,

Yes, after the first volley of 3-4 rounds, the platoon would displace by sections to alternate firing positions, 50-100 meters laterally where they had essentially the same field of fire. Generally, you would fire from a reverse slope and back down out of visual line of sight to move. The remaining section to cover your movement. These positions were pre selected when you occupied the postiton. Our wartime positions had been reconned for years prior so the alternate positions were very well selected. In combat, you would occupy and deploy by a map recon only, adjusting once you saw the ground. If the enemy was not stopped or more vehicles appeared, you had the option to displace to the rear to your next blocking position. The less engaged portion of your unit moving first to provide cover fire once in place. Very dicey in real time. Under 800 meters, Soviet tank fire and BMP rounds start to become pretty accurate so you would not want the enemy to close more than that. That would probably cause you to displace. It was during these periods as the enemy followed you, another force would hit them from the flank or rear and them fiollow you back to do it all over again.

In the regiment, they were simply called "trap plays" and were generally at platoon and troop level and were planned on terrain suitable for them. Each squadron had a tank comapny that was kept in reserve for attacks against battalion or smaller targets. Without teh inherent recon assets of a cav troop, their attack axis was pretty well defined. The battlefield is a big place with a surprisingf number of places to hide. The Soviets would adavance rapidly and teh placing of forces slightly off their axis was not that difficult as tehy would not be reconnig their flnks as they moved forward. It was hoped the echeloning of forces would assist us by diluting their combat power as a regiment or division would be strung out in echelons as it moved to gain contact.

The key was not to become "decisively engaged" where the enemy was able to prevent you from moving by the volume of fire he could put on you.

A cavalry platoon might occupy a much larger chunk of territory than a tank or or infantry conmpany, but the positions would be mutually supporting by direct fire. You would integrate smoke and indrirect fire into your plan so artillery was falling on the enemy as you displaced. Most Soviet radios in a company were recieve only, so only the platoon leaders and and company copmmander could report upwards. This and the shock effect of the initial fire was hoped to prevent them from seeing and reporting your move.

Until the Bradley appeared in numbers in the early 80's, Soviet artillery was seen as very effective against M113 mounted TOW systems as they had little protection from artillery. The first ones had expaosed launchers on top of teh vehilce with a pop up kevlar canopy. These were called TOWCAPS. A follow on vehicle was the hammerhead, I don't recall the classification. A clever idea with the ATGM launcher mounted on an extendable arm so the vehicle could be in full defilade while firing. Hard to see, much harder to hit.

Pre planning led to caches of ammunition being prepositioined behind you so if you halted teh enemy you could rotate your vehilcles back for ammunition at least.

[Warship NWS]

Until the Bradley appeared in numbers in the early 80's, Soviet artillery was seen as very effective against M113 mounted TOW systems as they had little protection from artillery. The first ones had expaosed launchers on top of teh vehilce with a pop up kevlar canopy. These were called TOWCAPS. A follow on vehicle was the hammerhead, I don't recall the classification. A clever idea with the ATGM launcher mounted on an extendable arm so the vehicle could be in full defilade while firing. Hard to see, much harder to hit.

The first M113 ATGM TOW vehicle was the M150 with 1 launcher, the improved M901 version had two launchers in a retractable mounting
http://www.armyvehicles.dk/images/m113tow_1.jpg
http://www.armyrecognition.com/Amerique_du_nord/Etats_Unis/vehicules_missiles/M113_Tow/M113_TOW_drawing.gif
http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/pics/m9012.jpg

[Mike Malanaphy]

The first M113 ATGM TOW vehicle was the M150 with 1 launcher, the improved M901 version had two launchers in a retractable mounting
http://www.armyvehicles.dk/images/m113tow_1.jpg
http://www.armyrecognition.com/Amerique_du_nord/Etats_Unis/vehicules_missiles/M113_Tow/M113_TOW_drawing.gif
http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/pics/m9012.jpg

Hi NWS,

Good pics. The M150 first saw combat with the Israelis how got a lmited number of TOWs near the end of the 73 war. Later versions in US service had a steel frame that could be erected to cover the cargo hatch. Kevlar panels were laid over the frame to provide a modicum of overhead and side protection from artillery fire.

If I remember correctly, in the 70s, each mech infantry company would have one TOW vehicle per platoon. Each mech battalion had an anti tank platoon in it's combat service support company which consisted of 8 TOW M113's which could be used to reinforce one or more of the companies. Even with a Dragon in each platoon, you an see what a huge increase in AT fire power the Bradley provided once it came into service. Until they arrived, tanks were the primary AT weapon in the US Army. In Europe, there were very few mech infantry battalions that didn't cross attach with a tank battalion from it's brigade. Typically a platton for each company and a company added to the battalion. Such mixed arms companies were called company teams.. Mech infantry platoons and companies would also cross attach. The permanent blending of tanks and scouts in a cav unit made them much more flexible than units that perhaps trained together once or twice a year. Especially in terms of the cut and thrust approach under the active defense doctrine.

A lot of thought was used towards forming a new "Tank Destroyer" branch with battalion sized units armed with the M901 in the mid 70's to counter the large number of Soviet tanks and teh production deficit we faced having replaced Israel after the 73 war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The first M113 ATGM TOW vehicle was the M150 with 1 launcher, the improved M901 version had two launchers in a retractable mounting
http://www.armyvehicles.dk/images/m113tow_1.jpg
http://www.armyrecognition.com/Amerique_du_nord/Etats_Unis/vehicules_missiles/M113_Tow/M113_TOW_drawing.gif
http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/pics/m9012.jpg

Chris:

Good pics! I note some similarities in the retractable mounting to the one used on Bradley IFVs. Did the one influence the other? Mike S or Mike M jump right in here.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi NWS,

Good pics. The M150 first saw combat with the Israelis how got a lmited number of TOWs near the end of the 73 war. Later versions in US service had a steel frame that could be erected to cover the cargo hatch. Kevlar panels were laid over the frame to provide a modicum of overhead and side protection from artillery fire.

If I remember correctly, in the 70s, each mech infantry company would have one TOW vehicle per platoon. Each mech battalion had an anti tank platoon in it's combat service support company which consisted of 8 TOW M113's which could be used to reinforce one or more of the companies. Even with a Dragon in each platoon, you an see what a huge increase in AT fire power the Bradley provided once it came into service. Until they arrived, tanks were the primary AT weapon in the US Army. In Europe, there were very few mech infantry battalions that didn't cross attach with a tank battalion from it's brigade. Typically a platton for each company and a company added to the battalion. Such mixed arms companies were called company teams.. Mech infantry platoons and companies would also cross attach. The permanent blending of tanks and scouts in a cav unit made them much more flexible than units that perhaps trained together once or twice a year. Especially in terms of the cut and thrust approach under the active defense doctrine.

A lot of thought was used towards forming a new "Tank Destroyer" branch with battalion sized units armed with the M901 in the mid 70's to counter the large number of Soviet tanks and teh production deficit we faced having replaced Israel after the 73 war.

Mike:

As always interesting insights into the Cold War army and its doctrine. Thanks!

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Good pics! I note some similarities in the retractable mounting to the one used on Bradley IFVs. Did the one influence the other? Mike S or Mike M jump right in here.

Some of the aiming components and the tube itself that missile is housed in may be the same but the entire mounting assembly for the M901 was different from the one used on the M2, as far as I know.