Strategic Inconsistencies in the Pacific

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi:

As part of the thread on blockships at Pearl Harbor as well as the thread on attacking the fuel farm at Pearl Harbor, references have been made to Japan's strategic miscalculations. Chris observed that the Japanese were could tactical planners, but poor strategic thinkers (forgive me if I misquoted here) and that may sum up the subject in a nutshell.

If anything, Japan went to war with the Western powers assuming that they would act how Japan wanted them to, or perhaps how Japan would have acted if the situations were reversed. Their entire war plan was predicated on the US not having the stomach to fight, especially if the Pacific fleet had been neutralized. On paper this might make sense, after all any war in the Pacific would have to be a naval war. Yet would Japan have given up meekly if the USN had pulled a reverse Pearl Harbor attack on Kure in November 1941? I seriously doubt it.

Japan unfortunately used a combination of wishful thinking and opportunism to attempt a massive land grab in the Pacific. Yet at times various Japanese officers displayed some sense of strategic vision. Most of the major players understood that a long term war of attrition against the US was unwinnable. They wanted a short victorious campaign. They knew that to be able to seize the Southern Resource Area, as they dubbed the colonial possessions that had their eyes on, they had to neutralize the only navy that could challenge them. So we get the Pearl Harbor raid and the invasion of the Philippines. Now the Philippines also demonstrates some of Japan's strategic vision. Obviously you can't have a major enemy naval and air base on your flank. In the book "MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines", author Richard Connaughton quotes one Japanese officer as saying that once the US stationed long range heavy bombers in the Philippines, Japan had no choice but to attack. If Japan can recognize the threat of long ranged airpower and realized how important oil was, why was she unable to recognize the need to totally neutralize Pearl Harbor and the USN? Why plan an incomplete blow? Could it be that oil and drydocks and repair facilities are not seen as worthy targets compared to warships and aircraft? Why doesn't Japan which has the example of over two years of German submarine warfare attempt to duplicate the U-boat war on the West coast? Think about how much shipping was sunk during Operation Drumbeat on the Atlantic Coast by a handful of German U-boats in a few months time. This was a time when the USN was struggling to adapt to the realities of unrestricted submarine warfare. America would never be more vulnerable to this type of attack. Yet the IJN submarine arm achieved little in the way of tonnage sunk compared to the German U-boats. Again we have to wonder did the IJN consider attacking merchants to be less prestigious than attacking warships? Considering that even with the Pacific fleet crippled, the IJN had to accept that the US could continue to build new warships practically with impunity. The only strategic weapons that the IJN could employ against the US build up were its aircraft carriers and its submarines, neither of which ever really threatened the mainland of the US.

The entire conduct of the Guadalcanal campaign further demonstrates the inability of the Japanese high command to think strategically. They continually underestimated the size of the US force on the island and the ability of the USN to keep them supplied. While the IJN still demonstrated considerable tactical skills particularly in night fighting it never was able to combine it superior resources for a decisive blow. The lack of trained pilots meant that even moderate losses could put a Japanese carrier out of action until its airgroup was rebuilt. The aerial war of attrition fought over Guadalcanal and the Solomons should have been the wakeup call to the IJN to streamline it training process to speed it up and increase the pool of replacement pilots. The existing training regime produced superb pilots but in very small numbers. Does anyone really think that Japanese pilots were better than US pilots who were trained in a fraction of the time? The loss ratio of IJN pilots in 1942-43 certainly doesn't show this.

There are many other examples of strategic inconsistencies in Japan's approach to war in the Pacific. I hope that this overly long post will serve as a starting point for further discussions.

[old_pop2000]

Japan, for the uninitiated, is an island. She was a maritime power but only recently since the Meji restoration. Although a maritime power, her focus was always westward toward Korea and China. She is seriously deprived of natural resources, and had to import almost all her raw materials after industrializing. Her primary export was silk and green tea. She even had to import rice from China. She had limited space for shipbuilding and for transportation of material between production centers on the islands.

The Japanese strategic planning was always at odds with itself. The Imperial Japanese army was focused on Russia but mostly the Chinese. The IJN was focused southward toward Burma, Indochina, Dutch East Indies etc. The IJN had one overriding requirement- Oil, Black Gold, Texas T. Their primary source was the LA basin in California. Japanese tankers were regularly tanking up at San Pedro, Long Beach and other oil ports. They did make some minor contracts with the Dutch to procure a small amount of oil from Borneo.

Scrap iron was another valuable commodity, purchased mostly from you-know-who and used to produce high quality steel. Most of the best steel is made from scrap, less from iron ore.

Now, how do you pay for all this? With dollars, especially after September 3, 1939. The dollar was the only viable currency.

Now that I have bored you with an extremely brief strategic situation report, for the fun.

As most of us are aware, the great conflict was a result of Japanese expansionism into China and its reluctance to withdraw. But it was also about the ever tightening export requirements placed on all nations by the Export Control Administration to begin getting the US on a war footing. In fact, the Japanese were given preferential treatment up until the invasion of Southern Indochina.

All of this, is the background for the strategic planning and considerations the Japanese had to develop and execute. Hope this helps.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Japan, for the uninitiated, is an island. She was a maritime power but only recently since the Meji restoration. Although a maritime power, her focus was always westward toward Korea and China. She is seriously deprived of natural resources, and had to import almost all her raw materials after industrializing. Her primary export was silk and green tea. She even had to import rice from China. She had limited space for shipbuilding and for transportation of material between production centers on the islands.

The Japanese strategic planning was always at odds with itself. The Imperial Japanese army was focused on Russia but mostly the Chinese. The IJN was focused southward toward Burma, Indochina, Dutch East Indies etc. The IJN had one overriding requirement- Oil, Black Gold, Texas T. Their primary source was the LA basin in California. Japanese tankers were regularly tanking up at San Pedro, Long Beach and other oil ports. They did make some minor contracts with the Dutch to procure a small amount of oil from Borneo.

Scrap iron was another valuable commodity, purchased mostly from you-know-who and used to produce high quality steel. Most of the best steel is made from scrap, less from iron ore.

Now, how do you pay for all this? With dollars, especially after September 3, 1939. The dollar was the only viable currency.

Now that I have bored you with an extremely brief strategic situation report, for the fun.

As most of us are aware, the great conflict was a result of Japanese expansionism into China and its reluctance to withdraw. But it was also about the ever tightening export requirements placed on all nations by the Export Control Administration to begin getting the US on a war footing. In fact, the Japanese were given preferential treatment up until the invasion of Southern Indochina.

All of this, is the background for the strategic planning and considerations the Japanese had to develop and execute. Hope this helps.

Dennis:

Someone has been reading Miller's book again. Good post.

Oh I do recall that swordsmiths liked to throw a few old horse shoes into the iron mix when forging a sword. It added some higher grade metal to the mix apparently.

[bridav58]

The PH raid brought them what 6 months to a year at the most? Well the USN almost certainly couldn't make any moves towards relieving the Phillipines (if they were attacked) in that timeframe anyways since they lacked any Western Pacific bases or the fleet train necessary . We used island hopping in getting back to the Phillipines and sealed off bypassed garrisons on the way back there why couldn't the Japanese just do the same in regards to the PI? If they simply didn't attack the PI but instead struck south what could the forces we had station there really do about it? 30-35 B-17's( I think that was the whole number stationed there) and like 100 P-40's aren't going to be able to do much ,the Asiatic Fleet was a joke while MacArthur's troops aren't going nowhere without more aircover and a far larger fleet. Just simply bypass the PI(let them wither on the vine) and don't bomb Pearl Harbor you then avoid committing an overt act with all of the political fall out.

Ducking for cover!!!! LOL !!!!

[Ed Rotondaro]

The PH raid brought them what 6 months to a year at the most? Well the USN almost certainly couldn't make any moves towards relieving the Phillipines (if they were attacked) in that timeframe anyways since they lacked any Western Pacific bases or the fleet train necessary . We used island hopping in getting back to the Phillipines and sealed off bypassed garrisons on the way back there why couldn't the Japanese just do the same in regards to the PI? If they simply didn't attack the PI but instead struck south what could the forces we had station there really do about it? 30-35 B-17's( I think that was the whole number stationed there) and like 100 P-40's aren't going to be able to do much ,the Asiatic Fleet was a joke while MacArthur's troops aren't going nowhere without more aircover and a far larger fleet. Just simply bypass the PI(let them wither on the vine) and don't bomb Pearl Harbor you then avoid committing an overt act with all of the political fall out.

Ducking for cover!!!! LOL !!!!

Brian:

If you bypass the PI, what prevents the USN from continuing to build up its presence there? If you allow more planes and troops and ships to gather there without interdicting them, then you've got a honking big base along the order of Truk or Rabaul right in your back yard. Oh and remember that B-17s can reach Formosa with ease. While I agree that not attacking the PI or PH avoids the US declaring war, how long can Japan allow the US to build up before the inevitable showdown occurs?

[old_pop2000]

Brian:

If you bypass the PI, what prevents the USN from continuing to build up its presence there? If you allow more planes and troops and ships to gather there without interdicting them, then you've got a honking big base along the order of Truk or Rabaul right in your back yard. Oh and remember that B-17s can reach Formosa with ease. While I agree that not attacking the PI or PH avoids the US declaring war, how long can Japan allow the US to build up before the inevitable showdown occurs?


The Japanese could not leave the sea communications route through the Luzon straits between the PI and China bordered by a belligerent nation like the US. They also wanted PI gold for buying raw materials from SA. Their gold reserves had dwindled.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Japanese could not leave the sea communications route through the Luzon straits between the PI and China bordered by a belligerent nation like the US. They also wanted PI gold for buying raw materials from SA. Their gold reserves had dwindled.

Dennis:

I assume that PI gold means the gold reserves from the government? Or did the PI have gold deposits? (I've never heard mention of this).

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I assume that PI gold means the gold reserves from the government? Or did the PI have gold deposits? (I've never heard mention of this).

Gold Mines, Ed, me hardy!! The Paracales Gold Mining Site was discovered in 1939.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Gold Mines, Ed, me hardy!! The Paracales Gold Mining Site was discovered in 1939.


Dennis:

I never knew that. I'll have to read up on this. Were they very productive?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Dennis:

I assume that PI gold means the gold reserves from the government? Or did the PI have gold deposits? (I've never heard mention of this).


Hi guys,

The Phillipine government had gold reserves as some if not all was evacuated on the USS Trout on 3 February, 1942. She onloaded at Corregidor 319 gold bars (over 6.5 tons) and 630 bags of coins, 1,000 silver pesos in each. The treasure was transported by Trout back to Pearl harbor and transferred to the USS Detroit.

[bridav58]

Brian:

If you bypass the PI, what prevents the USN from continuing to build up its presence there? If you allow more planes and troops and ships to gather there without interdicting them, then you've got a honking big base along the order of Truk or Rabaul right in your back yard. Oh and remember that B-17s can reach Formosa with ease. While I agree that not attacking the PI or PH avoids the US declaring war, how long can Japan allow the US to build up before the inevitable showdown occurs?


Japan controls all the sealanes to the PI. It really wasn't my intention to say not go to war with the US perse but simply see what the US does when you strike south without attacking Pearl Harbor or the Phillipines . IF the US does launch an attack from the PI or at least tries to then the Japanese can say they were attacked first . If the US doesn't attack well then declare a blockade thereby stopping any reinforcements from getting there. The B-17's? Well sometimes in Europe even when grouped in groups of a 100 or more they didn't knock out airfields, factories ,refineries or oil tank farms(couldn't resist the last one!!! lol !!!!) so where would 35 do so much? Further look at how MacArthur hesitated historically even after the overt PH attack how much would he hesitate here?
I mean it would be worth a try IMHO it couldn't be any worse then what happened historically.

[asnrobert]

Brian:

If you bypass the PI, what prevents the USN from continuing to build up its presence there? If you allow more planes and troops and ships to gather there without interdicting them, then you've got a honking big base along the order of Truk or Rabaul right in your back yard. Oh and remember that B-17s can reach Formosa with ease. While I agree that not attacking the PI or PH avoids the US declaring war, how long can Japan allow the US to build up before the inevitable showdown occurs?

Of course, launching a sneak attack on a country that is bigger than you with more people, resources and industry isn't too bright either.

If Japan did go to war without attacking the US, I think FDR would have a hard time convincing an isolationist Congress to go to war. Of course, he would probably beef up naval patrols, hoping to provoke some 'incident' (although FDR was more interested in helping Britain fight Hitler). And even supposing FDR was able to get Congress to declare war, would the American public (which was still pretty isolationist) be as willing to make the sacrifices needed to win- or tolerate the inevitable heavy losses?

[asnrobert]

Hi guys,

The Phillipine government had gold reserves as some if not all was evacuated on the USS Trout on 3 February, 1942. She onloaded at Corregidor 319 gold bars (over 6.5 tons) and 630 bags of coins, 1,000 silver pesos in each. The treasure was transported by Trout back to Pearl harbor and transferred to the USS Detroit.

I read about that. When the Trout reached Pearl, one gold bar was found to be missing. Turns out one of the cooks was using it as a paperweight!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Japan controls all the sealanes to the PI. It really wasn't my intention to say not go to war with the US perse but simply see what the US does when you strike south without attacking Pearl Harbor or the Phillipines . IF the US does launch an attack from the PI or at least tries to then the Japanese can say they were attacked first . If the US doesn't attack well then declare a blockade thereby stopping any reinforcements from getting there. The B-17's? Well sometimes in Europe even when grouped in groups of a 100 or more they didn't knock out airfields, factories ,refineries or oil tank farms(couldn't resist the last one!!! lol !!!!) so where would 35 do so much? Further look at how MacArthur hesitated historically even after the overt PH attack how much would he hesitate here?
I mean it would be worth a try IMHO it couldn't be any worse then what happened historically.

Brian:

So what does Japan do? Deny the USN the right to base ships at the Philippines? Do they attack a task force on their way there? If so, there's your war. And as I said, the US could add more B-17s as well as other assets. Point being if Japan leaves the Philippines alone, the USN can reinforce and in fact probably trigger a war just by being there. FDR gets almost what he wants (since we know he really wanted to get into the war in Europe, not the Pacific).

The strike south first and ignore the US possessions is a debated idea. I'm not saying it wouldn't work, I'm merely contending that it wouldn't avoid war in the long run.

[asnrobert]

Brian:

So what does Japan do? Deny the USN the right to base ships at the Philippines? Do they attack a task force on their way there? If so, there's your war. And as I said, the US could add more B-17s as well as other assets. Point being if Japan leaves the Philippines alone, the USN can reinforce and in fact probably trigger a war just by being there. FDR gets almost what he wants (since we know he really wanted to get into the war in Europe, not the Pacific).

The strike south first and ignore the US possessions is a debated idea. I'm not saying it wouldn't work, I'm merely contending that it wouldn't avoid war in the long run.

Of course, it could work to the advantage of the Japanese. While FDR fought with Congress, the Japanese could grab and control the NEI (which without US involvement may have fallen even sooner), plus the ships, planes and troops devoted to PH, Wake, Guam and the Philippines would be free to deploy elsewhere. By the time the FDR finally got the US into war, the Japanese could be well entrenched, and without the galvanizing influence of Pearl Harbor, Americans may not have been as resolute on achieving victory.

[old_pop2000]

If I read the April 1941 American-British-Dutch Agreement correctly,


The Associated Powers are convinced that any action against one is of vital importance for the others.

8. Knowledge by Japan that aggression by her against one of the Associated Powers would immediately lead to united resistance by all might prevent war.

Its sounds like any Japanese aggressive act against the Dutch, British or the US, will lead to all being at war.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/pt_14/x15-050.html

[bridav58]

If I read the April 1941 American-British-Dutch Agreement correctly,



Its sounds like any Japanese aggressive act against the Dutch, British or the US, will lead to all being at war.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/pt_14/x15-050.html

what Asnrobert and me are trying to get to is that the US public might not be as galvanised if no US territory is attacked. You avoid the political fallout of the historical Pearl Harbor raid. You could have maybe a little backing off of the "unconditional surrender" condition as far as terms if something does go wrong with the war for the Japanese or if things go right for the Japanese the US public might be more amenable to a negotiated surrender.

[old_pop2000]

what Asnrobert and me are trying to get to is that the US public might not be as galvanised if no US territory is attacked. You avoid the political fallout of the historical Pearl Harbor raid. You could have maybe a little backing off of the "unconditional surrender" condition as far as terms if something does go wrong with the war for the Japanese or if things go right for the Japanese the US public might be more amenable to a negotiated surrender.

I am simply pointing out that we did have a treaty obligation that would involve us in a hot war. We had ships in the ABDA Force in the Java area, a prime focus of Japanese southern operations. The Japanese had already sunk one of our warships, the Panay, and caused an international incident. Another or two, might be enough. The Roosevelt adminstration was good as manipulating the press, and information flow in the late 1930's wasn't like it was today.

I asked my mother, who lived in New Jersey during that timeperiod. She stated that they did not know much about the Japanese. It was the German's that were in the news on radio. The attack on PH was sudden to her and her family. No one really knew much about the Japanese.

[Ed Rotondaro]

what Asnrobert and me are trying to get to is that the US public might not be as galvanised if no US territory is attacked. You avoid the political fallout of the historical Pearl Harbor raid. You could have maybe a little backing off of the "unconditional surrender" condition as far as terms if something does go wrong with the war for the Japanese or if things go right for the Japanese the US public might be more amenable to a negotiated surrender.

Brian:

You're making a mistake here in linking the Pearl Harbor attack with unconditional surrender. That occurred more than a year later to reassure the Russians that the Western Allies would stay the course. Once the brutality of war becomes apparent in the Pacific, the US isn't going to back down. It took more than Pearl Harbor to harden our hearts. Read "War Without Mercy; Race and Power in the War in the Pacific" by John Dower for more details.

Respectfully,

[asnrobert]

Hi guys,

The Phillipine government had gold reserves as some if not all was evacuated on the USS Trout on 3 February, 1942. She onloaded at Corregidor 319 gold bars (over 6.5 tons) and 630 bags of coins, 1,000 silver pesos in each. The treasure was transported by Trout back to Pearl harbor and transferred to the USS Detroit.

In one of my old issues of Our Navy magazine, there was a 2 page article about this. I've scanned the pages and uploaded them to Flickr, so you can see them at the links below if you're interested:

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3097/2599692283_1733a7d3e7_b.jpg
http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3232/2599693155_40e9a0d033_b.jpg


BTW Ed, I found some articles relating to Leyte Gulf. I've scanned them and I'm in the process of posting them to Flickr- I've even found an article about the combat debut of the USS Guam that Chris might enjoy.