Hypothetichal Letye Gulf Question

[paladin5]

In Morison's volume on Leyte Gulf the author states that Rear Admiral Oldendorf's task force could have handled Vice Admiral Kurita's Center Force if the two forces had met in a short decisive crossing the T engagement, but not if the two forces had met in a long running battle. While I agree whole heatedly that Oldendorf most likely would have lost in the long running battle scenario because he simply didn't have enough ammo for it. I however find myself being somewhat skeptical about Oldendorf's chances for victory in the short battle scenario. I am thinking that Oldendorf simply didn't have enough ammunition to win a battle against a force as large as Kurita's under any conditions. I also have serious doubts as to whether the battleships equipped 14 inch guns could have severely damaged the Yamato. So that leaves just the Maryland and the West Vrginia, which were equipped with 16 inch 45 caliber guns, to deal with the Yamato, but between them they only had 299 rounds of AP ammunition and 851 round of HC ammunition. On the other hand the 14 inch ships had a grand total of 1,053 rounds of AP ammunition and 897 rounds of HC ammunition between them. However it should be noted that heavy caliber HC ammunition is worthless for use against other battle ships, its only use outside of the shore bombardment duties that it was designed for is for sinking destroys and maybe light and heavy cruisers, though I have doubts as to its usefulness against the heavy's. I think that this might have been enough to sink the Kongo and Nagato class Battleships, but even that is being very optimistic. Given the Data I have provided below I am curious to hear what you guys think on this subject. Below I have provided as much information as I have been able to find on Oldendorf's ships and their ammunition status on the morning of 25 October 1944. Unfortunately Morison's book lists nothing about the ammunition mix or quantity for the Japanese ships of Kurita's Center Force. The book also doesn't supply me with any information as to how good American or Japanesse gunnery was at this point in the war. Now I know that radar had an impact on American gunnery, especially at night and in bad weather, but I am not sure how big of an impact it was. I am kind of hoping that one you more experienced guys can fill that one in for me.

Ship & Ammunition Distribution Of Rear Admiral Oldendorf's Task Force On The Morning of 25 October 1944:

1637: Oldendorf's total supply of heavy caliber AP rounds at start of the Surigao Strait action on the night of 24-25 October 1944.

285: Rounds of heavy caliber AP expended during the Surigao Strait Action during the night of October 24-25 1944.

1352: Oldendorf's total supply of heavy caliber AP rounds on the morning of 25 October 1944.

1514: Oldendorf's total supply of heavy caliber HC rounds on the morning of 25 October 1944.
*Note: Heavy Caliber refers to 14 & 16 inch ammunition
*Note: No information is given as to whether or not any heavy caliber HC rounds were expended at Surigao Strait, as such I am going to assume that none were expended.

DD's Ammo Situation: Not given, but most of Oldendorf's DD's had expended their tropedos during the Surigao Strait action, and probably not yet had time to reload at a tender or ammo ship.

DD's Present: USS Newcomb, USS Richard P. Leary, USS. Albert W. Grant(Damaged during the Surigao Strait action), USS Robinson, USS Halford, USS Bryant, USS Heywood L. Edwards, USS Bennion, USS Leutze, USS Claxton, USS Cony, USS Thorn, USS Aulick, USS Sigourney, USS Welles, USS Hutchins, USS Daly, USS Bache, HMAS Arunta, USS Killen, USS Beale, USS Remey, USS McGowan, USS Melvin, USS Mertz, USS McDermut, USS Monssen, USS McNair, 9 Additional ships from DESRON's 21 & 49 were also assigned to Oldendorf's group on the morning of the 25th
*Note: I am going to assume that the 9 Ships from DESRON's 21 & 49 had full torpedo loads on the morning of the 25th since they were not involved in the Surigao Strait action of the previous night.

CL's Ammo Situation: Had only 50-80 rounds of AP each, exact number for each CL is not listed, supply of HC rounds described simply as 'ample'.
*Note Oldendorf's CL's Attempted to resupply their magazines after the Surigao Strait action but no 6in AP rounds were available from the two ammunition ships (Mazama & Durham Victory) that were available to them.

CL's Present: USS Denver, USS Columbia, USS Phoenix, USS Boise.

CA's Ammo Situation: Only info available states that the CA's magazines were loaded with 66% HC and 34% AP.

CA's Present: HMAS Shropshire, USS Minneapolis, USS Portland, USS Louisville (RADM. Oldendorfs' Flagship).

BB's Present and their individual ammo data:
*Note: Rounds per gun I have listed here is just the mathematical average, it does not reflect actual per gun ammo distribution for each ship.

USS Maryland: 8x16in 192 AP rounds, 24 AP rounds per gun, 445 HC Rounds, 55.625 HC rounds per gun.

USS West Virginia: 8x16in, 107 AP rounds, 13.375 AP rounds per gun, 172 HC rounds, 21.5 HC rounds per gun.

USS Tennesse: 12x14in, 327 AP rounds, 27.25 AP rounds per gun, 262 HC rounds, 21.834 HC rounds per gun.

USS Pennsylvania: 12x14in, 360 AP rounds, 30 AP rounds per gun, 14 HC Rounds, 1.167 HC rounds per gun.

USS Mississippi: 12x14in, 189 AP rounds, 15.75 AP rounds per gun, 543 HC rounds, 45.25 HC rounds per gun.

USS California: 12x14in, 177 AP rounds, 14.75 AP rounds per gun, 78 HC rounds, 6.5 HC Rounds per gun.

Data Source: All info is from "History of United Sates Naval Operations in WW2, Volume XII: Leyte June 1944 - January 1945" by Samuel Eliot Morison. The table on page 199, and the map located between pages 224 and 225 provided the names of Oldendorf's CA's, CL's, and DD's. The info on the ammo percentages of Oldendorfs CA's is from Page 201. All other info is from Pages 293-296.

[paladin5]

oh bother i managed to typo the title

[john964]

In Morison's volume on Leyte Gulf the author states that Rear Admiral Oldendorf's task force could have handled Vice Admiral Kurita's Center Force if the two forces had met in a short decisive crossing the T engagment, but not if the two forces had met in a long running battle. While I agree whole heartedly that Oldendorf most likely would have lost in the long running battle scenario bescause he simply didn't have enough ammo for it. I however find myself being somewhat skeptical about Oldendorf's chances for victory in the short battle scenario. I am thinking that Oldendorf simply didn't have enough ammunition to win a battle against a force as large as Kurita's under any conditions. I also have serious doubts as to whether the battleships equipped 14 inch guns could have severly damaged the Yamato. So that leaves just the Maryland and the West Vrginia, which were equipped with 16 inch 45 caliber guns, to deal with the Yamato, but between them they only had 299 rounds of AP ammunition and 851 round of HC ammunition. On the other hand the 14 inch ships had a grand total of 1,053 rounds of AP amunition and 897 rounds of HC ammunition between them. However it should be noted that heavy caliber HC ammunition is worthless for use against other battle ships, its only use outside of the shore bomardment duties that it was desinged for is for sinking destroys and maybe light and heavy cruisers, though I have doubts as to its usefullness agaisnt the heavys. I think that this might have been enough to sink the Kongo and Nagato class Battleships, but even that is being very optomistic. Given the Data I have provided below I am curious to hear what you guys think on this subject. Below I have provided as much informaton as I have been able to find on Oldendorf's ships and their ammunition status on the morning of 25 October 1944. Unfortunately Morison's book lists nothing about the ammunition mix or quantity for the Japanese ships of Kurita's Center Force. The book also doesn't supply me with any information as to how good American or Japanesse gunnery was at this point in the war. Now I know that radar had an impact on American gunnery, especially at night and in bad weather, but I am not sure how big of an impact it was. I am kind of hoping that one you more experienced guys can fill that one in for me.

Ship & Ammunition Distrubution Of Rear Admiral Oldendorf's Task Force On The Morning of 25 October 1944:

1637: Oldendorf's total supply of heavy caliber AP rounds at start of the Surigao Strait action on the night of 24-25 October 1944.

285: Rounds of heavy caliber AP expended during the Surigao Strait Action during the night of October 24-25 1944.

1352: Oldendorf's total supply of heavy caliber AP rounds on the morning of 25 October 1944.

1514: Oldendorf's total supply of heavy caliber HC rounds on the morning of 25 October 1944.
*Note: Heavy Caliber refers to 14 & 16 inch ammunition
*Note: No information is given as to whether or not any heavy caliber HC rounds were expended at Surigao Strait, as such I am going to assume that none were expended.

DD's Ammo Situation: Not given, but most of Oldendorf's DD's had expended their tropedos during the Surigao Strait action, and probably not yet had time to reload at a tender or ammo ship.

DD's Present: USS Newcomb, USS Richard P. Leary, USS. Albert W. Grant(Damaged during the Surigao Strait action), USS Robinson, USS Halford, USS Bryant, USS Heywood L. Edwards, USS Bennion, USS Leutze, USS Claxton, USS Cony, USS Thorn, USS Aulick, USS Sigourney, USS Welles, USS Hutchins, USS Daly, USS Bache, HMAS Arunta, USS Killen, USS Beale, USS Remey, USS McGowan, USS Melvin, USS Mertz, USS McDermut, USS Monssen, USS McNair, 9 Additional ships from DESRON's 21 & 49 were also assigned to Oldendorf's group on the morning of the 25th
*Note: I am going to assume that the 9 Ships from DESRON's 21 & 49 had full torpedo loads on the morning of the 25th since they were not involved in the Surigao Strait action of the previous night.

CL's Ammo Situation: Had only 50-80 rounds of AP each, exact number for each CL is not listed, supply of HC rounds described simply as 'ample'.
*Note Oldendorf's CL's Attempted to resupply their magazines after the Surigao Strait action but no 6in AP rounds were available from the two ammunition ships (Mazama & Durham Victory) that were available to them.

CL's Present: USS Denver, USS Columbia, USS Phoenix, USS Boise.

CA's Ammo Situation: Only info available states that the CA's magazines were loaded with 66% HC and 34% AP.

CA's Present: HMAS Shropshire, USS Minneapolis, USS Portland, USS Louisville (RADM. Oldendorfs' Flagship).

BB's Present and their individual ammo data:
*Note: Rounds per gun I have listed here is just the mathematical average, it does not reflect actual per gun ammo distribution for each ship.

USS Maryland: 8x16in 192 AP rounds, 24 AP rounds per gun, 445 HC Rounds, 55.625 HC rounds per gun.

USS West Virginia: 8x16in, 107 AP rounds, 13.375 AP rounds per gun, 172 HC rounds, 21.5 HC rounds per gun.

USS Tennesse: 12x14in, 327 AP rounds, 27.25 AP rounds per gun, 262 HC rounds, 21.834 HC rounds per gun.

USS Pennsylvania: 12x14in, 360 AP rounds, 30 AP rounds per gun, 14 HC Rounds, 1.167 HC rounds per gun.

USS Mississippi: 12x14in, 189 AP rounds, 15.75 AP rounds per gun, 543 HC rounds, 45.25 HC rounds per gun.

USS California: 12x14in, 177 AP rounds, 14.75 AP rounds per gun, 78 HC rounds, 6.5 HC Rounds per gun.

Data Source: All info is from "History of United Sates Naval Operations in WW2, Volume XII: Leyte June 1944 - January 1945" by Samuel Eliot Morison. The table on page 199, and the map located between pages 224 and 225 provided the names of Oldendorf's CA's, CL's, and DD's. The info on the ammo percentages of Oldendorfs CA's is from Page 201. All other info is from Pages 293-296.


Hmm, IMHO The IJN would get there heads handed to them.

The USN has the edge by a over whelming majority.
USN
16x16in/45
36x14in/50
12x14in/45

IJN
9x18in/45
8x16in/45
16x14in/45

Radar
All USN shps have at least a Mk3 FC radar several have Mk8. All USN have SS and AS radar of average to above average quality.
Of the IJN ships only Yamato has a FC radar, the rest only have poor or at best below average SS and AS radar.

Also the crews of the IJN ships would be tired from the constant combat operation of trying to run down Taffy 1,2,&3 during the day while the USN will have the chance to give there crews a limited break or chance for a little rest while they steam up for battle.

[Kyle Holgate]

Most of the US BB's had good radar as John said, that's a big multiplier as even with fewer shells to fire, more are hitting. True, Yamato is probably not going to be hurt badly by 14" shells, but her superstructure, fire control, bridge, radar, etc as well as her AA, secondary and tertiary gun mounts are all vulnerable. She could be reduced to a flaming wreck topside, even if everything behind armor is fine - and she'd be just as useless as if she'd been sunk. Mission kill - can't complete the mission any longer.

Now would the old ladies on the US side manage OK? Some would probably be hit, and an 18.1inch AP round is gonna ruin anyone's day. Still, these are stout ol' gals and can probably take their punishment. As long as the BB's can be screened from type 93 torpedoes, and a line of slow US battleships is a good target - I think the US forces would win the day with relatively few losses.

[john964]

Most of the US BB's had good radar as John said, that's a big multiplier as even with fewer shells to fire, more are hitting. True, Yamato is probably not going to be hurt badly by 14" shells, but her superstructure, fire control, bridge, radar, etc as well as her AA, secondary and tertiary gun mounts are all vulnerable. She could be reduced to a flaming wreck topside, even if everything behind armor is fine - and she'd be just as useless as if she'd been sunk. Mission kill - can't complete the mission any longer.

Now would the old ladies on the US side manage OK? Some would probably be hit, and an 18.1inch AP round is gonna ruin anyone's day. Still, these are stout ol' gals and can probably take their punishment. As long as the BB's can be screened from type 93 torpedoes, and a line of slow US battleships is a good target - I think the US forces would win the day with relatively few losses.

The way I would fight this battle is to have WV and MD pound on Yamato with CA and TN doing the same to Nagato along with MS and PA cuttin loose on Kongo and Haruna. You will have some problems with over concentration. With the battle going like this I suspect Nagato would head for the locker first followed by Kongo and Haruna with Yamato being treated like a door nob (everyone oncest to take a turn) at the end.

[Kyle Holgate]

I'd set whoever had the best fire control radar and most accurate team on Yamato, regardless of if they had 14" guns or not. The idea to me is to KO her fire control and ability to do battle as fast as possible so as to keep her ability to do damage with her 18.1 inch guns to a minimum. I don't think old US 16" shells vs old US 14" shells are going to have much difference on Yamato. Either one hits armor they bounce, either one hits un-armored areas they penetrate. With Nagato things change a bit. She's potentially armored somewhat against 14" rounds, and less capable vs 16". I think I might be sure at lest one of my 16" gunned momma's is slapping her around. The two BC's - dangerous to be sure with probably more experienced crews than the other ships. 2 each BB's on them should do the trick. THe cruisers and DDs are ample to engage Kurita's screen, and hopefully keep them busy enough not to fire "fish" too often.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The way I would fight this battle is to have WV and MD pound on Yamato with CA and TN doing the same to Nagato along with MS and PA cuttin loose on Kongo and Haruna. You will have some problems with over concentration. With the battle going like this I suspect Nagato would head for the locker first followed by Kongo and Haruna with Yamato being treated like a door nob (everyone oncest to take a turn) at the end.


Kyle, John, Paladin:

I don't agree with Morison on this. He was not a tactical analyst. I don't think there was enough ammo to defeat the Center Force. What I do think was that there was enough ships and firepower to make Kurita turn away. If he ran from escort carriers, DDs and DEs, then I don't believe he would have had the stomach to face Olendorf. Even with good radar, the number of shell hits would have been slight. The main edge that would have helped Olendorf was that he could have called on the Taffy escort carriers to make air attacks under better conditions than they did historically.

[Warship NWS]

I'd set whoever had the best fire control radar and most accurate team on Yamato, regardless of if they had 14" guns or not. The idea to me is to KO her fire control and ability to do battle as fast as possible so as to keep her ability to do damage with her 18.1 inch guns to a minimum. I don't think old US 16" shells vs old US 14" shells are going to have much difference on Yamato. Either one hits armor they bounce, either one hits un-armored areas they penetrate. With Nagato things change a bit. She's potentially armored somewhat against 14" rounds, and less capable vs 16". I think I might be sure at lest one of my 16" gunned momma's is slapping her around. The two BC's - dangerous to be sure with probably more experienced crews than the other ships. 2 each BB's on them should do the trick. THe cruisers and DDs are ample to engage Kurita's screen, and hopefully keep them busy enough not to fire "fish" too often.

I will note that with very long range gunnery, quite possible with good to excellent radar, those 14"-16" shells could possibly penetrate Yamato's deck armor depending on the gunnery ballistic arc, range, etc.. Her main armor was not completely immune to all large calibre shells at all ranges. Also, a 1-1.5+ ton AP shell slamming into those 18.1" turrets will leave a mark.. they may not penetrate but the guys inside will almost definitely feel it. Possible damage to the turrets includes barrels being sheered off, mountings dislodged, spalling/armor cracking, loss of calibration, jamming of the turret, etc.. Remember, we are not talking about far lighter cruiser shells here, large calibre shells will slam into a warship with many times greater energy.

Thanks.

[JMS]

I ran this through WC: DB (missing some ships like Shropshire because I forgot to make the fleets mixed and the US destroyers to simulate the lack of torpedoes.) and the US got their rear handed to them... by DD torpedoes. So IMO if destroyers are present in enough strength to stop the Japaneses DDs the forces are more or less evenly matched.

[Scott Chisholm]

Hi,

This is Ed's chosen field of study, so I will defer to him. However, I think Kurita would have relished a stand-up fight with USN BBs as it would have been keeping with the whole Bushido thing. He thought he and his command was doomed anyway, so why not go down swinging?

The reasons he turned away from Taffy 3 were (1) he didn't believe he could catch them (not realizing his CAs already had) and (2) he had no idea where Halsey was (his real concern). Since he couldn't go down swinging, he went home.

In my opinion, if the two forces had mixed it up, I think the Japanese would have come out on the short end - only because it would have given even more time for Taffys 1 and 2 to arrange their air attacks. Taffy 3 could have retired to the east, and recovered her planes from the beach to aid in the attack.

Just my two cents....

[john964]

I'd set whoever had the best fire control radar and most accurate team on Yamato, regardless of if they had 14" guns or not. The idea to me is to KO her fire control and ability to do battle as fast as possible so as to keep her ability to do damage with her 18.1 inch guns to a minimum. I don't think old US 16" shells vs old US 14" shells are going to have much difference on Yamato. Either one hits armor they bounce, either one hits un-armored areas they penetrate. With Nagato things change a bit. She's potentially armored somewhat against 14" rounds, and less capable vs 16". I think I might be sure at lest one of my 16" gunned momma's is slapping her around. The two BC's - dangerous to be sure with probably more experienced crews than the other ships. 2 each BB's on them should do the trick. THe cruisers and DDs are ample to engage Kurita's screen, and hopefully keep them busy enough not to fire "fish" too often.

From my information WV, CA and TN had Mk8 FCR the rest had Mk3. As to the Kongo's there armor can be penatraited at any range by any of the USN's BB's. The 16in gunships can penatraite Nagato at long and extream range while the 14in ships can only do this at extream range. The Yamato can only be penatraited at extream range by both 14 and 16in guns.

[old_pop2000]

Just some questions. We know that Oldendorf had just fought a long night battle on the 24th. We know that he was notified by Kinkaid of Kurita. We also are aware of the very low AP ammunition levels of all the battleships and that some of the battleships had turret issues.

If Kurita had not turned around but continued on his journey towards the invasion fleet, could Oldendorf have managed to exit the Surigao Straits and return to protect the Kinkaid? He was no longer at the head of the channel, he was moving down the channel with his light forces pursuing the remnants of the southern force.

If we presuppose that he accomplished this maneuver, could his 18 to 20 knot battleships have managed a running gun battle with Yamato and its surviving forces all of which could do over 25 knots.

I have some real doubts about the outcome of this scenario. A scenario which is entirely possible in fact, almost certain to have occurred.

The savior of Kinkaid's forces was the return of TF 38.4 from Ulithi. It had been recalled by Halsey and by 1300 would be within range to launch an airstrike.

[Kyle Holgate]

I will note that with very long range gunnery, quite possible with good to excellent radar, those 14"-16" shells could possibly penetrate Yamato's deck armor depending on the gunnery ballistic arc, range, etc.. Her main armor was not completely immune to all large calibre shells at all ranges. Also, a 1-1.5+ ton AP shell slamming into those 18.1" turrets will leave a mark.. they may not penetrate but the guys inside will almost definitely feel it. Possible damage to the turrets includes barrels being sheered off, mountings dislodged, spalling/armor cracking, loss of calibration, jamming of the turret, etc.. Remember, we are not talking about far lighter cruiser shells here, large calibre shells will slam into a warship with many times greater energy.

Thanks.

Right - the point is, you want to hit Yamato as much as you can, as fast as you can and the shells will do whatever they can do. If they KO turrets and a few get lucky and penetrate the deck then great, but if all they do is mangle the topsides and turn the superstructure into a flaming wreck, I would not complain.

To Ed - the idea is not to defeat Kurita in battle but to protect the transports. If you can also sink a number of Kurita's ships then that's of course just fine! The Taffies did quite a number on the Japanese cruisers in the actual attack, I would expect no less in an attack with battleships on the defending side. No way is Kurita going to be in any shape to attack transports & supply ships after tangling with Oldendorf.

[paladin5]

Kyle, John, Paladin:

I don't agree with Morison on this. He was not a tactical analyst. I don't think there was enough ammo to defeat the Center Force. What I do think was that there was enough ships and firepower to make Kurita turn away. If he ran from escort carriers, DDs and DEs, then I don't believe he would have had the stomach to face Olendorf. Even with good radar, the number of shell hits would have been slight. The main edge that would have helped Olendorf was that he could have called on the Taffy escort carriers to make air attacks under better conditions than they did historically.


ah so you reached the same conlusion as me then, btw nice sig quote.

[paladin5]

I will note that with very long range gunnery, quite possible with good to excellent radar, those 14"-16" shells could possibly penetrate Yamato's deck armor depending on the gunnery ballistic arc, range, etc.. Her main armor was not completely immune to all large calibre shells at all ranges. Also, a 1-1.5+ ton AP shell slamming into those 18.1" turrets will leave a mark.. they may not penetrate but the guys inside will almost definitely feel it. Possible damage to the turrets includes barrels being sheered off, mountings dislodged, spalling/armor cracking, loss of calibration, jamming of the turret, etc.. Remember, we are not talking about far lighter cruiser shells here, large calibre shells will slam into a warship with many times greater energy.

Thanks.


hmm thats an instresting point there warship.

[old_pop2000]

Right - the point is, you want to hit Yamato as much as you can, as fast as you can and the shells will do whatever they can do. If they KO turrets and a few get lucky and penetrate the deck then great, but if all they do is mangle the topsides and turn the superstructure into a flaming wreck, I would not complain.

To Ed - the idea is not to defeat Kurita in battle but to protect the transports. If you can also sink a number of Kurita's ships then that's of course just fine! The Taffies did quite a number on the Japanese cruisers in the actual attack, I would expect no less in an attack with battleships on the defending side. No way is Kurita going to be in any shape to attack transports & supply ships after tangling with Oldendorf.
Using Lancaster's N-squared Law, one can show that a large fleet of smaller ships, with more guns can defeat a smaller number of larger gunned ships. Quantity has a quality of its own-- Vladimir Lenin.

See Fleet Tactics by Captain Wayne Hughes.

[Kyle Holgate]

Using Lancaster's N-squared Law, one can show that a large fleet of smaller ships, with more guns can defeat a smaller number of larger gunned ships. Quantity has a quality of its own-- Vladimir Lenin.

See Fleet Tactics by Captain Wayne Hughes.

Yes.

The Japanese apparently had some disagreement though. The whole reason for Yamato was to have a single ship that could defeat more numerous, smaller opponents. Now for sure, radar fire control wasn't something that was planned for - but could a Yamato handle 2-3 Colorado class with only optical FC? I have my doubts, though the Japanese apparently did not!

[old_pop2000]

Yes.

The Japanese apparently had some disagreement though. The whole reason for Yamato was to have a single ship that could defeat more numerous, smaller opponents. Now for sure, radar fire control wasn't something that was planned for - but could a Yamato handle 2-3 Colorado class with only optical FC? I have my doubts, though the Japanese apparently did not!
Well, they might disagree, but experience and theory say differently. They might have just drawn the wrong conclusions or felt their samurai tradition was enough to overcome all obstacles including a snow storm's worth of 14 and 16 inch shells.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Right - the point is, you want to hit Yamato as much as you can, as fast as you can and the shells will do whatever they can do. If they KO turrets and a few get lucky and penetrate the deck then great, but if all they do is mangle the topsides and turn the superstructure into a flaming wreck, I would not complain.

To Ed - the idea is not to defeat Kurita in battle but to protect the transports. If you can also sink a number of Kurita's ships then that's of course just fine! The Taffies did quite a number on the Japanese cruisers in the actual attack, I would expect no less in an attack with battleships on the defending side. No way is Kurita going to be in any shape to attack transports & supply ships after tangling with Oldendorf.

Kyle, Dennis, et al:

One of the biggest fallacies of the analysis of this battle is that there were vulnerable transports at Leyte Gulf waiting to be blasted. I spent some time on Navweaps and was given a link to an interesting document on the actual invasion of Leyte Gulf which I will try to find and post for the forum. By the time Kurita would have arrived, all transports were unloaded and almost all were gone! There a handful of amphibious craft still around and a few transports. There was also a signficant number of DDs with full torpedo loads around. The timing of the invasion and the locating of the main IJN fleet at Lingga Roads in Singapore made it impossible for the IJN to carry out their plan. Indeed when the Sho plan was made operational, Kurita was in grave doubt (Sorry Scott he was no samurai) about even going through the motions. H.P. Willmott in his book on Leyte Gulf (highly recommended) shows that Kurita pretty much knew the mission was doomed and only carried it out of tradition. If anything he was looking for a way out and his excuses post war are very thin. I don't see him trying to slug it out with battleships and cruisers. His forces routinely mis-identified the US ships as Baltimore class cruisers and Essex class CVs. If he had met Olendorf, he probably would have thought that Halsey had not taken the bait and would have turned around. As Dennis has pointed out, I'm not sure that Oldendorf would have been able to reach Leyte before Kurita did, but his presence would have most likely have been enough to curtail any lengthy bombardment of the invasion sight. Also keep in mind that US forces had advanced well over ten miles inland and were in the process of establishing themselves off the beach head by the time that the Samar action occurred.
Oh and Scott, thanks for the compliment about Leyte Gulf.;)

[Spook046]

The savior of Kinkaid's forces was the return of TF 38.4 from Ulithi. It had been recalled by Halsey and by 1300 would be within range to launch an airstrike.

A nitnoid, I will confess, but TG 38.4 (Davison) had sailed north with the balance of TF 38/3rd Fleet in Halsey's effort to close with Ozawa.

Rather it was TG 38.1 which had been recalled from its planned R&R stopover to Ulithi, commanded by J S McCain (the grandfather of one of our present presidential candidates). When one reviews its order of battle (OOB), it was the most sizable of the task groups with three Essex-class and two light carriers, but that was because Hancock had been added in (from TG 38.2 IIRC) to join the R&R rotation too.

Something that might be validly asked is if sending over TG 38.1 towards Ulithi for its R&R right then was an advisable move in retrospect. For if this carrier group was closer on hand on 24th October, that might have played a role in the moment of decision on whether or not to leave some forces to face against Kurita on the 25th instead of taking everything north to go after Ozawa. Possibly a force built around TG's 38.1, 38.3 and 38.4 could've gone north while Bogan's TG 38.2 could've covered any BB force built up for command by Lee (Bogan was among those arguing to engage Kurita IIRC). Then again, even with TG 38.1 on hand, Halsey might've still taken everything up north. We can only speculate.

I do hesitate for now to really critique the decision to detach TG 38.1 towards Ulithi prior to the looming battle with the IJN fleets. After the extensive carrier strikes against Formosa and rebuffing the Japanese counterstrikes, overall fatigue within TF 38 and 3rd Fleet might have been such that starting the TG rotations had become too much of a necessity not to delay any further. I'll basically leave it as a "judgement call" situation where perhaps someone else here could illuminate further if possible.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A nitnoid, I will confess, but TG 38.4 (Davison) had sailed north with the balance of TF 38/3rd Fleet in Halsey's effort to close with Ozawa.

Rather it was TG 38.1 which had been recalled from its planned R&R stopover to Ulithi commanded by J S McCain (the grandfather of one of our present presidential candidates). When one reviews its oder of battle (OOB), it was the most sizable of the task groups, but that was because Hancock had been added in (from TG 38.2 IIRC) to join the R&R rotation too.

Something that might be validly asked is if sending over TG 38.1 towards Ulithi for its R&R right then was an advisable move in retrospect. For if this carrier group was closer on hand on 24th October, that might have played a role in the moment of decision on whether or not to leave some forces to face against Kurita on the 25th instead of taking everything north to go after Ozawa. Possibly a force buit around TG's 38.1, 38.3 and 38.4 could've gone north while Bogan's TG 38.2 could've covered any BB force built up for command by Lee (Bogan was among those arguing to engage Kurita IIRC). Then again, even with TG 38.1 on hand, Halsey might've still taken everything up north. We can only speculate.

I do hesitate for now to really critique the decision to detach TG 38.1 towards Ulithi prior to the looming battle with the IJN fleets. After the extensive carrier strikes against Formosa and rebuffing the Japanese counterstrikes, overall fatigue within TF 38 and 3rd Fleet might have been such that starting the TG rotations had become too much of a necessity not to delay any further. I'll basically leave it as a "judgement call" situation where perhaps someone else here could illuminate further if possible.

Spook:

As you mention, fatigue was a major factor in Halsey's decision to detach TG 38.1. In fact I do wonder why Halsey had not rested his entire force prior to Leyte Gulf. Considering that the original plan was for a December invasion, waiting another month certainly would have ensured a more rested fleet. Also flu was sweeping his task force and adding to the burden of operations.

I do criticise Halsey and his staff for not figuring out the decoy nature of Ozawa's carriers. In the past, the carriers always operated with powerful surface forces for protection. So Halsey has already identified Kurita's Center Force with the bulk of the IJN's remaining warships. Then he finally spots Ozawa's decoy force with carriers but a paucity of escorts. Also he is not experiencing anything like the kind of airstrikes the IJN had launched in June. Nobody could figure out that the carriers were decoys? Admiral Lee knew it and tried to convince Halsey's staff who blew him off. Admiral Mitscher even felt that they were chasing ghosts. But Halsey wanted to be in on the big kill. In his defense I will allow that the carriers as he said post war represented the greater strategic threat than the surface ships and he wanted to eliminate them. Possibly the loss of the Princeton to land based, naval aircraft made him think the carriers were still potent. As Thomas Cutler, a noted naval historian said in his intro to his book on Leyte, commanding one ship is difficult. The mind boggles at trying command an entire fleet and coordinate it against multiple threats.

So I will defer my judgement since nobody shoots at me and I can always re-type any mistake I make.;)

[old_pop2000]

A nitnoid, I will confess, but TG 38.4 (Davison) had sailed north with the balance of TF 38/3rd Fleet in Halsey's effort to close with Ozawa.

Rather it was TG 38.1 which had been recalled from its planned R&R stopover to Ulithi, commanded by J S McCain (the grandfather of one of our present presidential candidates). When one reviews its order of battle (OOB), it was the most sizable of the task groups with three Essex-class and two light carriers, but that was because Hancock had been added in (from TG 38.2 IIRC) to join the R&R rotation too.

Something that might be validly asked is if sending over TG 38.1 towards Ulithi for its R&R right then was an advisable move in retrospect. For if this carrier group was closer on hand on 24th October, that might have played a role in the moment of decision on whether or not to leave some forces to face against Kurita on the 25th instead of taking everything north to go after Ozawa. Possibly a force built around TG's 38.1, 38.3 and 38.4 could've gone north while Bogan's TG 38.2 could've covered any BB force built up for command by Lee (Bogan was among those arguing to engage Kurita IIRC). Then again, even with TG 38.1 on hand, Halsey might've still taken everything up north. We can only speculate.

I do hesitate for now to really critique the decision to detach TG 38.1 towards Ulithi prior to the looming battle with the IJN fleets. After the extensive carrier strikes against Formosa and rebuffing the Japanese counterstrikes, overall fatigue within TF 38 and 3rd Fleet might have been such that starting the TG rotations had become too much of a necessity not to delay any further. I'll basically leave it as a "judgement call" situation where perhaps someone else here could illuminate further if possible.
TF 38 under Marc Mitscher consisted of the following:

TG 38.1 McCain
TG 38.2 Bogan
TG 38.3 Sherman
TG 38.4 Davison
TG 30.3 Dubose Group

On October 23, 1944, they were placed as follows:

TG 38.1 Enroute for Ulithi
TG 38.2 Off San Bernardino Straits refueling from TG 30.3
TG 38.3 60 Miles E of Pololio Island
TG 38.4 60 Miles E off of Southern Samar

On October 25;

TG 38.1 Recalled from Ulithi
TG 38.2 Sent S against CentFor
TG 38.3 350 Miles N of Luzon-17-39 N 126-27 E
TG 38.4 Headed toward refuel

Hope that helps

[Citadelvette]

In his biography of Halsey, E.B. Potter takes note that because of the system for communications that was set up between commands (I don't have the book at the moment so I can't be specific on the setup) and the the priority of certain reports many of Kinkaid's dispatches arrived out of sequence. Thus Halsey was deprived of clear knowledge of Kinkaid's situation which in some part infuenced his decisions to chase Ozawa. Without knowledge of the carrier's airwings strengths, they still represent the greatest threat, combine that with confusion as to the status of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet and it's easy to see why much of Halsey's force was not brought to bear.

[Spook046]

TF 38 under Marc Mitscher consisted of the following:

TG 38.1 McCain
TG 38.2 Bogan
TG 38.3 Sherman
TG 38.4 Davison
TG 30.3 Dubose Group

On October 23, 1944, they were placed as follows:

TG 38.1 Enroute for Ulithi
TG 38.2 Off San Bernardino Straits refueling from TG 30.3
TG 38.3 60 Miles E of Pololio Island
TG 38.4 60 Miles E off of Southern Samar

On October 25;

TG 38.1 Recalled from Ulithi
TG 38.2 Sent S against CentFor
TG 38.3 350 Miles N of Luzon-17-39 N 126-27 E
TG 38.4 Headed toward refuel

Hope that helps

Yes, this does help as reference to Ed's (the other Ed, ;)) earlier point on the challenge of directing fleets in WWII against multiple threats as a step up from single-ship command. The challenge is magnified when the carrier TG's, operating separately, then have to be pulled back together again for the impending fleet action. On the morning of 24 October, the "spread" of the TF 38 TG's was about as far as 300 NM; from TG 38.3 to the NW to TG 38.4 to the SE, with TG 38.2 in-between.

[john964]

Just some questions. We know that Oldendorf had just fought a long night battle on the 24th. We know that he was notified by Kinkaid of Kurita. We also are aware of the very low AP ammunition levels of all the battleships and that some of the battleships had turret issues.

Evan if they were low on AP ammo, HC ammo is still going to hurt like hell evan if it does not penatrate. IIRC HC ammo has somthing like 3x the exploseve filler as AP ammo.

Here is something else to consider the Japanese would have also been low on ammo, as they had been installing new portholes on the CVE's and others.

Here is the ammo load for the US BB's
ship ammo load total on board ammo type rounds fired
WV 800 375 200AP 175HC 93AP
MD 800 685 240AP 445HC 48AP
CA 1200 318 240AP 78HC 63AP
TN 1200 664 396AP 298HC 69AP
MS 1200 744 201AP 543HC 12AP
PA 1200 453 360AP 93HC none

[Warship NWS]

On average; AP shells had around 2% filler, thicker casing, AP caps and windscreens, capable of penetrating up to around their diameter in size vs armor, and base fuzing. SAP/CM shells had around 4-8% filler, moderately thick casing, capable of penetrating up to around half of their diameter vs armor, and base fuzing. HE/HC had around 10-12% filler, lighter casing, capable of penetrating up to around 1/10th of their diameter vs armor, and point fuzing.

Overall, the critical differences in shells were the case, fuzing, and whether they had an AP cap or not. HE/HC shells could start fires, destroy or disable lightly to non-armored sections of a ship through blast and shrapnel damage, cause casualties, etc. I will note, in almost all cases where capital ships had recieved significant damage topside their combat effectiveness was reduced, sometimes considerably. A mission kill was quite possible without the use of AP shells.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Evan if they were low on AP ammo, HC ammo is still going to hurt like hell evan if it does not penatrate. IIRC HC ammo has somthing like 3x the exploseve filler as AP ammo.

Here is something else to consider the Japanese would have also been low on ammo, as they had been installing new portholes on the CVE's and others.

Here is the ammo load for the US BB's
ship ammo load total on board ammo type rounds fired
WV 800 375 200AP 175HC 93AP
MD 800 685 240AP 445HC 48AP
CA 1200 318 240AP 78HC 63AP
TN 1200 664 396AP 298HC 69AP
MS 1200 744 201AP 543HC 12AP
PA 1200 453 360AP 93HC none

John:

With all due respect, any hit hurts, but if you don't penetrate deeply into a capital ship (i.e. something with more than 8 inches of armor), you ain't gonna sink it. At best you can knock out its combat effectiveness, possibly. With Kurita's mindset, that may have been enough. If 7th Fleet had met Kurita with full ammo loads, they could have won. Meeting them with the prevailing conditions, the best they could hope for was to scare Kurita off.

[Kyle Holgate]

What did Halsey really feel he needed the fast battleships for? The majority of the Japanese BB's were already accounted for, so chasing north he wasn't in too much danger of his carriers running into a killing force of Japanese ships. He had plenty of BB's too - he could have split the nunmbers in half and had enough to screen his carriers in an emergency, AND have enough to meet Kurita. Of course we're not just talking BB's - you also have CA, CL, DD screening ships - but it still strikes me that Helsey was being a battleship man in the end.

Ed, about Kurita getting to the gulf. Even if the transports were all there waiting like sitting ducks there would have been an incredible swarm of DD's and DE's and what not with them. Kurita certainly wasn't going to walse in and sink the transports and leave without trouble! Look what a few DE's did historically protecting the Taffy. Imagine more of them along with DD's swarming out to protect their charges? Kurita would have been hurt -BB's encountering him or not.

[Citadelvette]

Halsey wanted to detach th BB's with Lee and hit Kurita but because of the poor communications which limited his knowledge of Kinkaid's situation and limited information about the decoy force he couldn't be sure what Kinkaid's status was, the amount of force needed to attack/defend from Ozawa (unsure if Ozawa's carriers had planes), and what he could spare to releive Kinkaid/ what was needed. Potter's book shows that Halsey sepertaed the BBs and escorts and stareted to dispatch them on occasion but called them back because messages saying Kinkaid was fine or or poor reports of Ozawa's strength. Really, the Japanese bluff plus poor U.S. communication negated most of Halsey's strength.

[Ed Rotondaro]

What did Halsey really feel he needed the fast battleships for? The majority of the Japanese BB's were already accounted for, so chasing north he wasn't in too much danger of his carriers running into a killing force of Japanese ships. He had plenty of BB's too - he could have split the nunmbers in half and had enough to screen his carriers in an emergency, AND have enough to meet Kurita. Of course we're not just talking BB's - you also have CA, CL, DD screening ships - but it still strikes me that Helsey was being a battleship man in the end.

Ed, about Kurita getting to the gulf. Even if the transports were all there waiting like sitting ducks there would have been an incredible swarm of DD's and DE's and what not with them. Kurita certainly wasn't going to walse in and sink the transports and leave without trouble! Look what a few DE's did historically protecting the Taffy. Imagine more of them along with DD's swarming out to protect their charges? Kurita would have been hurt -BB's encountering him or not.


Kyle:

Read my posts, I believe I alreay mentioned that?;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Halsey wanted to detach th BB's with Lee and hit Kurita but because of the poor communications which limited his knowledge of Kinkaid's situation and limited information about the decoy force he couldn't be sure what Kinkaid's status was, the amount of force needed to attack/defend from Ozawa (unsure if Ozawa's carriers had planes), and what he could spare to releive Kinkaid/ what was needed. Potter's book shows that Halsey sepertaed the BBs and escorts and stareted to dispatch them on occasion but called them back because messages saying Kinkaid was fine or or poor reports of Ozawa's strength. Really, the Japanese bluff plus poor U.S. communication negated most of Halsey's strength.

Hi:

Leyte is an example of bad intel and divided command. The entire operation should have been under naval command. MacArthur should not have had any say until the troops hit the ground, if then. If Spruance had been in command at Leyte, the USN would have sunk just about everything the IJN had afloat.

[paladin5]

Hi:

Leyte is an example of bad intel and divided command. The entire operation should have been under naval command. MacArthur should not have had any say until the troops hit the ground, if then. If Spruance had been in command at Leyte, the USN would have sunk just about everything the IJN had afloat.


this is true

[old_pop2000]

Hi:

Leyte is an example of bad intel and divided command. The entire operation should have been under naval command. MacArthur should not have had any say until the troops hit the ground, if then. If Spruance had been in command at Leyte, the USN would have sunk just about everything the IJN had afloat.
I agree about bad intel, with our ability to read Japanese codes, we should have been able to discern their intentions. I cannot agree about the command structure. I suspect the orders given to Halsey were poorly written. I also believe that it should have been expected that after attacking Formosa and sailing all that distance that the airwings on board 38.1-4 would have been in need of a rest and refuel. This should have been taken into consideration in the planning. I believe that we have an example of poor logistics.

In planning an operation, you have to account for what the enemy could do, not what you expect him to do. Sounds like "victory disease" to me. We always tend to blame command structure instead remembering that the opponent always has a say in your plans. But let's keep in mind, we completed the mission successfully, adapted to changing conditions, and destroyed the bulk of remainder of the Japanese fleet. The plan must have flexible enough, command structure adaptable enough and on-scene commanders experienced enough to deal with the ephemeral conditions always present in naval battles.

That's my opinion, what's yours

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle:

Read my posts, I believe I alreay mentioned that?;)

Which one - didn't see anything specifically dealing with Halsey & the BB's. Did see the one about Lee trying to get detached.
Helsey didn't need them to protect his carriers - or didn't need all of them at least. Had his CV's run afowl of Ise and Hyuga things could have gotten dicey I suppose, but even 1 BB escort wouldn't handled them nicely.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Which one - didn't see anything specifically dealing with Halsey & the BB's. Did see the one about Lee trying to get detached.
Helsey didn't need them to protect his carriers - or didn't need all of them at least. Had his CV's run afowl of Ise and Hyuga things could have gotten dicey I suppose, but even 1 BB escort wouldn't handled them nicely.


This was the post I was refering to Kyle:

Kyle, Dennis, et al:

One of the biggest fallacies of the analysis of this battle is that there were vulnerable transports at Leyte Gulf waiting to be blasted. I spent some time on Navweaps and was given a link to an interesting document on the actual invasion of Leyte Gulf which I will try to find and post for the forum. By the time Kurita would have arrived, all transports were unloaded and almost all were gone! There a handful of amphibious craft still around and a few transports. There was also a signficant number of DDs with full torpedo loads around. The timing of the invasion and the locating of the main IJN fleet at Lingga Roads in Singapore made it impossible for the IJN to carry out their plan. Indeed when the Sho plan was made operational, Kurita was in grave doubt (Sorry Scott he was no samurai) about even going through the motions. H.P. Willmott in his book on Leyte Gulf (highly recommended) shows that Kurita pretty much knew the mission was doomed and only carried it out of tradition. If anything he was looking for a way out and his excuses post war are very thin. I don't see him trying to slug it out with battleships and cruisers. His forces routinely mis-identified the US ships as Baltimore class cruisers and Essex class CVs. If he had met Olendorf, he probably would have thought that Halsey had not taken the bait and would have turned around. As Dennis has pointed out, I'm not sure that Oldendorf would have been able to reach Leyte before Kurita did, but his presence would have most likely have been enough to curtail any lengthy bombardment of the invasion sight. Also keep in mind that US forces had advanced well over ten miles inland and were in the process of establishing themselves off the beach head by the time that the Samar action occurred.
Oh and Scott, thanks for the compliment about Leyte Gulf.
__________________

[Citadelvette]

I agree about bad intel, with our ability to read Japanese codes, we should have been able to discern their intentions. I cannot agree about the command structure. I suspect the orders given to Halsey were poorly written. I also believe that it should have been expected that after attacking Formosa and sailing all that distance that the airwings on board 38.1-4 would have been in need of a rest and refuel. This should have been taken into consideration in the planning. I believe that we have an example of poor logistics.

In planning an operation, you have to account for what the enemy could do, not what you expect him to do. Sounds like "victory disease" to me. We always tend to blame command structure instead remembering that the opponent always has a say in your plans. But let's keep in mind, we completed the mission successfully, adapted to changing conditions, and destroyed the bulk of remainder of the Japanese fleet. The plan must have flexible enough, command structure adaptable enough and on-scene commanders experienced enough to deal with the ephemeral conditions always present in naval battles.

That's my opinion, what's yours


Dennis,

I agree concerning some of the poor intel on the Japanese forces, but I think a unified command would have been preferable because some of the communication difficulties between Halsey and Kinkaid was because of the fact that the two naval commanders were operating under different men, Halsey under Nimitz and Kinkaid under MacArthur. The poor system of coomunications between seperate commands like Nimitz and Macarthur was timeconsuming and ineffective under battle situations, and MacArthur because of his beef with Nimitz made extra hassel in the system. Under a unified command Halsey and Kinkaid would have had more direct contact allowing for greater flexibilty. While the commanders present did adapt and gained a victory, it caould have been greater with a unified command, which is why this fight went into a case study folder for the unified command structure argument post-war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I agree about bad intel, with our ability to read Japanese codes, we should have been able to discern their intentions. I cannot agree about the command structure. I suspect the orders given to Halsey were poorly written. I also believe that it should have been expected that after attacking Formosa and sailing all that distance that the airwings on board 38.1-4 would have been in need of a rest and refuel. This should have been taken into consideration in the planning. I believe that we have an example of poor logistics.

In planning an operation, you have to account for what the enemy could do, not what you expect him to do. Sounds like "victory disease" to me. We always tend to blame command structure instead remembering that the opponent always has a say in your plans. But let's keep in mind, we completed the mission successfully, adapted to changing conditions, and destroyed the bulk of remainder of the Japanese fleet. The plan must have flexible enough, command structure adaptable enough and on-scene commanders experienced enough to deal with the ephemeral conditions always present in naval battles.

That's my opinion, what's yours

Dennis:

I would say we are about half way there. Intel was a let down for sure. But command structure was a total failure and if things had gone badly, either MacArthur of Halsey would have been dismissed. Leyte demonstrates what happens when two very strong forces try to come together but still work independently. 7th Fleet existed mainly on paper until the Leyte operation. Most of its assets were detached from 5th/3rd fleet for this operation. Prior to that it either operated in the North Pacific or else was part of 5th fleet's amphibious arm. But at Leyte, because it now is landing MacArthur's army, it is a separate arm. I hate to say it, but the war in the Pacific would have been better served if Mac was either captured or martyed in 1942. He had his moments in New Guinea, but the Pacific war should have been a naval operation. What the hell does Mac know about naval combat? I have no problem with keeping him in the loop, but first and forth most, all naval assets should have been under one command.

Regarding Halsey's orders, they were amended by Admiral King's HQ. King himself was never sure who put in the option that "In case the opportunity for destruction of enemy fleet offers or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task". (Cutler "Letye Gulf" p.67). Now, how Halsey interpreted the enemy fleet and how history interpreted it is open to speculation. Halsey said post war that the carriers were strategically a greater danger and he was overall correct. But only if they had trained aircrews. In October of 1944, the biggest threat was Kurita's battleships and cruisers. Some have placed the blame on Kincaid, feeling that he let himself get outfoxed at Samar. Again the divided command comes into play. He thought he was being covered by Lee's TF 34. He even had a radio message stating that this force would be formed (he was eavesdropping on Halsey's comms). Yet Halsey had not actually given the order to form TF 34, merely the intent that he might do so. Kincaid in my opinion was a less than adequate admiral, but he was under the impression that 3rd fleet was providing distant cover and he would be free to deal with immediate threats in the form of Nishimura's task force.

Personally as I stated in an earlier post, the USN got a bit cocky with its successes at Philippines Sea and Formosa and began to believe that it could do anything. Moving up the invasion of the Philippines was bold but dangerous. A better rested 3rd fleet could have performed better in my opinion. Still it did allow for the defeat of the IJN as a surface force and probably shortened the war by several months.

[Kyle Holgate]

This was the post I was refering to Kyle:

Kyle, Dennis, et al:

One of the biggest fallacies of the analysis of this battle is that there were vulnerable transports at Leyte Gulf waiting to be blasted. I spent some time on Navweaps and was given a link to an interesting document on the actual invasion of Leyte Gulf which I will try to find and post for the forum. By the time Kurita would have arrived, all transports were unloaded and almost all were gone! There a handful of amphibious craft still around and a few transports. There was also a signficant number of DDs with full torpedo loads around. The timing of the invasion and the locating of the main IJN fleet at Lingga Roads in Singapore made it impossible for the IJN to carry out their plan. Indeed when the Sho plan was made operational, Kurita was in grave doubt (Sorry Scott he was no samurai) about even going through the motions. H.P. Willmott in his book on Leyte Gulf (highly recommended) shows that Kurita pretty much knew the mission was doomed and only carried it out of tradition. If anything he was looking for a way out and his excuses post war are very thin. I don't see him trying to slug it out with battleships and cruisers. His forces routinely mis-identified the US ships as Baltimore class cruisers and Essex class CVs. If he had met Olendorf, he probably would have thought that Halsey had not taken the bait and would have turned around. As Dennis has pointed out, I'm not sure that Oldendorf would have been able to reach Leyte before Kurita did, but his presence would have most likely have been enough to curtail any lengthy bombardment of the invasion sight. Also keep in mind that US forces had advanced well over ten miles inland and were in the process of establishing themselves off the beach head by the time that the Samar action occurred.
Oh and Scott, thanks for the compliment about Leyte Gulf.
__________________


Ok. That still doesn't tell us what Halsey thought he needed the fast battleships for. Granted they were pretty good AA support - maybe that's all he really cared about, but given how overwhelmingly superior his forces were over the Japanese - that hardly seems sufficient resoning. Halsey was never a cautious man - why not take the chance of scooting north after the Japanese CV's without the BB's - and leave them as a "Just in case" down where they can meet any Japanese mischieft that might develop?

[Citadelvette]

Ok. That still doesn't tell us what Halsey thought he needed the fast battleships for. Granted they were pretty good AA support - maybe that's all he really cared about, but given how overwhelmingly superior his forces were over the Japanese - that hardly seems sufficient resoning. Halsey was never a cautious man - why not take the chance of scooting north after the Japanese CV's without the BB's - and leave them as a "Just in case" down where they can meet any Japanese mischieft that might develop?

I think from what I've read the AA support was why Halsey kept his BBs because he was unsure of the Japanese carriers airwing's strength at the time. Halsey himself stated that he wanted nothing more than to take Lee and the BB force and waste Kurita in gun fight but his major reasons for not going were bad intel of the carrier force and poor comms between himself and Kincaid regarding the sitution to the South. I agree the theatre which is mostly ocean should have been under naval authority, keeping Mac in the loop and over the boots on the ground bacause his ego was almost always in the way and really didrupted operations at Leyte.

[old_pop2000]

It would seem by the posts that I've read, the solution to the problems at Leyte was to have a Joint Task Force Commander. This omniscient commander would have had knowledge that Kinkaid, Halsey and other commanders did not have, and would not have sanctioned Halsey's pursuit northward of Ozawa. Without the permission, Halsey would have destroyed Kurita's force and the Southern Force and all would be as it should be. The principle of Unity of Command, as the gods of war would say.

Well, there was a Joint Task Force Commander. This was ComSoWesPac, General MacArthur.

By agreement in SECNAV letter dtd April 20th, 1942, MacArthur was not eligible as a Supreme Commander to command directly any national force. However, it did not prevent him from directly commanding the joint forces assigned to invade the Philippines. In this position, he was a Joint Task Force Commander.

It was the usual policy of the Supreme Commander to appoint or designate an on-scene Joint Task Force Commander who would have exercised command under the Supreme Commander. In this instance, MacArthur chose not to setup such a subordinate JTFC position and exercised this function himself. MacArthur issued detailed orders to all commands for the execution of their parts of the operation.

So, to the charge that there was no unity of command, I say that is not true. It is true that the designated JTFC was not present at the landing area or on board the Nashville directly coordinating operations, but he was the JTFC, make no mistake. There is nothing that says the JTFC has to be on-scene.

Now, as to the problem of Halsey and his move northward. Nothing in CincPOA's Operation Plan 8-44 or in ComTHIRDFLT"s Operation Order 21-44 required that the commander Third Fleet obtain the concurrence of ComSowesPac in executing any of his operation or even advising him as to a change in plans. So, it appears that CinPOA's orders to Halsey were the problem area, not Halsey. This was not the first time such orders had been issued to Halsey, the same orders had been issued in the Ulithi operation two months before, exactly word for word. It must be realized that Halsey's area of operation was extensive, as per his orders from CinCPOA. His movement northward, was, in fact, within his area of responsibility. However, it was a matter of history, that the function of a covering force is to prevent interference with the actual combined operations--the landing, support and supply of the army.

So, we have a JTFC who is not on-scene and is not directly coordinating the movements of his forces and we have orders to a covering force that allow him to disregard what should have been a simple and straightforward decision to stay near the landing forces and use interior lines to thwart the forward movement of opponent forces. Both of these poor decisions were made by supreme commanders in their respective theatres; Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas and Commander, Southwest Pacific. Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur. But its William Halsey we blame.

[Citadelvette]

You hit the nail on the head their Dennis.

[old_pop2000]

Ok. That still doesn't tell us what Halsey thought he needed the fast battleships for. Granted they were pretty good AA support - maybe that's all he really cared about, but given how overwhelmingly superior his forces were over the Japanese - that hardly seems sufficient resoning. Halsey was never a cautious man - why not take the chance of scooting north after the Japanese CV's without the BB's - and leave them as a "Just in case" down where they can meet any Japanese mischieft that might develop?
Halsey was observing the time honored principle of concentration of forces. He could not split his forces in the face of the enemy.

[Citadelvette]

I agree again Dennis, Halsey wasn't stupid so he wouldn't risk dividing his force in the face of the enemy. At least w/o knowing their strength, he didn't have the information we do, hindsight's 20-20.

[old_pop2000]

He certainly wasn't stupid. He had experienced air attacks in his sorties against the Philippines and Formosa, and had no idea that the carrier planes had been off loaded to support the Formosa effort. He had to bring along as much AAA support as possible. He also had preliminary information that two Japanese TF's had sortied from their bases in Malaya and were sighted in the South China Sea's near their refueling base in the Dutch East Indies. A battleship was sighted in that grouping, so he had to stay alert. Plus, would you leave behind your new Iowa class battleships, if you were an old line admiral? I wouldn't especially if they were your flagship.

[Kyle Holgate]

He certainly wasn't stupid. He had experienced air attacks in his sorties against the Philippines and Formosa, and had no idea that the carrier planes had been off loaded to support the Formosa effort. He had to bring along as much AAA support as possible. He also had preliminary information that two Japanese TF's had sortied from their bases in Malaya and were sighted in the South China Sea's near their refueling base in the Dutch East Indies. A battleship was sighted in that grouping, so he had to stay alert. Plus, would you leave behind your new Iowa class battleships, if you were an old line admiral? I wouldn't especially if they were your flagship.

Maybe that's all it was - a desire to keep his forces consolodated. It still strikes me that after all was said and done, Halsey turned out to be a battleship sailor in the end, not quite believing that the new queen of the seas (carrier) can operate without the old gal's (even NEW old gals such as the Iowas).
I don't have my books - but IIRC Helsey had a good idea of the southern forces - Kuritas and....argh, I forget who was in charge of the Suragao st. ops - with Fuso and Yamashiro. Anyhow most of the Japanese battleships were accounted for.

It all depends on how much was known of the composition of the enemy forces. So the answer is Yes, as an amiral (or wargamer in my case) I may well split my BB's away from my carriers. Were I a carrier admiral I would also probably not have a BB as a flagship, though if I remember correctly the Iowas had very good communications suites, that may have been good reasoning for the flagship status.

[old_pop2000]

Maybe that's all it was - a desire to keep his forces consolodated. It still strikes me that after all was said and done, Halsey turned out to be a battleship sailor in the end, not quite believing that the new queen of the seas (carrier) can operate without the old gal's (even NEW old gals such as the Iowas).
I don't have my books - but IIRC Helsey had a good idea of the southern forces - Kuritas and....argh, I forget who was in charge of the Suragao st. ops - with Fuso and Yamashiro. Anyhow most of the Japanese battleships were accounted for.

It all depends on how much was known of the composition of the enemy forces. So the answer is Yes, as an amiral (or wargamer in my case) I may well split my BB's away from my carriers. Were I a carrier admiral I would also probably not have a BB as a flagship, though if I remember correctly the Iowas had very good communications suites, that may have been good reasoning for the flagship status.
I don't think that Halsey was a battleship admiral, but I believe that he knew their value if a surface battle erupted. He was fairly certain that he had destroyed much of their land based air strength but could not be certain as to how much of their carrier air strength was left and he knew that their remaining battleships could still pose a threat. If the Yamato, Kongo and other BB's were in the area, why not let the Iowa's have the honor of finishing them. It is entirely possible, that he was patently aware that this might have been the dreadnoughts last hurrah. That after the war ended, aircraft carriers would take over as the princes of the fleet and that the battleships would be mothballed. But all in all, I suspect he was just being cautious and keeping his best and strongest elements together as a combined force to meet any challenge.

[Citadelvette]

I don't think Halsey could be call and Old Line Admiral. He fought hard to get into the aviation community and get his wings and had worked with King on Fleet Problems laying the basis for wartime carrier ops in this respect he was quite innovative. As was said the Iowas were equipped as flagships and their armor was very protective of the associated systems, it was fairly logical to put his flag on an Iowa, New Jersy then Missouri.

[Kyle Holgate]

I don't think that Halsey was a battleship admiral, but I believe that he knew their value if a surface battle erupted. He was fairly certain that he had destroyed much of their land based air strength but could not be certain as to how much of their carrier air strength was left and he knew that their remaining battleships could still pose a threat. If the Yamato, Kongo and other BB's were in the area, why not let the Iowa's have the honor of finishing them. It is entirely possible, that he was patently aware that this might have been the dreadnoughts last hurrah. That after the war ended, aircraft carriers would take over as the princes of the fleet and that the battleships would be mothballed. But all in all, I suspect he was just being cautious and keeping his best and strongest elements together as a combined force to meet any challenge.

In my mind my idea of whether Halsey made a good or poor choice with taking all the BB's with him boils down to what he knew of the enemy forces and when. The US had a very good idea of the total Japanese navy composition prior to the war. They did not know for sure (IIRC) how many Yamato's they had. Most enemy BB's were accounted for or known to have been sunk at some point in the battle - but timing as to when this happened and what Halsey specifically knew makes a big difference.
I agree, that if I can help it I'd prefer to have all my forces greatly outnumber the enemy. If I know they have only 8-10 left and 7 of these are accounted for (Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo, Haruna, Fuso and Yamashiro) and are south - it just makes sense to me to keep my battleship forces to the south also.
Let's see. He did not know for sure that Musashi was sunk. He probably didn't know that Mutsu was lost in 1943 (spontaneous magazine explosion while in port). He knew that 2 Kongo class were sunk in 1942.

Hmm. I still "armchair quarterback" this one to be - keep the new BB's south in case Yamato and Musashi show up. Radar or not - I would not want to trust handling these monsters to Oldendorf and the old ladies!

[old_pop2000]

I don't think Halsey could be call and Old Line Admiral. He fought hard to get into the aviation community and get his wings and had worked with King on Fleet Problems laying the basis for wartime carrier ops in this respect he was quite innovative. As was said the Iowas were equipped as flagships and their armor was very protective of the associated systems, it was fairly logical to put his flag on an Iowa, New Jersy then Missouri.

Regardless of his flagship, Halsey had intel that the Kurita force, while potent, consisted of BB's and other surface ships without carriers. He had silenced the land based air power in the philippines, therefore Kurita could only hurt the landings if he got within 13 miles or so. He also knew of Oldendorf's BB's, which outnumbered Kurita and had better fire control.

On the other hand, Halsey knew that Ozawa had carriers and had to assume they had aircraft. They could launch a strike at 200 miles or greater and do far more damage in a shorter amount of time.

If we weigh those options and the fact that reconnaissance had shown that Kurita was retiring, the Ozawa force had to be the greater threat with the carriers and should be attacked as far from the landing zone as possible.

20/20 hindsight is the clearest vision in the world, but the fog of war can cloud judgements, poor or incomplete aerial reconnaissance or just a clever enemy can disupt your plans. Halsey's move north was within the scope of his orders; based on his intel, was the smarter move. Facts, not in his possession at the time, proved that this was not the best move, but then that is hindsight.

Note: as a gamer, I have never or will never split my force in the face of an unknown enemy.

[Kyle Holgate]

Regardless of his flagship, Halsey had intel that the Kurita force, while potent, consisted of BB's and other surface ships without carriers. He had silenced the land based air power in the philippines, therefore Kurita could only hurt the landings if he got within 13 miles or so. He also knew of Oldendorf's BB's, which outnumbered Kurita and had better fire control.

On the other hand, Halsey knew that Ozawa had carriers and had to assume they had aircraft. They could launch a strike at 200 miles or greater and do far more damage in a shorter amount of time.

If we weigh those options and the fact that reconnaissance had shown that Kurita was retiring, the Ozawa force had to be the greater threat with the carriers and should be attacked as far from the landing zone as possible.

20/20 hindsight is the clearest vision in the world, but the fog of war can cloud judgements, poor or incomplete aerial reconnaissance or just a clever enemy can disupt your plans. Halsey's move north was within the scope of his orders; based on his intel, was the smarter move. Facts, not in his possession at the time, proved that this was not the best move, but then that is hindsight.

Note: as a gamer, I have never or will never split my force in the face of an unknown enemy.

Key - unknown enemy. I agree there. I need enough information and enough certainty that it's correct (or nearly correct) with which to make a decision. Then of course it depends on what I am deciding.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis,

I agree concerning some of the poor intel on the Japanese forces, but I think a unified command would have been preferable because some of the communication difficulties between Halsey and Kinkaid was because of the fact that the two naval commanders were operating under different men, Halsey under Nimitz and Kinkaid under MacArthur. The poor system of coomunications between seperate commands like Nimitz and Macarthur was timeconsuming and ineffective under battle situations, and MacArthur because of his beef with Nimitz made extra hassel in the system. Under a unified command Halsey and Kinkaid would have had more direct contact allowing for greater flexibilty. While the commanders present did adapt and gained a victory, it caould have been greater with a unified command, which is why this fight went into a case study folder for the unified command structure argument post-war.

Bingo! Kincaid would have known Halsey's intentions and could have communicated his concerns directly to him. One thing I think that hurt was the resonance of the experience at Philippines Sea where aviators felt that Spruance allowed the bulk of the IJN to escape. Halsey had heard the murmurs about the "Spruance Nuance" otherwise known as excessive caution and didn't want that to occur again. For the IJN, they got exactly the right person in command who be most susceptible to the temptation to scoot after the decoy carriers.

One thing I'm interested in. Suppose Halsey does form up TF-34 under Admiral Lee? Does he leave at least one of the Iowa class BBs there with him? Does he also stick around and to exert overall command or does he let Lee call the shots? I can't see him transferring his flag from the New Jersey to one of the carriers and then head north.

[john964]

Halsey had 6 BB's available to his forces IA NJ WA SD MA IN. NJ was his flagship so it is out for being sent that leaves a force of IA WA SD MA IN. I fought a 'what if' battle using these ships and needles to say they basicly blew the japs out of the water in 39 min of game time. from begining to end when the last IJN ship was on its way to Davy Joeneses Locker.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I think from what I've read the AA support was why Halsey kept his BBs because he was unsure of the Japanese carriers airwing's strength at the time. Halsey himself stated that he wanted nothing more than to take Lee and the BB force and waste Kurita in gun fight but his major reasons for not going were bad intel of the carrier force and poor comms between himself and Kincaid regarding the sitution to the South. I agree the theatre which is mostly ocean should have been under naval authority, keeping Mac in the loop and over the boots on the ground bacause his ego was almost always in the way and really didrupted operations at Leyte.

There were also some concerns about letting Lee's task force operate without air cover. Lee maintained that he would risk it since air attacks had been infrequent. He suggested detaching two Independence class CVLs which mainly packed with fighters to provide air cover. Personally I think the Taffys would have been adequate to provide air cover if Lee's force was guarding San Bernadino Strait. Again though the divided command means Halsey would not ask Kincaid or order him to do that. Although I feel Kincaid would have gladly done this if he knew it would keep a powerful battleship force nearby.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok. That still doesn't tell us what Halsey thought he needed the fast battleships for. Granted they were pretty good AA support - maybe that's all he really cared about, but given how overwhelmingly superior his forces were over the Japanese - that hardly seems sufficient resoning. Halsey was never a cautious man - why not take the chance of scooting north after the Japanese CV's without the BB's - and leave them as a "Just in case" down where they can meet any Japanese mischieft that might develop?

Kyle:

Halsey's main reasoning was that you don't divide your forces. Still it is interesting to note that he planned on a gun action at dawn and was within easy distance when he turned around. One of the US BBs, I believe it was Massachusetts, had a gigantic battle flag flying in anticipation of the gunnery duel.

This does beg one question, should Halsey have continued on after Ozawa knowing full well that the earliest he could get to the Taffy CVEs was the next morning? Halsey maintained till his dying day that not continuing after the carriers was his biggest mistake. Considering that his carriers were more than adequate to polish of the IJN carriers, I feel his biggest mistake was not listening to Lee and leaving TF 34 to guard San Bernadino strait.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It would seem by the posts that I've read, the solution to the problems at Leyte was to have a Joint Task Force Commander. This omniscient commander would have had knowledge that Kinkaid, Halsey and other commanders did not have, and would not have sanctioned Halsey's pursuit northward of Ozawa. Without the permission, Halsey would have destroyed Kurita's force and the Southern Force and all would be as it should be. The principle of Unity of Command, as the gods of war would say.

Well, there was a Joint Task Force Commander. This was ComSoWesPac, General MacArthur.

By agreement in SECNAV letter dtd April 20th, 1942, MacArthur was not eligible as a Supreme Commander to command directly any national force. However, it did not prevent him from directly commanding the joint forces assigned to invade the Philippines. In this position, he was a Joint Task Force Commander.

It was the usual policy of the Supreme Commander to appoint or designate an on-scene Joint Task Force Commander who would have exercised command under the Supreme Commander. In this instance, MacArthur chose not to setup such a subordinate JTFC position and exercised this function himself. MacArthur issued detailed orders to all commands for the execution of their parts of the operation.

So, to the charge that there was no unity of command, I say that is not true. It is true that the designated JTFC was not present at the landing area or on board the Nashville directly coordinating operations, but he was the JTFC, make no mistake. There is nothing that says the JTFC has to be on-scene.

Now, as to the problem of Halsey and his move northward. Nothing in CincPOA's Operation Plan 8-44 or in ComTHIRDFLT"s Operation Order 21-44 required that the commander Third Fleet obtain the concurrence of ComSowesPac in executing any of his operation or even advising him as to a change in plans. So, it appears that CinPOA's orders to Halsey were the problem area, not Halsey. This was not the first time such orders had been issued to Halsey, the same orders had been issued in the Ulithi operation two months before, exactly word for word. It must be realized that Halsey's area of operation was extensive, as per his orders from CinCPOA. His movement northward, was, in fact, within his area of responsibility. However, it was a matter of history, that the function of a covering force is to prevent interference with the actual combined operations--the landing, support and supply of the army.

So, we have a JTFC who is not on-scene and is not directly coordinating the movements of his forces and we have orders to a covering force that allow him to disregard what should have been a simple and straightforward decision to stay near the landing forces and use interior lines to thwart the forward movement of opponent forces. Both of these poor decisions were made by supreme commanders in their respective theatres; Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas and Commander, Southwest Pacific. Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur. But its William Halsey we blame.

Dennis:

It's interesting to note that Halsey had made Nimitz aware of his intentions well before the Leyte operation. He was going after the carriers if he could find them and he was not discouraged in doing this. He was prevented from leaving earlier by Nimitz to go searching for the carriers when their location was still unknown. Nimitz' son, a submarine officer, happened to be at Pearl Harbor and was in father's office when the first frantic calls for help came through. He asked to see Halsey's orders when his father began blaming Halsey for leaving the strait unguarded. After examining the operational orders, he said "It's your fault". He pointed to the orders and the part that gave Halsey the right to move out against the IJN if he had the opportunity. "That's your opinion" his father said and that ended the discussion. (How They Won the War in the Pacific; Nimitz and His Admirals, by Edwin Hoyt, p.451).

I think a contributing factor to the situation was the feeling that the USN had missed a golden opportunity in June to destroy the IJN. Spruance's decision to guard the landings at Saipan had the full support of both Nimitz and more importantly Admiral King. But the naval aviators complained loudly (especially at the thought of a non-aviator being in command of the 5th fleet). Still the aviators may have exaggerated their prowess. They only bagged one carrier at Phillipine Sea while the submariners sank the two large fleet carriers. The performance of the naval aviators in the Sibuyan Sea also was lacking. All they managed to do was sink one battleship (admittedly the Musashi). But it was the subs and surface ships that sank more ships at Leyte. Admittedly the carriers did provide the coup de grace to many ships damaged by surface attack, but the same could be said of the surface ships that polished off crippled ships of Ozawa's task force. Admiral DuBose's combined cruiser destroyer task force ran down and finished off the cripples, but declined to try and engage the two hybrid battleship carriers (and wisely so). One can argue that the escort carriers probably were effective than their bigger sisters. After all they did drive off Kurita and help sink three CAs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I don't think Halsey could be call and Old Line Admiral. He fought hard to get into the aviation community and get his wings and had worked with King on Fleet Problems laying the basis for wartime carrier ops in this respect he was quite innovative. As was said the Iowas were equipped as flagships and their armor was very protective of the associated systems, it was fairly logical to put his flag on an Iowa, New Jersy then Missouri.

Another point to keep in mind was the facilities on a BB for staff work. They were the most spacious ships for that sort of thing and they had the best radar and communications at the time. New Jersey and Iowa had only been in commission from 1943 onward. And New Jersey was actually the newest and was probably the best choice for a flagship (although Mitscher still chose a carrier the Lexington as his flag and Spruance still used the old treaty cruiser Indianapolis).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Halsey had 6 BB's available to his forces IA NJ WA SD MA IN. NJ was his flagship so it is out for being sent that leaves a force of IA WA SD MA IN. I fought a 'what if' battle using these ships and needles to say they basicly blew the japs out of the water in 39 min of game time. from begining to end when the last IJN ship was on its way to Davy Joeneses Locker.

John:

The composition of TF-34 was powerful but would have been outnumbered at least in cruisers. The plan was for four of the USN BBs to form up with cruisers and destroyers for a surface action in needed. The two Iowa class BBs would not have been part of Lee's force. He would have had Washington, Alabama, South Dakota and Massachusetts along with with two CAs, two CLs and 18 destroyers. Still I feel this would have been more than adequate to crush Kurita's Center force. (Source of TF-34's composition is Samuel Morison's volume on Leyte).

[old_pop2000]

It is fascinating to survey the coverage of this operation, and the Marianna's along with the earlier operations and read the analysis of who, what, when, where and why. It's interesting to see how Fletcher gets sacked for not being more aggressive although he won three major carrier battles, something Halsey could never claim. It's interesting to see how Spruance is faulted at the Marianna's for not pursuing a defeated enemy, a basic tenet handed down by the Gods of War. Yet, he adhered to another tenet of a covering forcing staying close to the landing army to protect them. We have Halsey, through his bluff and aggressiveness turned the Battle of Guadalcanal around and secured a victory over the Japanese, himself being criticised for not adhering to that time honored tenet of a covering force staying close to the landing force or army. This, in spite of the fact that he pursued, what he considered a defeated enemy. And this is the very tenet that Spruance is criticised for not having adhered to.

Does something sound wrong here? Is it possible that authors and pundits are just trying to sell books and don't seriously have anything really important to contribute to body of knowledge concerning the Pacific War and the actions of both side.

How quaint it is for Chester Nimitz to state, after the war, that he does not know where the last lines of Halsey's orders came from. That he never put that phrase into his orders. So, Nimitz is stating that he, himself, never ordered Halsey to attack the japanese carriers if their location was known. Yet, the copy of the message and his orders plainly show Admiral Nimitz's name on them. Is he saying that someone, rewrote his orders and sent them to Halsey? Is he saying that Halsey must have faked the orders, because that is not what he sent them.

Halsey's move northward was within the scope of his orders. It was within his geographical area of responsibility. As a Navy admiral, his fleet was to be used to destroy the enemy fleet. Since the carrier was, by this time, the most important striking arm of any fleet, it was within his perogative to attack any force containing carriers. His one mistake, was to have broken one of the rules of the Gods Of War. The one that states that a covering force does not leave a landing force without protection.

Halsey's move northward has been analysed, scrutinized, investigated, dissected like a cadaver in the morgue, by every naval analyst, author and admiral want-a-be for 60 years. He made one error, he broke a tenet of the Gods Of War.

[john964]

John:

The composition of TF-34 was powerful but would have been outnumbered at least in cruisers. The plan was for four of the USN BBs to form up with cruisers and destroyers for a surface action in needed. The two Iowa class BBs would not have been part of Lee's force. He would have had Washington, Alabama, South Dakota and Massachusetts along with with two CAs, two CLs and 18 destroyers. Still I feel this would have been more than adequate to crush Kurita's Center force. (Source of TF-34's composition is Samuel Morison's volume on Leyte).
In my battle IIRC Kongo was the first to go with 3 of 4 MG turrets out, bridge hit 3 or 4x, rudder hit 4x, 4 sevear fires, 3 major fires, and 6 minor fires. Haruna was next with an ammo explosion. Before that it had 4 of 4 MG turret out, bridge hit 5x, rudder 4x, secondary gun ammo exposion 6 sevear fires, 2 major fires and 8 minor fires. Nagato went down with 2 of 4 MG turrets out, bridge hit 4x, rudder hit 3x, 1 sevear fire, 6 major fires, and 5 minor fires. Yamato was the last she succomed after taking hit from all 5 US BB's IIRC she had 2 of 3 MG turrets out, bridge hit 4X, rudder hit 2x, 4 sevear fires, 2 major fires and 4 minor fires.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In my battle IIRC Kongo was the first to go with 3 of 4 MG turrets out, bridge hit 3 or 4x, rudder hit 4x, 4 sevear fires, 3 major fires, and 6 minor fires. Haruna was next with an ammo explosion. Before that it had 4 of 4 MG turret out, bridge hit 5x, rudder 4x, secondary gun ammo exposion 6 sevear fires, 2 major fires and 8 minor fires. Nagato went down with 2 of 4 MG turrets out, bridge hit 4x, rudder hit 3x, 1 sevear fire, 6 major fires, and 5 minor fires. Yamato was the last she succomed after taking hit from all 5 US BB's IIRC she had 2 of 3 MG turrets out, bridge hit 4X, rudder hit 2x, 4 sevear fires, 2 major fires and 4 minor fires.


John:

Did you use Command at Sea rules to run the battle?

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle:

Halsey's main reasoning was that you don't divide your forces. Still it is interesting to note that he planned on a gun action at dawn and was within easy distance when he turned around. One of the US BBs, I believe it was Massachusetts, had a gigantic battle flag flying in anticipation of the gunnery duel.

This does beg one question, should Halsey have continued on after Ozawa knowing full well that the earliest he could get to the Taffy CVEs was the next morning? Halsey maintained till his dying day that not continuing after the carriers was his biggest mistake. Considering that his carriers were more than adequate to polish of the IJN carriers, I feel his biggest mistake was not listening to Lee and leaving TF 34 to guard San Bernadino strait.

I guess my view is that Halsey had more than one force. A surface force, and an "air" force (carriers). All the surface force does is provide some AA defense and is otherwise useless, it can't do its job (fighting surface threats) with the carriers along anyway - so by default to use the BB's you have to devide.

[old_pop2000]

I guess my view is that Halsey had more than one force. A surface force, and an "air" force (carriers). All the surface force does is provide some AA defense and is otherwise useless, it can't do its job (fighting surface threats) with the carriers along anyway - so by default to use the BB's you have to devide.
I think there is a more important question about Kinkaid's performance after receiving the message from Com Thirdflt concerning the action in the San Bernardino Straits. In that message from Com ThirdFlt, he details that he has created TG 34 to engage in a surface action with the enemy force now in the straits. He states that the enemy fleet is "milling around aimlessly in several groups". He is given reports of the air action against the enemy fleet and is informed that enemy fleet has changed course to 270 degrees. ComThirdflt then informs Kinkaid that he is proceeding north with 3 groups to attack enemy carriers. This is the bulk of the message that Kinkaid eventually sent to King.

In 1949, from his hospital bed in Bethesda Naval Hospital, King wrote a letter to Kinkaid and ask him " What arrangements, in the early morning or night before the dawn of October 25, 1944 were made by you, with the Naval air squadrons under your command or even after dawn, to scout the area of the San Bernardino Straits from the Sibuyan Sea up to the entrance until in the lee of Samar, in order to make certain where the Japanese central force had gone and find it...."

The letter is a page long, but shows King's concern, five years later, that after being told that Halsey and his carrier force had headed north to engage a carrier force, the Admiral Kinkaid did not attempt to scout and reconnoiter the San Bernardino Straits, even after he knew that Halsey's last scouting report was at dusk on the 24th. Would it not have been prudent to have kept that area of concern under surveillance. If he had, could he have recalled Halsey earlier, and maybe TF 38.1? What exactly were Kinkaid's responsibilities in this action. He was Seventh Fleet Commander and responsible for the landings, shore bombardment and protection of his area. The San Bernardino Straits were part of his area, as was the Surigao Straits.

In a later letter, King states to KinKaid" Except for the 5 patrol planes available as snoopers, no proper orders were given by you, to any of your three escort carriers groups to search the whole area from the Sibuyan Sea down throught the rest of the important strait to the entrance to the open sea. Had such planes been on "search", even from the earliest dawn, such planes could not have missed the Japanese "Middle Group", if it were there and could have remained aloft long enough to report the sightings." Kinkaid does state that he never gave any orders to scout the passage. He also states that since he believed that Halsey's TG 34 was covering the entrance near Samar, he had no reason to worry about it. Now, does it not seem apparent, that a force like TG 34 would not have air support or adequate search capability integral to the formation and that it would have been prudent to search and verify where the Japanese Middle force was, precisely. It's ok to chastise Halsey for leaving, but does that absolve Kinkaid from taking adequate steps to keep a close eye on a potentially dangerous force, even if he is certain that a covering force was available. What would the Gods of War say to that.

I would like to hear what the group might think. I believe this is more important than why Halsey did not take his battleships, which to my mind would not or could not accomplish the mission of destroying Kurita. Without aerial reconnaissance and scouting to fix the location of Kurita, the battleships could not have been positioned correctly to seal off the straits. Only aircraft could perform that job and Kinkaid had Taffy 3 to do that job.

[Kyle Holgate]

In my battle IIRC Kongo was the first to go with 3 of 4 MG turrets out, bridge hit 3 or 4x, rudder hit 4x, 4 sevear fires, 3 major fires, and 6 minor fires. Haruna was next with an ammo explosion. Before that it had 4 of 4 MG turret out, bridge hit 5x, rudder 4x, secondary gun ammo exposion 6 sevear fires, 2 major fires and 8 minor fires. Nagato went down with 2 of 4 MG turrets out, bridge hit 4x, rudder hit 3x, 1 sevear fire, 6 major fires, and 5 minor fires. Yamato was the last she succomed after taking hit from all 5 US BB's IIRC she had 2 of 3 MG turrets out, bridge hit 4X, rudder hit 2x, 4 sevear fires, 2 major fires and 4 minor fires.

I have run this a few times using the old dos Action Stations game - so I could use all the ships for both sides. The way they have it set up, the Iowa and New Jersey are about an hour ahead of the slower BB's - so have to deal with Kurita for a bit before they are reenforced. This makes quite a battle - One of the Iowa's can take on Yamato the other one is about right to handle Nagato & the BC's. The main issue I run into as the American is the torpedoes. It's very hard to avoid all the dozens and dozens of long lances that the Japanese can let fly - and my BB's almost always take a few hits that hurt - Even on an Iowa class.
Once the rest of the BB's get in play, and their escorts - the Japanese have little choice but to run or die. Yah, you can put a fish or two into some US ships and maybe sink one of the BB's if you get really lucky - at the expense of the entire Japanese force.

[Citadelvette]

I really think the problems we have with Leyte is the ages old concept of one commander's supporters laying blame on another instead of being truly objective about the issue and recognizing each individual's mistakes. Like Longstreet at Gettysburg so many have tried to make of Halsey at Leyte. Yes, Halsey made mistakes but so did every other major U.S. commader their or at H.Q. over them; Kinkaid, MacARthur, Nimitz evryone made mistakes whicg all contributed to the overall result and its important we recognize this.

[old_pop2000]

I really think the problems we have with Leyte is the ages old concept of one commander's supporters laying blame on another instead of being truly objective about the issue and recognizing each individual's mistakes. Like Longstreet at Gettysburg so many have tried to make of Halsey at Leyte. Yes, Halsey made mistakes but so did every other major U.S. commader their or at H.Q. over them; Kinkaid, MacARthur, Nimitz evryone made mistakes whicg all contributed to the overall result and its important we recognize this.

I agree, but if this forum wishes to analyze and discuss their analysis of the battle, offering hypothetical's, it would seem to me, that we would want to examine the actions, communications and results from top to bottom. Let's not focus on just Halsey, but the JCS on down, because the problems with this operation started with the organization structure of the Pacific area and worked its way down. This, to me, is the professional method of analyzing the actions and this forum purports to be a better than average forum, which I completely agree with. It is far more professional than any other I have watched.

[Kyle Holgate]

I think there is a more important question about Kinkaid's performance after receiving the message from Com Thirdflt concerning the action in the San Bernardino Straits. In that message from Com ThirdFlt, he details that he has created TG 34 to engage in a surface action with the enemy force now in the straits. He states that the enemy fleet is "milling around aimlessly in several groups". He is given reports of the air action against the enemy fleet and is informed that enemy fleet has changed course to 270 degrees. ComThirdflt then informs Kinkaid that he is proceeding north with 3 groups to attack enemy carriers. This is the bulk of the message that Kinkaid eventually sent to King.

In 1949, from his hospital bed in Bethesda Naval Hospital, King wrote a letter to Kinkaid and ask him " What arrangements, in the early morning or night before the dawn of October 25, 1944 were made by you, with the Naval air squadrons under your command or even after dawn, to scout the area of the San Bernardino Straits from the Sibuyan Sea up to the entrance until in the lee of Samar, in order to make certain where the Japanese central force had gone and find it...."

The letter is a page long, but shows King's concern, five years later, that after being told that Halsey and his carrier force had headed north to engage a carrier force, the Admiral Kinkaid did not attempt to scout and reconnoiter the San Bernardino Straits, even after he knew that Halsey's last scouting report was at dusk on the 24th. Would it not have been prudent to have kept that area of concern under surveillance. If he had, could he have recalled Halsey earlier, and maybe TF 38.1? What exactly were Kinkaid's responsibilities in this action. He was Seventh Fleet Commander and responsible for the landings, shore bombardment and protection of his area. The San Bernardino Straits were part of his area, as was the Surigao Straits.

In a later letter, King states to KinKaid" Except for the 5 patrol planes available as snoopers, no proper orders were given by you, to any of your three escort carriers groups to search the whole area from the Sibuyan Sea down throught the rest of the important strait to the entrance to the open sea. Had such planes been on "search", even from the earliest dawn, such planes could not have missed the Japanese "Middle Group", if it were there and could have remained aloft long enough to report the sightings." Kinkaid does state that he never gave any orders to scout the passage. He also states that since he believed that Halsey's TG 34 was covering the entrance near Samar, he had no reason to worry about it. Now, does it not seem apparent, that a force like TG 34 would not have air support or adequate search capability integral to the formation and that it would have been prudent to search and verify where the Japanese Middle force was, precisely. It's ok to chastise Halsey for leaving, but does that absolve Kinkaid from taking adequate steps to keep a close eye on a potentially dangerous force, even if he is certain that a covering force was available. What would the Gods of War say to that.

I would like to hear what the group might think. I believe this is more important than why Halsey did not take his battleships, which to my mind would not or could not accomplish the mission of destroying Kurita. Without aerial reconnaissance and scouting to fix the location of Kurita, the battleships could not have been positioned correctly to seal off the straits. Only aircraft could perform that job and Kinkaid had Taffy 3 to do that job.

Hmm. I think we need a timeline of what was reported to whome and when in order to get a picture in our minds of what information (or lack of) the various commanders had and when they got it. I need to google Earth my way to the strait Kurita used to see how defenseable it is (or isn't). Could a force of BB's plug the hole?

[old_pop2000]

In the wargames that all of you have played, has anyone gamed out the scenario as it happened except with the CVE's providing scouting and reconnaissance of the San Bernardino Straits up to the area off Samar? It would be interesting to see the results, if Kinkaid had gotten up to date intel and had to recall Halsey early on the 25th. Just wondering.

[Kyle Holgate]

In the wargames that all of you have played, has anyone gamed out the scenario as it happened except with the CVE's providing scouting and reconnaissance of the San Bernardino Straits up to the area off Samar? It would be interesting to see the results, if Kinkaid had gotten up to date intel and had to recall Halsey early on the 25th. Just wondering.

Unfortunately wargames needed to really cover this sort of battle are not yet built. I believe that NWS's SAS will be able to do it, eventually.
The problem is you need a game that will allow for somewhat strategic/area level command which drops to tactical level as needed when you get into combat. Midway is child's play compared to the forces involved here + islands to both restrict movement and cause radar issues.

[paladin5]

Unfortunately wargames needed to really cover this sort of battle are not yet built. I believe that NWS's SAS will be able to do it, eventually.
The problem is you need a game that will allow for somewhat strategic/area level command which drops to tactical level as needed when you get into combat. Midway is child's play compared to the forces involved here + islands to both restrict movement and cause radar issues.


still this would be an interesting senario to play out in a war game.

[old_pop2000]

It certainly would be interesting. We know that TG 38.1 was able to close on Kurita and launch an air attack at 1330 of the 25th. If Kinkaid has scouted the San Bernardino Straits, and informed Halsey several hours earlier, is it possible for TG 38.1 to have launched its air attack around 1130, about the time that Kurita was exiting the straits on the Samar area. If this had transpired, could a possible disaster have been turned into a dramatic, final battle in which Ozawa and Kurita are both destroyed. This would have eliminated Yamato, the remaining carriers and most of the remaining smaller battleships. Interesting to contemplate.

[Kyle Holgate]

It certainly would be interesting. We know that TG 38.1 was able to close on Kurita and launch an air attack at 1330 of the 25th. If Kinkaid has scouted the San Bernardino Straits, and informed Halsey several hours earlier, is it possible for TG 38.1 to have launched its air attack around 1130, about the time that Kurita was exiting the straits on the Samar area. If this had transpired, could a possible disaster have been turned into a dramatic, final battle in which Ozawa and Kurita are both destroyed. This would have eliminated Yamato, the remaining carriers and most of the remaining smaller battleships. Interesting to contemplate.

Not nearly as much fun to contemplate as having Halsey's fast battleships + escorts meet Kurita in a surface battle though! Dern blasted airplanes, messed everything up.

[old_pop2000]

Not nearly as much fun to contemplate as having Halsey's fast battleships + escorts meet Kurita in a surface battle though! Dern blasted airplanes, messed everything up.
A surface force would have required more than the fifty aircraft on the CVE's available to Halsey for air cover over the surface force. That would have meant detaching some of his fleet carriers. This would have reduced the number of available strike aircraft below the required number to attack Ozawa. Halsey was short fleet carriers until the next day when TG 38.1, recalled on the morning of the 24th, arrived back into the area.

But, in all probability, it would have taken fleet air wings to really destroy Kurita, although Yamato was already hurting from an aerial bomb that pierced three decks and opened a whole to the sea. Possibly destroyers with torpedoes might have slowed down the escorts, he could have just retreated back to the Sibuyan Sea.

[john964]

John:

Did you use Command at Sea rules to run the battle?Yes, I forgot to put in the damage done to the USN. Nobody was sunk but Iowa Washington and South Dakota were beat up preatty good. IIRC Iowa had 1 MG turret out, 2 secondary guns out, MB FCD out, 2 major and 3 minor fires. Washington had 4 secondary guns out, 2 secondary FC derectors out 1 sevear 1 major and 3 minor fires. South Dakota had 1 MG turret out 2 secondary guns out 1 bridge hit 1 rudder hit 2 engineering hits 1 major and 5 minor fires.

[Warship NWS]

Unfortunately wargames needed to really cover this sort of battle are not yet built. I believe that NWS's SAS will be able to do it, eventually.
The problem is you need a game that will allow for somewhat strategic/area level command which drops to tactical level as needed when you get into combat. Midway is child's play compared to the forces involved here + islands to both restrict movement and cause radar issues.

SAS could handle it in fairly good detail.. for even higher resolution covering the surface engagements SAS+NAW or WCDBv2.0 combination would be viable options.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I guess my view is that Halsey had more than one force. A surface force, and an "air" force (carriers). All the surface force does is provide some AA defense and is otherwise useless, it can't do its job (fighting surface threats) with the carriers along anyway - so by default to use the BB's you have to devide.

Kyle:

Halsey had one fleet, i.e. Third Fleet subdivided into Task Force 38 and Task groups which were composed of carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers. The surface ships, especially the BBs were assigned to Battleship divisions supporting individual Task Groups. The operational plan to create TF-34, which was the gunline was only to be undertaken if surfce action was deemed imminent. Otherwise, the BBs and cruisers screened the carriers. What's important to keep in mind was the sheer size of this fleet. Yes the D-Day fleet and other invasion fleets may have had more total ships, but in terms of how many warships were present, Halsey was in command of the most powerful naval armada in history. That's a lot to keep track of when you're tired, fighting off the flu and trying make decisions on the fly. He could have and should have been served better by his staff.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I think there is a more important question about Kinkaid's performance after receiving the message from Com Thirdflt concerning the action in the San Bernardino Straits. In that message from Com ThirdFlt, he details that he has created TG 34 to engage in a surface action with the enemy force now in the straits. He states that the enemy fleet is "milling around aimlessly in several groups". He is given reports of the air action against the enemy fleet and is informed that enemy fleet has changed course to 270 degrees. ComThirdflt then informs Kinkaid that he is proceeding north with 3 groups to attack enemy carriers. This is the bulk of the message that Kinkaid eventually sent to King.

In 1949, from his hospital bed in Bethesda Naval Hospital, King wrote a letter to Kinkaid and ask him " What arrangements, in the early morning or night before the dawn of October 25, 1944 were made by you, with the Naval air squadrons under your command or even after dawn, to scout the area of the San Bernardino Straits from the Sibuyan Sea up to the entrance until in the lee of Samar, in order to make certain where the Japanese central force had gone and find it...."

The letter is a page long, but shows King's concern, five years later, that after being told that Halsey and his carrier force had headed north to engage a carrier force, the Admiral Kinkaid did not attempt to scout and reconnoiter the San Bernardino Straits, even after he knew that Halsey's last scouting report was at dusk on the 24th. Would it not have been prudent to have kept that area of concern under surveillance. If he had, could he have recalled Halsey earlier, and maybe TF 38.1? What exactly were Kinkaid's responsibilities in this action. He was Seventh Fleet Commander and responsible for the landings, shore bombardment and protection of his area. The San Bernardino Straits were part of his area, as was the Surigao Straits.

In a later letter, King states to KinKaid" Except for the 5 patrol planes available as snoopers, no proper orders were given by you, to any of your three escort carriers groups to search the whole area from the Sibuyan Sea down throught the rest of the important strait to the entrance to the open sea. Had such planes been on "search", even from the earliest dawn, such planes could not have missed the Japanese "Middle Group", if it were there and could have remained aloft long enough to report the sightings." Kinkaid does state that he never gave any orders to scout the passage. He also states that since he believed that Halsey's TG 34 was covering the entrance near Samar, he had no reason to worry about it. Now, does it not seem apparent, that a force like TG 34 would not have air support or adequate search capability integral to the formation and that it would have been prudent to search and verify where the Japanese Middle force was, precisely. It's ok to chastise Halsey for leaving, but does that absolve Kinkaid from taking adequate steps to keep a close eye on a potentially dangerous force, even if he is certain that a covering force was available. What would the Gods of War say to that.

I would like to hear what the group might think. I believe this is more important than why Halsey did not take his battleships, which to my mind would not or could not accomplish the mission of destroying Kurita. Without aerial reconnaissance and scouting to fix the location of Kurita, the battleships could not have been positioned correctly to seal off the straits. Only aircraft could perform that job and Kinkaid had Taffy 3 to do that job.

Dennis:

I happen to agree that Kincaid's performance was found wanting. Also the US submarines didn't perform their patrol functions (with the exception of Darter and Dace) as well as they could have either. They went off looking for targets.

In Kincaid's defense, he was not meant to take on two threats. Halsey was the hammer who was supposed to Kurita out of the battle. He allowed the ridiculously optimistic reports of his aircrews to influence his judgement regarding damages done to Kurita.

Also there was adequate warning that Kurita had reversed course and was heading back into the straits. Now once again the divided command comes into play. Halsey mentioned in a series of articles post war in the Saturday Evening Post that had he known how low Kincaid's ammunition supply was, then he would have never left the straits unguarded. Now this can be taken as either an honest remark or an attempt to cover up a perceived failure to provide the distant cover that was part of his mission.

Regarding whether Halsey's BBs could find Kurita, I would say that between his own scout float planes and 7th fleet's planes, I doubt Kurita can slip past Lee. Lee would have it far easier in terms of screening the landings since he knew where they were. I am also of the opinion that TF-34 could have crippled enough of Kurita's force to allow them to be polished off by air attacks. Kurita ran from 7 escorts and 6 CVEs. Is really going to stand up to Lee's forces? What's your and the group's opinion?

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have run this a few times using the old dos Action Stations game - so I could use all the ships for both sides. The way they have it set up, the Iowa and New Jersey are about an hour ahead of the slower BB's - so have to deal with Kurita for a bit before they are reenforced. This makes quite a battle - One of the Iowa's can take on Yamato the other one is about right to handle Nagato & the BC's. The main issue I run into as the American is the torpedoes. It's very hard to avoid all the dozens and dozens of long lances that the Japanese can let fly - and my BB's almost always take a few hits that hurt - Even on an Iowa class.
Once the rest of the BB's get in play, and their escorts - the Japanese have little choice but to run or die. Yah, you can put a fish or two into some US ships and maybe sink one of the BB's if you get really lucky - at the expense of the entire Japanese force.

Kyle:

The big question this raises is why did Kurita's DDs perform so poorly at Samar? They were not even in the lead of the attack where they should have been. Fact is, I think Lee's DDs would have put even more stress on Kurita than his could have on Lee. They didn't even enter the battle until it was just about over due to some really piss poor orders. The days of the great IJN torpedo attacks were over by 1944.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In the wargames that all of you have played, has anyone gamed out the scenario as it happened except with the CVE's providing scouting and reconnaissance of the San Bernardino Straits up to the area off Samar? It would be interesting to see the results, if Kinkaid had gotten up to date intel and had to recall Halsey early on the 25th. Just wondering.

Dennis:

This again begs the question of whether he could recall Halsey (or plead with Nimitz for assistance while Halsey was still nearby). H.P. Willmott in his book on Leyte Gulf says that many officers awoke on the morning of the 25th and were surprised to see that they still heading North with the rest of Task Force 38. They had expected that TF-34 would have been formed based on what they had heard.

As a sidebar, the already strained relation between Halsey and Kincaid totally collapsed after this battle and especially post war. The two engaged in an epic duel in the print media which even had Admiral King (already ill) chastising both of them. Of course Halsey, who I feel is more sinned against than sinning, had to deal with his twin encounters with typhoons that sullied his reputation far more than Samar did.

About all early warning might have provided was a chance for all three Taffys to concentrate and fall back towards the Leyte Gulf in hopes that Kincaid's 7th Fleet could join them and scare off Kurita.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It certainly would be interesting. We know that TG 38.1 was able to close on Kurita and launch an air attack at 1330 of the 25th. If Kinkaid has scouted the San Bernardino Straits, and informed Halsey several hours earlier, is it possible for TG 38.1 to have launched its air attack around 1130, about the time that Kurita was exiting the straits on the Samar area. If this had transpired, could a possible disaster have been turned into a dramatic, final battle in which Ozawa and Kurita are both destroyed. This would have eliminated Yamato, the remaining carriers and most of the remaining smaller battleships. Interesting to contemplate.

Dennis:

Judging by the number of ships sunk by air attack, I feel that you might not have seen much better results than were seen at Sibuyan Sea on the 24th. Now if Halsey's entire force is concentrated here, then possibly his air strikes cripple or damage Kurita enough so that Lee can close in and fight that rare event, a decisive surface fleet action.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A surface force would have required more than the fifty aircraft on the CVE's available to Halsey for air cover over the surface force. That would have meant detaching some of his fleet carriers. This would have reduced the number of available strike aircraft below the required number to attack Ozawa. Halsey was short fleet carriers until the next day when TG 38.1, recalled on the morning of the 24th, arrived back into the area.

But, in all probability, it would have taken fleet air wings to really destroy Kurita, although Yamato was already hurting from an aerial bomb that pierced three decks and opened a whole to the sea. Possibly destroyers with torpedoes might have slowed down the escorts, he could have just retreated back to the Sibuyan Sea.

Dennis:

With all due respect your numbers are totally off for the CVEs. For Taffy 3 alone (six CVEs) here's the load out:

97 Wildcats
72 Avengers

Now admittedly these ships lacked sufficient anti-shipping weapons particularly AP bombs and enough torpedoes, but this doesn't even take into account the two other Taffy groups. Those CVEs managed to put a serious hurt on Kurita and even landed on Leyte to re-arm with more powerful bombs. Respectfully,

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

With all due respect your numbers are totally off for the CVEs. For Taffy 3 alone (six CVEs) here's the load out:

97 Wildcats
72 Avengers

Now admittedly these ships lacked sufficient anti-shipping weapons particularly AP bombs and enough torpedoes, but this doesn't even take into account the two other Taffy groups. Those CVEs managed to put a serious hurt on Kurita and even landed on Leyte to re-arm with more powerful bombs. Respectfully,
There were no light carriers attached to TF 34. In fact, Third Fleet only had 9 light carriers, each carrying between 19-26 fighters and 9 torpedo planes. One of those, the Independence had only a night air wing. Remember that he had sent back to Ulithi, two carrier groups which eliminates four light carriers out of the eight. He lost Princeton, which leaves him with only three. So, he probably could only spare one or two, at the very most to cover TF 34.

If Halsey had only assigned two CVL's to provide cover for TF 34, that would have given TF 34 approximately 38-52 fighters and 36 torpedo planes, full complement. Since they had been in combat and flying operations, I would expect 10 percent attrition rate. So, roughly speaking, there would have been only 35-47 operational fighters to fly SCAP over the TF 34, based on two CVE's.

Could Halsey have detailed a fleet carrier? Possibly, but remember back to the two carrier TF's that were gone. He only had four fleet carriers available to tackle Ozawa with. One or two CVE's was all he could have spared.

As for Taffy 3, it was in position, 30 miles out to sea off of Samar in its usual night position. In the morning of the 25th, had TF 34 been in position to guard the Straits, Kinkaid would have been notified of any sightings. Once that information was received and he was assured that TF 34 was guarding the straits, TAFFY 3 would have returned southward to its normal position providing air support to the ground troops and SCAP to the Seventh Fleet. Is there a possibility of requesting air support from TAFFY 3, yes. Would he get it, no.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There were no light carriers attached to TF 34. In fact, Third Fleet only had 9 light carriers, each carrying between 19-26 fighters and 9 torpedo planes. One of those, the Independence had only a night air wing. Remember that he had sent back to Ulithi, two carrier groups which eliminates four light carriers out of the eight. He lost Princeton, which leaves him with only three. So, he probably could only spare one or two, at the very most to cover TF 34.

If Halsey had only assigned two CVL's to provide cover for TF 34, that would have given TF 34 approximately 38-52 fighters and 36 torpedo planes, full complement. Since they had been in combat and flying operations, I would expect 10 percent attrition rate. So, roughly speaking, there would have been only 35-47 operational fighters to fly SCAP over the TF 34, based on two CVE's.

Could Halsey have detailed a fleet carrier? Possibly, but remember back to the two carrier TF's that were gone. He only had four fleet carriers available to tackle Ozawa with. One or two CVE's was all he could have spared.

As for Taffy 3, it was in position, 30 miles out to sea off of Samar in its usual night position. In the morning of the 25th, had TF 34 been in position to guard the Straits, Kinkaid would have been notified of any sightings. Once that information was received and he was assured that TF 34 was guarding the straits, TAFFY 3 would have returned southward to its normal position providing air support to the ground troops and SCAP to the Seventh Fleet. Is there a possibility of requesting air support from TAFFY 3, yes. Would he get it, no.

Dennis:

In an effort to clear up any misunderstandings here, I was responding to your claim that the CVEs only had 50 planes:

Quote A surface force would have required more than the fifty aircraft on the CVE's available to Halsey for air cover over the surface force. That would have meant detaching some of his fleet carriers. This would have reduced the number of available strike aircraft below the required number to attack Ozawa. Halsey was short fleet carriers until the next day when TG 38.1, recalled on the morning of the 24th, arrived back into the area.

But, in all probability, it would have taken fleet air wings to really destroy Kurita, although Yamato was already hurting from an aerial bomb that pierced three decks and opened a whole to the sea. quote

From your reply I'm making the assumption that you meant CVLs here. Regardless I think you are missing the point. Any air assets assigned to Lee's task force would have been primarily for air cover, not strike. If Halsey wanted to destroy Kurita with air strikes, he would have either detached a task group with fleet carriers as you mentioned, or else stuck around and used his entire strength to attack Kurita. The only reason that TF-34 would be formed would be for a surface action. When Halsey was weighing his options, one reason he didn't form up TF-34 besides dividing his forces was he didn't want Lee operating without air cover. But if he does form TF-34, then I think we can safely say that Kincaid's Taffy's could have provided adequate air cover. You mention that he would not pull them off their covering the beaches. If you recall he exactly did that to help support Taffy 3. All three CVE groups were launching air strikes against Kurita, in fact it was the two Taffys not under attack that launched the most effective strikes and probably did more to drive off Kurita than anything else.

Also if he asks Halsey is TF-34 guarding the Straits, in this case Halsey would say yes and most likely request some air support. I can't see Kincaid, who is desperately asking for this coverage, saying no. Even if it is just scouting and CAP, he has the assets to do this. While air strikes would be nice, Lee is there for a surface battle. Would he be able to fight a battle of annihilation? Probably not in daylight unless Kurita pushes forward. There aren't too many decisive surface actions between roughly equal fleets. The only reason I can see Kurita pushing ahead would be if he sees Lee's task force and no carriers. Then he might feel that he has a much better chance to achieve some sort of victory. When he encountered Sprague's Taffy 3, he and his staff misidentified the ships as Essex carriers and Baltimore class cruisers. He had no idea for most of the battle that he was fighting a very weak force.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

In an effort to clear up any misunderstandings here, I was responding to your claim that the CVEs only had 50 planes:

Quote A surface force would have required more than the fifty aircraft on the CVE's available to Halsey for air cover over the surface force. That would have meant detaching some of his fleet carriers. This would have reduced the number of available strike aircraft below the required number to attack Ozawa. Halsey was short fleet carriers until the next day when TG 38.1, recalled on the morning of the 24th, arrived back into the area.

But, in all probability, it would have taken fleet air wings to really destroy Kurita, although Yamato was already hurting from an aerial bomb that pierced three decks and opened a whole to the sea. quote

From your reply I'm making the assumption that you meant CVLs here. Regardless I think you are missing the point. Any air assets assigned to Lee's task force would have been primarily for air cover, not strike. If Halsey wanted to destroy Kurita with air strikes, he would have either detached a task group with fleet carriers as you mentioned, or else stuck around and used his entire strength to attack Kurita. The only reason that TF-34 would be formed would be for a surface action. When Halsey was weighing his options, one reason he didn't form up TF-34 besides dividing his forces was he didn't want Lee operating without air cover. But if he does form TF-34, then I think we can safely say that Kincaid's Taffy's could have provided adequate air cover. You mention that he would not pull them off their covering the beaches. If you recall he exactly did that to help support Taffy 3. All three CVE groups were launching air strikes against Kurita, in fact it was the two Taffys not under attack that launched the most effective strikes and probably did more to drive off Kurita than anything else.

Also if he asks Halsey is TF-34 guarding the Straits, in this case Halsey would say yes and most likely request some air support. I can't see Kincaid, who is desperately asking for this coverage, saying no. Even if it is just scouting and CAP, he has the assets to do this. While air strikes would be nice, Lee is there for a surface battle. Would he be able to fight a battle of annihilation? Probably not in daylight unless Kurita pushes forward. There aren't too many decisive surface actions between roughly equal fleets. The only reason I can see Kurita pushing ahead would be if he sees Lee's task force and no carriers. Then he might feel that he has a much better chance to achieve some sort of victory. When he encountered Sprague's Taffy 3, he and his staff misidentified the ships as Essex carriers and Baltimore class cruisers. He had no idea for most of the battle that he was fighting a very weak force.
First, you are correct, my fingers moved faster than the brain, which tends to occur these days. The light carriers in the TF 38 groups were CVL's of the Independence, Taffy 3 carriers were of the Casablanca Class escort carriers. I hope that clarifies the confusion. However, something you may or may not know. The pilots on the Independence class were specifically trained as CAP pilots for air to air support, this is not true of the pilots on the Casablanca's in Taffy 3. They were equipped and trained as bomber pilots, with little or no air to air combat training. This might not be in the books, but is true.

Let's also clarify the issue of the creation of TF 34. The message that was sent to Admiral Lee about the creation of TF 34, occurred at 0000-0234 hours of the 25th. The BB's at this time were apportioned out to each TF of the Third Fleet. This creation was in response to an Essex search aircraft detection during its mission, of a Japanese force consisting of three carriers, 2 light cruisers, and 3 destroyers. It was later confirmed and amplified by a search aircraft from the Independence as being 3 carriers, 4 -6 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers with one of the carriers being of the Ise class.

At 1010 hrs of the 24th, TF 38.3 and 4 were ordered to close on 38.2 under the command of TF 38.4 commander. They were to operate in the vicinity of the San Bernardino Straits and that if the enemy sortied, TF 34 would be formed with the USS Massachusetts leading the cruising formation.

At 2010 hrs, ComThirdFleet ordered TF 38.4 to head north.

At 0226 hrs, Commander TF 38 recommended that fleet head north after new sightings by USS Independence search aircraft. He also recommended TF 34 be formed at this time.

At 0253 hrs, TF 38 commander ordered TF 34 to take station 10 miles north of TF 38 and clear at 25 knots.

At 0330 TF 34 commander ordered TF 34 ships to clear independently, and take up cruising disposition 4 and speed was reduced to 15 knots.

After this, Third fleet engaged Ozawa and at 1148 on the 25th, TF 34 was dissolved, with TF 34.5 created, screening TF 38 ahead, moving back south towards the San Bernardino Straits.

Now, that is the exact timeline of events. At no time, was TF 34 ever created to cover the San Bernardino Straits and it was never contemplated. It was a battleline created to screen the carriers in approach of a fleet action with opposing enemy forces. Kinkaid and his staff eavesdropped on the message from ComThirdFleet to Lee and missed part of the message. From this fragment, they assumed that it was being created to cover the Straits. This is confirmed by a message that Kinkaid sent to King stating that Halsey had "detached certain fast battleships in preparation to engage strong enemy surface force then in the Sibuyan Sea." He then explains that Halsey message states he is heading north with three groups. From this, Kinkaid and his staff assumed that the fourth group was covering the San Bernardino Straits.

Unfortunately, Kinkaid had not been privy or eavesdropped on all the messages and only got part of it. he jumped to conclusions about why TF 34 was being formed.

If you look at the temporary task organization case 1 in TF 34's AAR, it specifically states Heavy Surface Striking Force. It then lists battle line and its ships, right flank, and then left flank and then center.

If Halsey, had contemplated using his Third fleet as a covering force for the San Bernardino straits, he would have left the fleet configured just the way it was. He would have sent out scouts, like he had done on the 24th and then when Kurita was spotted, launched a massive air assault and finished him off.

Halsey would never have detached TF 34 to guard the San Bernardino straits without air cover, he understood the value of concentrating his forces.

There would never have been a request to Kinkaid for air support over TF 34 because it would never exist and after 1100 hrs approximately on the 25th, it didn't exist any longer.

I hope this clears up any confusion between us. I should have done this before now. My humble apologies for the confusion, my friend.

[Ed Rotondaro]

First, you are correct, my fingers moved faster than the brain, which tends to occur these days. The light carriers in the TF 38 groups were CVL's of the Independence, Taffy 3 carriers were of the Casablanca Class escort carriers. I hope that clarifies the confusion. However, something you may or may not know. The pilots on the Independence class were specifically trained as CAP pilots for air to air support, this is not true of the pilots on the Casablanca's in Taffy 3. They were equipped and trained as bomber pilots, with little or no air to air combat training. This might not be in the books, but is true.

Let's also clarify the issue of the creation of TF 34. The message that was sent to Admiral Lee about the creation of TF 34, occurred at 0000-0234 hours of the 25th. The BB's at this time were apportioned out to each TF of the Third Fleet. This creation was in response to an Essex search aircraft detection during its mission, of a Japanese force consisting of three carriers, 2 light cruisers, and 3 destroyers. It was later confirmed and amplified by a search aircraft from the Independence as being 3 carriers, 4 -6 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers with one of the carriers being of the Ise class.

At 1010 hrs of the 24th, TF 38.3 and 4 were ordered to close on 38.2 under the command of TF 38.4 commander. They were to operate in the vicinity of the San Bernardino Straits and that if the enemy sortied, TF 34 would be formed with the USS Massachusetts leading the cruising formation.

At 2010 hrs, ComThirdFleet ordered TF 38.4 to head north.

At 0226 hrs, Commander TF 38 recommended that fleet head north after new sightings by USS Independence search aircraft. He also recommended TF 34 be formed at this time.

At 0253 hrs, TF 38 commander ordered TF 34 to take station 10 miles north of TF 38 and clear at 25 knots.

At 0330 TF 34 commander ordered TF 34 ships to clear independently, and take up cruising disposition 4 and speed was reduced to 15 knots.

After this, Third fleet engaged Ozawa and at 1148 on the 25th, TF 34 was dissolved, with TF 34.5 created, screening TF 38 ahead, moving back south towards the San Bernardino Straits.

Now, that is the exact timeline of events. At no time, was TF 34 ever created to cover the San Bernardino Straits and it was never contemplated. It was a battleline created to screen the carriers in approach of a fleet action with opposing enemy forces. Kinkaid and his staff eavesdropped on the message from ComThirdFleet to Lee and missed part of the message. From this fragment, they assumed that it was being created to cover the Straits. This is confirmed by a message that Kinkaid sent to King stating that Halsey had "detached certain fast battleships in preparation to engage strong enemy surface force then in the Sibuyan Sea." He then explains that Halsey message states he is heading north with three groups. From this, Kinkaid and his staff assumed that the fourth group was covering the San Bernardino Straits.

Unfortunately, Kinkaid had not been privy or eavesdropped on all the messages and only got part of it. he jumped to conclusions about why TF 34 was being formed.

If you look at the temporary task organization case 1 in TF 34's AAR, it specifically states Heavy Surface Striking Force. It then lists battle line and its ships, right flank, and then left flank and then center.

If Halsey, had contemplated using his Third fleet as a covering force for the San Bernardino straits, he would have left the fleet configured just the way it was. He would have sent out scouts, like he had done on the 24th and then when Kurita was spotted, launched a massive air assault and finished him off.

Halsey would never have detached TF 34 to guard the San Bernardino straits without air cover, he understood the value of concentrating his forces.

There would never have been a request to Kinkaid for air support over TF 34 because it would never exist and after 1100 hrs approximately on the 25th, it didn't exist any longer.

I hope this clears up any confusion between us. I should have done this before now. My humble apologies for the confusion, my friend.

Hi Dennis:

Thanks for the clarifications. I do agree that the CVE pilots were not trained for air to air combat (and being equipped with Wildcats would have been at a disadvantage against Zeros which seemed to be the primary IJN navak plane at this stage of the war). In fact the actual combat record of the Wildcats at Samar suggests that they were far better at the figher bomber role.

I will contest some of your post though. All data comes from Thomas Culter's book "The Battle of Leyte Gulf" pages 180-184. The proposal to form TF-34 was based on Halsey's contingency plans on October 24th 1944. Kurita was still at the time advancing thru the strait as of 1500 hours. Halsey is now looking at a possible night time surface action. He draws up the plan for TF-34, when and if Kurita's force emerged from the strait. Copies were sent to Nimitz and King, but not to Kincaid who as you mentioned eavesdropped on the message. Cutler mentions that the nuances of the message were the subject of misinterpretation. TF-34 was a contingency plan, not an operational order. Kincaid with his eavesdropping interprets it as something that will occur. Now this is further muddied by a subsequent message from Halsey stating that "If enemy sorties through San Bernadino Strait, TF-34 will be formed when directed by me". This was sent by short ranged radio (most likely TBS) to his own command. Nimitiz, King and Kincaid never received it.

The question at this juncture is how much did Halsey know about Ozawa's decoy force? When crunch time came, he know there were two enemy fleets approaching. He chose after deliberating with his staff to engage the one he thought was the greater danger, even though he did have an ad hoc contingency plan to deal with a surface threat with a surface task force.

So essentially we have to conclude that T-34 was never meant to operate in daylight. If the carriers can launch, Halsey will use them to smash the IJN. If TF-34 wasn't meant to operate without air cover, then Halsey either goes north as he did historically, or else he stays put and goes for round two against Kurita with his massed carriers. If Halsey doesn't believe in splitting his force, one can only conclude that TF-34 was an ad hoc formation meant to fight a surface action when the carriers were unable to strike.

[old_pop2000]

It's interesting to consider one point. How much actual battle experience did Halsey actually have with carriers and battleships. I don't know his complete biography but here is some of it.

1. He missed Coral Sea because of the Doolittle Raid. This wasn't really about handling carriers or a fleet in a major engagement.

2. He missed Midway due to illness.

3. He became Commander, South Pacific Forces which included Guadalcanal but never conducted any real battles, like Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons.

4. He was in Pearl, planning follow on operations during the Mariana's operation.

5. He took command of the Third Fleet in June 1944, four months before the Philippine operation conducting raids, not battles, against Okinawa, Formosa and the air bases on Luzon preparatory to the landings.

However, where is his actual battle experience? He did conduct the landings at Ulithi, the Palaus. But there was not contesting of those areas. Where was his actual experience in combat leading a fleet?

Officer's like Fletcher, Noyes, Sherman, Mitscher, and especially Spruance had actual battle experience leading a carrier/battleship force. I wonder if his performance at Leyte Gulf was the work of the Peter Principle in action? Halsey had risen to the height of his incompetancy.:p

Possibly he was like the officer's in the Civil War that he felt were above normal like J.E.B. Stuart. Cavalry officers who were dashing, raiders but unfortunately, at the critical time like Gettysburg, failed to perform the mission assigned to them.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It's interesting to consider one point. How much actual battle experience did Halsey actually have with carriers and battleships. I don't know his complete biography but here is some of it.

1. He missed Coral Sea because of the Doolittle Raid. This wasn't really about handling carriers or a fleet in a major engagement.

2. He missed Midway due to illness.

3. He became Commander, South Pacific Forces which included Guadalcanal but never conducted any real battles, like Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons.

4. He was in Pearl, planning follow on operations during the Mariana's operation.

5. He took command of the Third Fleet in June 1944, four months before the Philippine operation conducting raids, not battles, against Okinawa, Formosa and the air bases on Luzon preparatory to the landings.

However, where is his actual battle experience? He did conduct the landings at Ulithi, the Palaus. But there was not contesting of those areas. Where was his actual experience in combat leading a fleet?

Officer's like Fletcher, Noyes, Sherman, Mitscher, and especially Spruance had actual battle experience leading a carrier/battleship force. I wonder if his performance at Leyte Gulf was the work of the Peter Principle in action? Halsey had risen to the height of his incompetancy.:p

Possibly he was like the officer's in the Civil War that he felt were above normal like J.E.B. Stuart. Cavalry officers who were dashing, raiders but unfortunately, at the critical time like Gettysburg, failed to perform the mission assigned to them.


Dennis:

Excellent points. I did not want to tarnish his reputation, but the record shows that Spruance and Fletcher had more success. Halsey was in most respects the inspirational guy at the right time, as opposed to the big picture guy. He was sadly enough out of his depth by 1944-45.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Excellent points. I did not want to tarnish his reputation, but the record shows that Spruance and Fletcher had more success. Halsey was in most respects the inspirational guy at the right time, as opposed to the big picture guy. He was sadly enough out of his depth by 1944-45.
A constructive, impartial view of a person's abilities is not tarnishing his reputation. He was a raider, as the early raids on the Marshall's, Tokyo, Formosa, Iwo Jima, Wake, Wotje and all the rest are testament to. However, landing operations require the discipline of focusing on the objectives or keeping your eye on the ball. It would appear, that he had a blind side. I would also say that the organizational structure of the Pacific theatre as well as the orders issued were poorly written. The structure did not adapt to the changing conditions of 1944 from when it was created in 1941. I believe that Admiral Marc Mitscher was a better fleet commander than Halsey. He estimated accurately that the Japanese carriers could not have any aircraft aboard and also commented that the fleet should not leave the landing area. He seems to be the better choice. However, I also agree that Kinkaid was not the best choice either. Possibly another admiral would have been better. Halsey always had reservations about Kinkaids ability. I believe that Ray Turner would be the better choice for the amphibious commander.

[Spook046]

It's interesting to consider one point. How much actual battle experience did Halsey actually have with carriers and battleships. I don't know his complete biography but here is some of it.

1. He missed Coral Sea because of the Doolittle Raid. This wasn't really about handling carriers or a fleet in a major engagement.

2. He missed Midway due to illness.

3. He became Commander, South Pacific Forces which included Guadalcanal but never conducted any real battles, like Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons.

4. He was in Pearl, planning follow on operations during the Mariana's operation.

5. He took command of the Third Fleet in June 1944, four months before the Philippine operation conducting raids, not battles, against Okinawa, Formosa and the air bases on Luzon preparatory to the landings.

However, where is his actual battle experience? He did conduct the landings at Ulithi, the Palaus. But there was not contesting of those areas. Where was his actual experience in combat leading a fleet?

Officer's like Fletcher, Noyes, Sherman, Mitscher, and especially Spruance had actual battle experience leading a carrier/battleship force. I wonder if his performance at Leyte Gulf was the work of the Peter Principle in action? Halsey had risen to the height of his incompetancy.:p


Actually, Dennis, you've caught a very good point which has buzzed around in my head for a year or so.

Often, in 1944, carrier task group commanders that did not having prior command of a carrier force first went through a "makee learnee" observer stretch, watching how things were done. Jocko Clark went through this in early 1944. "Slew" McCain, while CO of TG 38.1 during the Leyte Gulf battle, was in "makee learnee" status to soon take overall command of TF 38 from Mitscher at the opportune moment. (Some feel that other TG commanders like Fred Sherman were more capable and should have been promoted up faster to take all of TF 38 instead, but that's another topic.)

And the Spruance of the Marianas operations was seasoned through prior months of fleet command and amphibious operations starting from the Gilberts campaign of late '43, where some hard and contentious lessons along the way had to be worked in.

Halsey, in turn, took up his seaborne 3rd Fleet command in late August of 1944. As an operational or "theater" commander of SoPac from 1942 to early 1944, IMO Halsey performed his job pretty well, particularly in late 1943 while closing in on Rabaul. But as Dennis has noted, Halsey's immediate and "onboard" experience in fleet command and maneuver was pretty limited, and what he commanded in 1942 as carrier forces wasn't anything quite so daunting as the balance of TF 38 and the rest of 3rd Fleet two years later.

For all intents, was Halsey ready enough in mid to late-1944 for seaborne command of a very sizable combat fleet? Could a month or two of "makee learnee" been helpful for Halsey to have done (onboard observation during Spruance's prior command cycle) before taking the reigns? We can only speculate, though perhaps in Halsey's case it could have arguably not made a dime of difference.

[Spook046]

For that matter, concerning Spruance, from what I've read of Spruance's argued maxims and principles on naval and amphibious operations in 1943-44 (Buell), on face value he actually violated some of these concerning the later Iwo Jima operation. I don't buy into the full critiques and charges leveled by R S Burnell and I think that Bradley's limited take on Spruance in "Flags of Our Fathers" was no more than a character assasination, but the more I read, the less impressed I still am with Spruance's overall performance at Iwo. That too will have to sit for another topic.

[john964]

First, you are correct, my fingers moved faster than the brain, which tends to occur these days. The light carriers in the TF 38 groups were CVL's of the Independence, Taffy 3 carriers were of the Casablanca Class escort carriers. I hope that clarifies the confusion. However, something you may or may not know. The pilots on the Independence class were specifically trained as CAP pilots for air to air support, this is not true of the pilots on the Casablanca's in Taffy 3. They were equipped and trained as bomber pilots, with little or no air to air combat training. This might not be in the books, but is true.
I beg to differ all fighter pilots of the time recieved basic ACM training in flight school but the with lack of consant practice or actual combat those skills would have erroeded down. It is like the TBM pilots of the Taffies the all probably recieved Anti-ship training but those skills were lacking from lack of use, but they were probably very good ground support bomber and ASW pilots as this was there pimeary mission.

[old_pop2000]

I believe that this is just one of the subjects about the Pacific war that is not examined in great detail. All of the officers are gone, I don't believe that we dishonor their memory and accomplishments if we honest examine how these officers and the whole system functioned in time of war. It is important for future officers to understand how we got where we are.

As far as maxims and principles, they are not hard and fast rules, just guidelines. There will be times to break them and times to adhere. It is the more successful leader who knows when.

[Spook046]

As far as maxims and principles, they are not hard and fast rules, just guidelines. There will be times to break them and times to adhere. It is the more successful leader who knows when.

Yes, this is correct. Which is why I added the "face value" qualifier in my prior post, I'm too dang subliminal sometimes. :o

But before mining down into that later, I'd better close up the loose ends I still have regarding the Leyte operations. Hopefully tonite. ;)

[old_pop2000]

Yes, this is correct. Which is why I added the "face value" qualifier in my prior post, I'm too dang subliminal sometimes. :o

But before mining down into that later, I'd better close up the loose ends I still have regarding the Leyte operations. Hopefully tonite. ;)
I did not miss the " face value " qualifier.

I think Raymond Spruance maybe the prototype of the modern, 21st century leader. He knows the value of his staff, encourages ideas and uses their suggestions and ideas. He understands the calculus of modern war. He weighs each ship and each man carefully and ensures that all actions further the goal. He understands technology, its uses and its weaknesses. He understood the decision making process and that a carefully made decision was better than a hasty one. He had timing. He gave general instructions to his staff, got out of the way, and let them do their jobs. He was manager, and probably the brightest officer in the US Navy. It was said that King called himself the second smartest man in the US Navy.. next to Ray Spruance. He was also a very good chess player.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A constructive, impartial view of a person's abilities is not tarnishing his reputation. He was a raider, as the early raids on the Marshall's, Tokyo, Formosa, Iwo Jima, Wake, Wotje and all the rest are testament to. However, landing operations require the discipline of focusing on the objectives or keeping your eye on the ball. It would appear, that he had a blind side. I would also say that the organizational structure of the Pacific theatre as well as the orders issued were poorly written. The structure did not adapt to the changing conditions of 1944 from when it was created in 1941. I believe that Admiral Marc Mitscher was a better fleet commander than Halsey. He estimated accurately that the Japanese carriers could not have any aircraft aboard and also commented that the fleet should not leave the landing area. He seems to be the better choice. However, I also agree that Kinkaid was not the best choice either. Possibly another admiral would have been better. Halsey always had reservations about Kinkaids ability. I believe that Ray Turner would be the better choice for the amphibious commander.

Dennis:

I agree. Mitscher and Spruance are at the top of my list for best admirals in WWII (at least in a combat situation). For surface actions, Lee followed by Tip Merrill tops the list. Unfortunately what you see is that WWII naval combat came to be dominated by two types of weapons, naval aviation and submarines. Now the USN was well served by Admiral Charles Lockwood (Uncle Charlie to his fellow bubble heads), but the airedales took awhile to find the right mix of leaders to exploit their abilities. This may be due to the fact that air minded admirals were not in positions of command at the start of the war. The Air heads while understanding the power of air attacks lacked the experience of commanding fleets in battle. (Mitscher pretty much learned on the job). So we proceed.

[Ed Rotondaro]

For that matter, concerning Spruance, from what I've read of Spruance's argued maxims and principles on naval and amphibious operations in 1943-44 (Buell), on face value he actually violated some of these concerning the later Iwo Jima operation. I don't buy into the full critiques and charges leveled by R S Burnell and I think that Bradley's limited take on Spruance in "Flags of Our Fathers" was no more than a character assasination, but the more I read, the less impressed I still am with Spruance's overall performance at Iwo. That too will have to sit for another topic.


Spook:

Good points in both posts, I will only say that naval warfare was changing so much that no admiral anywhere was able to fully integretate the lessons of WWII in the Pacific into the relatively brief time frame in question. Now imagine this: anti aircraft warfare somehow improves to the point where surface action becomes viable again (Read lots of David Drake's sci-fi for this). So how do the current crop of US carrier schooled admirals adapt? Good to see you back on board (other Ed).

[Citadelvette]

I believe that this is just one of the subjects about the Pacific war that is not examined in great detail. All of the officers are gone, I don't believe that we dishonor their memory and accomplishments if we honest examine how these officers and the whole system functioned in time of war. It is important for future officers to understand how we got where we are.

As far as maxims and principles, they are not hard and fast rules, just guidelines. There will be times to break them and times to adhere. It is the more successful leader who knows when.

I agree, objective examination does not tarnish the reputations of these officers or rebuke their accomplishments. No human being is perfect and we all make mistakes, even our large than life historical figures. No don't there is criticism of the actions of any wartime commander. But to be honest Halsey, Spruance, Mitscher, etc. were good officers and commanders, each had their strong suits and weaknesses, and I believe Nimitz and King tried to employ those in the most advantageous ways, which with the constant and rapid evolution of combat in Pacific was difficult .

[old_pop2000]

I agree, objective examination does not tarnish the reputations of these officers or rebuke their accomplishments. No human being is perfect and we all make mistakes, even our large than life historical figures. No don't there is criticism of the actions of any wartime commander. But to be honest Halsey, Spruance, Mitscher, etc. were good officers and commanders, each had their strong suits and weaknesses, and I believe Nimitz and King tried to employ those in the most advantageous ways, which with the constant and rapid evolution of combat in Pacific was difficult .
I find it interesting that the military, since the Vietnam War has employed the lessons learned technique. I read many of these and the honesty and forthright language will always add to the body of knowledge about the art of war. When I was a manager and team leader in the government, I held lessons learned and After action meetings when we had a server problem or major problem in the field with the desktop computers. I would ask for someone to state the problem, to ensure that the whole group understood what the problem was. Most of the time, they did not. Once the problem was defined, they could easily gather the facts and solve the issue. I believe that if our historical analysis methods can be used to improve our military simulators, we will have a much better military.

[Spook046]

Spook:

Good points in both posts, I will only say that naval warfare was changing so much that no admiral anywhere was able to fully integretate the lessons of WWII in the Pacific into the relatively brief time frame in question. Now imagine this: anti aircraft warfare somehow improves to the point where surface action becomes viable again (Read lots of David Drake's sci-fi for this). So how do the current crop of US carrier schooled admirals adapt? Good to see you back on board (other Ed).

Thanks, Ed. You might wonder why I tend to disappear for the given stretches that I do, particularly when all is said and done through the years, this forum remains one of the very best in discernment, information, objectivity, and forthright discussion of military history.

It wasn't the only reason, but adding another child to the family had a bit to do with it this time....

[old_pop2000]

Thanks, Ed. You might wonder why I tend to disappear for the given stretches that I do, particularly when all is said and done through the years, this forum remains one of the very best in discernment, information, objectivity, and forthright discussion of military history.

It wasn't the only reason, but adding another child to the family had a bit to do with it this time....
You know, they've found a cure for that.:D Its the water!!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thanks, Ed. You might wonder why I tend to disappear for the given stretches that I do, particularly when all is said and done through the years, this forum remains one of the very best in discernment, information, objectivity, and forthright discussion of military history.

It wasn't the only reason, but adding another child to the family had a bit to do with it this time....

Spook:

Congratulations! The circle of life is much more important than debating history. Well, was it a son or a daughter?:D Sincerely,

[Ed Rotondaro]

You know, they've found a cure for that.:D Its the water!!

And how many grandchildren do you have you old fart?:p

[Rick]

I believe that Admiral Marc Mitscher was a better fleet commander than Halsey.

Halsey had a huge reputation, but I wonder how much was it due to the press, building him up because of the Tokyo Raid? (Bull Halsey anyone?) and his colorful personality (kinda Pattonish in this respect, lots of good copy for the correspondents) It was a big suprise to me a few months ago when I realized that Halsey only fought a single carrier battle. HIs battle experience prior to Leyte Gulf isnt a heck of a lot.

Some early hit and run raids in early 42
Doolittle Raid
and...well thats it

He was out of action for Coral sea and Midway, was a theater commander in the SW Pacific, (and the one Carrier battle during his term was not a victory) not an afloat commander untill he got 3rd Fleet after the landings in the Marianas were over.

[old_pop2000]

And how many grandchildren do you have you old fart?:p
I have one, so far.

[john964]

And how many grandchildren do you have you old fart?:p
My mom has nine and three

[old_pop2000]

Let really examine, from a human's point of view, what Halsey's was thinking and why he took the steps.

First, he had been an officer in the Navy for 40 years and will probably retire shortly after this war is ended, he knows that. He now is in command, finally, of probably the greatest fleet that any nation has ever put into the water. He has the greatest battleships ever built. He has the best carriers with the most experienced pilots and probably the best naval aircraft built. And he has more of them than most countries have in their entire air force. He has the orders to seek out the enemy fleet and destroy it. He also knows that this is probably the swan song for the combined fleet. A fleet that he has trained to fight for most of his career. Yes, Kurita is a threat, but in his mind, he minimizes the threat because he is aware of Jesse Oldendorf's battleships and Kinkaids CVE's are still at the landing site, ready and able to defend it. He also aware that Kurita is hurting, how much, he isn't certain. He also is aware that TF 38.1 is heading at high speed to protect the straits, recalled from Ulithi and is only four to six hours away. But, he now has accurate information that a Japanese battle fleet of carriers, cruisers, destroyers and battleships is headed straight for his fleet. Does this 60 year old admiral, at the end of career, with the greatest fleet in history, continue to play sentry duty to Kinkaid or does he turn his magnificent tool northward and head toward a meeting engagement with a fleet he has trained to fight for 40 years.

That is the situation that Bull Halsey saw in his mind. Yes, he knew Bogan, Mitscher and lee were correct, doctrine says he should have stayed at the head of the San Bernardino Straits waiting for the remnants of Kurita's force to come out, a force he has already pounded for over four to six hours and launched four full airstrikes on, the day before.

But, like JEB Stuart after Brandy Station in the Civil War, the temptation to go galloping off was more than his good judgment could contain. Halsey simply lost sight of the ball. In this case, his responsibility to protect the landing zone. As a admiral in the US Navy, he was placed in that position due to his training and hopefully, attention to duty and good judgement. On that day, his good judgment failed him.

So, that is what we will remember of Bull Halsey, the one moment when his good judgment was overridden by his need for one last charge at the enemy.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Halsey had a huge reputation, but I wonder how much was it due to the press, building him up because of the Tokyo Raid? (Bull Halsey anyone?) and his colorful personality (kinda Pattonish in this respect, lots of good copy for the correspondents) It was a big suprise to me a few months ago when I realized that Halsey only fought a single carrier battle. HIs battle experience prior to Leyte Gulf isnt a heck of a lot.

Some early hit and run raids in early 42
Doolittle Raid
and...well thats it

He was out of action for Coral sea and Midway, was a theater commander in the SW Pacific, (and the one Carrier battle during his term was not a victory) not an afloat commander untill he got 3rd Fleet after the landings in the Marianas were over.

Rick:

Very solid post! That's exactly the truth about Halsey. He was a hero in the public's eyes when we needed one and he knew how to work the press. Kincaid by contrast was more subdued and even cautioned the press not to attribute any colorful quotes to him. What I do find interesting is that he and MacArthur (the ultimate ego driven prima donna) got along great. One would think they would have locked horns, but early on Halsey stood up to Mac and apparently earned his respect to the point where the two made a great team.

Halsey also had the reputation as a sailor's admiral. The rank and file loved him and his staff always enjoyed working under him. He did unfortunately have a tendency to go behind his subordinate admirals backs to issue his own operational instructions to task forces. Mitscher especially despised that and I think had little use for Halsey.

Halsey comes off better on paper than his record deserves. By contrast, Spruance was a true genius, probably the best mind in the navy at the time. His problem was his distance from people. He was not a touchy feely guy. It speaks volumes that he never published memoirs and if I recall may have destroyed his provate papers. For Spruance it was results that mattered. Let the record show what was accomplished. He was also a far better carrier admiral than Halsey despite being a cruiser admiral by training.

How's the job?

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have one, so far.

Excellent! Boy or girl?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let really examine, from a human's point of view, what Halsey's was thinking and why he took the steps.

First, he had been an officer in the Navy for 40 years and will probably retire shortly after this war is ended, he knows that. He now is in command, finally, of probably the greatest fleet that any nation has ever put into the water. He has the greatest battleships ever built. He has the best carriers with the most experienced pilots and probably the best naval aircraft built. And he has more of them than most countries have in their entire air force. He has the orders to seek out the enemy fleet and destroy it. He also knows that this is probably the swan song for the combined fleet. A fleet that he has trained to fight for most of his career. Yes, Kurita is a threat, but in his mind, he minimizes the threat because he is aware of Jesse Oldendorf's battleships and Kinkaids CVE's are still at the landing site, ready and able to defend it. He also aware that Kurita is hurting, how much, he isn't certain. He also is aware that TF 38.1 is heading at high speed to protect the straits, recalled from Ulithi and is only four to six hours away. But, he now has accurate information that a Japanese battle fleet of carriers, cruisers, destroyers and battleships is headed straight for his fleet. Does this 60 year old admiral, at the end of career, with the greatest fleet in history, continue to play sentry duty to Kinkaid or does he turn his magnificent tool northward and head toward a meeting engagement with a fleet he has trained to fight for 40 years.

That is the situation that Bull Halsey saw in his mind. Yes, he knew Bogan, Mitscher and lee were correct, doctrine says he should have stayed at the head of the San Bernardino Straits waiting for the remnants of Kurita's force to come out, a force he has already pounded for over four to six hours and launched four full airstrikes on, the day before.

But, like JEB Stuart after Brandy Station in the Civil War, the temptation to go galloping off was more than his good judgment could contain. Halsey simply lost sight of the ball. In this case, his responsibility to protect the landing zone. As a admiral in the US Navy, he was placed in that position due to his training and hopefully, attention to duty and good judgement. On that day, his good judgment failed him.

So, that is what we will remember of Bull Halsey, the one moment when his good judgment was overridden by his need for one last charge at the enemy.


Dennis:

That is as perfect a summation of Halsey and Leyte Gulf as I have ever read. Excellent! The man who was reputed to be a carrier admiral was leading with his battleline. He wanted a gun action. This would be the culmination of his career.

Now imagine Spruance in his place? A man who had won the two biggest carrier battles in history. A man who wold later turn down a chance for a gun action against the Yamato. What does Ray do?

Final sidebar: Halsey had no problem splitting his forces during the two naval battles around Guadalcanal in November 1942. He detaches his most powerful surface elements in the form of the two new battleships Washington and South Dakota with four DDs as escort. He watches as Admiral Lee wins the glory and turns the course of the campaign. Was it desperation that made him do this? Why is he unable to make the same call in 1944 when he has all the aces in his hand? Interesting to speculate.

[old_pop2000]

Excellent! Boy or girl?
A Girl, Sidney.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

That is as perfect a summation of Halsey and Leyte Gulf as I have ever read. Excellent! The man who was reputed to be a carrier admiral was leading with his battleline. He wanted a gun action. This would be the culmination of his career.

Now imagine Spruance in his place? A man who had won the two biggest carrier battles in history. A man who wold later turn down a chance for a gun action against the Yamato. What does Ray do?

Final sidebar: Halsey had no problem splitting his forces during the two naval battles around Guadalcanal in November 1942. He detaches his most powerful surface elements in the form of the two new battleships Washington and South Dakota with four DDs as escort. He watches as Admiral Lee wins the glory and turns the course of the campaign. Was it desperation that made him do this? Why is he unable to make the same call in 1944 when he has all the aces in his hand? Interesting to speculate.
Thank you, I appreciate the kind words, even if not deserved.

As for Spruance, he would have redeployed farther north, leaving a smaller scouting force of cruisers and destroyers to guard the straits. These would have been a trip wire unit, with orders to fire and fall back. He would also have stayed within aircraft scouting range, operating as many scouting aircraft over the strait as possible, with his air wings ready with AP bombs and torpedoes. He would have kept his force concentrated but been prepared to attack both forces. He would have kept scouting forces over the enemy fleet headed south. I do not believe that the Third Fleet has to be deployed between Kurita or Ozawa. They can handle both threats, provided they keep in reconnaissance range and keep a good eye on both threats.

As to the Guadalcanal issues, I believe that was an entirely different story. It was a night time deployment and action, with no air threat to the carriers or the landing forces, so it was a safe move.

It might be interesting to revisit the deployments around Guadalcanal, to assess the adherence to the basic principles of strategy.

[old_pop2000]

If, Halsey or Spruance had not taken the bait, but simply deployed a covering force on the straits and moved the Third Fleet northward to cover both, I believe that once the Ozawa force had detected this deployment, they would have realized that the bait was not having its desired effect.

At this point, unless Kurita and Ozawa can communicate and coordinate, Ozawa, being a prudent man, would have signaled to his carriers to retreat back to Formosa. However, he might have continued on with a smaller force of surface ships. The carriers in a surface battle are no value to him, his force can move quicker and easier without the carriers.

I believe that the attitude of throwing everything to the wind, as mostly depicted in books is not entirely correct. The carriers could have redeployed back to formosa, picked up the remnants of the air wings and gone back to Japan for further additions to the them. After some training, they could be used close to Japan, under an air umbrella from the mainland, as a mobile kamikaze base.

There are lots of different scenarios here. In fact, had Spruance been detected as the commander, the Sho plan might never have been activated. They might have sensed that he was not the type to fall for such a bait and would have attempted something different. A guiding principle for the Third Fleet should be to 1. Guard the San Bernardino Straits 2. Prevent the joining of the Kurita and Ozawa forces. Third fleet deployment should be able to accomplish both, and destroy both fleets in detail. Once Ozawa has reached a point where he can launch an air attack, his failure to do so, will be a sign that he has no aircraft on board, as Marc Mitscher suspects. This will only be a confirmation of that. This, then, makes his force, the lessor threat and NOW, we can deploy TF 34 to deal with Kurita or simply use all of our airpower to crush Kurita as he is the immediate threat to the Landings.

All things are possible.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A Girl, Sidney.


Dennis:

Excellent grandpa!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thank you, I appreciate the kind words, even if not deserved.

As for Spruance, he would have redeployed farther north, leaving a smaller scouting force of cruisers and destroyers to guard the straits. These would have been a trip wire unit, with orders to fire and fall back. He would also have stayed within aircraft scouting range, operating as many scouting aircraft over the strait as possible, with his air wings ready with AP bombs and torpedoes. He would have kept his force concentrated but been prepared to attack both forces. He would have kept scouting forces over the enemy fleet headed south. I do not believe that the Third Fleet has to be deployed between Kurita or Ozawa. They can handle both threats, provided they keep in reconnaissance range and keep a good eye on both threats.

As to the Guadalcanal issues, I believe that was an entirely different story. It was a night time deployment and action, with no air threat to the carriers or the landing forces, so it was a safe move.

It might be interesting to revisit the deployments around Guadalcanal, to assess the adherence to the basic principles of strategy.

Dennis:

Regarding Guadalcanal, this is true, it also a desperate time that required desperate measures. I do wonder if the experience of Philipines Sea would have caused Spruance to be a bit more reckless/aggressive had he been at Leyte Gulf. Of course this is all speculation as the two commanders rotated out to rest up and plan for the next major operation. Halsey does have to be taken to account for running into not one but two typhoons. Had he been perceived as Kincaid or Fletcher, he would have been relieved with cause. But like Patton, he was bullet proof by this stage of his career.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Regarding Guadalcanal, this is true, it also a desperate time that required desperate measures. I do wonder if the experience of Philipines Sea would have caused Spruance to be a bit more reckless/aggressive had he been at Leyte Gulf. Of course this is all speculation as the two commanders rotated out to rest up and plan for the next major operation. Halsey does have to be taken to account for running into not one but two typhoons. Had he been perceived as Kincaid or Fletcher, he would have been relieved with cause. But like Patton, he was bullet proof by this stage of his career.
I do not believe that Spruance would have acted any differently at leyte Gulf than he did at the Philippine Sea, he acted according to his perception of his responsibility and would not make make such a move. He might have deployed more intelligently to get between both opposing fleets. But he would not have totally abandoned the strait.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I do not believe that Spruance would have acted any differently at leyte Gulf than he did at the Philippine Sea, he acted according to his perception of his responsibility and would not make make such a move. He might have deployed more intelligently to get between both opposing fleets. But he would not have totally abandoned the strait.

Dennis:


I agree. Which is why its fun to speculate if Halsey was at Philippines Sea and Spruance at Leyte, what would the bag have been? History happens, we just try to undertand it. I'm still on the job.

[old_pop2000]

I agree. Which is why its fun to speculate if Halsey was at Philippines Sea and Spruance at Leyte, what would the bag have been? History happens, we just try to undertand it. I'm still on the job.

If I were a betting man, I would bet that Halsey at Philippine Sea would have finished off the Combined Fleet and Spruance would have had nothing to worry about at Leyte Gulf. No Japanese forces, to speak of, would have been available to attempt the Sho plan.

[Spook046]

Halsey comes off better on paper than his record deserves. By contrast, Spruance was a true genius, probably the best mind in the navy at the time. His problem was his distance from people. He was not a touchy feely guy. It speaks volumes that he never published memoirs and if I recall may have destroyed his provate papers. For Spruance it was results that mattered. Let the record show what was accomplished. He was also a far better carrier admiral than Halsey despite being a cruiser admiral by training.



There's no argument between us, Ed, that Spruance was the better fleet commander. I would argue that Raymond Spruance wasn't just the best US combat fleet commander of WWII, but also the best operational naval commander, which entails more than being a fleet commander during a specific naval engagement. Case in point: some of Spruance's decisions and assumptions in the Philippine Sea battle are still subject to critique, like from Y'Blood's "Red Sun Setting", Buell's "The Quiet Warrior", and particularly in Willmott's "June 1944". But further reading from Buell will also reveal that Spruance, beyond that specific naval battle, conducted overall command of the multiple Marianas invasion battles very well, and I think this tends to get forgotten too easily while it's a much better basis to commend Spruance's performance.

That said, I still can't quite put Spruance on the "genius" pedestal. He was brilliant, certainly, and deep-minded, but a genius commander more often than not anticipates his opponent's moves instead of vice-versa. Spruance still misread Ozawa during the Philippine Sea battle while Ozawa in turn better anticipated Spruance's stance (refer to Y'Blood and Willmott). One could argue that Ozawa the "Gargoyle" was unique in reading both Spruance and Halsey, and that gives pause for thought if Ozawa was able to face his opposition in 1944 on a genuine all-other-things-equal basis in terms of available forces and force proficiency.

And sometimes Spruance opted for more caution than a "genius" might recognize in strategic and operational opportunities. Spruance (with Turner and Holland Smith) argued firmly with Nimitz in December 1943 against Kwajalein and wanted instead to push for Wotje/Maleolap on a more "stepping stone" basis. Nimitz called all three to the mat and said they would be replaced if they still fought his decision, and they dropped it right there.

Spruance may have destroyed his personal papers (I know Mitscher did), but regardless, I do recommend Buell's "The Quiet Warrior" as a useful primary source. Buell doesn't shy from recounting some of Spruance's errors, but in the main provides an very informative and sympathetic portrait IMO.

[old_pop2000]

I think that, in the interest of a good analytical process, applying the "genius" or any other superlative to a human, based on decisions that they made, does not make any sense. It only makes sense, if the decision was made alone, without any outside influence and in the case of military action, that does not ever occur. Decisions are made, based on the plans originally established, intelligence gathered prior to and during the action or operation, forces available and training of the personel making the decision. The enemies reaction plays a large part in any decision. A course of action in any military encounter has many possible alternative decisions and actions that could have been implemented, many of whom would lead to success, some to failure.

Was Spruance a genius? Only his ranking in school and IQ test could really state that positively. Was he a commander who could be relied upon to make the correct decision leading to a successful outcome of the decision? I would say that, based on his record, he usually made the correct decision, based on his available information at the time, which lead to success. Could there have been alternatives that would have been equally successful? Yes and they can be explored with interest. Was he better in many ways than Halsey? In certain operational environments, he was better.

Now, what about Halsey? Were his decisions better or worse than Spruance's. We can't say. We can speculate that in certain operational environments, Halsey would do a better job, in others, his volitile temperment was not well suited. He, himself, gives it away when he stated he was not going to sit statically, protecting the straits, or something to that effect. He is telling us, his temperment was not suited for this kind of covering force operation.

Halsey was a raider. He was the Navy's version of JEB Stuart or Nathan Bedford Forest.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There's no argument between us, Ed, that Spruance was the better fleet commander. I would argue that Raymond Spruance wasn't just the best US combat fleet commander of WWII, but also the best operational naval commander, which entails more than being a fleet commander during a specific naval engagement. Case in point: some of Spruance's decisions and assumptions in the Philippine Sea battle are still subject to critique, like from Y'Blood's "Red Sun Setting", Buell's "The Quiet Warrior", and particularly in Willmott's "June 1944". But further reading from Buell will also reveal that Spruance, beyond that specific naval battle, conducted overall command of the multiple Marianas invasion battles very well, and I think this tends to get forgotten too easily while it's a much better basis to commend Spruance's performance.

That said, I still can't quite put Spruance on the "genius" pedestal. He was brilliant, certainly, and deep-minded, but a genius commander more often than not anticipates his opponent's moves instead of vice-versa. Spruance still misread Ozawa during the Philippine Sea battle while Ozawa in turn better anticipated Spruance's stance (refer to Y'Blood and Willmott). One could argue that Ozawa the "Gargoyle" was unique in reading both Spruance and Halsey, and that gives pause for thought if Ozawa was able to face his opposition in 1944 on a genuine all-other-things-equal basis in terms of available forces and force proficiency.

And sometimes Spruance opted for more caution than a "genius" might recognize in strategic and operational opportunities. Spruance (with Turner and Holland Smith) argued firmly with Nimitz in December 1943 against Kwajalein and wanted instead to push for Wotje/Maleolap on a more "stepping stone" basis. Nimitz called all three to the mat and said they would be replaced if they still fought his decision, and they dropped it right there.

Spruance may have destroyed his personal papers (I know Mitscher did), but regardless, I do recommend Buell's "The Quiet Warrior" as a useful primary source. Buell doesn't shy from recounting some of Spruance's errors, but in the main provides an very informative and sympathetic portrait IMO.


Spook:

Good post as always, I generally agree here. "Genius" is a relative term so I will agree that Spruanace can be criticised for good reason. Ozawa was the best of the IJN and he at least survived the war. No commander is perfect (maybe Nelson?), but Spruance is my pick when the crap hits the fan (WWII modern combined operations).

[Spook046]

Oh, Nelson wasn't perfect either (little known trivia is that he did lose some battles), but his "Nelson touch" of empowering and inspiring his subordinate commanders & crews, along with his own capabilities, was a force multiplier which IMO was unmatched by anyone else in his day. And again, I agree with you that in a WWII setting, I'd prefer having Spruance around as the top dog.

I think that Dennis's comparison of Halsey to Jeb Stuart does have something to it. Consider Stuart's relatively infamous performance during Gettysburg. Per Coddington's "The Gettyburg Campaign", pgs. 207-08:



On June 28, the day of decision for three generals, he (Lee) became convinced that the Union army was following him and made on the whole skillful arrangements to meet it. Stuart on that day received the same warning of the approaching conflict, but he failed to see his duty clearly enough to prepare for it and thus lost the chance to redeem himself. General Fitz Lee raised the question of "whether Stuart exercised the discretion undoubtedly given him, judiciously," and the answer is no. Therein lies the tragedy of Jeb Stuart in the Gettysburg campaign.


Not that I'm attempting an absolute comparison of Stuart at Gettysburg to Halsey at Leyte, rather that Coddington's attention to "judicious use of discretion" is relevant to consider.

[old_pop2000]

Oh, Nelson wasn't perfect either (little known trivia is that he did lose some battles), but his "Nelson touch" of empowering and inspiring his subordinate commanders & crews, along with his own capabilities, was a force multiplier which IMO was unmatched by anyone else in his day. And again, I agree with you that in a WWII setting, I'd prefer having Spruance around as the top dog.

I think that Dennis's comparison of Halsey to Jeb Stuart does have something to it. Consider Stuart's relatively infamous performance during Gettysburg. Per Coddington's "The Gettyburg Campaign", pgs. 207-08:



Not that I'm attempting an absolute comparison of Stuart at Gettysburg to Halsey at Leyte, rather that Coddington's attention to "judicious use of discretion" is relevant to consider.
I have Coddington's book on Gettysburg and I remember that phrase "judicious use of discretion". Good points. Jeb Stuart, as Halsey did, allowed his sense of adventure and ideas of what was best for the operation to sway his judgment. Both should have adhered to the mission assigned.

In reviewing Halsey's force structure and intelligence known at the time and the advice of his senior and excellent commander's like Mitscher, Lee and Bogan, he could have broken the time honored principle of concentration and deployed a cruiser-destroyer force to protect the strait and warn of Kurita's advance, which Halsey had already been advised of, since late in the evening of the 24th by scout aircraft. Had he taken this step and advised Kinkaid of this and requested backup from Taffey 3 and Oldendorff, it might have been a very different battle that took place at Samar on the morning of the 25th.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There's no argument between us, Ed, that Spruance was the better fleet commander. I would argue that Raymond Spruance wasn't just the best US combat fleet commander of WWII, but also the best operational naval commander, which entails more than being a fleet commander during a specific naval engagement. Case in point: some of Spruance's decisions and assumptions in the Philippine Sea battle are still subject to critique, like from Y'Blood's "Red Sun Setting", Buell's "The Quiet Warrior", and particularly in Willmott's "June 1944". But further reading from Buell will also reveal that Spruance, beyond that specific naval battle, conducted overall command of the multiple Marianas invasion battles very well, and I think this tends to get forgotten too easily while it's a much better basis to commend Spruance's performance.

That said, I still can't quite put Spruance on the "genius" pedestal. He was brilliant, certainly, and deep-minded, but a genius commander more often than not anticipates his opponent's moves instead of vice-versa. Spruance still misread Ozawa during the Philippine Sea battle while Ozawa in turn better anticipated Spruance's stance (refer to Y'Blood and Willmott). One could argue that Ozawa the "Gargoyle" was unique in reading both Spruance and Halsey, and that gives pause for thought if Ozawa was able to face his opposition in 1944 on a genuine all-other-things-equal basis in terms of available forces and force proficiency.

And sometimes Spruance opted for more caution than a "genius" might recognize in strategic and operational opportunities. Spruance (with Turner and Holland Smith) argued firmly with Nimitz in December 1943 against Kwajalein and wanted instead to push for Wotje/Maleolap on a more "stepping stone" basis. Nimitz called all three to the mat and said they would be replaced if they still fought his decision, and they dropped it right there.

Spruance may have destroyed his personal papers (I know Mitscher did), but regardless, I do recommend Buell's "The Quiet Warrior" as a useful primary source. Buell doesn't shy from recounting some of Spruance's errors, but in the main provides an very informative and sympathetic portrait IMO.

Hi Spook (or do you prefer Ed?):

As you and Dennis mention, the use of the term genius is putting an unfair burden on a person. It's like saying that a promising rookie baseball player is the next A-Rod or Josh Beckett. That's a lot to live up to. And it speaks volumes that Spruance was Nimitz's right hand man when not serving at sea and helped map out the operational details of the war.

I think he was somewhat poorly served by his carrier admirals at Philippines Sea. I've discussed this with another friend on a different forum who along with Dr. Eric Grove points out flaws in Mitscher use of recon assets to find and fix Ozawa. But in both of their defenses, the IJN knew where the attack was coming from and were able to try and exploit their range advantage, so that the USN was pretty much forced to stay in place and fight a defensive battle. This is demonstrated by the fact that of the three IJN carriers lost at Philippines Sea, only one was sunk by airpower, the other two being sunk by subs.

But any definition, were there any admirals in WWII that out thought their opponents? Maybe on the strategic level, we might consider the frequently maligned Admiral King. He was definitely the sharpest mind amongst the US chiefs of staff, but was so fixiated on the Japanese that he might have missed opportunities. The dynamics of how the US fought WWII and how the top commanders interacted are a subject unto themselves, but having observed the examples of how the Japanese, the Germans, the Russians and even the British operated at this level, I will say the US was fortunate in having a good team at the top and a president who let them do their jobs.

Oh well I've rattled on enough. Good post.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have Coddington's book on Gettysburg and I remember that phrase "judicious use of discretion". Good points. Jeb Stuart, as Halsey did, allowed his sense of adventure and ideas of what was best for the operation to sway his judgment. Both should have adhered to the mission assigned.

In reviewing Halsey's force structure and intelligence known at the time and the advice of his senior and excellent commander's like Mitscher, Lee and Bogan, he could have broken the time honored principle of concentration and deployed a cruiser-destroyer force to protect the strait and warn of Kurita's advance, which Halsey had already been advised of, since late in the evening of the 24th by scout aircraft. Had he taken this step and advised Kinkaid of this and requested backup from Taffey 3 and Oldendorff, it might have been a very different battle that took place at Samar on the morning of the 25th.

Dennis:

There is a book that I think is out of print entitled "Decision and Dissent", written by Carl Solberg, one of Halsey's staff. The officer was one of two that tried to keep Halsey focused on Kurita and his Center Force. His contention is that Halsey was surrounded by air minded officers who shared his belief in the total supremacy of the carrier and its offensive, rather than defensive employment. Also the unspoken feeling amongst the carrier admirals and also many of Halsey's staff was that Spruance was too cautious at Philippines Sea created what naval historian Thomas Cutler has called the "Spruance nuance". Halsey while a good friend of Spruance didn't want to be branded with that label and as has been stated was not the kind of person to sit around defending anything, not with as powerful a force as 3rd Fleet was in 1944. Evan Thomas in "Sea of Thunder" mentions the debates amongst the staff about "sitting around watching a rat hole, waiting for the rats to come out" (Sea of Thunder p.218).

When examining the facts known, the threats postulated on and the need to make the "right decision" it does become very difficult to think that any of us could have made the proper decision to split forces and tackle both enemy formations. Again the main culprit was a divided command and moving up the schedule of offensive operations that didn't allow the 3rd. Fleet adequate time to rest and refit. Had Halsey had all his carriers at full strength, I believe he might have had the guts to divide his forces and achieve his ultimate victory.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

There is a book that I think is out of print entitled "Decision and Dissent", written by Carl Solberg, one of Halsey's staff. The officer was one of two that tried to keep Halsey focused on Kurita and his Center Force. His contention is that Halsey was surrounded by air minded officers who shared his belief in the total supremacy of the carrier and its offensive, rather than defensive employment. Also the unspoken feeling amongst the carrier admirals and also many of Halsey's staff was that Spruance was too cautious at Philippines Sea created what naval historian Thomas Cutler has called the "Spruance nuance". Halsey while a good friend of Spruance didn't want to be branded with that label and as has been stated was not the kind of person to sit around defending anything, not with as powerful a force as 3rd Fleet was in 1944. Evan Thomas in "Sea of Thunder" mentions the debates amongst the staff about "sitting around watching a rat hole, waiting for the rats to come out" (Sea of Thunder p.218).

When examining the facts known, the threats postulated on and the need to make the "right decision" it does become very difficult to think that any of us could have made the proper decision to split forces and tackle both enemy formations. Again the main culprit was a divided command and moving up the schedule of offensive operations that didn't allow the 3rd. Fleet adequate time to rest and refit. Had Halsey had all his carriers at full strength, I believe he might have had the guts to divide his forces and achieve his ultimate victory.
Halsey commented after Fletcher had been relieved and wrote to Nimitz what he felt had been learned in the early day of the war, that carriers should never been tied to a single point in an operation but air support should determined prior to the operation. It would seem his actions at Leyte Gulf confirm what he believed as he supported Fletcher's retreat toward a refueling rendevous and out of danger.