How did the Zero fighter navigate?

[Kyle Holgate]

I've been trying to dig up the means by which the Zero navigated over long distances - sometimes over water. I'm aware of some RDF gear but so far have been unable to find anything specific about it or what else they may have used.

[old_pop2000]

I've been trying to dig up the means by which the Zero navigated over long distances - sometimes over water. I'm aware of some RDF gear but so far have been unable to find anything specific about it or what else they may have used.
"The radios in the early A6M2 and A6M3 were the type 96 Ku aviation Model 1 voice/telegraph and type 1 Ku Model 3 Radio Compass or Radio Direction finder. The Type 1-3 was the standard RDF for most IJN aircraft. The Type 96-1 consisted of three units, all installed in the cockpit. The Xmitter and Rcvr were separate units mounted low on the right side of the cockpit. The dynamotor powered the set and was mounted behind the pilots left elbow. Operational frequency was 3.8 to 5.8 Mc, with quartz crystal controled oscillators. Power output was 8 to 10 watts. Voice transmission range was 50 miles, any range over that was by telegraph code. Total weight was 38 pounds.

The RDF visual indicator was mounted in the lower left corner of the instrument panel. The face had an arc painted on it with the letters "right and left". A needle indicated the relative position of the aircraft to the signal. There was a switch box mounted next to the pilots right shoulder which allowed for switching between the radio and the RDF system. This system was a copy of the Fairchild Aero Compass manufactured in New York by the Fairchild Aerial Camera divison of Fairchild Aircraft Co. Model # was RC-4. Frequency range was 170-1200 KC.

The way it works is that the plane of the loop gives the strongest signal, the axis gives the minimum signal. The pilot finds the angle at which no signal is received, uses mag. compass to steer that heading. One caveat is that that can be both leading towards or away from the source. In darkness or cloudy conditions, you can be on a reciprocal course away from your intended target."

Of course, the other way is by magnetic compass, map, cruising speed and time. Its called dead reckoning. Emphasis on the dead.

Source: Radio Systems in the Early A6M Zero at J-aircraft.com- I have provided the link to the article before.

I hope that helps.

[old_pop2000]

http://mitsubishi_zero.tripod.com/avionics.htm

Pictures of the radios and RDF.

[Ed Rotondaro]

http://mitsubishi_zero.tripod.com/avionics.htm

Pictures of the radios and RDF.

Thanks Dennis, good stuff!

[Kyle Holgate]

Thanks Dennis. Chris and I had been talking about the Zero - and he's continuing to be critical of it and was saying that the Zero had to follow the bombers on long distance raids and wasn't able to navigate long distances without them. I was sure they could - obviously like any navigation over distance dependant on training of the pilots.

[old_pop2000]

Thanks Dennis. Chris and I had been talking about the Zero - and he's continuing to be critical of it and was saying that the Zero had to follow the bombers on long distance raids and wasn't able to navigate long distances without them. I was sure they could - obviously like any navigation over distance dependant on training of the pilots.
He is partially correct, as the land based squadrons on New Guinea and Rabaul, actually did remove the radios and antenna's on the A6M3 Model 32's due to the loss of range with the bigger engines. It was over 1000 miles from the two Rabaul airfields to Guadalcanal, just beyond the range of the Model 32's if climb out and action were considered. However, the Naval squadrons did not, as they needed the assistance to find their way home. The radio compass in the Zero was in the AM band, so it had a good range. But homing devices can be double-edged swords and the fleet commander might not want to betray his position by using the homing signal. So, we get back to old fashioned dead reckoning which all pilots were trained to perform. However, many times it was just using landmarks that was effective. Example: If you take off from Rabaul and fly a heading of 145 degrees, then Bougainville will be on your port side, along with Vella Vella, New Georgia, Pavuvu, then Guadalcanal on your starboard side. On your return flight, just reverse it. Simple but effective. You also look for landmarks on the islands like inlet's with special shapes, mountains etc. One real easy landmark was Savo, in the middle of the sound. Once you see that, Lunga and henderson are 15 miles on the starboard side. That was one of the easiest ways.

[Kyle Holgate]

He is partially correct, as the land based squadrons on New Guinea and Rabaul, actually did remove the radios and antenna's on the A6M3 Model 32's due to the loss of range with the bigger engines. It was over 1000 miles from the two Rabaul airfields to Guadalcanal, just beyond the range of the Model 32's if climb out and action were considered. However, the Naval squadrons did not, as they needed the assistance to find their way home. The radio compass in the Zero was in the AM band, so it had a good range. But homing devices can be double-edged swords and the fleet commander might not want to betray his position by using the homing signal. So, we get back to old fashioned dead reckoning which all pilots were trained to perform. However, many times it was just using landmarks that was effective. Example: If you take off from Rabaul and fly a heading of 145 degrees, then Bougainville will be on your port side, along with Vella Vella, New Georgia, Pavuvu, then Guadalcanal on your starboard side. On your return flight, just reverse it. Simple but effective. You also look for landmarks on the islands like inlet's with special shapes, mountains etc. One real easy landmark was Savo, in the middle of the sound. Once you see that, Lunga and henderson are 15 miles on the starboard side. That was one of the easiest ways.

My focus is to find out what the aircraft was really capable of - and try to strip away the myths that seem to have appeared around the aircraft. I don't go as far as some to say it was a terrible plane, it had faults and followed a far different design philosophy than did the US - but it was there, and did the jobs it was supposed to do quite well for a few years.
The aircraft as designed initially had the equipment that allowed for long range navigation. If that was removed - and if you're watching bombers I suppose you don't need it - then that's not (necessarily) the fault of the design. Just don't blink and loose track of the bombers!!!
Saburo Sakai made it back to his base with one eye shot out and partially paralyzed. I can't find the book (Samurai) so I'm not sure what meathod(s) were used by him to get home. It did show that a pilot could manage long range navigation over water though.

[old_pop2000]

My focus is to find out what the aircraft was really capable of - and try to strip away the myths that seem to have appeared around the aircraft. I don't go as far as some to say it was a terrible plane, it had faults and followed a far different design philosophy than did the US - but it was there, and did the jobs it was supposed to do quite well for a few years.
The aircraft as designed initially had the equipment that allowed for long range navigation. If that was removed - and if you're watching bombers I suppose you don't need it - then that's not (necessarily) the fault of the design. Just don't blink and loose track of the bombers!!!
Saburo Sakai made it back to his base with one eye shot out and partially paralyzed. I can't find the book (Samurai) so I'm not sure what meathod(s) were used by him to get home. It did show that a pilot could manage long range navigation over water though.
I can help you, with specifics. Just tell me exactly what you need. Remember in figuring maximum ranges, that the specific version of the aircraft is important, weather, altitude, types of aircraft escorted etc. even age of the aircraft.

[Warship NWS]

Thanks Dennis. Chris and I had been talking about the Zero - and he's continuing to be critical of it and was saying that the Zero had to follow the bombers on long distance raids and wasn't able to navigate long distances without them. I was sure they could - obviously like any navigation over distance dependant on training of the pilots.

The reason I brought this up is because I remember either reading, or hearing via a documentary, that the Zeke had problems with navigation to distant targets. Not all targets were easily visible all the time. When I talked to Dennis about this topic the other day I had asked him to investigate if there was a higher attrition rate due to navigational errors for the Zeke when (a) they had no aircraft with navigators to follow and (b) they did not take along their navigational equipment. I keep hearing how people mention "well they could fly so damn far!".. great, fly a plane hundreds of miles in the Pacific at cruising altitude and then fight in combat and then fly home - sounds simple right? Most pilots will tell you fatigue will be a serious problem for a plane with no autopilot, flying in the Pacific heat could be unbearable (depending on your altitude), no way to get up and stretch your legs, no way to use the bathroom comfortably, no way to bandage your wounds if your injured, etc.. I remember reading of pilots that could not even get out of their cockpits after long flights under their own power at times. Now tie this in with the fact that if you fubar even the slightest on your navigation you may very well never get home.. especially if your flying back to a ship or island that is in the middle of the ocean among many other islands that might look the similiar. There was occurances where aircraft landing on the wrong carriers, air strips, etc..

It makes for an interesting research project.

[Kyle Holgate]

The reason I brought this up is because I remember either reading, or hearing via a documentary, that the Zeke had problems with navigation to distant targets. Not all targets were easily visible all the time. When I talked to Dennis about this topic the other day I had asked him to investigate if there was a higher attrition rate due to navigational errors for the Zeke when (a) they had no aircraft with navigators to follow and (b) they did not take along their navigational equipment. I keep hearing how people mention "well they could fly so damn far!".. great, fly a plane hundreds of miles in the Pacific at cruising altitude and then fight in combat and then fly home - sounds simple right? Most pilots will tell you fatigue will be a serious problem for a plane with no autopilot, flying in the Pacific heat could be unbearable (depending on your altitude), no way to get up and stretch your legs, no way to use the bathroom comfortably, no way to bandage your wounds if your injured, etc.. I remember reading of pilots that could not even get out of their cockpits after long flights under their own power at times. Now tie this in with the fact that if you fubar even the slightest on your navigation you may very well never get home.. especially if your flying back to a ship or island that is in the middle of the ocean among many other islands that might look the similiar. There was occurances where aircraft landing on the wrong carriers, air strips, etc..

It makes for an interesting research project.

IIRC in Samurai - Saburo mentions having empty sake bottles in the cockpit when they left on long missions. They were not empty on the return. Guess the Zero pilots were good aims in more ways than one!

The problem with many Japanese planes is figuring out when it's pilot training deficiency vs some problem or lacking with the aircraft themselves that cause a problem. Any fighter is probably hard to fly for what - 6 hours or more without a break? I would expect the more cramped Zero to be harder on the pilot than the P-51D for example.

I agree with you (Chris) in many of your critisisms of the Zero, I do think though that in trying to defuze the rumor that the Zero was some superplane, that you tend not to give it what credit it is due. It was a bit of a technological wonder for its time (meaning 1939-40 when it was actually designed) and it did some things no one thought a fighter could do. The design philosophy though was flawed in my view and ultimimately helped lead to the early destruction of Japanese aviation.

[Warship NWS]

I agree with you (Chris) in many of your critisisms of the Zero, I do think though that in trying to defuze the rumor that the Zero was some superplane, that you tend not to give it what credit it is due. It was a bit of a technological wonder for its time (meaning 1939-40 when it was actually designed) and it did some things no one thought a fighter could do. The design philosophy though was flawed in my view and ultimimately helped lead to the early destruction of Japanese aviation.

I will give it credit where it is due.. high maneuverability to one direction (moderate in the other direction), good rate of climb, and excellent range.. but all of these credits came at a terrible cost in speed (seriously underpowered), durability, combat endurance, pilot efficiency, poor high altitude handling, poor high speed handling, no protection, no (or worthless) communications, etc.. the credits did not outweigh the flaws. It ended up being much like the Fokker EIII of WW1... it was feared due to being an unknown factor but once the enemy realized what they were fighting against the fear rapidly dissipated. All of these flaws meant that the best of the best of the Japanese pilots with all of their combat experience... were only breaking even with the USN/USMC pilots that were far less experienced and flying less maneuverable aircraft. That to me is not the showing of a great fighter plane and definitely the wrong plane for the job and to make matters worse almost completely non-upgradeable. In many ways once the IJN took on a competant and modern air force the Zeke failed them miserably as it was poor at CAP and escort duties due to lack of coordination, again no radios to warn each other of impending danger and too slow to catch interceptors diving on them, if they could even dive with them at all without tearing their wings off or becoming a flying brick at above 250mph. Many wargames IMHO greatly overestimate the capabilities of this over glorified fighter. The only real time it showed marked improvement over an enemy was when it was up against obsolete, in both aircraft and tactics, Chinese and Russian air forces. This is not trying to say the plane itself could NOT be dangerous if flown by a competant pilot vs someone silly enough to dogfight with it .. even silly obsolete Gladiators killed more modern Italian and German aircraft at the start of the war at times but when looking at the overall picture, IMHO, the Zeke was a serious liability to the IJN and they only had a short chance of time to make a real difference.. after Midway the Pacific War caved in on them.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

The reason I brought this up is because I remember either reading, or hearing via a documentary, that the Zeke had problems with navigation to distant targets. Not all targets were easily visible all the time. When I talked to Dennis about this topic the other day I had asked him to investigate if there was a higher attrition rate due to navigational errors for the Zeke when (a) they had no aircraft with navigators to follow and (b) they did not take along their navigational equipment. I keep hearing how people mention "well they could fly so damn far!".. great, fly a plane hundreds of miles in the Pacific at cruising altitude and then fight in combat and then fly home - sounds simple right? Most pilots will tell you fatigue will be a serious problem for a plane with no autopilot, flying in the Pacific heat could be unbearable (depending on your altitude), no way to get up and stretch your legs, no way to use the bathroom comfortably, no way to bandage your wounds if your injured, etc.. I remember reading of pilots that could not even get out of their cockpits after long flights under their own power at times. Now tie this in with the fact that if you fubar even the slightest on your navigation you may very well never get home.. especially if your flying back to a ship or island that is in the middle of the ocean among many other islands that might look the similiar. There was occurances where aircraft landing on the wrong carriers, air strips, etc..

It makes for an interesting research project.
Attritional loss information for Zero's is hard to come by. However, according to Navy statistics, there were 431 F4F's lost during the war, of which 229 were due to three non-combat related methods. 49 due to non-operational reasons while on combat missions, 112 while on non-combat related flights, 68 on carriers or land. That is a total of 229 out of 431. That is 53%. The important figure is the 49 lost while on combat missions to non-combat related reasons. Such reasons as lost, running out of fuel, mechanical failure, landing and takeoff problems etc. That is 13.5% of aircraft losses due to non-combat related reasons while on combat missions. I can't believe the Japanese losses were less than ours.

[Ed Rotondaro]

My focus is to find out what the aircraft was really capable of - and try to strip away the myths that seem to have appeared around the aircraft. I don't go as far as some to say it was a terrible plane, it had faults and followed a far different design philosophy than did the US - but it was there, and did the jobs it was supposed to do quite well for a few years.
The aircraft as designed initially had the equipment that allowed for long range navigation. If that was removed - and if you're watching bombers I suppose you don't need it - then that's not (necessarily) the fault of the design. Just don't blink and loose track of the bombers!!!
Saburo Sakai made it back to his base with one eye shot out and partially paralyzed. I can't find the book (Samurai) so I'm not sure what meathod(s) were used by him to get home. It did show that a pilot could manage long range navigation over water though.

Kyle:

Sakai was wounded over Guadalcanal and had about a 300 mile flight to Rabaul. He kept passing out from pain and managed to navigate by spotting some IJN cruisers (on their way to the battle of Savo Island). He barely mae it to Rabaul. Interestingly, he was one of the pioneers in how to coax extra range out the Zero for long flights by adjusting the throttle setting to keep fuel use down to the minimum. That also hepled save his life.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The reason I brought this up is because I remember either reading, or hearing via a documentary, that the Zeke had problems with navigation to distant targets. Not all targets were easily visible all the time. When I talked to Dennis about this topic the other day I had asked him to investigate if there was a higher attrition rate due to navigational errors for the Zeke when (a) they had no aircraft with navigators to follow and (b) they did not take along their navigational equipment. I keep hearing how people mention "well they could fly so damn far!".. great, fly a plane hundreds of miles in the Pacific at cruising altitude and then fight in combat and then fly home - sounds simple right? Most pilots will tell you fatigue will be a serious problem for a plane with no autopilot, flying in the Pacific heat could be unbearable (depending on your altitude), no way to get up and stretch your legs, no way to use the bathroom comfortably, no way to bandage your wounds if your injured, etc.. I remember reading of pilots that could not even get out of their cockpits after long flights under their own power at times. Now tie this in with the fact that if you fubar even the slightest on your navigation you may very well never get home.. especially if your flying back to a ship or island that is in the middle of the ocean among many other islands that might look the similiar. There was occurances where aircraft landing on the wrong carriers, air strips, etc..

It makes for an interesting research project.

Chris:

I think a good deal of the attritional losses for the Zeroes were due to the long range flying over the oceanas you mention. Navigating it is very difficult and then if they have less than reliable raadios or no radios at all this just compounds it. You also see much greater attritional losses from 1943 onwards due to the lack of flying hours for Japanese pilots. While long range is nice, there are limits to what you can subject a pilot to. Especially if you want to try for more than one sortie per day.

[old_pop2000]

Some considerations when figuring missions.

1. Course heading and times are figured with ground speed, not indicated airspeed or IAS. Ground speed is IAS plus wind, and wind is a vector quantity.

2. range is figured with approx. 20 minutes of engine warm up, 30 sec of takeoff, time to climb to cruising altitude, cruising speed at a particular altitude, takeoff weight. Altitude changes during flight will consume fuel so will have to be figured. I.E. Zero's will climb from 10,000 ft while escorting bombers, to 13,000 ft to have an altitude advantage over F4F's from Henderson or carriers. That 3000 ft. increase will require increasing power and prop setting which will use more fuel. The higher you fly, the more fuel you will use.

3. Weather conditions to and from the target and over the target may require lower altitude which may consume more fuel, if target is missed.

4. When returning to a carrier, you will have to enter the pattern, which means crossing from starboard to port across the carriers path, turn onto a reciprocal course to the carriers flying parallel the turning to port to line up for final then turn to port, to line up for final approach. Final approach is usually accomplished with full flaps, wheels down and locked, canopy open and engine to full rich, full power and engine rpm's to max. Again, a high fuel usage period.

[old_pop2000]

Kyle:

Sakai was wounded over Guadalcanal and had about a 300 mile flight to Rabaul. He kept passing out from pain and managed to navigate by spotting some IJN cruisers (on their way to the battle of Savo Island). He barely mae it to Rabaul. Interestingly, he was one of the pioneers in how to coax extra range out the Zero for long flights by adjusting the throttle setting to keep fuel use down to the minimum. That also hepled save his life.
Sakai would have done three things to get home:

1. Reduce engine rpm by using the pitch control to 1700 rpm

2. Fuel mixture control to lean

3. Throttle setting to minimum cruising speed

4. Slow descent to 1500 ft to reduce fuel

Remember also, he had a tail wind to assist. I will research the strength and direction of that tail wind based on meterological data available.

[Kyle Holgate]

I will give it credit where it is due.. high maneuverability to one direction (moderate in the other direction), good rate of climb, and excellent range.. but all of these credits came at a terrible cost in speed (seriously underpowered), durability, combat endurance (Most contemporaries had NO 20mm cannon), pilot efficiency (try to drive enen a good comfortable luxury car for 6 hours non stop, can we blame this on the plane? Honestly?), poor high altitude handling (No problem early war), poor high speed handling (again, not too much of an issue early war), no protection (contemporary 1st generation monoplanes were not really much better), no (or worthless) communications, (Some pilots removed the radios, that doesn't mean the aircraft was flawed.) etc.. the credits did not outweigh the flaws. It ended up being much like the Fokker EIII of WW1... it was feared due to being an unknown factor but once the enemy realized what they were fighting against the fear rapidly dissipated. All of these flaws meant that the best of the best of the Japanese pilots with all of their combat experience... were only breaking even with the USN/USMC pilots that were far less experienced and flying less maneuverable aircraft. That to me is not the showing of a great fighter plane and definitely the wrong plane for the job and to make matters worse almost completely non-upgradeable. In many ways once the IJN took on a competant and modern air force the Zeke failed them miserably as it was poor at CAP and escort duties due to lack of coordination (if not used correctly that is NOT a flaw of the aircraft itself), again no radios to warn each other of impending danger and too slow to catch interceptors diving on them, if they could even dive with them at all without tearing their wings off or becoming a flying brick at above 250mph. Many wargames IMHO greatly overestimate the capabilities of this over glorified fighter (agree, but that doesn't mean we have to under-glorify it to balance things out). The only real time it showed marked improvement over an enemy was when it was up against obsolete, in both aircraft and tactics, Chinese and Russian air forces. This is not trying to say the plane itself could NOT be dangerous if flown by a competant pilot vs someone silly enough to dogfight with it (Dogfighting was the name of the game in 1940. The 109, Spitfire, Hurricane, DE-520 were all dogfighters. Let's not ding the Zero more than we need to, just enough) .. even silly obsolete Gladiators killed more modern Italian and German aircraft at the start of the war at times but when looking at the overall picture, IMHO, the Zeke was a serious liability to the IJN and they only had a short chance of time to make a real difference.. after Midway the Pacific War caved in on them. (The Zero allowed for the war to begin with. Without it covering the Pacific to the extent they did was impossible in 1941. No other plane was as cabable of doing what the zero did in 1941.)

Thanks.

Comments by me are underlined above.
I think part of the problem is that the Zero was technically a first generation monoplane, or second if you call first generation the ones with fixed gear. It was still capable enough - or more than capable enough to handle itself in the sky against most opponents partially due to surprise, partially due to training, partially due to getting where it was needed when it was needed. I can't really objectively ding it for dogfigting ability at the expense of speed though - most air to air combat was at slower speeds and even the F-22 is a dogfighter. I think that the Japanese kept it around longer than they should have and yes, it wasn't an airframe that was as versitile as some like the 109 or Spitfire.
So I'm not claiming it was a superplane or deserving of much of the overblown status it was given (like Bismarck in some regards). Neither though, looking as objectively as possible can I honestly say it was bad. It was used in tactically flawed ways in many cases which tends to make it seem worse than it was - just as in some cases it was used in ways making it seem better. The truth, I think is somewhere in between.

[old_pop2000]

One of issues with the Type 00 fighter was that when the early difficiencies were discovered, the attempts to correct them, in many cases, took away good features.

When complaints from the squadrons about lack of adequate ammunition supply and forward speed were forwarded to Mitsubishi, they installed a new engine, which was heavier and used more fuel. This dropped the range and that was a valuable asset to the A6M2, especially when they flew from Formosa to the Philippines in support of the landings. They also increased the ammunition supply, which added more weight. The addition of the new engine, also changed the aerodynamics since it required a new cowling. The Sakai 21 had a two speed supercharger which increased altitude performance, however the longer engine required the engine mounts to be shorter which caused the fuel tank to be smaller and hence, less range. Also, the folding wings were removed which shortened the wings giving better roll rate in a dive.

[Warship NWS]

(Most contemporaries had NO 20mm cannon),

With only 7 seconds of effective firepower (the most conservative pilots could only get possibly 3 bursts) and very low muzzle velocity.. not a very valuable weapon compared to the HMGs on USN/USMC fighters were armed with that had better range, better muzzle velocity, better projectile cone density, and a lot more ammunition - which is absolutely critical if your not a crack shot. Not until it was loaded with 120 rounds and improved MV did it become a reasonable weapon for the early 1940s.


(try to drive enen a good comfortable luxury car for 6 hours non stop, can we blame this on the plane? Honestly?)

Ok .. drive a non-comfortable car for 6 hours with no air conditioning, damn little leg or elbow room, and then be expected to perform well in combat and then do that 6 hours home again - don't forget that in a plane you have to take off, form up, and land also -- and remember you have no autopilot (or cruise control). Ergonomics was NOT just invented recently. Even the crew performance of a tank varied widely based on internal design and even a few minutes of discomfort could cause serious disorientation for tank crews.. aircraft often magnified that problem as you simply could not get out of the plane and shake of the effects of a confined space.


poor high altitude handling (No problem early war), poor high speed handling (again, not too much of an issue early war),

All other major opponent aircraft could fly higher and still retain good performance and all other major opponents could fly faster and still retain good control. Anything above 250mph and the Zeke became a target.. not good when all of your enemies can push 300-350+ mph.. this gets worse in a dive.


no protection (contemporary 1st generation monoplanes were not really much better),

a) This is a critical flaw for any aircraft that belongs to a nation that cannot keep up with pilot training so every pilot lost is a serious blow to the most effective force you have that can help retain control of the Pacific.. your fighters, and b) Most other early 1940s aircraft could take a reasonable amount of punishment - especially the P-40, early P-38, and F4F which the Zeke was fighting against the most and which also made the 7.7mm guns on the Zeke nearly useless.


no (or worthless) communications, (Some pilots removed the radios, that doesn't mean the aircraft was flawed.) (if not used correctly that is NOT a flaw of the aircraft itself),

An aircraft is a combat system.. any part of that system that detracts from its ability to perform the mission it was intended for is a flaw. Radios were the GPS/communications of WW2.. without them you have lack of coordinated tactics and control.. and no chance of any team work if you tried it.. and this flaw very likely cost the lives of many Zeke pilots, the bombers they were escorting, and the ships they were defending.


Many wargames IMHO greatly overestimate the capabilities of this over glorified fighter (agree, but that doesn't mean we have to under-glorify it to balance things out).

I prefer wargames be historicaly balanced both in research and combat mechanics.


(Dogfighting was the name of the game in 1940. The 109, Spitfire, Hurricane, DE-520 were all dogfighters. Let's not ding the Zero more than we need to, just enough)

Tell that to the Red Baron who almost never ever dogfighted. You DO NOT WANT to dogfight unless you are forced to. Manueverability is more defensive then offensive. You want to kill before the enemy can maneuver.. not after. Turning will mean nothing if the enemy can simply dive away or outrun you. Turning is ONLY usefull IF you know your being attacked.


(The Zero allowed for the war to begin with. Without it covering the Pacific to the extent they did was impossible in 1941. No other plane was as cabable of doing what the zero did in 1941.)

Ok.. the Zeke could outrange and out turn all other fighters in the early 1940s..and what strategic advantage did this give the Japanese at the start of the war exactly (other then the defeats of the Russian and Chinese air forces) and was it worth the price they paid for those attributes? I seriously believe it was not worth the price.

[old_pop2000]

Why don't we go back to the original design requirements for the aircraft and judge the aircraft from there.

Prototype 12

Wing span less than 12 meters.
Max speed 500 km/hr at 4000 meters
Time to climb: less than 3.5 minutes to 3000 meters altitude
Endurance: full power on internal fuel only, 1.2 to 1.5 hours at 3000 meters
In an overload condition using both internal and external tanks, 1.5 to 2. 0 hours.
At economical cruiser speed, 6 to 8 hours
Take off field length: less than 70 meters with a headwind of 12 m/sec

Dogfight performance- equal to the Type 96 aircraft
Armament - two 20 mm cannons with two 7.7 mm MG's.
Communications Equip. - Radio and direction finder

Ok, those are the original prototype 12 requirements as presented to Horikoshi in 1937. He was not asked to bid on the fighter, he was told to design and build it. Immediately, it stands out to anyone that this fighter is going to be both an interceptor and and escort fighter. An escort fighter has to protect bombers on their missions. It requires long range, adequate performance and speed to deal with enemy aircraft. An interceptor, on the other hand, must have a high rate of climb, adequate armament and equipment but dogfight performance superior to that of the enemy escort fighters. The real performance catch in the requirements was the range and performance issues. Long range means a large amount of fuel which translates to a heavy aircraft, while a heavy aircraft will usually not perform well as a dogfighter in an interceptor role. Designing an aircraft to have both long range and high performance meant sacrificing something.

In his attempt to solve the problem of range and performance, Horikoshi realized that he needed a light and powerful engine. None were available. He also had the problem of minimizing the use of strategic materials in the building of the aircraft. Aluminum was a strategic material as was some of the high temperature steels used in the engine components.

I am not going to bore you with more details. But suffice it to say, Horikoshi had to design the lightest structure possible to save both materials and weight, use the smallest engine possible to allow for the best fuel mileage and gain the desired power to weight to achieve the desired performance. He realized that the lack of self sealing tanks and armor was risky but it was necessary. To illustrate this weight saving problem, it was policy to control anything heavier than 1/100,000 of the airplanes final weight. This is about 53 ounces, based on a weight of 5313 pounds. (check my math)

Horikoshi also realized that the requirements for turning radius and takeoff performance required sacrificing diving speed, lateral performance and flight speed, which is exactly what happened.

It was the Japanese pilots like Genda, who were responsible for the requirements and it was on their shoulders that the Zero's future rested. Much of there requests were based on experiences in China against inferior Russian and other foreign designs along with poor Chinese pilots. From these experiences, they drew the wrong conclusions and the Zero was the result.

Now, does this mean they build a bad aircraft. No, but it does say that they emphasized and valued the wrong parameters in aerial combat. But, in their defense, there was no combat experience to use except what they had encountered. There was no European war at the time, no BOB so no combat experience, save their own, to base their evaluations on. Hence, they arrived at the wrong conclusions about what was more valuable in air to air combat. They valued turning performance and climb rate, which are all defensive parameters as opposed to diving speed, horizontal speed and roll rate which are all characteristics desired in an offensive fighter. So, what was the Zero? An interceptor or a long range offensive escort fighter? It was both and none. In attempting to build a jack of all trades aircraft, they ended up with a plane with certain excellent performance figures unfortunately not the ones that were going to allow it to succeed in battle. With the light structure and small engine, there was no room in the structure for enhancements and when they were added, performance figures dropped.

But this isn't the whole story, much of the story of the early days of the Pacific war and clashes between the Zero and the Wildcat revolve around the leaders. It was James Thach, Indian Joe Bauer, Butch O'hare, James Flatley who developed tactics to use the strengths of the Wildcat and the US pilots ability to perform at a high level in deflection shooting that eventually ruled the day. Our .50 caliber MG's high rate of fire and flat trajectory coupled with the stability of the Wildcat, along with the excellent deflection shooting of the US pilots allowed them to take snap shots from the high side at Japanese aircraft and get enough hits to destroy the lightly built Zero. Japanese pilots rarely took shots at deflection angles greater than 30 degrees. Our pilots were trained rigorously to shoot from 90 degrees at a fleeting target.

Was the Zero a superior aircraft to the F4F Wildcat? Based on combat performance, I would say that it wasn't. However, the above mentioned factors must be considered in that evaluation. On a plane for plane basis, the Zero could out perform the Wildcat. However, in combat, it isn't always the better plane that wins, it usually is the best pilots, using the aircraft's best performance features coupled with superior tactics that wins the majority of the time.

[Warship NWS]

But this isn't the whole story, much of the story of the early days of the Pacific war and clashes between the Zero and the Wildcat revolve around the leaders. It was James Thach, Indian Joe Bauer, Butch O'hare, James Flatley who developed tactics to use the strengths of the Wildcat and the US pilots ability to perform at a high level in deflection shooting that eventually ruled the day. Our .50 caliber MG's high rate of fire and flat trajectory coupled with the stability of the Wildcat, along with the excellent deflection shooting of the US pilots allowed them to take snap shots from the high side at Japanese aircraft and get enough hits to destroy the lightly built Zero. Japanese pilots rarely took shots at deflection angles greater than 30 degrees. Our pilots were trained rigorously to shoot from 90 degrees at a fleeting target.

Thanks Dennis, to follow up on the "snap shot",

This is a factor of air combat I have raised before.. more ammunition means you can take more snap shots - 1 second bursts (snap shot), 2 second bursts (drawing a bead on the target), and 3 second bursts (drawing a bead and sawing a target apart), to try and acquire damaging hits. The better the pilot and the more ammo you have the more, and longer, bursts you can fire, ESPECIALLY snap shots - which are for the most part opportunity shots. When you are short on combat endurance, the Zeke was ONLY 7 seconds, you HAVE TO CONSERVE AMMUNITION which eliminates many gunnery opportunities while waiting for a prime shot. All the fuel and range in the world wont mean dip squat if your nothing but a target with empty guns and a fighter has ONLY ONE REASON FOR EXISTING.. a flying gun! This big wonderfull cannons HAVE TO HIT SOMETHING to kill it and if the pilot, remember he is in combat, has to worry constantly about running out of gun rounds then he is less likely to take those "snap shots".


Was the Zero a superior aircraft to the F4F Wildcat? Based on combat performance, I would say that it wasn't. However, the above mentioned factors must be considered in that evaluation. On a plane for plane basis, the Zero could out perform the Wildcat. However, in combat, it isn't always the better plane that wins, it usually is the best pilots, using the aircraft's best performance features coupled with superior tactics that wins the majority of the time.

Absolutely. The most lethal aircraft of WW2 were NOT always the most maneuverable nor that had the greatest range or "initial" climb rate. How well the pilots could coordinate and fight with the aircraft was often far more critical to winning aerial battles and a well balanced aircraft often gave a greater degree of tactical flexibility.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

I've been reading a Q & A with a former Zero pilot on line. He stated that navigation was by two methods, DED and celestrial. DED stands for Deductive Reckoning. I am not certain about the celestrial except that at high altitudes, the stars are visible, so you could see the north star or another navigation star in the southern hemisphere to guide by.

In DED you had to use airspeed and WCA. WCA is an abbreviation for wind correction angle. He describes a unique way of determining the WCA in flight. The Zero's at his base had red lines painted on the horizonal stabilizers. You would align those lines with the crests of the waves and read the angle off of the gyrocompass. This would be the WCA and then you could apply the rudder to compensate for the this angle in your course. Here is a brief instruction on navigating by DED.
"Dead" Reckoning (or "Ded" for Deductive Reckoning) is another basic navigational method used by low speed, small airplane pilots. It is based on mathematical calculations to plot a course using the elements of a course line, airspeed, course, heading and elapsed time. During this process pilots make use of a flight computer. Manual or electronic flight computers are used to calculate time-speed-distance measurements, fuel consumption, density altitude and many other en route data necessary for navigation.

The estimated time en route (ETE) can be calculated using the flight distance, the airspeed and direction to be flown. If the route is flown at the airspeed planned, when the planned flight time is up, the destination should be visible from the cockpit. Navigating using known measured and recorded times, distances, directions and speeds makes it possible for positions or "fixes" to be calculated or solved graphically. A "fix" is a position in the sky reached by an aircraft following a specific route. Pilots flying the exact same route regularly can compute the flight time needed to fly from one fix to the next. If the pilot reaches that fix at the calculated time, then the pilot knows the aircraft is on course. The positions or "fixes" are based on the latest known or calculated positions. Direction is measured by a compass or gyro-compass. Time is measured on-board by the best means possible. And speed is either calculated or measured using on-board equipment.

He is asked about radio communications and states that the performance was bad. He said that on certain days, the frequency of the US and japanese aircraft were the same, and he could only hear english speaking voices. He stated that this was an indication of the performance difference. Most of the time, the radio telegraphic system was used. All pilots had to learn morse code.

In summary, I believe we probably have three ways of navigating, depending on whether you were land based or carrier based. DED, or deductive reckoning was the primary method of navigation with celestrial next then radio compass. I suspect that the radio compass was used more by the carrier pilots as they approached the carriers. Celestrial would be on useful in clear conditions, so I think that DED was the primary. The "fix" talked about could be a known star and this could used to help maintain course. Landforms could also be use. Time was measure by a clock or a watch usually on their wrist or in the instrument panel. The Zero's would accompany the bombers, who would perform primary navigation however a return vector would be given to all pilots before takeoff. This is the heading to follow for returning to base.

I hope this research is valuable to you.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Attritional loss information for Zero's is hard to come by. However, according to Navy statistics, there were 431 F4F's lost during the war, of which 229 were due to three non-combat related methods. 49 due to non-operational reasons while on combat missions, 112 while on non-combat related flights, 68 on carriers or land. That is a total of 229 out of 431. That is 53%. The important figure is the 49 lost while on combat missions to non-combat related reasons. Such reasons as lost, running out of fuel, mechanical failure, landing and takeoff problems etc. That is 13.5% of aircraft losses due to non-combat related reasons while on combat missions. I can't believe the Japanese losses were less than ours.

Dennis:

That is a cogent point about planes lost due to fuel. You probably can give us some insight into this: Apparently when flying in close formation which US pilots had been trained to do, they used up more fuel. Many Midway aircraft had to ditch because of this on their way back to their carriers. Is this also a problem with jet aircraft? Thanks!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Sakai would have done three things to get home:

1. Reduce engine rpm by using the pitch control to 1700 rpm

2. Fuel mixture control to lean

3. Throttle setting to minimum cruising speed

4. Slow descent to 1500 ft to reduce fuel

Remember also, he had a tail wind to assist. I will research the strength and direction of that tail wind based on meterological data available.


Dennis:

Once the topic shifted to Sakai, I pulled out my copy of "Samurai" and read the chapter about his being wounded. He did all the things you mentioned as well as biting the inside of his mouth to keep from passing out. A very barve pilot whom I'm glad survived to tell the story from the other side of the fence.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

That is a cogent point about planes lost due to fuel. You probably can give us some insight into this: Apparently when flying in close formation which US pilots had been trained to do, they used up more fuel. Many Midway aircraft had to ditch because of this on their way back to their carriers. Is this also a problem with jet aircraft? Thanks!
The issue of fuel conservation is a big point for both sides. For the Japanese, the formation they flew, the VIC, required the two wingmen to use the throttle to stay in formation. This consumed more fuel and caused many wingmen to fail to return. It was incumbent on the leader to fly conservatively, and smoothly to prevent that problem.

In the US, and European nations, the VIC was discarded at the beginning of the war for the spread formation, or line abreast with greater distance between aircraft when preparing for combat. Transiting to and from the target, they usually flew in the finger four. Again, this formation eliminated the need to jockey the throttle to stay in formation.

In the spread or finger four, the usual distance between aircraft was based on the turning radius of the aircraft, it was not fixed.

As for modern jets, they usually fly the combat spread, with all aircraft in a line abreast formation, to allow their radars to be used to the max. The wider turning circles usually means that the fighters will fly about a half a mile to a mile apart. Usually just barely in visual range. Bombers, will fly closer to coordinate the bomb runs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Why don't we go back to the original design requirements for the aircraft and judge the aircraft from there.

Prototype 12

Wing span less than 12 meters.
Max speed 500 km/hr at 4000 meters
Time to climb: less than 3.5 minutes to 3000 meters altitude
Endurance: full power on internal fuel only, 1.2 to 1.5 hours at 3000 meters
In an overload condition using both internal and external tanks, 1.5 to 2. 0 hours.
At economical cruiser speed, 6 to 8 hours
Take off field length: less than 70 meters with a headwind of 12 m/sec

Dogfight performance- equal to the Type 96 aircraft
Armament - two 20 mm cannons with two 7.7 mm MG's.
Communications Equip. - Radio and direction finder

Ok, those are the original prototype 12 requirements as presented to Horikoshi in 1937. He was not asked to bid on the fighter, he was told to design and build it. Immediately, it stands out to anyone that this fighter is going to be both an interceptor and and escort fighter. An escort fighter has to protect bombers on their missions. It requires long range, adequate performance and speed to deal with enemy aircraft. An interceptor, on the other hand, must have a high rate of climb, adequate armament and equipment but dogfight performance superior to that of the enemy escort fighters. The real performance catch in the requirements was the range and performance issues. Long range means a large amount of fuel which translates to a heavy aircraft, while a heavy aircraft will usually not perform well as a dogfighter in an interceptor role. Designing an aircraft to have both long range and high performance meant sacrificing something.

In his attempt to solve the problem of range and performance, Horikoshi realized that he needed a light and powerful engine. None were available. He also had the problem of minimizing the use of strategic materials in the building of the aircraft. Aluminum was a strategic material as was some of the high temperature steels used in the engine components.

I am not going to bore you with more details. But suffice it to say, Horikoshi had to design the lightest structure possible to save both materials and weight, use the smallest engine possible to allow for the best fuel mileage and gain the desired power to weight to achieve the desired performance. He realized that the lack of self sealing tanks and armor was risky but it was necessary. To illustrate this weight saving problem, it was policy to control anything heavier than 1/100,000 of the airplanes final weight. This is about 53 ounces, based on a weight of 5313 pounds. (check my math)

Horikoshi also realized that the requirements for turning radius and takeoff performance required sacrificing diving speed, lateral performance and flight speed, which is exactly what happened.

It was the Japanese pilots like Genda, who were responsible for the requirements and it was on their shoulders that the Zero's future rested. Much of there requests were based on experiences in China against inferior Russian and other foreign designs along with poor Chinese pilots. From these experiences, they drew the wrong conclusions and the Zero was the result.

Now, does this mean they build a bad aircraft. No, but it does say that they emphasized and valued the wrong parameters in aerial combat. But, in their defense, there was no combat experience to use except what they had encountered. There was no European war at the time, no BOB so no combat experience, save their own, to base their evaluations on. Hence, they arrived at the wrong conclusions about what was more valuable in air to air combat. They valued turning performance and climb rate, which are all defensive parameters as opposed to diving speed, horizontal speed and roll rate which are all characteristics desired in an offensive fighter. So, what was the Zero? An interceptor or a long range offensive escort fighter? It was both and none. In attempting to build a jack of all trades aircraft, they ended up with a plane with certain excellent performance figures unfortunately not the ones that were going to allow it to succeed in battle. With the light structure and small engine, there was no room in the structure for enhancements and when they were added, performance figures dropped.

But this isn't the whole story, much of the story of the early days of the Pacific war and clashes between the Zero and the Wildcat revolve around the leaders. It was James Thach, Indian Joe Bauer, Butch O'hare, James Flatley who developed tactics to use the strengths of the Wildcat and the US pilots ability to perform at a high level in deflection shooting that eventually ruled the day. Our .50 caliber MG's high rate of fire and flat trajectory coupled with the stability of the Wildcat, along with the excellent deflection shooting of the US pilots allowed them to take snap shots from the high side at Japanese aircraft and get enough hits to destroy the lightly built Zero. Japanese pilots rarely took shots at deflection angles greater than 30 degrees. Our pilots were trained rigorously to shoot from 90 degrees at a fleeting target.

Was the Zero a superior aircraft to the F4F Wildcat? Based on combat performance, I would say that it wasn't. However, the above mentioned factors must be considered in that evaluation. On a plane for plane basis, the Zero could out perform the Wildcat. However, in combat, it isn't always the better plane that wins, it usually is the best pilots, using the aircraft's best performance features coupled with superior tactics that wins the majority of the time.

Dennis:

Superb analysis and summation! I especially like the categorization of defensive and offensive maneuvers. I gather that was something you and Chris mulled over? Regarding the US leadership, it's interesting to note that once the "fear factor" of the Zero was seen in the light of day and combat experience, the exchange rate between it and the Wildcat became about equal. And then when more capable aircraft came into service, the slaughter began. It is interesting that Japan had such a hard time developing and producing newer designs that might have contested the air better. I gather that the US had along electronics, a far larger aeronautical industrial base to fall back on.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Once the topic shifted to Sakai, I pulled out my copy of "Samurai" and read the chapter about his being wounded. He did all the things you mentioned as well as biting the inside of his mouth to keep from passing out. A very barve pilot whom I'm glad survived to tell the story from the other side of the fence.
Sakai stayed low because he did not want to expend fuel to climb but also to use the waves to give him WCA or wind correction adjustment for his DED navigation. It also kept him from being spotted by prowling F4F's. From 20,000 feet, he would be almost invisible.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The issue of fuel conservation is a big point for both sides. For the Japanese, the formation they flew, the VIC, required the two wingmen to use the throttle to stay in formation. This consumed more fuel and caused many wingmen to fail to return. It was incumbent on the leader to fly conservatively, and smoothly to prevent that problem.

In the US, and European nations, the VIC was discarded at the beginning of the war for the spread formation, or line abreast with greater distance between aircraft when preparing for combat. Transiting to and from the target, they usually flew in the finger four. Again, this formation eliminated the need to jockey the throttle to stay in formation.

In the spread or finger four, the usual distance between aircraft was based on the turning radius of the aircraft, it was not fixed.

As for modern jets, they usually fly the combat spread, with all aircraft in a line abreast formation, to allow their radars to be used to the max. The wider turning circles usually means that the fighters will fly about a half a mile to a mile apart. Usually just barely in visual range. Bombers, will fly closer to coordinate the bomb runs.

Dennis:

Thanks, that was a prompt reply! Was the throttle needed because the leader's plane was pushing the wingman's around?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

That is a cogent point about planes lost due to fuel. You probably can give us some insight into this: Apparently when flying in close formation which US pilots had been trained to do, they used up more fuel. Many Midway aircraft had to ditch because of this on their way back to their carriers. Is this also a problem with jet aircraft? Thanks!
The Japanese were behind in radio, radar and other electronic aids. While they had such devices, their sophistication was low. This was partially due to their separation from the US and Great Britain after their invasion of China. After that, they were cut off from technological assistance from the US. As I stated in another post, their type 3 KU Radio Compass was a copy of a Fairchild device. We had progressed far beyond with the Zed Baker 1 homing device. Many downed aircraft were strafed to destroy that device from reaching the wrong hands.

As for tactics, the initial investigation into new tactics using the F4F against the Japanese fighers was conducted by Lt. Commander James Thach at NAS Kaneohe. In his office, he played with matchsticks to device a formation that would break the Japanese pilots optimal firing solution which was a shooting from the six o's clock position. He reasoned that if one section of a four plane division spotted a diving enemy aircraft, without radioing the other section, they would turn towards the enemy aircraft and the other section would immediately spot the maneuver and turn the opposite way. This gave the Japanese pilot or pilots two targets moving almost 90 degrees across the field of view, a full deflection shot which they were not trained to accomplish. It also caused them to have to decide which two to chase, knowing that which ever one they chose, the other would latch onto their tail and it was over, quickly. He eventually taught his squadron, then wrote up his tactics and advise into document which became fighter doctrine. These tactics were eventually taught to Jim Flatley, then Butch O'Hare when he brought his fighter squadron to NAS Kaneohe. Thatch was sent to NAS North Island and that is where he consulted and discussed the new system with Flatley. Eventually, while at Kaneohe, he also taught Indian Joe Bauer. Thach believed that the Navy pilots had to stop complaining about the F4F-3 or 4 and simply find ways of fighting to stay alive until the new Hellcat was issued to the fleet. The only change they wanted was the inclusion of drop tanks, which they received just before Operation Watchtower.

Hope that helps.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Thanks, that was a prompt reply! Was the throttle needed because the leader's plane was pushing the wingman's around?
No, it was because in the VIC, the lead aircraft was at the head of an inverted V letter. The wingmen were at the ends of the strokes. It was very precise formation flying which required a constant throttle movement to stay in you position behind and level with the leader. This was different in the spread.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Japanese were behind in radio, radar and other electronic aids. While they had such devices, their sophistication was low. This was partially due to their separation from the US and Great Britain after their invasion of China. After that, they were cut off from technological assistance from the US. As I stated in another post, their type 3 KU Radio Compass was a copy of a Fairchild device. We had progressed far beyond with the Zed Baker 1 homing device. Many downed aircraft were strafed to destroy that device from reaching the wrong hands.

As for tactics, the initial investigation into new tactics using the F4F against the Japanese fighers was conducted by Lt. Commander James Thach at NAS Kaneohe. In his office, he played with matchsticks to device a formation that would break the Japanese pilots optimal firing solution which was a shooting from the six o's clock position. He reasoned that if one section of a four plane division spotted a diving enemy aircraft, without radioing the other section, they would turn towards the enemy aircraft and the other section would immediately spot the maneuver and turn the opposite way. This gave the Japanese pilot or pilots two targets moving almost 90 degrees across the field of view, a full deflection shot which they were not trained to accomplish. It also caused them to have to decide which two to chase, knowing that which ever one they chose, the other would latch onto their tail and it was over, quickly. He eventually taught his squadron, then wrote up his tactics and advise into document which became fighter doctrine. These tactics were eventually taught to Jim Flatley, then Butch O'Hare when he brought his fighter squadron to NAS Kaneohe. Thatch was sent to NAS North Island and that is where he consulted and discussed the new system with Flatley. Eventually, while at Kaneohe, he also taught Indian Joe Bauer. Thach believed that the Navy pilots had to stop complaining about the F4F-3 or 4 and simply find ways of fighting to stay alive until the new Hellcat was issued to the fleet. The only change they wanted was the inclusion of drop tanks, which they received just before Operation Watchtower.

Hope that helps.

Dennis:

So these pilots knew that the Hellcat was in the piple line? Interesting.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

So these pilots knew that the Hellcat was in the piple line? Interesting.
Yes, they did. The first pilot's comment flight took place in August of 1943 for the F6F-3. But test flight had been accomplished earlier. Reports had been flying around from BuAer.

[George LeSauvage]

Just a few questions:

1. Didn't the Zero drub the Hurricanes at Trincomalee? I'd assume they weren't incompetent.

2. What were the effective rates of climb of contemporary fighters? Specifically, how well do we know how this varied at various altitudes? (Dennis?) IIRC, the Zero was best in show, in 1941-42, but I'm not confident about that.

3. As to navigation, how good was ours, for single seaters? How much better than the IJN's? As to that, did the RN get much advantage with the navigators in their fighters? (I don't mean, was it worth the cost, but what was the gain?)

4. I don't get Chris's points about (a) the need for lots of ammo, & (b) the tactical need of quick hit-and-run attacks (no dogfights). They seem to me incompatible. IF you go by the dicta Boelke, sure, you run in, shoot, & run out. But it seems to me that the fact that you do need many bursts (& different ones for aiming & for killing), you're implying you stick around &, eventually, get sucked into a dogfight. I may be wrong here, but my impression is that, despite the recurrent theme of "don't dogfight", it seems somehow inevitable that dogfights just keep happening.

5. A point my uncle once made, was that the Zero's guns were not aligned correctly for convergance. You'd see the tracers going off in different directions when they were shooting at you. OTOH, this may've been only true late in the war (he was in SB2C's in the 2nd Wasp).

6. If the Zero didn't present problems to the USN, at the start of the war, then why did Thach bother to work out new tactics; if it did, doesn't this imply there was some advantage over even the F4F.

7. Generally, what is it that makes a fighter better or worse able to be upgraded? What did the Spit have over the Zeke in this regard?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Just a few questions:

1. Didn't the Zero drub the Hurricanes at Trincomalee? I'd assume they weren't incompetent.

2. What were the effective rates of climb of contemporary fighters? Specifically, how well do we know how this varied at various altitudes? (Dennis?) IIRC, the Zero was best in show, in 1941-42, but I'm not confident about that.

3. As to navigation, how good was ours, for single seaters? How much better than the IJN's? As to that, did the RN get much advantage with the navigators in their fighters? (I don't mean, was it worth the cost, but what was the gain?)

4. I don't get Chris's points about (a) the need for lots of ammo, & (b) the tactical need of quick hit-and-run attacks (no dogfights). They seem to me incompatible. IF you go by the dicta Boelke, sure, you run in, shoot, & run out. But it seems to me that the fact that you do need many bursts (& different ones for aiming & for killing), you're implying you stick around &, eventually, get sucked into a dogfight. I may be wrong here, but my impression is that, despite the recurrent theme of "don't dogfight", it seems somehow inevitable that dogfights just keep happening.

5. A point my uncle once made, was that the Zero's guns were not aligned correctly for convergance. You'd see the tracers going off in different directions when they were shooting at you. OTOH, this may've been only true late in the war (he was in SB2C's in the 2nd Wasp).

6. If the Zero didn't present problems to the USN, at the start of the war, then why did Thach bother to work out new tactics; if it did, doesn't this imply there was some advantage over even the F4F.

7. Generally, what is it that makes a fighter better or worse able to be upgraded? What did the Spit have over the Zeke in this regard?


George:

Actually you may be missing Chris' point about extra ammo. If allows you to stay in the fight longer, especially if you are on an escort mission and might have to fight your way in and out. If you look at the dive and zoom tactics favored by Allied fighters, you gain altitude, bounce your target and hopefully score hits. If not you use the dive to gain speed and climb fast and set up for another attack. Even if you are not dog fighting, this means you have more chances to attack. For example let's look at Cmdr. McCampbell's nine kills in a single engagement during the Leyte Gulf battles (his wingman bagged six). He used up all but six rounds in one machine gun to do this. And it was all through repeated dive and zoom attacks. I'll bet he appreciated all that ammo LOL!

Ther Hurricane's bad experiences came because they had no clear idea of the Zero's capabilities. By trying to fight the way did against Geman aircraft they got clocked by the more manueverable Zero. Most German fighter pilots considered the Hurricane very little of a threat when compared to the Spitfire since it lacked performance. Indeed the Hurricane was more useful attacking bombers while the Spitfire took on the fighter escorts.

I would say that a better fighter was more capable of fighting in a wide range of ways. ALso upgradeability certain didn't hurt. The Spitfire was a vey sound design, able to take increases in armament and engine size while still retaining its excellent handling qualities. Zero upgrades usually made the plane more sluggish, shortened its operational range, and lessened its rate of climb. The main problem was the inability of the Japanese to develop more powerful and reliable engines.

[old_pop2000]

Just a few questions:

1. Didn't the Zero drub the Hurricanes at Trincomalee? I'd assume they weren't incompetent.

2. What were the effective rates of climb of contemporary fighters? Specifically, how well do we know how this varied at various altitudes? (Dennis?) IIRC, the Zero was best in show, in 1941-42, but I'm not confident about that.

3. As to navigation, how good was ours, for single seaters? How much better than the IJN's? As to that, did the RN get much advantage with the navigators in their fighters? (I don't mean, was it worth the cost, but what was the gain?)

4. I don't get Chris's points about (a) the need for lots of ammo, & (b) the tactical need of quick hit-and-run attacks (no dogfights). They seem to me incompatible. IF you go by the dicta Boelke, sure, you run in, shoot, & run out. But it seems to me that the fact that you do need many bursts (& different ones for aiming & for killing), you're implying you stick around &, eventually, get sucked into a dogfight. I may be wrong here, but my impression is that, despite the recurrent theme of "don't dogfight", it seems somehow inevitable that dogfights just keep happening.

5. A point my uncle once made, was that the Zero's guns were not aligned correctly for convergance. You'd see the tracers going off in different directions when they were shooting at you. OTOH, this may've been only true late in the war (he was in SB2C's in the 2nd Wasp).

6. If the Zero didn't present problems to the USN, at the start of the war, then why did Thach bother to work out new tactics; if it did, doesn't this imply there was some advantage over even the F4F.

7. Generally, what is it that makes a fighter better or worse able to be upgraded? What did the Spit have over the Zeke in this regard?

Ok, well, why don't I start from the top of the list:

1. Yes, they did give the Hurricanes at Trincomalee a drubbing? As with any battle, there are mitigating circumstances. The Zero is a much more maneuverable fighter, higher climb rate flown by experienced pilots. The Hurricane is a good stable gun platform and as such, is really a good interceptor against bombers. However, as a fighter, it had some problems. I suspect these might have been BoB pilots and they were used to a different opponent under different conditions, as such, took heavy losses due to lack of experience.

2. As to climb rates, it varies with model, altitude and combat weight. Now, how do we know? Usually by testing captured aircraft. The British captured some Me-109's, FW190's and tested them at Boscombe Down, the RAF Flight Test Facility. Those written reports are on line, in a scanned format. The first captured Zero was found in the Aleutians upside down in the mud. It was from the Ryujo and crashed during the Aleutian Campaign. The pilot, Lt. Koga had died of a broken neck. The plane was shipped to NAS North Island and repairs effected, then test flown in San Diego. Report is available, in the same format. This was an A6M2 Model 21 Navy model, and this is how we managed to determine flight characteristics.

Climb rate on the Zero tested was between 2710 FPS@ sea level up to 1760 FPS@ 20,000 ft. Spitfire I had a climb rate at 20,000 ft. of 1310 FPS. Hurricane II 1740 FPS @20,000 ft. Just some representative figures.

3. All pilots are trained in DED navigation, or Dead Reckoning. Using an aero chart, flight calculator, a watch, and the magnetic compass in the aircraft, they can navigate using periodic fixes on stars or landmarks, calculating course, speed and wind correction angle. Levels of proficiency varied but naval pilots were highly trained as they flew over water. Most naval fighters were also equipped with a radio compass or RDF for radio direction finder or a homing device like the Zed BAker I in the US aircraft. However, the beam width on radio compass beams were wide and subject to poor reliability and atmospherics. The US ZB-1 could only be used above 7000 ft. Usually, the fighters would accompany the bombers, and the bomber navigators would guide the fighter. If separated, the fighters were given vector heading to get home.

4. This explanation could get complicated, but I will attempt it. First, the positions around an aircraft are described by the numbers on a clock. 12 o'clock is straight ahead, six is behind, 9 is on your port side, and 3 on the starboard wing. The weapons in WWII fired rounds that were ballistically guided hunks of lead whose trajectory was governed by the muzzle velocity and physics. The gunsights were usually rudimentary cross hairs although more advanced sights were available called lead computing sights. To shoot down an opponent required placing enough hunks of lead in a spot until the damage caused a catastrophic failure in either the structure, pilot, fuel system or the engine. Anyone of these will cause the termination of flight for the aircraft. So, the idea is to aim the crosshairs, and fire enough rounds per second to accomplish the task. Most of the MG used in the war had rates of fire around 500 to 700 rounds per minute. In one three second burst, that is about 24 bullets based on 500 rounds per minute. Each gun is supplied with around 200 to 400 rounds. So, that is enough to fire 16 three second bursts. After that, you are out of ammunition. So, the more ammunition you can carry, the longer you can stay in combat and the more chances of shooting down opponent aircraft. It also means that you can take more shots.

Tactically, we have two methods of combating an opponent aircraft. We can get involved in a turning battle until one of us gets into the six o'clock position and shoots the other down or we can use the boom and zoom method. In the later, you gain a height advantage, dive on your opponent from out of the sun and when within 300 yards, fire at him before he can react. If he turns away, then you keep diving, building up speed and then use that kinetic energy to regain altitude. Then look around and attempt the same thing. This method is usually the preferred method by the aces like Boelke, Richtofen and others. They rarely dogfight, as it usually ends up in disaster.

In the swirling, confused aerial battle, many times an opponents aircraft will suddenly appear and flash through your field of view. A good pilot who has been trained to shoot from a high angle of degrees from the rear, can usually, hit that aircraft as it flies through his field of view. This kind of shot is termed a snap shot. It is just what it denotes, a quick shot at a fleeting target. Pilots who can do this are usually trained in deflection shooting. This means they can shoot at their opponent from either the 9 o'clock position or the 3 o'clock position which is a difficult position because you to lead the other aircraft by shooting out in front to compensate for the time of travel of the bullet and distance the opponent will travel in that same time.

So, the pilots with MG's that have an adequate supply of ammunition, high muzzle velocities, numerous guns and have trained to use deflection shooting can achieve better results. Sometimes, you don't have to kill the other aircraft, just damage him and force him to head home. This is the best I can do, in the time and space available.

5. The problem with the Zero is that its guns were mounted on the cowling over the engine. There was little convergence that could be adjusted. Also, the 20 mm cannon had a low muzzle velocity which means it lost forward movement rather rapidly. The most important factor was the unstable nature of the Type 00 fighter, the Zero. It was so unstable that it was difficult to keep the nose steady and pointed in one spot for any length of time. We say that it was a poor gun platform.

6. The Zero did present problems, many problems. But Thach and the other fighter squadron leaders realized that the F4F was all they had until the Hellcat or the Corsair were available and they had to devise methods of combatting the Zero's best performance attributes and use the Wildcat's best qualities. So, Thach developed the Thach Weave.

7. The structural strength of the fuselage and wings along with space available, is what really determines the ability to upgrade the aircraft. Also, how powerful is the engine. Is there enough excess power to accomodate extra weight? Structurally, the thickness of the aluminum beams adds to the stiffness and gives the whole structure greater ability to bend and support more weight. The Zero's structure was thin and hence, could not support any added weight. The engine was of low power and hence, to add more ammunition, fuel or armor required an engine change which caused the cowling to be enlarged and aerodynamics changed. The Spitfire had a very strong structure called a monocoque, which is why it was heavier. However, it also had a very powerful engine with plenty of upgradeability built into it. Hence, the Spitfire could support additional weight such as larger guns, more ammunition, external fuel tanks, bombs and rockets. Zero was not able to do that. It did have an external fuel tank mounted underneath the fuselage.

Hope that gives some partial answers, although it will probably generate more than it answers.

[Warship NWS]

A note about combat endurance.. your no good if your just a flying gas can after 7 seconds. Ask any tank crew for example.. what good is all that range if you run out of shells? Range endurance determined how long you had powered movement.. combat endurance determined how long you were even a threat to anyone or just a target.

Radios.. critical? You bet your ass it was. War is a team sport.. not an individual sport. From the commander down to the guy firing the weapon. The Germans used team tactics vs the French and clobbered them.. why? RADIOS. The British defended their home island vs the Germans.. how? RADIOS. The USN/USMC pilots used team tactics vs the Japanese pilots.. how? RADIOS. Ever here of the concept of "safety in numbers"? Without radios.. not happening in a war where machines and ordnance kill people. The side that can MANAGE a fight better will have A SERIOUS advantage.

Tactics are 3 dimensional.. not weapon dimensional, not personel dimensional, not combat environment dimensional..tactics include ALL 3 dimensions and that is how a SYSTEM of tactics is developed. The SYSTEM does not exist without the thread that weaves it all together.. COMMUNICATIONS. The side with the better system will very likely win more battles. Weapons are also systems in themselves and cannot be looked at in individual parts - the glory parts. The more balanced a weapon system is the more tactical options you will have in combat .. the balance as it goes with all weapon "systems" is performance/efficiency, firepower, and protection. The lower the balance in any key area the more an enemy can exploit your weaknesses.

I think this about sums it up. ;)

[Kyle Holgate]

Radios - ok, we know that sometimes the Japanese tossed them out of their zeroes. Doing some digging it turns out that this is often due to their not working - largely due to Japanese problems with logistics and poor conditions at the front lines.
How often did they do it? I know that some want to pick on anything they possibly can to discredit the fighter so would like to believe that none had radios, but quite clearly they were built with them and many had them. I am still trying to find out how often and in exactly what circumstances (and why) they were removed. Let's not harp on the radio issue until we can find more data. If the data supports that most had them removed, then I'll accept that as a point taken. If not, then it is no more than rumor.

Tactics - it's pretty much a sure deal that the Japanese did not follow what was determined by others to be good airborne tactics. This isn't a fault of the aircraft itself. I can have a superb wrench and if I use it to hammer nails it's not so capable. The Japanese pilots at Miday are a good example of poor training. If you don't have radar then some cap should stay as highcap, not go chasing down low after targets in a samurai free for all, every man for himself. Not the fighter's fault.

Speaking of tactics - new ones had to be learned to defeat the Zero regularly. It took time to learn what to do to break even or win against the plane - same with the Spitfire and 109 and others. Why ding the Zero specifically due to the plane being used poorly in many instances? Any plane can be used badly (and many were). Why are we not railing against the Spitfire as its engine tended to quit with negative G's? 109 pilots found ways to exploit this - learned to defeat the aircraft in some cases. Zero pilots could have learned to defeat the new tactics of the Americans too - but they largely didn't due to rigid and faulty training as lone wolves. Not a flaw in the aircraft.

Dogfighting - It is still a requirement to be able to dogfight. Sure many pilots used the sneak up and blow them out of the sky method, but far and away you hear about dogfights over Guadalcanal, Germany, Italy, England. IF the Zero scores a 85 in dogfighting and a 30 in Boom and zoom compared to a 75 and 50 for a ME 109 (just to pick numbers out of the sky) - it still remains a good dogfighter. As before, I agree that the cannon were wimpy and short of ammo - no dispute there.

What if they didn't have the Zero? War would have still been possible, though they'd have had to close on Pearl Harbor some to put what ever other fighter they had within range. Quite a few raids over the Phillipines and in other places in the Pacific would not have been as easy - no escorts (even if it's not the best escort fighter, it was there at least). No fighters over Guadalcanal would have virtually given the island to the US (perhaps something that shoud have been done anyway, but I degress).

So one last time - my point is that the Zero was a reasonably good fighter. The useage was flawed in some cases due to bad tactics, and it did have other flaws. It wasn't the super plane that it is often touted to be. On the flip side though I see Zero (pun intended) evidence to suggest that it was anything but good (as opposed to excellent or superb or bad or mediocre or terrible).

[old_pop2000]

Radios - ok, we know that sometimes the Japanese tossed them out of their zeroes. Doing some digging it turns out that this is often due to their not working - largely due to Japanese problems with logistics and poor conditions at the front lines.
How often did they do it? I know that some want to pick on anything they possibly can to discredit the fighter so would like to believe that none had radios, but quite clearly they were built with them and many had them. I am still trying to find out how often and in exactly what circumstances (and why) they were removed. Let's not harp on the radio issue until we can find more data. If the data supports that most had them removed, then I'll accept that as a point taken. If not, then it is no more than rumor.

Tactics - it's pretty much a sure deal that the Japanese did not follow what was determined by others to be good airborne tactics. This isn't a fault of the aircraft itself. I can have a superb wrench and if I use it to hammer nails it's not so capable. The Japanese pilots at Miday are a good example of poor training. If you don't have radar then some cap should stay as highcap, not go chasing down low after targets in a samurai free for all, every man for himself. Not the fighter's fault.

Speaking of tactics - new ones had to be learned to defeat the Zero regularly. It took time to learn what to do to break even or win against the plane - same with the Spitfire and 109 and others. Why ding the Zero specifically due to the plane being used poorly in many instances? Any plane can be used badly (and many were). Why are we not railing against the Spitfire as its engine tended to quit with negative G's? 109 pilots found ways to exploit this - learned to defeat the aircraft in some cases. Zero pilots could have learned to defeat the new tactics of the Americans too - but they largely didn't due to rigid and faulty training as lone wolves. Not a flaw in the aircraft.

Dogfighting - It is still a requirement to be able to dogfight. Sure many pilots used the sneak up and blow them out of the sky method, but far and away you hear about dogfights over Guadalcanal, Germany, Italy, England. IF the Zero scores a 85 in dogfighting and a 30 in Boom and zoom compared to a 75 and 50 for a ME 109 (just to pick numbers out of the sky) - it still remains a good dogfighter. As before, I agree that the cannon were wimpy and short of ammo - no dispute there.

What if they didn't have the Zero? War would have still been possible, though they'd have had to close on Pearl Harbor some to put what ever other fighter they had within range. Quite a few raids over the Phillipines and in other places in the Pacific would not have been as easy - no escorts (even if it's not the best escort fighter, it was there at least). No fighters over Guadalcanal would have virtually given the island to the US (perhaps something that shoud have been done anyway, but I degress).

So one last time - my point is that the Zero was a reasonably good fighter. The useage was flawed in some cases due to bad tactics, and it did have other flaws. It wasn't the super plane that it is often touted to be. On the flip side though I see Zero (pun intended) evidence to suggest that it was anything but good (as opposed to excellent or superb or bad or mediocre or terrible).

1. I actually agree that only the Tainan Air Group at Rabaul actually removed their radio gear. It was in the A6M3 Model 32's that were short in range. The reasoning was that the radios were unreliable and weighed 38 lbs. That extra weight could give the pilots a little long time in the air and it was felt that was acceptable. The navy pilots did not remove their radios.

2. How do we separate the aircraft from its tactics? The aircraft was a result of Japanese experiences in China. They got what they ordered. In fact, the Japanese had no experience in carrier warfare, just like us. They based their requirements on land based air battles and operations, not on carrier based operations. One problem for the Japanese was the low number of fighters on the carriers. This problem was not corrected until after Midway.

3. The term "dogfight" is very overused and not terribly accurate in describing combat air operations over Guadalcanal and the transports. I would not get hung up on that term. The better term is "turning battle". In comparing tactics, the best way to defend against a Zero was not to engage in a turning battle with them.

The Type 00 A6M2 fighter was indeed a good fighter. Our Navy pilots had a lot of respect and fear of that aircraft. They developed tactics to negate the Japanese pilots favorite attack profile, the stern attack by turning into them with both sections of a division. This does not mean the Zero was a bad aircraft, but it's vulnerabilities caused excessive losses which crippled the IJN's air fleet and the pilot training was unable to maintain the supply of adequately trained pilots. Couple this with a poor pilot training organization and you now have a recipe for disaster, after the attrition of combat. But, plane for plane, it was a very capable interceptor and long range escort fighter.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Radios - ok, we know that sometimes the Japanese tossed them out of their zeroes. Doing some digging it turns out that this is often due to their not working - largely due to Japanese problems with logistics and poor conditions at the front lines.
How often did they do it? I know that some want to pick on anything they possibly can to discredit the fighter so would like to believe that none had radios, but quite clearly they were built with them and many had them. I am still trying to find out how often and in exactly what circumstances (and why) they were removed. Let's not harp on the radio issue until we can find more data. If the data supports that most had them removed, then I'll accept that as a point taken. If not, then it is no more than rumor.

Tactics - it's pretty much a sure deal that the Japanese did not follow what was determined by others to be good airborne tactics. This isn't a fault of the aircraft itself. I can have a superb wrench and if I use it to hammer nails it's not so capable. The Japanese pilots at Miday are a good example of poor training. If you don't have radar then some cap should stay as highcap, not go chasing down low after targets in a samurai free for all, every man for himself. Not the fighter's fault.

Speaking of tactics - new ones had to be learned to defeat the Zero regularly. It took time to learn what to do to break even or win against the plane - same with the Spitfire and 109 and others. Why ding the Zero specifically due to the plane being used poorly in many instances? Any plane can be used badly (and many were). Why are we not railing against the Spitfire as its engine tended to quit with negative G's? 109 pilots found ways to exploit this - learned to defeat the aircraft in some cases. Zero pilots could have learned to defeat the new tactics of the Americans too - but they largely didn't due to rigid and faulty training as lone wolves. Not a flaw in the aircraft.

Dogfighting - It is still a requirement to be able to dogfight. Sure many pilots used the sneak up and blow them out of the sky method, but far and away you hear about dogfights over Guadalcanal, Germany, Italy, England. IF the Zero scores a 85 in dogfighting and a 30 in Boom and zoom compared to a 75 and 50 for a ME 109 (just to pick numbers out of the sky) - it still remains a good dogfighter. As before, I agree that the cannon were wimpy and short of ammo - no dispute there.

What if they didn't have the Zero? War would have still been possible, though they'd have had to close on Pearl Harbor some to put what ever other fighter they had within range. Quite a few raids over the Phillipines and in other places in the Pacific would not have been as easy - no escorts (even if it's not the best escort fighter, it was there at least). No fighters over Guadalcanal would have virtually given the island to the US (perhaps something that shoud have been done anyway, but I degress).

So one last time - my point is that the Zero was a reasonably good fighter. The useage was flawed in some cases due to bad tactics, and it did have other flaws. It wasn't the super plane that it is often touted to be. On the flip side though I see Zero (pun intended) evidence to suggest that it was anything but good (as opposed to excellent or superb or bad or mediocre or terrible).


Kyle:

As Dennis has already mentioned, dogfighting has become the generic term for we now more properly call Air Combat Maneuvers (ACM). All planes need to be able to engage in this to some degree. Pure dogfighting was the outcome of very slow climbing, poor diving and tight turning short ranged biplanes. Once aircraft performance increased, offensive performance trumped aerobatics. You wnat to find the tighest turning planes in the world? Take a late model biplane. Want a killer fighter? Take a high perfomance mono plane circa 1944.

[Warship NWS]

Radios - ok, we know that sometimes the Japanese tossed them out of their zeroes. Doing some digging it turns out that this is often due to their not working - largely due to Japanese problems with logistics and poor conditions at the front lines.
How often did they do it? I know that some want to pick on anything they possibly can to discredit the fighter so would like to believe that none had radios, but quite clearly they were built with them and many had them. I am still trying to find out how often and in exactly what circumstances (and why) they were removed. Let's not harp on the radio issue until we can find more data. If the data supports that most had them removed, then I'll accept that as a point taken. If not, then it is no more than rumor.


Ok.. I talked further with Dennis on the phone on this one to help clear up some information about the Zeke radios. Apparently they were removed when the updated A6M3 Model 32 was produced that had shorter range by pilots operating from Rabaul. Why they were removed is the critical key here... and that was due to two reasons, to increase the range of the aircraft AND the unreliability of the radios. I knew I had read that pilots had removed their radios due to weight considerations, in some references I even read they were in some cases not even included (however it seems that those sources were not entirely accurate). So where does this leave us? Well if the pilots at Rabaul were removing them due to unreliability this tells us something does it not? Based on the information me and Dennis have discussed the radios were barely usefull at all, when and if they even worked. Lack of maintenance, spare parts, crude design, inefficent operation, etc.. made them not worth much more then paperweights. In the end, the USN fighters had far better radio sets with greater range and reliability. Also, Dennis can fill in some extra points here, even with radios their C&C of naval aircraft operations was inefficient and virtually to the point of being ineffective in many cases.


Tactics - it's pretty much a sure deal that the Japanese did not follow what was determined by others to be good airborne tactics. This isn't a fault of the aircraft itself. I can have a superb wrench and if I use it to hammer nails it's not so capable. The Japanese pilots at Miday are a good example of poor training. If you don't have radar then some cap should stay as highcap, not go chasing down low after targets in a samurai free for all, every man for himself. Not the fighter's fault.

I think your still missing something here.. the more balanced a weapon system is (fewer faults then virtues) means you have more tactical flexibility especially in a combined/team tactics environment -- move beyond just the plane itself. The Zeke was considered a "superior" fighter with excellent pilots yet the combat ratio vs the F4F with less experienced pilots was only 1:1. Its weaknesses also proved profound when they attacked dive and torpedo bombers and took excessive, for a fighter, losses due to their inability to sustain damage even from rifle sized machine guns. From the best I can tell, and I have tried to find as many possible sources as I could.. the only ace rear gunners of single engined attack aircraft during all of WW2 were in the USN in the Pacific. Parshall even mentions that a division of SBDs was jumped by several Zekes.. the Zekes killed nothing and ended up with 2 damaged aircraft that had to return to their carrier. Note, and I made this quite clear previously, the Zeke WAS a dangerous aircraft when in the right hands but its faults did NOT outweigh its virtues in the end.. that is the part that needs to be looked at.. the complete weapon system.


Speaking of tactics - new ones had to be learned to defeat the Zero regularly. It took time to learn what to do to break even or win against the plane - same with the Spitfire and 109 and others. Why ding the Zero specifically due to the plane being used poorly in many instances? Any plane can be used badly (and many were). Why are we not railing against the Spitfire as its engine tended to quit with negative G's? 109 pilots found ways to exploit this - learned to defeat the aircraft in some cases. Zero pilots could have learned to defeat the new tactics of the Americans too - but they largely didn't due to rigid and faulty training as lone wolves. Not a flaw in the aircraft.

The BoB duels between the RAF and Luft broke about even also as both sides had competant pilots while using roughly equal, yet evolving, effective fighter tactics. The planes were well balanced for the theater they were fighting in so neither side could gain a serious advantage. The Zeke vs F4F was somewhat of a counterbalance in comparison. The F4F had enough advantages to meet the Zeke on equal terms due to the deficiencies of the Zeke. What has bothered me for years is how many wargames, documentaries, etc.. have proclamed the Zeke to be "superior" to the F4F.. I believe it was not that superior as its defects did not give it enough of an advantage to sweep the skies of the F4Fs it was fighting against and thus as was historicaly proven. The F4Fs had enough virtues to allow for the tactical flexibility to take on the Zekes head to head and hold their own. Without those virtues, for example if you replaced the F4F with the F2A, the kill ratio would have been considerably different.


Dogfighting - It is still a requirement to be able to dogfight. Sure many pilots used the sneak up and blow them out of the sky method, but far and away you hear about dogfights over Guadalcanal, Germany, Italy, England. IF the Zero scores a 85 in dogfighting and a 30 in Boom and zoom compared to a 75 and 50 for a ME 109 (just to pick numbers out of the sky) - it still remains a good dogfighter. As before, I agree that the cannon were wimpy and short of ammo - no dispute there.

What exactly is dogfighting Kyle? Over 90% of the pilots killed in the air never knew what hit them. Most reasonably good pilots would end a fight before it even began, the less capable pilots often ended up as targets. Read your histories of combat aces, that you are so fond of, how many got into swirling circling dogfights vs assassinating their opponents? Most would not have made it to the rank of "ace" by dogfighting.. that is what got you killed as you will lose 2 things that keep you alive.. speed and altitude.


What if they didn't have the Zero? War would have still been possible, though they'd have had to close on Pearl Harbor some to put what ever other fighter they had within range. Quite a few raids over the Phillipines and in other places in the Pacific would not have been as easy - no escorts (even if it's not the best escort fighter, it was there at least). No fighters over Guadalcanal would have virtually given the island to the US (perhaps something that shoud have been done anyway, but I degress).

Personaly, if they had listened to the designer of the Zeke they would have made it more survivable and sturdy like he wanted.. all that would have meant is they would have had to build some forward airbases instead of figuring the range of the plane was worth the cost of dead pilots killed in combat in higher numbers. What good is range if your pilot dies or crashes on the way home? Oh yes, they gained some tactical victories by shooting down a few enemy planes.. so what? Tactical victories that were rather insignificant vs the start of a strategic spiral of defeat. The bombers did the bulk of the real damage to the enemy in the SE Asia sectors.. not the Zekes. As to Guadalcanal.. so what again.. they ended up with their own version of Hitlers Stalingrad, nothing more then an attritional meat grinder. If the plane did not have the range they would have built the airbase at Munda sooner and saved a lot of pilot losses.


So one last time - my point is that the Zero was a reasonably good fighter. The useage was flawed in some cases due to bad tactics, and it did have other flaws. It wasn't the super plane that it is often touted to be. On the flip side though I see Zero (pun intended) evidence to suggest that it was anything but good (as opposed to excellent or superb or bad or mediocre or terrible)

I never once said it was not a reasonably good fighter.. just not a SUPERIOR fighter to the Wildcat.. not even the P-40 for that matter which was the USAAF equivelant to the Wildcat in general performance. The only time the Zeke was truely superior was when it was up against the Russians and Chinese, or when a pilot was silly enough to try and turn with it, other then that it could be in trouble vs a fighter of the same time frame. Here is some good reading for you and how the P-40 held a higher kill ratio then the A6M2 when proper tactics were used,

http://www.chuckhawks.com/p-40_vs_zero.htm

A side note.. it is interesting that with the qualities of the A6M2 once the deficiencies were found its kill ratio from that point dropped like a stone. That I think says something in itself. The only time it held high kill ratios historicaly was when the enemy tried to turn with it or if it was up against obsolete fighters that could not run, roll, or dive away from it.

Thanks.

[George LeSauvage]

...
I think your still missing something here.. the more balanced a weapon system is (fewer faults then virtues) means you have more tactical flexibility especially in a combined/team tactics environment -- move beyond just the plane itself. The Zeke was considered a "superior" fighter with excellent pilots yet the combat ratio vs the F4F with less experienced pilots was only 1:1....Note, and I made this quite clear previously, the Zeke WAS a dangerous aircraft when in the right hands but its faults did NOT outweigh its virtues in the end.. that is the part that needs to be looked at.. the complete weapon system.
...
What exactly is dogfighting Kyle? Over 90% of the pilots killed in the air never knew what hit them. Most reasonably good pilots would end a fight before it even began, the less capable pilots often ended up as targets. Read your histories of combat aces, that you are so fond of, how many got into swirling circling dogfights vs assassinating their opponents? Most would not have made it to the rank of "ace" by dogfighting.. that is what got you killed as you will lose 2 things that keep you alive.. speed and altitude.
...
Thanks.

I have just 2 problems with this:

1. Switching back & forth between the system as a whole, & it's elements is a running problem with debates here, & shows in your discussion about the zero. Yes, it is correct, that the naval air systems as a whole were a bigger factor than the planes, themselves. But it misses the point, if you put that into evaluation of a plane, qua plane. If the USN's air tactics, gunnery training, & air control were superior, that does not tell against the Zero as a design; if anything, it speaks in its favor, as these advantages would have given the USN better kill rates, even if the 2 navies were flying identical aircraft. For this, one useful way to look at it is to switch the elements around, mentally. If the USN used the Zero, & the IJN, the F4F, but all other factors stayed the same, what would that entail?

2. On dogfighting, I think Kyle means the same as you do. But I can't agree with your dismissal of maneuver contests, just because they were a bad idea. I say this because of the persistant warnings I've read against getting into them, & statements that it was a bad idea to do so. (& I have read a number, although it's not my main area of interest). These did continue from WWI through the end of WWII; as I read it, dogfighting -- that is, getting into turning contests -- are an unavoidable feature of air fighting, however much the air forces, or the best pilots decry them. (Analogous to the way basketball games often descend into street ball, which can afflict even the best coached teams.)

And even the best aces did end up in such fights. There was an epic one between Richtofen & an RFC ace (can't remember his name), eventually won by the RB. Voss died in a very one-sided such contest. This doesn't refute, or attempt to refute, your insistence that it's a bad idea to engage in them. The point is that it's gonna happen, no matter how hard you try.

OTOH, I definitely agree with your stated thrust of removing the Zero from the pedestal it was on in my youth. The analogy to the Bismarck is sound; in both cases, they were given an aura of invincibility which needed refuting. But there were some points when you surely seemed to be saying it was a piece of crap, which is going too far. (& remember that this kind of revisionism is unending; in 20 years, the Iowa & the P-51 will, no doubt, be the targets of the same kind of comments.)

[Kyle Holgate]

Ok.. I talked further with Dennis on the phone on this one to help clear up some information about the Zeke radios. Apparently they were removed when the updated A6M3 Model 32 was produced that had shorter range by pilots operating from Rabaul. Why they were removed is the critical key here... and that was due to two reasons, to increase the range of the aircraft AND the unreliability of the radios. I knew I had read that pilots had removed their radios due to weight considerations, in some references I even read they were in some cases not even included (however it seems that those sources were not entirely accurate). So where does this leave us? Well if the pilots at Rabaul were removing them due to unreliability this tells us something does it not? Based on the information me and Dennis have discussed the radios were barely usefull at all, when and if they even worked. Lack of maintenance, spare parts, crude design, inefficent operation, etc.. made them not worth much more then paperweights. In the end, the USN fighters had far better radio sets with greater range and reliability. Also, Dennis can fill in some extra points here, even with radios their C&C of naval aircraft operations was inefficient and virtually to the point of being ineffective in many cases.



I think your still missing something here.. the more balanced a weapon system is (fewer faults then virtues) means you have more tactical flexibility especially in a combined/team tactics environment -- move beyond just the plane itself. The Zeke was considered a "superior" fighter with excellent pilots yet the combat ratio vs the F4F with less experienced pilots was only 1:1. Its weaknesses also proved profound when they attacked dive and torpedo bombers and took excessive, for a fighter, losses due to their inability to sustain damage even from rifle sized machine guns. From the best I can tell, and I have tried to find as many possible sources as I could.. the only ace rear gunners of single engined attack aircraft during all of WW2 were in the USN in the Pacific. Parshall even mentions that a division of SBDs was jumped by several Zekes.. the Zekes killed nothing and ended up with 2 damaged aircraft that had to return to their carrier. Note, and I made this quite clear previously, the Zeke WAS a dangerous aircraft when in the right hands but its faults did NOT outweigh its virtues in the end.. that is the part that needs to be looked at.. the complete weapon system.



The BoB duels between the RAF and Luft broke about even also as both sides had competant pilots while using roughly equal, yet evolving, effective fighter tactics. The planes were well balanced for the theater they were fighting in so neither side could gain a serious advantage. The Zeke vs F4F was somewhat of a counterbalance in comparison. The F4F had enough advantages to meet the Zeke on equal terms due to the deficiencies of the Zeke. What has bothered me for years is how many wargames, documentaries, etc.. have proclamed the Zeke to be "superior" to the F4F.. I believe it was not that superior as its defects did not give it enough of an advantage to sweep the skies of the F4Fs it was fighting against and thus as was historicaly proven. The F4Fs had enough virtues to allow for the tactical flexibility to take on the Zekes head to head and hold their own. Without those virtues, for example if you replaced the F4F with the F2A, the kill ratio would have been considerably different.



What exactly is dogfighting Kyle? Over 90% of the pilots killed in the air never knew what hit them. Most reasonably good pilots would end a fight before it even began, the less capable pilots often ended up as targets. Read your histories of combat aces, that you are so fond of, how many got into swirling circling dogfights vs assassinating their opponents? Most would not have made it to the rank of "ace" by dogfighting.. that is what got you killed as you will lose 2 things that keep you alive.. speed and altitude.



Personaly, if they had listened to the designer of the Zeke they would have made it more survivable and sturdy like he wanted.. all that would have meant is they would have had to build some forward airbases instead of figuring the range of the plane was worth the cost of dead pilots killed in combat in higher numbers. What good is range if your pilot dies or crashes on the way home? Oh yes, they gained some tactical victories by shooting down a few enemy planes.. so what? Tactical victories that were rather insignificant vs the start of a strategic spiral of defeat. The bombers did the bulk of the real damage to the enemy in the SE Asia sectors.. not the Zekes. As to Guadalcanal.. so what again.. they ended up with their own version of Hitlers Stalingrad, nothing more then an attritional meat grinder. If the plane did not have the range they would have built the airbase at Munda sooner and saved a lot of pilot losses.



I never once said it was not a reasonably good fighter.. just not a SUPERIOR fighter to the Wildcat.. not even the P-40 for that matter which was the USAAF equivelant to the Wildcat in general performance. The only time the Zeke was truely superior was when it was up against the Russians and Chinese, or when a pilot was silly enough to try and turn with it, other then that it could be in trouble vs a fighter of the same time frame. Here is some good reading for you and how the P-40 held a higher kill ratio then the A6M2 when proper tactics were used,

http://www.chuckhawks.com/p-40_vs_zero.htm

A side note.. it is interesting that with the qualities of the A6M2 once the deficiencies were found its kill ratio from that point dropped like a stone. That I think says something in itself. The only time it held high kill ratios historicaly was when the enemy tried to turn with it or if it was up against obsolete fighters that could not run, roll, or dive away from it.

Thanks.

Let's concentrate on the fighters not the tactics - if I use a perfectly sharp sword such as a cutlas and someone comes up with a manuver that allows the weapon to be defeated - but my forces don't evolve to counter that manuver - is it the fault of the sword?
In many cases I think Japanese tactics are at issue - and should be seporated from the fighter(s) flown. The thatch weave and other tactics invented by the US forces 'could' have been countered by the Zero and other fighters had they not stuck with their "lone gunman" way of flying. Countering the boom and zoom was harder - but many fighters had trouble with this against certain enemy fighters, it wasn't limited to the zero. Could the Zero if used effectively maintain air superiority over P-40's? Wildcats? IMO yes - that the japanese didn't find better ways to counter American tactics does not mean that they couldn't have. Back to my sword again - a rapier vs a samurai sword perhaps. If the rapier user comes up with some trick to win, the samurai has to evolve tactics too - something the Japanese very often failed to do in more areas than air to air combat.

Chris - "Never said it was not a reasonably good fighter". Ok - if you talk crap about something then I tend to use standard English and based on that determine an overal opinion. Based on long history of talking to you and reading posts about the Zero all I could do was interpret what's been said as that you thought it was a very far over-rated POS. If that isn't the case - sorry, and what are we debating? My view is that yes - it's over-rated for a number of reasons but the plane itself was still pretty good and very capable. I think it was often used for things it shouldn't have been and was relied upon far too much by the Japanese. Also as far as the radio thing, Japanese failures in logistics caused a lot of problems that virtually any aircraft would have suffered from. The US had the finest logistics and supply network in the world - that MUST count for the ability of F4F and P-40 aircraft to be maintained, radios, engines and all.

Here's one to ponder - what if the Japanese built the F4F and P-40 and the US had the Zero?

[old_pop2000]

On 10 July 1942, an American PBY flying over Akutan Island discovered an overturned aircraft laying in a marsh. Upon landing, it was discovered that it was an A6M2 Model 21 Zero fighter, with a dead pilot. The plane had been Lt. Koga's from the Ryujo. The plane was dragged to edge of the water, crated and shipped to San Diego and NAS North Island. It was rebuilt, and test flown in November of 1942. This was the now famous, Koga Zero. This single event has been termed by Horikoshi and Okumiya in their excellent book " Zero" as the greatest disaster in IJN history.

Why! Because it lay bare the secrets of a plane the US Naval and Marine pilots had feared since the start of the war, the Japanese Zero. What was found by the flight tests?

1. It used high quality materials, but was poorly manufactured.

2. It was not sectionalized to facilitate maintenance in the field, hence needed depot personnel to repair it.

3. It was a mediocre aircraft overall, but a good low speed aircraft. It had excellent maneuverability below 250 MPH, but was very heavy on the controls above that speed. It was also noticed that it turned to the left better than the right.

4. The float type carburator during a bobble maneuver, cut out, starving the engine. A bobble is a sudden pull back on the stick to initiate a climb, followed by a sudden forward push on the stick. This would cut the engine, causing the Zero to hang for a moment.

5. It had an excellent climb rate up to 16,000 ft, but this dropped off after that.

6. It had a poor diving speed and was unmaneuverable in dives.

7. It carried a low ammo supply, barely 60 rounds for the cannon which was a low MV gun.

8. The plane required an expert pilot to fly well, but was deadly to the average pilot.

Overall, the reports stated that the Zero was superior in most performance parameters to the F4F Wildcat, however was not well protected and the light structure made the aircraft susceptable to inflight structural failures, especially in high speed dives. In short, the plane would come apart, as some had witnessed, in high speed maneuvers.

This was not the first Zero discovered, one had force landed in Port Moresby in mid-1942 and one heavily damaged aircraft had been recovered after Pearl Harbor. The Koga was the only version able to be moved, rebuilt and flight tested.

So, what did we learn from the Koga Zero. That the Zero was an aircraft superior to the planes that it had faced in China, for which it was built to fight. But was only a marginally superior to the Hurricane and P-40's that it faced in combat in Burma and Southern China. It was equal to the F4F and P-38, however, provided the Wildcat pilot used hit and run tactics and did not enter a dogfight where turning was the name of the game. The P-38, while not as maneuverable as the Wildcat, had altitude superiority, climb rate, ruggedness and level speed advantage on the Zero and could choose when and where it fought. The Zero, was in fact, a first generation low wing monoplane. The plane's real weakness was the inability of Japanese industry to develop and replace it early in the war, with something superior. Therefore, modification's were made to enhance its performance based on lessons learned but these modifications only degraded its performance. Unfortunately, in the attempt to develop and meet the specifications, the aircraft structure would not support such modifications. So this was the A6M2 Zero. These facts were not developed until almost the end of the Guadalcanal operation and the Japanese carrier based and land based airgroups and wings were already depleted.

[Kyle Holgate]

Hm, it would be interesting to determine actual contemporary aircraft to the Zero. I believe it was the first low wing monoplane fighter with retractable gear for the Japanese. So would the US equivelant be the P-36? At work and busy, no time to look. Wikpedia for what it's worth - looks like the P-36 was roughly the US equivelant to the Zero. The carrier equivelant was the Brewster Buffalo I think. The Hawk had 1 x .50 cal and one 30 MG's, the buffalo had 4x 50 cal's.

[old_pop2000]

Hm, it would be interesting to determine actual contemporary aircraft to the Zero. I believe it was the first low wing monoplane fighter with retractable gear for the Japanese. So would the US equivelant be the P-36? At work and busy, no time to look. Wikpedia for what it's worth - looks like the P-36 was roughly the US equivelant to the Zero. The carrier equivelant was the Brewster Buffalo I think. The Hawk had 1 x .50 cal and one 30 MG's, the buffalo had 4x 50 cal's.
The P-36, the F4F, The F2A Buffalo, the P-43 would all be first generation, low winged monoplanes.

For your info: A flight test report conducted on an A6M2 against the P-40 and P-43.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/p5016.pdf

Enjoy!

[Warship NWS]

OK guys.. some points that are being entirely missed..

a) WARFARE in the mechanized age was A TEAM SPORT.. whether the Japanese believed that or not was their problem, not their opponents problem. The French with a 2:1 ratio of main battle tanks got their asses kicked by a TEAM ATTACK called Blitzkrieg.. much of this was due to LACK OF PROPER COMMUNICATIONS between tanks. Their tanks were NOT built with enough virtues to defeat the lesser armored German tanks.. sorry but that is what they went to war with and they lost miserably not just due to poor tactics but also for NOT ACTING AS A TEAM which would have been VERY difficult to do with NO RADIOS, or NOT ENOUGH RADIOS, for their tanks -- that is called C&C complete breakdown. A weapon is a system manned by men that DID NOT FIGHT ALONE. Back off the "lets microscope the one plane" thinking as it will not work in war. No man EVER fought alone .. EVER, in a full scale war. There were individual actions but they accomplished squat compared to the full scale of a war. No war, or any battle that meant anything in history, was fought by ONE MAN. To leave off the radio portion of the Zeke means not considering the communications factor for any aircraft built in WW2, or any other mechanized combat machine that was part of a formation of weapons. Sorry.. that is what they built with, it was a critical consideration for a weapon system called the airplane, that is what they went to war with and leaving it off.. heck might as well detract radar from the USN warships in 1944. They had them, that was history.. don't try and change it to defend the rest of the weapon.

b) I have NEVER EVER EVER stated that the Zeke was all in all a bad plane, I have stated many times that it was the worst weapon to be inflicted on the IJN. Read between the lines and get past the early years where it fought planes that were terribly obsolete and against threats that could not cost them the war. All that mattered was if they could defeat their ONLY seriously viable threat.. the USA. If they could not gain, and maintain, air superiority within the first 6-12 months vs the USA then the Zeke FAILED ITS REQUIRED MISSION-- it flat didn't do it and in turn THEIR PILOT RANKS WERE DECIMATED .. the IJN NEEDED A SURVIVABLE PLANE WITH GOOD COMMUNICATIONS NOT A PLANE THAT COULD EASILY GET THEM KILLED with the very simple change of enemy tactics they THEY COULD NOT OVERCOME DUE TO THE LIABILITIES OF THEIR OWN PLANE AS IT WAS BUILT. When you tie in the lack of a good radio (team tactics gone and squadron command and control is virtually out of the question), pilots could die with just a few bullet hits (and no replacements, also, you could use up all of your ammunition vs your opponent and still not kill him yet he in turn could kill you with just a few hits or damage your gas tanks and you will never make it home - long range is DOUBLE EDGED SWORD - this effectively MULTIPLIES the combat endurance of your enemy!), it could not not out dive the P-40 or F4F, it could not fight above 250mph worth a squat (well, all other planes could), it had only 7 seconds of EFFECTIVE firepower (might kill 1-2 planes.. USN fighters could kill 3-4 or more and often did and pilots could take a lot more snap shots - having lots of gas will not shoot down planes if you don't have bullets!), and virtually any modern early 1940s plane could out roll it, these problems will NOT make up for having good all around vision, long range, good climbing, and tight turn radius... sorry that is just the way it was and that is how history played it out regardless of how much some want to glorify or defend the Zeke. By the time they made it WHAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE START.. with the A6M3 it was already too little too late. They went in with the A6M2.. that is what they had and even with arguably some of the best pilots in the world.. they COULD NOT gain air superiority over the P-40s and F4Fs which had pilots less experience. A simple, very minor for that matter, change of tactics.. turned the tables against them in a way they could not compensate for without changing the plane itself.

[Warship NWS]

Here's one to ponder - what if the Japanese built the F4F and P-40 and the US had the Zero?

We would have lost the aerial superiority war. ZEKES REQUIRED excellent pilots to use them effectively. Our planes did not. In a war of attrition where the AVERAGE pilot is in FAR greater numbers and where experience comes with SURVIVABILITY IN COMBAT we would have lost the war of attrition very quickly if they started out with excellent pilots and we had mostly average pilots. You CANNOT leave out the human factor of war. All they would have had to do was to simply change tactics vs the Zekes weaknesses and the attrition rate would have killed us -- just like we did to them - but if we had expert pilots at the start of the war in the numbers the Japanese had it would have been magnified substantially. However, this goes against all doctrines of both nations so it would have never have happened.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

OK guys.. some points that are being entirely missed..

a) WARFARE in the mechanized age was A TEAM SPORT.. whether the Japanese believed that or not was their problem, not their opponents problem. The French with a 2:1 ratio of main battle tanks got their asses kicked by a TEAM ATTACK called Blitzkrieg.. much of this was due to LACK OF PROPER COMMUNICATIONS between tanks. Their tanks were NOT built with enough virtues to defeat the lesser armored German tanks.. sorry but that is what they went to war with and they lost miserably not just due to poor tactics but also for NOT ACTING AS A TEAM which would have been VERY difficult to do with NO RADIOS, or NOT ENOUGH RADIOS, for their tanks -- that is called C&C complete breakdown. A weapon is a system manned by men that DID NOT FIGHT ALONE. Back off the "lets microscope the one plane" thinking as it will not work in war. No man EVER fought alone .. EVER, in a full scale war. There were individual actions but they accomplished squat compared to the full scale of a war. No war, or any battle that meant anything in history, was fought by ONE MAN. To leave off the radio portion of the Zeke means not considering the communications factor for any aircraft built in WW2, or any other mechanized combat machine that was part of a formation of weapons. Sorry.. that is what they built with, it was a critical consideration for a weapon system called the airplane, that is what they went to war with and leaving it off.. heck might as well detract radar from the USN warships in 1944. They had them, that was history.. don't try and change it to defend the rest of the weapon.

b) I have NEVER EVER EVER stated that the Zeke was all in all a bad plane, I have stated many times that it was the worst weapon to be inflicted on the IJN. Read between the lines and get past the early years where it fought planes that were terribly obsolete and against threats that could not cost them the war. All that mattered was if they could defeat their ONLY seriously viable threat.. the USA. If they could not gain, and maintain, air superiority within the first 6-12 months vs the USA then the Zeke FAILED ITS REQUIRED MISSION-- it flat didn't do it and in turn THEIR PILOT RANKS WERE DECIMATED .. the IJN NEEDED A SURVIVABLE PLANE WITH GOOD COMMUNICATIONS NOT A PLANE THAT COULD EASILY GET THEM KILLED with the very simple change of enemy tactics they THEY COULD NOT OVERCOME DUE TO THE LIABILITIES OF THEIR OWN PLANE AS IT WAS BUILT. When you tie in the lack of a good radio (team tactics gone and squadron command and control is virtually out of the question), pilots could die with just a few bullet hits (and no replacements), it could not not out dive the P-40 or F4F, it could not fight above 250mph worth a squat (well, all other planes could), it had only 7 seconds of EFFECTIVE firepower (might kill 1-2 planes.. USN fighters could kill 3-4 or more and often did and pilots could take a lot more snap shots - having lots of gas will not shoot down planes if you don't have bullets!), and virtually any modern early 1940s plane could out roll it, these problems will NOT make up for having good all around vision, long range, good climbing, and tight turn radius... sorry that is just the way it was and that is how history played it out regardless of how much some want to glorify or defend the Zeke. By the time they made it WHAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE START.. with the A6M3 it was already too little too late. They went in with the A6M2.. that is what they had and even with arguably some of the best pilots in the world.. they COULD NOT gain air superiority over the P-40s and F4Fs which had pilots less experience. A simple, very minor for that matter, change of tactics.. turned the tables against them in a way they could not compensate for without changing the plane itself.

Thanks.

First point isn't being missed, I just totally disagree. If one wants to compare the Bismarck in 1941 to the KGV in 1941 or Washington in 1941 you take the platform and look at it - amor to armor, guns to guns, speed to speed, etc.
If the Germans built the Washington and used it like they did the Bismarck it would probably have been sunk too. If you use your weapon, whatever it is - gun to battleship - in a way that isn't tactically sound, then how can you say that it's the fault of the weapon? The US found tactical ways to win against Tiger tanks, and Panthers - this doesn't necessarily mean that the Sherman is better than the Panther or Tiger.
I can see we're not going to ever see eye to eye on this one, but at least I want to be clear on my opinion here.


No, you never ever said - but it was implied as far as I could tell. Probably a failing of this mode of communcation as much as anything. If I got the wrong impression then OK, at least we're clear now where we stand!

[Warship NWS]

The US found tactical ways to win against Tiger tanks, and Panthers - this doesn't necessarily mean that the Sherman is better than the Panther or Tiger. I can see we're not going to ever see eye to eye on this one, but at least I want to be clear on my opinion here.

Ah.. this response does not work.. all of those tanks had effective radios so they could coordinate their efforts so no definitive advantage for team tactics or command and control options there and the US used numbers, mobility, and reliability to compensate for the faults of the Sherman vs the Panther and Tigers.. does not compare at all to the Zeke vs P-40 and F4Fs. Try again. Remove effective communications from either side and see what happens just as an example, oh and remember, tanks never fought alone.

[Warship NWS]

First point isn't being missed, I just totally disagree. If one wants to compare the Bismarck in 1941 to the KGV in 1941 or Washington in 1941 you take the platform and look at it - amor to armor, guns to guns, speed to speed, etc.
If the Germans built the Washington and used it like they did the Bismarck it would probably have been sunk too.

Response again.. not viable. All of these ships had effective communications so they could operate with other ships and be coordinated from their bases of operations.. someone had to give them orders. However, battleships that operated alone often died and this is where viable escorts, which the KM did not have, determined how and where they could be used unless enemy air power dictated otherwise. Try again.

[Warship NWS]

No, you never ever said - but it was implied as far as I could tell. Probably a failing of this mode of communcation as much as anything. If I got the wrong impression then OK, at least we're clear now where we stand!

I never implied anything, it was a direct short and to the point comment that was deliberately aimed at making people think and to instigate a debate.. and it worked did it not? ;)

[Warship NWS]

Hey Kyle, or anyone that wants to try..

Here are some questions for you regarding the A6M2

1) Lack of reliable radios, how do you compensate for this?
2) Lack of ability to dive with your enemy, how do you compensate for this?
3) Lack of ability to take damage, how do you compensate for this? (Note: this in effect increased the combat endurance of our aircraft as they did not require as much ammunition to shoot it down)
4) Serious reduction in maneuverability above 250mhp, how do you compensate for this?
5) Only 7 seconds of effective ammunition vs your armored opponents, how do you compensate for this?

Give realistic answers please and then explain to me if the Japanese did, or did not - and why, use your responses. Remember, you have to do this without changing the plane in any way.

Flip side,

P-40 and F4F

1) Could not climb as fast initially with the Zeke, how do you compensate for this?
2) Could not turn as tight as the Zeke, how do you compensate for this?
3) Lower all around vision, how do you compensate for this?
4) Could not outrange the Zeke, how do you compensate for this?

Again, you cannot change the plane in any way.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Hm, it would be interesting to determine actual contemporary aircraft to the Zero. I believe it was the first low wing monoplane fighter with retractable gear for the Japanese. So would the US equivelant be the P-36? At work and busy, no time to look. Wikpedia for what it's worth - looks like the P-36 was roughly the US equivelant to the Zero. The carrier equivelant was the Brewster Buffalo I think. The Hawk had 1 x .50 cal and one 30 MG's, the buffalo had 4x 50 cal's.

Hey Kyle, here is one for you to chew on.. the P-36 and F2A derivatives actually racked up higher kill ratios vs equal or better opponents then the A6M2. Can you figure out why?

[Kyle Holgate]

Hey Kyle, or anyone that wants to try..

Here are some questions for you regarding the A6M2

1) Lack of reliable radios, how do you compensate for this?
2) Lack of ability to dive with your enemy, how do you compensate for this?
3) Lack of ability to take damage, how do you compensate for this? (Note: this in effect increased the combat endurance of our aircraft as they did not require as much ammunition to shoot it down)
4) Serious reduction in maneuverability above 250mhp, how do you compensate for this?
5) Only 7 seconds of effective ammunition vs your armored opponents, how do you compensate for this?

Give realistic answers please and then explain to me if the Japanese did, or did not - and why, use your responses. Remember, you have to do this without changing the plane in any way.

Flip side,

P-40 and F4F

1) Could not climb as fast initially with the Zeke, how do you compensate for this?
2) Could not turn as tight as the Zeke, how do you compensate for this?
3) Lower all around vision, how do you compensate for this?
4) Could not outrange the Zeke, how do you compensate for this?

Again, you cannot change the plane in any way.

Thanks.

Radios - I still think that this is a red herring you like to hang onto, I have seen zero reliable information on this other than the Guadalcanal episode and problems with logistics and supplies. These may be partially the plane's fault, but also you can't tell me that any aircraft couldn't have similar issues in similar situations!
I'm finished with the radio rumor until and unless Dennis or someone can show me reliable information that says most zero's had them removed - even in areas where they had good logistics and supply. I can't in good concience ding a plane for a deficiency in supply and logistics support.

Lack of dive - so what, ME-109 couldn't dive with a P-47, the Spitfire couldn't dive with a FW-190. Lots of planes could not follow other planes in a dive - why single out the Zero? To compensate you do what the allies did when encountering ME-262's - you had to spot them and turn into them quickly or jink out of their way when they were preparing to fire.

Now we're bringing vision in? Ok, once again - lots of planes had differing visibility from the cockpit. Let's pick on the Corsair for example. Many fighters including the zero had limitations in cockpit visibility, you had to compensate by rocking wings and moving your head around to check places you couldn't regularly see in.

Manuverability below 250 MPH - yep - if your opponent knows about it and can exploit it then you may have a problem. But then again - I never said the Zero was without problems - I just want to ensure that we're clear on what the real ones are and what are rumors. If I can't manuver well at higher speeds I have to spot the enemy and turn into them.

Seven seconds of ammo - yep, not the best in the world! Make sure your seven seconds count! This is a problem with the Zero but at least it has cannons for 7 seconds unlike many fighters of its time. Look at many Italian fighters or the Ratta or even some French designs. I'd much prefer more ammo for my cannons! The Zero certainly wasn't an ideal plane to take on the rugged American models it ended up meeting. That being said it did pretty good.

I'm not sure why we're continuing on here. We've established an agreement that the Zero was a fairly good fighter that had various strengths and weaknesses. We've cleared up that you don't think it was a POS and we've established that it wasn't the wonder machine that many seem to think it was. Isn't that what we were after?

To keep this at least a litte shorter I'm not gonna mess with the P-40 right now.

I will end up wth this though
Let's take a force of Zero fighters - A6M3's that have good logistical support and are contesting the air space over an island. Let's say that this island is in a spot so that both opposing sides aren't at the end of their endurance. The idea is to achieve and maintain air superiority over this island. P-40C (iirc) are the opponent fighters in equivelant numbers. Can either side gain air superiority over this mythical island? I the plane that must boom and zoom to survive going to be able to stay and keep the pressure on? Isn't "boom and zoom" another term for hit and run? If you want to maintain air superiority you have to stay, don't you?

[Warship NWS]

Radios - I still think that this is a red herring you like to hang onto, I have seen zero reliable information on this other than the Guadalcanal episode and problems with logistics and supplies. These may be partially the plane's fault, but also you can't tell me that any aircraft couldn't have similar issues in similar situations!
I'm finished with the radio rumor until and unless Dennis or someone can show me reliable information that says most zero's had them removed - even in areas where they had good logistics and supply. I can't in good concience ding a plane for a deficiency in supply and logistics support.

There was no rumor about it.. at Rabaul they ditched them because they were unreliable and not worth being a 38lb paperweight and to gain what range they could from the reducing the weights of their A6M3s. They were in the A6M2s but very crude, underpowered, they could not even hear each other most of the time, and due to their crude design.. along with poor maintence, they proved very unreliable. Their initial design proved faulty and the maintenance issues (which were magnified by their crude design) just compounded the problem. Their entire electronics sector was not up to the standards of the USA or British industry. This was a problem for the A6M2 from the very outset and contributed greatly in diminishing its effectiveness in the CAP and escort roles.

Do you not feel that communication in terms of air combat and command and control (in the air and from the air commander on the ships or bases) of your aerial assets to be important? I am just curious.

[Warship NWS]

I'm not sure why we're continuing on here. We've established an agreement that the Zero was a fairly good fighter that had various strengths and weaknesses. We've cleared up that you don't think it was a POS and we've established that it wasn't the wonder machine that many seem to think it was. Isn't that what we were after?


Yes.. but I do not think you understand the "why" parts of this equation.

[Warship NWS]

Switching back & forth between the system as a whole, & it's elements is a running problem with debates here, & shows in your discussion about the zero. Yes, it is correct, that the naval air systems as a whole were a bigger factor than the planes, themselves. But it misses the point, if you put that into evaluation of a plane, qua plane. If the USN's air tactics, gunnery training, & air control were superior, that does not tell against the Zero as a design; if anything, it speaks in its favor, as these advantages would have given the USN better kill rates, even if the 2 navies were flying identical aircraft.
First you cannot remove the weapon from the system in which it operates. That is not how a war is fought. In a nut shell.. the deficiencies of the Zeke allowed less experienced pilots in the P-40s and F4Fs to take on the best pilots the IJN had to offer and match them in a way that the pilots of the Zekes could not directly counter. If the Zeke was a more balanced aircraft their pilots could have evolved their tactics to maintain their edge in combat experience. That is what is being missed overall, and there was nothing they could do about it except to upgrade or change the aircraft. That to me is the showing of a deficient weapon system. If our pilots were as experienced as theirs at the start the spiral downward effect on their pilot ranks would have accellerated that much faster. Their changes to the A6M3 shows they realized that the A6M2 had problems that needed to be addressed but by then it was already too late as the deficiencies with the A6M2 had already cost them the bulk of their best pilots and they had no replacements for them.

[old_pop2000]

Here is a quote from a Technical Report by the Navy in 1946 on Japanese electronic construction methods.


From the captured equipment and previous knowledge gleaned from intelligence reports, it was apparent that most Japanese Radio Equipment had been designed with little or no attention to insuring satisfactory operation under unusual operating conditions

I wonder if high altitude, high speed flight with high G's could be considered, "unusual operating conditions".

Here is a brief snippet:


For radio operation at high altitudes, no precautions were taken in the early stages of the air war to prevent arc-overs and general equipment failures which usually occurred at 15,000 to 18,000 feet.

The reports stated that it wasn't until February of 1945 during the Second Naval Technical Institute was this problem addressed by using better insulation, greater spacing of critical components, and lower operating voltages. In interrogations, it was revealed that sporadic operation or complete failure would occur within 30 minutes to two hours at altitudes of 30000 ft. and above.

In another report on Japanese training, it states that deficiencies in Japanese electronic equipment, lack of aptitude in the average japanese student reduced the effectivenss of training and therefore, reduced effectiveness in the field.

Most of the reports hint that Japenese equipment was well designed and constructed, but was based on commercial standards, not military requirements. Japanese leaders did not emphasize training as it was considered defensive in nature. This would have an effect on the ability of the fleet squadrons to maintain the radios or any Japanese electronics.

It wasn't until 1945, that an airborne radio was produced which could operate on more than one channel merely by throwing a switch. So, in the air, if the channel you were using was jammed, busy with other aircraft or clutter with atmospherics, there was no way to switch to another frequency. I would expect many, so called failures, to be simply poor atmospherics or jammed channel making the radios unusable. The use of a commercial standard for military aircraft that are required to perform high speed maneuvers and are susceptible to shaking and moisture would reduce reliability.

Now, as to the Rabaul situation. Rabaul was unique. It was a long way from Japan and as the war progressed, parts were almost impossible to get. When the airfields were capture, they were filled with apparently good aircraft, all sitting and waiting for one or two parts that never arrived. The Japanese never considered the concept of cannibalization. Repair of radios, in the Rabaul area, with little or no parts would seem to have generated the idea of removing them. As they failed more frequently and no parts were available, eventually, just removing them and saving the weight would seem to be the best path.

I am providing this for informational purposes. I have not read of any other land based squadrons removing the radios and flying without them. This was a question of poor radios, poor supply, and inadequate radio repair. I hope we can put this issue of radio equipment to rest. Did unreliability factor into japanese operations. It would be conjecture on my part to speculate, however, without radios, command and control is difficult and battle management is important to the completion of any mission or operation.

[Warship NWS]

Afterw watching "Battle in 360" and reading over various parts of the attacks on the IJN CVs at Midway in "Shattered Sword" I came across some interesting observations,

Communications and combat endurance. We have talked now about the Zeke having unreliable radios and have raised the possibility of poor air CAP coordination doctrine on the CVs. Several pieces of evidence add to this context that I feel may well have had serious effects on the outcome of the Battle of Midway.

Compiled information from the book and the show give the following information.

* CAs were firing guns to make splashes in the water to notify CAP patrols that there were attackers in the area, very possibly the CA Chikuma. If they had good radios would this have been neccessary? (Show and P.221)
* One of the TBDs was being harrassed by a Zeke that was apparently out of ammunition and was trying to destroy the rear stabilizers with its propeller before being disrupted by the rear gunner. (Show)
* Parshall also states that the "ability of the Zero to kill American aircraft was proportional to the amount of 20mm ammunition available". (P.214) Attacks were made by VT-6 and VT-8 within the previous hour before the fatal SBD attacks. Having limited ammunition likely compounded the CAP rotation problems.
* (P.215-216) "Further, the CAP had demonstrated that it had the tendency to bunch up." "This was all symptomatic of the Japanese lack of adequate fighter direction", "Captian Okada and his counterparts knew that the only way to react quickly was to keep a sharp lookout and a brace of fresh fighters on deck that could be launched as new threats developed." Again, was this due to a lack of good radios? Very likely.
* At 10:10, and shortly thereafter, there would be 40+ CAP Zekes in the skies over the CVs (P.221). Should have been more then enough if there was proper C&C from the CVs.
* Parshall states that the CAP should have had the time to regain their patrol altitudes with a 4,000fpm climb rate within about 5 minutes (P.227).However here are some problems with this thoery IMHO, according to several of my sources the Zeke climb rate was only ~3,150fpm - which would have taken about 6-7 minutes (including some time to regain some speed after the climb) to reach the SBD initial attack altitudes of 19-20,000ft. At 10:15, just 5 minutes before the SBD attack VT/VF-3 squadrons were attacking from lower altitudes driving down the CAP altitudes to engage them. IMHO, there was no chance the could have regained altitude in time to engage the SBDs from VB-3, VS-6, and VB-6 -- especially considering they were coming in from opposite directions.

Tie it all together.. it was a recipe for disaster.

The above evidence creates some interesting questions.
* Was their a failure in CAP command and control, including very likely lack of communications with the Zekes in the air, which caused their entire CAP coverage to be brought down to low altitude and out of position to engage the incoming dive bombers?
* Did the "bunching up" of Zekes vs threats and constant requirement to keep CAP aircraft on the deck on the deck to intercept new threats also demonstrate a lack of CAP control?
* Was the low combat endurance a critical problem that caused them to continuously tie up the decks with CAP aircraft on rotation?

If the Zeke had good radios and tied that with a more disciplined CAP C&C and longer combat endurance could that have changed the outcome of the Battle of Midway? I very much believe it would have. Of course there is some speculation here but there is quite a bit of viable evidence to support my theory. The IJN were the best in the world at the time when it came to naval coordinated attacks so there is no excuse for them not to consider what might happen if they were in turn attacked by similiar aircraft to their own -- fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo planes. With the Zeke having a low durability problem it likely also caused a higher then normal attrition rate for CAP aircraft due to rear gunners and fighters. Thatches group with only 6 fighters shot down 4 Zekes themselves (while being attacked by 15-20 Zekes), however, VT/VB groups likely shot down as many as 10-13+ CAP aircraft with rear gunners according to the CAP rosters in Parshalls book.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Afterw watching "Battle in 360" and reading over various parts of the attacks on the IJN CVs at Midway in "Shattered Sword" I came across some interesting observations,

Communications and combat endurance. We have talked now about the Zeke having unreliable radios and have raised the possibility of poor air CAP coordination doctrine on the CVs. Several pieces of evidence add to this context that I feel may well have had serious effects on the outcome of the Battle of Midway.

Compiled information from the book and the show give the following information.

* CAs were firing guns to make splashes in the water to notify CAP patrols that there were attackers in the area, very possibly the CA Chikuma. If they had good radios would this have been neccessary? (Show and P.221)
* One of the TBDs was being harrassed by a Zeke that was apparently out of ammunition and was trying to destroy the rear stabilizers with its propeller before being disrupted by the rear gunner. (Show)
* Parshall also states that the "ability of the Zero to kill American aircraft was proportional to the amount of 20mm ammunition available". (P.214) Attacks were made by VT-6 and VT-8 within the previous hour before the fatal SBD attacks. Having limited ammunition likely compounded the CAP rotation problems.
* (P.215-216) "Further, the CAP had demonstrated that it had the tendency to bunch up." "This was all symptomatic of the Japanese lack of adequate fighter direction", "Captian Okada and his counterparts knew that the only way to react quickly was to keep a sharp lookout and a brace of fresh fighters on deck that could be launched as new threats developed." Again, was this due to a lack of good radios? Very likely.
* At 10:10, and shortly thereafter, there would be 40+ CAP Zekes in the skies over the CVs (P.221). Should have been more then enough if there was proper C&C from the CVs.
* Parshall states that the CAP should have had the time to regain their patrol altitudes with a 4,000fpm climb rate within about 5 minutes (P.227).However here are some problems with this thoery IMHO, according to several of my sources the Zeke climb rate was only ~3,150fpm - which would have taken about 6-7 minutes (including some time to regain some speed after the climb) to reach the SBD initial attack altitudes of 19-20,000ft. At 10:15, just 5 minutes before the SBD attack VT/VF-3 squadrons were attacking from lower altitudes driving down the CAP altitudes to engage them. IMHO, there was no chance the could have regained altitude in time to engage the SBDs from VB-3, VS-6, and VB-6 -- especially considering they were coming in from opposite directions.

Tie it all together.. it was a recipe for disaster.

The above evidence creates some interesting questions.
* Was their a failure in CAP command and control, including very likely lack of communications with the Zekes in the air, which caused their entire CAP coverage to be brought down to low altitude and out of position to engage the incoming dive bombers?
* Did the "bunching up" of Zekes vs threats and constant requirement to keep CAP aircraft on the deck on the deck to intercept new threats also demonstrate a lack of CAP control?
* Was the low combat endurance a critical problem that caused them to continuously tie up the decks with CAP aircraft on rotation?

If the Zeke had good radios and tied that with a more disciplined CAP C&C and longer combat endurance could that have changed the outcome of the Battle of Midway? I very much believe it would have. Of course there is some speculation here but there is quite a bit of viable evidence to support my theory. The IJN were the best in the world at the time when it came to naval coordinated attacks so there is no excuse for them not to consider what might happen if they were in turn attacked by similiar aircraft to their own -- fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo planes. With the Zeke having a low durability problem it likely also caused a higher then normal attrition rate for CAP aircraft due to rear gunners and fighters. Thatches group with only 6 fighters shot down 4 Zekes themselves (while being attacked by 15-20 Zekes), however, VT/VB groups likely shot down as many as 10-13+ CAP aircraft with rear gunners according to the CAP rosters in Parshalls book.

Thanks.
It is interesting when you examine all the facts and realize, the Japanese carrier doctrine was probably not as well developed as ours. Their lack of attention to electronics and defensive arrangements seems to agree with most observations that they felt that such measures were defensive and only offensive aspects were emphasized. It is also interesting that a nation that realized the force ratio in naval ships was against them, would certainly have explored any idea that could be considered a force multiplier, which a radio and better battle management certainly was. Radar and radios could have been a force multiplier for the small number of Zero fighters provided their ammunition supply was greater.

Everyone seems to forget that Japanese combat experience was over land, in China, not in the waters of the Pacific against a carrier force.

As to the Zero fighter, I find it interesting that the first modification to the Zero was to add a bigger engine, and add more ammunition. One wonders, since he considered the bigger engine initially, why he did not follow his instincts.

As a sideline, I want to compliment everyone involved in this discussion. While heated at times, it has lead to a deeper understanding of aerial combat in the Pacific especially on the Japanese side. Kyle's healthy scepticism has forced myself and all of us to investigate more deeply and consider more aspects of this issue of the A6M2 and the Japanese method of carrier warfare. Whether you call it stubborness or scepticism, he questioned our facts and reasoning. I have found that the questioning mind, is an open mind to new ideas and facts, and that that mind will grow over time. As to myself, having spent the better part of forty years around electronics and aircraft, I take for granted certain facts that I have integrated into my knowledgebase. I forget, sometimes, to go back and re-evaluate those basics facts and concepts that were engrained in that knowledgebase, so long ago. Tube technology is one of those long forgotten areas that were engrained years ago and the unreliability that extended from that technology.

I hope that we can use this discussion, which is not over, hopefully, as an example of how to investigate a discussion question. How to research and dig into the information, put it together and using healthy bit of scepticism, perform a much more professional analysis of the item in question. Kudos to Kyle, Chris and others for their contribution. In my investigation of other forums on this matter, I have discovered that we are far ahead in our knowledge and ideas.

[old_pop2000]

Let's explore some real world possibilities with the A6M2 and a possible upgrade to the plane. Let's start by understanding the economic limitations of the Japanese. Lack of resources in one, we may not have enough materials to build more Zero's or may have to limit the number of the new model. Remember also, that this is a balancing act, areas that are improved, might detract from others and those losses have to be accepted.

The first major update that Horikoshi and Hattori would address is the low engine power and lack of a second stage in the supercharger. A two stage blower will enhance high altitude performance allowing the Type 00 to maintain its climb rate past 16,000 ft. Altitude is life in aerial combat. CAP aircraft should gain as much altitude as possible as quickly as possible.

1. Change engine to the Nakajima Sakae 21 engine - Displacement 27.9 liters or 1702 CI. - Takeoff power is 1130 hp @2730 RPM. Low blower - 1070 hp - high blower -970 hp.

This change will give us over 200 hp at sea level and well over 300 at 19,000 ft. The engine is heavier, which will move the CG forward. We can compensate with ballast in the tail. The firewall will be moved back, reducing the fuel tank supply, to add the longer engine mounts. Additional weight is unknown.

2. With the additional power, we can now proceed to correct certain defeciencies. We need to request that the radio's be updated to prevent arcing at high altitude. This will be a separate issue for the Mitsubishi technical department. We can develop better, shock mounted brackets to reduce vibration and spark arrestors on the magnetoes of the engines to eliminate that problem. Aircraft wiring and grounding must be improved.

3. Poor diving performance- To correct this feature requires increasing the thickness of the wing panels from .02 inches to .04. This will add structural stiffness to the wings eliminating bending and possible catastrophic failure in high speed dives. This must be tested thoroughly in flight test, to ensure success. Additional weight must be accepted.

4. Eliminate wing folding mechanism- This feature will reduce out wing torsional stresses and possibly provide better maneuverability at the higher diving speeds. It also reduces material requirements and weight, to compensate for the thicker wing panels. Flight test is vital in this area.

5. Armament - Complaints from the field suggest that 7.7mm guns are worthless against US aircraft. Suggest we eliminate the cowl mounted 7.7mm to save weight, and replace 20 mm with two 13 mm Machine guns with 250 rounds per gun. Install selector switch to use two or four guns. This possibility must be explored. Also, increasing the muzzle velocity of the 20mm and ammunition supply could be a possibility. Testing at the armament facility of 13mm against armor plate and heavier aluminum panels is vital for decision.

6. Install pilot armor and self sealing fuel tanks- This additional weight must be accepted. Our pilots should be given more protection. Also suggest fire extinguisher system for fuel tank area.

7. Maneuverability at high speed - This problem was encountered in the elevator control system on original model. Suggest investigating control cable diameter to reduce control stick loads at 250 mph and higher.


Summation- The changes suggested may add up to 1000 lbs of extra weight, raising the total takeoff weight to over 6600 lbs. This will result in a loss of low speed maneuverability and range. This must be accepted. Advantages of better diving speed, better forward speed at all altitudes, greater firepower and enhanced climb rate up to 30,000 ft will be realized.

Suggest commencement of design exploration of next generation, single engined fighter for the both the carrier squadrons and land based squadrons.

[Warship NWS]

It is interesting when you examine all the facts and realize, the Japanese carrier doctrine was probably not as well developed as ours. Their lack of attention to electronics and defensive arrangements seems to agree with most observations that they felt that such measures were defensive and only offensive aspects were emphasized. It is also interesting that a nation that realized the force ratio in naval ships was against them, would certainly have explored any idea that could be considered a force multiplier, which a radio and better battle management certainly was. Radar and radios could have been a force multiplier for the small number of Zero fighters provided their ammunition supply was greater.

Everyone seems to forget that Japanese combat experience was over land, in China, not in the waters of the Pacific against a carrier force.

As to the Zero fighter, I find it interesting that the first modification to the Zero was to add a bigger engine, and add more ammunition. One wonders, since he considered the bigger engine initially, why he did not follow his instincts.

As a sideline, I want to compliment everyone involved in this discussion. While heated at times, it has lead to a deeper understanding of aerial combat in the Pacific especially on the Japanese side. Kyle's healthy scepticism has forced myself and all of us to investigate more deeply and consider more aspects of this issue of the A6M2 and the Japanese method of carrier warfare. Whether you call it stubborness or scepticism, he questioned our facts and reasoning. I have found that the questioning mind, is an open mind to new ideas and facts, and that that mind will grow over time. As to myself, having spent the better part of forty years around electronics and aircraft, I take for granted certain facts that I have integrated into my knowledgebase. I forget, sometimes, to go back and re-evaluate those basics facts and concepts that were engrained in that knowledgebase, so long ago. Tube technology is one of those long forgotten areas that were engrained years ago and the unreliability that extended from that technology.

I hope that we can use this discussion, which is not over, hopefully, as an example of how to investigate a discussion question. How to research and dig into the information, put it together and using healthy bit of scepticism, perform a much more professional analysis of the item in question. Kudos to Kyle, Chris and others for their contribution. In my investigation of other forums on this matter, I have discovered that we are far ahead in our knowledge and ideas.

Dennis your being nice..;)

One of the areas I have been researching lately, and yes it is probably an area many take for granted in our time of multiple methods of communication, is the effects of command, control, and communications back in the age where there was only the radio and visual signals to coordinate rapidly moving mechanized forces and ever evolving tactics. We must also remember that every weapon is a system and every weapon system is part of a greater system called a tactic and that all tactics were part of the overall doctrine of a military force. If any part of that system, including the weapon itself, was not balanced or designed to function within the doctrine correctly the entire system could fail. It is called the "ripple effect". The weapons and the system had to be flexible enough to evolve so as to not allow for continuous exploitation by an enemy looking for failures in those systems and weapons. This how warfare worked. It was all a system of teamwork and if the team did not work the enemy team would find ways to defeat you. Luck played a major role in warfare but a failure in they system could greatly increase the chances of the enemy being "lucky". 3 critical elements to all doctrines.. C3, tactics, and weapons. The more balanced the weapon systems and C3 the more flexible the tactics will be and that is how you develop a working and flexible/evolving doctrine.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let's concentrate on the fighters not the tactics - if I use a perfectly sharp sword such as a cutlas and someone comes up with a manuver that allows the weapon to be defeated - but my forces don't evolve to counter that manuver - is it the fault of the sword?
In many cases I think Japanese tactics are at issue - and should be seporated from the fighter(s) flown. The thatch weave and other tactics invented by the US forces 'could' have been countered by the Zero and other fighters had they not stuck with their "lone gunman" way of flying. Countering the boom and zoom was harder - but many fighters had trouble with this against certain enemy fighters, it wasn't limited to the zero. Could the Zero if used effectively maintain air superiority over P-40's? Wildcats? IMO yes - that the japanese didn't find better ways to counter American tactics does not mean that they couldn't have. Back to my sword again - a rapier vs a samurai sword perhaps. If the rapier user comes up with some trick to win, the samurai has to evolve tactics too - something the Japanese very often failed to do in more areas than air to air combat.

Chris - "Never said it was not a reasonably good fighter". Ok - if you talk crap about something then I tend to use standard English and based on that determine an overal opinion. Based on long history of talking to you and reading posts about the Zero all I could do was interpret what's been said as that you thought it was a very far over-rated POS. If that isn't the case - sorry, and what are we debating? My view is that yes - it's over-rated for a number of reasons but the plane itself was still pretty good and very capable. I think it was often used for things it shouldn't have been and was relied upon far too much by the Japanese. Also as far as the radio thing, Japanese failures in logistics caused a lot of problems that virtually any aircraft would have suffered from. The US had the finest logistics and supply network in the world - that MUST count for the ability of F4F and P-40 aircraft to be maintained, radios, engines and all.

Here's one to ponder - what if the Japanese built the F4F and P-40 and the US had the Zero?

Kyle:

As a fighter, the Zero certainly was effective, but I think what Chris has been trying to say is that it didn't take very long for the USN to find ways to counter its strengths and prey on its weaknesses. I also think a great deal of its legend was due to the fact that it was being flown by what could arguably be considered the finest naval pilots in the world (John Lundstrom in his First Team books can probably dispute this). Too many times green US pilots came up against legends like Saburo Sakai and never really had a chance. Still even the Japanese aces knew that the Wildcat was no push over unlike the P-39 or the Buffalo.

It is important to keep in mind that air war of attrition over the South West Pacific was won mainly by Wildcats and P-40s with some badly needed help from the Corsair and P-38. Those latter planes suffered some nasty defeats until they too mastered the tactics needed to survive against the Zero. It's not until the Hellcat and P-47 start showing in numbers that the Zero was really outclassed.

I will close with two observations. Even poorly performaing aircraft can win if they have speed and altitude. Too many of the air battles that I have studied have shown that bouncing your opponent can totally trump superior aircraft performance.

And Chris, the Zero even in 1944 was still a threat against any Allied plane if it was in the hands of an ace or a veteran. The trouble being that such pilots had become thin on the ground due to the lack of survivability of the Zero and all Japanese planes in general.

[Ed Rotondaro]

We would have lost the aerial superiority war. ZEKES REQUIRED excellent pilots to use them effectively. Our planes did not. In a war of attrition where the AVERAGE pilot is in FAR greater numbers and where experience comes with SURVIVABILITY IN COMBAT we would have lost the war of attrition very quickly if they started out with excellent pilots and we had mostly average pilots. You CANNOT leave out the human factor of war. All they would have had to do was to simply change tactics vs the Zekes weaknesses and the attrition rate would have killed us -- just like we did to them - but if we had expert pilots at the start of the war in the numbers the Japanese had it would have been magnified substantially. However, this goes against all doctrines of both nations so it would have never have happened.

Thanks.

Chris, Kyle and Dennis:

I'll give you a scary thought; imagine the IJN with a FW-190? Game over baby.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ah.. this response does not work.. all of those tanks had effective radios so they could coordinate their efforts so no definitive advantage for team tactics or command and control options there and the US used numbers, mobility, and reliability to compensate for the faults of the Sherman vs the Panther and Tigers.. does not compare at all to the Zeke vs P-40 and F4Fs. Try again. Remove effective communications from either side and see what happens just as an example, oh and remember, tanks never fought alone.

Chris:

Actually I see Kyle's point here, something that has been explored recently in the new Osprey series "Duel" which pits individual weapon systems against each other to analyze how they fared historically. Sure a team approach wins in most cases. The question is in a one of one duel how do we evaluate the Zero against its various opponents? But then again we have to consider is one plane surprised? Is it at lower or higher altitude? There are so many factors to consider that we can never say its slam dunk one way or the other.

See Kyle, I am ever the conciliator bringing widely differing viewpoints together. Maybe I should run for president?:rolleyes:

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

Actually I see Kyle's point here, something that has been explored recently in the new Osprey series "Duel" which pits individual weapon systems against each other to analyze how they fared historically. Sure a team approach wins in most cases. The question is in a one of one duel how do we evaluate the Zero against its various opponents? But then again we have to consider is one plane surprised? Is it at lower or higher altitude? There are so many factors to consider that we can never say its slam dunk one way or the other.

See Kyle, I am ever the conciliator bringing widely differing viewpoints together. Maybe I should run for president?:rolleyes:
I have a US Navy test result that says the Fw190A-3 versus the F4U-1 would have been an equal fight. But it did have some superiority against the F6F-3. Both are considered second generation low winged monoplanes.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/ptr-1107.pdf

Read and heed.

[Ed Rotondaro]

First you cannot remove the weapon from the system in which it operates. That is not how a war is fought. In a nut shell.. the deficiencies of the Zeke allowed less experienced pilots in the P-40s and F4Fs to take on the best pilots the IJN had to offer and match them in a way that the pilots of the Zekes could not directly counter. If the Zeke was a more balanced aircraft their pilots could have evolved their tactics to maintain their edge in combat experience. That is what is being missed overall, and there was nothing they could do about it except to upgrade or change the aircraft. That to me is the showing of a deficient weapon system. If our pilots were as experienced as theirs at the start the spiral downward effect on their pilot ranks would have accellerated that much faster. Their changes to the A6M3 shows they realized that the A6M2 had problems that needed to be addressed but by then it was already too late as the deficiencies with the A6M2 had already cost them the bulk of their best pilots and they had no replacements for them.

Chris:

As we have established that some Zeros did have radios, I'm still wondering if the mindset of the Japanese pilot was as much to blame for their losses as the Zero itself? Considering that Japanese culture pretty much stressed conformity and obedience, the free wheeling nature of Japanese fighter pilots (you don't see that behavior with their attack planes) is somewhat of an anamoly. Some of Saburo Sakai's accounts mention radio communication with other pilots. The IJN did use the wingman principle, but once a furball starts, they scatter all over the sky. It's almost as if the Japanese fighter pilot saw himself as the lone samaurai hero taking on all opponents. I'm not remotely convinced that even with good radios and more survivable planes that Japanese fighter pilots could ever have coped with increasingly better Allied fighters. I'm not sure their mindset was able to adjust at least in the time frame of WWII.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Afterw watching "Battle in 360" and reading over various parts of the attacks on the IJN CVs at Midway in "Shattered Sword" I came across some interesting observations,

Communications and combat endurance. We have talked now about the Zeke having unreliable radios and have raised the possibility of poor air CAP coordination doctrine on the CVs. Several pieces of evidence add to this context that I feel may well have had serious effects on the outcome of the Battle of Midway.

Compiled information from the book and the show give the following information.

* CAs were firing guns to make splashes in the water to notify CAP patrols that there were attackers in the area, very possibly the CA Chikuma. If they had good radios would this have been neccessary? (Show and P.221)
* One of the TBDs was being harrassed by a Zeke that was apparently out of ammunition and was trying to destroy the rear stabilizers with its propeller before being disrupted by the rear gunner. (Show)
* Parshall also states that the "ability of the Zero to kill American aircraft was proportional to the amount of 20mm ammunition available". (P.214) Attacks were made by VT-6 and VT-8 within the previous hour before the fatal SBD attacks. Having limited ammunition likely compounded the CAP rotation problems.
* (P.215-216) "Further, the CAP had demonstrated that it had the tendency to bunch up." "This was all symptomatic of the Japanese lack of adequate fighter direction", "Captian Okada and his counterparts knew that the only way to react quickly was to keep a sharp lookout and a brace of fresh fighters on deck that could be launched as new threats developed." Again, was this due to a lack of good radios? Very likely.
* At 10:10, and shortly thereafter, there would be 40+ CAP Zekes in the skies over the CVs (P.221). Should have been more then enough if there was proper C&C from the CVs.
* Parshall states that the CAP should have had the time to regain their patrol altitudes with a 4,000fpm climb rate within about 5 minutes (P.227).However here are some problems with this thoery IMHO, according to several of my sources the Zeke climb rate was only ~3,150fpm - which would have taken about 6-7 minutes (including some time to regain some speed after the climb) to reach the SBD initial attack altitudes of 19-20,000ft. At 10:15, just 5 minutes before the SBD attack VT/VF-3 squadrons were attacking from lower altitudes driving down the CAP altitudes to engage them. IMHO, there was no chance the could have regained altitude in time to engage the SBDs from VB-3, VS-6, and VB-6 -- especially considering they were coming in from opposite directions.

Tie it all together.. it was a recipe for disaster.

The above evidence creates some interesting questions.
* Was their a failure in CAP command and control, including very likely lack of communications with the Zekes in the air, which caused their entire CAP coverage to be brought down to low altitude and out of position to engage the incoming dive bombers?
* Did the "bunching up" of Zekes vs threats and constant requirement to keep CAP aircraft on the deck on the deck to intercept new threats also demonstrate a lack of CAP control?
* Was the low combat endurance a critical problem that caused them to continuously tie up the decks with CAP aircraft on rotation?

If the Zeke had good radios and tied that with a more disciplined CAP C&C and longer combat endurance could that have changed the outcome of the Battle of Midway? I very much believe it would have. Of course there is some speculation here but there is quite a bit of viable evidence to support my theory. The IJN were the best in the world at the time when it came to naval coordinated attacks so there is no excuse for them not to consider what might happen if they were in turn attacked by similiar aircraft to their own -- fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo planes. With the Zeke having a low durability problem it likely also caused a higher then normal attrition rate for CAP aircraft due to rear gunners and fighters. Thatches group with only 6 fighters shot down 4 Zekes themselves (while being attacked by 15-20 Zekes), however, VT/VB groups likely shot down as many as 10-13+ CAP aircraft with rear gunners according to the CAP rosters in Parshalls book.

Thanks.


Chris:

After watching Battle 360, I was very impressed with what they did get right and glad that Parshall was on board.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It is interesting when you examine all the facts and realize, the Japanese carrier doctrine was probably not as well developed as ours. Their lack of attention to electronics and defensive arrangements seems to agree with most observations that they felt that such measures were defensive and only offensive aspects were emphasized. It is also interesting that a nation that realized the force ratio in naval ships was against them, would certainly have explored any idea that could be considered a force multiplier, which a radio and better battle management certainly was. Radar and radios could have been a force multiplier for the small number of Zero fighters provided their ammunition supply was greater.

Everyone seems to forget that Japanese combat experience was over land, in China, not in the waters of the Pacific against a carrier force.

As to the Zero fighter, I find it interesting that the first modification to the Zero was to add a bigger engine, and add more ammunition. One wonders, since he considered the bigger engine initially, why he did not follow his instincts.

As a sideline, I want to compliment everyone involved in this discussion. While heated at times, it has lead to a deeper understanding of aerial combat in the Pacific especially on the Japanese side. Kyle's healthy scepticism has forced myself and all of us to investigate more deeply and consider more aspects of this issue of the A6M2 and the Japanese method of carrier warfare. Whether you call it stubborness or scepticism, he questioned our facts and reasoning. I have found that the questioning mind, is an open mind to new ideas and facts, and that that mind will grow over time. As to myself, having spent the better part of forty years around electronics and aircraft, I take for granted certain facts that I have integrated into my knowledgebase. I forget, sometimes, to go back and re-evaluate those basics facts and concepts that were engrained in that knowledgebase, so long ago. Tube technology is one of those long forgotten areas that were engrained years ago and the unreliability that extended from that technology.

I hope that we can use this discussion, which is not over, hopefully, as an example of how to investigate a discussion question. How to research and dig into the information, put it together and using healthy bit of scepticism, perform a much more professional analysis of the item in question. Kudos to Kyle, Chris and others for their contribution. In my investigation of other forums on this matter, I have discovered that we are far ahead in our knowledge and ideas.


Dennis:

If you look at the entire Japanese approach to war, it was always offensive "Toujours l'audace" to praphrase. Also I think one reason we have a wide range of knowledge is that we have some very knowledgeable folks on board or actively posting. Having been on other forums I can see their lack of balance and at times lack of respect for differing views. As a member of the NWS team I will not name any other forums.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let's explore some real world possibilities with the A6M2 and a possible upgrade to the plane. Let's start by understanding the economic limitations of the Japanese. Lack of resources in one, we may not have enough materials to build more Zero's or may have to limit the number of the new model. Remember also, that this is a balancing act, areas that are improved, might detract from others and those losses have to be accepted.

The first major update that Horikoshi and Hattori would address is the low engine power and lack of a second stage in the supercharger. A two stage blower will enhance high altitude performance allowing the Type 00 to maintain its climb rate past 16,000 ft. Altitude is life in aerial combat. CAP aircraft should gain as much altitude as possible as quickly as possible.

1. Change engine to the Nakajima Sakae 21 engine - Displacement 27.9 liters or 1702 CI. - Takeoff power is 1130 hp @2730 RPM. Low blower - 1070 hp - high blower -970 hp.

This change will give us over 200 hp at sea level and well over 300 at 19,000 ft. The engine is heavier, which will move the CG forward. We can compensate with ballast in the tail. The firewall will be moved back, reducing the fuel tank supply, to add the longer engine mounts. Additional weight is unknown.

2. With the additional power, we can now proceed to correct certain defeciencies. We need to request that the radio's be updated to prevent arcing at high altitude. This will be a separate issue for the Mitsubishi technical department. We can develop better, shock mounted brackets to reduce vibration and spark arrestors on the magnetoes of the engines to eliminate that problem. Aircraft wiring and grounding must be improved.

3. Poor diving performance- To correct this feature requires increasing the thickness of the wing panels from .02 inches to .04. This will add structural stiffness to the wings eliminating bending and possible catastrophic failure in high speed dives. This must be tested thoroughly in flight test, to ensure success. Additional weight must be accepted.

4. Eliminate wing folding mechanism- This feature will reduce out wing torsional stresses and possibly provide better maneuverability at the higher diving speeds. It also reduces material requirements and weight, to compensate for the thicker wing panels. Flight test is vital in this area.

5. Armament - Complaints from the field suggest that 7.7mm guns are worthless against US aircraft. Suggest we eliminate the cowl mounted 7.7mm to save weight, and replace 20 mm with two 13 mm Machine guns with 250 rounds per gun. Install selector switch to use two or four guns. This possibility must be explored. Also, increasing the muzzle velocity of the 20mm and ammunition supply could be a possibility. Testing at the armament facility of 13mm against armor plate and heavier aluminum panels is vital for decision.

6. Install pilot armor and self sealing fuel tanks- This additional weight must be accepted. Our pilots should be given more protection. Also suggest fire extinguisher system for fuel tank area.

7. Maneuverability at high speed - This problem was encountered in the elevator control system on original model. Suggest investigating control cable diameter to reduce control stick loads at 250 mph and higher.


Summation- The changes suggested may add up to 1000 lbs of extra weight, raising the total takeoff weight to over 6600 lbs. This will result in a loss of low speed maneuverability and range. This must be accepted. Advantages of better diving speed, better forward speed at all altitudes, greater firepower and enhanced climb rate up to 30,000 ft will be realized.

Suggest commencement of design exploration of next generation, single engined fighter for the both the carrier squadrons and land based squadrons.

Dennis:

Didn't the Goerge or Frank sort of accomplish this? I believe the lack of reliable larger engines was the main problem coupled with the lack of skilled techs to maintain these engines.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have a US Navy test result that says the Fw190A-3 versus the F4U-1 would have been an equal fight. But it did have some superiority against the F6F-3. Both are considered second generation low winged monoplanes.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/ptr-1107.pdf

Read and heed.

Dennis:

Thanks, those two planes do match up well.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

As we have established that some Zeros did have radios, I'm still wondering if the mindset of the Japanese pilot was as much to blame for their losses as the Zero itself? Considering that Japanese culture pretty much stressed conformity and obedience, the free wheeling nature of Japanese fighter pilots (you don't see that behavior with their attack planes) is somewhat of an anamoly. Some of Saburo Sakai's accounts mention radio communication with other pilots. The IJN did use the wingman principle, but once a furball starts, they scatter all over the sky. It's almost as if the Japanese fighter pilot saw himself as the lone samaurai hero taking on all opponents. I'm not remotely convinced that even with good radios and more survivable planes that Japanese fighter pilots could ever have coped with increasingly better Allied fighters. I'm not sure their mindset was able to adjust at least in the time frame of WWII.

Having radios is one thing.. having radios that are actually any good is another. That was the problem. In the early 1940s there was no compensation for lack of good radio communications and doctrine... especially in air combat. How were Japanese going to evolved into team tactical thinking without reliable communications? If their own CV could not manage them as a CAP then there was little if any chance of them doing so on their own. You had to change the plane to fix the problem -- it needed reliable radios.

[Warship NWS]

Kyle:

As a fighter, the Zero certainly was effective, but I think what Chris has been trying to say is that it didn't take very long for the USN to find ways to counter its strengths and prey on its weaknesses.

And they were weaknesses that could not be addressed unless the plane was upgraded or replaced.. that is the critical key here. You can only compensate for so much with good pilots otherwise why bother evolving your weapons and tactics at all?


And Chris, the Zero even in 1944 was still a threat against any Allied plane if it was in the hands of an ace or a veteran. The trouble being that such pilots had become thin on the ground due to the lack of survivability of the Zero and all Japanese planes in general.

Any plane could shoot down another plane with the right pilot and circumstances but the more weaknesses you have vs your opponent the less your odds will be of succeeding. The better balanced your weapon system is vs your opponent, the better the tactics, and the better the pilot the better your odds overall and remember, most pilots were NOT top notch pilots and by 1944 this was a serious problem for the Japanese.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Actually I see Kyle's point here, something that has been explored recently in the new Osprey series "Duel" which pits individual weapon systems against each other to analyze how they fared historically. Sure a team approach wins in most cases. The question is in a one of one duel how do we evaluate the Zero against its various opponents? But then again we have to consider is one plane surprised? Is it at lower or higher altitude? There are so many factors to consider that we can never say its slam dunk one way or the other.

See Kyle, I am ever the conciliator bringing widely differing viewpoints together. Maybe I should run for president?:rolleyes:

The other thing to consider is how often and how much effect would a 1 vs 1 fight on the overall battle of attrition... in most all cases, very little. Planes, unless on recon duty or stragglers, almost never flew alone. There is the thing called safety in numbers.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Didn't the Goerge or Frank sort of accomplish this? I believe the lack of reliable larger engines was the main problem coupled with the lack of skilled techs to maintain these engines.
The National Air and Space Museum is preparing a new book on Japanese aircraft engines. Here is a brief excerpt:


Material shortages were common. The workforce was often unskilled and minimally trained. Fuel for testing powerplants was in short supply. In fact, much of the advanced research and development being conducted focused on planning for the lack of quality metals and the lack of petroleum-based fuel. This occurred at the same time that advanced research and development in America was concerned almost exclusively with improving engine performance and increasing production—no expense spared. Bombing raids forced workers from their homes, destroyed factories and forced companies to divert resources into factory dispersion programs.

I believe we are discovering some real lack of investigation in many of the books that are out there.

[john964]

Dennis:

Didn't the Goerge or Frank sort of accomplish this? I believe the lack of reliable larger engines was the main problem coupled with the lack of skilled techs to maintain these engines.
Also what about the late stage Tony and Tojo?

[old_pop2000]

Also what about the late stage Tony and Tojo?
Why don't one or all of you, research the following aircraft and compare them. You could use a spreadsheet format or list: I would use the Model 21 Zero as a comparison. Get information on the Tony, Frank, George, etc. Just do the later single engined, low winged monoplanes. Compare top speed at the same altitude, climb rate at two different altitudes, armament, range under combat load. That isn't much data and it should be relatively easy to find.

Here is a link to start someone off:http://www.angelfire.com/fm/compass/Hayate.htm

Have fun

[Warship NWS]

The Zeke was not a 1st generation fighter for the Japanese. It was a 2nd generation monoplane fighter much like the P-40 and F4F.

First generation 1930s designed monoplane fighters included, (quick referencing for comparison)

A5M Claude (fought at the Coral Sea)
Ki-27 Nate
P-36 Hawk
Hawker Hurricane I
Brewster Buffalo
Bf-109B
MC.200
MB.150
LaGG-3

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

After watching Battle 360, I was very impressed with what they did get right and glad that Parshall was on board.

I agree. If you watched closely you could see that the decks were not filled with planes when the dive bombers stuck.. only 3-4 Zekes were on the deck. That episode of 360 was far better then the first one covering the USS Enterprise. It is also interesting to note that the original movie "The Battle of Midway" was right for the most part about the "wave hopping" after the survivors. The Zekes were still chasing down VF/VT-3 when VB-3/6, VS-6 struck the IJN CVs. The CVs were not coordinating the Zekes at all that were in the skies if you read between the lines of Parshalls book. That was a major flaw in their CAP doctrine and was quite likely due to lack of communictions. In the movie you saw air wing commander stating "we are trying to get them back up to their patrol altitudes".. well they couldn't to start with, no way to communicate with the CAP fighters. The CAP was basicly left to do its own thing with no C&C coordination either from the air or from the CVs. The part the movie got wrong was not showing how the CAP fighters were constantly tying up the deck with rearming and instead showed the CVs preparing a major strike on the flight decks, which Parshall proved was incorrect.

[old_pop2000]

I've provided a lot information on the F4F, its strong points and weaknesses. I 've done the same with the A6M2. Now let's see if you were paying attention.

I am an F4F-3, flying at 15,000 ft., cruising speed of 115 MPH. I am jumped from the 5 o' clock position, sun high by a A6M2. You spot him at a distance of 500 yards.

What is the best defense?

Remember the sequence of events is important, and crucial. If you leave out one particular step, it might cost you your life.

Any takers?

[Warship NWS]

I've provided a lot information on the F4F, its strong points and weaknesses. I 've done the same with the A6M2. Now let's see if you were paying attention.

I am an F4F-3, flying at 15,000 ft., cruising speed of 115 MPH. I am jumped from the 5 o' clock position, sun high by a A6M2. You spot him at a distance of 500 yards.

What is the best defense?

Remember the sequence of events is important, and crucial. If you leave out one particular step, it might cost you your life.

Any takers?

I know the answer but.. I will sit back on this one..;)

[old_pop2000]

I know the answer but.. I will sit back on this one..;)
Are you certain? The standard answer might get you killed.;)

Think about your controls. Think about his capability, his limitations. Sometimes the simplest maneuver is the best.:D

[Warship NWS]

Are you certain? The standard answer might get you killed.;)

Think about your controls. Think about his capability, his limitations. Sometimes the simplest maneuver is the best.:D

All I will say is ..yep. ;) Actually, there is possibly more then one answer but there are other factors that could be involved. ;)

[Mike Malanaphy]

All I will say is ..yep. ;) Actually, there is possibly more then one answer but there are other factors that could be involved. ;)

Hi Guys,

The Wildcat pilot should go to full power and dive away from the Zero. He should be able to out accelerate the lighter Zero and his unboosted controls will get stiff as he tries to follow. With the extra speed and distance, the Wildcat can escape or use his speed to gain altitude for a diving attack on the Zero.

[Warship NWS]

Hi Guys,

The Wildcat pilot should go to full power and dive away from the Zero. He should be able to out accelerate the lighter Zero and his unboosted controls will get stiff as he tries to follow. With the extra speed and distance, the Wildcat can escape or use his speed to gain altitude for a diving attack on the Zero.

Not enough time to make that work.. at 500 yards and he is already diving.. you wont accellerate from 115mph to 250mph fast enough to avoid being killed. Bang you just ate 20mm.

Note, for a purely defensive maneuver.. your half right but still dead.

[old_pop2000]

Are you certain? The standard answer might get you killed.;)

Think about your controls. Think about his capability, his limitations. Sometimes the simplest maneuver is the best.:D
Thanks for participating, Mike:

If you don't mind, I will wait to answer this question when I've gotten more ideas. There is more than one answer.

Just one suggestion: Think offensively, not defensively.

[old_pop2000]

Just some information on the Japanese fighter formation.

The Japanese flew in what is a three-aircraft Shōtai composed of a leader and two wingmen.

When not in combat, they would fly in a triangle formation about 160 ft apart, all at the same altitude. Look at the three middle fingers of your hand, the leader is the middle finger and the two wingmen are on either side.

When preparing for combat, they would move to a formation where one wingmen was behind the leader and 650 ft above. The other was 1000 ft behind.

From this formation, they could easily move to the line astern and make separate firing passes.

Due to the poor radio telephones in the fighters, hand semaphores, prearranged signal flares and wagging of wings was the often used communication method.

At the start of the Pacific War, the Japanese carriers had eighteen Zeros on board. They were divided into two groups of nine. One group for escort, the other for CAP above the carrier.

Due to a lack of radar, the Japanese developed the standing patrol of one three-plane Shōtai aloft, another spotted on the deck for immediate launch and a third, probably down below, fueled and armed. Duration of a standing patrol was 2 hours. Each pilot was responsible for a sector above the carrier.

The poor quality radios made it impossible to control CAP aircraft already aloft. There was no designated air defense officer; the task was rotated amongst the officers. Any air intel had to go through the air group commander first, then to the air defense officer. This definitely slowed the process. Without radar, good radios and a permanently designated air defense officer who could learn his trade, the development of a combat information center was hampered.

The Zero's low ammo supply hampered their air combat time, as they had to break off to land and rearm. This may have contributed to the loss of the four carriers at Midway as many CAP aircraft were required to land, re-arm then takeoff and regain altitude. Without radar and good radios, there was no clear method of directing them to the dive bombers.

Maintenance: I researched the construction and apparently the front and rear spar on the wings were one piece with a spline connecting them to the fuselage at the 10th rib. This simply means that to repair damage on either wing, the entire wing assembly from tip to tip, with the fuselage connection, must be removed. Probably not an easy task in a crowded hanger bay or on Rabaul with no supplies. Also, on the A6M3 Model 32, the ailerons were 11 inches shorter than on the Model 21. Aileron trim tabs were adjustable only on the ground. Normal fuel capacity was 134 gallons on the Hamp, with 20 gallons in a tank behind the firewall, two 57 gallon tanks in wings between the spars, set 49.5 inches from the wing root. They were not protected and were not part of the wing structure. Airfoil was an NACA 2315 at the root, NACA 3309 at the tip. Wing loading was 21.3 lbs/sq/ft. Most of this is for the Hamp Model 32.


I hope this helps all of you.

[Warship NWS]

Thanks Dennis, some additional thoughts..



Due to the poor radio telephones in the fighters, hand semaphores, prearranged signal flares and wagging of wings was the often used communication method.

IIRC, the attack on PH was started with a hand flare from the lead air strike commander .. I do not believe it was seen by all pilots. If anyone finds otherwise feel free to correct me as I am going off of memory here.


The Zero's low ammo supply hampered their air combat time, as they had to break off to land and rearm. This may have contributed to the loss of the four carriers at Midway as the many CAP aircraft were required to land, re-arm then takeoff and regain altitude. Without radar and good radios, there was no clear method of directing them to the dive bombers.

* As Parshall so well stated "the effectiveness of the Zeke was proportional to the 20mm ammunition available".

* Let's take this situation and convert it to the RAF during the BoB1940 - drop out the aircraft radios, the Luft would have won the air war in about a week - without radar in about 2-3 weeks - without both.. probably in a few days. It would have been interesting to see what would have happend if the armaments for the Luft and RAF fighters were switched and how that would have affected combat endurance tactics.

It is interesting to wonder how critical the MGFF 20mm 60RPG problem was to the Luft during the BoB since they were using a cannon of relatively the same general characteristics as the Type 99-1 on the Zekes or to contemplate how the aircraft would have acted in the campaigns if they had 4 x 12.7/13mm guns with 250-350 rounds each (allowing for around 16-23 seconds of combat endurance rather then 7 seconds) and what kind of difference that would have made in combat during their campaigns.

Side note, the Bf-109E was for all intensive purposes a better aircraft then the Zeke with the exception of range, turn radius (to the left), and pilot visibilty -- all other attributes were as good as, or better, then the Zeke. The Bf-109E also had a good radio. If the IJN was equipped with the Bf-109E at Midway the battle might have turned out quite differently with one deficiency.. the Bf-109E had only about 50% of the range of the Wildcat so in the escort role it would have been a problem unless it was escorting a raid only flying out to around 150 miles maximum. Gas economy over the target would not have been as critical due to the limited time of engagement compared to flying over hostile territory and back as was required over Britian during 1940. The IJN however would have likely developed drop tanks to help solve the problem of limited internal fuel range.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thanks for participating, Mike:

If you don't mind, I will wait to answer this question when I've gotten more ideas. There is more than one answer.

Just one suggestion: Think offensively, not defensively.

Dennis:

I read that the best thing to do if you don't have altitude is to turn to your attacker. Or else roll away? (I'm not a fighter pilot, but I play one on TV).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thanks Dennis, some additional thoughts..



IIRC, the attack on PH was started with a hand flare from the lead air strike commander .. I do not believe it was seen by all pilots. If anyone finds otherwise feel free to correct me as I am going off of memory here.



* As Parshall so well stated "the effectiveness of the Zeke was proportional to the 20mm ammunition available".

* Let's take this situation and convert it to the RAF during the BoB1940 - drop out the aircraft radios, the Luft would have won the air war in about a week - without radar in about 2-3 weeks - without both.. probably in a few days. It would have been interesting to see what would have happend if the armaments for the Luft and RAF fighters were switched and how that would have affected combat endurance tactics.

It is interesting to wonder how critical the MGFF 20mm 60RPG problem was to the Luft during the BoB since they were using a cannon of relatively the same general characteristics as the Type 99-1 on the Zekes or to contemplate how the aircraft would have acted in the campaigns if they had 4 x 12.7/13mm guns with 250-350 rounds each (allowing for around 16-23 seconds of combat endurance rather then 7 seconds) and what kind of difference that would have made in combat during their campaigns.

Side note, the Bf-109E was for all intensive purposes a better aircraft then the Zeke with the exception of range, turn radius (to the left), and pilot visibilty -- all other attributes were as good as, or better, then the Zeke. The Bf-109E also had a good radio. If the IJN was equipped with the Bf-109E at Midway the battle might have turned out quite differently with one deficiency.. the Bf-109E had only about 50% of the range of the Wildcat so in the escort role it would have been a problem unless it was escorting a raid only flying out to around 150 miles maximum. Gas economy over the target would not have been as critical due to the limited time of engagement compared to flying over hostile territory and back as was required over Britian during 1940. The IJN however would have likely developed drop tanks to help solve the problem of limited internal fuel range.

Thanks.

Chris:

Another thing to keep in mind is that German pilots fought with far better doctrine than the Japanese. Essentially they and the US and Brits worked as teams. That's why so many German aces survived the war (that and they weren't flying gas cans!).

I believe the Luftwaffe realized the limiatations of their original 20mm cannons and corrected them far earlier than the IJN did. Possibly by the time the FW-190 was introduced, since it had two different model 20mm cannons on board.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I read that the best thing to do if you don't have altitude is to turn to your attacker. Or else roll away? (I'm not a fighter pilot, but I play one on TV).
I will provide an answer by the end of the day. Remember that there are more than one answer, but for the F4F, in this type of situation, probably only one that stays offensive.

Thanks.

To another question, is this a real live situation? Somewhat, yes.

[Kyle Holgate]

Yes.. but I do not think you understand the "why" parts of this equation.

At least where the Zeke stands we're at a stalemate. There is a difference between not understanding something and disagreeing. I understand just fine, I just have a different opinion. I've stated my case, you've stated yours. I disagree with a number of points, you disagree with a number of mine.

I will restate my main point of contention - The Zero fighter as a single unit was a reasonably good fighter and was surprisingly capable. Yes, it was primarily a dogfighter but as said in Aces of the sky by one of flying tigers - in those days we were trained to dogfight. New tactics had to be created largely because of the Zero - meaning it certainly heavily impacted the air war. A whole new set of tactics had to be created and learned to routinely defeat this plane - that has to be something.
That poor tactics and rigid training along with poor logistics and conditions greatly impacted the capability of this fighter during the war is a part of the perceived problem of the aircraft. If you want to call this failing a ding to the plane itself then that is your right. I choose not to do this and instead look at the weapon - independant of if it were poorly used or was difficult to maintain to a large extent due to a lack in logistics, good mechanics, etc.
Some questions asked earlier: Radios - Very important of course.

Dennis - the bounced F4F - Only thing I can think of right off is to go into a very hard right turn (so a clockwise turn from 12 toward 5:00). I am not sure there is enough oomph in the Wildcat to actually climb into it, so it'd have to be either level or a diving turn to try to gain speed. I'm thinking a diving hard right bank then turn though may be the best counter for the diving Zero at my 5:00.

[Warship NWS]

I will restate my main point of contention - The Zero fighter as a single unit was a reasonably good fighter and was surprisingly capable. Yes, it was primarily a dogfighter but as said in Aces of the sky by one of flying tigers - in those days we were trained to dogfight. New tactics had to be created largely because of the Zero - meaning it certainly heavily impacted the air war. A whole new set of tactics had to be created and learned to routinely defeat this plane - that has to be something.
That poor tactics and rigid training along with poor logistics and conditions greatly impacted the capability of this fighter during the war is a part of the perceived problem of the aircraft. If you want to call this failing a ding to the plane itself then that is your right. I choose not to do this and instead look at the weapon - independant of if it were poorly used or was difficult to maintain to a large extent due to a lack in logistics, good mechanics, etc.
Some questions asked earlier: Radios - Very important of course.

I will try this one last time based on FACTS, not opinion. They COULD have made a better plane, the designer of the plane wanted to.. but was not allowed to, so that part had nothing to do with logistics. So in the end they could not recover their edge in air combat using the attributes of the aircraft once the allies changed tactics on them that countered its weaknesses unless they changed the aircraft itself. The better A6M5 design was perfectly possible for them at the START OF THE WAR instead of the A6M2 they went to war with, the Japanese pilots and Naval Ministry (Genda primarly) went against it as they wanted the LIGHTEST possible aircraft - which killed the chance of a better engine, more ammo, better diving speed, better high altitude, and better survivability (all due to weight restrictions caused by being forced to use a less powerful and lighter engine). This was not a problem with the LOGISTICS.. as they built FAR more A6M5s then the A6M2s. Basicaly, they tied their own hands behind their backs regarding air combat tactics options when they stuck with the A6M2 design at the start of the war due to the deficiencies of the plane itself... so yes THE A6M2 DESERVES TO BE DINGED. The A6M5 gave them more air combat tactics options (including a far greater dive speed due to thicker wings), more combat endurance, better high altitude performance, and better suvivability.. basicaly, everything the A6M2 should have had AT THE START but didn't BY THEIR OWN CHOICE, again this had nothing to do with logistics. The radio problem, was never really corrected until 1945...their poor design quality was not due to logistics (that just magnified the problem AFTER they were in service). They also could not counter team tactics even if they wanted to without good radios. The only detraction was the lower range of the A6M5 which could have been resolved by building more satellite airstrips (which they did try to do after the A6M3 but was too little too late - again they counted on the "range" of the A6M2 to save the day but it backfired on them for what they had to pay for the range) yet the A6M5 still outranged every allied fighter plane at the start of the Pacific War. Now, if you want to counter me please do so with facts of your own.. that is all I ask.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

In his book, Horikoshi states:


I started to work on the engine selection and made a preliminary weight estimate. Of all type of airplanes, none are so dependent upon engine selection as are fighters. Only when the engine has been selected can a designer produce a draft of the airframe. In the case of the prototype 12, as previously stated, the Mitsubishi Kinsei type 46 and the Zuisei type 13 were listed as candidate engines. The Kinsei being the more powerful of the two. If we used the Kinsei we could have an airplane with high performance and high speed in one jump.... this was in keeping with my philosophy that it woud be better to design a high performance fighter in one big leap rather than to eventually reach that goal by making numerious small improvements to a lower performance over the span of its lifetime...But the Kinsei required a bigger airframe.

Horikoshi goes on to explain that in order to use the Kinsei, the fuselage would have to be bigger with more weight and therefore the wings, which have to support that weight, would have to be bigger along with the tail. This would have made a 3000 kg or 6613 pound aircraft. Pilots used to flying the Type 96 Claude would not accept this and Mitsubishi would have lost the contract for the fighter. He stated that he went with the smaller engine because the overall dimensions of the aircraft would be acceptable to the pilots, as would be the overall weight.

The Kinsei engine was a 1050 hp@2500 rpm engine up to 5000 ft. However, by the time the A6M2 was being developed, the engine was changed to the Nakajima Sakae 12 of 940 HP. The A6M3 of 1942, had the Sakae 21 with the two stage supercharger and was rated at 1130 hp.

So, the A6M1 aircraft was equipped with the Zuisei engine, however, the WWII Pacific version of the fighter, the A6M2 had the Sakae 12 later, the Sakae 21.

The key here is that a more powerful engine was available for the A6M1 when first designed. Had that engine been used, there might not have been a need to install the Sakae engine. The Kinsei had plenty of power at 1050 hp. But the pilots would not have bought off on a 6613 pound aircraft and Mitsubishi would have lost the contract.

[Kyle Holgate]

I will try this one last time based on FACTS, not opinion. They COULD have made a better plane, the designer of the plane wanted to.. but was not allowed to, so that part had nothing to do with logistics. So in the end they could not recover their edge in air combat using the attributes of the aircraft once the allies changed tactics on them that countered its weaknesses unless they changed the aircraft itself. The better A6M5 design was perfectly possible for them at the START OF THE WAR instead of the A6M2 they went to war with, the Japanese pilots and Naval Ministry (Genda primarly) went against it as they wanted the LIGHTEST possible aircraft - which killed the chance of a better engine, more ammo, better diving speed, better high altitude, and better survivability (all due to weight restrictions caused by being forced to use a less powerful and lighter engine). This was not a problem with the LOGISTICS.. as they built FAR more A6M5s then the A6M2s. Basicaly, they tied their own hands behind their backs regarding air combat tactics options when they stuck with the A6M2 design at the start of the war due to the deficiencies of the plane itself... so yes THE A6M2 DESERVES TO BE DINGED. The A6M5 gave them more air combat tactics options (including a far greater dive speed due to thicker wings), more combat endurance, better high altitude performance, and better suvivability.. basicaly, everything the A6M2 should have had AT THE START but didn't BY THEIR OWN CHOICE, again this had nothing to do with logistics. The radio problem, was never really corrected until 1945...their poor design quality was not due to logistics (that just magnified the problem AFTER they were in service). They also could not counter team tactics even if they wanted to without good radios. The only detraction was the lower range of the A6M5 which could have been resolved by building more satellite airstrips (which they did try to do after the A6M3 but was too little too late - again they counted on the "range" of the A6M2 to save the day but it backfired on them for what they had to pay for the range) yet the A6M5 still outranged every allied fighter plane at the start of the Pacific War. Now, if you want to counter me please do so with facts of your own.. that is all I ask.

Thanks.

Ok, no problem - the could have built a better plane - yep, this is a fact.
The plane they DID build dominated air combat for the most part wherever it was met for some time. This is a fact as well and I can support this with the viewpoints of dozens of pilots and dig up supportive views from many, many books. This may not be a fact as such, but it is at least an opinion held by many historians and pilots on both sides. I personally choose to give them this point - as to do otherwise would be to suggest that an EMC egineer that studies books and thinks a lot can "armchair quarterback" the issue and conclude that all these people are wrong & I'm right.
So again, this isn't a fact as in the earth is round, but it's a fact in that it is a very well supported view.

Yes, it had poor diving speed compared to others, yes it had deficiencies that ONCE DISCOVERED could be counteracted. No dispute here, as you say - facts not opinions.

Fact - the F4F and P-40 had problems against the Zero. New tactics had to be discovered and even then the aircraft ended up roughly equal in combat. The US built the Hellcat and P-38 and follow on aircraft to gain a clear superiority over their enemies (not just the zero).

Fact - The training methods of the Japanese produced very rigid pilots - much like the Russians fielded. They did not react to changes in tactics by the enemy very well if at all. OPINION - with a bit of teamwork of their own, the thatch weave could have been counterpunched. I agree that there may well be a counter to the counter to the counter - but the point is the Japanese pilots and training was at fault here not the fighter they flew.

The radio problem. To be blunt here - PROVE IT IS A FACT!!! provide me facts here PLEASE. I continue to argue here because all I have is your word for it unsubtatiated by anything I have read or been able to find - and I have been trying. Note, I am not suggesting youre making it up but in everything I have been able to find - nothing supports this - so I can't say it's a fact. I don't know where the truth lies here so can't make an informed decision. You've never told me where you came up with this "fact".
So here are the facts concerning the radio issue that I have found evidence to support:

The radios were not that great, tended to have fairly short range. This is a limitation for sure, no arguement there. They could have been better (and should have been).
The radios often broke down. Ok. So did the Russian radios, and the Germans in weather and for that matter the Flying Tigers had a hell of a time with theirs in China.
When they broke down, the pilots just had them tossed out. Ok. Can't say I blame them.
Yes - they could have been better - but they had them as part of the design - this is a fact as far as I can determine (Zero - My Martin Caidin - Caidun (sp?) - you can see the radio in the cockpit layout). I've seen cockpit photo's in other sources showing the radio. It was supposed to have one.

I'll use your "I never said that" back at you: I never said the Zero did not deserve dings in a number of areas. Here is what I DO say ( one...more...time...): The Zero was a reasonably good fighter. To futher elaborate on my opinion: Its performance helped to allow many of the early victories achieved by the Japanese. That the allies learned ways to counteract it and then built aircraft to out-perform it don't detract from what it initially achieved. The Germans found ways to help counter the Spitfire, the RN found ways to help defeat the Me-109E, the Japanese and Germans found ways to better defeat the B-17 (I can go on and on and on). The Zero (and many, many other aircraft) had deficiencies which - once discovered could be exploited. Yep - I totally agree this is a fact.

Once again - not sure what we're debating any more. We have both said the Zero was a reasonably good fighter. I agreed earlier, that it certainly wasn't without problems and I repeated it above. The Zero was a bit of a dead end design - it wasn't one you could just toss new engines in and tweak the airframe and keep it in the fight like the Spitfire or Me-109. It certainly was NOT super and is probably over-hyped in many historical texts (and TV documentaries). I don't know what else to say.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In his book, Horikoshi states:



Horikoshi goes on to explain that in order to use the Kinsei, the fuselage would have to be bigger with more weight and therefore the wings, which have to support that weight, would have to be bigger along with the tail. This would have made a 3000 kg or 6613 pound aircraft. Pilots used to flying the Type 96 Claude would not accept this and Mitsubishi would have lost the contract for the fighter. He stated that he went with the smaller engine because the overall dimensions of the aircraft would be acceptable to the pilots, as would be the overall weight.

The Kinsei engine was a 1050 hp@2500 rpm engine up to 5000 ft. However, by the time the A6M2 was being developed, the engine was changed to the Nakajima Sakae 12 of 940 HP. The A6M3 of 1942, had the Sakae 21 with the two stage supercharger and was rated at 1130 hp.

So, the A6M1 aircraft was equipped with the Zuisei engine, however, the WWII Pacific version of the fighter, the A6M2 had the Sakae 12 later, the Sakae 21.

The key here is that a more powerful engine was available for the A6M1 when first designed. Had that engine been used, there might not have been a need to install the Sakae engine. The Kinsei had plenty of power at 1050 hp. But the pilots would not have bought off on a 6613 pound aircraft and Mitsubishi would have lost the contract.

Dennis:

I believe that both you and Chris mentioned in earlier posts that the Zero's design was based primarily on the Japanese air combat experiences over China. It begs the question, to what degree did Japanese aircraft engineers know about European and American aircraft and the increasingly more powerful engines being utilized? It is interesting that pilots had as much say in the type of plane developed as opposed to higher command.

[Kyle Holgate]

Dennis:

I believe that both you and Chris mentioned in earlier posts that the Zero's design was based primarily on the Japanese air combat experiences over China. It begs the question, to what degree did Japanese aircraft engineers know about European and American aircraft and the increasingly more powerful engines being utilized? It is interesting that pilots had as much say in the type of plane developed as opposed to higher command.

Here's a quote from "war planes of the second world war" Fighters, volume 3. This is with regards to the KI.60 (an earlier version of the Ki.61 Hien or Tony)

"The early months of the war in Europe led the J.A.A.F. to consider the possible need for heavier fighters wtih liquid-cooled engines comparable to the latest European designs"

So it looks like the JAAF at least was keeping an eye on the European airwar.

[old_pop2000]

It's time to provide, my solution to the question I posed to all.

The solution is to accelerate then kick the rudder hard right, skidding your plane to the right. It's termed "slamming the bandit". The Japanese pilots used a technique called HnC or hit and climb. If you put a little back pressure, accelerate then kick hard right, you start to gain altitude, and slide out in front of him. This reduces his lateral turning room. He probably had his gun sight on you and suddenly you slid toward him, giving him a 90 degree deflection shot and Japanese pilots never took 90 degree deflection shots.

In some circumstances, you can unload and roll back the other way and get a snap shot as he passes, provided you have timed it and prepared for it.

One problem with the split S and dive away is that you might be too low to execute that maneuver. It is a viable alternative but you will lose sight of your opponent when you roll and will take yourself out of the fight. Situational awareness is very important in these situations.

To those of you who said turn into him, you are basically correct. Skidding is faster, but a turn would do it. Good work.

[Warship NWS]

Ok, no problem - the could have built a better plane - yep, this is a fact. The plane they DID build dominated air combat for the most part wherever it was met for some time. This is a fact as well and I can support this with the viewpoints of dozens of pilots and dig up supportive views from many, many books. This may not be a fact as such, but it is at least an opinion held by many historians and pilots on both sides. I personally choose to give them this point - as to do otherwise would be to suggest that an EMC egineer that studies books and thinks a lot can "armchair quarterback" the issue and conclude that all these people are wrong & I'm right.

Yes.. many sources have touted the plane to be "superior" to all others and then the ones that dug a little deeper stated that the superiority stopped right about when the tactics changed and they faced competant pilots flying other 2nd generation modern monoplane aircraft with just a simple change of tactics - they simply stopped trying to turn with it or allowed themselves to get slowed down to the speed where the Zeke was effective at if they could help it. So was it more the pilot that made the plane great or the plane itself when lesser pilots with obsolete aircraft engaged and matched it? That is the interesting question.



Yes, it had poor diving speed compared to others, yes it had deficiencies that ONCE DISCOVERED could be counteracted. No dispute here, as you say - facts not opinions.
Fact - the F4F and P-40 had problems against the Zero. New tactics had to be discovered and even then the aircraft ended up roughly equal in combat.


And the Japanese could not reverse that counteraction without changing the plane itself - that part of the equation is critical. The P-40s and F4Fs did not need major changes to keep matching the Zekes.. but the Zekes needed major changes to regain their prioir dominating superiority.


Fact - The training methods of the Japanese produced very rigid pilots - much like the Russians fielded. They did not react to changes in tactics by the enemy very well if at all. OPINION - with a bit of teamwork of their own, the thatch weave could have been counterpunched. I agree that there may well be a counter to the counter to the counter - but the point is the Japanese pilots and training was at fault here not the fighter they flew.

Then why didnt they? Without good radios teamwork was almost entirely out of the question. Their pilots were not stupid, they were the best in the world at the time.. doesn't do any good if they cannot talk to each other in the air when it really mattered.



The radio problem. To be blunt here - PROVE IT IS A FACT!!! provide me facts here PLEASE. I continue to argue here because all I have is your word for it unsubtatiated by anything I have read or been able to find - and I have been trying. Note, I am not suggesting youre making it up but in everything I have been able to find - nothing supports this - so I can't say it's a fact. I don't know where the truth lies here so can't make an informed decision. You've never told me where you came up with this "fact".
So here are the facts concerning the radio issue that I have found evidence to support:


Dennis and I have posted several times the evidence you ask for. He checked how the radios were built and designed and stated quite clearly they were not as powerful or as well built as our own radios. Dennis actually has, and I have seen them also, documents from investigators of the Japanese technology after the war ended. Also, if their radios worked why is there NO evidence of any kind that the CVs or pilots in the air ever talked to each other at Midway? (Next I will be researching Coral Sea) This is not to say they NEVER worked but they did not work well enough, or often broke down, so as to prove nearly worthless. Dennis also stated clearly they were not designed up to "military standards". You of all people, being on modern USN warship, should know that communications are only as reliable and efficient as the equipment that you have. Without good reliable communications how efficiently would you have operated on your warship?


The radios were not that great, tended to have fairly short range. This is a limitation for sure, no arguement there. They could have been better (and should have been). The radios often broke down. Ok. So did the Russian radios, and the Germans in weather and for that matter the Flying Tigers had a hell of a time with theirs in China.
When they broke down, the pilots just had them tossed out. Ok. Can't say I blame them.
Yes - they could have been better - but they had them as part of the design - this is a fact as far as I can determine (Zero - My Martin Caidin - Caidun (sp?) - you can see the radio in the cockpit layout). I've seen cockpit photo's in other sources showing the radio. It was supposed to have one.

It did have one and I previously admitted that at first I thought they didn't due to the lack of any evidence that they were, hardly ever, if ever, used in combat - at the least not when it really mattered. What me and Dennis found was that they had them but they proved so unreliable due to their poor designs that the A6M3 pilots were tossing them out. This is not to say that other nations did not have problems with their earlier sets of radios, we are talking the 1940s here and radios were fairly new, but it came down to how often did they work vs not working. It all came down to how well they were designed and how well they worked in combat conditions. With all of the information me and Dennis have found the IJN sets were not well insulated, prone to failure, and unreliable.. making reliable communications in combat conditions virtually impossible. The greatest effect this had is you cannot incorporate or evolve team tactics without good communications. The air war over Britain with the RAF vs Luftwaffe was an ever evolving challenge of team work tactics.. both sides had fairly good radios however so this was possible. If one side had bad radios the air war would have likely played out very differently as one side would have not been able to effectively counter new aerial tactics.. this is what happened to the Japanese. It was not just a matter of not being trained to fight as a team, they could not do it as effectively as we could due to lack of good communications. They simply could not evolve their tactics as effectively even if they tried to.


Once again - not sure what we're debating any more. We have both said the Zero was a reasonably good fighter. I agreed earlier, that it certainly wasn't without problems and I repeated it above. The Zero was a bit of a dead end design - it wasn't one you could just toss new engines in and tweak the airframe and keep it in the fight like the Spitfire or Me-109. It certainly was NOT super and is probably over-hyped in many historical texts (and TV documentaries). I don't know what else to say.

On this part you and me agree. The part I think you and me were mostly disagreeing on was what the IJN pilots could have done to counteract the defects.. and in the end there was nothing they could do except change the plane itself -- this is critical. You cannnot compensate for poor durability, poor diving capability, or poor handling above 250mph, and poor high altitude performance.. they could do nothing about those problems until they changed the engine and major sections of the plane itself. Again, you have the best pilots in the world in the A6M2 taking on far less experienced pilots in the F4F and P-40.. and broke even .. this to me is not a good showing of supposedly great, or even good for that matter IMHO, fighter when being flown by great pilots. The allied pilots figured out ways to counter it and there was nothing the IJN pilots could do to regain their dominating superiority that they previously enjoyed vs less competant air forces except to change the plane itself, by then though it was too late as the damage was done. The defects were exploited and as the Japanese even acknowledged themeselves when we were able to research that plane it was the worst blow to their forces during the entire war. They bluffed against weaker opponents, and vs better opponents initially, and we called it with better tactics while flying more tacticaly flexible aircraft.. and there was not a damn thing they could do to regain their previously enjoyed superiority without making major changes to the plane. They were forced to break even at that point until they produced a better aircraft, actually the aircraft they should have built from the start, but by then the damage was done and most of their great pilots were dead.

Hopefully this makes more sense now. We are hitting a topic in more complexity then you typicaly see in most sources so it is not easy to get across multi-dimensional thinking on a text type forum. Also, I just wanted to make sure you were not disagreeing with me just for the sake of disagreeing on these finer points. You know how you hate to admit anytime I might be right. (and yes, you have said that many times before) ;) You have to look at the causes and effect and think outside the box here.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Link to article on radio systems in the early A6M Zero:

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/gregspringer/radios/radio_systems.htm


:D

[Mike Malanaphy]

Not enough time to make that work.. at 500 yards and he is already diving.. you wont accellerate from 115mph to 250mph fast enough to avoid being killed. Bang you just ate 20mm.

Note, for a purely defensive maneuver.. your half right but still dead.

Guess that's why I'm not Chuck Yeager. :(

[old_pop2000]

Guess that's why I'm not Chuck Yeager. :(
Mike:
The split S and dive away is a valid maneuver, but the issue is that it is defensive and not offensive. At some altitudes, that maneuver is not possible. In a formation, it can also break up formation cohesion, which is important. This is not a black and white game, there are just some answers better than others.

[Warship NWS]

Guess that's why I'm not Chuck Yeager. :(

Guy.. none of us are on this thread (that I know of ;)). The amount of training to make a pilot proficient even back then was no simple task and they either learned to fly and kill or be killed. To be honest I did not think of the "side slip" rudder maneuver at first although in flight sims I have used it to help aim my gunfire. I felt like "duh" that makes sense.. basicaly all it meant was horizontal jinking rather then vertical jinking. It is very easy for us non-pilots to forget that big fin in the back called the "rudder" to help avoid getting shot. When you think of the myriad of 3 dimensional air combat tactics pilots learned it is easy to see why their training, when properly trained, was so extensive.

[old_pop2000]

Guy.. none of us are on this thread (that I know of ;)). The amount of training to make a pilot proficient even back then was no simple task and they either learned to fly and kill or be killed. To be honest I did not think of the "side slip" rudder maneuver at first although in flight sims I have used it to help aim my gunfire. I felt like "duh" that makes sense.. basicaly all it meant was horizontal jinking rather then vertical jinking. It is very easy for us non-pilots to forget that big fin in the back called the "rudder" to help avoid getting shot. When you think of the myriad of 3 dimensional air combat tactics pilots learned it is easy to see why their training, when properly trained, was so extensive.
The skid maneuver is part of a set of maneuvers called jinking. They are out-of-plane maneuvers. The skid must be drastic enough to create a large angle off for the attacker. A jink maneuver like a skid, or sudden pitch up usually has to be followed with another maneuver like a climbing turn, barrel roll etc. Sometimes the jink is enough to cause the attacker to overshoot and a defender that has planned his maneuver well enough, can roll back onto his attackers tail. Commander Thach accomplished this during the battle of Midway when his four aircraft were jumped. He eventually was able to time his maneuver and roll back, take a snap shot at the climbing Japanese Zero and obtain his first kill of three for the day. His was not a skid, as such, but was a combination of a skid with break turn.

[Kyle Holgate]

Yes.. many sources have touted the plane to be "superior" to all others and then the ones that dug a little deeper stated that the superiority stopped right about when the tactics changed and they faced competant pilots flying other 2nd generation modern monoplane aircraft with just a simple change of tactics - they simply stopped trying to turn with it or allowed themselves to get slowed down to the speed where the Zeke was effective at if they could help it. So was it more the pilot that made the plane great or the plane itself when lesser pilots with obsolete aircraft engaged and matched it? That is the interesting question.



And the Japanese could not reverse that counteraction without changing the plane itself - that part of the equation is critical. The P-40s and F4Fs did not need major changes to keep matching the Zekes.. but the Zekes needed major changes to regain their prioir dominating superiority.



Then why didnt they? Without good radios teamwork was almost entirely out of the question. Their pilots were not stupid, they were the best in the world at the time.. doesn't do any good if they cannot talk to each other in the air when it really mattered.



Dennis and I have posted several times the evidence you ask for. He checked how the radios were built and designed and stated quite clearly they were not as powerful or as well built as our own radios. Dennis actually has, and I have seen them also, documents from investigators of the Japanese technology after the war ended. Also, if their radios worked why is there NO evidence of any kind that the CVs or pilots in the air ever talked to each other at Midway? (Next I will be researching Coral Sea) This is not to say they NEVER worked but they did not work well enough, or often broke down, so as to prove nearly worthless. Dennis also stated clearly they were not designed up to "military standards". You of all people, being on modern USN warship, should know that communications are only as reliable and efficient as the equipment that you have. Without good reliable communications how efficiently would you have operated on your warship?



It did have one and I previously admitted that at first I thought they didn't due to the lack of any evidence that they were, hardly ever, if ever, used in combat - at the least not when it really mattered. What me and Dennis found was that they had them but they proved so unreliable due to their poor designs that the A6M3 pilots were tossing them out. This is not to say that other nations did not have problems with their earlier sets of radios, we are talking the 1940s here and radios were fairly new, but it came down to how often did they work vs not working. It all came down to how well they were designed and how well they worked in combat conditions. With all of the information me and Dennis have found the IJN sets were not well insulated, prone to failure, and unreliable.. making reliable communications in combat conditions virtually impossible. The greatest effect this had is you cannot incorporate or evolve team tactics without good communications. The air war over Britain with the RAF vs Luftwaffe was an ever evolving challenge of team work tactics.. both sides had fairly good radios however so this was possible. If one side had bad radios the air war would have likely played out very differently as one side would have not been able to effectively counter new aerial tactics.. this is what happened to the Japanese. It was not just a matter of not being trained to fight as a team, they could not do it as effectively as we could due to lack of good communications. They simply could not evolve their tactics as effectively even if they tried to.



On this part you and me agree. The part I think you and me were mostly disagreeing on was what the IJN pilots could have done to counteract the defects.. and in the end there was nothing they could do except change the plane itself -- this is critical. You cannnot compensate for poor durability, poor diving capability, or poor handling above 250mph, and poor high altitude performance.. they could do nothing about those problems until they changed the engine and major sections of the plane itself. Again, you have the best pilots in the world in the A6M2 taking on far less experienced pilots in the F4F and P-40.. and broke even .. this to me is not a good showing of supposedly great, or even good for that matter IMHO, fighter when being flown by great pilots. The allied pilots figured out ways to counter it and there was nothing the IJN pilots could do to regain their dominating superiority that they previously enjoyed vs less competant air forces except to change the plane itself, by then though it was too late as the damage was done. The defects were exploited and as the Japanese even acknowledged themeselves when we were able to research that plane it was the worst blow to their forces during the entire war. They bluffed against weaker opponents, and vs better opponents initially, and we called it with better tactics while flying more tacticaly flexible aircraft.. and there was not a damn thing they could do to regain their previously enjoyed superiority without making major changes to the plane. They were forced to break even at that point until they produced a better aircraft, actually the aircraft they should have built from the start, but by then the damage was done and most of their great pilots were dead.

Hopefully this makes more sense now. We are hitting a topic in more complexity then you typicaly see in most sources so it is not easy to get across multi-dimensional thinking on a text type forum. Also, I just wanted to make sure you were not disagreeing with me just for the sake of disagreeing on these finer points. You know how you hate to admit anytime I might be right. (and yes, you have said that many times before) ;) You have to look at the causes and effect and think outside the box here.

Thanks.

With respect Chris, it sure seems like you hate to grant any point to me too! When I debate/argue a subject I at least consider that my view 'could' be wrong going in. Instead of that it SEEMS like you often just expand the debate if I make some points. Initially we weren't talking about high altitude performance, then suddenly it's tossed in for some reason out of the blue isntead of sticking with the subject matter within the contect and frame work we were already discussing.
Also - facts are tenuous. I have listened to what you have dug up and what Dennis has said and tried very hard - spent hours online and in my books and even went to the library this weekend to research the radio issue. I won't say i've found everything there is on it - but the facts as I know them through fairly careful checking and cross checking don't totally support your views. If you don't want to believe me fine - I don't want to believe you either as you've yet to show me any proof that the radios were so bad they greatly impacted on the ability of the overal fighter to fight. EVERYTHING I found says they were too short ranged - but did cover enough range to clearly speak to each other in typical formations. Engine noise got into them at some speeds and they buzzed or whined. They did not take at all well to moiture and humidity. Japanese ground crews were often not expert enough to fix them. Japanes pilots did complain a bit, but a Samurai doesn't complain. They suffered from a lack of communication and feedback to the manufacturers in many areas from the front lines and did not react to changing conditions well or at all through changes in tactics OR gear. Very rigid system.

In every other field we try to substantiate things. In NWS wargames we don't "guess", we look for multiple sources if we can to support what we think is true if we can't find actual good factual information. This is an area where I think our information is not clear.
Note - I am open for more info on the radios! I'd like to figure this one out. If they indeed were nearly useless then where is this info coming from? Can it be substantiated?

As for the fighter itself - Through some changes in tactics the P-40 and F4F managed to hold their own against the Zero. Neither could gain air superiority over it unless other factors were involved to help them out. That the Japanese didn't find a way to communicate within their own ranks and modify their tactics more - is a fault of their system. I cannot see how you can stretch this into being a fault of the plane. Sure some things it couldn't do it just couldn't do - no tactics can change that. Again though, that isn't unique to the Zero, so I find it difficult to single it out to pick on.

Now if you want to pick on a fighter - I give you the ME-110C! Hmm, well I can argue with myself a bit here and say that when they used it as a night fighter or fighter bomber it proved better... heh... can't even agree with myself sometimes LOL ;)

[old_pop2000]

With respect Chris, it sure seems like you hate to grant any point to me too! When I debate/argue a subject I at least consider that my view 'could' be wrong going in. Instead of that it SEEMS like you often just expand the debate if I make some points. Initially we weren't talking about high altitude performance, then suddenly it's tossed in for some reason out of the blue isntead of sticking with the subject matter within the contect and frame work we were already discussing.
Also - facts are tenuous. I have listened to what you have dug up and what Dennis has said and tried very hard - spent hours online and in my books and even went to the library this weekend to research the radio issue. I won't say i've found everything there is on it - but the facts as I know them through fairly careful checking and cross checking don't totally support your views. If you don't want to believe me fine - I don't want to believe you either as you've yet to show me any proof that the radios were so bad they greatly impacted on the ability of the overal fighter to fight. EVERYTHING I found says they were too short ranged - but did cover enough range to clearly speak to each other in typical formations. Engine noise got into them at some speeds and they buzzed or whined. They did not take at all well to moiture and humidity. Japanese ground crews were often not expert enough to fix them. Japanes pilots did complain a bit, but a Samurai doesn't complain. They suffered from a lack of communication and feedback to the manufacturers in many areas from the front lines and did not react to changing conditions well or at all through changes in tactics OR gear. Very rigid system.

In every other field we try to substantiate things. In NWS wargames we don't "guess", we look for multiple sources if we can to support what we think is true if we can't find actual good factual information. This is an area where I think our information is not clear.
Note - I am open for more info on the radios! I'd like to figure this one out. If they indeed were nearly useless then where is this info coming from? Can it be substantiated?

As for the fighter itself - Through some changes in tactics the P-40 and F4F managed to hold their own against the Zero. Neither could gain air superiority over it unless other factors were involved to help them out. That the Japanese didn't find a way to communicate within their own ranks and modify their tactics more - is a fault of their system. I cannot see how you can stretch this into being a fault of the plane. Sure some things it couldn't do it just couldn't do - no tactics can change that. Again though, that isn't unique to the Zero, so I find it difficult to single it out to pick on.

Now if you want to pick on a fighter - I give you the ME-110C! Hmm, well I can argue with myself a bit here and say that when they used it as a night fighter or fighter bomber it proved better... heh... can't even agree with myself sometimes LOL ;)
Kyle:

It is not worth my time, to research this radio issue, any further. Having been trained on tube technology, installed and repaired aircraft wiring, I can safely say that poor grounding, inadequate safeguards against arcing at high altitude and spark arrestors on aircraft engines will cause excessive noise on early low to medium frequency radios of that era. In reading Sakae's book, and two to three other stories by Zero pilots. In those three accounts, I never hear of Japanese pilots using the voice command radio to contact each other in the air. In fact, Sakae makes it a point that he would move up to the pilot in question and use hand signals to explain what he wanted. He states that the Japanese did not have good teamwork in the air, like the US did and perfected throughout the war. Couple these few remarks, with the TAIC reports on the poor quality of the grounding and wiring, would lead one to believe that the radios and the associate power and wiring were poorly protected. However, the reports do say the radios were designed well and of good quality.

In general, for that era, all radios and electronic equipment had reliability issues. Don Felt, the Saratoga Air group commander lost his radio, just before the attack on the Ryujo at Eastern Solomons. However, the rest of his group had radios, and the second in command took command. This, most likely would never have happened in the Japense Naval air forces. They just did not trust their radios. The radio telegraphy, which was not as sensitive, worked but was not useable for command. It was an aircraft to base type of system.

Now, that is a brief recap of what I know and perceive. I am done.

Dennis

[Mike Malanaphy]

The skid maneuver is part of a set of maneuvers called jinking. They are out-of-plane maneuvers. The skid must be drastic enough to create a large angle off for the attacker. A jink maneuver like a skid, or sudden pitch up usually has to be followed with another maneuver like a climbing turn, barrel roll etc. Sometimes the jink is enough to cause the attacker to overshoot and a defender that has planned his maneuver well enough, can roll back onto his attackers tail. Commander Thach accomplished this during the battle of Midway when his four aircraft were jumped. He eventually was able to time his maneuver and roll back, take a snap shot at the climbing Japanese Zero and obtain his first kill of three for the day. His was not a skid, as such, but was a combination of a skid with break turn.

Hi Dennis,

Gonna have to blow the dust off my flight simulators. I have Microsoft's Combat Flight Simualtor which covers the Pacific. I also have X Wing and Flanker 2.5. My favorite, Mig Alley, does not like my new computer. :(

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle:

It is not worth my time, to research this radio issue, any further. Having been trained on tube technology, installed and repaired aircraft wiring, I can safely say that poor grounding, inadequate safeguards against arcing at high altitude and spark arrestors on aircraft engines will cause excessive noise on early low to medium frequency radios of that era. In reading Sakae's book, and two to three other stories by Zero pilots. In those three accounts, I never hear of Japanese pilots using the voice command radio to contact each other in the air. In fact, Sakae makes it a point that he would move up to the pilot in question and use hand signals to explain what he wanted. He states that the Japanese did not have good teamwork in the air, like the US did and perfected throughout the war. Couple these few remarks, with the TAIC reports on the poor quality of the grounding and wiring, would lead one to believe that the radios and the associate power and wiring were poorly protected. However, the reports do say the radios were designed well and of good quality.

In general, for that era, all radios and electronic equipment had reliability issues. Don Felt, the Saratoga Air group commander lost his radio, just before the attack on the Ryujo at Eastern Solomons. However, the rest of his group had radios, and the second in command took command. This, most likely would never have happened in the Japense Naval air forces. They just did not trust their radios. The radio telegraphy, which was not as sensitive, worked but was not useable for command. It was an aircraft to base type of system.

Now, that is a brief recap of what I know and perceive. I am done.

Dennis

That pretty much supports what I've managed to dig up. I was reading about the radios the English used. At the war start they were terrible and often didn't work right or at all, but at least there feedback got where it needed to go and the problem was very well fixed by BOB time.
Japanese pilots were generally extermely well trained, but not in teamwork. The only clear instances I found of Zero fighter raidos working well was in some of the instances later in the war (1944) when they were scrambled to attack bombers. At least one - A6M3 (I think, it wasn't an M5) had comm's with his team mates - it's mentioned that one spots the bombers and radios the information to the flight leader.
A difficult area to find clear data on for sure.

[old_pop2000]

That pretty much supports what I've managed to dig up. I was reading about the radios the English used. At the war start they were terrible and often didn't work right or at all, but at least there feedback got where it needed to go and the problem was very well fixed by BOB time.
Japanese pilots were generally extermely well trained, but not in teamwork. The only clear instances I found of Zero fighter raidos working well was in some of the instances later in the war (1944) when they were scrambled to attack bombers. At least one - A6M3 (I think, it wasn't an M5) had comm's with his team mates - it's mentioned that one spots the bombers and radios the information to the flight leader.
A difficult area to find clear data on for sure.
Let's not minimize the effects of poor radios and the absence of effective command and control of combat air patrols over the task force. Without effective voice to voice communications, without larger quantities of ammunition, without adequate radar and procedures in place to conduct an effective air defense of the fleet, as we have seen, the IJN was very vulnerable. We cannot separate the aircraft performance which includes radio communication, low ammunition supply etc. from this mix. Battle management is a system that requires all parts working adequately. The Zero's high climb rate and range should have been good qualities for a defensive interceptor, except the lack of reliable communications and ammunition load, detracted from its capability. But it was not the entire picture. The US had similar issues except our F4F had a short range and poor climb rate. We corrected the range issue by Guadalcanal with two 58 gal fuel tanks. Our ammunition supplies were not a limiting factor. The climb rate was augmented by our radar which gave us adequate advance warning enabling the Fido to launch our supporting CAP's early enought to get to altitude. However, that did not always occur and the low climb rate did cause the loss of Lexington. In total, we compensated for the deficiencies of the plane with a good CIC of battle management. The Japanese never accomplished that. So, in the system that they had prepared, the Zero was a liability and their poor battle management system could not compensate for those deficiencies although, IMO, the A6M3 Model 32 could have performed adequately in place of the A6M2. The Model 32 did have a larger ammunition supply and with its two stage supercharger, a better high altitude climb rate which was very advantageous in defending the fleet.

Overall, both fighters had deficiencies. We expanded out command and control methods with an enlarged CIC, training for FIDO's and their teams, better radars, improved IFF on all ships in the fleet. Accompanying this was the development of improved tactics and finally, the development of better aircraft. The Japanese never improved their system. It wasn't until the advent of the A6M5 Model 52 did they get a very good, high speed fighter. This was in late 1943. Far too late to have any real effect. It was equal to our Hellcat and was at the mercy of the F4U Corsair. What the A6M5 shows is that the original requirements for the Prototype 12 were flawed as Horikoshi and Hattori had determined when they first saw them in 1937.

[Kyle Holgate]

Let's not minimize the effects of poor radios and the absence of effective command and control of combat air patrols over the task force. Without effective voice to voice communications, without larger quantities of ammunition, without adequate radar and procedures in place to conduct an effective air defense of the fleet, as we have seen, the IJN was very vulnerable. We cannot separate the aircraft performance which includes radio communication, low ammunition supply etc. from this mix. Battle management is a system that requires all parts working adequately. The Zero's high climb rate and range should have been good qualities for a defensive interceptor, except the lack of reliable communications and ammunition load, detracted from its capability. But it was not the entire picture. The US had similar issues except our F4F had a short range and poor climb rate. We corrected the range issue by Guadalcanal with two 58 gal fuel tanks. Our ammunition supplies were not a limiting factor. The climb rate was augmented by our radar which gave us adequate advance warning enabling the Fido to launch our supporting CAP's early enought to get to altitude. However, that did not always occur and the low climb rate did cause the loss of Lexington. In total, we compensated for the deficiencies of the plane with a good CIC of battle management. The Japanese never accomplished that. So, in the system that they had prepared, the Zero was a liability and their poor battle management system could not compensate for those deficiencies although, IMO, the A6M3 Model 32 could have performed adequately in place of the A6M2. The Model 32 did have a larger ammunition supply and with its two stage supercharger, a better high altitude climb rate which was very advantageous in defending the fleet.

Overall, both fighters had deficiencies. We expanded out command and control methods with an enlarged CIC, training for FIDO's and their teams, better radars, improved IFF on all ships in the fleet. Accompanying this was the development of improved tactics and finally, the development of better aircraft. The Japanese never improved their system. It wasn't until the advent of the A6M5 Model 52 did they get a very good, high speed fighter. This was in late 1943. Far too late to have any real effect. It was equal to our Hellcat and was at the mercy of the F4U Corsair. What the A6M5 shows is that the original requirements for the Prototype 12 were flawed as Horikoshi and Hattori had determined when they first saw them in 1937.

Ok. I do agree that the poor radios are a "ding" to the fighter. I think what I've been trying to do is be sure we've demystified the thing - without going to far. Basically give it credit where due and ding it where it deserves it. I think as a fighter it was superior to the F4F and older versions of the P-40 - even if we take the radio hit. I think this is the remaining point of contention between Chris and I.
You're getting brave stepping into our furball Dennis - heh heh.

[old_pop2000]

Ok. I do agree that the poor radios are a "ding" to the fighter. I think what I've been trying to do is be sure we've demystified the thing - without going to far. Basically give it credit where due and ding it where it deserves it. I think as a fighter it was superior to the F4F and older versions of the P-40 - even if we take the radio hit. I think this is the remaining point of contention between Chris and I.
You're getting brave stepping into our furball Dennis - heh heh.
Well, Kyle:
I approach this problem as a systems trained person. We are trained, as you were, to evaluate items as a part of a system, not individually. On a pure fighter to fighter basis, if we were to prepare a list of performance specifications for each aircraft and fly them off against each other, then overall, in the area of flight performance, the Japanese Zero has to be rated superior to the F4F. However, I would add other factors to evaluate it completely. Flight test results can tell you much, including the fact that this was an excellent low speed aircraft, but mediocre past 200 MPH. I can document that fact in two or three basic reports conducted on the Kunming Zero and the Koga Zero. I can also use Horikoshi's own words, that alludes to that. It used old technology for the control system on the horizontal stabilizer and rudder along with the ailerons. This old system, a remnant of biplane days was not designed to be effect past 200 mph since most biplane fighters are not capable of such speeds. Horikoshi and Hattori, having contact with other aircraft designers, understood the problem. Unfortunately, they could not produce the kind of fighter that they felt was required. The lack of an up-to-date control system is the key to its poor controllability and maneuverability above 200 mph. When you hear that it was very maneuverable, it was below 200 mph, not above. Above 250 mph, it was uncontrollable and unmaneuverable. Other factors such as poor maintainability due to the contruction and assembly methods, poor wiring, low engine power and moderate octane rating of the gas, all conspired to rob the plane of it's true potential. The best model was the A6M5 Model 52, bar none. In rating aircraft, it along with some late war models were very excellent aircraft. But by that time, as you are aware, it was far too late to affect the outcome. In comparison to the F4F, below 200 mph, it had superior flight performance. However, not above 200 mph. It's only advantage, overall was the extended range. But weighing what you gained by what you lost, I feel it was overemphasized. Less range, two stage supercharger with more power would have given it far better level speed and a climb rate that would be available beyond 15,000 ft. Until the Sakae 21, the A6M2 was a poor performer past 15,000 to 20,000 ft.

Those are my ideas and thoughts. You and Chris can argue all you want.

[Kyle Holgate]

Well, Kyle:
I approach this problem as a systems trained person. We are trained, as you were, to evaluate items as a part of a system, not individually. On a pure fighter to fighter basis, if we were to prepare a list of performance specifications for each aircraft and fly them off against each other, then overall, in the area of flight performance, the Japanese Zero has to be rated superior to the F4F. However, I would add other factors to evaluate it completely. Flight test results can tell you much, including the fact that this was an excellent low speed aircraft, but mediocre past 200 MPH. I can document that fact in two or three basic reports conducted on the Kunming Zero and the Koga Zero. I can also use Horikoshi's own words, that alludes to that. It used old technology for the control system on the horizontal stabilizer and rudder along with the ailerons. This old system, a remnant of biplane days was not designed to be effect past 200 mph since most biplane fighters are not capable of such speeds. Horikoshi and Hattori, having contact with other aircraft designers, understood the problem. Unfortunately, they could not produce the kind of fighter that they felt was required. The lack of an up-to-date control system is the key to its poor controllability and maneuverability above 200 mph. When you hear that it was very maneuverable, it was below 200 mph, not above. Above 250 mph, it was uncontrollable and unmaneuverable. Other factors such as poor maintainability due to the contruction and assembly methods, poor wiring, low engine power and moderate octane rating of the gas, all conspired to rob the plane of it's true potential. The best model was the A6M5 Model 52, bar none. In rating aircraft, it along with some late war models were very excellent aircraft. But by that time, as you are aware, it was far too late to affect the outcome. In comparison to the F4F, below 200 mph, it had superior flight performance. However, not above 200 mph. It's only advantage, overall was the extended range. But weighing what you gained by what you lost, I feel it was overemphasized. Less range, two stage supercharger with more power would have given it far better level speed and a climb rate that would be available beyond 15,000 ft. Until the Sakae 21, the A6M2 was a poor performer past 15,000 to 20,000 ft.

Those are my ideas and thoughts. You and Chris can argue all you want.

LOL, and we do argue all we want!

So I guess we need to establish how important the low manuverabilty over 200 mph is or the poor performance at altitude. I'll grant that the problem with high speed manuvering is a problem, but I question whether performance over 20k feet is that important. What altitude did dive bombers typically start their dive at - cruise to target at? Most air combat was below 20k I think - but I admit I don't know for sure.

[old_pop2000]

LOL, and we do argue all we want!

So I guess we need to establish how important the low manuverabilty over 200 mph is or the poor performance at altitude. I'll grant that the problem with high speed manuvering is a problem, but I question whether performance over 20k feet is that important. What altitude did dive bombers typically start their dive at - cruise to target at? Most air combat was below 20k I think - but I admit I don't know for sure.
SBD's would come in at two different altitudes, around 10,000 ft and 15,000 ft. Fighters covering those dive bombers had to sit, at least, 2000 to 5000 ft. above them for adequate coverage. This puts them above 20,000 ft.

For the Torpedo bombers, the fighters would not want to give up much altitude and waited until the TBF's or TBD's would call them down for action.

At Coral Sea, Bombing and Scouting 3 launched and slow climbed to 18000 ft, then circle to await Fighting 3's takeoff and climb out. They climbed to 22,000 ft for coverage.

As to the importance, speed is life in aerial combat, we have stated that before. If a Zero was cruising at 120 mph and was jumped, it could do some amazing aerobatics initially to avoid the initial attack. However, after that, it was going to need some speed, or the game was over. US pilots realized quickly that the plane had poor maneuverability at high speeds, so they immediately accelerated and kept the fight above 200 mph. This essentially negated the Japanese maneuverability.

Over the course of the war, combat speeds increased. the BnZ tactics were adopted more and more by attacking and defending aircraft. Speed and maneuverability at speed became more and more important. The Japanese pilots that fought in China, had drawn the wrong conclusions from their overwhelming victories over poor aircraft and even poorer pilots. Remember that the AVG was not operational until Dec. 7th, 1941.

[Warship NWS]

Kyle I will have to make this short as my next few weeks will be keeping me quite busy, however, not all facts will jump up at you and say "here I am.. I am the truth!". Analysis work is not always about a long string of fact and data either, sometimes you have to put the pieces of the equation together to come up with viable answers to hard and often complex questions. This holds especially true when doing tactics, battle, and weapons analysis. Wars were fought as combat systems acting together in a doctrine and set of tactics not individual components. When I did my battle analysis of The Battle of Savo Island NOT ONE single source had all the answers... even the books dedicated to just that topic got parts wrong or were incomplete in terms of some specific points due to in many cases trying to cover a lot of information in as concise a format as possible or due to just covering what happened rather then why it happened on a technological level of detail. Example, many books talk about the SC radar but almost none pointed out that it was not even a SS radar by design, it was an AS radar and very possibly manually rotated or fixed it its mounting. Even Parshalls book about Midway brought about in some cases more questions then answers, but it did give more clues then many other sources I have read about the battle to date. Another example is how many authors look at ships as individual components or why they were built rather then what they could do as a complete weapon system as built. Many times analysis of a weapon and how it performed in combat is a matter of deductive reasoning, data extrapolation, and battle analysis.. not just simple personal interpretations of battle histories or weapon stats.

I have to get back to my duties here at NWS now.. have fun on the forums. Remember, keep an open mind and broaden your thinking to 3 dimensional.. warfare was never 1 or 2 dimensional and never fought with just individual components or weapons but instead functioned as entire systems as part of an overall set of doctrines or tactics.

Take care.

[Warship NWS]

Regarding maximum altitudes, lets also remember that the higher flying aircraft could pick and choose when or when not to engage.. the Mig-15 proved this against the F-86s over Korea.

[old_pop2000]

Regarding maximum altitudes, lets also remember that the higher flying aircraft could pick and choose when or when not to engage.. the Mig-15 proved this against the F-86s over Korea.

The first item in Dicta Boelke is to secure an advantage over your opponent. Height has always been one of those advantage, sought. From Boelke to Von Richtofen to Galland and Johnson to the modern aces like Robin Olds etc. Height or altitude is always an advantage.

The greatest fighter pilots were always hunters who stalked their prey, dived at high speed, fired at close range and then either ran or climbed. The HnR or the HnC is the preferred tactic of those great fighter pilots. The aircraft for such maneuvers must have a high diving speed, excellent forward speed, and excellent weaponry with adequate ammunition.

[Kyle Holgate]

I agree, but then when the war is down low flying at 30,000 feet didn't gain much. A good example I think, is the war over the Soviet Union. Many if not most of the Soviet fighters were pretty bad at altitude, but there really wasn't much reason to be up there as the fighting was down low - with the fighters typically supporting ground support aircraft or intercepting enemy ground support aircraft.
I'm quite aware that an altitude advantage in air combat is extremely desirable for a number of reasons - that being said though if you're tooling up at 30,000 feet and the battle is down ad 15,000 you're not using your altitude advantages or potential performance advantages.
I know things are not that cut and dried in actual combat - but hopefully at least I've gotten my point across. Height advantage is always useful in air to air combat but high altitude advantage usefulness is greatly dependant on the situation - the war you're fighting at the time.

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle I will have to make this short as my next few weeks will be keeping me quite busy, however, not all facts will jump up at you and say "here I am.. I am the truth!". Analysis work is not always about a long string of fact and data either, sometimes you have to put the pieces of the equation together to come up with viable answers to hard and often complex questions. This holds especially true when doing tactics, battle, and weapons analysis. Wars were fought as combat systems acting together in a doctrine and set of tactics not individual components. When I did my battle analysis of The Battle of Savo Island NOT ONE single source had all the answers... even the books dedicated to just that topic got parts wrong or were incomplete in terms of some specific points due to in many cases trying to cover a lot of information in as concise a format as possible or due to just covering what happened rather then why it happened on a technological level of detail. Example, many books talk about the SC radar but almost none pointed out that it was not even a SS radar by design, it was an AS radar and very possibly manually rotated or fixed it its mounting. Even Parshalls book about Midway brought about in some cases more questions then answers, but it did give more clues then many other sources I have read about the battle to date. Another example is how many authors look at ships as individual components or why they were built rather then what they could do as a complete weapon system as built. Many times analysis of a weapon and how it performed in combat is a matter of deductive reasoning, data extrapolation, and battle analysis.. not just simple personal interpretations of battle histories or weapon stats.

I have to get back to my duties here at NWS now.. have fun on the forums. Remember, keep an open mind and broaden your thinking to 3 dimensional.. warfare was never 1 or 2 dimensional and never fought with just individual components or weapons but instead functioned as entire systems as part of an overall set of doctrines or tactics.

Take care.

The problem with the truth in many cases or more likely a fact - is that so much is unknown. We are all limited by what texts we can find about the subject matter we're all debating about and have to do the best we can with what we can find. The problem arises when - even with the same facts available - people choose to interpret what they see and put down their views on the situation as best they can given the limited information. So in other words, the Asteroid that landed 65 million years ago in the gulf of mexico is a fact. The dinosaurs all died out at almost exactly the sametime - this is a fact. Condluding that they died because of the asteroid impact is a theory or an opinion.

I will not typically debate facts unless various sources appear to be at odds as to what they are. I will form my own theories based on the facts though, and defend my opinions unless someone can find a good hole or problem in my critical thinking.
I took a college course in critical thinking and it is probably the best money I ever spent on anything. One of the vital components in it is to consider first, that you could be wrong. Your facts could be faulty, your opinon based on it flawed no matter how long you've studied the material in question. Question everything.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Here's a quote from "war planes of the second world war" Fighters, volume 3. This is with regards to the KI.60 (an earlier version of the Ki.61 Hien or Tony)

"The early months of the war in Europe led the J.A.A.F. to consider the possible need for heavier fighters wtih liquid-cooled engines comparable to the latest European designs"

So it looks like the JAAF at least was keeping an eye on the European airwar.

Kyle:

I think that is one of the rare instances were the Germans provided some technical exertise to their Japanes "allies".

[Ed Rotondaro]

It's time to provide, my solution to the question I posed to all.

The solution is to accelerate then kick the rudder hard right, skidding your plane to the right. It's termed "slamming the bandit". The Japanese pilots used a technique called HnC or hit and climb. If you put a little back pressure, accelerate then kick hard right, you start to gain altitude, and slide out in front of him. This reduces his lateral turning room. He probably had his gun sight on you and suddenly you slid toward him, giving him a 90 degree deflection shot and Japanese pilots never took 90 degree deflection shots.

In some circumstances, you can unload and roll back the other way and get a snap shot as he passes, provided you have timed it and prepared for it.

One problem with the split S and dive away is that you might be too low to execute that maneuver. It is a viable alternative but you will lose sight of your opponent when you roll and will take yourself out of the fight. Situational awareness is very important in these situations.

To those of you who said turn into him, you are basically correct. Skidding is faster, but a turn would do it. Good work.

Dennis:

Interesting tactic. I imagine US pilots practiced that?

[Ed Rotondaro]

The skid maneuver is part of a set of maneuvers called jinking. They are out-of-plane maneuvers. The skid must be drastic enough to create a large angle off for the attacker. A jink maneuver like a skid, or sudden pitch up usually has to be followed with another maneuver like a climbing turn, barrel roll etc. Sometimes the jink is enough to cause the attacker to overshoot and a defender that has planned his maneuver well enough, can roll back onto his attackers tail. Commander Thach accomplished this during the battle of Midway when his four aircraft were jumped. He eventually was able to time his maneuver and roll back, take a snap shot at the climbing Japanese Zero and obtain his first kill of three for the day. His was not a skid, as such, but was a combination of a skid with break turn.

Dennis:

The Friday night Dogfight episode showed frequent examples of jinking.

[old_pop2000]

Kyle:

I think that is one of the rare instances were the Germans provided some technical exertise to their Japanes "allies".
Jinking is a standard set of tactics to throw off an attacker, however they are usually followed by a much more violent maneuver to permanently remove the attacker from an advantageous position. Such tactics could involve a horizontal scissors, barrel roll, vertical scissors etc. The principle is always to turn toward your attacker. A skid turn is a very quick turn, that even an unmaneurverable aircraft can usually perform.

Yes, to the question of US tactics. USF-74 covers fighter doctrine and tactics. There was a 1941 version and new versions as things evolved. I would love to find one on the web. There was a tremendous change from the USF-74 of 41 to the USF-74 of 1944.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Kyle:

It is not worth my time, to research this radio issue, any further. Having been trained on tube technology, installed and repaired aircraft wiring, I can safely say that poor grounding, inadequate safeguards against arcing at high altitude and spark arrestors on aircraft engines will cause excessive noise on early low to medium frequency radios of that era. In reading Sakae's book, and two to three other stories by Zero pilots. In those three accounts, I never hear of Japanese pilots using the voice command radio to contact each other in the air. In fact, Sakae makes it a point that he would move up to the pilot in question and use hand signals to explain what he wanted. He states that the Japanese did not have good teamwork in the air, like the US did and perfected throughout the war. Couple these few remarks, with the TAIC reports on the poor quality of the grounding and wiring, would lead one to believe that the radios and the associate power and wiring were poorly protected. However, the reports do say the radios were designed well and of good quality.

In general, for that era, all radios and electronic equipment had reliability issues. Don Felt, the Saratoga Air group commander lost his radio, just before the attack on the Ryujo at Eastern Solomons. However, the rest of his group had radios, and the second in command took command. This, most likely would never have happened in the Japense Naval air forces. They just did not trust their radios. The radio telegraphy, which was not as sensitive, worked but was not useable for command. It was an aircraft to base type of system.

Now, that is a brief recap of what I know and perceive. I am done.

Dennis

Dennis:

I'm glad you brought up the mention of tube technology, because I was wondering about just how delicate these radios were. Just about every account of battles in WWII that I have read about mentions communications difficulties. In fact I find it interesting that they were able to communicate at all. I can see why telegraph was still so important at least for long ranged communications. I've read accounts of vacuum tubes popping out of installations on ships due to the firing of their main guns. One wonders what high gee manuevers would do to such equipment?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let's not minimize the effects of poor radios and the absence of effective command and control of combat air patrols over the task force. Without effective voice to voice communications, without larger quantities of ammunition, without adequate radar and procedures in place to conduct an effective air defense of the fleet, as we have seen, the IJN was very vulnerable. We cannot separate the aircraft performance which includes radio communication, low ammunition supply etc. from this mix. Battle management is a system that requires all parts working adequately. The Zero's high climb rate and range should have been good qualities for a defensive interceptor, except the lack of reliable communications and ammunition load, detracted from its capability. But it was not the entire picture. The US had similar issues except our F4F had a short range and poor climb rate. We corrected the range issue by Guadalcanal with two 58 gal fuel tanks. Our ammunition supplies were not a limiting factor. The climb rate was augmented by our radar which gave us adequate advance warning enabling the Fido to launch our supporting CAP's early enought to get to altitude. However, that did not always occur and the low climb rate did cause the loss of Lexington. In total, we compensated for the deficiencies of the plane with a good CIC of battle management. The Japanese never accomplished that. So, in the system that they had prepared, the Zero was a liability and their poor battle management system could not compensate for those deficiencies although, IMO, the A6M3 Model 32 could have performed adequately in place of the A6M2. The Model 32 did have a larger ammunition supply and with its two stage supercharger, a better high altitude climb rate which was very advantageous in defending the fleet.

Overall, both fighters had deficiencies. We expanded out command and control methods with an enlarged CIC, training for FIDO's and their teams, better radars, improved IFF on all ships in the fleet. Accompanying this was the development of improved tactics and finally, the development of better aircraft. The Japanese never improved their system. It wasn't until the advent of the A6M5 Model 52 did they get a very good, high speed fighter. This was in late 1943. Far too late to have any real effect. It was equal to our Hellcat and was at the mercy of the F4U Corsair. What the A6M5 shows is that the original requirements for the Prototype 12 were flawed as Horikoshi and Hattori had determined when they first saw them in 1937.


Dennis:

One wonders if any surviving Japanese pilots appreciate the irony that their nation is probably the best maker of electronics in the world. They could have used that capacity during WWII.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok. I do agree that the poor radios are a "ding" to the fighter. I think what I've been trying to do is be sure we've demystified the thing - without going to far. Basically give it credit where due and ding it where it deserves it. I think as a fighter it was superior to the F4F and older versions of the P-40 - even if we take the radio hit. I think this is the remaining point of contention between Chris and I.
You're getting brave stepping into our furball Dennis - heh heh.

Kyle:

The only part I might disagree with here is that from reading accounts Wildcat versus Zero combat, it seems that whoever had the altitude edge seemed to have the advantage. An awful lot USN and USMC aces flew primarily in Wildcats. What does that say?;)

[old_pop2000]

Tube technology is based on Lee DeForest's discoveries in the early 20th century. An electron tube is an evacuated glass container with with wire components inside. The simplest was the triode consisting of a cathode which emits electrons when excited by voltage, a grid where signals are inserted and a plate where the emitted electrons are collected. The amplification of the tube is controlled by the increase or decrease in the quantity of electrons that reach the plate, through the grid. It acts like a siphon. The evacuated glass tube is sealed after the control wires are inserted then glued to a ceramic base. The wires inside are fed throught the base and soldered into a base with a key and lock mechanism. On aircraft, there is usually a metal wire cage that snaps over the tube and connects to the metal base. This keeps the tube in place after insertion into the chassis. As opposed to modern equipment, all resistors, capacitors, coils, transformers and tube sockets are hard wired with 22 gauge multistranded wire coated with rubber to protect against the elements. Here are some links to better understand the concept.

http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/data/valve/valve_theory/diode_vacuum_tube.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/data/valve/valve_theory/tube_basic_theory.php&h=118&w=109&sz=3&tbnid=2ILChcC8lVAJ:&tbnh=118&tbnw=109&sa=X&oi=image_result&resnum=1&ct=image&cd=1

http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img.alibaba.com/photo/11753827/Vacuum_Tube_Audio_Amplifier.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.alibaba.com/catalog/11753827/Vacuum_Tube_Audio_Amplifier.html&h=105&w=140&sz=84&tbnid=xhA30gXiop0J:&tbnh=105&tbnw=140&sa=X&oi=image_result&resnum=1&ct=image&cd=2

http://www.oneillselectronicmuseum.com/page10c.html


I hope that helps, unfortunately I haven't found a picture of an aircraft radio circa 1940, if I do and it shows the rats nest of wiring beneath the chassis, I will offer it.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

One wonders if any surviving Japanese pilots appreciate the irony that their nation is probably the best maker of electronics in the world. They could have used that capacity during WWII.
The radios were not badly manufactured or designed, although behind US and European models. It was the power supplies, wiring and lack of engine spark arrestors that caused most of the difficult. Also, the radios were not designed to mil-spec, but were built to commercial specifications. This means that they were probably not coated or protected against high altitude arcing. As the atmosphere thins, the voltages used in the tube circuits would arc and possible cause noise and could burn out resistors and other passive components. Modern electronics uses 5 volts or 3.5volts. These radios used over 24 volts and sometimes higher, used in the power amplifiers, with more current used as tubes are current(moving electrons)hogs. Aircraft electronics are specifically designed for altitude, cold and reduced pressure. I am certain that many Japanese pilots would have relished having a better electronics industry at that time.

[Warship NWS]

The problem with the truth in many cases or more likely a fact - is that so much is unknown. We are all limited by what texts we can find about the subject matter we're all debating about and have to do the best we can with what we can find. The problem arises when - even with the same facts available - people choose to interpret what they see and put down their views on the situation as best they can given the limited information. So in other words, the Asteroid that landed 65 million years ago in the gulf of mexico is a fact. The dinosaurs all died out at almost exactly the sametime - this is a fact. Condluding that they died because of the asteroid impact is a theory or an opinion.

I will not typically debate facts unless various sources appear to be at odds as to what they are. I will form my own theories based on the facts though, and defend my opinions unless someone can find a good hole or problem in my critical thinking.
I took a college course in critical thinking and it is probably the best money I ever spent on anything. One of the vital components in it is to consider first, that you could be wrong. Your facts could be faulty, your opinon based on it flawed no matter how long you've studied the material in question. Question everything.

Is that your long round about way of saying you just enjoy being a pain in the ass? ;)

[Kyle Holgate]

Is that your long round about way of saying you just enjoy being a pain in the ass? ;)

No, actually my friend - it's a round about way of saying that it seems from my end that you never question your own conclusions and always seem to debate from an "I'm right, you're wrong, you're just not thinking right" standpoint. It seems like any counter arguement or point I make gets trashed immediately without even a once around the brain consideration. It is quite possibly a perception limitation due to the medium of communication we're using - but still - it can be a bit frustrating. Meaning - you are a PI MY ass too! Turn about is fair play though... heh heh heh.

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle:

The only part I might disagree with here is that from reading accounts Wildcat versus Zero combat, it seems that whoever had the altitude edge seemed to have the advantage. An awful lot USN and USMC aces flew primarily in Wildcats. What does that say?;)

Hi Ed, This is true. How much of an advantage is the altitude "edge" though? A Hurricane which was clearly inferior to the 109E in most areas was quite capable of downing them if they could get a tactical advantage such as alititude grants.
I will allow that given some of the deficiencies of the Zero that an altitude advantage may allow even a bit more advantage in this case, but I'm not sure it makes the F4F an aircraft that should be considered "as good" as the Zero.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Ed, This is true. How much of an advantage is the altitude "edge" though? A Hurricane which was clearly inferior to the 109E in most areas was quite capable of downing them if they could get a tactical advantage such as alititude grants.
I will allow that given some of the deficiencies of the Zero that an altitude advantage may allow even a bit more advantage in this case, but I'm not sure it makes the F4F an aircraft that should be considered "as good" as the Zero.

kyle:
I believe that I have stated, that the Zero, in flight performance tests, was superior to the F4F in almost all flight regimes. Up to 250 knots, the plane was more maneuverable, had a higher climb rate, longer range etc. However, past 250 knots, it was almost unmaneuverable. Above 16,000 ft., the F4F-3 could barely out climb the Zero, but not enough to live on. However, in firepower and survivability, diving speed, she was not superior, she was either equal or inferior. Succinctly, she was a good low speed aircraft. With low speed being defined as below 250 knots. 250 knots is 287 mph, sorry for the failure to use knots instead of mph. On a plane for plane basis, she was superior to the F4F-4, however, in the total combat environment which includes tactics, battle management and pilot training and aircraft development, she was patently inferior. And the last portions were the deciding issue.

[Warship NWS]

No, actually my friend - it's a round about way of saying that it seems from my end that you never question your own conclusions and always seem to debate from an "I'm right, you're wrong, you're just not thinking right" standpoint. It seems like any counter arguement or point I make gets trashed immediately without even a once around the brain consideration. It is quite possibly a perception limitation due to the medium of communication we're using - but still - it can be a bit frustrating. Meaning - you are a PI MY ass too! Turn about is fair play though... heh heh heh.

Forums have a way of making a person sound more blunt then they may already be. When Brooks Rowlette used to post on our old YG forums he came across even more blunt then I do, but in person he was extremely cordial, just as an example. Bluntness can also be quite often mistaken for arrogance - listen to what is being said, not how you think it is being said is sometimes the better measure to take. We are both passionate about research Kyle but it seemed to me that even when given evidence you wanted to stick to your predetermined conclusions. One of the problems I have seen with many authors of history is when they write opinions not based on conclusive, or even circumstantial, evidence and often copy each other (that is how the Midway thing about the CVs being loaded with planes when the SBDs hit them got started, one perspective got blown out of proportion and it stuck for years because noone decided to ask the right questions) so I have a tendency to question books about battle histories when I go through and start breaking things down for a proper analysis. I have no issue with questioning perspectives, opinions, percieved facts, etc.. I do it all the time. But if your going to try to counter evidence offered do so with evidence of your own -- we were attacking the radio issue with the Zekes and you offered nothing to counter it with except the implication, IMHO, of "I don't believe you". Let's move on please.. we can talk more about this more in private my friend. ;)

[Kyle Holgate]

Forums have a way of making a person sound more blunt then they may already be. When Brooks Rowlette used to post on our old YG forums he came across even more blunt then I do, but in person he was extremely cordial, just as an example. Bluntness can also be quite often mistaken for arrogance - listen to what is being said, not how you think it is being said is sometimes the better measure to take. We are both passionate about research Kyle but it seemed to me that even when given evidence you wanted to stick to your predetermined conclusions. One of the problems I have seen with many authors of history is when they write opinions not based on conclusive, or even circumstantial, evidence and often copy each other (that is how the Midway thing about the CVs being loaded with planes when the SBDs hit them got started, one perspective got blown out of proportion and it stuck for years because noone decided to ask the right questions) so I have a tendency to question books about battle histories when I go through and start breaking things down for a proper analysis. I have no issue with questioning perspectives, opinions, percieved facts, etc.. I do it all the time. But if your going to try to counter evidence offered do so with evidence of your own -- we were attacking the radio issue with the Zekes and you offered nothing to counter it with except the implication, IMHO, of "I don't believe you". Let's move on please.. we can talk more about this more in private my friend. ;)

I have a couple books coming to the local library about the zero - so I'm still looking for info there. The radio thing specifically - there doesn't seem to be much that says much about it. IT seemed from my point of view that the limited data was being used to conclude that they never worked. For me - not enough information was or is available to draw much of a conclusion beyond what Dennis has said and I paraphrase best I can - they were reasonably well built but not well grounded nor built to standards which would tend to allow them to work well in rough (aircraft) environments. My own digging (and it's been very extensive!) says little more. I personally then - since we don't have much good info - chose to consider that they work some of the time so was unwilling to just count them out when considering the overall aircraft.

Clear as mud!? LOL - thought so

The funny thing about all this - is that when it was all said and done it seems like we were arguing about nothing much and that we both agree that the Zero was a pretty good (not great nor super) aircraft for its time. Usually it's over-rated and has this superman sort of mistique about it - and its not deserved. I mainly started this to expand on that - so as to be sure that it's not concluded that the Zero was a POS either - which is no more true than the superplane idea.

[Warship NWS]

I have a couple books coming to the local library about the zero - so I'm still looking for info there. The radio thing specifically - there doesn't seem to be much that says much about it. IT seemed from my point of view that the limited data was being used to conclude that they never worked. For me - not enough information was or is available to draw much of a conclusion beyond what Dennis has said and I paraphrase best I can - they were reasonably well built but not well grounded nor built to standards which would tend to allow them to work well in rough (aircraft) environments. My own digging (and it's been very extensive!) says little more. I personally then - since we don't have much good info - chose to consider that they work some of the time so was unwilling to just count them out when considering the overall aircraft.

Clear as mud!? LOL - thought so

First off we never stated they "never" worked but as Dennis clearly also stated they were good for commercial use NOT military use which in turn made them highly unreliable in combat operations. Military standards, as you should also know being someone who served in the military, are quite a bit different then civilian standards. Example.. most civilians don't fly at high altitude with their radio sets in the early 1940s, pull mulit-G maneuvers, fly thousands of miles in all sorts of weather, etc. There is a lot of circumstantial evidence to show they were hardly effective however such as at Midway where the CAs had to fire salvos to get the attention of the CAP aircraft, the CAP was poorly organized when multiple axis attacks were being made, they had to react with CAP constantly standing on the decks to counter new threats, etc. It is well known that the IJN pilots were trained in non-coordinated tactics but their was no way to effectively correct that with unreliable air combat communications. Part of the problem with many history books, and ironically many modern wargames, is that communications are not emphasized enough, nor in proper detail, between individual combat units to properly portray the mind set and C3 issues of the time frames - as they say hindsight is 20/20.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

First off we never stated they "never" worked but as Dennis clearly also stated they were good for commercial use NOT military use which in turn made them highly unreliable in combat operations. Military standards, as you should also know being someone who served in the military, are quite a bit different then civilian standards. Example.. most civilians don't fly at high altitude with their radio sets in the early 1940s, pull mulit-G maneuvers, fly thousands of miles in all sorts of weather, etc. There is a lot of circumstantial evidence to show they were hardly effective however such as at Midway where the CAs had to fire salvos to get the attention of the CAP aircraft, the CAP was poorly organized when multiple axis attacks were being made, they had to react with CAP constantly standing on the decks to counter new threats, etc. It is well known that the IJN pilots were trained in non-coordinated tactics but their was no way to effectively correct that with unreliable air combat communications. Part of the problem with many history books, and ironically many modern wargames, is that communications are not emphasized enough, nor in proper detail, between individual combat units to properly portray the mind set and C3 issues of the time frames - as they say hindsight is 20/20.

Thanks.

One has to wonder - The RAF learned from the Germans and adapted the open figure 4 formation (I think that's what it was called) which allowed both wingmen and lead to worry about watching what's going on not where they were in formation. The Japanese are known to have flown like a swarm of bees (a F4F pilot's words). I wonder what sorts of improvements in tactics and formations would have been implimented in a less rigid structure, and with very good, reliable radios that worked most of the time.

[Warship NWS]

One has to wonder - The RAF learned from the Germans and adapted the open figure 4 formation (I think that's what it was called) which allowed both wingmen and lead to worry about watching what's going on not where they were in formation. The Japanese are known to have flown like a swarm of bees (a F4F pilot's words). I wonder what sorts of improvements in tactics and formations would have been implimented in a less rigid structure, and with very good, reliable radios that worked most of the time.

Good question. I will let all of you toss that one around, again my time for the next few weeks will be short.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

let me give you some ideas of the things that a mil spec aircraft radio would have:

1. All component would be securely fastened to the metal chassis and ground externally to eliminate EMI interference.

2. All components would be coated after installation against mildew from moisture

3. All wiring would meet a mil spec for that particular wire. It would be multilayered, with the one layer being a metal woven jacket that was grounded to the amphenol high density plug in the set. The outer layer would be a rubber or later, teflon to protect against weather.

4. The set would be required to be vibration tested, in a high altitude chamber with temperature and humidity controls. It would have to be able to transmit, tune, receive etc. while the altitude was changed, temperature changed and the humidity.

Note: after any maintenance, all those coatings, and grounds had to be retained to prevent problems.

5. The whole radio set would have to be hard mounted on a shock mounted bracket and secured with bolts. Those bolts being safety wired to prevent them from become loose in the cockpit.

Trust me when I tell you that a desktop Packard Pell radio of that same period was not built anywhere near those tight specifications. With all that protection, the tubes still failed and the radios quit.

[old_pop2000]

The formation that you are indicating was developed by Werner Moelders in the Spanish Civil War. He found the the old three plane Vic formation was too confining for high speed aircraft and that pilots spent more time watching and staying in formation, rather than having their head on a swivel. The tightness of the formation also hampered maneuverability.

He developed the finger four. It corresponds to the four fingers of your hand with the leader in the middle. it consisted of the leader, his wingman, the other element leader and his wingman. The whole formation was called schwarm; two aircraft together were called a rotte.

As I indicated, Sakae mentions that the Japanese never really developed teamwork to any degree. I don't know and cannot speculate if that was because of the poor radios or whether it really would not have matter if they had good radios, they would have fought separately.

[old_pop2000]

One more piece of information. Sakae refers to a very strong caste system in the IJN pilots. Many pilots were not officers and were not considered samuari. Officers would not talk to them or associate with. Sakae, was an NCO originally as were some of his friends. But this might have had a strong influence on their tactics and how they were organized.

[Kyle Holgate]

Hmm. One can then consider that if the lower caste pilots learned something about how to defeat a B-17, for example - that the snobby samurai would not want to listen to them even if they were told - which they probably would't be.
The impression I have gotten is that while expert to the extreme, many Japanese were also very rigid in their tactics and were not nearly so inventive as pilots of other nations. They did not share techniques and tactics that worked and didn't, and their overal ways did not evolve very quickly.
In contrast, one of the strengths IMO of the US military - pilots included - is that they tended to react to new cirucmstances very quickly and come up change tactics - sharing what works and what doesn't widely - so as to meet challenges that perhaps similar Japanese pilots would end up unable to cope with.

One exampe in my mind is the use of the Thatch Weave to allow lower performance fighters to beat the Zero. It seems to me that once this is noticed by the Japanese - that they could find a way to counter it - as the Americans would now be doing something predictable. Predictable in air combat in my mind = dead if you're not careful.

[old_pop2000]

Hmm. One can then consider that if the lower caste pilots learned something about how to defeat a B-17, for example - that the snobby samurai would not want to listen to them even if they were told - which they probably would't be.
The impression I have gotten is that while expert to the extreme, many Japanese were also very rigid in their tactics and were not nearly so inventive as pilots of other nations. They did not share techniques and tactics that worked and didn't, and their overal ways did not evolve very quickly.
In contrast, one of the strengths IMO of the US military - pilots included - is that they tended to react to new cirucmstances very quickly and come up change tactics - sharing what works and what doesn't widely - so as to meet challenges that perhaps similar Japanese pilots would end up unable to cope with.

One exampe in my mind is the use of the Thatch Weave to allow lower performance fighters to beat the Zero. It seems to me that once this is noticed by the Japanese - that they could find a way to counter it - as the Americans would now be doing something predictable. Predictable in air combat in my mind = dead if you're not careful.

It is a possibility that there wasn't much of flow of information from the front line squadrons back to the training squadrons. Unless a pilot like Sakae was returned to Japan[which he was] there would not be much change in the fighter doctrine, except at the squadron level. But the attrition factor now comes into play, especially at Rabaul. Lack of timely reinforcements, spare parts, new airplanes etc. simply attrited the quality over a short time.

This same attrition affected carrier squadrons, especially after Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons.

It is easy to see flaws in a fighter tactic that you see frequently, but you have to survive the first engagements to be able to use the information effectively. Japanese pilots knew that their leaders would not spare any ships or aircraft to retrieve downed pilots, which is a real waste of talent, couple this with the Japanese aircrafts tendency to burn and explode, and you have a real high attrition rate and no information feedback from the squadrons.

[Warship NWS]

It is a possibility that there wasn't much of flow of information from the front line squadrons back to the training squadrons. Unless a pilot like Sakae was returned to Japan[which he was] there would not be much change in the fighter doctrine, except at the squadron level. But the attrition factor now comes into play, especially at Rabaul. Lack of timely reinforcements, spare parts, new airplanes etc. simply attrited the quality over a short time.

This same attrition affected carrier squadrons, especially after Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons.

It is easy to see flaws in a fighter tactic that you see frequently, but you have to survive the first engagements to be able to use the information effectively. Japanese pilots knew that their leaders would not spare any ships or aircraft to retrieve downed pilots, which is a real waste of talent, couple this with the Japanese aircrafts tendency to burn and explode, and you have a real high attrition rate and no information feedback from the squadrons.

Of course all of this was compounded by the lack of good communications in the air. ;)

[old_pop2000]

Transfer of information and discussions about tactics, usually occurs after you return from the mission, in a mission debriefing. That is provided enough return to make it worth the effort. I don't think a radio in the air, is going to help.

[Warship NWS]

Transfer of information and discussions about tactics, usually occurs after you return from the mission, in a mission debriefing. That is provided enough return to make it worth the effort. I don't think a radio in the air, is going to help.

If the tactics require any reasonable coordination in the air then I think it would matter, including helping pilots to survive to return home to discuss the tactics, as was proven when those wigmen in Sakais flight were jumped and shot down when he could not tell them to "watch out!". How about coordination to help your CVs survive attack? You may not be going home without them.

[old_pop2000]

If the tactics require any reasonable coordination in the air then I think it would matter, including helping pilots to survive to return home to discuss the tactics, as was proven when those wigmen in Sakais flight were jumped and shot down when he could not tell them to "watch out!". How about coordination to help your CVs survive attack? You may not be going home without them.
That is true, but a worthwhile discussion of the opponents tactics and how to combat them really has to wait until all the survivors make it home. But in the air, radios do offer a nice way help your compatriots to make it back.

[Kyle Holgate]

Of course all of this was compounded by the lack of good communications in the air. ;)

You just never give it a rest, do you?! :rolleyes:

Any real evolution of tactics usually takes place - as Dennis says - back at the base or carrier when pilots are debriefed and as they talk over their mission with each other. One pilot may notice that if he turned hard left that the enemy plane seemed to be unable to follow him as well as if he turned right. Other pilots on hearing this may say - yeah, I've noticed that too! Then discussion turns to using it as an evasion tactic to help you get away if bounced.
Now it certainly helps if pilot A sees Pilot B about to be bounced if he can warn him of it and pilot B can USE the tactic - of course this is important. BUT if pilot B knows the new tactic he can use it whether he's got a radio or not.

In the US and England and to a lesser extent Germany information on enemy tactics and aircraft were fed back through the chain of command. With Japan and Russia this didn't seem to happen as well. While it did not take the Germans long to learn the head on attack on the B-17 it did take the Japanese a long time to learn the trick. The Germans managed to get the information out to other groups - the Japanese seemed largely unable or unwilling or hadn't the structure to do this sort of thing.

[Warship NWS]

That is true, but a worthwhile discussion of the opponents tactics and how to combat them really has to wait until all the survivors make it home. But in the air, radios do offer a nice way help your compatriots to make it back.

Agreed. Setting up for coordinated air combat, reforming after a furball, warning of impending danger, telling each other where bandits are after spotting them, etc.. kind of hard to do with hand signals. ;) As to AARs after the battle and evolving tactical considerations, yes, that would require sitting down and going over the daily events.

[old_pop2000]

You just never give it a rest, do you?! :rolleyes:

Any real evolution of tactics usually takes place - as Dennis says - back at the base or carrier when pilots are debriefed and as they talk over their mission with each other. One pilot may notice that if he turned hard left that the enemy plane seemed to be unable to follow him as well as if he turned right. Other pilots on hearing this may say - yeah, I've noticed that too! Then discussion turns to using it as an evasion tactic to help you get away if bounced.
Now it certainly helps if pilot A sees Pilot B about to be bounced if he can warn him of it and pilot B can USE the tactic - of course this is important. BUT if pilot B knows the new tactic he can use it whether he's got a radio or not.

In the US and England and to a lesser extent Germany information on enemy tactics and aircraft were fed back through the chain of command. With Japan and Russia this didn't seem to happen as well. While it did not take the Germans long to learn the head on attack on the B-17 it did take the Japanese a long time to learn the trick. The Germans managed to get the information out to other groups - the Japanese seemed largely unable or unwilling or hadn't the structure to do this sort of thing.

I won't minimize the value of an operational, reliable voice radio system, RDF and other aids. However, the evolution of fighter tactics and doctrine can only be developed, and proceed if pilots can have a free interchange of information. There must be a period, when a squadron or group commander can sit at a desk and contemplate what they have seen in combat against his opponent and develop lessons learned. They should then be able to send those recommendations and lessons learned up the chain of command to have them considered and implemented.

I do not see this free exchange of information in the Japanese system and I do not see the leaders of the squadrons or groups making any attempt to utilize a lessons learned process. If they did, then the problem must be at the higher levels of command. I do know the carrier captains were not pilots, whereas all of ours had to be pilots.

I believe that this problem is far more important than the radio issue because, if this issue of the radios had been identified, then the radio issue would have been solved before 1945. Either the pilots were not allowed to voice their objections or they were dismissed by the higher levels of command.

[Warship NWS]

To Kyle,

Yes, going over tactics in detail would require waiting till everyone is on the ground.. but, that does not cover all of the numerous situations you might run into when your back in the air so some coordination on the fly before combat starts, much like a quarterback tells his squad which play to go with next, is at times quite usefull, then reform, and then prepare for the next possible action. Point being, you go over the play book on the ground, but you pick the plays in the air. Much more efficient to do that via voice then hand signals, flares, and "wing wagging". Imagine German tanks without radios when attacking the French tanks using only visual cues. Having a great play book is nice but not being able to pick the plays from the book on the fly will mean you will never be as flexible as your opponent. Just to try and describe this a bit better. ;)

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I believe that this problem is far more important than the radio issue because, if this issue of the radios had been identified, then the radio issue would have been solved before 1945. Either the pilots were not allowed to voice their objections or they were dismissed by the higher levels of command.

There is no doubt that the doctrine itself was flawed. Had the doctrine INCLUDED the importance of in flight communications then yes I agree they would have likely addressed the problem much sooner. In comparison various other air forces found the radio to be a pretty important piece of the overall doctrinal system otherwise they would not have bothered making sure they would even work in combat.

[Warship NWS]

To the forum readers, personaly, regardless of what points we agree on or not regarding some specific details regarding this complex topic, I think it is a good change of pace to finally have discussions that involve the C3 and doctrinal considerations of warfare. Anyone can pull up weapon stats but having an intelligent discussion, even if it is passionate, about how these weapons functioned as part of an overall system in war is something I find very constructive and far more thought provoking then just comparing a few numbers from the books.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

A quick note,

Dennis will be posting a short and concise description of how aircraft radios were used in combat including air to air and air to ground. The biggest trick for both of us is describing exactly how they were used. Personaly, over the past few weeks, thanks to further research and discussions about this topic I have learned more then I started out with as well. The hard part is trying to get everyone to develop as accurate a picture as possible in the readers minds of how they gave an advantage to the side that not only had them but also used them effectively. Combat communications is a complex and quite often very misunderstood part of warfare so these discussions are a great way to help all of us get a better understanding of the communications, or lack thereof, that effected all combat systems and doctrines in combat. I would like to personaly thank Dennis for his time and extensive contributions to this in depth topic of discussion and for all those that posted on this thread.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

A quick note,

Dennis will be posting a short and concise description of how aircraft radios were used in combat including air to air and air to ground. The biggest trick for both of us is describing exactly how they were used. Personaly, over the past few weeks, thanks to further research and discussions about this topic I have learned more then I started out with as well. The hard part is trying to get everyone to develop as accurate a picture as possible in the readers minds of how they gave an advantage to the side that not only had them but also used them effectively. Combat communications is a complex and quite often very misunderstood part of warfare so these discussions are a great way to help all of us get a better understanding of the communications, or lack thereof, that effected all combat systems and doctrines in combat. I would like to personaly thank Dennis for his time and extensive contributions to this in depth topic of discussion and for all those that posted on this thread.

Thanks.

The reason the aircraft radios are called command sets, is because they are really used for short, commands. Most of the targeting information, tactics etc. were discussed and planned on the ground. In fact, radio silence was the watchword in most of the Pacific air battles. When you get into the air, the radios are used sparingly, depending on the type of aircraft and mission. In a bomber mission, like an SBD, the air group commander may issue commands to each section as to targeting, and timing. He might say something like " Red section take the carrier on the left, Blue section the one on the right, on my mark, go". He will also provide an accurate sighting and targeting report back to the carrier, before commencing the attack. He might contact the escort to notify them that the attack is commencing. That's it except for warning commands like "Red one, break right" "Blue two, you have a Zeke coming in from 3:00 o'clock". He might issue commands to reform such as "red and blue sections reform at 12,000 ft. and head for home". You say as little as possible to eliminate any possible detection of valuable information like where you came from, where you are headed. Usually, after dropping their ordnance, whether it be bombs or torpedoes, the aircraft would climb to a predetermined altitude and head for home, possibly rendevousing at a prearrange spot and flying home together, if possible. The base, has moved, so a prearranged meeting point had been determine prior to takeoff. With aircraft equipped with the ZB-1 homing device, as you got closer to the base, the homing device would provide a vector to fly, to get into close range contact with the fleet.

Now, was there extra curricular comments made during combat. Of course. If a pilot shot down a plane, he might let everyone know. It occurred many times that a snooper would be detected and the fighter would be vectored and find the target to be a flying boat doing reconnaissance on the fleet. If he shot it down, he would notify Fido of the kill and the type of aircraft to provide a contact report to be plotted to see if the snooper had seen anything. Usually the sig intelligence personnel would detect communications from the snoopers, and would notify the CAG or fleet commander of the detection.

These command radios were important to battle management of the air groups and the CAP. Keep in mind, also, that the few channels the radios had, might be very busy with chatter from other aircraft in the area, especially aircraft involved fleet defense.

Hope this helps.

[Warship NWS]

Thanks Dennis for the posting. Some additional thoughts, the only other options for comms were telegraphy and visual cues. For obvious reasons these methods had serious limitations in terms of quick, efficient, and effective means of sending messages.. especially in the heat of combat or when critical messages needed to be sent as fast and as understandable as possible.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Thanks Dennis for the posting. Some additional thoughts, the only other options for comms were telegraphy and visual cues. For obvious reasons these methods had serious limitations in terms of quick, efficient, and effective means of sending messages.. especially in the heat of combat or when critical messages needed to be sent as fast and as understandable as possible.

Thanks.
The command sets only had a range of up 50 miles, on a good atmospheric day. Ranges were more like 25 miles. When notifying the carrier of contacts or anything, it usually fell to the SBD's because they were up higher and had an ARM1 on board to handle the radios. If you look at attack wing organization, the wing was usually led by a senior dive bomber commander. Case in point, Felt, Ault were all air group commanders and flew in SBD's. Howard Young of the Enterprise flew in an SBD-3, later the same air group was lead by C. Wade McCluskey in again, an SBD-3. The Yorktown was led in an SBD-3 by Oscar Pederson also, Hornet was led in an SBD-3 by Stanhope Ring. The GF-8 Radio transmitters and the RU-2 Radio Receivers in the aircraft were AM modulated radio sets operating on four frequency bands with a bandwidth of each channel of 600 kc. They also had CW for telegraphy and MCW which is modulated continuous wave for radio direction finding or radio compass.

I may try to go to the air museum repair and rebuild hanger and discuss the radios with them, they have an electronic's expert working there.

[Ed Rotondaro]

First off we never stated they "never" worked but as Dennis clearly also stated they were good for commercial use NOT military use which in turn made them highly unreliable in combat operations. Military standards, as you should also know being someone who served in the military, are quite a bit different then civilian standards. Example.. most civilians don't fly at high altitude with their radio sets in the early 1940s, pull mulit-G maneuvers, fly thousands of miles in all sorts of weather, etc. There is a lot of circumstantial evidence to show they were hardly effective however such as at Midway where the CAs had to fire salvos to get the attention of the CAP aircraft, the CAP was poorly organized when multiple axis attacks were being made, they had to react with CAP constantly standing on the decks to counter new threats, etc. It is well known that the IJN pilots were trained in non-coordinated tactics but their was no way to effectively correct that with unreliable air combat communications. Part of the problem with many history books, and ironically many modern wargames, is that communications are not emphasized enough, nor in proper detail, between individual combat units to properly portray the mind set and C3 issues of the time frames - as they say hindsight is 20/20.

Thanks.

Chris:

What I do find interesting about the whole concept of Japanese communications is the cultural aspect. Even when comms worked good, it appears that the Japanese did not communicate well with their forces. There are numerous examples of this in the later battles in 1944. Land based air was routinely clobbered and nobody made the admirals at sea aware of this, mainly due to lack of face. At Leyte Gulf, Nishimura made no effort to inform Shima of the huge task force that he was getting sunk by, nor did he consider it necessary to inform Kurita of his situation. Considering that the IJN loved complex plans, this lack of communication may have doomed them from the get go. Still it appears that IJN attack planes coordinated much better than their fighters did. Could this be due to having an extra crewman as a dedicated radio operator?

Another aspect to consider is the fact that once plans were made, nobody questioned them and the pilots just carried on. The need for consensus and respect for superiors may have also worked against the Japanese when it came to combat action. Hell it hurt the Brits at Jutland too.

[Ed Rotondaro]

One more piece of information. Sakae refers to a very strong caste system in the IJN pilots. Many pilots were not officers and were not considered samuari. Officers would not talk to them or associate with. Sakae, was an NCO originally as were some of his friends. But this might have had a strong influence on their tactics and how they were organized.


Dennis:

A very cogent point, and that was unlike most other airforces where the bulk of the pilots at least were officers (or warrant officers). See my post on cultural ramifications of Japan (and watch me pontificate LOL!).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hmm. One can then consider that if the lower caste pilots learned something about how to defeat a B-17, for example - that the snobby samurai would not want to listen to them even if they were told - which they probably would't be.
The impression I have gotten is that while expert to the extreme, many Japanese were also very rigid in their tactics and were not nearly so inventive as pilots of other nations. They did not share techniques and tactics that worked and didn't, and their overal ways did not evolve very quickly.
In contrast, one of the strengths IMO of the US military - pilots included - is that they tended to react to new cirucmstances very quickly and come up change tactics - sharing what works and what doesn't widely - so as to meet challenges that perhaps similar Japanese pilots would end up unable to cope with.

One exampe in my mind is the use of the Thatch Weave to allow lower performance fighters to beat the Zero. It seems to me that once this is noticed by the Japanese - that they could find a way to counter it - as the Americans would now be doing something predictable. Predictable in air combat in my mind = dead if you're not careful.

Kyle:

Good points! From my research I've seen that a lot of talk about how to fight was done in the officers club over a few cold ones (This is especially true of Arleigh Burke's famous DesRon 23. Those guys could drink!). It also built morale:D

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

A very cogent point, and that was unlike most other airforces where the bulk of the pilots at least were officers (or warrant officers). See my post on cultural ramifications of Japan (and watch me pontificate LOL!).
In the US Navy, there were non-officer flyers. They were usually Machinist Mates like Machinist Don Runyon of the Enterprise. I believe all were eventually commissioned as Ensign's.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I won't minimize the value of an operational, reliable voice radio system, RDF and other aids. However, the evolution of fighter tactics and doctrine can only be developed, and proceed if pilots can have a free interchange of information. There must be a period, when a squadron or group commander can sit at a desk and contemplate what they have seen in combat against his opponent and develop lessons learned. They should then be able to send those recommendations and lessons learned up the chain of command to have them considered and implemented.

I do not see this free exchange of information in the Japanese system and I do not see the leaders of the squadrons or groups making any attempt to utilize a lessons learned process. If they did, then the problem must be at the higher levels of command. I do know the carrier captains were not pilots, whereas all of ours had to be pilots.

I believe that this problem is far more important than the radio issue because, if this issue of the radios had been identified, then the radio issue would have been solved before 1945. Either the pilots were not allowed to voice their objections or they were dismissed by the higher levels of command.

Dennis:

It is interesting to note that in many US squadrons, the commanding officer was rarely the best pilot or highest scoring ace. In fact many weren't even aces. Commanders were chosen for their qualities of teaching, communicating, administering and leading the unit. Of course there were exception such David McCambell or Richard Bong, but as long as the commander could both talk the talk and walk the walk (be respected as a pilot), they could get the job done.

I remember in Band of Brothers, there was a replacement platoon commander who always seemed unavailable or unable to make decisions. Finally Winters replaced him with Spiers and the whole company was grateful. Service people in combat know who a good leader is.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There is no doubt that the doctrine itself was flawed. Had the doctrine INCLUDED the importance of in flight communications then yes I agree they would have likely addressed the problem much sooner. In comparison various other air forces found the radio to be a pretty important piece of the overall doctrinal system otherwise they would not have bothered making sure they would even work in combat.

Chris:

What I find strange is the absolute requirement for good communications when operating over the vast stretches of the Pacific. Recon was so vital, that the radio was in many ways more important than the armament of a plane. Think of the times when communication failure hurt the Allies (Can you say Savo island?). Having to wait for the plane to land from its patrol and tell you where some enemy was could be and was fatal.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

It is interesting to note that in many US squadrons, the commanding officer was rarely the best pilot or highest scoring ace. In fact many weren't even aces. Commanders were chosen for their qualities of teaching, communicating, administering and leading the unit. Of course there were exception such David McCambell or Richard Bong, but as long as the commander could both talk the talk and walk the walk (be respected as a pilot), they could get the job done.

I remember in Band of Brothers, there was a replacement platoon commander who always seemed unavailable or unable to make decisions. Finally Winters replaced him with Spiers and the whole company was grateful. Service people in combat know who a good leader is.
In the fighter squadrons, many of the combat leaders were the best and most experienced pilots, some were aces like Thach, Flatley, O' Hare and McCampbell. Many, were removed from flying early, to take over duties as air group commanders, some went to advanced squadron training units, some to advanced flight training. This was the definite advantage that we had and exploited. We had good leaders and tried to protect and use their knowledge to improve our doctrine.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The reason the aircraft radios are called command sets, is because they are really used for short, commands. Most of the targeting information, tactics etc. were discussed and planned on the ground. In fact, radio silence was the watchword in most of the Pacific air battles. When you get into the air, the radios are used sparingly, depending on the type of aircraft and mission. In a bomber mission, like an SBD, the air group commander may issue commands to each section as to targeting, and timing. He might say something like " Red section take the carrier on the left, Blue section the one on the right, on my mark, go". He will also provide an accurate sighting and targeting report back to the carrier, before commencing the attack. He might contact the escort to notify them that the attack is commencing. That's it except for warning commands like "Red one, break right" "Blue two, you have a Zeke coming in from 3:00 o'clock". He might issue commands to reform such as "red and blue sections reform at 12,000 ft. and head for home". You say as little as possible to eliminate any possible detection of valuable information like where you came from, where you are headed. Usually, after dropping their ordnance, whether it be bombs or torpedoes, the aircraft would climb to a predetermined altitude and head for home, possibly rendevousing at a prearrange spot and flying home together, if possible. The base, has moved, so a prearranged meeting point had been determine prior to takeoff. With aircraft equipped with the ZB-1 homing device, as you got closer to the base, the homing device would provide a vector to fly, to get into close range contact with the fleet.

Now, was there extra curricular comments made during combat. Of course. If a pilot shot down a plane, he might let everyone know. It occurred many times that a snooper would be detected and the fighter would be vectored and find the target to be a flying boat doing reconnaissance on the fleet. If he shot it down, he would notify Fido of the kill and the type of aircraft to provide a contact report to be plotted to see if the snooper had seen anything. Usually the sig intelligence personnel would detect communications from the snoopers, and would notify the CAG or fleet commander of the detection.

These command radios were important to battle management of the air groups and the CAP. Keep in mind, also, that the few channels the radios had, might be very busy with chatter from other aircraft in the area, especially aircraft involved fleet defense.

Hope this helps.

Dennis:

As you mention commands were brief. Was this due to combat experience, or pre-war doctrine? I seem to recall that early on, US pilots had a tendency to overload the comm net in the heat of battle. I assume that the communications doctrine grew with experience?

[Ed Rotondaro]

In the US Navy, there were non-officer flyers. They were usually Machinist Mates like Machinist Don Runyon of the Enterprise. I believe all were eventually commissioned as Ensign's.

Dennis:

That's my understanding as well. A friend of mine's dad was a pilot pre-war but had no college when he joined. He started as an enlisted man but after a brief OCS he got a commision.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In the fighter squadrons, many of the combat leaders were the best and most experienced pilots, some were aces like Thach, Flatley, O' Hare and McCampbell. Many, were removed from flying early, to take over duties as air group commanders, some went to advanced squadron training units, some to advanced flight training. This was the definite advantage that we had and exploited. We had good leaders and tried to protect and use their knowledge to improve our doctrine.

Dennis:

Sad to think that Thomas MacGuire, the second highest scoring US ace was due for relief when he was killed.

[old_pop2000]

Not any sadder than Bong making it through combat only to die, testing a jet.

[Kyle Holgate]

Speaking of land combat for a moment - The Germans are often sited as having such an effective army in WW2 due to their ability to change and adapt on the fly - in other words if things weren't exactly like they were reported in their pre-attack briefing, they were allowed and encouraged to think on their feet and modify their manuvers or tactics to get the job done.
In contrast - the Russians were known for being extremely rigid. The order may be to take hill 120 form the Germans after a bombardment. Well it turns out that the Germans retreated last night and there are none there. The bombardment goes on as sceduled though and the troops storm the hill according to their orders. No one took any iniative to perhaps bombard the hill the Germans were actually on and attack it - or cancel the attack.
I think that in many cases the Japanese were much like this across various combat theaters. Their air combat tactics evolved very slowly, as did infantry tactics. They followed the book in their ASW and were less likely to try to find some new way to work than were their American counterparts.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Not any sadder than Bong making it through combat only to die, testing a jet.

Dennis:

Yeah I was thinking aout that when I posted. What a waste, if anyone deserved the fruits of victory and a long life it was him.

[George LeSauvage]

Chris: 2 points about radios & tactics: (& I hope I'm not being incoherent.)

1. WAS the poor quality of the radios a problem with the Zero, or a problem with the Japanese conception of how naval air was to be used? That is, what is the relation of cause & effect? Did the Zero have poor radios because it was necessary to it's design, or because it was a low priority for the IJN? (Were other Japanese radios equally bad, or just this design?) Since other radio designs must have been available to them very early, as there were plenty in civilian use, plus they must have captured tons of US & Brit stores, surely they could have redesigned if they'd wanted to, couldn't they? I mean, I can see that such things as engine power, protection, wing design, & ammo supply would entail major redesign, but the radio? I would have to think it was more a matter of misplaced priorities, than anything else.

2. Relatedly, given that the Japanese didn't see teamwork as vital to air combat, to the degree that the western powers did, wouldn't that have made them slow to revise their tactics? I can understand the argument that they didn't, but that they couldn't have done so? They don't seem to have grasped the way we were fighting, & the role communication & teamwork played. (This may have been furthered by their lack of radar, as fighter direction is a corollary to using radar in air defense).

And again, if they never got the point of how communication was key to USN tactics--at least until too late--wouldn't that relate to their (apparent) lack of need to upgrade the radios?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Speaking of land combat for a moment - The Germans are often sited as having such an effective army in WW2 due to their ability to change and adapt on the fly - in other words if things weren't exactly like they were reported in their pre-attack briefing, they were allowed and encouraged to think on their feet and modify their manuvers or tactics to get the job done.
In contrast - the Russians were known for being extremely rigid. The order may be to take hill 120 form the Germans after a bombardment. Well it turns out that the Germans retreated last night and there are none there. The bombardment goes on as sceduled though and the troops storm the hill according to their orders. No one took any iniative to perhaps bombard the hill the Germans were actually on and attack it - or cancel the attack.
I think that in many cases the Japanese were much like this across various combat theaters. Their air combat tactics evolved very slowly, as did infantry tactics. They followed the book in their ASW and were less likely to try to find some new way to work than were their American counterparts.

Kyle:

That's always been a curious dichtomy for me. At the tactical level, the Germans were very flexible, but as you went up the line of command, they couldn't act without permission from HQ. That tied the generals hands so to speak.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Chris: 2 points about radios & tactics: (& I hope I'm not being incoherent.)

1. WAS the poor quality of the radios a problem with the Zero, or a problem with the Japanese conception of how naval air was to be used? That is, what is the relation of cause & effect? Did the Zero have poor radios because it was necessary to it's design, or because it was a low priority for the IJN? (Were other Japanese radios equally bad, or just this design?) Since other radio designs must have been available to them very early, as there were plenty in civilian use, plus they must have captured tons of US & Brit stores, surely they could have redesigned if they'd wanted to, couldn't they? I mean, I can see that such things as engine power, protection, wing design, & ammo supply would entail major redesign, but the radio? I would have to think it was more a matter of misplaced priorities, than anything else.

2. Relatedly, given that the Japanese didn't see teamwork as vital to air combat, to the degree that the western powers did, wouldn't that have made them slow to revise their tactics? I can understand the argument that they didn't, but that they couldn't have done so? They don't seem to have grasped the way we were fighting, & the role communication & teamwork played. (This may have been furthered by their lack of radar, as fighter direction is a corollary to using radar in air defense).

And again, if they never got the point of how communication was key to USN tactics--at least until too late--wouldn't that relate to their (apparent) lack of need to upgrade the radios?

George:

I think their whole inability to adapt was due in part to a very strained industrial base, especially in terms of electronics. When you compare the US in WWII with the resources of Westinghouse, General Electric, RCA and other companies to call on, Japan never had a chance. Look at the poor state of their radar. We see Japan today as a technological powerhouse. They weren't that until post war.

[old_pop2000]

Chris: 2 points about radios & tactics: (& I hope I'm not being incoherent.)

1. WAS the poor quality of the radios a problem with the Zero, or a problem with the Japanese conception of how naval air was to be used? That is, what is the relation of cause & effect? Did the Zero have poor radios because it was necessary to it's design, or because it was a low priority for the IJN? (Were other Japanese radios equally bad, or just this design?) Since other radio designs must have been available to them very early, as there were plenty in civilian use, plus they must have captured tons of US & Brit stores, surely they could have redesigned if they'd wanted to, couldn't they? I mean, I can see that such things as engine power, protection, wing design, & ammo supply would entail major redesign, but the radio? I would have to think it was more a matter of misplaced priorities, than anything else.

2. Relatedly, given that the Japanese didn't see teamwork as vital to air combat, to the degree that the western powers did, wouldn't that have made them slow to revise their tactics? I can understand the argument that they didn't, but that they couldn't have done so? They don't seem to have grasped the way we were fighting, & the role communication & teamwork played. (This may have been furthered by their lack of radar, as fighter direction is a corollary to using radar in air defense).

And again, if they never got the point of how communication was key to USN tactics--at least until too late--wouldn't that relate to their (apparent) lack of need to upgrade the radios?

George:

1. The answer to your question is both. The Japanese monographs and comments that I've read, show that the pilots would have wished that the radios worked better and more reliably. Their lack of teamwork was not due to the poor radios, but to the caste system and the failure of the IJN to really develop an air doctrine prior to the war.

The US Navy air doctrine had been in development since the days of the old Langley, Lex and Sara. The Japanese did not have their first fleet training exercise with carriers until the late '30's. They based their air doctrine on what had been learned from the air war in China.

As to the designs, there were not up to US and European standards but good for the purpose and built well. The start of the war, caused severe shortages in strategic materials such as copper for wiring and a shortage of trained workers to build and install such equipment.

According to the Naval Mission to Japan, the Japanese technicians and developers did not get any feedback from the operational units about problems due to the veil of secrecy. Research was involved in improving the electronics, but without feedback to guide them, it was just pure research. Another issue was the big gap between research and production. It's one thing to design and test a new radio, but now you have to produce that radio in numbers. This is the problem with the Japanese. Finally, the Second Research bureau was founded in 1945 to coordinate research and operational needs. Japanese maintenance officers did complain about the issues, but those complains never reach beyond a certain level in the fleet.

Until the Second Research Institue, the issue of special construction for operational requirements was never of great importance. Probably because it was always estimated that the war would be short. Pressurizing of electronic equipment was never considered important. It was never thought that combat would occur over 18,000 ft. All of this relates to the backwardness of the Japanese electronic industry and attitude of most mid and senior level officers of the IJN.

2. I believe much of the problem with the Japanese failure to adjust to changing conditions is the rigid caste system and the failure, at the beginning to plan for a long war. With no free flow of information up the chain of command to the officers who could adjust the flight training, aircraft development and combat doctrine, the system stayed static. Some senior IJN officers knew this was going to be a war of attrition. But not enough, to steer the Navy ministry from pushing the government and army towards the event. Once the ball got rolling down hill, no one wanted to be the one to try to stop it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

George:

1. The answer to your question is both. The Japanese monographs and comments that I've read, show that the pilots would have wished that the radios worked better and more reliably. Their lack of teamwork was not due to the poor radios, but to the caste system and the failure of the IJN to really develop an air doctrine prior to the war.

The US Navy air doctrine had been in development since the days of the old Langley, Lex and Sara. The Japanese did not have their first fleet training exercise with carriers until the late '30's. They based their air doctrine on what had been learned from the air war in China.

As to the designs, there were not up to US and European standards but good for the purpose and built well. The start of the war, caused severe shortages in strategic materials such as copper for wiring and a shortage of trained workers to build and install such equipment.

According to the Naval Mission to Japan, the Japanese technicians and developers did not get any feedback from the operational units about problems due to the veil of secrecy. Research was involved in improving the electronics, but without feedback to guide them, it was just pure research. Another issue was the big gap between research and production. It's one thing to design and test a new radio, but now you have to produce that radio in numbers. This is the problem with the Japanese. Finally, the Second Research bureau was founded in 1945 to coordinate research and operational needs. Japanese maintenance officers did complain about the issues, but those complains never reach beyond a certain level in the fleet.

Until the Second Research Institue, the issue of special construction for operational requirements was never of great importance. Probably because it was always estimated that the war would be short. Pressurizing of electronic equipment was never considered important. It was never thought that combat would occur over 18,000 ft. All of this relates to the backwardness of the Japanese electronic industry and attitude of most mid and senior level officers of the IJN.

2. I believe much of the problem with the Japanese failure to adjust to changing conditions is the rigid caste system and the failure, at the beginning to plan for a long war. With no free flow of information up the chain of command to the officers who could adjust the flight training, aircraft development and combat doctrine, the system stayed static. Some senior IJN officers knew this was going to be a war of attrition. But not enough, to steer the Navy ministry from pushing the government and army towards the event. Once the ball got rolling down hill, no one wanted to be the one to try to stop it.

Dennis:

My only observation about Japan planning for a long war was that they knew they couldn't win one. Their entire war plan was based on a quick victory, partly due to their belief in their superiority and their understanding that a long war was impossible. Still they could have planned better for a protracted struggle. I believe group think mentality crippled them and still does. I read an article recently on the very real problems with their economy and the author made the point that an innovative enterprise like Google could never have been developed in Japan.

[Warship NWS]

Their lack of teamwork was not due to the poor radios, but to the caste system and the failure of the IJN to really develop an air doctrine prior to the war.

This part I am not sure I entirely agree with. WW1 saw pilots acting more as individuals then teams in part because they only had visual cues for communications. I cannot see how team work could be fostered with little to no reliable voice communications in a war where planes are flying over 250-300mph. Even the simplest of voice commands (alerting or coordinating) offered some level of team work and without reliable radios even that was not possible. I would completely agree that their lack of team work thinking negated any real chance of working together in the air but I do not think their chances of correcting that issue without reliable communications in the air would not have been effective, if nothing else, greatly diminished.

[old_pop2000]

This part I am not sure I entirely agree with. WW1 saw pilots acting more as individuals then teams in part because they only had visual cues for communications. I cannot see how team work could be fostered with little to no reliable voice communications in a war where planes are flying over 250-300mph. Even the simplest of voice commands (alerting or coordinating) offered some level of team work and without reliable radios even that was not possible. I would completely agree that their lack of team work thinking negated any real chance of working together in the air but I do not think their chances of correcting that issue without reliable communications in the air would have been effective, if nothing else, greatly diminished.
The formations the Japanese flew were not based on the two plane element or the four plane section. Teamwork was not stressed, except in certain cases with pilots like those in the Rabaul area. I have stated that once in the air, radios are not used to develop or coordinate tactics. Here is a brief snippet:

This is a comment from a junior fido, Ens. George Givens:


My best memory is of "Ham" Dow sweating like a Turk while he attempted to break into the many, many radio transmissions that were on the fighter frequency. Bear in mind that if two transmitters open up at the same time in the same general area, you get nothing but a squeal on the air. That happened several times on this particular day.... Good radio discipline is essential, Messages should be brief and the transmitter should get off the air as soon as possible.

This is a description of action during the attack by Shokaku dive bombers on the Enterprise during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

Again, the radios are a command set, to be used for sighting reports, combat reports and short air to air directives and alerts, nothing more. Your tactics have to be developed before you get into the cockpit and practiced.

[Warship NWS]

I would completely agree that their lack of team work thinking negated any real chance of working together in the air but I do not think their chances of correcting that issue without reliable communications in the air would not have been effective, if nothing else, greatly diminished. ... correction to my previous post, I left out the "not" part.

[old_pop2000]

After the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, carriers and air groups compiled lots of reports on the actions and lessons learned. The primary complaint was poorly functioning radios, delayed contact reports, malfunctioning IFF gear, and other shortcomings in passing vital information to those who needed to know. Captain Davis of the Enterprise described communications as "weak to the point of danger". Kinkaid called them the "greatest weakness". Fletcher had asked for UHF radios and he reaffirmed that request.

The Fido's on the Enterprise complained of a lack of radio discipline on the fighter circuit, which was blamed on training methods.

Pilots felt it unreasonable to expect sixty odd VF to maintain radio silence in the heat of battle. They thought it assisted moral. They recommended that the CV's CAP operate on a different radio frequency.

Captain Ramsey felt that the number of transmissions by the VF pilots were the result of inexperience and their wide dispersal and was not considered abnormal. He recommended that interplane communications such as between section and wingman use a different frequency than the those of fighter direction.

Pilots also commented on the visible deterioration of the enemy pilot skills during the battle.

There is more on this, like the suggestion of the creation of a "fighter carrier" to handle CAP and IAP.

So, from this brief excerpt it should be apparent that radios of the era were unreliable and the Japanese did not have a lock on that problem. Unfortunately, they were not able to voice the problems and get the higher brass to listen. By the time of the end of August 1942, japanese pilot skills had begun to decline rapidly. It might have been helpful to have reliable radios in the air for coordination however, better tactics and training might have been far more helpful.

[Warship NWS]

It might have been helpful to have reliable radios in the air for coordination however, better tactics and training might have been far more helpful.

Training was crucial, no doubt there at all. You could have good radios but poor radio discipline. You could have radios that worked but limited range or not enough channels to be used efficiently. Training would include radio discipline and doctrine for efficient communications - which I agree was a problem for many military forces as communications in combat evolved. Lack of quality communications could obviously compound that problem. Even the British RAF during the BoB had issues with radio doctrines and limited range of their sets and some efficiency issues at the start of the campaign were finally worked out near the middle to the end of the campaign. In the end I think it came down to 3 critical components,

a) Quality/Flexibility
b) Maintenance
c) Doctrinal

All of these factors would lead to how efficient the communications would be in combat.

In any event, IMHO, our communications were definitely better then the IJN in the air and via ground control and I do believe that did give us an edge in combat in regards to team work, at the least preserving the team via improving survivability (much easier to keep flying with those that are already trained and that your familiar with in terms of how they react in combat), improved training (easier to train someone in the air - anyone remember watching the "Battle of Britain"?), and improved in air coordination. IMHO, coordination was part of the overall doctrine of team work.

I think we can all agree however that this is a complex topic with somewhat limited factual evidence but a good deal of circumstantial evidence. With the thousands of aerial engagements that took place during WW2 we only have a small segment of "radio communications" samples to go on for those that did use them, and even fewer for those that did not, or could not, use them effectively. There is no doubt that 1940s communications were very much in their infancy and even the slightest doctrinal, or quality, difference could prove critical in warfare.

That is it for me folks. It has been a great discussion. Time to get back to work on WCDB ..;)

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

Other than reports like "12 bandits at 2 o'clock high" sorts of reports, or "Ace, you have a 109 on your tail!" sorts of communications what actually went on - via the radios? I can picture some tactical planning on a minor level - "you take the one on the left, I have the other one" and such - but nothing that really would make a huge difference.

I am not disputing that radio communications are both useful and very good to have. The question is - if we assume they are a force multiplier of sorts, in that they allow for fewer forces to do a bit more than forces without good radio communications - just how big of an advantage do they really provide?

If you have 12 Zero's with radios working or the same 12 with crappy or no radios - and they are about to encounter a group of enemy dive bombers escorted by fighters - what sort of difference(s) might we see in how they attack (note, it could be F4F's or 109's, doesn't have to be Zero's - that was just another poke at Chris - must keep my PITA image untarished, after all ;))

[old_pop2000]

Other than reports like "12 bandits at 2 o'clock high" sorts of reports, or "Ace, you have a 109 on your tail!" sorts of communications what actually went on - via the radios? I can picture some tactical planning on a minor level - "you take the one on the left, I have the other one" and such - but nothing that really would make a huge difference.

I am not disputing that radio communications are both useful and very good to have. The question is - if we assume they are a force multiplier of sorts, in that they allow for fewer forces to do a bit more than forces without good radio communications - just how big of an advantage do they really provide?

If you have 12 Zero's with radios working or the same 12 with crappy or no radios - and they are about to encounter a group of enemy dive bombers escorted by fighters - what sort of difference(s) might we see in how they attack (note, it could be F4F's or 109's, doesn't have to be Zero's - that was just another poke at Chris - must keep my PITA image untarished, after all ;))

You can see a clear evolution from the early air battle near Wotje Island, to the Rabaul attack and Coral Sea, through Midway to Guadalcanal and then to Eastern Solomons, of fighter direction in the carrier task forces. AAR and lessons learned show that better, higher frequency radios in the UHF band are requested. Better radio discipline is request. In Eastern Solomons, at one point in a lull in the air battle, the FIDO of the Big E, tells all the pilots to pipe down, so he can issue orders to the CAP's as more Japanese type 99's and fighter were detected in the second attack wave. We see a request for better IFF to help distinguish between friend and foe. Better doctrine based on improved radar with autorotating antenna's and PPI scan scopes is required. You see a much higher appreciation for the value of good radio communications from the ground to the air and vice versa, also from air to air. This really gets back to better battle management.

PS. I wouldn't worry about your PITA image. It is safe and secure, trust me.:rolleyes::p

[Kyle Holgate]

PS. I wouldn't worry about your PITA image. It is safe and secure, trust me.:rolleyes::p

Thank you Dennis, that is very reassuring!

The evolution of ground based communications and coordination to direct fighters is interesting. I was recently reading about how night fighter tactics evolved in both England and later over Germany. Before the advent of onboard radar the fighter had to be directed to visual contact -and one fighter pilot mentioned that he didn't feel much like a flyer, more like a puppet.
The evolution of night fighter tactics with and without ground and airborne raidar is pretty interesting. But that's worth a thread of its own probably.

[old_pop2000]

Thank you Dennis, that is very reassuring!

The evolution of ground based communications and coordination to direct fighters is interesting. I was recently reading about how night fighter tactics evolved in both England and later over Germany. Before the advent of onboard radar the fighter had to be directed to visual contact -and one fighter pilot mentioned that he didn't feel much like a flyer, more like a puppet.
The evolution of night fighter tactics with and without ground and airborne raidar is pretty interesting. But that's worth a thread of its own probably.
Ok, go for it. You are correct, it would make for an interesting subject.

[Kyle Holgate]

Ok, go for it. You are correct, it would make for an interesting subject.

I will get a tread started at some point, I'm still in the process of researching the subject matter. Can't jump in until I have at least some idea of what I'm talking about, I'd get toasted alive in here!

[asnrobert]

Dennis:

As you mention commands were brief. Was this due to combat experience, or pre-war doctrine? I seem to recall that early on, US pilots had a tendency to overload the comm net in the heat of battle. I assume that the communications doctrine grew with experience?
Years ago I read a biography of Robert Stanford Tuck, one of the RAF aces of the BOB, and I seem to recall he also complained about pilots being too "chatty" on the radio (or R/T, as the Brits called it).

[old_pop2000]

"Chatty" pilots were a complaint after Eastern Solomon's because there was only one frequency being used. The FIDO's wanted a fighter interception frequency to be able to talk to the aircraft, and leave the air to air frequency vacant.

[old_pop2000]

I was just reviewing and reading some air battles over the Solomon's and an interesting comment was made. The Japanese seemed to make the same error consistently. They would hit and climb, but if they overshot the F4F, they would continue down, then below and front, begin to pull out. This was right in front of the F4F's, which would simply nose down and get a perfect high side deflection shot at the climbing Zero.

The skid maneuver that I described would work perfect in this instance, as the Japanese would be force to overshoot when you skid, then simply push left aileron, and forward on the stick and you are now in a very good firing position to catch the Zero attempting to pull out.

[old_pop2000]

Lone Sentry has scanned and uploaded a new document from WWII on the Koga Zero. I have copied the radio section and am providing it because it has the first good description of the radio system, antenna and radio compass in the aircraft. It is detailed enough to allow me to research the tubes and radio separately and hopefully get some interesting information. Link to total article is provided.


THE NEW MITSUBISHI-NAGOYA ZERO FIGHTER


Radio. Two way radio; radio mast aft of cockpit is of streamlined wood, hollow with copper wire inside. 96 Type air, Number 1, wireless voice transmitter, type 1. Receiver No. 976, January 1942. Manufactured by Toyo Electric Corporation.

The radio compass was made by Fairchild Aero Camera Co., New York City. Aerial #429. Loop located in pilot enclosure just in back of pilot's seat. Controls located on right hand side of cockpit. L or R meter located on instrument dash board. This equipment looked as though it had been used before it was installed in this plane. Frequency range, 170 to 460 and 450 to 1200 KC. Switch was located in the 450 to 1200 KC position when gear was removed.

The radio receiver has 5 Japanese-made tubes of the following types: one 6C6 RF amplifier, one 6A7 1st detector and oscillator, one 6C6 IF amplifier, one 76 second detector, one 76 audio stage. Receiver is super-heterodyne with a crystal-controlled oscillator to determine the frequency of the receiver. It has a beat oscillator for CW reception. One dial to tune antenna and 1st detector stage. Frequency can only be changed by changing the crystal which plugs in the front of the panel. Both transmitter and receiver were using 4145 KC crystals. No other crystals were located in or about the plane. Radio was made by Toyo Electric Corporation in January 1942. Dynamotor is marked generator, air Model 1, revision 1, input 12.5 volts, 13 amps; output for sending 500 volts, 0.12 amps; output for receiving 150 volts, 0.03 amps. No. 302360; weight, 6.8 kilograms (15 lbs.). Made February 1942 by Koana Manufacturing Corporation.

The radio transmitter has power of about 10 watts, crystal controlled, voice of C.W. Frequency range approximately 2,000 KC to 6,000 KC. Frequency can only be changed by removing crystal and inserting another. Has a neon bulb for indicating resonance in the plate circuit and an antenna ammeter with maximum reading of .8 of an ampere. Power supply is in the 12 volt plane battery and a dynamotor supply of about 600 volts, D.C. Transmitter uses one Japanese 503 tube for oscillator and one Japanese 503 tube for modulator. These tubes seem to be the equivalent of an 807 RCA tube.

There were 3 dynamotors on the plane, one each for transmitter, receiver, and radio compass. They were located aft of the cockpit. The generator taken from the Fairchild Radio Compass was an Eclipse made in the United States.


http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt08/zero-fighter.html

[Ed Rotondaro]

Lone Sentry has scanned and uploaded a new document from WWII on the Koga Zero. I have copied the radio section and am providing it because it has the first good description of the radio system, antenna and radio compass in the aircraft. It is detailed enough to allow me to research the tubes and radio separately and hopefully get some interesting information. Link to total article is provided.



http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt08/zero-fighter.html

Dennis:

Thanks Forum hound LOL!

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Thanks Forum hound LOL!

Thank you, Lord Dark Helmet!!! Yogurt the Wise is always on the job. May the Schwartz be with you!!!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thank you, Lord Dark Helmet!!! Yogurt the Wise is always on the job. May the Schwartz be with you!!!


Yogurt:

I can use all the digestive help I can get LOL! Any good wines on the cruise?

[old_pop2000]

Yogurt:

I can use all the digestive help I can get LOL! Any good wines on the cruise?
We did some wine tasting in Walla Walla. We had four bottles from two vintner's delivered.

1. Waterbrook 2006 Riesling - Riesling is my wife's favorite wine - She is part German, go figure.

2. Ash Hollow 2007 Gewurztraminer and a 2007 Somanna -The last is a 50% mixture of Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Gris.

We tasted some Syrah at another vintner's tasting room and it was good. But my lady is still gaining acceptance of red wines. We have only moved her into Chianti in the last year along with Cabernet Sauvignon's. She is still a Rieseling, Chardonnay and Gewurztraminer girl, along with some italian reds, depending on the mood.

Now, as for me. If it is wet and alcoholic, I'll probably drink it. Try a mixture of Everclear, grape cool-aid and seven up. But don't smoke around it, if know what I mean.

[john964]

We did some wine tasting in Walla Walla. We had four bottles from two vintner's delivered.

1. Waterbrook 2006 Riesling - Riesling is my wife's favorite wine - She is part German, go figure.

2. Ash Hollow 2007 Gewurztraminer and a 2007 Somanna -The last is a 50% mixture of Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Gris.

We tasted some Syrah at another vintner's tasting room and it was good. But my lady is still gaining acceptance of red wines. We have only moved her into Chianti in the last year along with Cabernet Sauvignon's. She is still a Rieseling, Chardonnay and Gewurztraminer girl, along with some italian reds, depending on the mood.

Now, as for me. If it is wet and alcoholic, I'll probably drink it. Try a mixture of Everclear, grape cool-aid and seven up. But don't smoke around it, if know what I mean.
You should try the drink of choice at Subic Bay PI is Mojo. IIRC the recipe is 1 pint rum 1 pint cherry brandy 1 12oz beer 1 12oz can of 7up and then add Pinapple juice and crushed ice untill you reach 2qts. From what I understand it is the alcohol equelvlent of a mugging.

[Ed Rotondaro]

We did some wine tasting in Walla Walla. We had four bottles from two vintner's delivered.

1. Waterbrook 2006 Riesling - Riesling is my wife's favorite wine - She is part German, go figure.

2. Ash Hollow 2007 Gewurztraminer and a 2007 Somanna -The last is a 50% mixture of Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Gris.

We tasted some Syrah at another vintner's tasting room and it was good. But my lady is still gaining acceptance of red wines. We have only moved her into Chianti in the last year along with Cabernet Sauvignon's. She is still a Rieseling, Chardonnay and Gewurztraminer girl, along with some italian reds, depending on the mood.

Now, as for me. If it is wet and alcoholic, I'll probably drink it. Try a mixture of Everclear, grape cool-aid and seven up. But don't smoke around it, if know what I mean.


Dennis:

Thanks for the recommendations. Everclear scares me, that's for hard core prisoners of war or death row immates. Probably would be a good fuel injector cleaner too.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Thanks for the recommendations. Everclear scares me, that's for hard core prisoners of war or death row immates. Probably would be a good fuel injector cleaner too.
Definitely scary stuff at 190 proof. The guys who made the drink called them purple passions. But, when you are young.

[Warship NWS]

Guys.. I think the stuff about drinks should be in the "off-topic" section of our forums..;)

[Kyle Holgate]

Guys.. I think the stuff about drinks should be in the "off-topic" section of our forums..;)

Except maybe Sake or drinks with Sake - with a bit of imagination you may be able to tie those into this thread. How did the Zero's navigate with the pilot saused on Sake...?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Except maybe Sake or drinks with Sake - with a bit of imagination you may be able to tie those into this thread. How did the Zero's navigate with the pilot saused on Sake...?

Kyle:

They only gave sake to the kamikaze pilots and even that was a little cup.;)

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle:

They only gave sake to the kamikaze pilots and even that was a little cup.;)

I was just trying to bring things back on topic! So did a little cup make them more accurate?

[Ed Rotondaro]

I was just trying to bring things back on topic! So did a little cup make them more accurate?

Kyle:

I don't know, what was the accuracy rate about 15% I think?

[Kyle Holgate]

Finally got my book dealing with the original design and building of the Zero along with the testing and further development. The original specifications call for a pilot to pilot radio and a long range navigation system (based on RF I guess?). Unfortunatly it doesn't give any details on what the Nav system may be or how it worked (or how accurate it would be).

[old_pop2000]

Finally got my book dealing with the original design and building of the Zero along with the testing and further development. The original specifications call for a pilot to pilot radio and a long range navigation system (based on RF I guess?). Unfortunatly it doesn't give any details on what the Nav system may be or how it worked (or how accurate it would be).

The radio in a Zero was a Type 96 KU 1 Radio with a Type 1 KU-3 Radio direction finder and compass. The radio direction indicator was located on the left side of the instrument panel, its control unit on the right side of the cockpit, to the rear of the inertia starting handle. Loop antenna was located behind the pilot. Transformer and battery were located behind the pilots seat. Radio operated on a frequency range of 3.8 to 5.8 MHZ, crystal controlled. To change frequency, the crystals had to be changed. Power was 8-10 watts in voice, 30 watts in telegraph, called CW for continuous wave. Voice was limited to 50 miles.

Hope that is enough.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The radio in a Zero was a Type 96 KU 1 Radio with a Type 1 KU-3 Radio direction finder and compass. The radio direction indicator was located on the left side of the instrument panel, its control unit on the right side of the cockpit, to the rear of the inertia starting handle. Loop antenna was located behind the pilot. Transformer and battery were located behind the pilots seat. Radio operated on a frequency range of 3.8 to 5.8 MHZ, crystal controlled. To change frequency, the crystals had to be changed. Power was 8-10 watts in voice, 30 watts in telegraph, called CW for continuous wave. Voice was limited to 50 miles.

Hope that is enough.

Dennis:

How does that fare compared to what a US or British fighter or attack plane would be carrying for radios?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

How does that fare compared to what a US or British fighter or attack plane would be carrying for radios?

The navy used early in the war, the ARC-1 which was an am modulated 9 channel radio with a special guarded channel for secure communications. There was also a radar homing receiver ARR-1, for use with the Navy ZB-1 homing system.