Vitals and immunity zones, a conversation of naval concepts,

[Warship NWS]

A personal perspective,

"Immunity zone" was an engineering concept with questionable, at best, tactical implications. The concept was simple - a range that rendered the "vitals" of a warship immune to enemy projectiles.

"Vitals" was an overall design concept intended to describe the powerplants, fuel bunkerage, and magazines of a warship - this terminology could vary per time frame as noted below.

Immunity zone is at best a controversial concept and often proven tactically unreliable as it depended on an accurate perception or information regarding enemy weapon technologies - in the 1940s or earlier this was hardly reliable so quite often a nation would use its own weapons as a guideline. The IZ could also vary depending on engagement ranges, angles, metallurgy qualities, etc..etc..

Vitals were a bit easier to define and measure in a relative quantity as all navies had "vitals" on warships, or what was considered vital to the operations of a warship, that being the powerplants, fuel tanks, and ammunition magazines. There is little doubt that these parts of a warship were "vital" to the operations of warship, however, they were only useful if a warship could be committed to and stay an active participant in combat, in my personal opinion. The vast majority of mission kills, according to most historical records, imply that ships were often knocked out of a battle and/or kept from the critical fighting that never had their vitals effected by combat - or, their vitals were damaged after their weapon systems had been neutralized. Mission kills were in most cases achieved more often vs the above decks portions of a warship as compared to below the decks. Some could argue that this was due to the protection below the deck, some could also argue that above the deck is what absorbed the most hits. Could this be a matter of personal perspective? Possibly.

My personal thought however on vitals is that they are often taken out of context or over-emphasized in terms of the operations of warship. A warship without its weapons is little more then a cruise liner target, but the vitals do allow what is above the deck to function - note however, some ships could still use their weapons even if the vitals were damaged to some degree.

Should what is above the deck be considered as vital, or at least measurable, to what was considered vital below the deck? How does the term "vitals" apply across different time frames of naval warfare? In the age of sail the guns were below the decks and the powerplant above the deck (the sails). After the advent of ironclads they were both in or below the hull. Move on to armored turreted ships with guns and fire controls above the deck and all of the powerplant below the deck.

This is an open conversation and I will note there are no black and white answers and the tactical and strategic requirements, or missions, of a warship could greatly effect the perceptions of what was considered "vital" in a naval war.

Enjoy the chat.

[ksf1973]

That last point is THE BIG ONE is this discussion, but overall any system the failure of which prevents a warship from completing its mission would be vital.

Of course, multiple vital failures can easily occur during a single cruise, as with the Bismark, which had already suffered a mission-ending injury with PoW's fuel bunker hit in the Denmark Strait, long before the OTHER vital hit on her rudder.

[William Miller]

"Vital: existing as a manifestation of life b: concerned with or necessary to the maintenance of life" ...Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,2008
The "Vitals" are, of course, those items in a unit that are required to maintain the life/survival of that unit.

The exact definition of what is being discussed is always important IMHO.


My rather short take on this subject:

Yes, an intact weapon system is (usually) required to inflict damage upon an enemy -- indeed if the mission's goal is to inflict damage upon the enemy then a weapon system is "vital" to the mission. But -- when we speak of the "vitals" of a ship, I believe we are generally referring to those systems that need to be protected in order for the ship to survive, not simply to fullfill its current mission objectives. That is the difference in my view. As a very very simple analogy -- my lungs, heart, liver, kidneys, etc are vital to my survival (hence they are called 'vitals' or 'vital organs'), while my hands/arms (which are in effect my weapon systems since I am so bad at shooting with my feet) are not.

Loss of gun or torpedo mounts are generally not, in the majority of cases, "vital" to a ships base survival. Serious flooding of the ships compartments, a shell penetrating into a magazine, the propulsion system being put out of action, etc will far more often lead to the ships demise, and hence these types of systems are considered the ships "vitals" (not "vital" -- note the difference).

[Warship NWS]

WM makes a valid argument on the context of vitals in terms of survival vs what is vital to the mission.

However, IMHO, humans have a different mission in life then that of a ship that is built for a specific purpose and on average has considerably different usefulness is terms of life spans. On a soldier level for example most soldiers would be rendered mission killed if he cannot function in terms of hand to hand combat and/or fire various weapons if he loses an arm. The arms may not be needed to breathe but I would think they would be needed for combat - AKA holding a gun.

Now, a tougher open-ended question. How do "vitals" play out in the context of mission kills (either permanent or temporary) vs hard kills and how much difference does it make in a naval war across different time frames? Thoughts?

Thanks.

[Scott Chisholm]

I think William has the right of it, and is what I tried to say on the other thread.

"Vital", "Mission Essential", and "High Value" are all very subjective terms. I remember the difference between "High Value Asset" and "Mission Essential Asset" being explained to me as the HVA being the ship you were standing on, while the MEA was the ship that needed to survive to complete the mission. If the two were not the same, and you weren't on the MEA, then you were expendable....

[Warship NWS]

An interesting concept of modern naval designs.. with more of the weapons being put under the deck does this change the concept of the "vitals"? In armored warships "vitals" were protected by belts and decks of armor however in modern navies the only ship with a large coverage of some type of metalic protection would be CVNs. On smaller warships the "vitals" are protected by kevlar - which is more for blast frag prevention then true armor. This raises the question of what is considered "vital" below the deck of surface combatant warship as compared to ships of previous generations of naval warfare. I will leave this topic open to discussion.

[Ed Rotondaro]

"Vital: existing as a manifestation of life b: concerned with or necessary to the maintenance of life" ...Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,2008
The "Vitals" are, of course, those items in a unit that are required to maintain the life/survival of that unit.

The exact definition of what is being discussed is always important IMHO.


My rather short take on this subject:

Yes, an intact weapon system is (usually) required to inflict damage upon an enemy -- indeed if the mission's goal is to inflict damage upon the enemy then a weapon system is "vital" to the mission. But -- when we speak of the "vitals" of a ship, I believe we are generally referring to those systems that need to be protected in order for the ship to survive, not simply to fullfill its current mission objectives. That is the difference in my view. As a very very simple analogy -- my lungs, heart, liver, kidneys, etc are vital to my survival (hence they are called 'vitals' or 'vital organs'), while my hands/arms (which are in effect my weapon systems since I am so bad at shooting with my feet) are not.

Loss of gun or torpedo mounts are generally not, in the majority of cases, "vital" to a ships base survival. Serious flooding of the ships compartments, a shell penetrating into a magazine, the propulsion system being put out of action, etc will far more often lead to the ships demise, and hence these types of systems are considered the ships "vitals" (not "vital" -- note the difference).


William:

I agree 100%. A very succint summation. If anything, the experience of the South Dakota at Guadalcanal shows that you can heavily damage the upper works, but still fight the ship (albeit badly) and disengage to be repaired.

I think Chris has used examples where a warship is heavily outnumbered and facing numerous opponents that can outmanuever and engage on several different angles. Here once the upper works are damaged, the ship will find it hard to retaliate and can get dragged down, almost like a bear against hunting dogs. But put two equally sized battlelines against each other and let one side have an immunity zone based on larger guns, well then even if its ships take topside damage, they have a chance to disengage while being covered by the rest of the squadron. Historical example, HMS Warspite at Jutland has her steering gear jammed and is within 10,000yds of the leading German BBs. Her armor manages to protect her from no less than 13 heavy shell hits and she regains steering control and gets away. Now if she's on her own, most likely she dies. From the same battle, the German battlecruiser Lutzow takes a terrific pounding, but what causes her to be abadoned is progressive flooding that is slowing her down and making her unable to maintain station with the rest of the German BCs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

WM makes a valid argument on the context of vitals in terms of survival vs what is vital to the mission.

However, IMHO, humans have a different mission in life then that of a ship that is built for a specific purpose and on average has considerably different usefulness is terms of life spans. On a soldier level for example most soldiers would be rendered mission killed if he cannot function in terms of hand to hand combat and/or fire various weapons if he loses an arm. The arms may not be needed to breathe but I would think they would be needed for combat - AKA holding a gun.

Now, a tougher open-ended question. How do "vitals" play out in the context of mission kills (either permanent or temporary) vs hard kills and how much difference does it make in a naval war across different time frames? Thoughts?

Thanks.

Chris:


Obviously the most vital "vital" at least in terms of immediate destruction is the magazine of a ship. This has been true since the Age of Sail. With the redundancy of multiple boiler rooms, I would put steering gear ahead of engine rooms since we have numerous examples of ships being crippled and the finished off due to such damage. Generators certainly rank up there, although you could usually rig something up to get this around this (In fact I'm always amazed at how good damge control can restore a lot of function to a warship in spite of serious damages). Prop shafts and rudders are all killers to a ships survival. PoW worst flooding came from the torpedo hit near her shafts that allowed the damaged shaft to rip the hell out of her and started serious flooding.

Topside, I would rather lose a main gun turret than fire control or the bridge. And since a good deal of the components of FC are way up and have little protection, it's obvious these things get smacked. Yet with the redundancy built into warships, a crew can overcome to a degree such damage. Radar can be re-wired or re-routed. Repairs can be jury rigged (assuming the enemy gives that breathing space). Loss of the bridge can be compensated for, but it's harder to compensate for the loss of the captain and other staff officers.

Regarding which damage is more sure to mission kill a ship is difficult to consider. As you point out, most ships that took severe topside damage were already screwed and never had the chance to make it back home. This is much more evident in WWII. If you examine the photos of the German BCs that survived Jutland, you'll see plenty of above deck damage (especially turrets), but since they didn't have a magazine detonate or lose appreciable speed, they did live to be scuttled another day;).

[Warship NWS]

Some additional personal thoughts,

IMHO, the term "vital", as Scott put it, is subjective. On a technical/survival level the "vitals" would obviously cover the fuel, ammo, and powerplant of a ship - which just so happened to also be at or below the waterline - where the flooding can occur. Interestingly enough, "vitals", according to some sources I have read does not cover "flooding" however water does not help your question of survivability if it gets into the hull for obvious reasons, and as WM accurately pointed out.

Now, aside from the technical engineering concept of the "vitals" we still have what is "vital" to the mission at hand. If a ship cannot perform its role in combat then its "vitals" being protected can be somewhat irrelevant. If the weapons are disabled or destroyed and the ship is rendered incapable of defending itself against faster and smaller warships then the "vitals" all of the sudden can become very vulnerable to torpedo attack or the ship could be destroyed by fires started by repetitive hits without the belt or deck ever being penetrated. Either the above case could occur or a mission kill could simply render the entire concept of the "vitals" a moot point. Now obviously this can depend on the tactical situation but there were cases in naval history where it either happened or was a serious possibility. Let us all remember, we can fight more naval battles on PC in a day or two then happened throughout all of WW1 and WW2 combined so there are many plausible what-ifs that could have occurred throughout those time frames in naval history.

In response to the SD example, the ship was not damaged severely enough in either weapons or the vitals to render it completely combat ineffective, or even mission killed for that matter. The temporary mission kill was self-inflicted due to an engineering mistake. The SC radar was destroyed and but most of the damage was superficial.. had the IJN pressed the attack during her being blind and unarmed it could have ended up being a Scharnhorst vs DoY/CRs/DDs situation if not for the Washington being virtually undetected while the SD was under attack. 28 knots speed was not going to get the SD out of trouble on its own. Fortunately the IJN forces fumbled the ball at the last minute and ended up negating their numerical advantage.

The Bismarck was a forgone conclusion after the torpedo hit, but effectively she was unable to fight back after the first 4-6 major caliber hits. Had she still been able to push 30 knots nothing could catch her unless her vitals were hit except for planes and cruisers. The RN was very lucky with the Bismarck.. otherwise the RAF would have likely had another bomb sponge for target practice as happened to the Tirpitz.

The Scharnhorst was a strange case example. Being hounded by DDs/CRs and giving as good as she received (she scored several hits on the attacking ships with her 11" guns - let us not forget this fact.. if not it could have been more problematic for her before DoY arrived).. however a CR hit her radar and blinded her to the impending danger.. the DoY got into visual range, put a 14" into a vital space and the game was over. A question remains however, had the CRs put a shell into her FCDs rendering her main guns ineffective in rough weather could the CRs/DDs gotten close enough to torpedo her? Possibly, if they could cut through the rough seas enough to press their attacks, although the RN had a habit of firing torpedoes too shallow and thus hitting the belt lines rather then the hulls.

The S&G vs the Renown.. one 15" shell renders Gs FCD disabled and another shell takes out a turret.. if not for their slightly better speeds in rough seas the S could have been fighting Renown on her own and it could have been a far different engagement.

There is a problem here however.. the KM tactics were anomalies of naval warfare with the use of capital ships as "raiders".. not ships of the traditional battleline so in their case speed was of far greater importance to their survival then gunfire so the "vitals" ended up being absolutely critical to the survival of the KM capital ships. In the end however, their survival likely proved more costly to the Germans then to the British in terms of resources expended to keep them operating vs being destroyed.

In terms of WW1.. battleships were the least used warships of the war so even if their vitals were hit or not it mattered little as overall they had only a handful of opportunities to prove their expensive cost of existence. Oddly enough the most famous ships that went bang for the RN were not even hit in the vitals at all and very few capital ships were lost even when hit in their vitals for a variety of reasons.

So we are still left with the open-ended question.. how do we compare the weapons of a ship to its "vitals" in terms of the survivability of the ship in combat? Does the concept of mission kills, temporary or permanent, effect the differences between "vitals" and the weapons in how they play a role in tactical surface warfare? Is there too much emphasis on the "vitals" vs weapons in terms of historical reference context?

One of the main points of this discussion is to not only examine the concept of protecting the "vitals" from a technical standpoint but also the tactical implications and whether or not the immunity zone concept proved successful or questionable in combat.

Opinions and thoughts?

[Warship NWS]

As a side note, I have always advocated the concept of "speed is life" for naval combat so at no time have I ever considered the "vitals" of a ship in question in terms of the survivability of a warship in combat. The question comes in as to why the weapons of a ship, the reason for its existence, is not considered as vital components of a warship in various historical and naval context. See my previous post for more specific details regarding this discussion.

Thanks.

[bridav58]

On the Battle of North Cape it's not really for sure that Scharnhorst was hit in the boiler hump by Duke of York it seems some research indicates that she suffered a machinery breakdown ,the shop always was a dog in her machinery reliability .

[old_pop2000]

I just wanted to inject some important facts about ships. There are two primary forces acting on a ship- buoyancy or the weight of the displaced water and gravity in the form of the weight of the ship. Buoyancy works upward to support weight. It is absolutely vital to any ship. Another important concept is stability both for and aft and side to side. These forces and concepts are carefully engineered into every ship.

The three heaviest items in ship are the hull and hull structure, protection in the form of armor, and machinery including magazines. The hull and armor occupy 80% of the weight. It is not by chance, that the third heaviest portion of the ship, is located at the center of gravity and the center of buoyancy. It is also not by chance, that the bulk of armor protection is located at the waterline protecting the greatest area of buoyancy. I would also remind you that the "vitals" are located below the waterline, in most cases.

So, the main armor protection is placed to protect the buoyancy, then the vitals and then the three other areas including weapons and hull structure. Flotation or buoyancy is absolutely the most important factor in the protection of the ship. Since the vitals are in the area of greatest buoyancy, it will also be protected. It less causal and more associative.

Sorry if this engineering bores all of you, but remember that a ship is a floating, mobile weapons platform. The floating portion of that definition is absolutely the most important area to be protected.

Thanks for listening.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I just wanted to inject some important facts about ships. There are two primary forces acting on a ship- buoyancy or the weight of the displaced water and gravity in the form of the weight of the ship. Buoyancy works upward to support weight. It is absolutely vital to any ship. Another important concept is stability both for and aft and side to side. These forces and concepts are carefully engineered into every ship.

The three heaviest items in ship are the hull and hull structure, protection in the form of armor, and machinery including magazines. The hull and armor occupy 80% of the weight. It is not by chance, that the third heaviest portion of the ship, is located at the center of gravity and the center of buoyancy. It is also not by chance, that the bulk of armor protection is located at the waterline protecting the greatest area of buoyancy. I would also remind you that the "vitals" are located below the waterline, in most cases.

So, the main armor protection is placed to protect the buoyancy, then the vitals and then the three other areas including weapons and hull structure. Flotation or buoyancy is absolutely the most important factor in the protection of the ship. Since the vitals are in the area of greatest buoyancy, it will also be protected. It less causal and more associative.

Sorry if this engineering bores all of you, but remember that a ship is a floating, mobile weapons platform. The floating portion of that definition is absolutely the most important area to be protected.

Thanks for listening.

Dennis:

Good solid points to keep in mind, not only about vitals, but about ship design itself.

[Warship NWS]

To Dennis, valid points regarding the engineering but I think the flooding portion of the vitals protection covers what you elaborated on in terms of how its effects the buoyancy of a ship in combat. ;)

To Brivad58, from every source I have seen to date the S started slowing down immediately after one of the 14" shells was registered as a hit on her stern quarter. I have not seen any evidence so far to contradict it. If you have a verifiable source please point it out.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Good solid points to keep in mind, not only about vitals, but about ship design itself.

I am no expert on this, but I feel that a ship must be viewed as a system. Flotation and stability are two vital factors in a ship's construction and equipment. Part of machinery is dedicated to maintaining that flotation and stability, so I would view that as a good reason to protect it.

[Warship NWS]

I am no expert on this, but I feel that a ship must be viewed as a system. Flotation and stability are two vital factors in a ship's construction and equipment. Part of machinery is dedicated to maintaining that flotation and stability, so I would view that as a good reason to protect it.

I have always advocated that any weapon should be looked at not only as a complete weapon system but also in the context of how it operated in a system of warfare. You do hit on a often forgotten point however, the engineering spaces also included the anti-flooding system.. AKA the pumping system which obviously also effects the flooding capacity of a warship. DC equipment is also located within the hull.

[old_pop2000]

To Dennis, valid points regarding the engineering but I think the flooding portion of the vitals protection covers what you elaborated on in terms of how its effects the buoyancy of a ship in combat. ;)



To a certain extent, but keep in mind, as I have said in a later post, the vitals have equipment in them, that is used to manage the flooding and hence the stability. This is probably the most important area to be protected. Yamato maybe a good example of how targeting can disrupt or overcome the ability of the machinery to maintain stability. I doubt we ever penetrated that armored citadel, but by flooding one side of the ship faster than the machinery could cope, we were able to partially effect an unstable position in her.

Anyway, I will leave the discussion to all of you.

Thanks

[Warship NWS]

To a certain extent, but keep in mind, as I have said in a later post, the vitals have equipment in them, that is used to manage the flooding and hence the stability. This is probably the most important area to be protected. Yamato maybe a good example of how targeting can disrupt or overcome the ability of the machinery to maintain stability. I doubt we ever penetrated that armored citadel, but by flooding one side of the ship faster than the machinery could cope, we were able to partially effect an unstable position in her.

Anyway, I will leave the discussion to all of you.

Thanks

LOL.. Dennis .. I think we just crossed posts at the same time. See above about flooding vs pumps and DC equipment. ;) We were both on the same wavelength at the same time.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Ok.. lets angle this conversation from a different perspective.. armor protection for the "vitals" would be considered the passive defense for protecting your ship, so would this not make the weapons the active defense? If the survival of your ship is critically effected by the status of your "vitals" would the weapons not be vital to keeping the enemy from damaging those systems? How vital does this make your weapons in playing a role in the survivability of the ship?

Thoughts?

Remember here.. we are also addressing tactical implications not just engineering concepts.

[Warship NWS]

Ship design fact.. the "vitals" were not the only armored parts of an armored warship, and quite often not the most heavily armored portion. The guns on any ship above a destroyer were also armored. With the advent of the turreted warship the guns were moved above the deck into armored gunhouses so obviously someone felt it was just as important to protect the weapons that actively defended a warship with similiar amounts of protection, after this occurred the below the decks portion of a ship became the "vitals", prior to that change everything below the deck could be considered "vitals", depending on your point of view. If this perspective retains any level of validity, then why would the guns, after being moved above deck, be considered any less vital to the survivability of a ship in combat? Thoughts and opinions?

[Ed Rotondaro]

I am no expert on this, but I feel that a ship must be viewed as a system. Flotation and stability are two vital factors in a ship's construction and equipment. Part of machinery is dedicated to maintaining that flotation and stability, so I would view that as a good reason to protect it.

Dennis:

That is one of the strong points about Norman Friedman's book on battleship design. He breaks the ships down system by system and explains the design components and the choices a naval architect has when designing the ship. I'm glad I managed to get a copy of this book as it has been OOP for years. Wish he would update it and get a new edition published.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To a certain extent, but keep in mind, as I have said in a later post, the vitals have equipment in them, that is used to manage the flooding and hence the stability. This is probably the most important area to be protected. Yamato maybe a good example of how targeting can disrupt or overcome the ability of the machinery to maintain stability. I doubt we ever penetrated that armored citadel, but by flooding one side of the ship faster than the machinery could cope, we were able to partially effect an unstable position in her.

Anyway, I will leave the discussion to all of you.

Thanks

Dennis:

The example of the Yamato is a good one. The USN learned from the attack on the Musashi that it was better to concentrate the torpedo hits on one side of the ship so as to render counter flooding less effective. Yamato took fewer torpedo hits, but sank faster and with much greater loss of life than her sister ship.

[Warship NWS]

A quick note about torpedoes.. obviously they would hit the vicinity of the "vitals".. they cannot hit anywhere else. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok.. lets angle this conversation from a different perspective.. armor protection for the "vitals" would be considered the passive defense for protecting your ship, so would this not make the weapons the active defense? If the survival of your ship is critically effected by the status of your "vitals" would the weapons not be vital to keeping the enemy from damaging those systems? How vital does this make your weapons in playing a role in the survivability of the ship?

Thoughts?

Remember here.. we are also addressing tactical implications not just engineering concepts.

Chris:

If the weapons can successfully suppress the attack in a timely manner, then you don't have to worry about whether your defenses can protect the ship. But if you can't suppress the attack (we all know how long it usually takes for one ship to hit another enough times to neutralize it), then you have to hope that you passive defenses can withstand the attack. In this same line of thought, should we consider the AA weapons on a ship as part of the passive defenses or the active defenses as you have termed it?

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

If the weapons can successfully suppress the attack in a timely manner, then you don't have to worry about whether your defenses can protect the ship. But if you can't suppress the attack (we all know how long it usually takes for one ship to hit another enough times to neutralize it), then you have to hope that you passive defenses can withstand the attack. In this same line of thought, should we consider the AA weapons on a ship as part of the passive defenses or the active defenses as you have termed it?

Think of how many AA weapons we put on ships during WW2.. and decide for yourself. The point of an open-ended discussion is to allow for multiple points of view, not for the original poster to give all of their own answers or opinions.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Ship design fact.. the "vitals" were not the only armored parts of an armored warship, and quite often not the most heavily armored portion. The guns on any ship above a destroyer were also armored. With the advent of the turreted warship the guns were moved above the deck into armored gunhouses so obviously someone felt it was just as important to protect the weapons that actively defended a warship with similiar amounts of protection, after this occurred the below the decks portion of a ship became the "vitals", prior to that change everything below the deck could be considered "vitals", depending on your point of view. If this perspective retains any level of validity, then why would the guns, after being moved above deck, be considered any less vital to the survivability of a ship in combat? Thoughts and opinions?

I am sure that you are aware, that the turret and its suspended floor fit into the hull reaching almost all the way to the keel. Below the waterline, correct? So, in point of fact, the turrets are protected by the armoured belt as well as turret armour, so I don't think anything has really changed, simply the technology. The guns, while the offensive side of the equation of a ship, do not contribute to the flotation but do contribute to the negative side- the weight. IMO, if the flotation and stability of a ship is maintained, the offensive side can be repaired and refitted. However, with the loss of flotation and stability, it simply does not matter.

[old_pop2000]

As most of you should know, modern combat is both intense and lethal. The lethality index of modern weapons is off the charts, in most cases. As naval architects examined the problem of lethality, it became apparent that the weight of passive protection out weighed its advantages. It not only was the second heaviest contributor to the displacement of the ship, but this extra weight forced the designers to install bigger and more powerful engines. These enlarged and more powerful engines created more problems for devising hull supports and protection. They also created heating problems as more power means more heat. However, they had an example of a solution with actual combat experience to prove the point----the WWII destroyer. No armour, smaller size, smaller engines but with greater speed and maneuverability, but with a higher weapons load per ton than any other ship. They also carried some of the best electronics suites of the fleet. Almost a perfect combination of speed, maneuverability and lethality.

With this basic combination, weapons and sensor suites could now be added to increase lethality, contributing a far greater portion of the weight and the cost. Weapons and sensor technology now contributes a far greater portion of the cost of building the ship. So naval designers and tacticians now have a ship that can protect itself actively, by detecting a threat and killing it before it strikes the ship. With the increased speed and maneuverability, smaller optical, radar and heat signature, we have hopefully, given the ship a greater survivability.

[Warship NWS]

I am sure that you are aware, that the turret and its suspended floor fit into the hull reaching almost all the way to the keel. Below the waterline, correct? So, in point of fact, the turrets are protected by the armoured belt as well as turret armour, so I don't think anything has really changed, simply the technology. The guns, while the offensive side of the equation of a ship, do not contribute to the flotation but do contribute to the negative side- the weight. IMO, if the flotation and stability of a ship is maintained, the offensive side can be repaired and refitted. However, with the loss of flotation and stability, it simply does not matter.

As to the loading systems of the guns being protected by the belt armor, and barbette armor, as well as the gunhouses being protected by armor - that is correct, in that context we should also include guns protected by casemates. In that sense, how do we weigh the "vital" requirements of protecting your guns as well as what is below the deck?

What do others on this thread think?

[bridav58]

To Dennis, valid points regarding the engineering but I think the flooding portion of the vitals protection covers what you elaborated on in terms of how its effects the buoyancy of a ship in combat. ;)

To Brivad58, from every source I have seen to date the S started slowing down immediately after one of the 14" shells was registered as a hit on her stern quarter. I have not seen any evidence so far to contradict it. If you have a verifiable source please point it out.

Thanks.
There was some discussion on this matter over on warships1.com & Bob Henneman's Battlecruiser board. It seems some expedition found the wreck that plus some other evidence I'll try and find it.

[Warship NWS]

With the increased speed and maneuverability, smaller optical, radar and heat signature, we have hopefully, given the ship a greater survivability.

Modern ships of war rely more then ever on electronics/speed/maneuverability (passive) and weapons (active) defenses to protect the "vitals" of a warship as it was proven that technology could simply overcome armor by hitting where was ship was least protected, or unprotected, by armor. The logical course of action was to counter such weapons via passive (non-armor) or active defenses.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Think of how many AA weapons we put on ships during WW2.. and decide for yourself. The point of an open-ended discussion is to allow for multiple points of view, not for the original poster to give all of their own answers or opinions.

Thanks.

Chris:

I'd have to say that all that AA is meant to be a very aggressive active defensive weapon. Especially coupled with all those MK37 FC directors.

[Ed Rotondaro]

As most of you should know, modern combat is both intense and lethal. The lethality index of modern weapons is off the charts, in most cases. As naval architects examined the problem of lethality, it became apparent that the weight of passive protection out weighed its advantages. It not only was the second heaviest contributor to the displacement of the ship, but this extra weight forced the designers to install bigger and more powerful engines. These enlarged and more powerful engines created more problems for devising hull supports and protection. They also created heating problems as more power means more heat. However, they had an example of a solution with actual combat experience to prove the point----the WWII destroyer. No armour, smaller size, smaller engines but with greater speed and maneuverability, but with a higher weapons load per ton than any other ship. They also carried some of the best electronics suites of the fleet. Almost a perfect combination of speed, maneuverability and lethality.

With this basic combination, weapons and sensor suites could now be added to increase lethality, contributing a far greater portion of the weight and the cost. Weapons and sensor technology now contributes a far greater portion of the cost of building the ship. So naval designers and tacticians now have a ship that can protect itself actively, by detecting a threat and killing it before it strikes the ship. With the increased speed and maneuverability, smaller optical, radar and heat signature, we have hopefully, given the ship a greater survivability.

Dennis:

Which is why the DDG is the premier surface combatant in most navies. Our CGNs really aren't any bigger than the Arleigh Burke DDGs, although they carry a lot more missiles.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Modern ships of war rely more then ever on electronics/speed/maneuverability (passive) and weapons (active) defenses to protect the "vitals" of a warship as it was proven that technology could simply overcome armor by hitting where was ship was least protected, or unprotected, by armor. The logical course of action was to counter such weapons via passive (non-armor) or active defenses.

Chris:

Especially with BVR weapons, the electronics and guidance are key. Guys like Kyle and William would have been really busy in a modern naval battle.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I'd have to say that all that AA is meant to be a very aggressive active defensive weapon. Especially coupled with all those MK37 FC directors.

So can one conclude that the weapons are just as vital to the survival of a warship as your vitals especially in a case where speed is not enough of a passive defense to get you out of trouble? How does this point of view play out if your battleship is attacked by faster cruisers and destroyers, or even possibly a slightly faster battleship?

[old_pop2000]

So can one conclude that the weapons are just as vital to the survival of a warship as your vitals especially in a case where speed is not enough of a passive defense to get you out of trouble? How does this point of view play out if your battleship is attacked by faster cruisers and destroyers, or even possibly a slightly faster battleship?

I am going to watch for a while, because I am certain what the answer is.;)

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Especially with BVR weapons, the electronics and guidance are key. Guys like Kyle and William would have been really busy in a modern naval battle.

I think a more accurate way to put it was the guidance packages of the weapons was the more critical factor in altering the concepts of active/passive defenses compared to the BVR capabilities. By the end of WW2 targets could be engaged with gunfire beyond visual range, which obviously varies with visiblity. The guided munition, starting with the first guided missiles and kamikaze tactics, changed the importance of active defenses vs passive defenses almost overnight. The range of a weapon is often not as critical as its accuracy. The range of a weapon is also often far easier to increase then its accuracy especially in more complex combat environments.

[Warship NWS]

I am going to watch for a while, because I am certain what the answer is.;)

I had a feeling you would come up with some interesting conclusions, but note, it can be a matter of personal perspective - sometimes engineering concepts do not answer how doctrines and tactics alter the formulas of combat conditions. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

As to the loading systems of the guns being protected by the belt armor, and barbette armor, as well as the gunhouses being protected by armor - that is correct, in that context we should also include guns protected by casemates. In that sense, how do we weigh the "vital" requirements of protecting your guns as well as what is below the deck?

What do others on this thread think?

Chris:

Regarding secondary guns mounted in casements, weren't they just meant to have splinter proof protection? In other words, they can't take a direct hit from guns there onw size and up?

[Scott Chisholm]

I'm probably going to regret delving into areas just outside my expertise....

Let's see...

Weapons. Sensors. Propulsion. Habitability. Endurance. Seaworthiness. Cost.

I think that covers it. ;)

Here goes....

When building a ship, the first thing that is done is to determine the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Environment (POE) of the platform. That is not a trivial task, and ROC/POE undergo continual modification throughout the life of a ship. In fact, it is what drives ship modernization programs.

Once you determine the ROC/POE for a ship, you then have to balance the seven factors. Ultimately, cost gets 51% of the vote as none of us have unlimited checking accounts.

Sensors cost the most, followed closely by weapons. Habitability can run into serious dollars, depending on how much you want to pamper you crew. Seaworthiness and endurance largely drive the size of the ship.

At today's prices, there's no room for serious armor unless you spend REALLY BIG BUCKS to build a large ship.

So, we wind up with eggshells armed with hammers, and the goal is to not get hit.

History has proven that one, or even two, Exocet/Harpoon class missiles will not necessarily sink a ship, nor will a 1000lb/500kg bomb. Nobody's ever been hit by an SS-N-22 class weapon, but it's probably safe to say anything under 7,000 tons will probably be a hard kill.

With these realities, what is vital? If you say electronics/sensors because they can help keep you from getting hit, then I would argue that they are useless if the propulsion/electrical plant is down.

But, even if you are fully mobile, you can't out run a missile if your electronic suite is down.

I think the question that has been asked is incomplete, or at least ambiguous. Perhaps a better pair of questions would be "What is vital to the accomplishment of the ship's mission?", and "What is vital to the survival of the ship?"

[Ed Rotondaro]

So can one conclude that the weapons are just as vital to the survival of a warship as your vitals especially in a case where speed is not enough of a passive defense to get you out of trouble? How does this point of view play out if your battleship is attacked by faster cruisers and destroyers, or even possibly a slightly faster battleship?

Chris:

If attacked by a swarm of smaller combatants, the secondary batteries become crucial to survival, especially if facing a torpedo armed opponent. The main guns just can't fire or train fast enough. Against a faster BB, then you better have guns that equal or outrange him and fire control to hit first. The faster BB can determine the range and angle of approach. Got to hit first, hit hard, hit often. The main battery becomes key here.

[old_pop2000]

...
But, even if you are fully mobile, you can't out run a missile if your electronic suite is down.

I think the question that has been asked is incomplete, or at least ambiguous. Perhaps a better pair of questions would be "What is vital to the accomplishment of the ship's mission?", and "What is vital to the survival of the ship?"


Commander:
So we come back to something I've stated all along on this thread and many others. That ships, like aircraft, tanks, whatever are systems. It is impossible to separate each specific system and place a value on its contribution to the mission or missions. However, we can prioritize. we know that under current procurement, electronic suites capture most of the cost. All weapons are requirements based. The RFP's are based on the mission or missions that the weapon is tasked to perform. I believe that the point of the original question was to attempt to elevate the position of tactics and doctrine into the discussion of ship requirements. That engineering has always been the prime mover in requirements but that tactics and doctrine are equal and this means that weapons are equally important. I should let him speak, but this is my perception. We cannot separate hull design, power engineering, habitability, survivability, electronics, weapons from each other.

Here is a question to you, sir. Is the power requirements of modern naval vessels driven by the electronic systems or the hull requirements for speed? In what proportion? There maybe security aspects to an answer, so generalize if possible.

Thanks

[Warship NWS]

I will remind everyone.. this is not a "black and white answers" type of discussion. It is an exercise in theoretical thinking involving engineering, tactics, doctrines, etc.. which can vary based on time frame and individual perception. Warfare is science deployed into the art and chaos of conflict.. there are no absolutes except that men and machines die.

The two terms that were derived on ship building doctrines were "immunity zone" and "vitals". The IZ was the concept of protecting the "vitals" from enemy shellfire - which of course is very subjective as it can vary on a variety of combat variables. The "vitals" were considered the ammunition, fuel, and powerplant of a ship which could be effected by flooding, fires, shell damage, etc. Now the term "vitals" is a bit more definitive as its based on specific engineering terminology and is easier to quantify then an IZ which is much more variable.

Here is the catch however.. how does the "vitals" play into the theoretical tactical part of naval combat especially since the IZ is so variable and subjective of a concept? Now the IZ only played a specific part in development with the advent of turrets and armor so it does not really play a role in other time frames. This leaves us with only the "vitals" for age of sail, ironclads, and modern day. However, does "vitals" have the same meaning and tactical considerations for all of these time frames and if not how did it change over time? In a tactical context, should the weapons be considered as vital to the defense of a ship since the weapons help to actively protect the "vitals"?

These are just some of the possible questions regarding this topic. There could be many more.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Regarding secondary guns mounted in casements, weren't they just meant to have splinter proof protection? In other words, they can't take a direct hit from guns there onw size and up?

Depends on the ship and casemate design.. some were better then others. In WCDB this is actually modelled on a per ship class basis as to how much protection was given to the SB/TB mounts.

[Scott Chisholm]

Here is a question to you, sir. Is the power requirements of modern naval vessels driven by the electronic systems or the hull requirements for speed? In what proportion? There maybe security aspects to an answer, so generalize if possible.

Dennis,

Why so formal? Have I ticked you off somehow? Whatever happened to "If you can't run with the Big Dogs, get back to the porch, puppy!"

Ah, for the Good Ol' Days.... :p

The answer to your question is "yes", but the impact is a bit different for steam ships and diesel/gas turbine ships.

The full combat electrical loading drives the number of generators on the ship, and you usually have more generators than required so as to support casualties and maintenance.

Propulsion requirements are dictated by shaft torque/horsepower limitations (which drives the number/size of the screws), hull form, displacement, and desired speed.

Aircraft carriers have the additional requirement of maintaining sufficient reserve power to operate the catapults.

On a diesel/gas turbine ship it is pretty easy: if you need more power, add generators; more speed, add more main engines, though since a ship's screws are essentially axial flow propeller pumps, the power/speed relationship is a cubic function (required power being related to the cube of desired speed): double the speed, increase the power requirement by a factor of eight. In any case, due to their relatively small footprint, the difference between one gas turbine per shaft and two is not that much of an increase in weight. The same goes for the generators.

Not so for a steam plant. Every piece of steam driven equipment needs to have piping for supply steam and some method of dealing with exhaust steam. Steam plants are HEAVY.

The choice of electrical distribution systems also has a serious impact on ship's weight. If you use a lower voltage system, you will most likely need more generators to generate the required power. More generators means more cabling. I can't remember exactly how much a 4" diameter stranded wire copper cable weighs, but I would venture to guess about 20 pounds per foot. Put 5 or 10 miles of that on a ship, and you have a significant weight issue.

You can get around that by using a higher voltage distribution system. A higher line voltage enables you to generate the same power with less current (the whole P=IV thing). Less current means you can use smaller diameter cables, which reduces weight.

The increased electrical power requirement resulting from modern electronics stresses "traditional" electrical distribution systems. By that, I mean we are beginning to reach the limit of what "we've always used" can handle. The NIMITZ class CVNs' electrical distribution system is vastly different from the rest of the fleet in that is operates as a considerably higher voltage that "traditional" systems. That system is now making its way into the conventional fleet.

The power requirements of CVN(X) are even more demanding, and have driven us to a radically new distribution system. I won't go into details in this forum, but will gladly respond to questions stemming from open sources.

I hope that helps.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

Why so formal? Have I ticked you off somehow? Whatever happened to "If you can't run with the Big Dogs, get back to the porch, puppy!"




Absolutely not, but you are a retired commander in the US Navy, I believe that commands some respect. But...

Scottie, me lad, how the heck are ya!!

Thanks for the answer, I understand. The problem with a high voltage/low current is that some systems will require the voltage stepped down while other will require the current stepped up. This usually means transformers, which are heavy and, much better regulators. It can also mean more EMI so shielding becomes important and shielding adds weight to the cabling as does the steel braid to protect the cable from shrapnel. Higher voltage will also mean more voltage drop per length of cable depending on the diameter. I suspect you use solid copper wire, not stranded 22 or 20 gauge wiring.

Most people do not realize how much power is consumed by modern electronics. The average PC consumes around 150 watts of power, that's about 3.6 kw per hour of operation. I bet your shipboard computers consume a lot more power than that in one hour of operation. Not to mention the air conditioning system needed to dissipate the heat. ;)

[Warship NWS]

Actually, the average gaming PC is at around 350-500W now depending on what graphical intensive application your running and how much juice the CPU and video card require. Other high bandwidth components can also ramp up the power requirements. Of course Im sure you know all this already.. I just thought it was odd to hear "150W".. haven't seen those in a while now. ;)

[bridav58]

A debate on this matter is here.

http://bismarck-class-forum.dk/thread.php?threadid=922

[Sea Dragon]

I'm going to try and suggest a few things, though i have no real experience in the matter.

It would seem to me that it is quite subjective, the loss of an asset, multiple assets or even a battle does not mean the loss of an overall tactical situation. Furthermore sometimes the loss of an asset is required. Even should that asset be a high value one!

So a ships vitals are always going to depend on the role in which it has to play in a particular senario. This almost always results in the Engineering teams doing DC based on priority.

Some have argued that "speed above all else" is the required porponent. I have to say that speed without a viable reason will not win a naval engagement. The battle cruiser fared terribly throughout history. In Jutland, in the case of the Hood against the bismark and as a general rule. This was simply because speed requires less protection. Less protection means the ship will die quicker when it gets hit....It WILL get hit at some point.

The only fundamental 'vital' for a ship in my opinion is its ability to remain afloat. As long as it can stay afloat it can be repaired and it can act. After that we have mission required vitals. A picket destroyer is a pawn, it is out there to be a target that has to be attacked, therefore loss of mobility is far less of a problem than loss of its weapon systems that force you to engage it.
An escort ship must be able to keep pace with the convoy. While weapons are important should it have all weapons but no speed it cannot protect the convoy.

So the other vitals in a ship, weaponary, sensors, engineering. They are all relative to the goal it must achieve.

A ship in a gun line in a bay protecting a landing has no need of speed, it has no really need for sensors..It just has to be able to keep firing its great big guns to attract attention and fire onto itself and away from a Mission Vital Asset.

Thats why ships opperate in task forces, SAG's, CAG's, CVBG's and ARG's. It is the pooling of multiple ships that are tasked to preform a mission goal. Certain ships are too be considered expendable in the protection of the vital ship.

In essence a destroyer in a CVBG has no vital requirements, it can, should and will be sacrificed to protect the carrier. That is its role and all that is required to fufill that role is the willingness of the crew to act as a buffer for the carrier.


Its such a large and open ended topic that it is difficult to assign a definite wording to 'vital'

[Ed Rotondaro]

I'm probably going to regret delving into areas just outside my expertise....

Let's see...

Weapons. Sensors. Propulsion. Habitability. Endurance. Seaworthiness. Cost.

I think that covers it. ;)

Here goes....

When building a ship, the first thing that is done is to determine the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Environment (POE) of the platform. That is not a trivial task, and ROC/POE undergo continual modification throughout the life of a ship. In fact, it is what drives ship modernization programs.

Once you determine the ROC/POE for a ship, you then have to balance the seven factors. Ultimately, cost gets 51% of the vote as none of us have unlimited checking accounts.

Sensors cost the most, followed closely by weapons. Habitability can run into serious dollars, depending on how much you want to pamper you crew. Seaworthiness and endurance largely drive the size of the ship.

At today's prices, there's no room for serious armor unless you spend REALLY BIG BUCKS to build a large ship.

So, we wind up with eggshells armed with hammers, and the goal is to not get hit.

History has proven that one, or even two, Exocet/Harpoon class missiles will not necessarily sink a ship, nor will a 1000lb/500kg bomb. Nobody's ever been hit by an SS-N-22 class weapon, but it's probably safe to say anything under 7,000 tons will probably be a hard kill.

With these realities, what is vital? If you say electronics/sensors because they can help keep you from getting hit, then I would argue that they are useless if the propulsion/electrical plant is down.

But, even if you are fully mobile, you can't out run a missile if your electronic suite is down.

I think the question that has been asked is incomplete, or at least ambiguous. Perhaps a better pair of questions would be "What is vital to the accomplishment of the ship's mission?", and "What is vital to the survival of the ship?"

Scott:

Or which comes first, the chicken or the egg?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis,

Aircraft carriers have the additional requirement of maintaining sufficient reserve power to operate the catapults.

The increased electrical power requirement resulting from modern electronics stresses "traditional" electrical distribution systems. By that, I mean we are beginning to reach the limit of what "we've always used" can handle. The NIMITZ class CVNs' electrical distribution system is vastly different from the rest of the fleet in that is operates as a considerably higher voltage that "traditional" systems. That system is now making its way into the conventional fleet.

I hope that helps.

Scott:

I have some questions. Regarding the steam catapults, does an aircraft carrier maintain steam under pressure for the cats, or does it generate it on demand? I recall you mentioning that with nuclear power plants, it is much easier to generate and maintain steam.

Regarding your engineering training, would you have been qualified to maintain a nuclear power plant on a submarine? Or does that also require additional training as a submariner?

Regarding electrical power requirements, I remember back in the late '80s and early '90s as offices began to become more automated, we found ourselves running into this problem as well. Buildings were not wired for PCs, photocopiers, microwave ovens, refrigerators and automatic coffee makers. We would often have a breaker trip when somebody was making coffee while somebody else was running the microwave. Also we found that people wanted all sorts of personal things in there workspace, like lamps, fans, radios, etc. in addition to their PCs and calculators. Many of the government buildings that I have worked in have undergone extensive facelifts to add more electrical outlets, etc.

You must have loved training all those airedales who were fast tracked to become ship drivers in steam propulsion eh?

[Ed Rotondaro]

I'm going to try and suggest a few things, though i have no real experience in the matter.

It would seem to me that it is quite subjective, the loss of an asset, multiple assets or even a battle does not mean the loss of an overall tactical situation. Furthermore sometimes the loss of an asset is required. Even should that asset be a high value one!

So a ships vitals are always going to depend on the role in which it has to play in a particular senario. This almost always results in the Engineering teams doing DC based on priority.

Some have argued that "speed above all else" is the required porponent. I have to say that speed without a viable reason will not win a naval engagement. The battle cruiser fared terribly throughout history. In Jutland, in the case of the Hood against the bismark and as a general rule. This was simply because speed requires less protection. Less protection means the ship will die quicker when it gets hit....It WILL get hit at some point.

Its such a large and open ended topic that it is difficult to assign a definite wording to 'vital'

Hi:

I would like to disagree with you on one point here. "speed requires less protection" is not always valid. If you are willing to pay the price in size, weight and cost you can have both. The Queen Elizabeth class battleships were the worlds first fast BBs. They were also at the time the largest. In the US Iowa class, you got tremendous speed, firepower and protection. You also got a ship with an enormous propulsion plant and a price tag or $100 million dollars in 1944.

Respectfully,

[Kyle Holgate]

Hi:

I would like to disagree with you on one point here. "speed requires less protection" is not always valid. If you are willing to pay the price in size, weight and cost you can have both. The Queen Elizabeth class battleships were the worlds first fast BBs. They were also at the time the largest. In the US Iowa class, you got tremendous speed, firepower and protection. You also got a ship with an enormous propulsion plant and a price tag or $100 million dollars in 1944.

Respectfully,

If you read what he means, not exactly what he says he's right. All things being equal speeding up a ship means you have to make allowances elsewhere in armor or weapons or something. The Iowa and previous South Dakota class are excellent examples - to keep the same (or almost anyway) protection from SD, you had to add 10,000 tons which gained the Iowa 6 knots. Yes, there were other improvements if someone wants to nit pick (and that's to be expected here :rolleyes:) but hopefully one will try to see the point instead of looking for faults to jump on.

I like to look at WW1 ships - German BB's compared to their contemporary BC's, and compare those to the ones on the other side of the Channel - the RN BB's and BC's. Different philosophies of course, and different requirements factor in, but Tirpitz's insistence that the first job of the ship is to stay afloat is obvious.
I think the RN finally got it right with Hood - the BC with BB protection - designed to be as well protected as the QE class. Like SD and Iowa before her though, the cost and weight increase was considerable. Hood was probably the first fast BB - it's her demise at Denmark Strait via a magazine explosion that looked much like the ones at Jutland that probably doom her to be considered a BC forever.

[Scott Chisholm]

Ed,


Regarding the steam catapults, does an aircraft carrier maintain steam under pressure for the cats, or does it generate it on demand? I recall you mentioning that with nuclear power plants, it is much easier to generate and maintain steam.

There are two approaches to steam catapults: dry catapults and wet catapults.

In a dry catapult system, the steam comes directly off the main steam main (not a redundancy). That approach results in a significant surge on the main steam system each time you shoot a plane off the front end.

A wet catapult system inserts a "shock absorber" or "accumulator" between the main steam system and the catapult. In that system, the accumulator is filled with water heated by main steam to the same temperature as the steam. That is what is known as a "saturated system": steam and water coexisting at the same temperature and pressure.

The advantage of using an accumulator maintained at saturation temperature/pressure is that a decrease in accumulator pressure suddenly places the water in the accumulator at a temperature higher than its saturation temperature. That results in the water "flashing" (suddenly boiling) to steam to reestablish a proper saturation pressure.

So, I hook up an airplane to the catapult. When the launch valve opens, steam rushes from the catapult accumulator to the catapult cylinders, where it pushes against the catapult piston - to which the aircraft is attached. Aircraft rushes down the flight deck.

Meanwhile, the water in the catapult accumulator is furiously boiling in an attempt to maintain its saturation pressure. That serves to keep the steam piping leading to the catapult piston pressurized (a good thing if you happen to be the pilot in that aircraft!).

During all of this, the main steam system is oblivious to what is happening with the catapult...

After the aircraft is launched, the launch valve shuts, and the catapult accumulator repressurizes. However, since the water "gave up" its "latent heat of vaporization" while it was boiling, the temperature (and pressure) of the accumulator has dropped and might not be sufficient to launch another aircraft...

So, the "catapult fill valves" open, admitting main steam (this is the first the main steam system knows that anything has been going on with the catapults) at a measured rate into the accumulator. The main steam repressurizes (and thereby reheats) the accumulator so it is ready for the next launch.

We use wet accumulators. Depending on various settings, the cycle time is about 30 seconds per catapult.

An interesting fact is that it takes an average of about 400 gallons of water to throw a plane off an aircraft carrier. Think about how much water a 50-plane Alpha Strike requires.... CVNs make a lot of water....


Regarding your engineering training, would you have been qualified to maintain a nuclear power plant on a submarine? Or does that also require additional training as a submariner?

The nuclear power training pipeline is identical for surface nukes and Submarine-ers (they hate being called "sub-mariners" - they claim they're just as good of mariners as we surface folk... :D). The training pipeline starts with Nuclear Power School (the nuke equivalent of "Ground School) and continues with Prototype training ("Flight School", if you will); the total pipeline is about a year long. From there, we attend various service schools enroute to our ships/subs. The only thing that really distinguishes a surface nuke from a Submariner is Sub school. In fact, the guy I relieved as MPA on ABRAHAM LINCOLN was a Submariner - unusual, but perfectly legal.


You must have loved training all those airedales who were fast tracked to become ship drivers in steam propulsion eh?

You know, I give Aviators a (justifiable) hard time about a lot of things, but the people we select for CVN COs are some of the most amazing people I've ever met. They get "fast tracked" through the nuclear power pipeline, but they do not skip anything. I went through my pipeline with the P-COs for CARL VINSON and EISENHOWER, and they studied just as hard as I did. In 24 years, I only ever met one who made me scratch my head and wonder, "What in the hell were they thinking when they picked him?"

The real fun is when you get to the carrier and have to teach some egotistical a$$hole in the Air Wing (usually some LCDR Squadron XO or OPS) that he really shouldn't get on the Nukes' bad side. You'd be surprised how often the power panel outside his office/stateroom requires maintenance. Or, the ventilation system. Or, the potable water system. Or, all three at once in the Arabian Gulf....

Hotel Services terrorism - the great equalizer. :D

[Ed Rotondaro]

I will remind everyone.. this is not a "black and white answers" type of discussion. It is an exercise in theoretical thinking involving engineering, tactics, doctrines, etc.. which can vary based on time frame and individual perception. Warfare is science deployed into the art and chaos of conflict.. there are no absolutes except that men and machines die.

The two terms that were derived on ship building doctrines were "immunity zone" and "vitals". The IZ was the concept of protecting the "vitals" from enemy shellfire - which of course is very subjective as it can vary on a variety of combat variables. The "vitals" were considered the ammunition, fuel, and powerplant of a ship which could be effected by flooding, fires, shell damage, etc. Now the term "vitals" is a bit more definitive as its based on specific engineering terminology and is easier to quantify then an IZ which is much more variable.

Here is the catch however.. how does the "vitals" play into the theoretical tactical part of naval combat especially since the IZ is so variable and subjective of a concept? Now the IZ only played a specific part in development with the advent of turrets and armor so it does not really play a role in other time frames. This leaves us with only the "vitals" for age of sail, ironclads, and modern day. However, does "vitals" have the same meaning and tactical considerations for all of these time frames and if not how did it change over time? In a tactical context, should the weapons be considered as vital to the defense of a ship since the weapons help to actively protect the "vitals"?

These are just some of the possible questions regarding this topic. There could be many more.

Thanks.

Chris:

Since we are no longer in an era of big guns and armor, the Immunity zone is either obsolete or needs to be re-defined.

Using todays weapons which have over the horizon capabilities the IZ could be considered that distance at which a ship's electronic counter measures have enough time to detect, track and defeat an incoming missile or aircraft carrying a missile. As you and Scott have mentioned if an opponent could get into close range of its target and then launch, the target might not be able to take any defensive measures due to the lack of time. And since there are so many different missiles out there, the IZ would have to be based on the particular missile's capabilities versus the target ship's capabilities. We could say that an Aegis cruiser could probably detect a missile threat at greater range than Perry class frigate and have better means of defeating the threat. So can we speculate that a Tico class has a greater IZ than the frigate?

With a submarine, could the IZ be based on the range of the sub's torpedoes? Or is that more likely just a range limitation factor?

[Scott Chisholm]

Since we are no longer in an era of big guns and armor, the Immunity zone is either obsolete or needs to be re-defined.

I'm not sure that's entirely true. CVNs are built very much along the lines of the old "protected cruiser" concept of the late 1800s. I think I talked about that in the other forums once.

[Warship NWS]

I'm not sure that's entirely true. CVNs are built very much along the lines of the old "protected cruiser" concept of the late 1800s. I think I talked about that in the other forums once.

Does the USN use the same engineering terminology, example IZ, or is the concept of protecting some vital components with actual armor being used in a similiar manner to the "protected cruisers"? I'm sure you cannot get too far down this road for obvious reasons. I do know CVNs do have some level of metal type armor protection and kevlar for blast frag reduction covering vital spaces. However, cruisers had their armor mostly on the skin of the ship whereas, as best I understand it, a CVN is mostly internal - except for the flight deck being given some level of thickness for hull strengthening and to absorb the punishment of flight ops which in turn can help offer some horizontal protection.

[Warship NWS]

Since we are no longer in an era of big guns and armor, the Immunity zone is either obsolete or needs to be re-defined. <snip>


As I understand the concept of the USN measure of defenses the IZ (using passive armor protection) has been replaced with "layered defenses" using active defensive weapons and passive electronic measures (often tied with speed/maneuverability). Any similiarities to the concept of "IZ" from there would be subjective and based on personal perception but I personaly do not see it in the same light. With IZ your counting on protection from actual impacting ordnance after the fact whereas the layered defenses are destroying or decoying the ordnance before impact.

[Scott Chisholm]

As I understand the concept of the USN measure of defenses the IZ (using passive armor protection) has been replaced with "layered defenses" using active defensive weapons and passive electronic measures (often tied with speed/maneuverability). Any similiarities to the concept of "IZ" from there would be subjective and based on personal perception but I personaly do not see it in the same light. With IZ your counting on protection from actual impacting ordnance after the fact whereas the layered defenses are destroying or decoying the ordnance before impact.

Chris,

The CVNs utilize an "armored box" construction where everything important is inside the box. The skin of the ship is not necessarily armored, but the spaces outside of the box are considered expendable and therefore serve as a measure of armor.

The internal layout of a CVN utilizes several different methods of passive protection. I probably shouldn't get into any details in this venue. Just say that while you won't find 20 inches of high yield steel, but the end result if quite similar for the weapons we are likely to face.

There are considerations for underwater blast damage.

As for the rest of the fleet, you won't find any armor: it simply takes up too much weight to put on enough armor to be meaningful.

Eggshells armed with hammers....

[old_pop2000]

Chris,

The CVNs utilize an "armored box" construction where everything important is inside the box. The skin of the ship is not necessarily armored, but the spaces outside of the box are considered expendable and therefore serve as a measure of armor.

The internal layout of a CVN utilizes several different methods of passive protection. I probably shouldn't get into any details in this venue. Just say that while you won't find 20 inches of high yield steel, but the end result if quite similar for the weapons we are likely to face.

There are considerations for underwater blast damage.

As for the rest of the fleet, you won't find any armor: it simply takes up too much weight to put on enough armor to be meaningful.

Eggshells armed with hammers....

It would be interesting to find out what they discovered in the USS America tests. Any hints floating around that can be voiced in public? Thoughts, guesses?

[Warship NWS]

Chris,

The CVNs utilize an "armored box" construction where everything important is inside the box. The skin of the ship is not necessarily armored, but the spaces outside of the box are considered expendable and therefore serve as a measure of armor.

The internal layout of a CVN utilizes several different methods of passive protection. I probably shouldn't get into any details in this venue. Just say that while you won't find 20 inches of high yield steel, but the end result if quite similar for the weapons we are likely to face.

There are considerations for underwater blast damage.

As for the rest of the fleet, you won't find any armor: it simply takes up too much weight to put on enough armor to be meaningful.

Eggshells armed with hammers....

Scott, (this is not a disagreement, just a point of view) what you say about the CVNs has been a known factor to me however I would find it speculative in how that would function in the same light as an "IZ" concept. The IZ was based partly on the range of the attacker itself determining the impact angle and energy of the projectiles in question. In the case modern naval combat the attacker has far less of a contribution to the angle of the impacting ordnance unless unguided ordnance is being used. Another change in the variables is the speed of the impacting ordnance, SAP/AP capabilities, explosive power, and the use of guidance systems. This creates far greater number of variables then what the original IZ concept had to obviously cope with. The curiosity question is did the USN engineers attempt to create a "IZ" type of protection or just as much protection as they felt could be afforded for such a large area of vitals to cover against modern ordnance - avgas, powerplant, ordnance, etc.? I would think it would be the latter of the two possibilities. In any case, there is no doubt that the CVNs are by far the best protected ships in terms of a modern version of armored warships.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,



There are two approaches to steam catapults: dry catapults and wet catapults.

In a dry catapult system, the steam comes directly off the main steam main (not a redundancy). That approach results in a significant surge on the main steam system each time you shoot a plane off the front end.

Are there any advantages to the dry catapult system?


The only thing that really distinguishes a surface nuke from a Submariner is Sub school. In fact, the guy I relieved as MPA on ABRAHAM LINCOLN was a Submariner - unusual, but perfectly legal.

So you could have served on a sub if you had also attended sub school?


The real fun is when you get to the carrier and have to teach some egotistical a$$hole in the Air Wing (usually some LCDR Squadron XO or OPS) that he really shouldn't get on the Nukes' bad side. You'd be surprised how often the power panel outside his office/stateroom requires maintenance. Or, the ventilation system. Or, the potable water system. Or, all three at once in the Arabian Gulf....

Hotel Services terrorism - the great equalizer. :D

Too funny!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,



There are two approaches to steam catapults: dry catapults and wet catapults.

In a dry catapult system, the steam comes directly off the main steam main (not a redundancy). That approach results in a significant surge on the main steam system each time you shoot a plane off the front end.


The only thing that really distinguishes a surface nuke from a Submariner is Sub school. In fact, the guy I relieved as MPA on ABRAHAM LINCOLN was a Submariner - unusual, but perfectly legal.


The real fun is when you get to the carrier and have to teach some egotistical a$$hole in the Air Wing (usually some LCDR Squadron XO or OPS) that he really shouldn't get on the Nukes' bad side. You'd be surprised how often the power panel outside his office/stateroom requires maintenance. Or, the ventilation system. Or, the potable water system. Or, all three at once in the Arabian Gulf....

Hotel Services terrorism - the great equalizer. :D

Scott:

Are there any advantages to a dry catapult system?

So you could have served on a sub had you also attended sub school (just what you want, more school).

Hotel Services terrorism, I love it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Does the USN use the same engineering terminology, example IZ, or is the concept of protecting some vital components with actual armor being used in a similiar manner to the "protected cruisers"? I'm sure you cannot get too far down this road for obvious reasons. I do know CVNs do have some level of metal type armor protection and kevlar for blast frag reduction covering vital spaces. However, cruisers had their armor mostly on the skin of the ship whereas, as best I understand it, a CVN is mostly internal - except for the flight deck being given some level of thickness for hull strengthening and to absorb the punishment of flight ops which in turn can help offer some horizontal protection.

Chris:

While you could compute the IZ against a given gun caliber, how do you do it against a missile? There's an awful lot of space of a CVN that isn't armored.

[Ed Rotondaro]

As I understand the concept of the USN measure of defenses the IZ (using passive armor protection) has been replaced with "layered defenses" using active defensive weapons and passive electronic measures (often tied with speed/maneuverability). Any similiarities to the concept of "IZ" from there would be subjective and based on personal perception but I personaly do not see it in the same light. With IZ your counting on protection from actual impacting ordnance after the fact whereas the layered defenses are destroying or decoying the ordnance before impact.

Chris:

I'll agree because with mdoern weapons, range isn't as much a factor as was with guns. A missile launched from 50NM is as deadly as one launched from 20NM. The only difference is the layered defense has a little more time against the long ranged shot, although it might be harder to pick up a seaskimming missile at long range.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Chris,

The CVNs utilize an "armored box" construction where everything important is inside the box. The skin of the ship is not necessarily armored, but the spaces outside of the box are considered expendable and therefore serve as a measure of armor.

The internal layout of a CVN utilizes several different methods of passive protection. I probably shouldn't get into any details in this venue. Just say that while you won't find 20 inches of high yield steel, but the end result if quite similar for the weapons we are likely to face.

There are considerations for underwater blast damage.

As for the rest of the fleet, you won't find any armor: it simply takes up too much weight to put on enough armor to be meaningful.

Eggshells armed with hammers....

Scott:

That makes sense, you can get away with the weight on something as big as a CVN that is nuclear powered compared to a CG with conventional power. Thanks for the details.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It would be interesting to find out what they discovered in the USS America tests. Any hints floating around that can be voiced in public? Thoughts, guesses?

Dennis:

I'll bet that data is classified until the next decade with a need to know stamp.

[Scott Chisholm]

I wasn't privvy to the AMERICA tests. I know that when she was scuttled many were shocked at how fast she sank. They apparently were not aware that all of the watertight doors, hatches and scuttles had been removed....

The naval architecture design considerations of the CVNs is well beyond my area of expertise; I only know what I know from my Engineering and Damage Control experiences serving in and inspecting them. I'm really hesitant to go into greater discussion about some of what I know because that might confirm previously "unconfirmed" open source material, which would constitute a security breech. As always, I'm entirely too good looking to try to be cute (by playing "I've got a secret")....;)

About the only advantage I can see with a dry catapult system is you eliminate the weight of the catapult accumulators (which are (1) huge, and (2) located relatively high in the ship and constitute a stability consideration). The boilers used to supply the catapults would either have to be dedicated to the task, or large (and consequently heavy) enough to absorb the steam transient resulting from a catapult shot.

A major down side of a dry catapult is they are much more prone to a "cold cat" shot - if you lose the boiler just as you open the launch valve, the catapult won't get sufficient steam to accelerate the aircraft to a safe speed.

Pilots tell me getting run over by a 90,000 ton carrier is no fun. I've pulled one helmet out of a main condenser. The pilot lost it when he ejected following a aircraft malfunction during launch; he was quite surprised when we returned it to him.

F-18s don't make much of a bump when a CVN runs over them, but the damn thing did nick one of my screws.

[john964]

The real fun is when you get to the carrier and have to teach some egotistical a$$hole in the Air Wing (usually some LCDR Squadron XO or OPS) that he really shouldn't get on the Nukes' bad side. You'd be surprised how often the power panel outside his office/stateroom requires maintenance. Or, the ventilation system. Or, the potable water system. Or, all three at once in the Arabian Gulf....

Hotel Services terrorism - the great equalizer. :D
Scott, there are 3 people you never piss-off on a ship. The corpsmen the postal clerk and the disbursing clerk.

The Doc can mess up your medical records somthing fierce. Like losing your shot record so you have to get your Boot Camp shots all over again.

Postal Clerk You want mail don't ya

Disbursing Clerk you actuly want to get paid for this sh**

[asnrobert]

Scott, there are 3 people you never piss-off on a ship. The corpsmen the postal clerk and the disbursing clerk.




On subs we didn't have Dispersing Clerks or Postal Clerks. We had Yeomen, who did their jobs plus handled the service records (another reason you didn't want to get them P.O.ed).
We actually had this one Yeoman who was going to be discharged with some service-connected disability. However, just before he was discharged, it was discovered he was altering his service record in order to get medals he wasn't qualified for. Ended getting booted out with nothing.

Another rate would be the cooks. One Mess Specialist told me of this one Chief Petty Officer who was giving him a hard time. Well, one supper they were serving this spicy chicken. This cook told me he made one piece extra EXTRA spicy, and told the mess cook who was serving the meal to make sure the chief got that piece. He did, and had indigestion so bad he had to go to the hospital.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The naval architecture design considerations of the CVNs is well beyond my area of expertise; I only know what I know from my Engineering and Damage Control experiences serving in and inspecting them. I'm really hesitant to go into greater discussion about some of what I know because that might confirm previously "unconfirmed" open source material, which would constitute a security breech. As always, I'm entirely too good looking to try to be cute (by playing "I've got a secret")....;)

About the only advantage I can see with a dry catapult system is you eliminate the weight of the catapult accumulators (which are (1) huge, and (2) located relatively high in the ship and constitute a stability consideration). The boilers used to supply the catapults would either have to be dedicated to the task, or large (and consequently heavy) enough to absorb the steam transient resulting from a catapult shot.

A major down side of a dry catapult is they are much more prone to a "cold cat" shot - if you lose the boiler just as you open the launch valve, the catapult won't get sufficient steam to accelerate the aircraft to a safe speed.

Pilots tell me getting run over by a 90,000 ton carrier is no fun. I've pulled one helmet out of a main condenser. The pilot lost it when he ejected following a aircraft malfunction during launch; he was quite surprised when we returned it to him.

F-18s don't make much of a bump when a CVN runs over them, but the damn thing did nick one of my screws.

Scott:

Please don't end up on the Leavenworth Softball Team by disclosing what you shouldn't. We won't miss ya, but CinCHouse and son will LOL!;)

Pulling a helmet out of a condenser? Holy Sh*t! You must have seen more stuff than most of us will ever see in a lifetime.

You don't own the screws on the carrier, you just keep 'em turning!:D Thanks as always.

[bridav58]

To Dennis, valid points regarding the engineering but I think the flooding portion of the vitals protection covers what you elaborated on in terms of how its effects the buoyancy of a ship in combat. ;)

To Brivad58, from every source I have seen to date the S started slowing down immediately after one of the 14" shells was registered as a hit on her stern quarter. I have not seen any evidence so far to contradict it. If you have a verifiable source please point it out.

Thanks.


And see that link?

[Warship NWS]

And see that link?

Yes I did.. but I will wait for more verifiable evidence directly from authoritative sources before siding against the findings by G&D. I may not agree with everything published in their battleship books but I feel their battle damage details are some of the best presently available.

Thanks.

[bridav58]

Yes I did.. but I will wait for more verifiable evidence directly from authoritative sources before siding against the findings by G&D. I may not agree with everything published in their battleship books but I feel their battle damage details are some of the best presently available.

Thanks.

I understand fully just suggesting another way at looking at things. I kind of agree too with what G & D say but not so much about the hit through the boiler hump . I just wished Garzke & Dulin would have foot noted thier book more.

[Warship NWS]

To Bridav58, there are 3 possibilities,

a) The shell hit caused a speed loss as indicated by multiple sources including G&D. The timing of the salvo impact with the speed loss does hold some credible evidence for such an occurrence.

b) A machinery breakdown that was the direct cause for the speed loss. At this time I would consider this possibility circumstantial until more verifiable evidence can be provided. However, due to the fact that the S was pushing her powerplant to try and keep several CRs/DDs from pressing their attacks on her this would likely lead to higher chances of possible machinery failures due to the stress of higher revolutions and heavy seas.

c) One possibility could also include both of the above taking place during the engagement. With troubling machinery I would be fairly certain that any substantial damage could have possibly caused more problems then item (b) above describes or exacerbated weaknesses in the stressed powerplant.

For the time being I think it is fair to stay with the present plausibility of a direct hit occurring that lead to the speed loss until some form of verifiable evidence can be provided to prove otherwise.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

To Bridav58, there are 3 possibilities,

a) The shell hit caused a speed loss as indicated by multiple sources including G&D. The timing of the salvo impact with the speed loss does hold some credible evidence for such an occurrence.



In examining G & D's account and drawing along with John Winton's account in his book titled Death of Scharnhorst, the fatal shot(if we wish to call it that or the golden BB) was fired at a range of around 12000 yards. At that range, the angle of the entry had to be around 9 to 10 degrees, which correlates with the reports of the detonation at the upper area of boiler Room 1. No list was ever reported after that shot, but a dramatic speed decrease to 8 knots, then the conversation between the chief engineer and Bey, in which the engineer stated he could maintain 22 knots. It was also reported that the double bottom was penetrated by the shell fragments. I have a problem believing that a torpedo did that kind of damage, unless she was deep running and ignited underneath the keel. The way to verify that a torpedo was not the source is to use side scan sonar to detect the torpedo hits on scharnhorst's wreck and see if a torpedo hit occurred at that location. The wreck is upside down with the bow gone due to a massive explosion. She reportedly took 11 torpedo hits. Examination of a shell hit, at the upper edge of the belt might be possible, but with the muck and settling of the wreck, it is problematic.

If no torpedo hit is detected, then only three possibilities exist:

1. Machinery failure- If that is true, why dog down the hatches and commence pumping out the boiler room 1 which is what happened.

2. Shell hit - This seems to make the most sense and following actions seem to indicate this kind of damage.

3. Captain or Engineering officer actually ordered the speed decrease to save the engines- this one is even more unrealistic, but cannot be ruled out completely.

Thanks

[Ed Rotondaro]

Scott, there are 3 people you never piss-off on a ship. The corpsmen the postal clerk and the disbursing clerk.

The Doc can mess up your medical records somthing fierce. Like losing your shot record so you have to get your Boot Camp shots all over again.

Postal Clerk You want mail don't ya

Disbursing Clerk you actuly want to get paid for this sh**

How the navy really works by guys that been there and done that! Thanks John, I love this stuff. :D

[Scott Chisholm]

Always be nice to the Doc with the Big Fingers....:eek:

[Warship NWS]

Ok 2 things ..

a) Let's keep this thread on topic please.. OT chatter needs to go in the OT section of our forums.

b) Please do not post entire articles from other forums here. As a professional courtesy the permission of the poster and/or the moderator of other forums, should be obtained beforehand. Even better, ask the author of the original article to post on our forums directly. Note, long forum posts on other forums in this context do qualify as "articles".

Thank you.

[bridav58]

Here's a link to the article posted on another website.

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/7190?page=2

[Ed Rotondaro]

Always be nice to the Doc with the Big Fingers....:eek:


Scott:

I'm not going there!:D