At Dawn We Slept

[Mike Malanaphy]

HI folks,

I finally got around to getting a copy of Gordon Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" about the attack on Pearl Harbor. I'm about 3/4s of the way through it to where the second wave is making it's approach. I wish I had read this when it was first published. A massive work that is easy to read and digest. Chock full of information from both sides of the Hawaii Operation from genesis to attack. Prange was evidently on MacArthur's staff during WW II and had unprecedented access to the Japanese particiapnts after the war. The book was a compilation of his life's work and published after his death.

The Japanese side is particularly interesting and I was surprised at the number of people who knew of the navy prior to the attack including a number of staff officers involved in the planning. That the torpedoes modified for Pearl Harbor's shallow waters barely arrived in time for the attack and there was considerable worry that torpedo nets might be installed. There is excellent coverage of Japanese intelligence efforts and American code breaking efforts as well. In this day of rapid communications, it was interesting to learn intercepts from Hawaii were MAILED to Washington and a number of critical messages were decrypted after the event. Access to Japanese cable traffic was gained only through the illegal cooperation of RCA which handled consular traffic only every other month.

Despite knowing the basic story and the ending, reading Prange's work was like hearing it for the first time and I was thoroughly rivetted to the story. It was almost like reading a Tom Clancy novel. In retrospect, the inevitablity of war between the US and Japan was starkly apparent and as was the blind spot about Pearl being a likely target by nearly everyone in the chain of command. When Marshall alerted the Army commands on Sunday morning, Pearl was one of the last copmmands to be notified after the Phillipines and the Carribean. There was considerable sentinment in the Japanese striking force not to cancel teh attack if deiscovered.

Prange believes that there were clues in intercepted message traffic pointing to Pearl Harbor paricularly the "bomb plot message and interest in ship movements in and out of Pearl and is an intersting contrast with Prado's later analysis "Combined Fleet Decoded" who argues the opposite side. What is startling in the face of increasing tensions was the lack of airsearch by the PBYs available. For some reason, the USN area of interst was to the south of the island not to the North or NE.

There is a ton of great stuff in this book and I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in the Pacific war. I may have to check out his book on Midway also though it was largely finished by his two research assistants.

[asnrobert]

I recently picked up a used copy in excellent condition at work (it was on a shelf with other books and magazines for anyone who wanted them; I also picked up a copy of Starvation Island, about Guadalcanal), and just started reading it. What amazed me was that many USN officers like Admiral Bellinger (and even Admiral Kimmel) predicted that Japan might open hostilities with a sneak attack on Pearl (on a "weekend or national holiday"), yet almost nothing was done to prepare.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I recently picked up a used copy in excellent condition at work (it was on a shelf with other books and magazines for anyone who wanted them; I also picked up a copy of Starvation Island, about Guadalcanal), and just started reading it. What amazed me was that many USN officers like Admiral Bellinger (and even Admiral Kimmel) predicted that Japan might open hostilities with a sneak attack on Pearl (on a "weekend or national holiday"), yet almost nothing was done to prepare.

Hi Robert,

Yes, one of the most disurbing facts was the lack of PBYs in the air. There were many things that Kimmel and Bloch did not have control of, but they did have a substantial force of PBYs fro reconnaissance. It's intersting that Opana radar picked up the inbound strike, but not the Chikuma scout plane sent ahead which was undetected over the harbor.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Robert,

Yes, one of the most disurbing facts was the lack of PBYs in the air. There were many things that Kimmel and Bloch did not have control of, but they did have a substantial force of PBYs fro reconnaissance. It's intersting that Opana radar picked up the inbound strike, but not the Chikuma scout plane sent ahead which was undetected over the harbor.


Mike:
On the surface, it appears that there were 71 PBY's available. But that is a bogus number. On the 23 November 1941, two squadrons had just arrived and were in training. A 360 degree search pattern using a 10 degree sector size, requires 36 PBY's minimum. Even if there were 71 total, with 10% down for maintenance, there were still not enough to search 360 degrees. Without prior knowledge, 360 was the prudent search area. There were never enough PBY's and B-18's to perform an adequate aerial search.

[JMS]

Mike:
On the surface, it appears that there were 71 PBY's available. But that is a bogus number. On the 23 November 1941, two squadrons had just arrived and were in training. A 360 degree search pattern using a 10 degree sector size, requires 36 PBY's minimum. Even if there were 71 total, with 10% down for maintenance, there were still not enough to search 360 degrees. Without prior knowledge, 360 was the prudent search area. There were never enough PBY's and B-18's to perform an adequate aerial search.

But also they had to choose, so they chose to search what they thought was the likely avenue of attack, the Southwest. The Pearl harbor investigation treats this in some detail.

[asnrobert]

I realize that options were limited, given shortages in materiel and the need for training personnel. But I wonder, did Kimmel and Short do all they could have done? It seems to me that there was a lot of wishful thinking, from Washington on down, which seems to be the real culprit of the Pearl Harbor fiasco.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:
On the surface, it appears that there were 71 PBY's available. But that is a bogus number. On the 23 November 1941, two squadrons had just arrived and were in training. A 360 degree search pattern using a 10 degree sector size, requires 36 PBY's minimum. Even if there were 71 total, with 10% down for maintenance, there were still not enough to search 360 degrees. Without prior knowledge, 360 was the prudent search area. There were never enough PBY's and B-18's to perform an adequate aerial search.

Hi Dennis,

Your quite correct about the lack of resources for adequate air search around Oahu per the Martin-Bellinger assessment which required 180 B-17s. Not only would the B-17s search, but would provide the long range punch against any force detected as it was the Army's responsibility to protect Kimmel in port. The two PBY units were newly formed and needed training, but they were all you had.

With tensions rising and the message traffic he was recieving about Japanese movements, it was clear war was close. Those planes could have been concentrated on the most likely avenue of approach. I am drawn to Kimmel's comment about Halsey, "He doesn't complain and does the most with what he has". I think that could reasoning could apply to teh PBYs as well. Similarly, Short's overriding worry about sabotage lead him to cluster his planes against that threat rather than air attack. Overall, no one thought a Japanese attack agains Pearl was a likely possibility. If so, Short could have had a small contingent of his fighters in the air and they could have been vectored against the approaching Fuchida.

Hard to tell if in the long run it would have made any real differnece in the outcome of the attack. Perhaps a few more fighters would have as Tyler and Welch shot down 7 of the Japanese planes brought down.

[old_pop2000]

Your quite correct about the lack of resources for adequate air search around Oahu per the Martin-Bellinger assessment which required 180 B-17s. Not only would the B-17s search, but would provide the long range punch against any force detected as it was the Army's responsibility to protect Kimmel in port. The two PBY units were newly formed and needed training, but they were all you had.

Hard to tell if in the long run it would have made any real differnece in the outcome of the attack. Perhaps a few more fighters would have as Tyler and Welch shot down 7 of the Japanese planes brought down.


Mike:
In point of fact, even if an adequate number of aircraft and crews with spares, had been available, you cannot conduct around the clock, searches forever. You cannot keep your troops on alert for long periods of time. The stress on aircraft and personnel would have worn the Patrol Wing One and the Army bombers down. The real answer was the long range radar network that was in the process of being installed and brought on-line along with an integrated fighter command network. Couple this with adequate intelligence as to the opponent inclinations and intentions, and you now have a possibility of an adequate warning. This is what should have been accomplished before the fleet was moved to PH. Admiral Richardson stated as such to the president and was fired over the issue. He proved to be correct. This takes us back to the whole issue of planning for the opponents capabilities, not his intentions. We knew from our own wargames, that an air attack from the NE was feasible and a dangerous threat. We knew from the lessons learned that PH was not adequately equipped to defend itself from such a surprise attack. Therein lies the failure.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:
In point of fact, even if an adequate number of aircraft and crews with spares, had been available, you cannot conduct around the clock, searches forever. You cannot keep your troops on alert for long periods of time. The stress on aircraft and personnel would have worn the Patrol Wing One and the Army bombers down. The real answer was the long range radar network that was in the process of being installed and brought on-line along with an integrated fighter command network. Couple this with adequate intelligence as to the opponent inclinations and intentions, and you now have a possibility of an adequate warning. This is what should have been accomplished before the fleet was moved to PH. Admiral Richardson stated as such to the president and was fired over the issue. He proved to be correct. This takes us back to the whole issue of planning for the opponents capabilities, not his intentions. We knew from our own wargames, that an air attack from the NE was feasible and a dangerous threat. We knew from the lessons learned that PH was not adequately equipped to defend itself from such a surprise attack. Therein lies the failure.

Hi Dennis,

I agree completely with your assesment of what was needed. The decision to move the fleet to Pearl harbor was a political decision, not a military one. It was hoped the presence of the fleet would have a deterrent effect on Japan and send them a maessage regarding American resolve. The Japanese got the message and believed the actioin was provocative and became one of the rationales for the Hawaii Operation. OOPS! The valid reservations held by Richardson were seen as an obstacle rather than helpful. How much this affected Kimmel's performance afterwards is open to debate.

In July of 1940, there just wasn't the resources to protect Pearl as a fleet base. Radar warning networks were still on the drawing board then. A lack of AA guns, fighters, and almost everything else.

Your concerns about the impact of high alert all the time are valid too. You don't however need 24/7 coverage. Pilot and airframe time could be husbanded for the most likely time of attack...dawn and just after. Certainly, patrolling woulfd be the best training for the PBYs.

I'm conflicted about Kimmel. Pearl Harbor was certainly not all his fault, there was plenty to go around. He had an impossible task given Japaneses tensions. But he was a key player. His claim that vital information that would have made a difference was witheld from him just doesn't hold water. He already knew knew war was coming and that the Europe first priiority was already impacting on his strength and readiness. He wasn't going to get more resources even if the location and time had been read in an intercept. The only real military option would be to withdraw the fleet to the west coast and cede the Pacific to the Japanese. Lacking that, his PBYs and submarines were all he had.

[old_pop2000]

I agree completely with your assesment of what was needed. The decision to move the fleet to Pearl harbor was a political decision, not a military one. It was hoped the presence of the fleet would have a deterrent effect on Japan and send them a maessage regarding American resolve. The Japanese got the message and believed the actioin was provocative and became one of the rationales for the Hawaii Operation. OOPS! The valid reservations held by Richardson were seen as an obstacle rather than helpful. How much this affected Kimmel's performance afterwards is open to debate.

In July of 1940, there just wasn't the resources to protect Pearl as a fleet base. Radar warning networks were still on the drawing board then. A lack of AA guns, fighters, and almost everything else.

Your concerns about the impact of high alert all the time are valid too. You don't however need 24/7 coverage. Pilot and airframe time could be husbanded for the most likely time of attack...dawn and just after. Certainly, patrolling woulfd be the best training for the PBYs.

I'm conflicted about Kimmel. Pearl Harbor was certainly not all his fault, there was plenty to go around. He had an impossible task given Japaneses tensions. But he was a key player. His claim that vital information that would have made a difference was witheld from him just doesn't hold water. He already knew knew war was coming and that the Europe first priiority was already impacting on his strength and readiness. He wasn't going to get more resources even if the location and time had been read in an intercept. The only real military option would be to withdraw the fleet to the west coast and cede the Pacific to the Japanese. Lacking that, his PBYs and submarines were all he had.

Mike:
In order to adequately perform a search, a two plane search pattern is required. One plane for each sector must leave before dawn, to arrive at the maximum range at dawn. The second has to leave two hours afterward, to replace it. If we go on the 5 degrees per sector, 360 degrees, with two planes, then we are looking at 144 planes per day. You would fly from 0430 hrs to dusk, depending on when dusk occurs. 1750 hrs in December.

This is an interesting subject, maybe I can find some definitive data and explanations.

[john964]

Mike:
In order to adequately perform a search, a two plane search pattern is required. One plane for each sector must leave before dawn, to arrive at the maximum range at dawn. The second has to leave two hours afterward, to replace it. If we go on the 5 degrees per sector, 360 degrees, with two planes, then we are looking at 144 planes per day. You would fly from 0430 hrs to dusk, depending on when dusk occurs. 1750 hrs in December.

This is an interesting subject, maybe I can find some definitive data and explanations.Dennis, How far out do you want to patrol, If you want to patrol like they did at Midway were they had patrols out to 700 miles. At the PBY's cruising speed of 85-100 kt you are looking at a take off of 2200-2300 and maybe earler to arive at in the patrol area at dawn (0400-0500) For the B-17C its cruising speed is faster at 150-200 kt. that means that they could take off later at around 0000-0200 to reach its patrol area at dawn.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, How far out do you want to patrol, If you want to patrol like they did at Midway were they had patrols out to 700 miles. At the PBY's cruising speed of 85-100 kt you are looking at a take off of 2200-2300 and maybe earler to arive at in the patrol area at dawn (0400-0500) For the B-17C its cruising speed is faster at 150-200 kt. that means that they could take off later at around 0000-0200 to reach its patrol area at dawn.


The patrol ranges for PH would be more like 450 miles. You would want to arrive at dawn or a little after, around 0500-0600. Probable takeoff time would be around 0200-0300 hrs. Remember that there was a morning security patrol that took off at 0600 loaded with depth charges. The aircraft would takeoff from Kanoehe, and circle the island CCW, out about one or two miles to Barber's Point, then eastward along the coast of Oahu to Diamond Head, then east-southeast below Molokai and Maui, the return along a parallel course south of Lanai, about 5 miles out to sea, then clockwise around Oahu again. This was a submarine patrol. The flight was scheduled back at 1000 hrs. Altitude was 1000 ft. There were actually three aircraft that performed this ASW patrol.

On December 7th, there were 7 aircraft patrolling out to 450 miles from Midway, from 120 degrees to 170 degrees, with 3 aircraft on ASW patrols. 9 aircraft were under repair.

[john964]

The patrol ranges for PH would be more like 450 miles. You would want to arrive at dawn or a little after, around 0500-0600. Probable takeoff time would be around 0200-0300 hrs. Remember that there was a morning security patrol that took off at 0600 loaded with depth charges. The aircraft would takeoff from Kanoehe, and circle the island CCW, out about one or two miles to Barber's Point, then eastward along the coast of Oahu to Diamond Head, then east-southeast below Molokai and Maui, the return along a parallel course south of Lanai, about 5 miles out to sea, then clockwise around Oahu again. This was a submarine patrol. The flight was scheduled back at 1000 hrs. Altitude was 1000 ft. There were actually three aircraft that performed this ASW patrol.

On December 7th, there were 7 aircraft patrolling out to 450 miles from Midway, from 120 degrees to 170 degrees, with 3 aircraft on ASW patrols. 9 aircraft were under repair.
Heres something to consider if you want to conduct a 2 phase search have take off times the same one search done by the USAAF and the other done by the USN. The reason why is with the AAF faster aircraft they would reach the end of there patrols 2.5-3 hours if you are patroling out to 450 miles. While the USN's aircraft would arrive in 4.5-5.5 hours so it would be about 2-2.5 hours behind.

[old_pop2000]

Heres something to consider if you want to conduct a 2 phase search have take off times the same one search done by the USAAF and the other done by the USN. The reason why is with the AAF faster aircraft they would reach the end of there patrols 2.5-3 hours if you are patroling out to 450 miles. While the USN's aircraft would arrive in 4.5-5.5 hours so it would be about 2-2.5 hours behind.


If the AAF had the B-17's, that would be possible. You could, however, use the B-17 on an outer patrol, say around 450 miles, with 2 degree sectors. Then use the PBY's on an inner patrol of 200 miles, with an enlarged sector size for overlap. This might allow for ASW patrols which the PBY was designed and much better suited for.

As you can see, they require large numbers of aircraft, spares and spare crews. There is probably not enough room at Ford Island, Kanoehe or Wheeler Field for the numbers. Some of the patrols might have to be conducted from Midway and French Frigate shoals to augment the northern sectors from 300 to 45 degrees true.

[john964]

If the AAF had the B-17's, that would be possible. You could, however, use the B-17 on an outer patrol, say around 450 miles, with 2 degree sectors. Then use the PBY's on an inner patrol of 200 miles, with an enlarged sector size for overlap. This might allow for ASW patrols which the PBY was designed and much better suited for.

As you can see, they require large numbers of aircraft, spares and spare crews. There is probably not enough room at Ford Island, Kanoehe or Wheeler Field for the numbers. Some of the patrols might have to be conducted from Midway and French Frigate shoals to augment the northern sectors from 300 to 45 degrees true.Dennis, As I look back on this idea, I see one of the biggest stumbling blocks "GETTING THE ARMY AND THE NAVY TO WORK TOGETHER"

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, As I look back on this idea, I see one of the biggest stumbling blocks "GETTING THE ARMY AND THE NAVY TO WORK TOGETHER"

Yea, that would be a stumbling block. It should have been Martin and Bellinger's job. In fact, they prepared and submitted a report called the Martin-Bellinger Report about the problems at Pearl Harbor. They warned that a surprise attack was possible by air. But everyone knew that from the 1936 war games. They did not present anything that was not already known. There is a difference between what is possible and what is probable.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis, As I look back on this idea, I see one of the biggest stumbling blocks "GETTING THE ARMY AND THE NAVY TO WORK TOGETHER"

That plus getting the services to really understand the urgency of the threat. A lot of blame should be placed on Marshall and Stark for not making sure that their subordinates had a viable plan in place. Marshall got a pass for his lack of planning regarding our entry into WWII.

[asnrobert]

That plus getting the services to really understand the urgency of the threat. A lot of blame should be placed on Marshall and Stark for not making sure that their subordinates had a viable plan in place. Marshall got a pass for his lack of planning regarding our entry into WWII.

And General short was totally clueless as to airpower. His big plan for aviation personnel was to use them as ground troops. :rolleyes:

[Ed Rotondaro]

And General short was totally clueless as to airpower. His big plan for aviation personnel was to use them as ground troops. :rolleyes:

Robert:

Warfare tends to shake out the clueless, but at a very high cost initally. I don't have much faith in Short or Kimmel, but even less in Stark or Marshall. Sarcastic Ed is back.:rolleyes:

[asnrobert]

Robert:

Warfare tends to shake out the clueless, but at a very high cost initally. I don't have much faith in Short or Kimmel, but even less in Stark or Marshall. Sarcastic Ed is back.:rolleyes:

From what I'm reading in the book, Kimmel seems to have had a fairly good grasp of the situation, but with little he could do about it. He didn't have nearly enough planes to do the patrolling needed (An Army officer named Farthing wrote a report in which he had accurately predicted what the Japanese would do, and recommended having 180 B-17s based in Hawaii for 360 degree patrol coverage. The problem: there were only 109 B-17s in the entire US inventory, and most of these were slated for the Philippines or elsewhere), and much of his experienced personnel were constantly being siphoned off to man new construction, so training was an issue.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, if I had to pick one thing as the biggest factor in the Pearl Harbor debacle, it would be wishful thinking on the part of senior officers. Many of them predicted that Japan might open hostilities with a surprise attack on Pearl (one even mentioned it would probably be on a weekend or holiday), but at the same time they really didn't think the Japanese would pull it off. General Marshall seemed to think that flying a couple dozen B-17s to Oahu would turn it into some sort of invincible fortress (in one early 1941 exercise, B-17s were conveniently able to locate and "sink" an enemy flattop before it could launch its planes). As Gordon Prange put it, the Army regarded the Flying Fortress as some sort of cure-all (they certainly had that attitude with regard to the Philippines).

[old_pop2000]

Just a few more suggestions on anyones reading list for Pearl Harbor.

Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History - This is the second book by Gordon Prange, Goldstein and Dillon.

Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement - By Henry Clausen- Clausen was an attorney and special investigator appointed by Secretary of the War Henry Stimson to investigate Pearl Harbor. He had total access to anyone, and his conclusions were kept secret in the final report. The book gives those top secret conclusions. Clausen found on eleven occasions that Admiral Kimmel withheld from Short, vital intelligence that had it been passed along, might have caused Short to go on war alert prior to the attack. Clausen also discovered that Pearl Harbor failed to pass along information to Washington. He also found that the 14th part of the message sent from Tokyo to Washington was available 9 hours prior to when it was delivered about the break in relations with the US.

I strongly urge you to read this book and the other. Another possible addition would be the Goldstein and Dillon book: The Pearl Harbor Papers. These are a release of the Japanese documents and interviews by Prange after the war, about Pearl Harbor. I cannot vouch for this book, just passing it along.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Guys,

Just saw a 2003 Discovery Channel show on the Military channel. A two parter called "Myths of Pearl Harbor". Dspite some hyperbole, a pretty informative discussion of the attack and some of the myths surrounding it. Some of teh more compelling segemnts were:

Taking a cew member of Ward's #3 gun to see the sunken Japanese midget with a 4" hole at the base of it's conning tower and no depth charge damage.

A demo at a testing tank of how the wooden fins on the Jpaanese torpedoes actually worked.

An examination of the possibility of a midget submarine being visible in a Japanese aerial photo of the attack on battleship Row. They did a recreation with a scale midget and the results were impressive. Also some experts looked at the photo and compared the number of torpedo tracks versus the number of splashes. They saw 6 tracks and four splashes, two of teh tracks emanating near the object they believed was the midget. The same guys however discounted splashes behind the object as rooster tails caused by the midget's propeller breaking the water and said they were topedo splashes based upon high speed photos from the scale torpedo dropping tests. Well, now they got extra splashes, but no planes visible that would have just dropped them.

They wargamed the results of Kimmel putting to sea if given enough warning. Involved were Bond and Parshall. The results only had Kimmel losing three battleships. The retired admiral was out of sorts, he couldn't understand why the Japanese torpedo bombers were sao successful when all of ours where shot down at Midway.. Read a book please!

Still a very well down show, well above most of what you see regarding military history.

[asnrobert]

I realize this thread has been dormant for a few months, but I recently finished the book and wanted to share my thoughts.
Working in the health care field there’s a phrase I’m familiar with: “sentinel event.” This is hospital speak for a major league FUBAR (like the man who had the wrong foot amputated, or the young girl who died when they transplanted an organ of the wrong blood type). In cases like these (or even in simple ones like medication errors), the error is not attributable to one single cause, but to a series of failures throughout the system. This can certainly be said for the Pearl Harbor disaster.
One of the things that struck me was the schizoid attitude (for the lack of a better word) of US leaders- on the one hand, many in Washington and predicted that the Japanese might start a war with an attack on Pearl Harbor, but on the other hand, many of these same officers didn’t believe the Japanese would do it. For instance, when US intelligence deciphered the “bomb plot” message (Japan wanted intelliegence on which ships were moored where), intelligence officers assumed it was related to tracking fleet movement or perhaps a submarine attack.
I think Marshall and Stark bear some blame. Stark would sent dire war warnings to Hawaii, then in his private letters to Kimmel would downplay the threat. Marshall assumed that Hawaii had access to Magic, but they did not, and if they had, then perhaps items like the “bomb plot” message might have raised some red flags. Also, when General Short wrote to Marshall stating his efforts on preventing sabotage, Marshall should have corrected him and urged Short to take greater precautions against attack.
On the other hand, Short and Kimmel must shoulder most of the blame since they were the leaders on the spot (Short more than Kimmel since it was the Army’s responsibility to protect the fleet while in port). They may not have had access to Magic, and thus might not have been aware of all the diplomatic wrangling (or of things like the “bomb plot” message), but anyone who could read a newspaper in 1941 would have known of the deteriorating situation between the US and Japan. General Short in particular seems to have been totally clueless regarding the capabilities of airpower. In the wargames conducted that summer, General Short focused on repelling a land invasion. In his scenario, his land-based air had been destroyed and his airmen were deployed as infantrymen. General Short considered aviation personnel as “surplus” and wanted the enlisted Army Air Corp personnel to spend up to two months training as infantrymen. The possibility that the Japanese might launch a hit and run air attack never entered his mind. When he received the war warning in November, General Short focused on the part of the message to defend against sabotage and avoid alarming the civilian populace, and ignored everything else- so when December 7 arrived, the planes were bunched together and the ammunition was under lock and key. Kimmel at least saw the possibility of a Japanese air raid, but he believed the Japanese would attack when his fleet at sea. I wonder if it ever occurred to them if they might strike while his fleet was in port and thus sitting ducks, à la Taranto? Kimmel also kept his fleet in the same peacetime routine whereby they put to sea on Monday and returned to port on Friday, a predictable schedule that made it that much easier for the Japanese.
As it has been pointed out in other threads on this forum, Pearl Harbor lacked sufficient patrol planes to provide an adequate search. Of course, this was because the US was paying the price for neglecting its military for two decades. In 1941, with war clouds gathering, the US was frantically playing a game of catch-up. It was trying to rebuild its military, fortifying the Philippines, and providing aid to Britain all at once. There simply wasn’t enough time or resources to accomplish everything. Many of Kimmel’s most experienced personnel had been pulled to man new construction at home, so training the new personnel was also something that diverted time away from patrols. A Colonel Farthing who commanded a bomber wing at Oahu wrote a paper analysing Hawaii’s defenses (and who predicted with prophetic accuracy how the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor) recommended 180 Flying Fortresses being stationed in Hawaii to provide adequate 360 air search coverage around the islands. However, there were only 109 Fortresses in the the entire US inventory at the time, and many of these were earmarked for the Philippines, Britain or mainland defense. According to Prange, Short could have asked Kimmel to use some of his seaplanes to assist in patrols, but interservice communication was not as good as it could have been.
I think Prange did a good job debunking the conspiracy theorists. Personally I do not believe that he knew about the Pearl Harbor attack in advance. For one thing, he wished to help Britain fight Germany; a war with Japan would be a diversion of resources. For another, even though he realized war was imminent when he read the 14-part message from Japan breaking off diplomatic relations, there was nothing in the Japanese transmissions (military or diplomatic) that definitively spelled out an attack on Pearl Harbor. Also, I think if there was some evidence that Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked and FDR suppressed it, there would be too many people in the loop that would know. Even during the war, FDR had enemies in Washington who believed he had witheld information (like how George W. Bush asked “what did he know and when did he know it?” after 9-11), and it would only take one person who knew the truth to go them and spill the beans.

[Ed Rotondaro]

HI folks,

I finally got around to getting a copy of Gordon Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" about the attack on Pearl Harbor. I'm about 3/4s of the way through it to where the second wave is making it's approach. I wish I had read this when it was first published. A massive work that is easy to read and digest. Chock full of information from both sides of the Hawaii Operation from genesis to attack. Prange was evidently on MacArthur's staff during WW II and had unprecedented access to the Japanese particiapnts after the war. The book was a compilation of his life's work and published after his death.

The Japanese side is particularly interesting and I was surprised at the number of people who knew of the navy prior to the attack including a number of staff officers involved in the planning. That the torpedoes modified for Pearl Harbor's shallow waters barely arrived in time for the attack and there was considerable worry that torpedo nets might be installed. There is excellent coverage of Japanese intelligence efforts and American code breaking efforts as well. In this day of rapid communications, it was interesting to learn intercepts from Hawaii were MAILED to Washington and a number of critical messages were decrypted after the event. Access to Japanese cable traffic was gained only through the illegal cooperation of RCA which handled consular traffic only every other month.

Despite knowing the basic story and the ending, reading Prange's work was like hearing it for the first time and I was thoroughly rivetted to the story. It was almost like reading a Tom Clancy novel. In retrospect, the inevitablity of war between the US and Japan was starkly apparent and as was the blind spot about Pearl being a likely target by nearly everyone in the chain of command. When Marshall alerted the Army commands on Sunday morning, Pearl was one of the last copmmands to be notified after the Phillipines and the Carribean. There was considerable sentinment in the Japanese striking force not to cancel teh attack if deiscovered.

Prange believes that there were clues in intercepted message traffic pointing to Pearl Harbor paricularly the "bomb plot message and interest in ship movements in and out of Pearl and is an intersting contrast with Prado's later analysis "Combined Fleet Decoded" who argues the opposite side. What is startling in the face of increasing tensions was the lack of airsearch by the PBYs available. For some reason, the USN area of interst was to the south of the island not to the North or NE.

There is a ton of great stuff in this book and I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in the Pacific war. I may have to check out his book on Midway also though it was largely finished by his two research assistants.

Mike:

Prange's book is generally considered to be a classic and a must read. Even as new data is revealed over the years, his book still is detailed enough to stand the test of time. I do admit to liking Prados' book, but what it shows is how two historians can come to different conclusions even when reviewing the same data. The lack of recon by the USN was criminal and reflects on the complacency of Kimmel and Short.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I recently picked up a used copy in excellent condition at work (it was on a shelf with other books and magazines for anyone who wanted them; I also picked up a copy of Starvation Island, about Guadalcanal), and just started reading it. What amazed me was that many USN officers like Admiral Bellinger (and even Admiral Kimmel) predicted that Japan might open hostilities with a sneak attack on Pearl (on a "weekend or national holiday"), yet almost nothing was done to prepare.

Robert:

General Marshall and Admiral Stark are as much to blame as Kimmel was. When they would issue stern warnings about imminent dangers, did they ever follow up with "What are your contingency plans?" Or "What have done so far to detect and deal with an attack?" They left their subordinates swinging in the breeze. It is almost as if they wanted the war, something the conspiracy theorists have been spouting for years. Personally I see it as peacetime incompetence.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Mike:
On the surface, it appears that there were 71 PBY's available. But that is a bogus number. On the 23 November 1941, two squadrons had just arrived and were in training. A 360 degree search pattern using a 10 degree sector size, requires 36 PBY's minimum. Even if there were 71 total, with 10% down for maintenance, there were still not enough to search 360 degrees. Without prior knowledge, 360 was the prudent search area. There were never enough PBY's and B-18's to perform an adequate aerial search.

Dennis:

Yet they had already wargamed out the most likely approach to the attack years before when Admiral King launched a mock attack during a Fleet Problem. They had enough planes to cover the approach that the IJN actually used. They didn't need 360 coverage.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I realize that options were limited, given shortages in materiel and the need for training personnel. But I wonder, did Kimmel and Short do all they could have done? It seems to me that there was a lot of wishful thinking, from Washington on down, which seems to be the real culprit of the Pearl Harbor fiasco.

Robert:

For years I felt that Kimmel and SHort were scapegoats, denied intel and left swinging in the wind. I no longer believe this. In the book "Defenseless; Command Failure at Pearl Harbor", authors John Lambert and Noroman Polmar pretty much show that neither man took warnings seriously or even had a coherent plan to counter an attack on Pearl Harbor. They had the makings of a state of the art air warning system based on British models which they were totally indifferent to. I will assign a good portion of the balme to Generall Marshall and Admiral Stark for not following up on what the plans were to deal with an attack. They blandly assumed that their subordinates had preparations once they were issued warnings. Contrast this with Admiral Halsey's behaviour while delivering fighters to Wake Island. He had his SBDs flying long range scouting and had a CAP up during daylight hours. He acted as if he was at war. While Bull made some mistakes during the war, nobody can ever question his aggressiveness or readiness for battle. Kimmel and Short were examples of peacetime officers who had long service and who once war began were destined to be shunted aside in favor of officers who could fight. Very few of the senior officers at the start of WWII turned out to be effective. It was the newly promoted who won the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Dennis,

I agree completely with your assesment of what was needed. The decision to move the fleet to Pearl harbor was a political decision, not a military one. It was hoped the presence of the fleet would have a deterrent effect on Japan and send them a maessage regarding American resolve. The Japanese got the message and believed the actioin was provocative and became one of the rationales for the Hawaii Operation. OOPS! The valid reservations held by Richardson were seen as an obstacle rather than helpful. How much this affected Kimmel's performance afterwards is open to debate.

In July of 1940, there just wasn't the resources to protect Pearl as a fleet base. Radar warning networks were still on the drawing board then. A lack of AA guns, fighters, and almost everything else.

Your concerns about the impact of high alert all the time are valid too. You don't however need 24/7 coverage. Pilot and airframe time could be husbanded for the most likely time of attack...dawn and just after. Certainly, patrolling woulfd be the best training for the PBYs.

I'm conflicted about Kimmel. Pearl Harbor was certainly not all his fault, there was plenty to go around. He had an impossible task given Japaneses tensions. But he was a key player. His claim that vital information that would have made a difference was witheld from him just doesn't hold water. He already knew knew war was coming and that the Europe first priiority was already impacting on his strength and readiness. He wasn't going to get more resources even if the location and time had been read in an intercept. The only real military option would be to withdraw the fleet to the west coast and cede the Pacific to the Japanese. Lacking that, his PBYs and submarines were all he had.

Mike:

I agree. It is interesting to note that basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent was almost as bad as Churchill's decision to send the Prince of Wales and Repluse to Singapore as a deterrent. The result: Lots of dead sailors and sunken battleships.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis, How far out do you want to patrol, If you want to patrol like they did at Midway were they had patrols out to 700 miles. At the PBY's cruising speed of 85-100 kt you are looking at a take off of 2200-2300 and maybe earler to arive at in the patrol area at dawn (0400-0500) For the B-17C its cruising speed is faster at 150-200 kt. that means that they could take off later at around 0000-0200 to reach its patrol area at dawn.

John:

I wonder if subs could have been used as a picket line and patrolling force? They had good endurance and didn't need to be submerged.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis, As I look back on this idea, I see one of the biggest stumbling blocks "GETTING THE ARMY AND THE NAVY TO WORK TOGETHER"

John:

Agreed, but interestingly they did work well at the junior officer level on the air warning system according to Lamber and Polmar in "Defenseless". It was Kimmel and Short that took no interest in the system. Basically they didn't proceed with any sort of urgency towards the threats that they had been warned of. Were they given a tough mission? Yes. Did they even take rudimentary measures to prepare? No.

[old_pop2000]

Just some random thoughts on the Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

1. Using Midway as an example of using PBY's is not entirely valid. At Midway, we had hard intel as to the direction and composition of the enemy fleet, we only had to concentrate the PBY's in a 180 degree search pattern. Probably less than that but we wanted to ensure that the Invasion force was detected moving from Saipan, from the SW.

2. We knew about Operation K and had stopped it, by occupying French Frigate Shoals with a Seaplane Tender, operating PBYs from that point.

3. We had installed, after PH, a radar antenna and shack on the western edge of Sand Island by the time of the Midway battle.

At PH, we had no intel about the whereabouts or composition of the Japanese carrier force. It was always in US Naval planning, with WPO, that the first strike would come at the Philippines, not PH. Our total defensive plans for using the Pacific Fleet were developed and built around that battle plan. While it is true that Admiral Richardson was against using the PH base for the fleet, it was not because it could be attacked, but because of the ship repair facilities were not completed. He felt that the facilities at PH were not adequate for the fleet to be stationed there for any long period of time. Also, the Japanese route took it over 1500 miles from Midway and any PBY aircraft available for search, so Midway was useless at PH.

As to the air defense of PH. The only adequate air defense of Pearl Harbor had to be based on the SCR-270 radars being implaced around the island, adequate operations room space and personnel and procedures to gather data, sort and classify, identify friend or foe and be able to launch defending fighters in sufficient time. At the time of PH, there was no electronic means of identifying a friend or foe, electronically. There was no IFF systems available for the SCR-270's or installed in the fighters. However, there were many other problems. One was General Short's myopia about the effectiveness of radar, his failure to provide electric power to many of the sites, failure to accelerate the development of the PH integrated air defense system. The use of patrol aircraft to defend an island was the very reason that the Brits developed radar. They realized that search aircraft and standing patrols would soon wear out the aircraft and the personnel. So the key to AD at Pearl Harbor was always RADAR, not PBYs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I realize this thread has been dormant for a few months, but I recently finished the book and wanted to share my thoughts.
Working in the health care field there’s a phrase I’m familiar with: “sentinel event.” This is hospital speak for a major league FUBAR (like the man who had the wrong foot amputated, or the young girl who died when they transplanted an organ of the wrong blood type). In cases like these (or even in simple ones like medication errors), the error is not attributable to one single cause, but to a series of failures throughout the system. This can certainly be said for the Pearl Harbor disaster.
I think Prange did a good job debunking the conspiracy theorists. Personally I do not believe that he knew about the Pearl Harbor attack in advance. For one thing, he wished to help Britain fight Germany; a war with Japan would be a diversion of resources. For another, even though he realized war was imminent when he read the 14-part message from Japan breaking off diplomatic relations, there was nothing in the Japanese transmissions (military or diplomatic) that definitively spelled out an attack on Pearl Harbor. Also, I think if there was some evidence that Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked and FDR suppressed it, there would be too many people in the loop that would know. Even during the war, FDR had enemies in Washington who believed he had witheld information (like how George W. Bush asked “what did he know and when did he know it?” after 9-11), and it would only take one person who knew the truth to go them and spill the beans.

Robert:

I agree. Mainly because the people who would have first known that some sort of attack was imminent would have been navy admirals and there is no way Leahy or King would allow the fleet to get clocked like that just to get into a war. FDR himself had asked his admirals when would the US be able to go to war with Japan and was told not until late 1942. Even Churchill, who some claim had advanced knowledge had met with FDR and said he was counting on the US Pacific fleet to bolster the British possessions in the Far East, even to the point of allowing basing at Singapore. These are not the actions of individuals looking to sacrifice a fleet to get the US into a war.

[asnrobert]

Robert:

I agree. Mainly because the people who would have first known that some sort of attack was imminent would have been navy admirals and there is no way Leahy or King would allow the fleet to get clocked like that just to get into a war. FDR himself had asked his admirals when would the US be able to go to war with Japan and was told not until late 1942. Even Churchill, who some claim had advanced knowledge had met with FDR and said he was counting on the US Pacific fleet to bolster the British possessions in the Far East, even to the point of allowing basing at Singapore. These are not the actions of individuals looking to sacrifice a fleet to get the US into a war.

In Prange's book, Churchill is quoted as hoping that FDR "could keep the Japanese dog quiet." Churchill wanted American help in fighting Hitler- the last thing Britain needed was to be dragged into a Pacific war, especially if the US was still at peace with Germany.

[asnrobert]

John:

I wonder if subs could have been used as a picket line and patrolling force? They had good endurance and didn't need to be submerged.


I don't know. Both sides deployed subs at the battle of Midway and neither force was very effective.

[asnrobert]

Mike:

I agree. It is interesting to note that basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent was almost as bad as Churchill's decision to send the Prince of Wales and Repluse to Singapore as a deterrent. The result: Lots of dead sailors and sunken battleships.

However, I read somewhere (I think Morison, but am not sure), that basing the fleet at Pearl forced the Navy to improve its facilities, which meant that when war broke out, the base was better able to support the needs of the fleet. Had the fleet stayed at San Diego, it probably would have been safe from attack, but Pearl Harbor would be less able to meet wartime demands. Of course, that begs the question: what would the Japanese have done if the fleet had stayed in California.

[Ed Rotondaro]

However, I read somewhere (I think Morison, but am not sure), that basing the fleet at Pearl forced the Navy to improve its facilities, which meant that when war broke out, the base was better able to support the needs of the fleet. Had the fleet stayed at San Diego, it probably would have been safe from attack, but Pearl Harbor would be less able to meet wartime demands. Of course, that begs the question: what would the Japanese have done if the fleet had stayed in California.

Robert:

The IJN would have probably followed the same offensive plan of seizing the Philippines and other US possessions as well as striking South towards the Dutch East Indies. The only difference being that they would then be planning on a decisive battle against the USN which they planned on wearing down with attritional warfare as the fleet made its way to the Central Pacific for the USN's plan for a decisive battle. But since War Plan Orange had been modified to Rainbow, one wonders what the USN's plan was if its fleet was intact?

[old_pop2000]

Robert:

The IJN would have probably followed the same offensive plan of seizing the Philippines and other US possessions as well as striking South towards the Dutch East Indies. The only difference being that they would then be planning on a decisive battle against the USN which they planned on wearing down with attritional warfare as the fleet made its way to the Central Pacific for the USN's plan for a decisive battle. But since War Plan Orange had been modified to Rainbow, one wonders what the USN's plan was if its fleet was intact?

Ed:
The real question to answer is whether the lack of Pearl Harbor attack, would have still prompted the replacement of Stark and Kimmel. The emphasis on offensive action in the Pacific, was strictly King's view and it was contrary to Rainbow 5. Would Stark have been as vociferous about his requirements in the Pacific and with Kimmel, would he have echoed King's views. Would Kimmel have tied the submarines to the fleet or released them to unrestricted submarine warfare? Would Kimmel have pushed Halsey to carrier raids or kept him close to the battle fleet. I suspect he would have. Those are the questions to answer, as to how we would have reacted to no attack on Pearl Harbor. Would Kimmel have sent the battleships back to the coast for protection?

As to the issue of the improvements for the fleet base at Pearl Harbor, they were already in the works and proceeding. This was why Richardson did not want the fleet moved, at that time. Once those defenses and facilities were completed, he had no objection.

[old_pop2000]

I've just ordered a new book entitled: "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War" By John A. Adams. It wasn't expensive but seems to have a different viewpoint. Has anyone read it or read a review?

Also, went to the gun show this weekend and found a new used bookstore in San Diego with lot's of war and weapons books. I am headed there after New Years. They might have some Conroy's and Friedman books, they are going to look in the back room.

I am going today, to pickup my new lower receiver assy. for my AR-15 rifle I am building. Still have to get the trigger assy and upper receiver and barrel. But journey of a thousand miles takes the first step.

Have a good day.

Note: Should we move this discussion to the main military history forum?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Robert:

The IJN would have probably followed the same offensive plan of seizing the Philippines and other US possessions as well as striking South towards the Dutch East Indies. The only difference being that they would then be planning on a decisive battle against the USN which they planned on wearing down with attritional warfare as the fleet made its way to the Central Pacific for the USN's plan for a decisive battle. But since War Plan Orange had been modified to Rainbow, one wonders what the USN's plan was if its fleet was intact?

Hi Guys,

Yamamoto was adamant that the US Pacific fleet be eliminated as a threat to teh move south. He threatened to resign if he didn't get his way and teh Naval staff relented and he got his wish. Pearl Harbor was all Yamamoto's idea. If the US fleet was not based at Pearl, but on the west coast, I believe that Yamamoto would have attacked it there. Why? The bulk of the Japanese Navy was deployed to support Army offensive operations in the south. A move by the Pacific fleet towards Japan freezes the IJN in place to protect the homeland whether it sails from Pearl or San Diego. The attack would have been a considerable logistics threat, but doable.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Guys,

Yamamoto was adamant that the US Pacific fleet be eliminated as a threat to teh move south. He threatened to resign if he didn't get his way and teh Naval staff relented and he got his wish. Pearl Harbor was all Yamamoto's idea. If the US fleet was not based at Pearl, but on the west coast, I believe that Yamamoto would have attacked it there. Why? The bulk of the Japanese Navy was deployed to support Army offensive operations in the south. A move by the Pacific fleet towards Japan freezes the IJN in place to protect the homeland whether it sails from Pearl or San Diego. The attack would have been a considerable logistics threat, but doable.

It believe the plan to attack the IJN would depend more on who was CinCPacfleet. If it was Kimmel, he would use the BB's in the original WPO. He was always an advancer type. However, if he was replaced by Nimitz under King, I suspect the BB's might head back to the coast for update and refurbishment. The carriers would be the primary striking weapon along with the submarines.

[Mike Malanaphy]

It believe the plan to attack the IJN would depend more on who was CinCPacfleet. If it was Kimmel, he would use the BB's in the original WPO. He was always an advancer type. However, if he was replaced by Nimitz under King, I suspect the BB's might head back to the coast for update and refurbishment. The carriers would be the primary striking weapon along with the submarines.

Hi Dennis,

Your definitely right about how different leaders might have implemented Rainbow-5. The most important would be the President. He was clearly in agreement with Churchill about Germany first. The War Plan Orange had to some extent worked in a vacuum. Their planniing assumptions never fore saw a world war that would require every ounce of American strength and production to bring victory. I believe in our earlier discussions regarding Orange, we found that even under their best estimates, there was not enough logistical support in terms of a fleet train to support such a move across the Pacific.

It speaks to the blind spot all sides had in their prewar planning about logistics. War planing for the move south should have told them that it would be impossible for the USN to move in strength against Japan. In addtion, the Japanese watched their Axis partner, Germany, wreak havoc wiht U Boats against an island empire and assumed that it wouldn't happen to them.

Had the Japanese been more astute in their knowleedge of logistics, it could have been a strong argument against Yamamoto's "all or nothing" Hawaii Operation that the US could not move in strength against the Japanese mainland, the fundamental underlying the "Decisive Battle" concept. That Nagumo's carriers could shield the homeland and the flank of the move south without engaging America directly.

At a tactical level, Yamaoto's plan delivered what it had promised, the USN was immobilized for 6 months and unable to effectively bar the Japanese from taking their initial objectives. An outcome, based upon military and political considerations for the US, would have occurred any. At a strategic level, it was the end of the Japanese Empire.

[old_pop2000]

........Had the Japanese been more astute in their knowledge of logistics, it could have been a strong argument against Yamamoto's "all or nothing" Hawaii Operation that the US could not move in strength against the Japanese mainland, the fundamental underlying the "Decisive Battle" concept. That Nagumo's carriers could shield the homeland and the flank of the move south without engaging America directly.

At a tactical level, Yamaoto's plan delivered what it had promised, the USN was immobilized for 6 months and unable to effectively bar the Japanese from taking their initial objectives. An outcome, based upon military and political considerations for the US, would have occurred any. At a strategic level, it was the end of the Japanese Empire.

Here are the instructions to the US Pacific Fleet from Rainbow 5

The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia.

The above statement is from the section entitled "Concepts of War". (Link to entire document on Hyperwar is below) Seems to me, that this gives the CinCPacFleet some wide latitude as to the range of options. We know that Stark told Kimmel to act combatively and that when asked about losses, was told "The restrictions... do not imply severe losses will be risked... providing compensating gains appear probable. According Miller in "War Plan Orange" Soc McMorris then went to work preparing plans that were "swift, vigorous and offense".

So, if PH does not occur but the Japanese still move southward, war would come and Kimmel was empowered to take swift, vigorous and offensive action however, the method seems to be entirely up to him. With most of the fleet logistics in the Atlantic, how does he propose to accomplish that? Possibly using the same methods as Nimitz, I presume. Launch unrestricted economic warfare using submarines would seem to follow the spirit of the action "calculated to weaken Japanese economic power". Lightening carrier raids in the central Pacific would also weaken and divert Japanese strength away from Malaysia.

But, the real question is; does Kimmel use the slower battleships for any offensive action? How? Without adequate fleet oilers, those ships sailing at 15-18 knots at best, are sitting ducks for Japanese submarines stationed around PH as they were on December 7th. Remember that Saratoga was torpedoed near PH on January 11th. If Kimmel decides to launch raids into the Mandates using the carrier force accompanied by battleships, what kind of air cover can he provide? At the time of PH, the carriers only had 18 F4Fs and one of the carriers had Brewster Buffaloes. If we assume Lexington, Enterprise and Saratoga, then he only has 54 fighters to provide escort for his bombers and combat air patrols over the carrier and battleship forces. Do you believe that this is sufficient? The 36 fighters available at Coral Sea were not enough to protect Lex and Enterprise, almost 6 months later and the Buffaloes had been replaced. Yes, he can use some of his SBDs for torpedo plane protection at low altitude. However, then he can't use them for scouting and as we know, finding your opponent first and attacking first was the key to victory in carrier battles early in the war. So, it appears, he has to keep the BBs near land to use land based fighters to protect them. If so, then they can't venture more than 150 miles from PH or Midway. Can't really do much out there, can they. Everytime those BBs head out to sea, they gulp fuel and the new tank farm is not completed yet. Only the above ground tanks are available and they are vulnerable.

Okay. This is the situation facing Kimmel and McMorris at the beginning. How do they solve this issue? How do you prepare a war plan to execute Rainbow 5 without the resources necessary to move long distances with slow moving ships, without adequate air cover or ASW forces. How would you in a game? Any ideas? Remember Rainbow 5s statement that the US does not intend to provide more reinforcements for the Far East. That is a necessary factor guiding your war plans.


Note: the Miller quotes are from page 287.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html

[Ed Rotondaro]

It believe the plan to attack the IJN would depend more on who was CinCPacfleet. If it was Kimmel, he would use the BB's in the original WPO. He was always an advancer type. However, if he was replaced by Nimitz under King, I suspect the BB's might head back to the coast for update and refurbishment. The carriers would be the primary striking weapon along with the submarines.

King might have tried to use the BBs as well. He constantly pestered Nimitz to find a role for the undamaged ones and even wnated them to sail with the Midway task force. Nimitz deftly dodged this by suggesting the old ships would be better used guarding the West Coast. (Source Black Shoe Carrier Admiral).

[old_pop2000]

King might have tried to use the BBs as well. He constantly pestered Nimitz to find a role for the undamaged ones and even wnated them to sail with the Midway task force. Nimitz deftly dodged this by suggesting the old ships would be better used guarding the West Coast. (Source Black Shoe Carrier Admiral).

In February 1942, with the Allied situation worsening in the SW Pacific, King did call on Nimitz to provide an aggressive diversion or reinforcements to that area. He wanted Nimitz to use all available resources including the 6 battleships still on the West Coast. Nimitz replied on February 7th, that the hit and run strategy currently employed could not use the 21 knot battleships due to lack of available air cover and ASW assets to provide protection. He recommended against that strategy.

King replied back that the PacFleet was not markedly inferior and by attacking the mandates, it would provide the needed protectioin the Midway-Hawaii line. Nimitz sent Admiral Pye to Washington immediately to explain the situation in person, since Pye was a classmate of King and a close friend, not to mention a former commander of battleships and considered an excellent strategist. No more was heard of this idea.

It was Nimitz that requested later in March, IIRC, for Pye to bring the BBs back to Pearl, however, in April, he ordered him to return them to the West Coast, because he did not want them using up the limited fuel supply for the carriers. Nimitz did briefly, before Midway consider bringing the BBs out from San Francisco before Midway, but then reconsidered the idea. This was based on the fact that Intel had identified eleven fast battleships including Yamato in the IJN fleet organization for Operation MI and Nimitz only had 6 old slow BBs, which would slow down the carriers.

It would seem, that both men desperately wanted to use the battleships, but events seem to preclude it. Coral Sea, Midway, the hit and run raids by Halsey seem to prove the case, that the battleships just weren't the decisive element that they had bben considered in prewar doctrine.

Source: Nimitz by E.B. Potter

[Ed Rotondaro]

In February 1942, with the Allied situation worsening in the SW Pacific, King did call on Nimitz to provide an aggressive diversion or reinforcements to that area. He wanted Nimitz to use all available resources including the 6 battleships still on the West Coast. Nimitz replied on February 7th, that the hit and run strategy currently employed could not use the 21 knot battleships due to lack of available air cover and ASW assets to provide protection. He recommended against that strategy.

King replied back that the PacFleet was not markedly inferior and by attacking the mandates, it would provide the needed protectioin the Midway-Hawaii line. Nimitz sent Admiral Pye to Washington immediately to explain the situation in person, since Pye was a classmate of King and a close friend, not to mention a former commander of battleships and considered an excellent strategist. No more was heard of this idea.

It was Nimitz that requested later in March, IIRC, for Pye to bring the BBs back to Pearl, however, in April, he ordered him to return them to the West Coast, because he did not want them using up the limited fuel supply for the carriers. Nimitz did briefly, before Midway consider bringing the BBs out from San Francisco before Midway, but then reconsidered the idea. This was based on the fact that Intel had identified eleven fast battleships including Yamato in the IJN fleet organization for Operation MI and Nimitz only had 6 old slow BBs, which would slow down the carriers.

It would seem, that both men desperately wanted to use the battleships, but events seem to preclude it. Coral Sea, Midway, the hit and run raids by Halsey seem to prove the case, that the battleships just weren't the decisive element that they had bben considered in prewar doctrine.

Source: Nimitz by E.B. Potter

Dennis:

Another factor was the realization that most of the older BBs were deficient in both light AA and radar. When you look at the refits on the West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Nevada, the result are much more capable warships better able to defend themselves against air attack. The fast carriers were better supported by the newer battleships with their massive AA suites than by the 21 knot vessels.

I agree in the use and importance of battleships as the hit and run raids demonstrated. Even if evey BB at Pearl had been sunk and destroyed, as long as the carriers were intact, the IJN had to be worried. I consider the torpedo hit on Saratoga and losses of Lexington and Yorktown to have been far more damaging than the disabling of the Pacific Fleet battleline.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Another factor was the realization that most of the older BBs were deficient in both light AA and radar. When you look at the refits on the West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Nevada, the result are much more capable warships better able to defend themselves against air attack. The fast carriers were better supported by the newer battleships with their massive AA suites than by the 21 knot vessels.

I agree in the use and importance of battleships as the hit and run raids demonstrated. Even if evey BB at Pearl had been sunk and destroyed, as long as the carriers were intact, the IJN had to be worried. I consider the torpedo hit on Saratoga and losses of Lexington and Yorktown to have been far more damaging than the disabling of the Pacific Fleet battleline.

I would agree that the loss of your carrier striking force was far more important to the overall Pacific Strategy than the loss of the 21 knot battleships with the poor AA defenses.

If they have skipped the ships, and struck the shore installations like the 69 fuel tanks, dock and repair facilities etc. They would have accomplished far more and changed the overall Pacific naval strategy. Myopia was rampant in the IJN. However, in all fairness, the carriers were the primary objective for the attack, luck was against them.