Blockship Oahu Redux ...

[robdab]

For those that were interested in my last ill-fated attempt, I'll try again.

Please consider if you will, the benefits to the Japanese had they decided to have the Tatuta Maru lead the Kido Butai to Oahu:

- she had sufficient range so as to not require at sea re-fueling

- she would sail independently and so not further complicate KB movements

- she was pre-authorized by Washington for entry into Hawaiian waters

- she was expected to be crossing the north Pacific and could (secretly) scout for the KB

- if buzzed by a scouting PBY she could give the KB an early warning of its approach

- if she spotted a merchantman or warship she could give the KB an early warning

- she had visited Oahu dozens of times pre-war and her last visit to Honolulu was just over a month previous so her crew knew the area well.

- her regular radio position transmissions could even have been used as a cover for any accidental KB radio 'ooopes'. Any Americans listening in or RDFing for her would have watched her daily progress without concern as this had been done three times before by repatriation ships inbound from Japan.

- her weather/cloud cover reports could have been a godsend to the KB had the weather not been as co-operative as it was historically in the days prior to Dec.7'41

- her broadcast of a homing signal could have accurately guided the KB's strike planes right to the entrance to Pearl Harbor at 0750 had there been early morning mist, fog or low cloud cover on that day which might have otherwise "scrubbed" the attack.

Consider also the historical use by the Japanese of the blockship concept:

- during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 at Port Arthur http://www.russojapanesewar.com/kesshitai.html and

- at Manila Bay http://www.hmsfalcon.com/foreign/foreign.htm

They may not have been great at doing it but they certainly believed in the concept of going after enemy ports.

Your further thoughts on the topic please ...

[Warship NWS]

As a note I fed the links that robdad used in his post to him.. I did not recall the IJN ever attempting to use blockships before but a little digging and he was right on that part, problem is their experiences were faulty as the attempts did not seem to prove successful - which is probably why I never came across the information before in my readings over the years. For one, the attempts during 1905, 1942, 1944, and 1945 were using small coastal ships of around 2,000 tons.

So the questions would be in following to his own..

a) How large of a ship would you need to block PH and where exactly would it have to sink to be useful?

b) How long would it take the USN to move it and/or work around it?

Personally, I would give it very low chances as this would be at a time of international tensions with patrols watching for hostile activities. The only prior experiences with this challenge seem to be back in 1905 and of which they were intercepted and fired upon.

So what do you all think? Should the IJN have even attempted it and would it have had any chances of workable success?

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Here is a link to the Tatsatu Maru that robdab is talking about (16,000+ tons)

http://www.timetableimages.com/maritime/images/tatsuta1.htm

Thanks.

[john964]

- her regular radio position transmissions could even have been used as a cover for any accidental KB radio 'ooopes'. Any Americans listening in or RDFing for her would have watched her daily progress without concern as this had been done three times before by repatriation ships inbound from Japan.

Your further thoughts on the topic please ...

There would have been no radio 'oopes' IIRC the radio transmiters of the PH strike group had been rendered temporarely inoperable and the normal operators had been left behaind.

[robdab]

Chris,

Thanks for the added information and for clearing up the pesky automatic URL censor issue.

One small point. She was 16,975 tons so rounding off to 17,000 tons would be more accurate than rounding off to 16,000+ tons.

You asked:

a) How large of a ship would you need to block PH and where exactly would it have to sink to be useful? - To which I would respond that the PH entrance channel was dredged to a width of 700' with a (low tide) depth varying from 72' at the entrance nets, 40' over most of it's length and 42' at the coaling station docks near Hospital Point. PH's shipping areas were maintained at 45'. Tide rise was only 12". Why the difference between 40' and 45' I do not know for sure but I assume that the addditonal 5' allowed ships to not touch bottom as they were loaded or (unloaded) slightly unevenly.

The entrance channel varied between 850' and 1250' wide but where not dredged only averaged 15'- 21' deep because of hard coral deposits.

Tatuta Maru was 584' long, 74' of beam and drew 28.5' normally. Her keel to maindeck height was 85' with funnels another 37' above that.

b) How long would it take the USN to move it and/or work around it?- with her bottoms blown out, not just her seacocks opened ?

Personally, I would give it very low chances as this would be at a time of international tensions with patrols watching for hostile activities. The only prior experiences with this challenge seem to be back in 1905 and of which they were intercepted and fired upon.- in the middle of an active war with Russia that is.

I would point out that Yoshikawa still had complete peacetime freedom of movement thru non-military areas as of Dec.6'41 and would have been able to check the alertness and numbers of any US observers posted by visiting the areas near the PH entrance. Or by using the telescope on the roof of the Japan's Honolulu Consulate.

Acording to the sworn Pearl Harbor Inquiry testimoney of General Short himself, Yoshikawa would have found only anti-sabotage sentries posted at military sites and some critical road and railway bridges. They were Army personnel watching for skulkers in the shadows, not naval watch officers trained to watch for shipping. Short did NOT order ANY of his 100+ coastal artillery observation/fire control bunkers manned that morning. Not a one. And those were the gents that were supposed to be watching for Japanese naval attack from off-shore. The watchers were not even at their posts on the morning of Dec.7'41.

As far as Oahu's General Short was concerned, there was NO time of internatioanl tensions apparent. Even though he had a "War Warning" message from Washington on Nov.29'41, he posted no patrols/observers to watch to seaward.

And even if he had, Tatuta Maru was expected at Honolulu Harbor since her repatriation trip was authorized by Washington. She would not be likely to cause any alarm until after sometime after Ward was hit.

--------------------------------------------------------
john964,

Wrt radio silence being broken ..."stuff" happens. The Japanese were so worried about it that they did as you suggested, removing pieces of all of the transmitting gear, fleet wide. The regular KB radio operators were left behind in Japan to continue fake broadcasts in their recognizable "hand", not to guard against the loss of radio silence.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Chris,

Thanks for the added information and for clearing up the pesky automatic URL censor issue.

One small point. She was 16,975 tons so rounding off to 17,000 tons would be more accurate than rounding off to 16,000+ tons.

You asked:

a) How large of a ship would you need to block PH and where exactly would it have to sink to be useful? - To which I would respond that the PH entrance channel was dredged to a width of 700' with a (low tide) depth varying from 72' at the entrance nets, 40' over most of it's length and 42' at the coaling station docks near Hospital Point. PH's shipping areas were maintained at 45'. Tide rise was only 12". Why the difference between 40' and 45' I do not know for sure but I assume that the addditonal 5' allowed ships to not touch bottom as they were loaded or (unloaded) slightly unevenly.

The entrance channel varied between 850' and 1250' wide but where not dredged only averaged 15'- 21' deep because of hard coral deposits.

Tatuta Maru was 584' long, 74' of beam and drew 28.5' normally. Her keel to maindeck height was 85' with funnels another 37' above that.

b) How long would it take the USN to move it and/or work around it?- with her bottoms blown out, not just her seacocks opened ?

Personally, I would give it very low chances as this would be at a time of international tensions with patrols watching for hostile activities. The only prior experiences with this challenge seem to be back in 1905 and of which they were intercepted and fired upon.- in the middle of an active war with Russia that is.

I would point out that Yoshikawa still had complete peacetime freedom of movement thru non-military areas as of Dec.6'41 and would have been able to check the alertness and numbers of any US observers posted by visiting the areas near the PH entrance. Or by using the telescope on the roof of the Japan's Honolulu Consulate.

Acording to the sworn Pearl Harbor Inquiry testimoney of General Short himself, Yoshikawa would have found only anti-sabotage sentries posted at military sites and some critical road and railway bridges. They were Army personnel watching for skulkers in the shadows, not naval watch officers trained to watch for shipping. Short did NOT order ANY of his 100+ coastal artillery observation/fire control bunkers manned that morning. Not a one. And those were the gents that were supposed to be watching for Japanese naval attack from off-shore. The watchers were not even at their posts on the morning of Dec.7'41.

As far as Oahu's General Short was concerned, there was NO time of internatioanl tensions apparent. Even though he had a "War Warning" message from Washington on Nov.29'41, he posted no patrols/observers to watch to seaward.

And even if he had, Tatuta Maru was expected at Honolulu Harbor since her repatriation trip was authorized by Washington. She would not be likely to cause any alarm until after sometime after Ward was hit.

--------------------------------------------------------
john964,

Wrt radio silence being broken ..."stuff" happens. The Japanese were so worried about it that they did as you suggested, removing pieces of all of the transmitting gear, fleet wide. The regular KB radio operators were left behind in Japan to continue fake broadcasts in their recognizable "hand", not to guard against the loss of radio silence.

Hi:

Regarding whether the Tatuta maru could block the channel, I concur that it is more than physicaly possible. Comparing her dimensions to the USS Nevada which almost did block the channel, we come up with a ship that while displacing less than the battleship, more importantly drew almost exactly the same amount of water, 28.5 feet. Her other dimensions are certainly in line with the Nevada's so she is definitely a viable candidate for the mission. Actually pulling off the mission is another story, but if you were to speculate on the odds of success for HMS Campbeltown to ram and block the St. Nazaire dry dock, you wouldn't put money on it. And that occurred during wartime against an enemy that was prepared for attack. A surprise attack suceeded at Pearl Harbor by carrier air, why not by a special operation from a surface vessel? It is certainly not impossible.

[old_pop2000]

I will defer to the previously expressed opinions of our currently serving Naval officer with experience in sailing through that area and with ships themselves. My only contribution is that the timing of explosives is critical, based on my viewing of the operation to place the Oriskany down as a reef. According to interviews on TV, one explosive charge setting off a little late or early and the ship will turn over or many other movements. I have to assume that this problem is inherent in any attempt to sink a ship, precisely where you want it and in the precise position that you want it to settle in.

However, this is alternate history and factors are always different. That is what makes them fun.

Again, if someone needs information researched, I will help.

[robdab]

... My only contribution is that the timing of explosives is critical, based on my viewing of the operation to place the Oriskany down as a reef. According to interviews on TV, one explosive charge setting off a little late or early and the ship will turn over or many other movements. I have to assume that this problem is inherent in any attempt to sink a ship, precisely where you want it and in the precise position that you want it to settle in.

But wasn't Oriskany sunk in water many times deeper than she was tall ? If not settling evenly she could certainly roll over and shift some. But then, why does that matter for a reef unless it is planned for sport divers to be able to tour her in an upright position ?

In the case of the Tatuta Maru her 85' main deck height OR her 74' beam would still be WELL above water level whether or not she settled on her keel or her side. She's to be scuttled in a channel only 40' deep so either way, upright or sideways, at least 34' (or 45' + funnels) of her is going to be above water and 40' of her below water. The only positional matter of import is just how perpendicular to the channel her crew can get her anchored, while under 2x3" coastal artillery fire ?

[old_pop2000]

But wasn't Oriskany sunk in water many times deeper than she was tall ? If not settling evenly she could certainly roll over and shift some. But then, why does that matter for a reef unless it is planned for sport divers to be able to tour her in an upright position ?

In the case of the Tatuta Maru her 85' main deck height OR her 74' beam would still be WELL above water level whether or not she settled on her keel or her side. She's to be scuttled in a channel only 40' deep so either way, upright or sideways, at least 34' (or 45' + funnels) of her is going to be above water and 40' of her below water. The only positional matter of import is just how perpendicular to the channel her crew can get her anchored, while under 2x3" coastal artillery fire ?


Yes, she was and that was a factor. Just pointing it out. I do not have enough information concerning the process of artificial reef construction using derelict ships.

[Kyle Holgate]

I think the US would use explosives and jsut blow the crap out of the block ship - but how long that would take I don't know. Halsey would have had to anchor somewhere or use some other port for Enterprise when it returned and even with good oil tanks no one is getting in to refuel for a while. I'd expect perhaps a few weeks delay at most - but I don't know much about underwater demolition so really am guessing based on very little!

[john964]

I think the US would use explosives and jsut blow the crap out of the block ship - but how long that would take I don't know. Halsey would have had to anchor somewhere or use some other port for Enterprise when it returned and even with good oil tanks no one is getting in to refuel for a while. I'd expect perhaps a few weeks delay at most - but I don't know much about underwater demolition so really am guessing based on very little!Halsey could use the Port of Honolulu to refuel even if they have to use tanker trucks running in shuttle from the fuel depot.

As I said before with a few cranes and some shore mounted winches and several cutting teams going 24/7 you could scrap the ship to in place to the water line in less than 2 weeks.

[robdab]

I think the US would use explosives and jsut blow the crap out of the block ship - but how long that would take I don't know. Halsey would have had to anchor somewhere or use some other port for Enterprise when it returned and even with good oil tanks no one is getting in to refuel for a while. I'd expect perhaps a few weeks delay at most - but I don't know much about underwater demolition so really am guessing based on very little!

No doubt they'd blow it up repeatedly. But with the bigger US warships drawing between 29' and 32' you can't leave much metal on the bottom of a narrow channel that is only 40' deep. Enterprise won't much like dragging her props and rudder thru the steel remains of the Tatuta Maru. And if your few hardhat divers are cutting and blowing up the Tatuta Maru then they aren't working on getting survivors out of sunken US battleships. Vey bad for morale that.

I'd expect a couple of US tankers to "set up house" inside of Honolulu Harbor once it stops burning, to act as a temporary gas station but at tanker speeds the US West Coast is still at least a week away, if an ASW escort can be found. USS Neches was 1,200 nmiles out, on the wrong side of a Japanese submarine picketline, with a cargo of bunker "C" but with a 10 knot maximim speed even she is 5 days away. Enterprise and her TF are going to be in a tough spot if the Kido Butai finds her. And Lexington was hurting for fuel too. I'm not sure if Saratoga (which arrived without a tanker on Dec.15'41) could bring much extra or not ? Maybe enough to get all three out of Hawaiian waters for the time being ? Just guessing though.

----------------------------------------------------------------
john964,

I think that the scenario includes a 3rd wave airstrike by the Kido Butai so Honolulu Harbor's 12 fuel tanks (and most of that largely wooden city) would be burning too. As would be old_pop2000's 26 tanks to the SE of the submarine base. My 3rd wave Kates would have also bombed most of the 26 tanks in the Hospital Point tank farm so there really isn't much fuel to truck anywhere while Tatita Maru blocks that channel.

As I said before with a few cranes and some shore mounted winches and several cutting teams going 24/7 you could scrap the ship to in place to the water line in less than 2 weeks. - Even if that were true, what then ? You'd stil have 584' x 70' x 40' of steel hull underwater and blocking that channel.

Plus one or two more if my minisubs have done their channel ambush job properly. Maybe some sea mines too.

Your cutting team numbers are still limited by the number of hardhat (and rubber airhose) divers willing/able to work blind, surrounded by sharp steel splinters in water than has bloating bodies to attract sharks. Inside a Japanese wreck that might be filled with bobbytraps designed to discourage exactly what you are trying to do.

[keschofield]

Given the complete surprise that was achieved on 12/7/41, I have no doubt that the arrival of such a ship off the mouth of the PH entry channel could easily have been arranged. It certainly wouldn't have been the worst example of US unreadiness on that day!

However, when it comes to ship handling and the vagaries of navigating in the PH channel I defer to our resident expert, Scott.

History shows that blockship placement was always problematic at best. I don't have the resources or the time to research right now, but my recollection is that blockship placement was unsuccessful more often than it was successful. That's not to say its not worth trying. What a coup it would be for the IJN to have blocked the channel! High risk, low chance of success, but definitely worth the try.

Does anybody have any idea if the planners in the IJN ever considered such a tactic?

[Warship NWS]

One small point. She was 16,975 tons so rounding off to 17,000 tons would be more accurate than rounding off to 16,000+ tons.


You cannot compare a ship that is not meant to be a likely stripped down blockship to one meant to be a cruise liner.. that is why I did not round up. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Given the complete surprise that was achieved on 12/7/41, I have no doubt that the arrival of such a ship off the mouth of the PH entry channel could easily have been arranged. It certainly wouldn't have been the worst example of US unreadiness on that day!

However, when it comes to ship handling and the vagaries of navigating in the PH channel I defer to our resident expert, Scott.

History shows that blockship placement was always problematic at best. I don't have the resources or the time to research right now, but my recollection is that blockship placement was unsuccessful more often than it was successful. That's not to say its not worth trying. What a coup it would be for the IJN to have blocked the channel! High risk, low chance of success, but definitely worth the try.

Does anybody have any idea if the planners in the IJN ever considered such a tactic?

Kurt:

I believe that Scapa Flow was partly guarded by sunken ships, mainly to deter submarines. U-47 had to navigate very carefully to in and sink Royal Oak. I wonder how the Brits sank the ships in position?

[john964]

No doubt they'd blow it up repeatedly. But with the bigger US warships drawing between 29' and 32' you can't leave much metal on the bottom of a narrow channel that is only 40' deep. Enterprise won't much like dragging her props and rudder thru the steel remains of the Tatuta Maru. And if your few hardhat divers are cutting and blowing up the Tatuta Maru then they aren't working on getting survivors out of sunken US battleships. Vey bad for morale that.

I'd expect a couple of US tankers to "set up house" inside of Honolulu Harbor once it stops burning, to act as a temporary gas station but at tanker speeds the US West Coast is still at least a week away, if an ASW escort can be found. USS Neches was 1,200 nmiles out, on the wrong side of a Japanese submarine picketline, with a cargo of bunker "C" but with a 10 knot maximim speed even she is 5 days away. Enterprise and her TF are going to be in a tough spot if the Kido Butai finds her. And Lexington was hurting for fuel too. I'm not sure if Saratoga (which arrived without a tanker on Dec.15'41) could bring much extra or not ? Maybe enough to get all three out of Hawaiian waters for the time being ? Just guessing though.

----------------------------------------------------------------
john964,

I think that the scenario includes a 3rd wave airstrike by the Kido Butai so Honolulu Harbor's 12 fuel tanks (and most of that largely wooden city) would be burning too. As would be old_pop2000's 26 tanks to the SE of the submarine base. My 3rd wave Kates would have also bombed most of the 26 tanks in the Hospital Point tank farm so there really isn't much fuel to truck anywhere while Tatita Maru blocks that channel.

As I said before with a few cranes and some shore mounted winches and several cutting teams going 24/7 you could scrap the ship to in place to the water line in less than 2 weeks. - Even if that were true, what then ? You'd stil have 584' x 70' x 40' of steel hull underwater and blocking that channel.

Plus one or two more if my minisubs have done their channel ambush job properly. Maybe some sea mines too.

Your cutting team numbers are still limited by the number of hardhat (and rubber airhose) divers willing/able to work blind, surrounded by sharp steel splinters in water than has bloating bodies to attract sharks. Inside a Japanese wreck that might be filled with bobbytraps designed to discourage exactly what you are trying to do.

As for divers getting survivours out of sunken ships after Dec 14 forget it. IIRC historicaly the last survivour was pulled out of OK on Dec 11 or 12.

[robdab]

Chris, you wrote,

You cannot compare a ship that is not meant to be a likely stripped down blockship to one meant to be a cruise liner.. that is why I did not round up. ;) - But such a stipping effort would be highly risky. What would happen should a nosey US cruiser stop her 12 miles out for an inspection ? Historically it never happened BUT the Japanese couldn't be sure that it wouldn't and so would NOT want to risk the unravelling of their entire KB plan.

She would best appear as normal as possible, inside and out, with some "fake" civilian passengers as well. There must have been some women in the IJN ?

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kurt, thanks for the "guarded support". I believe that you are my first "convert" ?

Welcome to the darkside !

[djcyclone]

Let's say this did work. It is only a passanger liner, so it is not armored. With so much of its hull being above water I would thing the best thing would be to shoot it with a 16" gun right in the center. After only a couple of shots it would be near breaking apart. The question is would a couple of tugs of the day have had enough towing power to drag the two parts out of the way. Then just send divers in to clear the remaining wreckage so properllers and ruddrs do not get effected.

If this would have been possible, then the max delay is no more than a week. It would have probably taken longer since our main efforts where trying to save sailors in the Arizona and such.

[old_pop2000]

I wonder how long it would take to construct a bypass channel around the blockship to allow traffic to pass?

[robdab]

Let's say this did work. It is only a passanger liner, so it is not armored. With so much of its hull being above water I would thing the best thing would be to shoot it with a 16" gun right in the center. After only a couple of shots it would be near breaking apart. The question is would a couple of tugs of the day have had enough towing power to drag the two parts out of the way. Then just send divers in to clear the remaining wreckage so properllers and ruddrs do not get effected.

Except that the only 16" shells stocked on Oahu were of the AP type. Armour Piercing. They would go thru Tatuta's hull like a "hot knofe thru butter" leaving only, 16" holes. It would take many of those to weaken her hull enough for it to split. As for tugs dragging her 8,500 ton halves out of the way over a muddy channel bottom, think again.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

old_pop2000, you wrote,

I wonder how long it would take to construct a bypass channel around the blockship to allow traffic to pass? - I can only speculate that this would largely depend on just how fast the Japanese minisubs could sink the dredges attempting it.

IIRC there were three civilian dredges inside of PH at the time of the Dec.7'41 attack. Being only lightly comstructed and not expected to engage in combat I would expect one torpedo to be sufficient to finish each. Out of the 6-8 that would be left after USS Ward was sent to a watery grave. So, say an average of 7 torpedoes vs 3 dredges ? A short fight I'd expect.

Resulting in yet more wrecks to clear from the entrance channel.

Historically the answer to your question would be months. The entrance into PH thru the calcified coral was deepened by blasting and dredging, not at all a fast process.

[Warship NWS]

Chris, you wrote,

You cannot compare a ship that is not meant to be a likely stripped down blockship to one meant to be a cruise liner.. that is why I did not round up. ;) - But such a stipping effort would be highly risky. What would happen should a nosey US cruiser stop her 12 miles out for an inspection ? Historically it never happened BUT the Japanese couldn't be sure that it wouldn't and so would NOT want to risk the unravelling of their entire KB plan.

She would best appear as normal as possible, inside and out, with some "fake" civilian passengers as well. There must have been some women in the IJN ?

Your quickly turning what could be a more simple equation of buoyancy into a far more complex and variable problem. Since everyone here is assuming the USN would have its guard completely down during the whole attempt you could have just told them they were on a training cruise if you stripped it down -- since its not armed why would they believe otherwise? Also, with our guard down again, why would we stop the ship anyways? Personaly, I think we would have gotten pretty suspicious regardless if it was stripped down or not.

In any case, I still find the entire hypothetical pluasibility of this Trojan Horse idea highly problematic at best. As Command Bart Mancuso in "Hunt for Red October" said so well.. "There is still a million things that could go wrong with this stunt!"

This still leaves out the high probability of the dock resources being geared up to resolve the matter as quickly as possible. We cannot, and should not, underestimate what we might have done to get rid of a half sunk ship in the harbor entrance. Personaly, IF everything went perfectly - which is a big IF - I think we would have had demolition teams removing that ship pretty quickly. The mini-subs were a minimal threat at best and of which a few escorts - and especially aircraft - could have neutralized if needed - mini-subs can't stay underwater for long and once surfaced they are dead.

Those are my final thoughts anyways.. I need to get back to work here so I will let all of you ponder over this to your hearts content. ;)

[robdab]

Chris, you wrote,

Since everyone here is assuming the USN would have its guard completely down during the whole attempt you could have just told them they were on a training cruise if you stripped it down -- since its not armed why would they believe otherwise? - I'm just trying to stay as close to the actual history as is possible with my scenario. Historiclly the US government approved 4 repatriation ship voyages so that US and Japanese citizens could be returned to their homelands during a time of international crisis. Regular run commercial trans-Pacific Japanese cargo-liners were pre-approved, not stripped training cruise trips. Why do you insist on "messing about with the history" when it isn't necessary for the scenario ?

Also, with our guard down again, why would we stop the ship anyways? Agreed and historically none of the first three were stopped for inspection. But on the 4th voyage, with the KB lurking to the north, why take an unnecessary risk in order to save a few lamps, carpets and beds from a watery grave ?

Personaly, I think we would have gotten pretty suspicious regardless if it was stripped down or not. - Other than your forsight knowledge of my scenario, why ? Washington had pre-approved the trips.

In any case, I still find the entire hypothetical pluasibility of this Trojan Horse idea highly problematic at best. As Command Bart Mancuso in "Hunt for Red October" said so well.. "There is still a million things that could go wrong with this stunt!" - And one could CERTAINLY say the exact same thing about the entire PH raid. My scenario wouldn't increase the risk to the KB much at all and I think would, in fact, reduce that historical risk somewhat as Tatuta Maru would be another Japanese scouting asset as the KB approached Oahu.

This still leaves out the high probability of the dock resources being geared up to resolve the matter as quickly as possible. We cannot, and should not, underestimate what we might have done to get rid of a half sunk ship in the harbor entrance. Personaly, IF everything went perfectly - which is a big IF - I think we would have had demolition teams removing that ship pretty quickly. - No doubt. I don't expect my blockship/minisubs to stopper PH for months. Just a few weeks is all that I need. Time enough to burn the oil, bombard the "fish in a barrel" and draw a ring of Japanese submarines (ordered this time to sink tankers as well as warships) around Hawaii

I know that it won't win the war for Japan but the question is, might the Japanese leadership of 1941, have thought so ? Not a US surrender by any means but rather a ceasefire that would acknowledge Japan's contol of the NEI oil ?

The mini-subs were a minimal threat at best and of which a few escorts - and especially aircraft - could have neutralized if needed - mini-subs can't stay underwater for long and once surfaced they are dead. - Also agreed. Except for the aircraft part. Historically three USN PBYs flew right over the minisubs and didn't detect them until alerted to a surfaced one by Anteres/Ward. The minisub's historical missions were a waste of a resource that I believe should have been used to block the PH entrance channel. A mission that required their still-secret status and ambush ability.

[Warship NWS]

Why do you insist on "messing about with the history" when it isn't necessary for the scenario ?


Because your "messing about with the history" by attempting something the IJN had never even considered or attempted before on such a complex scale in terms of distance, timing of event, size of ship, etc. - blockship of around 16,000+ tons (depending on how much stuff they left on board - including fuel I might add - not just carpets, lamps, and stuff). Could they have attempted it? Maybe.. I just personaly consider the odds of success very low. To pull off this entire stunt meant someone had to think it up, plan it, execute it, and have a million things work correctly. Launching a CV strike was ALREADY within their doctrinal and planning capabilities, and within their frames of mind - which some in the USA even knew before they did it.


I don't expect my blockship/minisubs to stopper PH for months. Just a few weeks is all that I need. Time enough to burn the oil, bombard the "fish in a barrel" and draw a ring of Japanese submarines (ordered this time to sink tankers as well as warships) around Hawaii

Now your "messing with history" and the entire IJN mindset of the 1940s completely. The IJN NEVER gave orders for their subs to attack "tankers" nor any merchants at all. This was another massive strategic blunder on their part, and another reason why the blockship was highly unlikely with their mindset at the time, they were tactical thinkers, not strategic thinkers - as they even proved with their air attack on PH. Your also not considering the fact that they needed every single drop of oil they could keep their hands on for their warships, that is a major reason why WW2 got started. To waste a bunch of oil on an ocean liner with low odds of success to try and block a harbor for maybe a few days to a couple of weeks at most is an act of desperate futility. You could oil up several DDs for the same price and they needed DDs more then they needed some grasping for straws blockship attack.

As to the mini-subs.. they did squat and had very little chances of success. After the air raids we had DDs available for patrols and CVs in the area if needed so the mini-subs would have been neutralized in quick order - especially considering the fact they could not stay under for long at all - remember, we would be at war footing.. not peace time with possible hostile intentions - and we were looking for any thing that even looked supsicious.

This will be my final post on this topic, not trying to be rude but I have work to do.

Thanks.

[robdab]

...To pull off this entire stunt meant someone had to think it up, plan it, execute it, and have a million things work correctly. Launching a CV strike was ALREADY within their doctrinal and planning capabilities, and within their frames of mind - which some in the USA even knew before they did it. - I just can't see how adding 1 single ship to the entire KB effort is going to require that much Japanese effort ?

Especially when you consider that HISTORICALLY most of this voyage HAPPENED. Tatuta Maru set sail with much fanfare and headed east from Japan. She only reversed her course to head back to Japan at midnight on Dec.6-7'41. The only parts that need to be "invented" for my scenario are extra anchors, a jammer, two hidden deck guns and scuttling charges. Hardly a major investment of time or money considering the potential rewards.

The minisubs were already in the water just off of the PH entrance. One even in combat with the Ward, ALREADY.

Now your "messing with history" and the entire IJN mindset of the 1940s completely. The IJN NEVER gave orders for their subs to attack "tankers" nor any merchants at all. - Then why were some sunk by IJN subamrines off of the US West Coast ? The 'Cynthia Olsen', sunk well before 0755 Dec.7'41 comes to mind. Were IJN submarine skippers just a rebellious lot back then ? She was a schooner carrying lumber IIRC. Didn't look even remotely like a warship.

You're also not considering the fact that they needed every single drop of oil they could keep their hands on for their warships, that is a major reason why WW2 got started. To waste a bunch of oil on an ocean liner with low odds of success to try and block a harbor for maybe a few days to a couple of weeks at most is an act of desperate futility. You could oil up several DDs for the same price and they needed DDs more then they needed some grasping for straws blockship attack. - In fact my blockship attempt would have used LESS fuel that the Tatuta Maru HISTORICALLY used to return to Japan from her midnight turn around point. To get to Oahu was only 1/3 the distance that she had to cover to return to Japan. You argue contrary to the historical facts.

As to the mini-subs.. they did squat and had very little chances of success. Considering their historical suicide mission, I do agree with you. My scenario gives them a better chance of a meaningful death, at least.

After the air raids we had DDs available for patrols and CVs in the area if needed so the mini-subs would have been neutralized in quick order - especially considering the fact they could not stay under for long at all - remember, we would be at war footing.. not peace time with possible hostile intentions - and we were looking for any thing that even looked supsicious. - Yes, but you continue to ignore the fact that the US didn't know that the Japanese had a working minisub design in the water.

Had those minisubs not tried to sneak into PH then neither Condor, Antares, Ward nor that PBY would have seen one and so been able to warn the US defenders about the very existance of their midget attackers. A full sized I-boat can't even fully submerge in a 40' deep channel so your hordes of US DDs (still trapped within PH btw) won't even be looking for a submerged Japanese submarine there, until well after the torpedoes have hit and a second (and maybe a third) blockship is on the bottom of that channel.

This will be my final post on this topic, not trying to be rude but I have work to do. - Don't we all. LOL.

[Warship NWS]

I just can't see how adding 1 single ship to the entire KB effort is going to require that much Japanese effort ?

Simply sailing along to a port and preparing to use it as a blockship are not the same thing, especially since they had never attempted it before. Remember this was the 1940s with a nationality that did not think outside the box very much. TIMING and PLANNING were very critical and your assuming everything would go as planned and that US forces would do exactly as you expect. I never said it was impossible, just very low odds of occurring and then succeeding if we stick to the historical environment of the time frame.


Then why were some sunk by IJN subamrines off of the US West Coast ? The 'Cynthia Olsen', sunk well before 0755 Dec.7'41 comes to mind. Were IJN submarine skippers just a rebellious lot back then ? She was a schooner carrying lumber IIRC. Didn't look even remotely like a warship.

Your going to compare the chance sinking of a small 250' schooner to the fact that the IJN subs were never under doctrinal orders to attack, specifically, tanker sea lanes? If your going to fly with that then why were they not used like U-boats in the Atlantic? That could have changed how we fought the Pacific Naval war.. FAR more so then your entire blockship theory. So how far out of bounds are we going to go here to fit your theory? To me, yet another massive IJN *strategic* blunder.


You argue contrary to the historical facts.

You missed my point entirely.. they needed oil for more worthwhile efforts IMHO, not just a chancy shot at sinking a cruise liner in a harbor entrance.


Considering their historical suicide mission, I do agree with you. My scenario gives them a better chance of a meaningful death, at least. Yes, but you continue to ignore the fact that the US didn't know that the Japanese had a working minisub design in the water.

Well.. the Ward sure gave us a good idea of that, and if we KNEW they had subs at all we surely would be looking for them would we not? Ok.. one is smaller then the other .. its still a sub. We were not that out to lunch. Again your completely assuming what our response would be to your blockship situation.

Again, I need to get back to work.. the rest of you can have fun with this. My final thoughts.. odds of it working, extremely slim, and with the mindset of the IJN, it would not have happened. All other attempts were with 2,000 ton expendable gunboat or coastal ships at far easier to reach locations and even then they proved problematic at best.

Thanks.

[robdab]

Simply sailing along to a port and preparing to use it as a blockship are not the same thing, especially since they had never attempted it before. Remember this was the 1940s with a nationality that did not think outside the box very much. - You don't consider the entire historical Pearl Harbor attack as an example of "thinking outside the box" for 1941 ??? For a raid over 3,000 miles from home, they developed a shallow water torpedo, an 800kg AP battleship shell bomb, developed and tested an underway re-fueling capability and for the first time ever on the planet, worked a 6 carrier strike force attack and you still claim them to be a nation that did not think outside of the box very much ???

Just what would you consider to be thinking outside of the box if this string of spectacular SUCCESSES don't meet your standard ?

TIMING and PLANNING were very critical and your assuming everything would go as planned and that US forces would do exactly as you expect. - By attaching my blockship to the KB's strike I am assuming all of the historical risks that the Japanese of that day were willing to risk. I see little reason ( or opportunity for that matter) for the American defenders to react much differently than they did historically, just because one extra pre-approved Japanese cargo-liner shows up that morning,. She was expected. Officially authorized by Washington to be there while heading for Honolulu.

Your going to compare the chance sinking of a small 250' schooner to the fact that the IJN subs were never under doctrinal orders to attack, specifically, tanker sea lanes? - No. My point was made in response to your statement from post #23 of this thread that I now quote, "The IJN NEVER gave orders for their subs to attack "tankers" nor any merchants at all." Nowhere did you use the word "doctrine". Several Allied merchant ships and tankers certainly were attacked and sunk by Japanese submarines around Hawaii and the US West Coast, in the early months of the Pacific War.

You missed my point entirely.. they needed oil for more worthwhile efforts IMHO, not just a chancy shot at sinking a cruise liner in a harbor entrance. - Yet you miss my point as well. You speak to what the Japanese SHOULD have done IYHO, with the collected wisdom of 66+ years of hindsight, while OTH I designed an AH scenario based as much as possible on what the Japanese DID ACTUALLY DO in 1941. Considering the difference in those two approaches to WW2 history, I doubt that we will ever agree on much of anything.

Well.. the Ward sure gave us a good idea of that, and if we KNEW they had subs at all we surely would be looking for them would we not? - The discussion now becomes circular ... I've already pointed out that the USN would be unlikely to look for a submerged submarine in waters they know to be too shallow for one to submerge in.

As a really silly example, do you check your bathwater for a submerged hippo before you climb in that tub everytime ?

Ok.. one is smaller then the other .. its still a sub. We were not that out to lunch. - Historically Oahu's defenders were out for breakfast, lunch and dinner all at the same time.

Again your completely assuming what our response would be to your blockship situation. - When I look at the US military resources available, they way that they were deployed (and mostly not deployed at all) prior to the historical attack, along with the response methods and times taken, I can see no other response by the US defenders than the one that I have outlined.

The only American commander that showed any swiftness of reaction historically was Cpt. Outerbridge of the USS Ward (Dec.7 was literally only his second day "on the job" in command of her) and I made sure that he got killed off (or at least isolated in a liferaft) very early in my scenario. No moss growing on this Cannuk.

Using the historical reaction times of the US defenders and the military assets that they actually had available that morning, what other reactions to my surprise blockship attack would you suggest ? And why ?

[Warship NWS]

Robdab,

Like I said I am done with this topic. I gave it the benefit of the doubt with a slim chance of success and tried to keep it within the realm of plausible historical context but you seem to think that just because they made very minor modifications to 2 weapons that were already a part of their inventory that they would dream up such a 16,000+ ton trojan horse out of the blue. Well all of their admirals, battle planners, etc.. didn't do it, so did they just drop the ball because you thought it up nearly 70 years later? Your convinced it could have been done apparently with great chances of success, since you show no reason why it would have any chance to fail, and that the US military forces at that time would have been completely oblivious to them trying it just because it was supposedly a routine sailing of a cruise liner even though they had trouble getting the idea to work even with ships far smaller then a cruise liner not only in 1905 but even after 1942. Why debate or ask for opinions if you are already convinced by your own theoretical conclusions?

I am not replying again, you are already convinced it would work and have been adjusting the rules of this debate as you go along to fit your theory. Not trying to be rude, but that is my professional opinion.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Just out of curiosity I did a bit of research regarding this entire "blockship" theory and found quite a few interesting facts that Robdab failed to bring up for some reason. For one thing the ship "Tatsuta Maru" had no chance of being used as a block ship by the IJN.

* The IJN never planned, nor even considered, the idea and for that matter they converted the ship to a transport immediately after 12/7/41, the day of the infamous air attack, when she arrived at Yokohama harbor.

* The "Tatsuta Maru" was the LAST Japanese liner scheduled to leave Pearl Harbor on 11/5/41 and no Japanese ocean liners ever approached, or where scheduled to approach, the harbor before the war began on 12/7/41 and ALL liners were under scrutiny by the FBI while being on watch for Axis spies and espionage activities. There was also some court measures regarding the ship with "conspiracy" considerations involving her operations and the Japanese NYK company that owned the ship.

* Prior to 1941 the "Tatsuta Maru" was used as an oceanic liner between California and Japan, not Hawaii. In 1938 "Tatsuta Maru" name was changed to "Tatuta Maru" and during 1941 was scheduled to evacuate Japanese citizens from San Fransisco and Honolulu -- NOT PEARL HARBOR. At no time, according to any records I could find, did she ever enter the harbor entrance - the crew HAD NO experience of sailing into the military port harbor whatsoever.

* The "Tatsuta Maru" being used as a blockship could NOT be done while in her "liner" configuration due to buoyancy reasons as I had mentioned before. The successful uses of blockships involved filling the lower sections of a ship with concrete, rubble, or other heavy materials to balance out the ship for sinking upright and this based on actual blockship *successful* deployments by a navy that actually had a lot more experience at using blockships, the Royal Navy of WW1. No ship larger then a cruiser sized ship had EVER been used for a blockship in naval history vs an enemy port - that I could find, and even at that they proved problematic at best even with considerable planning and multiple block ships being deployed vs a single harbor entrance with experienced combat trained crews. Only one use of blockships proved successful on a limited scale. Another attempt was easily avoided using dredging equipment by a far less sophisticated navy then the USN in 1941, the German navy of WW1. Stating the IJN would have just drawn the idea from out of the blue and then had any reasonable chance of success contradicts any historical context of the use of blockships - much less the far more narrow minded IJN tactical thinking and utter lack of experience with the exception of 1905, 36 years prior to Pearl Harbor - and that was using multiple coastal ships at Port Arthur with poor results. No blockship in naval history was ever deployed at such great distances either.

The critical timing of such an attempt is another matter Robdab did not catch on to and for some reason avoided in my responses. If the ship arrived before the air attack it may well have given an alert of possible hostile intentions - something the IJN was desperately trying to avoid - especially a Japanese flagged ship trying to enter a naval military port during a tense international stand off between the USA and Japan, and if after the attack the ship may well have been fired upon by coastal batteries or naval patrols thus defeating the attempt. In any case, the "Tatsatu Maru" was not even available or able to make such an attack for the reasons above so it is a moot point.

End of discussion and I will not reply further to this, IMHO futile, discussion.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Simply sailing along to a port and preparing to use it as a blockship are not the same thing, especially since they had never attempted it before. Remember this was the 1940s with a nationality that did not think outside the box very much. - You don't consider the entire historical Pearl Harbor attack as an example of "thinking outside the box" for 1941 ??? For a raid over 3,000 miles from home, they developed a shallow water torpedo, an 800kg AP battleship shell bomb, developed and tested an underway re-fueling capability and for the first time ever on the planet, worked a 6 carrier strike force attack and you still claim them to be a nation that did not think outside of the box very much ???

Just what would you consider to be thinking outside of the box if this string of spectacular SUCCESSES don't meet your standard ?

TIMING and PLANNING were very critical and your assuming everything would go as planned and that US forces would do exactly as you expect. - By attaching my blockship to the KB's strike I am assuming all of the historical risks that the Japanese of that day were willing to risk. I see little reason ( or opportunity for that matter) for the American defenders to react much differently than they did historically, just because one extra pre-approved Japanese cargo-liner shows up that morning,. She was expected. Officially authorized by Washington to be there while heading for Honolulu.

Your going to compare the chance sinking of a small 250' schooner to the fact that the IJN subs were never under doctrinal orders to attack, specifically, tanker sea lanes? - No. My point was made in response to your statement from post #23 of this thread that I now quote, "The IJN NEVER gave orders for their subs to attack "tankers" nor any merchants at all." Nowhere did you use the word "doctrine". Several Allied merchant ships and tankers certainly were attacked and sunk by Japanese submarines around Hawaii and the US West Coast, in the early months of the Pacific War.

You missed my point entirely.. they needed oil for more worthwhile efforts IMHO, not just a chancy shot at sinking a cruise liner in a harbor entrance. - Yet you miss my point as well. You speak to what the Japanese SHOULD have done IYHO, with the collected wisdom of 66+ years of hindsight, while OTH I designed an AH scenario based as much as possible on what the Japanese DID ACTUALLY DO in 1941. Considering the difference in those two approaches to WW2 history, I doubt that we will ever agree on much of anything.

Well.. the Ward sure gave us a good idea of that, and if we KNEW they had subs at all we surely would be looking for them would we not? - The discussion now becomes circular ... I've already pointed out that the USN would be unlikely to look for a submerged submarine in waters they know to be too shallow for one to submerge in.

As a really silly example, do you check your bathwater for a submerged hippo before you climb in that tub everytime ?

Ok.. one is smaller then the other .. its still a sub. We were not that out to lunch. - Historically Oahu's defenders were out for breakfast, lunch and dinner all at the same time.

Again your completely assuming what our response would be to your blockship situation. - When I look at the US military resources available, they way that they were deployed (and mostly not deployed at all) prior to the historical attack, along with the response methods and times taken, I can see no other response by the US defenders than the one that I have outlined.

The only American commander that showed any swiftness of reaction historically was Cpt. Outerbridge of the USS Ward (Dec.7 was literally only his second day "on the job" in command of her) and I made sure that he got killed off (or at least isolated in a liferaft) very early in my scenario. No moss growing on this Cannuk.

Using the historical reaction times of the US defenders and the military assets that they actually had available that morning, what other reactions to my surprise blockship attack would you suggest ? And why ?

Hi:

The only thing I would pose here is the already mentioned problems with using a blockship. Once the discussion started, I went back and reviewed historical uses of blockships and as Kurt mentioned much earlier in the thread, they usually are not successful unless done without any hinderances. The British attempt to block Ostend and Zeebrugge during WWI featured several blockships and it took two attempts to partialy block these U-boat bases. Now admittedly Britain was trying to do so in the middle of a war against an alerted enemy who was actively opposing them whereas in your scenario the IJN would have the element of surprise and at initially weak opposition. Regarding submarines, once the fighting starts I don't give any IJN sub much of chance to linger around Pearl Harbor. As Chris points out, aircraft will be looking for such threats. The end question is just how long would a blockship neutralize Pearl Harbor? I can't see it blocking operations for more than three months tops. Attacking the fuel farm and the infrastructure at Pearl Harbor would have set the USN back much further than just blocking the harbor. Now doing all these things certainly sets back the USN's ability to do anything for most of 1942. So what does Japan gain? She historically conquered all of her goals by summer 1942. With the exception of Port Moresby she has what she wants. So now she either fortifies her perimeter or continues expanding. She ended up wasting resources and time in Burma and India, and then still has to deal with China and eventually the US. So the great American counter offensive in the Pacific kicks off in 1943 instead of November 1942. I don't see much of a gain other than the IJN still has her carrier forces. This assumes that Nimitz choses not to engage at Midway due to the lack of a base to sortie from. All that blocking PH does is delay the inevitable. It would also probably force FDR to allow admiral King to position the bulk of the USN in the Pacific rather than split it between the Atlantic and Pacific which is what King wanted anyway.

[Warship NWS]

I can't see it blocking operations for more than three months tops. Attacking the fuel farm and the infrastructure at Pearl Harbor would have set the USN back much further than just blocking the harbor.

Sorry.. I had to respond to this one..;) I don't think either case would have set us back that much, it all depends on the response. We could have said the heck with salvaging operations on the BBs (as one example), they were not needed anyways and most were completely rebuilt, and used the manpower to clear the channel, fix the fuel tanks - or finish the underground ones, and get back to limited operations at first and full operations shortly thereafter. I agree though that King would have been bitching up a storm! ;) That is the big part of the equation that cannot be simply disregarded.. our response.

[old_pop2000]

Sorry.. I had to respond to this one..;) I don't think either case would have set us back that much, it all depends on the response. We could have said the heck with salvaging operations on the BBs (as one example), they were not needed anyways and most were completely rebuilt, and used the manpower to clear the channel, fix the fuel tanks - or finish the underground ones, and get back to limited operations at first and full operations shortly thereafter. I agree though that King would have been bitching up a storm! ;) That is the big part of the equation that cannot be simply disregarded.. our response.

Hey Mates:

After 34 years of working with the government, I would be very surprised if contingency plans did not exist in Washington or Hawaii for those eventualities. Despite the fact that the US Navy was caught napping at Pearl harbor, the carriers were missing, the ships in the harbor responded to the attack within 5 minutes. I would bet that some analyst deep in the bowels of the War Department had already theorized about a blockship at the entrance and the destruction of the Fuel tanks. In fact, Red Hill was being built because of Chester Nimitz when he was at the Bureau of Navigation. He felt the above ground tanks were vulnerable and needed to be replacement. So, while I don't have specific details on such plans, you can take it from this old former federal employee, that we were never that stupid, guys. We had contingency plans for almost everything, believe it. There are people in the pentagon that have nothing to do but think up this stuff and solutions. There are boxes and boxes of plans for contingencies. Sometimes we were so worried about what might happen, we forgot about what is happening. Problems that were right in front of our faces, we missed. Funny, quite often true.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hey Mates:

After 34 years of working with the government, I would be very surprised if contingency plans did not exist in Washington or Hawaii for those eventualities. Despite the fact that the US Navy was caught napping at Pearl harbor, the carriers were missing, the ships in the harbor responded to the attack within 5 minutes. I would bet that some analyst deep in the bowels of the War Department had already theorized about a blockship at the entrance and the destruction of the Fuel tanks. In fact, Red Hill was being built because of Chester Nimitz when he was at the Bureau of Navigation. He felt the above ground tanks were vulnerable and needed to be replacement. So, while I don't have specific details on such plans, you can take it from this old former federal employee, that we were never that stupid, guys. We had contingency plans for almost everything, believe it. There are people in the pentagon that have nothing to do but think up this stuff and solutions. There are boxes and boxes of plans for contingencies. Sometimes we were so worried about what might happen, we forgot about what is happening. Problems that were right in front of our faces, we missed. Funny, quite often true.

Dennis:

That's why your plans division draws up color coded war plans, just in case.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

That's why your plans division draws up color coded war plans, just in case.

Yes indeedy, sir. And the Orange one, worked.:D:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

Yes indeedy, sir. And the Orange one, worked.:D:D

Dennis:

Did you know we had plans for invading Ireland if necessary plus one for a war with Imperial Russia? Not to mention Plan Gold for a war with France in the Carribean.

[keschofield]

Dennis:

... Not to mention Plan Gold for a war with France in the Carribean.


That wouldn't have taken long! :D

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Did you know we had plans for invading Ireland if necessary plus one for a war with Imperial Russia? Not to mention Plan Gold for a war with France in the Carribean.

Yes, and one for Canada.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi:

The only thing I would pose here is the already mentioned problems with using a blockship. Once the discussion started, I went back and reviewed historical uses of blockships and as Kurt mentioned much earlier in the thread, they usually are not successful unless done without any hinderances. The British attempt to block Ostend and Zeebrugge during WWI featured several blockships and it took two attempts to partialy block these U-boat bases. Now admittedly Britain was trying to do so in the middle of a war against an alerted enemy who was actively opposing them whereas in your scenario the IJN would have the element of surprise and at initially weak opposition. Regarding submarines, once the fighting starts I don't give any IJN sub much of chance to linger around Pearl Harbor. As Chris points out, aircraft will be looking for such threats. The end question is just how long would a blockship neutralize Pearl Harbor? I can't see it blocking operations for more than three months tops. Attacking the fuel farm and the infrastructure at Pearl Harbor would have set the USN back much further than just blocking the harbor. Now doing all these things certainly sets back the USN's ability to do anything for most of 1942. So what does Japan gain? She historically conquered all of her goals by summer 1942. With the exception of Port Moresby she has what she wants. So now she either fortifies her perimeter or continues expanding. She ended up wasting resources and time in Burma and India, and then still has to deal with China and eventually the US. So the great American counter offensive in the Pacific kicks off in 1943 instead of November 1942. I don't see much of a gain other than the IJN still has her carrier forces. This assumes that Nimitz choses not to engage at Midway due to the lack of a base to sortie from. All that blocking PH does is delay the inevitable. It would also probably force FDR to allow admiral King to position the bulk of the USN in the Pacific rather than split it between the Atlantic and Pacific which is what King wanted anyway.

Hi Ed,

Modern attempts to use blockships have only been partially successful. Even after two attempts to block those ports, German U Boats could get by the blockships. In 1904, the Japanese tried to sink a blockship in the channel for Port Arthur to bottle up the Russian fleet. That attempt failed also with heavy casualties.

[Warship NWS]

Hi Ed,

Modern attempts to use blockships have only been partially successful. Even after two attempts to block those ports, German U Boats could get by the blockships. In 1904, the Japanese tried to sink a blockship in the channel for Port Arthur to bottle up the Russian fleet. That attempt failed also with heavy casualties.

Actually the Japanese attempted it with 5 2,000 ton coastal ships,

http://www.russojapanesewar.com/kesshitai.html

The Zeebrugge Raid using 3 old cruisers,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeebrugge_Raid

The First Ostend Raid using 2 old cruisers,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Ostend_Raid

The Second Ostend Raid using 1 protected cruiser,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Ostend_Raid

Only the Second Ostend Raid proved marginally successful, Zeebrugge Raid succeeded for 3 days only, and the rest were failures.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

As I mentioned in the previous thread, the US Navy tried to sink a freighter to block Santiago Harbor, and it failed.

[old_pop2000]

As I mentioned in the previous thread, the US Navy tried to sink a freighter to block Santiago Harbor, and it failed.


It's interesting how easily ships can sink in bad weather, striking a reef, in many different ways. But it is very hard to do it on purpose and get it right. The list of failures is endless. I suspect the list of absolute success, scanty. Isn't that interesting. By the way, Newt Gingrich has written two two alternate history novels. In one of those, Yamamoto leads the Pearl Harbor attack, they sink a blockship, destroy the fuel farms. I have never read the book but this is what an extensive review has stated. Isn't that coincidental.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

Modern attempts to use blockships have only been partially successful. Even after two attempts to block those ports, German U Boats could get by the blockships. In 1904, the Japanese tried to sink a blockship in the channel for Port Arthur to bottle up the Russian fleet. That attempt failed also with heavy casualties.

Mike:

From what I've read, the most successful use of blockships occurs when the ship is sunk under controlled conditions (i.e. not during combat). This allows the demolition to occur precisely and you can have ships standing by to ensure the proper positioning of the blockship. If I recall correctly, Egypt sank several ships to block access to the Suez canal prior to war with Israel (possibly during the Suez crisis?).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Actually the Japanese attempted it with 5 2,000 ton coastal ships,

http://www.russojapanesewar.com/kesshitai.html

The Zeebrugge Raid using 3 old cruisers,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeebrugge_Raid

The First Ostend Raid using 2 old cruisers,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Ostend_Raid

The Second Ostend Raid using 1 protected cruiser,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Ostend_Raid

Only the Second Ostend Raid proved marginally successful, Zeebrugge Raid succeeded for 3 days only, and the rest were failures.

Thanks.

Chris:

And costly failures in terms of lives lost by the RN and Marines. IIRC more Victoria Crosses were awarded for these actions than were awarded to some army corps after fours years on the Western Front.

[old_pop2000]

Has anyone read the alternate historical novels by Newt Ginghrich? I've read Harry Turtledove, but was interested in Gingrich's books. Just a reasonable review would help. I am looking for some items he includes in his scenarios. Might save me some money.

Thanks, mates.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Has anyone read the alternate historical novels by Newt Ginghrich? I've read Harry Turtledove, but was interested in Gingrich's books. Just a reasonable review would help. I am looking for some items he includes in his scenarios. Might save me some money.

Thanks, mates.

Dennis:

I haven't read them, but from what I understand his alternative histories employ some of the ideas we've kicked around recently. It would be interesting to see how he addresses some of the issues we've debated. Have you checked for possible book reviews?