Yamato Questions ?

[robdab]

Gents,

I understand that Yamato was commissioned on or about Dec.14'41 and took roughly another 3 months to "work up" to combat certified status.

Can anyone tell me how difficult it would have been for Japan to advance her historical construction and crew training schedules by 3.5 months so that she might have been "ready for action" when the Pacific War began ?

Was slowing her sister's construction as a way to add a 3rd shift to Yamato's labourforce, a useful possibility ?

On a related theme, were the 18.1" type 3 shells in service by Dec.7'41 or did they come later ?



My apologies if these quetions have been asked here previously.

[old_pop2000]

Gents,

I understand that Yamato was commissioned on or about Dec.14'41 and took roughly another 3 months to "work up" to combat certified status.

Can anyone tell me how difficult it would have been for Japan to advance her historical construction and crew training schedules by 3.5 months so that she might have been "ready for action" when the Pacific War began ?

Was slowing her sister's construction as a way to add a 3rd shift to Yamato's labourforce, a useful possibility ?

On a related theme, were the 18.1" type 3 shells in service by Dec.7'41 or did they come later ?



My apologies if these quetions have been asked here previously.

Source: Naval Technical Mission to Japan 1946 Report O-19

If we are talking about the Common shell Model 3 Incendiary used for AA- The report states that production was turned over to arsenals just before Guadalcanal. This is the extent of the information. No date of implementation is given. Someone probably has the information in one of their battleship books.

[john964]

Gents,

I understand that Yamato was commissioned on or about Dec.14'41 and took roughly another 3 months to "work up" to combat certified status.

Can anyone tell me how difficult it would have been for Japan to advance her historical construction and crew training schedules by 3.5 months so that she might have been "ready for action" when the Pacific War began ?

Was slowing her sister's construction as a way to add a 3rd shift to Yamato's labourforce, a useful possibility ?

On a related theme, were the 18.1" type 3 shells in service by Dec.7'41 or did they come later ?



My apologies if these quetions have been asked here previously.
In the USN during WWII it took an average of about 3 months to get DD DE and SS ready for combat, for CV BB CA and CL it took upwards of 6 months. So when Yamato sailed for Midway it had probably just became combat ready.

[old_pop2000]

In the USN during WWII it took an average of about 3 months to get DD DE and SS ready for combat, for CV BB CA and CL it took upwards of 6 months. So when Yamato sailed for Midway it had probably just became combat ready.

Using Kaigun by Mark Peattie and David C. Evans, I would venture a guess that the answer to the thread question is :

1. Shortage of funds- Japanese National income was 4 billion dollars of which 28% went to defense.

2. Shortage of steel- The US export control administration had placed restrictions on the export of scrap steel which was a primary component of steel making. In 1940, the Japanese produced 7.5 million metric tons.

There are other possible mitigating factors like a poor transportation system for moving parts, lack of highly skilled labor. These ships were given a high priority and most likely affected the construction of other, possibly more vital ships like destroyers, cruisers etc. Most of these were build in commercial shipyards, of which there are precious few.

Not much of an answer, but maybe someone has a history of the ship.

[Warship NWS]

I would add that BB Yamato was built with extreme secrecy in mind which likely did not help with the production time frame.. accelerating her time frame while trying to retain secrecy would have been seriously questionable.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I do not have the time to get into heavy detail on this subject but here are some sources that might be of some use,

http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/wwii/Japanese.navy/jap_yamoto_bat.txt

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_battleship_Yamato

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yamato_class_battleship

[Warship NWS]

My apologies if these quetions have been asked here previously.


Quick note, I have no issue with a topic being raised that has been discussed before for several reasons,

a) To allow new members a chance to pick up where the knowledge left off and so they can possibly add new fresh perspectives to historical topics.

b) We do not have prior forum archives due to a server failure back in Feb of this year plus it would be hard for any one person to track all threads and posts of an active forum of open discussions.

c) Historians have been known to copy each others materials and/or sources over the years, as has been proven with various topics of discussion where historical events where re-evaluated based on new or improved information, point being - sometimes rehashing old ground can produce new knowledge.

A topic of discussion will either take on a life of its own or be shelved due to lack of time or interest at that time by other members. Various topics can be hit and miss.. I have even posted some topics that lasted no more then a few posts at times.. and others will go on for weeks. That is the nature of forums, but you never know until you try. ;)

Thanks.

[robdab]

old_pop2000,

Thanks for that type #3 info.

Can you tell me if that round was ever intended to be used as a land bombardment shell or only as an AA round ? I'm wondering here of its effects if fired on an enemy airfield such as Henderson on Guadalcanal ? It sounds to me as if the round would be very nasty to aircraft (and their asssociated barracks, ammo and fuel dumps) caught on the ground during a night bombardment ?

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john964,

After your comment I was reminded to check her TROM at http://www.combinedfleet.com/yamato.htm which shows her Kure built but not deemed operational until May 27'42, a mere two days prior to departure for the Midway operation, despite having become Yamamoto's flagship on Feb.12'42.

It seems that her crew rather unexpectedly failed her 23 mile gunnery tests on March 30'42 (held under Yamamoto's personal observation - ouch !) and had to go back to gunnery school in the Inland Sea.

Comparison with her Nagasaki built sister Musashi's TROM at http://www.combinedfleet.com/musashi.htm shows a much quicker "working up" period

I remain amazed that in such a small and crowded country, the Japanese were able to maintain the secrets of both of these monsters thru such a long building period, so completely that the US still didn't know their details as late as 1944.

[old_pop2000]

old_pop2000,

Thanks for that type #3 info.

Can you tell me if that round was ever intended to be used as a land bombardment shell or only as an AA round ? I'm wondering here of its effects if fired on an enemy airfield such as Henderson on Guadalcanal ? It sounds to me as if the round would be very nasty to aircraft (and their asssociated ammo and fuel dumps) caught on the ground during a night bombardment ?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

john964,

After your comment I was reminded to check her TROM at http://www.combinedfleet.com/yamato.htm which shows her Kure built but not deemed operational until May 27'42, a mere two days prior to departure for the Midway operation, despite having become Yamamoto's flagship on Feb.12'42.

It seems that her crew rather unexpectedly failed her 23 mile gunnery tests on March 30'42 (held under Yamamoto's personal observation - ouch !) and had to go back to gunnery school in the Inland Sea.

Comparison with her Nagasaki built sister Musashi's TROM at http://www.combinedfleet.com/musashi.htm shows a much quicker "working up" period


Based on my previous reference and the following snippet from the NavWeaps site, I would say it was intended for AA only. I am not an armaments expert, however since it was designed to detonate at 1100 yards after firing, I have doubts it could be. Just my simple opinion, insufficient information to draw a more informed conclusion.


As were most Japanese warships, the Yamato and Musashi were provided with a special anti-aircraft incendiary shrapnel shell officially designated as "3 Shiki tsûjôdan" (Common Type 3) and supposedly nicknamed "The Beehive," but this could be apocryphal. This round weighed 2,998 lbs. (1,360 kg) and was filled with 900 incendiary-filled tubes. A time fuze was used to set the desired bursting distance, usually about 1,000 meters (1,100 yards) after leaving the muzzle. These projectiles were designed to expel the incendiary tubes in a 20 degree cone extending towards the oncoming aircraft with the projectile shell itself being destroyed by a bursting charge to increase the quantity of steel splinters. The incendiary tubes ignited about half a second later and burned for five seconds at 3,000 degrees C, producing a flame approximately 5 meters (16 feet) long.
The concept behind these shells was that the ship would put up a barrage pattern through which an attacking aircraft would have to fly. However, these shells were considered by US Navy pilots to be more of a visual spectacular than an effective AA weapon.

As to its effectiveness against aircraft, the only known use by Yamato, was at Okinawa and out of 300 attacking aircraft, only 10 were shot down. My conclusion would be that it's performance was less than expected.

As to the issue of accelerating the construction, launch and fitting out of the Yamato. Insufficient information to draw an intelligent conclusion.

[Warship NWS]

As to its effectiveness against aircraft, the only known use by Yamato, was at Okinawa and out of 300 attacking aircraft, only 10 were shot down. My conclusion would be that it's performance was less than expected.

The results of the beehive were abysmal at best. To the best of anyones knowledge, not a single plane was shot down by the 18.1" gunfire that I can recall. All "10" aircraft shot down .. were by other AA guns.

Think of it this way.. no AA directors for the guns, your maneuvering which adds further aiming complications for such a slow firing gun at around 1.5 RPM on average - or less since again your maneuvering, and your firing at targets moving at over 150mph.. hmm.. nah, not going to work. ;)

[robdab]

Based on my previous reference and the following snippet from the NavWeaps site, I would say it was intended for AA only. I am not an armaments expert, however since it was designed to detonate at 1100 yards after firing, I have doubts it could be. Just my simple opinion, insufficient information to draw a more informed conclusion.

Many thanks for that source and quote which indicates that the detonation timing could be selected ... sound like you're right though. It seems unlikely that a fuse that could execute at 1,100 yards would be adjustable to 11,000yds or more. And to be really effective an air burst is needed. A ground contact detonation would not scatter the 3,000'C burning tubes very far and wide.

I had hopes that the type 3 (modified into bomb form much as the 800kg AP battleship shells were) might have been a good tankfarm buster but it seems to be fused too fast, designed too late and too heavy a lift for the Kates at Pearl Harbor.

[robdab]

I did some looking in o-19 where I found the following for the 18.1"/45cal type 3 incendiary AA shell:

2,640 ft/sec velocity, nose fuse type 4 ,

o-17 lists the type 4 as being a time fuse adjustable from 0-55 seconds which at 2,640 fps gives a maximum distance before bursting of 48,400' or 16,133 yds. Roughly 9 miles.

Good enough I'd say for an offshore bombardment of Henderson Field had Yamato/Musashi ever been ordered there ?

I'd consider sets consisting of 3 HE rounds from each 18" tube to "bust up" the target followed by 1 type 3 incindiary to get the fumes well and truely burning. Repeated.

[Warship NWS]

The other question you have to keep in mind robdab is do you want to burn up a lot of limited oil and risk one of your most prestigeous warships to hopefully score a hit, which keep in mind they fired LOTS of shells at Guadalcanal with VERY poor results, in the hopes you might light something on fire. Ask Dennis, his dad was actually there during some of the bombardments IIRC.

Thanks.

[ksf1973]

Far as I know, the Yamato took much longer to do her working up than the IJN had hoped, doing especially poorly on her gunnery qualifications.

Damn gun-clubbers...:D

[ksf1973]

I did some looking in o-19 where I found the following for the 18.1"/45cal type 3 incendiary AA shell:

2,640 ft/sec velocity, nose fuse type 4 ,

o-17 lists the type 4 as being a time fuse adjustable from 0-55 seconds which at 2,640 fps gives a maximum distance before bursting of 48,400' or 16,133 yds. Roughly 9 miles.

Good enough I'd say for an offshore bombardment of Henderson Field had Yamato/Musashi ever been ordered there ?

I'd consider sets consisting of 3 HE rounds from each 18" tube to "bust up" the target followed by 1 type 3 incindiary to get the fumes well and truely burning. Repeated.

Similarly to the technique used by the USAF in Korea on North Korean ammunition dumps. HE bombs to crack them open and napalm to set them off.

[robdab]

The other question you have to keep in mind robdab is do you want to burn up a lot of limited oil and risk one of your most prestigeous warships to hopefully score a hit, which keep in mind they fired LOTS of shells at Guadalcanal with VERY poor results, in the hopes you might light something on fire. Thanks.

Chris,

I suggested the idea as a way to improve the Japanese record of bombardment performance. I'm a believer in the abilty of fire to act as a major damage multiplyer.

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ksf1973,

Please see my posting #8 on this thread.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=robdab;6896]old_pop2000,

Thanks for that type #3 info.

Can you tell me if that round was ever intended to be used as a land bombardment shell or only as an AA round ? I'm wondering here of its effects if fired on an enemy airfield such as Henderson on Guadalcanal ? It sounds to me as if the round would be very nasty to aircraft (and their asssociated barracks, ammo and fuel dumps) caught on the ground during a night bombardment ?

Hi:

The round was specifically developed to knock out airstrips, not as an AA round per se. It was later employed in that role with essentially disasterous results (Musashi fired them during the battle of Leyte Gulf and it resulted in the disabling of one of her 18.1" guns). In fact during the First naval battle of Guadalcanal (November 12-13 1942), the two IJN battlecruisers Hiei and Kirishima were loaded with these rounds which were useless against warships and may have been one of the reasons that the US task force didn't lose more ships since the gun crews had to swap out these shells for standard AP shells. USS San Francisco was hit by one of these shells and damaged, but survived since the shell didn't penetrate her armor.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Far as I know, the Yamato took much longer to do her working up than the IJN had hoped, doing especially poorly on her gunnery qualifications.

Damn gun-clubbers...:D

Kristian:

And Yamato historically shot poorly in her only real surface action at Samar in 1944. I don't think she would have fared well against a modern US or British BB.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Chris,

I suggested the idea as a way to improve the Japanese record of bombardment performance. I'm a believer in the abilty of fire to act as a major damage multiplyer.

-----------------------------------------------------
ksf1973,

Please see my posting #8 on this thread.

Hi:

Don't you think that a standard HE round would be sufficient to do the job? If AP rounds can start fires on warships which unlike fuel tanks are heavily armored and not as flammable, one could make a reasonable assumption that HE could light up a fuel tank if a direct hit is scored. Just my thoughts.

[old_pop2000]

The other question you have to keep in mind robdab is do you want to burn up a lot of limited oil and risk one of your most prestigeous warships to hopefully score a hit, which keep in mind they fired LOTS of shells at Guadalcanal with VERY poor results, in the hopes you might light something on fire. Ask Dennis, his dad was actually there during some of the bombardments IIRC.

Thanks.

Sorry, but I don't recall ever discussing the battleship bombardment with him. I don't have the date of his injury during the bombing attack. I believe it was before the battleship bombardment. He left the island after the injury and returned later to Munda to fly from there.

As to whether you could install a type 4 fuze into type 3 incendiary, I don't know if you could or couldn't. Would it work, maybe. Would it do any good, due to the nature of the target, and resourcefulness of the Marines. Insufficient information to make an informed decision. Maybe William or one of the others might know. My information is that the type 3 incendiary shell only went to the arsenals for production, just before the Guadalcanal campaign. It was only loaded extensively on the Yamato in 1944. Could that have changed, sure. Lot's of questions, few precise answers. But that is the nature of alternate history.

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=robdab;6896]old_pop2000,

Thanks for that type #3 info.

Can you tell me if that round was ever intended to be used as a land bombardment shell or only as an AA round ? I'm wondering here of its effects if fired on an enemy airfield such as Henderson on Guadalcanal ? It sounds to me as if the round would be very nasty to aircraft (and their asssociated barracks, ammo and fuel dumps) caught on the ground during a night bombardment ?

Hi:

The round was specifically developed to knock out airstrips, not as an AA round per se. It was later employed in that role with essentially disasterous results (Musashi fired them during the battle of Leyte Gulf and it resulted in the disabling of one of her 18.1" guns). In fact during the First naval battle of Guadalcanal (November 12-13 1942), the two IJN battlecruisers Hiei and Kirishima were loaded with these rounds which were useless against warships and may have been one of the reasons that the US task force didn't lose more ships since the gun crews had to swap out these shells for standard AP shells. USS San Francisco was hit by one of these shells and damaged, but survived since the shell didn't penetrate her armor.

I am confused, because the type 3 he is referencing was designed for AA work. I don't recall it ever having been used at Guadalcanal, it was strictly for the 18.1 inch guns. You all have the books, what shell are we referring to for Hiei and Kirishima?

[robdab]

old_pop2000 and Ed,

Thanks for the feedback. That type 3 shell meets my requirements perfectly save for that Sept/Oct 1942 date. 1941 would have been much better. Time for more research.

The type 4 is the nose fuse listed for the 18" type 3 round in O-19.

As far as just counting on HE to start fires, I am skeptical. My own experience of being mortared by 120s indicates that its just not that easy. One or two shells out of 30 can start a fire in something combustable and the very next shell can blow it out again in an instant. The fire might get started again, or it might not ... I've seen a sudden gush of oil from a splitting tank extinguish a fire by cutting off it's oxygen supply. Surprised the heck out of me, let me tell you.

From what I have read most shipboard fires started in aircraft/stores or when ready use ammunition, paint lockers were hit so certainly it is possible. I just want to be really, really sure that the fuel tanks are going to burn

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Table 2 on page 13 of o-19 indicates that type 3 shells were made for
18"/45 cal
16"/45 cal
14"/45 cal
8"/50 cal
5"/50 cal
5"/40 cal
and that all used the same type 4 nose fuse

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=Ed Rotondaro;6926]

I am confused, because the type 3 he is referencing was designed for AA work. I don't recall it ever having been used at Guadalcanal, it was strictly for the 18.1 inch guns. You all have the books, what shell are we referring to for Hiei and Kirishima?

Dennis:

I'll check tonight. The shell I think we are talking about is the Sanshiki which was a "beehive" shell designed for AA work. I'm at work and don't have access to my books, I'll see what's on-line, but our firewall here often prevents me from retrieving articles related to weapons. Some of the articles I've found refer to the Sanshiki as the Type 3 incendiary shell so that may be what's confusing me. The Hiei and Kirishima had these shells on board when they were preparing to bombard Henderson Field in Nov 1942.

[Ed Rotondaro]

old_pop2000 and Ed,

Thanks for the feedback. That type 3 shell meets my requirements perfectly save for that Sept/Oct 1942 date. 1941 would have been much better. Time for more research.

The type 4 is the nose fuse listed for the 18" type 3 round in O-19.

As far as just counting on HE to start fires, I am skeptical. My own experience of being mortared by 120s indicates that its just not that easy. One or two shells out of 30 can start a fire in something combustable and the very next shell can blow it out again in an instant. The fire might get started again, or it might not ... I've seen a sudden gush of oil from a splitting tank extinguish a fire by cutting off it's oxygen supply. Surprised the heck out of me, let me tell you.

From what I have read most shipboard fires started in aircraft/stores or when ready use ammunition, paint lockers were hit so certainly it is possible. I just want to be really, really sure that the fuel tanks are going to burn

--------------------------------------------------------
Table 2 on page 13 of o-19 indicates that type 3 shells were made for
18"/45 cal
16"/45 cal
14"/45 cal
8"/50 cal
5"/50 cal
5"/40 cal
and that all used the same type 4 nose fuse

Hi:

When and where did you get mortared? If you don't mind sharing the details? I'm trying to go over wars that Canada was in and since you and I are about the same age, all I can come up with is possibly the First Gulf War.

[robdab]

Thai-Cambodian Border 1981
I've never served.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thai-Cambodian Border 1981
I've never served.

I'm not sure I would want your job LOL! Did you get hazardous duty pay?

[robdab]

It wasn't supposed to be hazardous. Only all the water buffalo that I didn't have to BBQ.

Except for the bleeding nose, eyes and ears, it wasn't that bad for me. Others had it much worse.

I can't even begin to imagine what those gents on Henderson Field went thru with 5", 8" & 14" falling all over them. Yamato's shells were even bigger.

[Warship NWS]

I would just add that there is a considerable difference between a 500lb GP bomb that has around 50% (~250lb) Pyrcic acid or Type 98 explosive and a 120mm mortar round with 6.6lb of Composition B - not including hot fragments and their destruction radius. Plus, a mortar bombardment is not the same thing as sections of dive bombers attacking individual large targets.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Similarly to the technique used by the USAF in Korea on North Korean ammunition dumps. HE bombs to crack them open and napalm to set them off.

The concept in theory might be the same but there is a huge difference between firing a series of 18.1" HE shells with 136lb burster charges and highly inaccurate gunnery (IJN naval bombardments were highly inaccurate) and then trying to hit that similar spot with a incendiary shell with a relatively small detonation radius compared to a fighter bomber with possible ballistic computer bomb sight dropping a multiple 500lb GP bombs with a 250lb filler that can actually see the target and then drop a 500lb Napalm bomb with 75 gallons of flammable fuel with thickener covering a much larger detonation footprint. The chances of one succeeding is FAR greater then the other.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would just add that there is a considerable difference between a 500lb GP bomb that has around 50% (~250lb) Pyrcic acid or Type 98 explosive and a 120mm mortar round with 6.6lb of Composition B - not including hot fragments and their destruction radius. Plus, a mortar bombardment is not the same thing as sections of dive bombers attacking individual large targets.

Thanks.

Chris:

Yet compared to a comparable artillery shell, a mortar bomb packs more explosive since it doesn't have to deal with the high stresses of being fired from a cannon. Pound for pound, a mortar round is more destructive, although not as destructive as a 500lb bomb of course. Most infantrymen state that being under mortar attack is one of the most frightening things imaginable.

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

Yet compared to a comparable artillery shell, a mortar bomb packs more explosive since it doesn't have to deal with the high stresses of being fired from a cannon. Pound for pound, a mortar round is more destructive, although not as destructive as a 500lb bomb of course. Most infantrymen state that being under mortar attack is one of the most frightening things imaginable.

You need a daisy cutter. It was a 500lb HE with a pole welded to the fuse. When the bomb hit, it exploded about two to four feet above the ground. Great for clearing jungle and killing anything in its path. My dad explained the whole mechanism one day. It wasn't standard issue, but great on the Canal.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Yet compared to a comparable artillery shell, a mortar bomb packs more explosive since it doesn't have to deal with the high stresses of being fired from a cannon. Pound for pound, a mortar round is more destructive, although not as destructive as a 500lb bomb of course. Most infantrymen state that being under mortar attack is one of the most frightening things imaginable.

Robdab was comparing a mortar attack and how that might counter the effects of flammability vs structural targets (snuffing out flames) - I was just noting that there is a lot more difference between a 500lb bomb which can break bones from the shockwave alone, not including blast effects and hot shrapnel, out to several hundreds of yards compared to a 120mm mortar round. Mortars vs troops is not the same thing as trying to destroy metallic structural and possibly flammable targets. The more explosives you can apply to a structural target the better. The area of effect and potential of starting fires is dramatically different. That was the only point I was trying to make.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Robdab was comparing a mortar attack and how that might counter the effects of flammability vs structural targets (snuffing out flames) - I was just noting that there is a lot more difference between a 500lb bomb which can break bones from the shockwave alone, not including blast effects and hot shrapnel, out to several hundreds of yards compared to a 120mm mortar round. Mortars vs troops is not the same thing as trying to destroy metallic structural and possibly flammable targets. The more explosives you can apply to a structural target the better. The area of effect and potential of starting fires is dramatically different. That was the only point I was trying to make.

Thanks.

Have you given any consideration to a different attack profile?

Use Val's loaded with 551 lb HE/GP to blow the tanks and start the oil gushing out. Use a high level attack with B5N's loaded with smaller bombs to start the fires, up from 2500-3000 ft. The B5N's could drop Type 99 #3 33.7 kg bombs that carry 144 white phosphorus pellets. Used against bomber formations and designed in 1938. White phosporus should ignite the leaking oil. Val's might be able to drop the 33.7KG simultaneously with the 250kg bombs.

Just a passing thought.

[robdab]

Have you given any consideration to a different attack profile?

Use Val's loaded with 551 lb HE/GP to blow the tanks and start the oil gushing out. Use a high level attack with B5N's loaded with smaller bombs to start the fires, up from 2500-3000 ft. The B5N's could drop Type 99 #3 33.7 kg bombs that carry 144 white phosphorus pellets. Used against bomber formations and designed in 1938. White phosporus should ignite the leaking oil. Val's might be able to drop the 33.7KG simultaneously with the 250kg bombs.
Just a passing thought.

Didn't I suggest using 2x30kg incendiary bombs under the wings of a Val, along with it's primary weapon, as a "fuel tank buster" way back near the start of another thread ? I was told then that there were no incendiary bombs in IJN carrier use so how is it that this one turns up now ?

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Chris, in your post #29 you state,

...(IJN naval bombardments were highly inaccurate)...

I would refer you to page #262 of the book "Kaigun" where the authors attribute 12% hits to Nagato at the astounding range of 32,000 metres, using spotting aircraft and indirect fire. That is hardly, " highly inaccurate" in anyone's navy of that day.

[old_pop2000]

Didn't I suggest using 2x30kg incendiary bombs under the wings of a Val, along with it's primary weapon, as a "fuel tank buster" way back near the start of another thread ? I was told then that there were no incendiary bombs in IJN carrier use so how is it that this one turns up now ?




Weren't flares carried aboard carriers? Aren't they magnesium, how much difference is there? However, it was just a suggestion to Warship NWS.

[Warship NWS]

..(IJN naval bombardments were highly inaccurate)...

I would refer you to page #262 of the book "Kaigun" where the authors attribute 12% hits to Nagato at the astounding range of 32,000 metres, using spotting aircraft and indirect fire. That is hardly, " highly inaccurate" in anyone's navy of that day.

And how many thousands of shells did they fire in their bombardments? Now compare that to the damage they really inflicted. You cannot take one *possible* attack based on one source, the IJN side at that, and use that as blanket coverage for all of their bombardments. The IJN claimed great accuracy of naval gunfire before the war during excersizes also and were completely dismayed at how bad their gunfire was in actual combat. If their accuracy was so astounding then the 2 airfields on Guadalcanal should have ceased to exist -- didn't happen, for that matter, they were hardly interrupted for very long at all even after heavy shelling. To make your problem worse yet, the Yamato, as has been mentioned several times already, to compare your incendinary shellfire had some of the poorest gunfire accuracy in combat of all. Not trying to be blunt here, just realistic.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Have you given any consideration to a different attack profile?

Use Val's loaded with 551 lb HE/GP to blow the tanks and start the oil gushing out. Use a high level attack with B5N's loaded with smaller bombs to start the fires, up from 2500-3000 ft. The B5N's could drop Type 99 #3 33.7 kg bombs that carry 144 white phosphorus pellets. Used against bomber formations and designed in 1938. White phosporus should ignite the leaking oil. Val's might be able to drop the 33.7KG simultaneously with the 250kg bombs.

Just a passing thought.

There are plausible possibilities with the available technology, the question would be is if the Japanese would have actually done any of them with their frame of mind and doctrinal practices in combat. Personaly, the idea of the 500lb GP bombs I think would have done just fine, so I see no reason to make a simple plan into one that is more complex. Just my opinion anyways. ;)

[old_pop2000]

There are plausible possibilities with the available technology, the question would be is if the Japanese would have actually done any of them with their frame of mind and doctrinal practices in combat. Personaly, the idea of the 500lb GP bombs I think would have done just fine, so I see no reason to make a simple plan into one that is more complex. Just my opinion anyways. ;)

I was just having fun. This is alternate history.:D:D

[robdab]

And how many thousands of shells did they fire in their bombardments? Now compare that to the damage they really inflicted. You cannot take one *possible* attack based on one source, the IJN side at that, and use that as blanket coverage for all of their bombardments. The IJN claimed great accuracy of naval gunfire before the war during excersizes also and were completely dismayed at how bad their gunfire was in actual combat. If their accuracy was so astounding then the 2 airfields on Guadalcanal should have ceased to exist -- didn't happen, for that matter, they were hardly interrupted for very long at all even after heavy shelling. To make your problem worse yet, the Yamato, as has been mentioned several times already, to compare your incendinary shellfire had some of the poorest gunfire accuracy in combat of all. Not trying to be blunt here, just realistic.

Thanks.

I think that you compare apples to oranges to justify your conclusion. Perhaps if you had said that Japanese night bombardment accuracy was terrible I might have agreed. But then, until radar directed fire control came along, whose was really any better ? And the Japanese cruisers certainly got it very right at the Battle of Savo Island.

You are most welcome.

[Warship NWS]

I think that you compare apples to oranges to justify your conclusion. Perhaps if you had said that Japanese night bombardment accuracy was terrible I might have agreed. But then, until radar directed fire control came along, whose was really any better ? And the Japanese cruisers certainly got it very right at the Battle of Savo Island.

You are most welcome.

I am not comparing apples to oranges at all my friend.. I have analyzed many naval engagements over the years and the IJN never proved especially accurate at naval gunnery in WW2 - ESPECIALLY when bombarding. It is one thing to catch us by complete surprise moving at 12-15 knots, Savo Island, then to be fired back at in earnest and maneuvering at 20-30 knots in later night engagements so please do not try and use, again, one inicident of complete surprise as a blanket coverage for all of their gunnery engagements. Even the Japanese themselves were dissapointed in their own gunnery accuracy according to their own records which proved FAR lower then in excersizes before the war.. again, they were not getting shot at or firing at fast moving maneuvering targets. Their bombardments, which were almost all hit and run attacks due to limited time on station and most without spotters thus firing blindly and indirectly, proved to be for the most part - ineffective. The fact that they fired thousands of shells and hardly ever did any reasonable disruption to the airfields on Guadalcanal, even when unmolested by our own naval units, speaks for itself.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I was just having fun. This is alternate history.:D:D

Quite true. ;)

[robdab]

Chris, you wrote,

Even the Japanese themselves were dissapointed in their own gunnery accuracy according to their own records which proved FAR lower then in excersizes before the war.. again, they were not getting shot at or firing at fast moving maneuvering targets. Their bombardments, which were almost all hit and run attacks due to limited time on station and most without spotters thus firing blindly and indirectly, proved to be for the most part - ineffective. - And is anyone surprised by that ? Without spotters and in the dark, it is a wonder that they did as well as they did do historically. If we ignore the mostly blind night shoots (nobody did well at those in the dark until radar came along), other than Christmas Island in early 1942, what daylight shore bombardments did any IJN battleships do ? I can't claim to have studied the historical record for examples but few come to mind to support your, or any other, viewpoint.

Perhaps I can propose an AH scenario where we might further examine (and wrestle with) the Japanese battleship's shore bombardment potential outside of the historical reality of their failures to knockout targets, in the dark ?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Robdab was comparing a mortar attack and how that might counter the effects of flammability vs structural targets (snuffing out flames) - I was just noting that there is a lot more difference between a 500lb bomb which can break bones from the shockwave alone, not including blast effects and hot shrapnel, out to several hundreds of yards compared to a 120mm mortar round. Mortars vs troops is not the same thing as trying to destroy metallic structural and possibly flammable targets. The more explosives you can apply to a structural target the better. The area of effect and potential of starting fires is dramatically different. That was the only point I was trying to make.

Thanks.

Chris:

I understand. Obviously you want a bomb or these days perhaps a air to ground missile like a Maverick to take out a target like a fuel tank.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Chris, you wrote,

Even the Japanese themselves were dissapointed in their own gunnery accuracy according to their own records which proved FAR lower then in excersizes before the war.. again, they were not getting shot at or firing at fast moving maneuvering targets. Their bombardments, which were almost all hit and run attacks due to limited time on station and most without spotters thus firing blindly and indirectly, proved to be for the most part - ineffective. - And is anyone surprised by that ? Without spotters and in the dark, it is a wonder that they did as well as they did do historically. If we ignore the mostly blind night shoots (nobody did well at those in the dark until radar came along), other than Christmas Island in early 1942, what daylight shore bombardments did any IJN battleships do ? I can't claim to have studied the historical record for examples but few come to mind to support your, or any other, viewpoint.

Perhaps I can propose an AH scenario where we might further examine (and wrestle with) the Japanese battleship's shore bombardment potential outside of the historical reality of their failures to knockout targets, in the dark ?

Hi:

The only daylight shore bombardment I can recall that the IJN performed during WWII was at Wake Island and that was done by destroyers and light cruisers. I don't believe that the IJN bombarded the two Aleutian islands that they invaded, certainly not with BBs which were not part of the Aleutians operation.

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

I understand. Obviously you want a bomb or these days perhaps a air to ground missile like a Maverick to take out a target like a fuel tank.


Ed:
Excuse me for intruding, but a consideration must be the contents of the tank. Robdab did indicate that this was not avgas or even raw oil, it was ships fuel oil. It does not ignite as easily or burn as easily. This is the reason that it is preheated. The contention is that a 500 lb. HE should be enough to ignite the fuel, as per William. William certainly knows more than I do. However, there is a possibility that the explosion will simply blow the fires out or that it will not ignite at all due to its nature. Comparing the results at other attacks has to be done with recognition that the two attacks maybe dealing with two different fuels. Each with its own ignition temperature. My position was always, go for the tanks no matter what. Either they explode and catch fire or not. Either way, you have reduced the US's container capacity on an island that has no direct source of fuel oil. With a 1/2 inch steel container, a 500lb HE bomb should puncture or destroy the tanks easily. The problem is you might need a direct hit. Again, blast effects have to be considered.

Just my one and a half cents.:D:D

[robdab]

Gents,

Wrt fuel storage tanks, there are many and varied ways to "destroy" them, as we can all no doubt imagine. But I ask you to think about how you define the word "destroy" ?

Bomb/shell fragments from a near miss or even a direct hit will puncture a tank and allow its contents to escape into the berm. The degree of berm containment being determined by the suddenness of that release and how badly that near misses have distorted the berm's structure.

But in that case, much of the berm's contents can be saved and re-used. The tank can usually be patched and reused, with some storage time lost to do so. Nothing much was really "destroyed".

However, if you can ignite those spilling contents, away from a fire supression system, the resulting heat will soften the tank walls to the point that they flow like soft toffee and completely collapse. Such a tank cannot be repaired, total replacement is required. Demolition/removal of the cooled and hardened steel "toffee" is extremely time consuming. Both tank and fuel are "destroyed".

Avgas and diesel are easy to ignite. Bunker "C" is not. Unless of course some burning Avgas or burning diesel happens to be introduced to the spilled bunker "C" to function as an igniter for it.

You really want to burn the fuel to ensure the "destruction" of a tankfarm.


Hence my interest in the date of the introduction of the Yamato's type 3 incendiary shells and my interest in completing her 4 months early.

[ksf1973]

The concept in theory might be the same but there is a huge difference between firing a series of 18.1" HE shells with 136lb burster charges and highly inaccurate gunnery (IJN naval bombardments were highly inaccurate) and then trying to hit that similar spot with a incendiary shell with a relatively small detonation radius compared to a fighter bomber with possible ballistic computer bomb sight dropping a multiple 500lb GP bombs with a 250lb filler that can actually see the target and then drop a 500lb Napalm bomb with 75 gallons of flammable fuel with thickener covering a much larger detonation footprint. The chances of one succeeding is FAR greater then the other.

Thanks.

Yeah, I meant to say "similar concept", rather than "similar technique"...

[ksf1973]

Chris,

I suggested the idea as a way to improve the Japanese record of bombardment performance. I'm a believer in the abilty of fire to act as a major damage multiplyer.

-----------------------------------------------------
ksf1973,

Please see my posting #8 on this thread.

Oops, missed that one...:o

[Kyle Holgate]

Bunker fuel is certainly not easy to ignite - a few years ago a ship called the New Carissa beached on the Oregon shore line. The powers that be decided to burn off the fuel aboard (make it air pollution instead of water pollution!). They tried to ignite it one time, and it failed to go - and this was using incendiary devices and taking time - not dropping bombs or using HE. Didn't work. Anyhow here is the story - it may be somewhat relevant to the bunker fuel burning question

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Carissa

[Kyle Holgate]

I have often wondered at the idea of having the Japanese ships stay around Guadalcanal instead of heading up the slot. The plan would be to have some ships (probably a BB included) bombard at night as was their typical pattern, try to reduce the airfield as much as possible. Then have a second force come down near dawn and stay around, using spotter aircraft to correct fall of shot (something the Japanese were practiced at) and keep Henderson down during the day as well, and use the daylight more accurate (in theory) bombardment to really wreck the place.

I think they did pretty well overall - considering it was night and they had no visual cue to when they were on target or not as far as I know. I have not heard that they used spotter aircraft at night - though they could have I would suppose, dropping flares for illumination.
One thing you can give the Japanese - they trained in much more realistic environments than did the USN. Often they'd be at night, in terrible weather and would loose men here and there to accidents. We only have a few situations where they were in daylight fighting with guns to judge by. None of these situations showed any great accuracy. I think it would be short sighted though to use the small sample as any sort of indication that their daylight gunnery accuracy as a whole would all be similar. We really don't know how they'd do in combat at 32,000 yards firing over a smoke screen using aerial spotters. It's easy to be skeptical, but skepticism doesn't mean that they didn't do well!

[William Miller]

Gents,

A couple of points about oil tanks/fires, and about the IJN Type 3 shells:

Oil Tankage: According to statistics and test data I have collected over the years, a typical 500 lb GP bomb would more likely than not cause a fire in a typical large AvGas or Gasoline tank on a near (rupturing) hit (somewhere in the order of 60-70% odds of this). Diesel tanks would catch fire at a reduced rate, somewhere on the order of 30-50%, while estimates where that tanks filled with typical bunker oil would catch fire only 20-35% of the time. So roughly you would only have a 1-in-4 odds of catching a bunker-filled tank on fire using typical HE bombs.

Using IJN type 3 shells for land bombardment: IMHO it would prove almost impossible for the IJN of the period to modify these rounds for effective long-range bombardment missions versus any significant target. The individual pyro elements burn for only 4-6 seconds, which gives a window of 3-4 seconds or less to properly disperse/pattern and land the elements on a target before they burn out: given the nature of the ballistics involved for long-range fire, the physical limitations of the fuzes/timers involved, and other issues, I believe that the shells would have a very low success rate at best. The vast majority of shells would either disperse too early (and thus burn out before they dispersed and struck the target area), or disperse too late and simply impact the ground in a relatively compact cluster that would likely miss covering the target area. Basically you are attempting to create an effective incendiary artillery cluster round using WW2 IJN technology, which I believe was not feasable at the time.

[old_pop2000]

I have often wondered at the idea of having the Japanese ships stay around Guadalcanal instead of heading up the slot. The plan would be to have some ships (probably a BB included) bombard at night as was their typical pattern, try to reduce the airfield as much as possible. Then have a second force come down near dawn and stay around, using spotter aircraft to correct fall of shot (something the Japanese were practiced at) and keep Henderson down during the day as well, and use the daylight more accurate (in theory) bombardment to really wreck the place.

I think they did pretty well overall - considering it was night and they had no visual cue to when they were on target or not as far as I know. I have not heard that they used spotter aircraft at night - though they could have I would suppose, dropping flares for illumination.
One thing you can give the Japanese - they trained in much more realistic environments than did the USN. Often they'd be at night, in terrible weather and would loose men here and there to accidents. We only have a few situations where they were in daylight fighting with guns to judge by. None of these situations showed any great accuracy. I think it would be short sighted though to use the small sample as any sort of indication that their daylight gunnery accuracy as a whole would all be similar. We really don't know how they'd do in combat at 32,000 yards firing over a smoke screen using aerial spotters. It's easy to be skeptical, but skepticism doesn't mean that they didn't do well!

It might be a mistake to assume the Japanese did not have observers watching the results. The Japanese had an OP on Mt. Austen which look down on Henderson Field, Lunga Pt. and the whole area where the bomb dump was located. They could see the effects of every shot. From Mt. Austin to Henderson Field was 5 miles, looking straight down. The problem was that the Japanese ships could not adjust their fire based on the OP sightings, they were not in contact. I could be wrong on that, but that's what I remember reading. Louie the Louse and Washing Machine Charlie came over before the bombardment and illumintated the target with flares. Then the BB's started to fire with the new bombardment shells but they only had 500 each. I believe that they fired over 900 shells. Pistol Pete fired also with aid from spotting on Mt. Austin and charlie and Louie.

[old_pop2000]

Gents,

A couple of points about oil tanks/fires, and about the IJN Type 3 shells:

Oil Tankage: According to statistics and test data I have collected over the years, a typical 500 lb GP bomb would more likely than not cause a fire in a typical large AvGas or Gasoline tank on a near (rupturing) hit (somewhere in the order of 60-70% odds of this). Diesel tanks would catch fire at a reduced rate, somewhere on the order of 30-50%, while estimates where that tanks filled with typical bunker oil would catch fire only 20-35% of the time. So roughly you would only have a 1-in-4 odds of catching a bunker-filled tank on fire using typical HE bombs.

Using IJN type 3 shells for land bombardment: IMHO it would prove almost impossible for the IJN of the period to modify these rounds for effective long-range bombardment missions versus any significant target. The individual pyro elements burn for only 4-6 seconds, which gives a window of 3-4 seconds or less to properly disperse/pattern and land the elements on a target before they burn out: given the nature of the ballistics involved for long-range fire, the physical limitations of the fuzes/timers involved, and other issues, I believe that the shells would have a very low success rate at best. The vast majority of shells would either disperse too early (and thus burn out before they dispersed and struck the target area), or disperse too late and simply impact the ground in a relatively compact cluster that would likely miss covering the target area. Basically you are attempting to create an effective incendiary artillery cluster round using WW2 IJN technology, which I believe was not feasable at the time.

Hey, thanks William.

So, it appears that you go ahead with the attack and hope for the best. My opinion is that it was better than just not striking them at all.

[robdab]

William, thanks for the update,

tanks filled with typical bunker oil would catch fire only 20-35% of the time. So roughly you would only have a 1-in-4 odds of catching a bunker-filled tank on fire using typical HE bombs. - Since bunker "A" and bunker "B" are made by adding more and more diesel to bunker "C", would you think it fair to guesstimate 0-12% chance of ignition for bunker "C", 0-24% for bunker "B" and 0-35% for bunker "A" ?

Using IJN type 3 shells for land bombardment: IMHO it would prove almost impossible for the IJN of the period to modify these rounds for effective long-range bombardment missions versus any significant target. The individual pyro elements burn for only 4-6 seconds,- Thanks for the catch on this one. When I read the original description I thought that it said 4-6 minutes not seconds. My bad. Thank you.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
old_pop2000,

The problem was that the Japanese ships could not adjust their fire based on the OP sightings, they were not in contact. - So by definition then the IJN battlecruisers were still firing blind, possibly just at map co-ordinates. No surprise then that the accuracy was not that good in the dark. A few flares several miles away wouldn't help much if your observer can't radio the impact point corrections to the gunners.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed:
Excuse me for intruding, but a consideration must be the contents of the tank. Robdab did indicate that this was not avgas or even raw oil, it was ships fuel oil. It does not ignite as easily or burn as easily. This is the reason that it is preheated. The contention is that a 500 lb. HE should be enough to ignite the fuel, as per William. William certainly knows more than I do. However, there is a possibility that the explosion will simply blow the fires out or that it will not ignite at all due to its nature. Comparing the results at other attacks has to be done with recognition that the two attacks maybe dealing with two different fuels. Each with its own ignition temperature. My position was always, go for the tanks no matter what. Either they explode and catch fire or not. Either way, you have reduced the US's container capacity on an island that has no direct source of fuel oil. With a 1/2 inch steel container, a 500lb HE bomb should puncture or destroy the tanks easily. The problem is you might need a direct hit. Again, blast effects have to be considered.

Just my one and a half cents.:D:D

Dennis:

I agree that fuel oil isn't highly combustable compared to gasoline per se, but the experiences of ships being hit by bombs and starting fires leads me to believe that the heat from the explosion of a bomb or artillery shell should be sufficient to ignite the oil. But maybe not, I certainly can't claim to be either an expert on explosives or hydrocarbon combustion.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Gents,

A couple of points about oil tanks/fires, and about the IJN Type 3 shells:

Oil Tankage: According to statistics and test data I have collected over the years, a typical 500 lb GP bomb would more likely than not cause a fire in a typical large AvGas or Gasoline tank on a near (rupturing) hit (somewhere in the order of 60-70% odds of this). Diesel tanks would catch fire at a reduced rate, somewhere on the order of 30-50%, while estimates where that tanks filled with typical bunker oil would catch fire only 20-35% of the time. So roughly you would only have a 1-in-4 odds of catching a bunker-filled tank on fire using typical HE bombs.

Using IJN type 3 shells for land bombardment: IMHO it would prove almost impossible for the IJN of the period to modify these rounds for effective long-range bombardment missions versus any significant target. The individual pyro elements burn for only 4-6 seconds, which gives a window of 3-4 seconds or less to properly disperse/pattern and land the elements on a target before they burn out: given the nature of the ballistics involved for long-range fire, the physical limitations of the fuzes/timers involved, and other issues, I believe that the shells would have a very low success rate at best. The vast majority of shells would either disperse too early (and thus burn out before they dispersed and struck the target area), or disperse too late and simply impact the ground in a relatively compact cluster that would likely miss covering the target area. Basically you are attempting to create an effective incendiary artillery cluster round using WW2 IJN technology, which I believe was not feasable at the time.

William:

I'm a little confused with thr terminology and hope you can offer some guidance. I know that warships were rated by bunkerage tonnage when referring to fuel. Now is Bunker C the fuel that a warship would use, or is would it use diesel? Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

old_pop2000,

The problem was that the Japanese ships could not adjust their fire based on the OP sightings, they were not in contact. - So by definition then the IJN battlecruisers were still firing blind, possibly just at map co-ordinates. No surprise then that the accuracy was not that good in the dark. A few flares several miles away wouldn't help much if your observer can't radio the impact point corrections to the gunners.

RobDab:
I don't think I explained that clearly, sorry. Louie the Louse was a floatplane launched by the cruisers and battleships everytime they came down to bombard at night. He would precede the attack, and drop flares, then the ships would start firing. He was in contact with them and did adjust their fire. But, at night, probably under some AA fire from the Marines and the altitude not to mention possible metereological elements, it was difficult to accurately adjust the fire. However, they did hit the Avgas tanks, both Henderson and Fighter one, and came close to the pagoda tower, destroyed a bomb dump and kept everyone awake. When the sun came up, the Japanese bombers from Rabaul came in, unopposed as there was no fuel or planes to send up. Again, we have to balance risk versus reward. However, the bomber raids were more accurate and more consistent but did take heavier losses. My father was injured in one of the bomber raids and left the island before, I believe, the October 14 battleship raid occurred. I have no data at this time, on accuracy except that they fired over 900 round of ammunition, almost all of it being the new bombardment shells. Hope that clarifies the issue.

[robdab]

old_pop2000,

Louie the Louse was a floatplane launched by the cruisers and battleships everytime they came down to bombard at night. He would precede the attack, and drop flares, then the ships would start firing. I knew that he would drop flares but I was under the impressio that the IJN ships would then direct fire and adjust on their own, by that flarelight.

He was in contact with them and did adjust their fire. - Didn't know that. Thanks for the clarification. Was there more than 1 "Louie" up at a time or did 1 plane try to direct the fire of many IJN warships ?

[old_pop2000]

old_pop2000,

Louie the Louse was a floatplane launched by the cruisers and battleships everytime they came down to bombard at night. He would precede the attack, and drop flares, then the ships would start firing. I knew that he would drop flares but I was under the impressio that the IJN ships would then direct fire and adjust on their own, by that flarelight.

He was in contact with them and did adjust their fire. - Didn't know that. Thanks for the clarification. Was there more than 1 "Louie" up at a time or did 1 plane try to direct the fire of many IJN warships ?

The bombardment was preplanned. So minor adjustments were all that was necessary. The bombardment of the battleships lasted 70 minutes. Louie also dropped flare bombs. So, it was 900 shells in 70 minutes. Apparently it was one of the most intensive bombardment by large caliber shells during the war. One 36cm shell hit a food dump and destroyed the spam cans, terrible loss for the Marines. The shelling stopped at 0250 hrs. The SBD's lost 35 aircraft during the night bombardment, 16 of 40 Wildcat's were destroyed, and part of the hospital was hit.

See the next post for more detailed information from Richard Franks book "Guadalcanal"

[old_pop2000]

Some more information from Richard Franks "Guadalcanal" Pages 316-319

expenditures

Type 3 antiaircraft incendiary

104-Kongo
0-Haruna

Type 1 AP
331
294

Type 0
HE
189
189

Subcaliber Modified 12 inch
34
21

The first rounds struck west of the runway, however, according the source, the Japanese gunners marched the salvoes back and forth across the runway and parking areas and into the groves north of the fields. The range was 29,500 yards and the firing began at 01331/2. Kongo fired first, then Haruna joined. According to Frank, there were early plans to use two battleships and four heavy cruisers along with the Yamato, but considerations of maneuvering room and time precluded her use. The decision was to use Kongo and Haruna. Most likely due to their speed advantage.

The 104 special type 3 shells, according to this source were good for AA or bombardment and carried a modest bursting charge with 470 individual incendiary sub-munitions. The gunnery officer from the Yamato was in an observation post on Mount Austen, while the Kongo's gunnery officer was in a group of four spotter and illumination planes. Kurita's order called for firing a barrage pattern into a 2200 meter square area overlapping Henderson Field and the fighter strip.

Hope this clarifies the issue. Sorry for all the confusion. I am usually careful, but it is busy today.

[William Miller]

William:

I'm a little confused with thr terminology and hope you can offer some guidance. I know that warships were rated by bunkerage tonnage when referring to fuel. Now is Bunker C the fuel that a warship would use, or is would it use diesel? Thanks.

Ed,

"Bunker C" is was the primary fuel used by USN capital ships at least during the 1930s and WW2 -- for example the USS Arizona had about 1.5 million gallons of Bunker C on board when she was sunk. I gave typical rates for the other fuels (AvGas and Diesel) merely to show the significant differences between the combustion rates of these fuels when properly stored in tank farms.

[William Miller]

William, thanks for the update,

tanks filled with typical bunker oil would catch fire only 20-35% of the time. So roughly you would only have a 1-in-4 odds of catching a bunker-filled tank on fire using typical HE bombs. - Since bunker "A" and bunker "B" are made by adding more and more diesel to bunker "C", would you think it fair to guesstimate 0-12% chance of ignition for bunker "C", 0-24% for bunker "B" and 0-35% for bunker "A" ?



Rob,

The data I have mainly applies to Bunker C, meaning that A and B would have slightly higher ignition odds (still not as bad as, say, Diesel). If I were to attempt to specify ranges for each type I would go with numbers in the ranges of 30-40% for "A", 25-40% for "B", and 20-35% for "C". Not huge differences really, as the % of diesel used would not make that significant a difference in ignition odds. A 30% average would seem to be about correct.

I should also note that these odds are not for a single bomb striking on/near each tank, but was derived for a typical mass attack on a large tank farm by medium WW2-era bombers. The density of bombs dropped obviously will affect these odds, as well as the accuracy of such drops.

[Warship NWS]

The part I would add is this.. punctured tanks leaking oil would also disperse fumes which could instigate the flammability of the fuels being spilt. In this sense if you puncture some tanks and they do not light up their spilt oil could spill over or be lit by other oil that is already afire or other forms of ignition. The punctured tanks would also have to be repaired before they could be used again which may require heavy equipment if the holes are large enough - of which of course they would have to wait for the fires to be put out before repairs could begin.

The big question would be is how much damage would be done to the various tank locations and would it be enough to alter naval operations enough to force compensation efforts and how fast could repairs be effected to increase oil distribution capacity for the islands. Without specific ways to determine how much damage would have been done we cannot determine how much of repair or compensation efforts would have been applied with enough accuracy to make final conclusions as to the overall effects of such an attack.

Could the attacks have been some measure of success? I have no doubt they could have as was shown at Midway and Darwin. However neither of those locations had the possibility of massive repair or compensation capacities in comparison to an attack on PH tank farms.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

RobDab:
I don't think I explained that clearly, sorry. Louie the Louse was a floatplane launched by the cruisers and battleships everytime they came down to bombard at night. He would precede the attack, and drop flares, then the ships would start firing. He was in contact with them and did adjust their fire. But, at night, probably under some AA fire from the Marines and the altitude not to mention possible metereological elements, it was difficult to accurately adjust the fire. However, they did hit the Avgas tanks, both Henderson and Fighter one, and came close to the pagoda tower, destroyed a bomb dump and kept everyone awake. When the sun came up, the Japanese bombers from Rabaul came in, unopposed as there was no fuel or planes to send up. Again, we have to balance risk versus reward. However, the bomber raids were more accurate and more consistent but did take heavier losses. My father was injured in one of the bomber raids and left the island before, I believe, the October 14 battleship raid occurred. I have no data at this time, on accuracy except that they fired over 900 round of ammunition, almost all of it being the new bombardment shells. Hope that clarifies the issue.

Dennis:

In his book "Guadalcanal", Richard Frank and the survivors he interviewed all refer to the Oct 14th raid simply as "The Bombardment". It destroyed some aircraft and killed some personnel but failed to knock Henderson Field out.

For clarity sake, are we considering the new bombardment shells the same as the Sanshiki rounds? The Navweaps site refers to these shells as type 3 incendiary shells to difference them from the ordinary Type 3 HS shells.

[Ed Rotondaro]

old_pop2000,

Louie the Louse was a floatplane launched by the cruisers and battleships everytime they came down to bombard at night. He would precede the attack, and drop flares, then the ships would start firing. I knew that he would drop flares but I was under the impressio that the IJN ships would then direct fire and adjust on their own, by that flarelight.

He was in contact with them and did adjust their fire. - Didn't know that. Thanks for the clarification. Was there more than 1 "Louie" up at a time or did 1 plane try to direct the fire of many IJN warships ?


Hi:

I was under the impression that parachute flares don't last very long, say perhaps a minute, at least based on what has been discussed many years back regarding naval star shells. That was in conjunction with discussions about the Fighting Steel project of which William and Chris are the experts.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some more information from Richard Franks "Guadalcanal" Pages 316-319

expenditures

Type 3 antiaircraft incendiary

104-Kongo
0-Haruna

Type 1 AP
331
294

Type 0
HE
189
189

Subcaliber Modified 12 inch
34
21

The first rounds struck west of the runway, however, according the source, the Japanese gunners marched the salvoes back and forth across the runway and parking areas and into the groves north of the fields. The range was 29,500 yards and the firing began at 01331/2. Kongo fired first, then Haruna joined. According to Frank, there were early plans to use two battleships and four heavy cruisers along with the Yamato, but considerations of maneuvering room and time precluded her use. The decision was to use Kongo and Haruna. Most likely due to their speed advantage.

The 104 special type 3 shells, according to this source were good for AA or bombardment and carried a modest bursting charge with 470 individual incendiary sub-munitions. The gunnery officer from the Yamato was in an observation post on Mount Austen, while the Kongo's gunnery officer was in a group of four spotter and illumination planes. Kurita's order called for firing a barrage pattern into a 2200 meter square area overlapping Henderson Field and the fighter strip.

Hope this clarifies the issue. Sorry for all the confusion. I am usually careful, but it is busy today.

Dennis:

I was not aware that the IJN had a subcaliber projectile for their 14" guns. Was that from Navweaps?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,

"Bunker C" is was the primary fuel used by USN capital ships at least during the 1930s and WW2 -- for example the USS Arizona had about 1.5 million gallons of Bunker C on board when she was sunk. I gave typical rates for the other fuels (AvGas and Diesel) merely to show the significant differences between the combustion rates of these fuels when properly stored in tank farms.

William:

Thanks for the details. I gather that Bunker C was a thicker product than diesel. I've pumped diesel into a rental truck and it just looked like gray gasoline. Smelled lousy too.

[old_pop2000]

The part I would add is this.. punctured tanks leaking oil would also disperse fumes which could instigate the flammability of the fuels being spilt. In this sense if you puncture some tanks and they do not light up their spilt oil could spill over or be lit by other oil that is already afire or other forms of ignition. The punctured tanks would also have to be repaired before they could be used again which may require heavy equipment if the holes are large enough - of which of course they would have to wait for the fires to be put out before repairs could begin.

The big question would be is how much damage would be done to the various tank locations and would it be enough to alter naval operations enough to force compensation efforts and how fast could repairs be effected to increase oil distribution capacity for the islands. Without specific ways to determine how much damage would have been done we cannot determine how much of repair or compensation efforts would have been applied with enough accuracy to make final conclusions as to the overall effects of such an attack.

Could the attacks have been some measure of success? I have no doubt they could have as was shown at Midway and Darwin.

Thanks.

I continue to state that, despite the unknown factor of whether we can destroy all the fuel or even get it to burn, it is a high value target and as such, should have been on the targeting list and should have been higher in priority. It was a failure, from top to bottom, to accurately assess the targets and place a proper target priority, despite the unknown factor of whether the attack was a great success, adequate success or just a failure. The tanks should have been struck with the second group in the first attack, then another attack with a third group. Just bomb the darn things, and hope for the best. This is not the 8th AF or 15 AF using B-24's and 1000 lb. incendiary bombs, it was single engined, carrier based attack aircraft, they had limitations. Just bomb 'em. Why is this so hard to figure out?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I was not aware that the IJN had a subcaliber projectile for their 14" guns. Was that from Navweaps?

No, it was from Richard Franks "Guadalcanal" however, I could research it at Navweaps and Fischer Tropsch. Navweaps gets much if its information from the latter source.

[Warship NWS]

Hi:

I was under the impression that parachute flares don't last very long, say perhaps a minute, at least based on what has been discussed many years back regarding naval star shells. That was in conjunction with discussions about the Fighting Steel project of which William and Chris are the experts.

Aerial dropped flares would last as long as it took to hit the ground, or however long their burnout cycle is.. so the higher you fly the longer they last, problem is, the higher you fly the harder it will be to spot targets. The problem with flares however, especially over areas with terrain with obstacles, is that they do not give off consistent lighting effects like searchlights would. Starshells are also fired in patterns of multiple shells so as to give the best chances for spotting possible.

[Warship NWS]

I continue to state that, despite the unknown factor of whether we can destroy all the fuel or even get it to burn, it is a high value target and as such, should have been on the targeting list and should have been higher in priority. It was a failure, from top to bottom, to accurately assess the targets and place a proper target priority, despite the unknown factor of whether the attack was a great success, adequate success or just a failure. The tanks should have been struck with the second group in the first attack, then another attack with a third group. Just bomb the darn things, and hope for the best. This is not the 8th AF or 15 AF using B-24's and 1000 lb. incendiary bombs, it was single engined, carrier based attack aircraft, they had limitations. Just bomb 'em. Why is this so hard to figure out?

I don't think anyone was disputing the fact that they should have been targeted.. it would have been more valuable to attack the tank farms then some 20 knot old battlewagons - that part is for certain. The tank farms were strategic targets.. the battlewagons, at best, were tactical targets.

[Warship NWS]

Hence my interest in the date of the introduction of the Yamato's type 3 incendiary shells and my interest in completing her 4 months early.

One critical problem with this thread.. the Yamato was NOT going to be used to to bombard AF1 and Henderson Field.. this question is ONLY for Robdab, everyone else, please let him asnwer it. Can you tell me the 2 primary rasons why Yamato would not be used for the bombardment of Guadalcanal?

[robdab]

Chris, you asked,

... this question is ONLY for Robdab, everyone else, please let him asnwer it. Can you tell me the 2 primary rasons why Yamato would not be used for the bombardment of Guadalcanal? - Well, here we go with the first of the "lets put the new kid in his place" questions, right ? Sensibly I should pass but I never really studied Yamato and would like to know the answers so, I'll bite ...

If someone had mentioned a test when I signed up for membership here, I would have studied harder, really.

Several reasons come to mind:

- she was slower than the battlecruisers and thus more likely to be caught by the "Cactus Air Force" while on her way back up the slot.
- she was Yammomoto's Flagship of the Combined Fleet and damage to her would have meant much "loss of face".
- there were American carrier aircraft in the area regularly
- she drew more depth than the battlecruisers and there were several poorly charted shallow areas around the Solomons
- ammunition for her 18.1" rifles whether it be AP, HE or type 3 was never plentiful with bombardment ammunition being the scarcest
-fuel and the tankers neded to move it was already getting scarce for the Japanese. Oct 17'42 saw both (fuel hogs) Yamato and Musashi pump 4,500 TONS (not gallons) of "go-juice" out of their own tanks for other IJN warships.
- the blow to Japan's honor/national pride were she to be lost would be unacceptable to Yammomoto

- but if I really had to pick just one reason, I'd say that it would have been because Japan only ever produced 27x18.1" gun tubes. And they couldn't be re-lined. Seven for Yamato, seven for Musashi and seven for Shinano, so, no spares were available (until it was decided to complete Shinano as a carrier instead). With a predicted barrel life of only 120-150 rounds the Japanese wouldn't have wanted to waste those tubes on pounding a mere muddy dirt airstrip (even if it was coverd with metal matting). They'd be saved for a big battleship confrontation, the Decisive Battle.

Did I win ?

[Warship NWS]

The first and most critical reason was her lack of speed.. all other ships used for the Slot attacks were capable of 30+ knots at least... those that limped died.

The second.. fuel. Yamato burned oil at a very high rate.. especially if she had to hump it at a minimum cruising speed of 25 knots just to keep pace which was only 2 knots slower then her max speed.

All other reasons are correct however but were secondary considerations. The point to the test is that it was never going to happen so what shells she fired or her barrel life was irrellevant.

Thanks.

[robdab]

The first and most critical reason was her lack of speed.. all other ships used for the Slot attacks were capable of 30+ knots at least... those that limped died. -Well I'm glad that I listed speed as my first choice then.

The second.. fuel. Yamato burned oil at a very high rate.. especially if she had to hump it at a minimum cruising speed of 25 knots just to keep pace which was only 2 knots slower then her max speed.- Damn, I didn't list fuel until my #6 reason, but isn't that just a variation on the speed reason ? The faster she went, the more fuel she used ...

All other reasons are correct however but were secondary considerations. The point to the test is that it was never going to happen so what shells she fired or her barrel life was irrellevant.- To you pehaps. I never considered her for Guadalcanal. The entire purpose of my starting the thread was to consider if there was a way to get her to Oahu for a Dec.7'41 bombardment there. I think that the only place where she might have had some material effect on the war had it been possible to advance her construction and ammunition schedules. Blowing Henderson Field to hell (yet again) wouldn't have made any difference to the final outcome of the Pacific War except to very slightly delay it.

Thanks.- What, no prize ??? I feel used, but not surprised. LOL

[Warship NWS]

The entire purpose of my starting the thread was to consider if there was a way to get her to Oahu for a Dec.7'41 bombardment there.


I seriously doubt that would have happened either.. for most of the reasons stated already. The Yamato and Musashi, as pretty much proven with their battle histories, were almost one or two *combat* deployment only and nearly worthless ships - basically a huge waste of resources - its no wonder that the Shinano was changed to a CV. I would also note that the Type 3 shells would have worn out the barrels even faster, if that was not mentioned already. In terms of overall combat efficiency the SDs, NCs, and Iowas were superior in those regards.

I will give you that you came up with the correct answers however, I just wanted to make sure you were on the same page in terms of historical context. ;)

[robdab]

The Yamato and Musashi, as pretty much proven with their battle histories, were almost one or two *combat* deployment only and nearly worthless ships - basically a huge waste of resources - Spoken in the lauguage of a 66+ years of perfect hindsight. The question is when did the Japanese realize it ?

I will give you that you came up with the correct answers however, I just wanted to make sure you were on the same page in terms of historical context. ;) - Thanks but I keep struggling to get onto the next page, the "what if" page. This same old, same old, page keeps holding me back.

So, do I get to ask you for two reasons now ?

[Warship NWS]

Spoken in the lauguage of a 66+ years of perfect hindsight. The question is when did the Japanese realize it ?


Actually not really.. most nations should have realized that BBs were on their way out after WW1, which is where they started to prove that being expensive does not equate into being effective. After RJW1905 modern contemporary battleships spent the vast majority of their careers escorting, bombarding, being sunk by subs or mines, or rusting. The IJN I am pretty sure realized that their oil problems were going not going to be helped by big fat naval artillery batteries eating up huge amounts of oil, whether they realized it or not, well that could go to show own short sightedness IMHO, as happened with the entire concept of attacking PH in the first place. Maybe it isn't hindsight however, as even the IJN never deployed them for combat operations, where they actually did anything, until 1944.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

Aside from issues already mentioned the Japanese were saving their main BB's for the decisive battle. Using them on Guadalcanal wasn't in the cards - though ironically enough the campaign turned out to BE the decisive battle - just not all at once.
At 27 knots the monsters could probably have made it down and bombarded and gotten out of range. If they'd done their jobs right though, there shouldn't be an air threat to run from any longer, Henderson should be a cratered mess with wrecks around it and burning fuel tanks!

[old_pop2000]

Interesting article on "Oil and the Japanese Strategy in the Solomons:A postulate"

http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm

Hope this adds to the discussion


Note: According to records, the Midway operation used 1 years worth of fuel from the IJN's reserves which had been calculated at 1.5 years at the start of the war.

[Warship NWS]

Aside from issues already mentioned the Japanese were saving their main BB's for the decisive battle. Using them on Guadalcanal wasn't in the cards - though ironically enough the campaign turned out to BE the decisive battle - just not all at once.
At 27 knots the monsters could probably have made it down and bombarded and gotten out of range. If they'd done their jobs right though, there shouldn't be an air threat to run from any longer, Henderson should be a cratered mess with wrecks around it and burning fuel tanks!

Would it have been worth expending non-replaceable huge amounts of oil to knock out targets that we could replace within a very short time? Can't much save your oil for that big fight if you use up your oil making craters and raising hell with the jungle. It really doesn't help matters that we were knocking off their ability to move oil either - AKA tankers being sunk by subs.

[Kyle Holgate]

Would it have been worth expending non-replaceable huge amounts of oil to knock out targets that we could replace within a very short time? Can't much save your oil for that big fight if you use up your oil making craters and raising hell with the jungle. It really doesn't help matters that we were knocking off their ability to move oil either - AKA tankers being sunk by subs.

The sub threat wasn't that big a deal during the time when Guadalcanal was still in question - they didn't get their torpedo issues and what not figured out until later. The main issue in my mind is that they needed to poop or get off the pot. Sending in troops and bombardment missions piecemeal was just playing into the hands of the attrition fight that the US could afford. They needed to get together a midway sort of force (well, ok - maybe not that ridiculous) and re-take the island once and for all OR evacuate.
Of course they didn't know it, but saving fuel for later wasn't going to help - their only faint hope was to use the fuel they had and make some real dents while they still could - come 1943 & later the situation was hopeless beyond making the US pay dearly for their invasions.

[old_pop2000]

FYI

According Naval Sources- Up to June 1943- Tankers were fourth on a priority list for submarines

As of December 1941 - Tanker tonnage afloat - 575,474

As of December 1942 - Tanker tonnage afloat - 662,356

As of December 1943 - Tanker Tonnage afloat - 863,953

As of December 1944 - Tanker tonnage afloat - 862,962

As of August 1945 - Tanker tonnage afloat-266,948


From "The War Against Japanese Transportation" United States Bomb Survey

[Warship NWS]

Ok.. agree, the first IJN tanker was sunk in 3/42 (had to refresh my memory as to when the tankers started being sunk). So moving the oil was not a problem yet.. but again was it worth it to waste thousands of tons of oil to raise hell with the jungle and make craters?

As to the take it or leave it context that Kyle noted, personally, they should have left it be. No matter how it played out it was costing them resources they could not replace. It was bad enough that by 3/42 they had already lost a fair number of transports, freighters, troop ships, subs, and destroyers to our submarines. This is not even measuring the amount of aircraft and naval fuel reserves they burned up trying to keep an island that was near worthless to them and they had no hopes of effectively supporting.

As I have stated before.. Guadalcanal was the Japense version of Stalingrad in the Pacific IMHO.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Ok.. agree, the first IJN tanker was sunk in 3/42 (had to refresh my memory as to when the tankers started being sunk). So moving the oil was not a problem yet.. but again was it worth it to waste thousands of tons of oil to raise hell with the jungle and make craters?

As to the take it or leave it context that Kyle noted, personally, they should have left it be. No matter how it played out it was costing them resources they could not replace. It was bad enough that by 3/42 they had already lost a fair number of transports, freighters, troop ships, subs, and destroyers to our submarines. This is not even measuring the amount of aircraft and naval fuel reserves they burned up trying to keep an island that was near worthless to them and they had no hopes of effectively supporting.

As I have stated before.. Guadalcanal was the Japense version of Stalingrad in the Pacific IMHO.

Thanks.

I think you misinterpreted the information. All that stated was that we were not sinking their tankers, in fact, we were not even prioritizing them. The same criticism of Japanese myopia in regards to oil, a strategic commodity, could be safely applied to the US. They did not attack the fuel farm at Pearl Harbor or attack our tankers, correct? Well, neither did we. The problem is we had oil production in full swing on the West Coast, where the Japanese were getting their oil prior to the start of the war. Unfortunately, the Japanese did not have that luxury. The IJN had only 1.5-2 years worth of oil stored. They had to bring it from Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The other issue is that they were consuming it far faster than they had anticipated in such operations as Operation MI. The Solomons operation came at a time, when they had just lowered their fuel reserves. Actually, they had fuel in Borneo, which had already been captured. There had been no attempt to defend it, however, due to attempts to sabotage, it had only 70% oil capacity.

So, the problem was never transportation of oil, the problem was the lack of oil. Oil supplies had been dwindling because the pace of combat operations had increased beyond the prewar calculations and the Japanese were short of it. We had more oil than we could store. The West Coast oil fields had to stop producing because of the shortage of oil storage facilities.

If we examine a month by month tonnage availability chart starting in December 1944, we see a dramatic drop in tonnage available. In December it was 868,962 By February,1945 it was 679,984. This was the single greatest drop, to date, in the war. What happened from 14 October to 31 December 1944?

[Warship NWS]

I think you misinterpreted the information. All that stated was that we were not sinking their tankers, in fact, we were not even prioritizing them.


I didn't misinterprete the information old friend, we did sink tankers but your right about the part we did not prioritize them at the start - which I agree we should have. I did know however that USN subs did start sinking whatever they could find and as of 3/42 the they sank their first tanker (Kaizyo Maru of 8,637 tons) and were sinking good numbers of destroyers, subs, freighters and transports very early on starting right after the raid on Pearl Harbor. Point being, we were sinking tankers based on targets of opportunity but later, as you and Kyle pointed out, we prioritized them. It is curious why this was not done sooner though.

Thanks.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Ok.. agree, the first IJN tanker was sunk in 3/42 (had to refresh my memory as to when the tankers started being sunk). So moving the oil was not a problem yet.. but again was it worth it to waste thousands of tons of oil to raise hell with the jungle and make craters?

As to the take it or leave it context that Kyle noted, personally, they should have left it be. No matter how it played out it was costing them resources they could not replace. It was bad enough that by 3/42 they had already lost a fair number of transports, freighters, troop ships, subs, and destroyers to our submarines. This is not even measuring the amount of aircraft and naval fuel reserves they burned up trying to keep an island that was near worthless to them and they had no hopes of effectively supporting.

As I have stated before.. Guadalcanal was the Japense version of Stalingrad in the Pacific IMHO.

Thanks.

Hi NWS,

I would disagree. The Japanese had little choice but to fight as when would the odds for them be better? If not Guadalcanal, when? The American effort was not dubbed "Operation Shoestring" lightly as the issue was in doubt till mid October. A Japanese victory may well have given them a breathing space into 1943. the push for Port Moresby had the IJA distracted, but a decisive committment of troops to retake the isalnd would have stopped Allied momentum after Midway in it's tracks. Not changed the war's outcome, but perhaps extended it a year.

[Warship NWS]

Hi NWS,

I would disagree. The Japanese had little choice but to fight as when would the odds for them be better? If not Guadalcanal, when? The American effort was not dubbed "Operation Shoestring" lightly as the issue was in doubt till mid October. A Japanese victory may well have given them a breathing space into 1943. the push for Port Moresby had the IJA distracted, but a decisive committment of troops to retake the isalnd would have stopped Allied momentum after Midway in it's tracks. Not changed the war's outcome, but perhaps extended it a year.

Extended a year for what reason? Guad. was hardly a strategic location, tactical at best, and more or less on the job training for us with an attritional price tag. They lost a lot of forces and resources over a location they hardly needed. The naval bases were the real strategic locations they should have prepared good defenses for instead of trying to hold onto a location they could not even supply adequately. If they did take it back we could have just put forces in the area to interdict their supplies and cause them nothing but problems. I am not saying we were running a perfectly smooth operation at the time but I do not feel the island meant all that much to them, or us for that matter. At most we could have held back from taking the island for a few months and then hit it with a larger force and the results would have been similiar in either case - either way it was not going to save them a year - IMHO. The chance they had to set us back a bit was at Savo Island but Mikawa blew it, and Yamamoto was pissed about that too. ;)

[old_pop2000]

Hi NWS,

I would disagree. The Japanese had little choice but to fight as when would the odds for them be better? If not Guadalcanal, when? The American effort was not dubbed "Operation Shoestring" lightly as the issue was in doubt till mid October. A Japanese victory may well have given them a breathing space into 1943. the push for Port Moresby had the IJA distracted, but a decisive committment of troops to retake the isalnd would have stopped Allied momentum after Midway in it's tracks. Not changed the war's outcome, but perhaps extended it a year.

Mike:
Isn't it interesting that the one type of warfare that the Japanese had to avoid due to a lack of economic and military resources, was a battle of attrition. Yet that is exactly what eventually happened. I wonder if a military, at the time, does not comprehend or understand the long term effects of their operations. I wonder when they finally realized that this had been exactly the type of battle that we could afford, but they could not.

[old_pop2000]

Extended a year for what reason? Guad. was hardly a strategic location, tactical at best, and more or less on the job training for us with an attritional price tag. They lost a lot of forces and resources over a location they hardly needed. The naval bases were the real strategic locations they should have prepared good defenses for instead of trying to hold onto a location they could not even supply adequately. If they did take it back we could have just put forces in the area to interdict their supplies and cause them nothing but problems. I am not saying we were running a perfectly smooth operation at the time but I do not feel the island meant all that much to them, or us for that matter. At most we could have held back from taking the island for a few months and then hit it with a larger force and the results would have been similiar in either case - either way it was not going to save them a year - IMHO. The chance they had to set us back a bit was at Savo Island but Mikawa blew it, and Yamamoto was pissed about that too. ;)

Based on War Plan Orange and its eventual replacement, the line-West Coast through Fiji to Australia was a vital strategic sea communications lane that had to and would be protected. It's protection was based on New Caledonia, Efate, and Espiritu Santo. Guadalcanal and the passage between those areas was a vital strategic forward perimeter for that communication lane. Distance from Fiji to the Solomons was about 1192 miles, through the aforementioned islands. They were strategic. With the Japanese in control of Florida and Guadalcanal, the Japanese patrol wings could fly out of Tulagi and Japanese bombers could place the forward bases under air attack. Would they, is another alternate history. This was the second and third phase of their war plans, created after Pearl Harbor with the Army.

[Ed Rotondaro]

No, it was from Richard Franks "Guadalcanal" however, I could research it at Navweaps and Fischer Tropsch. Navweaps gets much if its information from the latter source.


Dennis:

Thanks, I'll go back and re-read that. Who or what is Fischer Tropsch?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Aerial dropped flares would last as long as it took to hit the ground, or however long their burnout cycle is.. so the higher you fly the longer they last, problem is, the higher you fly the harder it will be to spot targets. The problem with flares however, especially over areas with terrain with obstacles, is that they do not give off consistent lighting effects like searchlights would. Starshells are also fired in patterns of multiple shells so as to give the best chances for spotting possible.


Chris:

Thanks for the details. I figured you would know more about that subject.;)

[Warship NWS]

Well, we could start another thread entirely covering the South Pacific campaign on this one.. LOL! ;)

However, IMHO, the Japanese should have stopped at Rabaul as anything south of that was ending up putting their logistics support ships into a situation they could not protect effectively as was proven when they tried to resupply their Guad. forces. They did not have the oil reserves to keep trying to cover up all the places we could cause problems at. They lost a lot of forces and resources trying to take Port Moresby, trying to take back Guadalcanal, and then their failed attempt at Midway.. all operations failed miserably. I just think they should have gone as far as Rabaul, at most, and stopped. They were already pushing their luck going that far.

As to Guadalcanal itself.. sure they could have put 2 engined bombers on it if they could keep us from interdicting their supply ships.. gotta have bombs, parts, pilots, food, and avgas. Would it have been worth the cost and what other response could we have put into the problem?

The only strategic value, IMHO, that Guad. held was a possible recon base .. anything else I think would have been of tactical value only to the Japanese. What we needed most was refueling points for our ships and bases for our bombers. Strategic vs tactical really depends I guess on how the island is used by either side in the end and its direct effect as an airbase on the course of the war.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Thanks, I'll go back and re-read that. Who or what is Fischer Tropsch?

Fischer Tropsch is a process of creating oil artificially, like the Haber Bosch process. There is a website( which I have posted, Ed) which contains government reports on German oil and synthetic oil processing and such. These were generated after the war, by the post war commission. One of those reports is the Naval Mission to Japan. Navweaps website uses this information for much of there data. Examine the bottom of their Japan weapons and you will see the references. I believe Parshall and many others use them as primary documents.

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/

Look on the left, under primary document. the site is framed. You will see government reports. Have fun.

[old_pop2000]

Well, we could start another thread entirely covering the South Pacific campaign on this one.. LOL! ;)

However, IMHO, the Japanese should have stopped at Rabaul as anything south of that was ending up putting their logistics support ships into a situation they could not protect effectively as was proven when they tried to resupply their Guad. forces. They did not have the oil reserves to keep trying to cover up all the places we could cause problems at. They lost a lot of forces and resources trying to take Port Moresby, trying to take back Guadalcanal, and then their failed attempt at Midway.. all operations failed miserably. I just think they should have gone as far as Rabaul, at most, and stopped. They were already pushing their luck going that far.

As to Guadalcanal itself.. sure they could have put 2 engined bombers on it if they could keep us from interdicting their supply ships.. gotta have bombs, parts, pilots, food, and avgas. Would it have been worth the cost and what other response could we have put into the problem?

The only strategic value, IMHO, that Guad. held was a possible recon base .. anything else I think would have been of tactical value only to the Japanese. What we needed most was refueling points for our ships and bases for our bombers. Strategic vs tactical really depends I guess on how the island is used by either side in the end and its direct effect as an airbase on the course of the war.

Thanks.

I would have to get my references out. However, the second phase, IIRC, was to take Guadalcanal and place fighters and bombers on it. Then attack and invade New Caledonia, Efate etc and cut the supplies going to Australia. At the same time, they were going to move over the Owen Stanley(good luck) and take Port Moresby( if the US and the Aussies let them). Ambitious plan, but hope springs eternal.

[Warship NWS]

I would have to get my references out. However, the second phase, IIRC, was to take Guadalcanal and place fighters and bombers on it. Then attack and invade New Caledonia, Efate etc and cut the supplies going to Australia. At the same time, they were going to move over the Owen Stanley(good luck) and take Port Moresby( if the US and the Aussies let them). Ambitious plan, but hope springs eternal.

Yep.. logistics is a bitch ain't it?! ;) Imagine how vulnerable their sea lanes would be then eh.. our subs would be having so much fun, especially vs a navy that did not believe much in ASW.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The first and most critical reason was her lack of speed.. all other ships used for the Slot attacks were capable of 30+ knots at least... those that limped died.

The second.. fuel. Yamato burned oil at a very high rate.. especially if she had to hump it at a minimum cruising speed of 25 knots just to keep pace which was only 2 knots slower then her max speed.

All other reasons are correct however but were secondary considerations. The point to the test is that it was never going to happen so what shells she fired or her barrel life was irrellevant.

Thanks.

Chris:

I would say that RobDan nailed the challenge perfectly. A well done to him.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The first and most critical reason was her lack of speed.. all other ships used for the Slot attacks were capable of 30+ knots at least... those that limped died. -Well I'm glad that I listed speed as my first choice then.

The second.. fuel. Yamato burned oil at a very high rate.. especially if she had to hump it at a minimum cruising speed of 25 knots just to keep pace which was only 2 knots slower then her max speed.- Damn, I didn't list fuel until my #6 reason, but isn't that just a variation on the speed reason ? The faster she went, the more fuel she used ...

All other reasons are correct however but were secondary considerations. The point to the test is that it was never going to happen so what shells she fired or her barrel life was irrellevant.- To you pehaps. I never considered her for Guadalcanal. The entire purpose of my starting the thread was to consider if there was a way to get her to Oahu for a Dec.7'41 bombardment there. I think that the only place where she might have had some material effect on the war had it been possible to advance her construction and ammunition schedules. Blowing Henderson Field to hell (yet again) wouldn't have made any difference to the final outcome of the Pacific War except to very slightly delay it.

Thanks.- What, no prize ??? I feel used, but not surprised. LOL

Hi:

I'm not sure the IJN would want to risk a shore bombardment of Oahu unless they planned on invading. While the defenses at Pearl Harbor were not as strong as they would eventually become, there was still a decent amount of coastal artillery in the form of 16" guns in several batteries. If those batteries are intact, ship bombardment becomes very risky.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Yamato and Musashi, as pretty much proven with their battle histories, were almost one or two *combat* deployment only and nearly worthless ships - basically a huge waste of resources - Spoken in the lauguage of a 66+ years of perfect hindsight. The question is when did the Japanese realize it ?

I will give you that you came up with the correct answers however, I just wanted to make sure you were on the same page in terms of historical context. ;) - Thanks but I keep struggling to get onto the next page, the "what if" page. This same old, same old, page keeps holding me back.

So, do I get to ask you for two reasons now ?

Hi:

Yamamoto was quoted as saying that the Yamato was as useless as a samurai sword on the modern battlefield, yet he also planned on using her to help finish off the USN at Midway. There was a sort of perverse love/hate relation with the battleship where Yamamoto was concerned.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Interesting article on "Oil and the Japanese Strategy in the Solomons:A postulate"

http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm

Hope this adds to the discussion


Note: According to records, the Midway operation used 1 years worth of fuel from the IJN's reserves which had been calculated at 1.5 years at the start of the war.

Dennis:

Interesting article. Thanks for the link.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I think you misinterpreted the information. All that stated was that we were not sinking their tankers, in fact, we were not even prioritizing them. The same criticism of Japanese myopia in regards to oil, a strategic commodity, could be safely applied to the US. They did not attack the fuel farm at Pearl Harbor or attack our tankers, correct? Well, neither did we. The problem is we had oil production in full swing on the West Coast, where the Japanese were getting their oil prior to the start of the war. Unfortunately, the Japanese did not have that luxury. The IJN had only 1.5-2 years worth of oil stored. They had to bring it from Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The other issue is that they were consuming it far faster than they had anticipated in such operations as Operation MI. The Solomons operation came at a time, when they had just lowered their fuel reserves. Actually, they had fuel in Borneo, which had already been captured. There had been no attempt to defend it, however, due to attempts to sabotage, it had only 70% oil capacity.

So, the problem was never transportation of oil, the problem was the lack of oil. Oil supplies had been dwindling because the pace of combat operations had increased beyond the prewar calculations and the Japanese were short of it. We had more oil than we could store. The West Coast oil fields had to stop producing because of the shortage of oil storage facilities.

If we examine a month by month tonnage availability chart starting in December 1944, we see a dramatic drop in tonnage available. In December it was 868,962 By February,1945 it was 679,984. This was the single greatest drop, to date, in the war. What happened from 14 October to 31 December 1944?

Dennis:

IIRC the IJN took a long time to get the oil fields in Sumatra up and running after they had been sabotaged. It's ironic that Japan went to war to secure oil and had such a hard time getting any use out of the fields seized.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I think you misinterpreted the information. All that stated was that we were not sinking their tankers, in fact, we were not even prioritizing them. The same criticism of Japanese myopia in regards to oil, a strategic commodity, could be safely applied to the US. They did not attack the fuel farm at Pearl Harbor or attack our tankers, correct? Well, neither did we. The problem is we had oil production in full swing on the West Coast, where the Japanese were getting their oil prior to the start of the war. Unfortunately, the Japanese did not have that luxury. The IJN had only 1.5-2 years worth of oil stored. They had to bring it from Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The other issue is that they were consuming it far faster than they had anticipated in such operations as Operation MI. The Solomons operation came at a time, when they had just lowered their fuel reserves. Actually, they had fuel in Borneo, which had already been captured. There had been no attempt to defend it, however, due to attempts to sabotage, it had only 70% oil capacity.

So, the problem was never transportation of oil, the problem was the lack of oil. Oil supplies had been dwindling because the pace of combat operations had increased beyond the prewar calculations and the Japanese were short of it. We had more oil than we could store. The West Coast oil fields had to stop producing because of the shortage of oil storage facilities.

If we examine a month by month tonnage availability chart starting in December 1944, we see a dramatic drop in tonnage available. In December it was 868,962 By February,1945 it was 679,984. This was the single greatest drop, to date, in the war. What happened from 14 October to 31 December 1944?

Dennis:

1944 has always been cited as the year that US submarine operations really kicked into high gear. Both tankers and destoryers were the priority targets. Also keep in mind that a lot of that tanker tonnage you quoted was reserved for use by the IJA in China, not the IJN in the Pacific. Japan badly mismanged her merchant fleet during the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I didn't misinterprete the information old friend, we did sink tankers but your right about the part we did not prioritize them at the start - which I agree we should have. I did know however that USN subs did start sinking whatever they could find and as of 3/42 the they sank their first tanker (Kaizyo Maru of 8,637 tons) and were sinking good numbers of destroyers, subs, freighters and transports very early on starting right after the raid on Pearl Harbor. Point being, we were sinking tankers based on targets of opportunity but later, as you and Kyle pointed out, we prioritized them. It is curious why this was not done sooner though.

Thanks.

Chris:

It might depend on where the tankers were located and where the US subs were on their war patrols.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Extended a year for what reason? Guad. was hardly a strategic location, tactical at best, and more or less on the job training for us with an attritional price tag. They lost a lot of forces and resources over a location they hardly needed. The naval bases were the real strategic locations they should have prepared good defenses for instead of trying to hold onto a location they could not even supply adequately. If they did take it back we could have just put forces in the area to interdict their supplies and cause them nothing but problems. I am not saying we were running a perfectly smooth operation at the time but I do not feel the island meant all that much to them, or us for that matter. At most we could have held back from taking the island for a few months and then hit it with a larger force and the results would have been similiar in either case - either way it was not going to save them a year - IMHO. The chance they had to set us back a bit was at Savo Island but Mikawa blew it, and Yamamoto was pissed about that too. ;)

Chris:

The IJN saw Guadalcanal as the first step up the Solomons and Rabual. Rabual was the key. Rabual was their base in the South West Pacific. The IJN poured men and supplies into there in anticipation of a US landing, only to have them stuck there once the US isolated the place. It became the largest open air prisoner of war camp in the world.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Fischer Tropsch is a process of creating oil artificially, like the Haber Bosch process. There is a website( which I have posted, Ed) which contains government reports on German oil and synthetic oil processing and such. These were generated after the war, by the post war commission. One of those reports is the Naval Mission to Japan. Navweaps website uses this information for much of there data. Examine the bottom of their Japan weapons and you will see the references. I believe Parshall and many others use them as primary documents.

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/

Look on the left, under primary document. the site is framed. You will see government reports. Have fun.

Dennis:

Thanks for the prompt response. You must live chained to the PC LOL! Just like Chris.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I would say that RobDan nailed the challenge perfectly. A well done to him.

I would agree except for the part that I already gave an answer previously in post #13



The other question you have to keep in mind robdab is do you want to burn up a lot of limited oil and risk one of your most prestigeous warships to hopefully score a hit, which keep in mind they fired LOTS of shells at Guadalcanal with VERY poor results, in the hopes you might light something on fire.


The part of chewing up lots of oil was a dead giveaway to the fact that the Yamato was a fuel hog and had to hump it to keep pace with other 30+ knot warships that were operating in the "Slot". The problem here is however he was implying in his answers about using the Yamato for a scenario even worse then that.. for a bombardment of PH. The Hiei and Kirishima was deployed with the CV task force due to their 30+ knot speeds, the Yamato would have not kept pace without, again, chewing up even more fuel going to PH and back - add to that the Yamato was not even combat ready yet. The rest of the answers were inconsequential beyond those critical points.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Hi:

Yamamoto was quoted as saying that the Yamato was as useless as a samurai sword on the modern battlefield, yet he also planned on using her to help finish off the USN at Midway. There was a sort of perverse love/hate relation with the battleship where Yamamoto was concerned.

Note, he never stated such comments about carriers. ;)

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

It might depend on where the tankers were located and where the US subs were on their war patrols.

The early WW2 USN subs had more limited range then the Gatos and especially the extended range Tench classes.. which were the ones that could sail around the Formosa region, plus when we took the Phillipines that just made it worse. However, we averaged 18 merchants sunk a month from Dec 41 to Dec 42.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Extended a year for what reason? Guad. was hardly a strategic location, tactical at best, and more or less on the job training for us with an attritional price tag. They lost a lot of forces and resources over a location they hardly needed. The naval bases were the real strategic locations they should have prepared good defenses for instead of trying to hold onto a location they could not even supply adequately. If they did take it back we could have just put forces in the area to interdict their supplies and cause them nothing but problems. I am not saying we were running a perfectly smooth operation at the time but I do not feel the island meant all that much to them, or us for that matter. At most we could have held back from taking the island for a few months and then hit it with a larger force and the results would have been similiar in either case - either way it was not going to save them a year - IMHO. The chance they had to set us back a bit was at Savo Island but Mikawa blew it, and Yamamoto was pissed about that too. ;)

Hi NWS,

Again I would disagree, Guadalcanal was a strategic asset for the Japanese as an airbase to interdict Allied supply movements from the eastern Pacific. It bolstered their outer defense perimeter and extended their reconnaissance assets. It's loss threatened Rabaul, the bastion in the SW Pacific. It was equally strategic for the US to prevent that and relieve pressure on the Australians holding on in New Guinea.

The loss of the 1st Marine Division would have pretty much depleted available American land forces in the theater to retake the island. The US Army was in no position to assist in retaking an island that might have 25,000 Japanese troops on it. All the combat ready divisions were committed to North Africa.

Lot of variables here, especially considering Japanese logistics problems in the theater. The possession of Henderson Field made life extremely difficult for the Japanese. Nipping it in the bud by decisive action had no downside for the Japanese other than keeping them in a war they couldn't win. Avoiding the attrttional warfare of the campaign would have presserved their forces and personnel for later actions though their slow production of aircarft and pilots was hardly enough to keep them in the game once the USN got rolling in late 1943.

It is interseting to speculate what the USN would have done had Hornet and Wasp not been lost and the Saratoga remained operational in the aftermath of a quick ejection of the Marines by the Japanese.

Definitely agree about Mikawa. Had he gotten to the transports, it would have made the Imperial Armiy's task much easier. We have discussed in teh past, the ability and opportunity for the IJN to suppress Henderson by daily bombardments from teh start with destroyers and cruisers.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would agree except for the part that I already gave an answer previously in post #13



The part of chewing up lots of oil was a dead giveaway to the fact that the Yamato was a fuel hog and had to hump it to keep pace with other 30+ knot warships that were operating in the "Slot". The problem here is however he was implying in his answers about using the Yamato for a scenario even worse then that.. for a bombardment of PH. The Hiei and Kirishima was deployed with the CV task force due to their 30+ knot speeds, the Yamato would have not kept pace without, again, chewing up even more fuel going to PH and back - add to that the Yamato was not even combat ready yet. The rest of the answers were inconsequential beyond those critical points.

Thanks.


Chris:

Now that you mention it, I'm not sure Yamato or Musashi ever deployed with carriers except possibly during the Battle of Philippines Sea. The Yamato was not with the carriers at Midway, they were again escorted by the battlecruisers. Also at Leyte the carriers were not present with the main battleship group which included Yamato and Musashi (although that was because they were the decoys).

[Ed Rotondaro]

The early WW2 USN subs had more limited range then the Gatos and especially the extended range Tench classes.. which were the ones that could sail around the Formosa region, plus when we took the Phillipines that just made it worse. However, we averaged 18 merchants sunk a month from Dec 41 to Dec 42.

Chris:

And that was with inconsistent torpedoes. I wonder how many of those ships were sunk by the deck gun?

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

And that was with inconsistent torpedoes. I wonder how many of those ships were sunk by the deck gun?

Some U-boat captains sank the bulk of their shipping with a deck gun, as likely did the USN subs in the Pacific when the torps failed or if they wanted to save the torps for juicier targets or when they were required to attack while submerged. The problem was not so much in sinking Japanese ships but having the range to find them for the older subs that were operating before the Gato class started to deploy in numbers. USN subs sank 249 merchant ships in their first year alone - and many of sunk ships (not merchants) were Japanese destroyers, subs, and mine warfare ships. We still had the earlier Mk10 torpedoes in service (especially on the S class subs which could not fire the Mk14s - btw the S Class had the fastest underwater speed of any USN submarine of WW2 at 11 knots) and many Mk10s were kept in service while the problems with the Mk14 were being figured out.

As of 1943 the numbers of sunk merchants raised to 433, 1944 it doubled to 971, and 1945 it was 702. During 1944 most of the Japanese ships lost were sunk in the East and South China seas, especially around the Phillipines .. the favored Gato, Balao, and Tench class hunting grounds.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Now that you mention it, I'm not sure Yamato or Musashi ever deployed with carriers except possibly during the Battle of Philippines Sea. The Yamato was not with the carriers at Midway, they were again escorted by the battlecruisers. Also at Leyte the carriers were not present with the main battleship group which included Yamato and Musashi (although that was because they were the decoys).

I do not believe they ever deployed as part of the organic force with CVs. They simply were not fast enough and burned far too much oil to keep pace. Our 28 knot BBs were barely able to do it and we had more efficient engines and hull profiles then the Yamato class - we also had the available fuel for them and tankers.

[Warship NWS]

Hi NWS,

Again I would disagree, Guadalcanal was a strategic asset for the Japanese as an airbase to interdict Allied supply movements from the eastern Pacific. It bolstered their outer defense perimeter and extended their reconnaissance assets. It's loss threatened Rabaul, the bastion in the SW Pacific. It was equally strategic for the US to prevent that and relieve pressure on the Australians holding on in New Guinea. <snip>


Hi Mike, I think the idea of the Japanese using Guad. for a strategic base is questionable at best. Even if they did we could interdict their supplies to that base with subs out of Brisbane or via CV hit and run raids. The problem here is if they did get Guad. they could not readily defend it without risking high losses.. they were simply not that efficient at defending their bases. This is also not stating the fact that we could have possibly landed on another island somewhere in the Solomons chain and caused them dismay. As you say, there are many variables and the entire campaign was a flip flop of events based a lot on who was luckier on what day of the week - but, the most telling signs of their inability to hold the island was the training of their troops, lack of good engineering capability, shortage of available oil supplies, poor bombardment record, and inadequate and poorly organized support units - transports, supplies, etc.. We could stay just outside of Rabauls' aircraft coverage and pound Guad. with CV airpower with near impunity. I agree with Dennis that they should have acquired an airbase closer to Rabaul first and then worked down, as it was they strained their ability to cover Guadalcanal with aircover due to the distance to Guadalcanal, and as such A6M3s for example ditched their radios to save weight. The fatigue for those pilots had to be extreme for such a long flight also and their mostly flimsy planes - especially the bombers in this case - did not help matters.

All in all.. their entire Solomons effort was ad hoc and ill equipped to defend the airstrips on Guadalcanal. For us, it could be argued that it was a strategic location but only after bombers were landed on the base that could hit Rabaul IMHO. The bulk of our forces were coming from Pearl and the other bases to the south of Guadalcanal since there was no port on or near that island. I just feel that the ports were the true strategic locations of the Pacific War, more so then the airbases which acted as places to land 2-4 engined bombers from, the planes the CVs could not carry - so in effect they acted as big unsinkable CVs. On that context, I can see them as strategic locations - when they acted as strategic bomber and recon bases - not just for fighters.

It is a complex topic however with many perspectives as to how or what could have happened.. the fortunes of war could have changed in either direction based on what decisions were made and who was the luckier side on a day by day basis. That is probably why so many debates revolve around the entire Solomons Campaign.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

Some U-boat captains sank the bulk of their shipping with a deck gun, as likely did the USN subs in the Pacific when the torps failed or if they wanted to save the torps for juicier targets or when they were required to attack while submerged. The problem was not so much in sinking Japanese ships but having the range to find them for the older subs that were operating before the Gato class started to deploy in numbers. USN subs sank 249 merchant ships in their first year alone - and many of sunk ships (not merchants) were Japanese destroyers, subs, and mine warfare ships. We still had the earlier Mk10 torpedoes in service (especially on the S class subs which could not fire the Mk14s - btw the S Class had the fastest underwater speed of any USN submarine of WW2 at 11 knots) and many Mk10s were kept in service while the problems with the Mk14 were being figured out.



I read that many fleet boats put to sea with the older Mk 10s on board when the Mk14s were in short supply. One fleet boat went on one patrol carrying nothing but Mk10s and some even older Mk9s (I believe none of the Mk9s hit a target),

[old_pop2000]

Generally, when a nation has limited war aims, it's plans are limited. This is exactly the situation for the Japanese. They had limited war aims in the Pacific. They were to take the southern portion of Indochina, then the Dutch Indies, Malaysia, Philippines, generally the Southwest Pacific. They took Rabaul, then took the north side of New Guinea. This was the extent of their war aims.

When the Allies responded with a no negotiate policy, the Japanese realized that leaving Australia to become a jump off point for Allied operations against the SW pacific, the Japanese began to develop a second and third phase of their war plans. These were against the US-Fiji-Australia supply lines. Guadalcanal and its airbase were a part of that second phase.

The method the Japanese used to start the war, is what doomed any chance for them to negotiate a settlement for the conquered area. They had to neutralize any base from which the Allies could strike at the defensive perimeter of co-prosperity sphere. As operations in the Coral Sea and from Australia increased, the Japanese had to neutralize those bases and lines. The key was the carrier striking force and at Midway, it was destroyed. The Japanese then had to simply strengthen the outer perimeter. Guadalcanal was part of the effort to strengthen that outer perimeter. From that base they could control operations for, at least a thousand miles. From here, it was a simple jump to New Caledonia as a foward base to interdict supplies to Australia.

That is why Guadalcanal was important to them. By taking Guadalcanal, and placing fighters and long range aircraft we could now start attacking their Rabaul base, making it unteneble.

The Japanese move to Guadalcanal was always, a strategic move, not a tactical move. The Japanese as well as the Allies realized that airbases from which bombers could fly, could control the seas and protect their ships. The two assets gave them sea control of the SW Pacific. Either one missing, means a loss of that sea control.

[Warship NWS]

Since we are moving a bit off topic with this thread I started up a new thread covering strategic vs tactical considerations of various locations during WW1 and WW2,

http://forums.navalwarfare.org/showthread.php?t=340

Thanks. :)

[john964]

Some U-boat captains sank the bulk of their shipping with a deck gun, as likely did the USN subs in the Pacific when the torps failed or if they wanted to save the torps for juicier targets or when they were required to attack while submerged. The problem was not so much in sinking Japanese ships but having the range to find them for the older subs that were operating before the Gato class started to deploy in numbers. USN subs sank 249 merchant ships in their first year alone - and many of sunk ships (not merchants) were Japanese destroyers, subs, and mine warfare ships. We still had the earlier Mk10 torpedoes in service (especially on the S class subs which could not fire the Mk14s - btw the S Class had the fastest underwater speed of any USN submarine of WW2 at 11 knots) and many Mk10s were kept in service while the problems with the Mk14 were being figured out.

As of 1943 the numbers of sunk merchants raised to 433, 1944 it doubled to 971, and 1945 it was 702. During 1944 most of the Japanese ships lost were sunk in the East and South China seas, especially around the Phillipines .. the favored Gato, Balao, and Tench class hunting grounds.

Thanks.
Chris, From my information the Trench class did not deploy untill very late in the war. IIRC only 12 Tench class submarines conducted war patrols and from what I understand only few did more than one war patrol and several arrived off Japan with in days of the surrender.

[Warship NWS]

Chris, From my information the Trench class did not deploy untill very late in the war. IIRC only 12 Tench class submarines conducted war patrols and from what I understand only few did more than one war patrol and several arrived off Japan with in days of the surrender.

Only 31 were built and they were basically the same as the Balao class except for some improved internal arrangements and the ability to carry 4 more torpedoes. The biggest different between the Balao and the Gato was the increased diving depth from 300' to 400'. This is why I stated them as a series.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Dennis:

1944 has always been cited as the year that US submarine operations really kicked into high gear. Both tankers and destoryers were the priority targets. Also keep in mind that a lot of that tanker tonnage you quoted was reserved for use by the IJA in China, not the IJN in the Pacific. Japan badly mismanged her merchant fleet during the war.

Hi Guys,

I looked through Blair's "Silent Victory" and found some interesting stats on the tonnage war.

Japan started the war with 5.4 million tons of merchant shipping and imported 20 million tons of strategic impots a year. By the end of 1942, 350 USN submarine war patrols had sank only 180 merchants for 725,000 tons. The Japanese merchant marine only had 200,000 tons less than at the start of the war and imports remained at the same level. By the end of 1943, the Japanese merchant marine was down to 4.1 million tons and imports were down 25% to 16 million tons. 350 patrols mounted in 1943 as well, but they sank 335 ships for 1.5 million tons. During 1944, submarines sank 603 ships for 2.7 million tons, more in 1944 than in the previous years combined.

The tanker picture was much better for the Japanese.

1942: Japanese tanker tonnage increased from 575,00 tons to 686,000.

1943: Japanese tanker tonnage went from 686,000 tons to 863,000 tons despite the sinking of 150,000 tons of tankers.

1944: Japanese tanker tonnage went from 863,000 to 869,000 tons, but she built 204 tankers that year for 624,000 tons.

Blair cites a number of reasons for this, but primarily a lack of concentration on the Luzon strait bottleneck prior to 1944. Too many special missions and chasing after high value naval units were a detriment as were the bad torpedoes, the ensuing torpedo shortage, the submarines split into three commands for Pacific operations, the retirement of a number of pre war built boats from combat operations and a number sidelined by the deffective H.O.R diesels.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike, I think the idea of the Japanese using Guad. for a strategic base is questionable at best. Even if they did we could interdict their supplies to that base with subs out of Brisbane or via CV hit and run raids. The problem here is if they did get Guad. they could not readily defend it without risking high losses.. they were simply not that efficient at defending their bases. This is also not stating the fact that we could have possibly landed on another island somewhere in the Solomons chain and caused them dismay. As you say, there are many variables and the entire campaign was a flip flop of events based a lot on who was luckier on what day of the week - but, the most telling signs of their inability to hold the island was the training of their troops, lack of good engineering capability, shortage of available oil supplies, poor bombardment record, and inadequate and poorly organized support units - transports, supplies, etc.. We could stay just outside of Rabauls' aircraft coverage and pound Guad. with CV airpower with near impunity. I agree with Dennis that they should have acquired an airbase closer to Rabaul first and then worked down, as it was they strained their ability to cover Guadalcanal with aircover due to the distance to Guadalcanal, and as such A6M3s for example ditched their radios to save weight. The fatigue for those pilots had to be extreme for such a long flight also and their mostly flimsy planes - especially the bombers in this case - did not help matters.

All in all.. their entire Solomons effort was ad hoc and ill equipped to defend the airstrips on Guadalcanal. For us, it could be argued that it was a strategic location but only after bombers were landed on the base that could hit Rabaul IMHO. The bulk of our forces were coming from Pearl and the other bases to the south of Guadalcanal since there was no port on or near that island. I just feel that the ports were the true strategic locations of the Pacific War, more so then the airbases which acted as places to land 2-4 engined bombers from, the planes the CVs could not carry - so in effect they acted as big unsinkable CVs. On that context, I can see them as strategic locations - when they acted as strategic bomber and recon bases - not just for fighters.

It is a complex topic however with many perspectives as to how or what could have happened.. the fortunes of war could have changed in either direction based on what decisions were made and who was the luckier side on a day by day basis. That is probably why so many debates revolve around the entire Solomons Campaign.

Thanks.

Hi NWS,

I completely agree with the above. I was quibbling with your definition of strategic versus tactical in your original post about the value of Guadalcanal as seen by both sides. : )

[Warship NWS]

Hi NWS,

I completely agree with the above. I was quibbling with your definition of strategic versus tactical in your original post about the value of Guadalcanal as seen by both sides. : )

The definition of tactical vs strategic in terms of bases can vary for a variety of reasons, even as a matter of dates. That is why I started up that new thread covering that complex topic. Thanks friend.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Guys,

I looked through Blair's "Silent Victory" and found some interesting stats on the tonnage war.

Japan started the war with 5.4 million tons of merchant shipping and imported 20 million tons of strategic impots a year. By the end of 1942, 350 USN submarine war patrols had sank only 180 merchants for 725,000 tons. The Japanese merchant marine only had 200,000 tons less than at the start of the war and imports remained at the same level. By the end of 1943, the Japanese merchant marine was down to 4.1 million tons and imports were down 25% to 16 million tons. 350 patrols mounted in 1943 as well, but they sank 335 ships for 1.5 million tons. During 1944, submarines sank 603 ships for 2.7 million tons, more in 1944 than in the previous years combined.

The tanker picture was much better for the Japanese.

1942: Japanese tanker tonnage increased from 575,00 tons to 686,000.

1943: Japanese tanker tonnage went from 686,000 tons to 863,000 tons despite the sinking of 150,000 tons of tankers.

1944: Japanese tanker tonnage went from 863,000 to 869,000 tons, but she built 204 tankers that year for 624,000 tons.

Blair cites a number of reasons for this, but primarily a lack of concentration on the Luzon strait bottleneck prior to 1944. Too many special missions and chasing after high value naval units were a detriment as were the bad torpedoes, the ensuing torpedo shortage, the submarines split into three commands for Pacific operations, the retirement of a number of pre war built boats from combat operations and a number sidelined by the deffective H.O.R diesels.


The figures he quotes are the figures I got from the USSBS report on Japanese tanker tonnage afloat. The report also shows the losses of merchants steadily decreasing. The twelve tankers lost in 1943 were to the Brisbane boats under Admiral Christie.

As to the Luzon strait issue, that's why after December 31, 1944, the tanker tonnage dropped dramatically. We had taken back the Philippines. We could send out patrol planes and medium bombers to search for the shipping and convoys, notifying the boats and they could kill the tankers or anything else in the way. We could now choke off the supply of oil heading to Japan. However, by this time, it was a moot point. Most of the IJN ships were at the bottom of the sea. :):)

[Warship NWS]

I have started another thread covering USN and IJN submarine operations in the Pacific,

http://forums.navalwarfare.org/showthread.php?t=341

Note I also posted a thread for covering tactical vs strategic bases for both world wars here;

http://forums.navalwarfare.org/showthread.php?t=340

Lets move off of this thread if we are not discussing the "Yamato" theory any longer.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some U-boat captains sank the bulk of their shipping with a deck gun, as likely did the USN subs in the Pacific when the torps failed or if they wanted to save the torps for juicier targets or when they were required to attack while submerged. The problem was not so much in sinking Japanese ships but having the range to find them for the older subs that were operating before the Gato class started to deploy in numbers. USN subs sank 249 merchant ships in their first year alone - and many of sunk ships (not merchants) were Japanese destroyers, subs, and mine warfare ships. We still had the earlier Mk10 torpedoes in service (especially on the S class subs which could not fire the Mk14s - btw the S Class had the fastest underwater speed of any USN submarine of WW2 at 11 knots) and many Mk10s were kept in service while the problems with the Mk14 were being figured out.

As of 1943 the numbers of sunk merchants raised to 433, 1944 it doubled to 971, and 1945 it was 702. During 1944 most of the Japanese ships lost were sunk in the East and South China seas, especially around the Phillipines .. the favored Gato, Balao, and Tench class hunting grounds.

Thanks.

Chris:

This is an interesting topic, but I'll post more on the new thread you started.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Generally, when a nation has limited war aims, it's plans are limited. This is exactly the situation for the Japanese. They had limited war aims in the Pacific. They were to take the southern portion of Indochina, then the Dutch Indies, Malaysia, Philippines, generally the Southwest Pacific. They took Rabaul, then took the north side of New Guinea. This was the extent of their war aims.

When the Allies responded with a no negotiate policy, the Japanese realized that leaving Australia to become a jump off point for Allied operations against the SW pacific, the Japanese began to develop a second and third phase of their war plans. These were against the US-Fiji-Australia supply lines. Guadalcanal and its airbase were a part of that second phase.

The method the Japanese used to start the war, is what doomed any chance for them to negotiate a settlement for the conquered area. They had to neutralize any base from which the Allies could strike at the defensive perimeter of co-prosperity sphere. As operations in the Coral Sea and from Australia increased, the Japanese had to neutralize those bases and lines. The key was the carrier striking force and at Midway, it was destroyed. The Japanese then had to simply strengthen the outer perimeter. Guadalcanal was part of the effort to strengthen that outer perimeter. From that base they could control operations for, at least a thousand miles. From here, it was a simple jump to New Caledonia as a foward base to interdict supplies to Australia.

That is why Guadalcanal was important to them. By taking Guadalcanal, and placing fighters and long range aircraft we could now start attacking their Rabaul base, making it unteneble.

The Japanese move to Guadalcanal was always, a strategic move, not a tactical move. The Japanese as well as the Allies realized that airbases from which bombers could fly, could control the seas and protect their ships. The two assets gave them sea control of the SW Pacific. Either one missing, means a loss of that sea control.

Dennis:

Exactly, that is the situation in a nutshell. Good summation.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Chris, From my information the Trench class did not deploy untill very late in the war. IIRC only 12 Tench class submarines conducted war patrols and from what I understand only few did more than one war patrol and several arrived off Japan with in days of the surrender.


John:

The Tench was merely a slightly modified Balao, differences to the bridge being the main identifier here. (From Squadron books Gato Class Submarines in Action)

[old_pop2000]

John:

The Tench was merely a slightly modified Balao, differences to the bridge being the main identifier here. (From Squadron books Gato Class Submarines in Action)

On the tench class, they removed the deckgun, added a snorkel, streamlined the hull, and added additional battery power for greater underwater endurance.

[john964]

On the trench class, they removed the deckgun, added a snorkel, streamlined the hull, and added additional battery power for greater underwater endurance.Dennis that sounds like the GUPPY program of the 50's. The Tench class mod's over the Balao class was a slightly larger battery capacity and more torepedo storage 28 vs 24.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis that sounds like the GUPPY program of the 50's. The Tench class mod's over the Balao class was a slightly larger battery capacity and more torepedo storage 28 vs 24.


I spelled it Trench instead of Tench. Sorry. However, for one of the few times, I have used Wikipedia. Here is the link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tench_class_submarine.

If it is wrong, by all means, show corrections.