The Combined Fleet at Pearl Harbor, not Midway

[old_pop2000]

Something that has puzzled me, so I thought I would throw the question to the forum. Yamamoto sent the bulk of the IJN to Midway to take an atoll and create the decisive battle in June, 1942. He got thumped pretty hard and never came back.

Why not send them on December 7th to do the same thing. There were two carriers in the area then and a sleeping naval base?

Anyone got any ideas?

[Warship NWS]

Something that has puzzled me, so I thought I would throw the question to the forum. Yamamoto sent the bulk of the IJN to Midway to take an atoll and create the decisive battle in June, 1942. He got thumped pretty hard and never came back.

Why not send them on December 7th to do the same thing. There were two carriers in the area then and a sleeping naval base?

Anyone got any ideas?

I found that odd also.. the force arrayed against a silly insignificant island called Midway was around 50% greater in CV strength and around 200% more in surface action strength (rough guess) of that sent to a strategic naval base.. Pearl Harbor. One is nothing more then air base on a pile of sand and the other is the key USN naval base in the Pacific. Lack of strategic planning maybe? However, invading Hawaii, as was planned for Midway, was out of the question due to logistical support reasons. What they needed to do was what they did to Darwin.. bomb the crap out of anything and everything at Pearl for around 1-3 days and hopefully draw out the USN CVs to get waxed. That was the ONLY time we did not know where their CVs were going. Boy.. lots of what ifs here.. geez.. I wonder where this thread will go? ;) Good one Dennis. LOL!

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Here are some interesting contrasts:

1. At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had six fleet carriers and their pilots were as highly trained as they would ever be. We had two. The traditional 3:1 advantage in numbers.

2. At Midway, even Fuchida during training could not believe that these were the same pilots their level of training was so bad. Actually, he stated they weren't, most of the PH attack group pilots had been lost in the interim six months.

3. We did not have JN-25 broken. We were deaf and blind.

4. Midway Island on December 7th was poorly defended and should have been an easy target. It certainly wasn't six months later.

5. US Carriers were scattered, the Japanese were concentrated.

6. One of our carriers had Brewster Buffaloes and the other had F4F-3. Neither had self sealing tanks nor pilot armor. Neither did the A6M2 Model 21, but their pilots had more experience and a better handling aircraft.

7. If December 7th went the normal way, Enterprise was in the harbor at night. What if the IJN battleships steamed near the island and did a night bombardment.

Anyway, I'll let you all come up with some more contrasts etc.

[bridav58]

According to my Francis Dean's " America's 100,000" F4F-3's except the first 81 sent to the UK had armor and self -sealing tanks. Also guys just how is Kido Butai going to stick around PH for 1-3 days?

[old_pop2000]

According to my Francis Dean's " America's 100,000" F4F-3's except the first 81 sent to the UK had armor and self -sealing tanks. Also guys just how is Kido Butai going to stick around PH for 1-3 days?


The F4F-3 as delivered by Grumman did not have self sealing tanks or pilot armor. The pilot armor was fashioned from plates at Kanoehe or on the carriers and installed. They were makeshift. Later, rubber fuel bladders were installed. However, at Pearl Harbor, they were not available.

They would not stay around Pearl Harbor. At Pearl, they would have launched three attacks and destroyed the fuel tanks, sub pens and most of the aircraft and fields. They would return northward to join up with the bulk of the Imperial Japanese fleet led by Nagato and Mutsu. The carriers and escorts would refuel, rearm and repair all damaged aircraft then take Midway Island. They might encounter Lexington, as she was delivering fighters. That is generally the way it might have unfolded. There are probably difference scenario's.

[Warship NWS]

What if the IJN battleships steamed near the island and did a night bombardment.


You could start up a thread on this theory alone.. as you would have to consider the following factors - what time frame in relation to the air attacks, possible threats to the bombardment ships, logistical considerations, etc..

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I found that odd also.. the force arrayed against a silly insignificant island called Midway was around 50% greater in CV strength and around 200% more in surface action strength (rough guess) of that sent to a strategic naval base.. Pearl Harbor. One is nothing more then air base on a pile of sand and the other is the key USN naval base in the Pacific. Lack of strategic planning maybe? However, invading Hawaii, as was planned for Midway, was out of the question due to logistical support reasons. What they needed to do was what they did to Darwin.. bomb the crap out of anything and everything at Pearl for around 1-3 days and hopefully draw out the USN CVs to get waxed. That was the ONLY time we did not know where their CVs were going. Boy.. lots of what ifs here.. geez.. I wonder where this thread will go? ;) Good one Dennis. LOL!

Thanks.

Dennis and Chris:

Since Pearl Harbor was a raid meant to knock out the carriers and battleships and get the hell out of Dodge, there was no need for the combined fleet to sail. The ships chosen for PH were all fast movers, none of the older, slower BBs sailed unlike at Midway. Unless an invasion was planned, there was no need to risk the entire fleet.

Midway on the other hand was meant to be the "Decisive Battle", so Yamamoto brings the bulk of his assets and is hoping for a surface action of all things with his BBs despite the demonstrated proof that the carrier has supplanted the BB as the premier weapon. He is gambling that the USN will commit its carriers (they did) and its battleships (they didn't) as well as every other available resource to defend an unimportant atoll landing strip. If there was ever a failure of both strategic analysis and assessment of battle damages, then Midway was it. Did Yamamoto think the USN would offer battle with its depleted surface assets? If so he was thinking like a Japanese samurai eager for death in battle. He knew how badly he had crippled the surface fleet.

[asnrobert]

Dennis and Chris:

Since Pearl Harbor was a raid meant to knock out the carriers and battleships and get the hell out of Dodge, there was no need for the combined fleet to sail. The ships chosen for PH were all fast movers, none of the older, slower BBs sailed unlike at Midway. Unless an invasion was planned, there was no need to risk the entire fleet.

Midway on the other hand was meant to be the "Decisive Battle", so Yamamoto brings the bulk of his assets and is hoping for a surface action of all things with his BBs despite the demonstrated proof that the carrier has supplanted the BB as the premier weapon. He is gambling that the USN will commit its carriers (they did) and its battleships (they didn't) as well as every other available resource to defend an unimportant atoll landing strip. If there was ever a failure of both strategic analysis and assessment of battle damages, then Midway was it. Did Yamamoto think the USN would offer battle with its depleted surface assets? If so he was thinking like a Japanese samurai eager for death in battle. He knew how badly he had crippled the surface fleet.

OTOH, the primary goal of the Pearl Harbor raid was to get the carriers, but they were at sea. If Nagumo had hung around for a couple days as Chris suggested, they may have been able to nail one or two of them and sink them in deep water, so they'd be gone for good.

[Ed Rotondaro]

OTOH, the primary goal of the Pearl Harbor raid was to get the carriers, but they were at sea. If Nagumo had hung around for a couple days as Chris suggested, they may have been able to nail one or two of them and sink them in deep water, so they'd be gone for good.

Robert:

While I agree that Nagumo still had a powerful force to destroy any USN assets, the whole PH raid was a gamble and the IJN was risking a powerful portion of its fleet. The fear of submarine attacks, carrier attacks and attacks by land based air that was no longer surprised was weighing heavily on the minds of all the IJN commanders. PH had succeeded to a large degree in their opinions. They had to decide was it worth risking losses in the hope of nailing a US carrier. Suppose they do sink Lexington and Enterprise, but lose Akagi and Kaga? How wins in that scenario? The IJN could not afford to swap ships one on one with the USN at any point in the war. This is not like 1944 when a powerful mobile US carrier based fleet could operate in contested waters for months at a time. The IJN put a lot of eggs in one basket and was not going to risk losing them. While Yamamoto expected to lose a carrier in the PH raid, this was predicated on nailing two or more US carriers. When that doesn't occur, the risk becomes too great, at least in my opinion.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I found that odd also.. the force arrayed against a silly insignificant island called Midway was around 50% greater in CV strength and around 200% more in surface action strength (rough guess) of that sent to a strategic naval base.. Pearl Harbor. One is nothing more then air base on a pile of sand and the other is the key USN naval base in the Pacific. Lack of strategic planning maybe? However, invading Hawaii, as was planned for Midway, was out of the question due to logistical support reasons. What they needed to do was what they did to Darwin.. bomb the crap out of anything and everything at Pearl for around 1-3 days and hopefully draw out the USN CVs to get waxed. That was the ONLY time we did not know where their CVs were going. Boy.. lots of what ifs here.. geez.. I wonder where this thread will go? ;) Good one Dennis. LOL!

Thanks.

Hi NWS,

The purpose of the Hawaii Operation wwas to neutralize the US fleet protecting the left flank ofth move flank of the move south. With the exception of the battle line, the rest of the IJN was committed to supporting the Army. Even though realtively small in numbers of ships, Nagumo had the bulk of the IJN's striking power with him. Neither Yamamoto or the naval staff foresaw the possibility of Nagumo being able lurk in the area several days to exploit his advantage, they depended on their submarines to sink escaping USN ships in the area. They failed, but Nagumo had superior scouting and striking power and could have dominated the area for several days. The risk was higher, but so were the rewards of possibly catching the carriers at sea or in port. I'm sure Yamamoto saw them as the biggest threat to Japanese plans.

[old_pop2000]

Some additional factors that might affect operations at this time. At Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto and Nagumo will be facing Stark, Kimmel, Halsey and Wilson Brown not King, Nimitz, Halsey and Spruance. Another set of players, different experiences and different attitudes. Keep in mind that Kimmel was an aggressive battleship admiral who was a devotee of the aggressive school in War Plan Orange. How does his reaction change the paradigm?

Remember that at Midway, our carriers had 27 fighters per squadron, per carrier. At Pearl Harbor, they only have 18 per squadron, for two ships. Do you think that is going to be enough fighters to protect the carriers and escort the attack aircraft, if the operation comes to that.

If Lexington and Enterprise were to rendevous, they would have 36 fighter-F4F-3's and Buffaloes- to defend the fleet and escort the any attack on the Japanese fleet. At Coral Sea, this number was found to be insufficient, and both squadrons had F4f-3 fighters.
Normally you would have four CAP's on station, with four CAP's on hot standby on the deck. This takes away 8 aircraft from the 36, provided you haven't lost any due to attrition.

One more question. How does Yamamoto sell the idea of a more extensive, decisive campaign to attack Midway, Pearl Harbor versus the hit and run raid concept?

[old_pop2000]

How many ships and which ones could have been spared for an enlarged Pearl Harbor attack force?

Could the Invasion of Guam and Wake have been delayed, to allow for the use of its forces at Pearl Harbor?

What would be the best composition for the two forces. Remember we will have the reinforced First Striking Fleet and the Main Battle fleet led by Nagato and Mutsu.?

Would both forces sail together to arrive at Pearl or would the Main Battle fleet sail a few days behind?

Do the Japanese have enough fleet oilers to satisfy the needs of such a large fleet in December 1941?

[bridav58]

The F4F-3 as delivered by Grumman did not have self sealing tanks or pilot armor. The pilot armor was fashioned from plates at Kanoehe or on the carriers and installed. They were makeshift. Later, rubber fuel bladders were installed. However, at Pearl Harbor, they were not available.

They would not stay around Pearl Harbor. At Pearl, they would have launched three attacks and destroyed the fuel tanks, sub pens and most of the aircraft and fields. They would return northward to join up with the bulk of the Imperial Japanese fleet led by Nagato and Mutsu. The carriers and escorts would refuel, rearm and repair all damaged aircraft then take Midway Island. They might encounter Lexington, as she was delivering fighters. That is generally the way it might have unfolded. There are probably difference scenario's.

I'm just going by what my reference tells me..It lists 5426 lbs. for empty wieght which includes 155 lbs. for armor. It seems to list 285 F4F-3 ,65 F4F-3A, 81 Martlett I(they definately didn't have protected tanks or armor), 100 Martlett II, and 30 Martlett III . Dean says all the ones (except the first 81 delivered to the UK & the 65 F4F-3A which the USMC got) had armor/sealing tanks added in production in his writing part of his book but his tabular part(taken from primary documents just does the wieght loadout of various parts of aircraft . Where does one find info on the USN/USMC adding armor plates at Kanoehe? Just wondering.

[Warship NWS]

Interesting thought here.. would Yamamoto had launched the Pearl Harbor attack if the CVs were NOT based at Pearl Harbor and only battleships were there?

Just something to contemplate when discussing the thought process behind the attack. ;)

[Warship NWS]

As a note, my first reply was more rhetorical then answers. IMHO, Nagumo should have launched a 3rd strike to knock out port facilities as he did at Darwin. He should have also stuck around as long as logisticaly possible to try and knock out the CVs. Dennis got it square on.. our commanders and CVs in that area at the time were not as capable nor as cohesive as what was gathered and planned for during the Coral Sea and Midway operations - we knew we were readying for battle in those cases. Our CVs were MUCH easier targets and not operating together and they would be up against the cream of the IJN pilot ranks and seriously outnumbered and outclassed in terms of planes. The F4F-3s would have done ok with the exception of the pilot training differential but the Devastators with the crappy Mk13 (side note, the TBDs were considered the most advanced torpedo bombers of 1937 .. ironic) and Buffalos would have been near useless. The SBDs would have had to take on the brunt of the 20-40 CAP Zekes almost on their own IMHO and IIRC they were not armored yet.

If the IJN wanted to kill the CVs that badly.. that was their best chance to do so.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

I'm just going by what my reference tells me..It lists 5426 lbs. for empty wieght which includes 155 lbs. for armor. It seems to list 285 F4F-3 ,65 F4F-3A, 81 Martlett I(they definately didn't have protected tanks or armor), 100 Martlett II, and 30 Martlett III . Dean says all the ones (except the first 81 delivered to the UK & the 65 F4F-3A which the USMC got) had armor/sealing tanks added in production in his writing part of his book but his tabular part(taken from primary documents just does the wieght loadout of various parts of aircraft . Where does one find info on the USN/USMC adding armor plates at Kanoehe? Just wondering.

The story is that the east coast squadrons began receiving F4F-3 and -3A's with bladderlike, rubber contraptions that, when installed in the main fuel tanks, offered unparalled fire protectioni, but at the cost of reducing the fuel carried to 144 gallons. This is from page 14 first paragraph.

On the third paragraph, he states that the Grummans did not have factory-installed pilot armor, bullet-proof windscreens, reflector gunsights or self-sealing tanks.

My point is that you are not incorrect totally. The planes were not produced by Grumman with those features. These were added later to enhance the plane. The F4F-4 came equipped from Grumman with all of the above added.

So, for PH attack and any subsequent action, VF-6 on the Enterprise and VF-2 The Rippers, on the lexington would have fought with F4F-3 with none of the above equipment, and the F2A-2,-3 's with VF-2 would fight similarly equipped.

Good research, just trying to help. This is why I brought it up. It may seem like detail, but for the PH action it is critical. Those planes would have been very vulnerable. You can't take information from Coral Sea and apply it. Those were F4F-4's, not the -3 of PH timeframe.

[Warship NWS]

Slight follow up, as I mentioned my first reply was more rhetorical then answers.. IMHO again.. the IJN attack force during the PH operation was more then sufficient to destroy both Pearl Harbor and to search for the missing CVs. Their naval striking power was easily 4-6 times greater then our own available CVs combined. The flip side, we went to Midway with 3 CVs, a few CRs, and a handfull of DDs and won vs a much larger armada. It was all up to the striking power of the CVs and since invading Hawaii was out of the question they did not need anything more then a core CV strike force. If they intended to bombard, which the IJN never proved very good at, the Kongo class of BCs and maybe a couple of CAs would have sufficed. It is just ironic that the Japanese launched such a large armada vs a spit of sand in the middle of the ocean that had no strategic importance and a far smaller force vs the most strategic naval base in the Pacific for the USN.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Just some other considerations.

Yamamoto has always been considered a gambler. The PH operation was a bold stroke for the IJN, considering that its higher echelons of command were conservative. It took a man with his gambling nature, as history tells us, to make this operation a reality. It took the IJN high commands respect for Yamamoto and his abilities for them to approve such a risky plan. To send their most powerful long range naval strike force, 3000 miles to hit the US Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor took some real quantum leaps in their strategic and tactical thinking. Of course, they had Taranto as an example, but the Italian fleet and it leaders were not the US Pacific Fleet led by Admiral Kimmel. Remember also, that the Japanese naval leaders believed they had the best aircraft and pilots. These men had experience in China. However, land attacks against Chinese pilots and Russian aircraft is not the same as flying against the US Naval air force.

My point is that it was a big stretch for the IJN leaders to allow this operation to move forward, so how much more was possible to get out of them. Could Yamamoto's reputation stretch far enough to allow him to sell the idea of a major, combat operation like an extended Pearl Harbor Attack using forces from the Guam and Wake Island invasion along with the remaining battleships at Hashirajima. Understand, this major upgrade to the Pearl Harbor operation is going to require more fuel from the already dwindling Naval surplus. The actual Midway operation used one year's worth of fuel from the surplus, for no gains and just losses. They bought off on the Midway attack only after the success at Pearl Harbor and the first months of the war.

Would they buy off on a massive upgrade to the Pearl Harbor Attack, on just their faith in the CinC, Combined Fleet and his staff. Would Yamamoto's gambling nature allow him to risk such an attack? These questions would have to be answered.

[robdab]

You do realize gents, that you'll soon be discussing an AH Japanese invasion of Hawaii, don't you ? The seed has been planted ... and now you all stand "at the top of a slippery slope", "looking down the road to hell", "that is paved with good intentions".

I'm lookng forward to this one ...

It took the IJN high commands respect for Yamamoto and his abilities for them to approve such a risky plan. - old pop2000, it wasn't respect at all. It was naked fear. IIRC he threatened to resign, just before the start of a war with the US, if they didn't support his Oahu strike. Power politics at its finest !

[old_pop2000]

It took the IJN high commands respect for Yamamoto and his abilities for them to approve such a risky plan. - old pop2000, it wasn't respect at all. It was naked fear. IIRC he threatened to resign, just before the start of a war with the US, if they didn't support his Oahu strike. Power politics at its finest !

You are correct only partially, however. Nagano did not have to agree. He did so because of Yamamoto's popularity and prestige. It was ultimately his prestige with the rest of the navy that convinced Nagano and the Naval General Staff. In fact, Yamamoto did not give the ultimatum in person, he sent two of his staff officers to layout the plan to Nagano and the Naval staff. They called him after the staff decided against it, and he told them to tell the staff and Nagano that he would resign. They respected his judgement and gave their ok. I think most draw the wrong conclusions about this. It was their respect for his judgment and leadership, that finally gave them the nudge toward the action.

Much of this is from Sadao Asado's From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, Page 281-282

Apparently, the Naval Staff considered this operation a subsidiary operation to delay transpacific advance of the US fleet. However, to Yamamoto it was a major operation intended to bring about a short war. He stated "we must be determined to settle the issue of war on the first day" even though this involved the risk of "the total annihilation" of Japan's air power. Yamamoto, as opposed the Naval staff, believed that this operation should decide the issue of war. This is one reason why I do not understand why he did not throw more weight to the attack and stay around to finish off the carriers and the base completely. His goals seem to be at odds with his implementation.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Interesting thought here.. would Yamamoto had launched the Pearl Harbor attack if the CVs were NOT based at Pearl Harbor and only battleships were there?

Just something to contemplate when discussing the thought process behind the attack. ;)

Chris:

This adds and interesting wrinkle in that who decided what were the most threatening targets at Pearl Harbor? By all accounts Yamamoto did not being initiating the planning for a PH attack until after the successful RN attack at Taranto. He then had the IJN planning staff start tackling the problems, objectives and requirements to carry out such an attack. Would he have advocated a surprise strike without carriers being present? I believe so since the IJN's counter to War Plan Orange envisioned an attritional series of battles as the USN moved across the Pacific to engage the Japanese Fleet. Knowing that if a formal declaration of war is given and if Japan moves against the Philippines and other US possesions, this would give the USN time to gather its forces and begin the steady advance against Japan. So even without the carriers, Yamamoto needs to ensure that no US capital ship fleet can interfere with Japan's plans. The carrier is moving rapidly to the forefront of the main striking force of a navy and Yamamoto's air officers realize this and put their US counterparts at the top of the hit list, but even if the carriers are not present, the IJN has to move since war has been decided upon. Pearl Harbor is a forward fleet base that can serve as a staging point for US operations. Yamamoto has now been handed a powerful finely honed weapon that can neutralize this threat. The gambler in him doubles down and goes for it.

[old_pop2000]

Interesting thought here.. would Yamamoto had launched the Pearl Harbor attack if the CVs were NOT based at Pearl Harbor and only battleships were there?


Absolutely. We have two pieces of information that prove that to us.

1. By 0200 on the morning of 7 December,1941 Yoshikawa had sent his last message to the Tokyo and this was forwarded to Yamamoto. It stated that the carriers were missing. Yamamoto had plenty of time to cancel the attack at that time but did not.

2. From Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3
[quote]The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.


This explicit orders seem to indicate that the order of priority was, in Yamamoto's mind, battleships then carriers. Yoshikawa had been sending reports that the carriers were in and out of Pearl Harbor frequently. In fact, early reports during the week did confirm that both ships had left port. The last message only confirmed that they had not arrived back. Yet, Yamamoto never changed the orders or cancelled and ordered the First Striking fleet to return.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Slight follow up, as I mentioned my first reply was more rhetorical then answers.. IMHO again.. the IJN attack force during the PH operation was more then sufficient to destroy both Pearl Harbor and to search for the missing CVs. Their naval striking power was easily 4-6 times greater then our own available CVs combined. The flip side, we went to Midway with 3 CVs, a few CRs, and a handfull of DDs and won vs a much larger armada. It was all up to the striking power of the CVs and since invading Hawaii was out of the question they did not need anything more then a core CV strike force. If they intended to bombard, which the IJN never proved very good at, the Kongo class of BCs and maybe a couple of CAs would have sufficed. It is just ironic that the Japanese launched such a large armada vs a spit of sand in the middle of the ocean that had no strategic importance and a far smaller force vs the most strategic naval base in the Pacific for the USN.

Thanks.

Chris:

What a difference six months make and a few small scale practice raids, plus some improvements to US Wildcats. We were fast learners if nothing else, or perhaps the smartest personnel were in the aviation arm (if not initially). We still needed far longer to get up to speed in nighttime surface actions and DD tactics.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Slight follow up, as I mentioned my first reply was more rhetorical then answers.. IMHO again.. the IJN attack force during the PH operation was more then sufficient to destroy both Pearl Harbor and to search for the missing CVs. Their naval striking power was easily 4-6 times greater then our own available CVs combined. The flip side, we went to Midway with 3 CVs, a few CRs, and a handfull of DDs and won vs a much larger armada. It was all up to the striking power of the CVs and since invading Hawaii was out of the question they did not need anything more then a core CV strike force. If they intended to bombard, which the IJN never proved very good at, the Kongo class of BCs and maybe a couple of CAs would have sufficed. It is just ironic that the Japanese launched such a large armada vs a spit of sand in the middle of the ocean that had no strategic importance and a far smaller force vs the most strategic naval base in the Pacific for the USN.

Thanks.

Hi NWS,

I think the difference is the the US carriers, not Midway, were the strategic objective for the second operation. Yamamoto had seen what had transpired since Pearl and the failure to get them the first time round. The early raids to keep the Japanese guessing, the psychological slap in the face of the Doolittle Raid, and the set back of Coral Sea which marked the high point of Japanese expansion. Yamamoto had promised he could run wild for 6 months, but couldn't guarantee results afterwards. He was now up against his own deadline and decided to fight the decisive battle off Midway rather than the mandates.

Surely by now, after Pearl Harbor and the Prince of Wales and Repulse, Yamamoto knew that USN battleships were little or no threat to the IJN, only the US carriers. It seems inexplicable that the Japanese forces would be seperated so as not to be mutually supporting and that the passive Nagumo would remain in command of the most powerful element in the Japanese Navy. In this role, you really did want a commander that could be flexible, creative, and be able to go for the juglar.

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=robdab;6735]You do realize gents, that you'll soon be discussing an AH Japanese invasion of Hawaii, don't you ? The seed has been planted ... and now you all stand "at the top of a slippery slope", "looking down the road to hell", "that is paved with good intentions".

I'm lookng forward to this one ...

QUOTE]

Hi:

Trust that will not happen. As we Yanks say "Been there, done that". You might get a rise out of the newer members, but we've been around the block on this topic and are not going to waste time on it. So unless you want to waste your time, don't waste ours OK?:rolleyes:

Respectfully,

You are correct, Ed. I never started this thread to discuss staying around to bomb Pearl Harbor back to the stone age. However, the NWS director has suggested that, and its worth discussing, if you wish. My point in bringing this up is simply that based on what Asado states Yamamoto's goal was, to end the war on the first day, why not send the bulk of the fleet and go after Midway and the carriers. Why not use the goals of Operation MI at Pearl Harbor? If ending the war on the first day was the goal, then sending the bulk of the fleet to destroy as much of the facilities as can be reached at PH and the US carriers along with the "Gibraltar of the Pacific" seems to be consistent. This is not fantasy, as such. It is simply asking why not combine the two operational goals at Pearl Harbor. All the advantages sought at Midway, were present at Pearl Harbor except one carrier.

I agree, let's not get into invading the islands, we and Harry Turtledove have beat that subject to death.

[Warship NWS]

You do realize gents, that you'll soon be discussing an AH Japanese invasion of Hawaii, don't you ? The seed has been planted ... and now you all stand "at the top of a slippery slope", "looking down the road to hell", "that is paved with good intentions".


I think I was pretty clear that an invasion of Hawaii was out of the question. Logistically the IJN was in no way capable of launching, much less maintaining, a worthwhile amphibious assault on Hawaii.. they proved that with their less then glowing achievements against far less defended and easier to reach locations. Assaulting Hawaii would have cost them resources and ships they could not afford to lose for gains that would have been very short lived - in essence at most a Pyhrric minor tactical short lived victory, at worst a tragic defeat that could well have accelerated their losing the Pacific theater of war.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

I think I was pretty clear that an invasion of Hawaii was out of the question. Logistically the IJN was in no way capable of launching, much less maintaining, a worthwhile amphibious assault on Hawaii.. they proved that with their less then glowing achievements against far less defended and easier to reach locations. Assaulting Hawaii would have cost them resources and ships they could not afford to lose for gains that would have been very short lived - in essence at most a Pyhrric minor tactical short lived victory, at worst a tragic defeat that could well have accelerated their losing the Pacific theater of war.

Thanks.

Totally agree. It is the old idea of balancing what you win by what you will lose. Acceptable risk versus reward. Which, as you and I are aware, is a cornerstone of military planning.

[Warship NWS]

You are correct, Ed. I never started this thread to discuss staying around to bomb Pearl Harbor back to the stone age. However, the NWS director has suggested that, and its worth discussing, if you wish.


Not entirely correct. I stated a 3rd strike to try and do significant damage to the port facilities as was done at Darwin in the initial 2-3 strikes that were launched against that port on 2/19/42. The Japanese CV strike force had enough logistics IMHO to hit the port with a 3rd strike in an attempt to try and do strategic damage before leaving then possibly sail for an additional 1-2 days to try and hit the CVs if they could find them - this was their greatest chance of killing the CVs with minimal risk of air attacks on themselves. Anything beyond that I think would have jeopardized their successful return to base due to logistical constraints.

[old_pop2000]

Not entirely correct. I stated a 3rd strike to try and do significant damage to the port facilities as was done at Darwin in the initial 2-3 strikes that were launched against that port on 2/19/42. The Japanese CV strike force had enough logistics IMHO to hit the port with a 3rd strike in an attempt to try and do strategic damage before leaving then possibly sail for an additional 1-2 days to try and hit the CVs if they could find them - this was their greatest chance of killing the CVs with minimal risk of air attacks on themselves. Anything beyond that I think would have jeopardized their successful return to base due to logistical constraints.


"bomb the crap out of anything and everything at Pearl for around 1-3 days and hopefully draw out the USN CVs to get waxed"

Did I misinterpret the meaning of the above sentence?

[Warship NWS]

I might be going against the grain of what most of you might think but I believe that Yamamoto was after the USN CVs more then the BBs at Pearl Harbor. As I like to say, actions speak louder then words, and if one reads between the lines here it should be noted that he took the largest gamble of the history of the IJN by using the most potent attack ships in their arsenal.. the CVs. I do not believe this was just due to the fact they were attacking a port, but because there was nothing more potent for attacking warships. If this is the case then can one not assume that if he considered the CVs the most lethal warships for attacking other warships that the same respect for our own CVs would not be in play? The attack profiles of the aircraft did include targets on both sides of Ford Island.. and did include the specific moorings that were used for the CVs Saratoga and Enterprise.. on that date the Utah and California were there instead and both were hit by torpedoes. Now, we can debate this until the end of time as no one can state for 100% certainty what he was thinking at the time and CVs had not yet proven themselves in naval combat.. but the potential was certainly in the minds of CV minded admirals. I believe that both the CVs and BBs were primary targets, regardless of the reasons, and that the attack on PH would not have taken place if the CVs were not based there. I am sure the Japanese knew that even with the attack on Toranto the BBs could possibly be repaired, as was done by the Italians, so sinking them at sea would mean they would never be repaired. The problem here however is that they failed to kill the one thing that drove all ships at sea.. the oil tank farms, as we have discussed already - and we have also debated over how the USN would compensate for such damage.

In the end, I do believe that the attack on PH was an attempt to knock out as many capital ships as possible - CVs included - but the CVs being based at PH made such an attack a far better calculated risk then just sinking 1920s battleships that could not even catch any of the IJN warships and that were very vulnerable to air attack.

This is my professional opinion anyways. ;)

[Warship NWS]

Did I misinterpret the meaning of the above sentence?

In my first post on the topic I had stated a 3rd strike, in the second I should have retained the clarity I guess.. the 1-3 days - 3 at most - would be to try and draw out the USN CVs or hunt them down if possible while their chances were the greatest of doing damage to our CVs with minimal risk to their own CVs by air strikes. The main damage done to Darwin was done within 2-3 air strikes... bombing something back to the "stone age", as you stated, would have been impractical, at least significant damage was entirely possible. ;)

[old_pop2000]

In my first post on the topic I had stated a 3rd strike, in the second I should have retained the clarity I guess.. the 1-3 days - 3 at most - would be to try and draw out the USN CVs or hunt them down if possible while their chances were the greatest of doing damage to our CVs with minimal risk to their own CVs by air strikes.


No problem, I thought maybe I missed something or had another senior moment.LOL:D

[old_pop2000]

I might be going against the grain of what most of you might think but I believe that Yamamoto was after the USN CVs more then the BBs at Pearl Harbor. As I like to say, actions speak louder then words, and if one reads between the lines here it should be noted that he took the largest gamble of the history of the IJN by using the most potent attack ships in their arsenal.. the CVs. I do not believe this was just due to the fact they were attacking a port, but because there was nothing more potent for attacking warships. If this is the case then can one not assume that if he considered the CVs the most lethal warships for attacking other warships that the same respect for our own CVs would not be in play? The attack profiles of the aircraft did include targets on both sides of Ford Island.. and did include the specific moorings that were used for the CVs Saratoga and Enterprise.. on that date the Utah and California were there instead and both were hit by torpedoes. Now, we can debate this until the end of time as no one can state for 100% certainty what he was thinking at the time and CVs had not yet proven themselves in naval combat.. but the potential was certainly in the minds of CV minded admirals. I believe that both the CVs and BBs were primary targets, regardless of the reasons, and that the attack on PH would not have taken place if the CVs were not based there. I am sure the Japanese knew that even with the attack on Toranto the BBs could possibly be repaired, as was done by the Italians, so sinking them at sea would mean they would never be repaired. The problem here however is that they failed to kill the one thing that drove all ships at sea.. the oil tank farms, as we have discussed already - and we have also debated over how the USN would compensate for such damage.

In the end, I do believe that the attack on PH was an attempt to knock out as many capital ships as possible - CVs included - but the CVs being based at PH made such an attack a far better calculated risk then just sinking 1920s battleships that could not even catch any of the IJN warships and that were very vulnerable to air attack.

This is my professional opinion anyways. ;)


While I did post the actual battle orders, I have to agree in some respects. It is possible that the orders could be interpreted to mean they were of equal priority. However, once the orders were written and sent out, the picture could have changed. Our problem is that we only have what was written, as evidence. It is a little vague, in some respects. I am not certain it is that important. I still feel that the attack was going forward unless the US decided to start discussions again.

[Warship NWS]

I still feel that the attack was going forward unless the US decided to start discussions again.


On that I agree, with this to be included.. when the USN Pacific Fleet was moved to PH this included the CVs, not just the BBs. If it was just the BBs.. then I think an alternative plan would have been considered. Both Enterprise (Adm. Halsey) and Lexington (RAdm. Newton) were being operated in the Pacific with PH as their main base. Saratoga was on her way to PH at that time.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

On that I agree, with this to be included.. when the USN Pacific Fleet was moved to PH this included the CVs, not just the BBs. If it was just the BBs.. then I think an alternative plan would have been considered. Both Enterprise (RAdm. Halsey) and Lexington (RAdm. Newton) were being operated in the Pacific with PH as their main base. Saratoga was on her way to PH at that time.

Thanks.


Based on what Asado tells us about discussions and Yamamoto, he wanted the whole fleet. If the carriers were not there, he might have changed it, but I seriously doubt it. I believe he would have gone forth but with a contingency plan in case the carriers show up. The next problem is how does he verify that the carriers have moved or not moved from the coast? Does Yoshikawa get instructions to examine that possibility and verify. I wonder if they send an agent or diplomat to the West Coast to determine this. In my view, Yamamoto must have firm intelligence as to where the carriers are home based. He must know for certain.

[Warship NWS]

Based on what Asado tells us about discussions and Yamamoto, he wanted the whole fleet. If the carriers were not there, he might have changed it, but I seriously doubt it. I believe he would have gone forth but with a contingency plan in case the carriers show up. The next problem is how does he verify that the carriers have moved or not moved from the coast? Does Yoshikawa get instructions to examine that possibility and verify. I wonder if they send an agent or diplomat to the West Coast to determine this. In my view, Yamamoto must have firm intelligence as to where the carriers are home based. He must know for certain.

Adm. Yamamoto may have felt there was no choice but to go with the plan due to the nature of the political considerations at that time - if war is coming might has do what you can when you can. If your going to attack .. take your best chances to knock out whatever you can when you get there - the most strategic *known* base in the Pacific was Pearl Harbor. Better to have some chance of killing CVs then no chance at all. I still believe though that if the CVs were not operating out of PH at all then another target or alternate plan to lure the CVs into action would have been considered, if logistically feasible.

[old_pop2000]

Adm. Yamamoto may have felt there was no choice but to go with the plan due to the nature of the political considerations at that time - if war is coming might has do what you can when you can. If your going to attack .. take your best chances to knock out whatever you can when you get there - the most strategic *known* base in the Pacific was Pearl Harbor. Better to have some chance of killing CVs then no chance at all. I still believe though that if the CVs were not operating out of PH at all then another target or alternate plan to lure the CVs into action would have been considered, if logistically feasible.

What target is valuable enough for the US fleet to risk their carriers is the question that has to answered. If the carriers are on the coast, it's going to take them, minimum seven days to reach Pearl. Sara did it in seven days, from December 8th to December 15th and she and her sister were faster than Enterprise. See the problem. If they are on the coast or even patroling the coast, it takes them seven days to get close to Pearl Harbor.

Do the Japanese sit and wait for seven days, running out of fuel and being stalked by US submarines. Do they send their I boats to pick off the carriers on their speed trip to Pearl. Lots of unanswered questions.

[bridav58]

The story is that the east coast squadrons began receiving F4F-3 and -3A's with bladderlike, rubber contraptions that, when installed in the main fuel tanks, offered unparalled fire protectioni, but at the cost of reducing the fuel carried to 144 gallons. This is from page 14 first paragraph.

On the third paragraph, he states that the Grummans did not have factory-installed pilot armor, bullet-proof windscreens, reflector gunsights or self-sealing tanks.

My point is that you are not incorrect totally. The planes were not produced by Grumman with those features. These were added later to enhance the plane. The F4F-4 came equipped from Grumman with all of the above added.

So, for PH attack and any subsequent action, VF-6 on the Enterprise and VF-2 The Rippers, on the lexington would have fought with F4F-3 with none of the above equipment, and the F2A-2,-3 's with VF-2 would fight similarly equipped.

Good research, just trying to help. This is why I brought it up. It may seem like detail, but for the PH action it is critical. Those planes would have been very vulnerable. You can't take information from Coral Sea and apply it. Those were F4F-4's, not the -3 of PH timeframe.


The Enterprise on 12/7/41 was carrying F4F-3A's which didn't have armor or self sealing fuel tanks as per Lundstrom. Grumman produced 285 F4F-3's, 65 F4F-3A's(which went to the Enterprise & USMC), 81 Martlett I's (which went to the UK and didn;t have any protection either) , 100 Martlett II's of which 90 had folding wings & protection as requested by the UK , and 30 Martlett III's which were a Greek order siezed by the UK (and also had armor and self seal tanks as requested by the UK). However Francis Dean is quite clear that the 285 of model F4F-3 had factory installed armor, bullett proof windshileds and self sealing tanks.
I don't know Dennis I mean Lundstrom and Dean both use primary documents for the most part. I'm pretty sure more people have heard of Lundstrom then Dean of course people are going to be more interested in actual action rather then the more technical natured stuff. Just MHO though. I've always relied on Lundstrom for the operational issues & Dean the more technical stuff.
Now on Coral Sea the Yorktown & Lexington both had F4F-3's at that battle as per page 190 of Lundstrom's "First Team" . It seems even the unarmored types didn't do too badly early in the war before they were upgraded with armor and protected tanks. In First Team VF-2 & VF-42 pilots thought the F4F-3 every bit the equal in speed & climb to the Zero(page 300-301) being superior in firepower & protection. If the F4F-3's at Coral Sea could equal the Zero in speed & climb then the lighter unprotected F4F-3A's would do even better in those areas.

[bridav58]

What target is valuable enough for the US fleet to risk their carriers is the question that has to answered. If the carriers are on the coast, it's going to take them, minimum seven days to reach Pearl. Sara did it in seven days, from December 8th to December 15th and she and her sister were faster than Enterprise. See the problem. If they are on the coast or even patroling the coast, it takes them seven days to get close to Pearl Harbor.

Do the Japanese sit and wait for seven days, running out of fuel and being stalked by US submarines. Do they send their I boats to pick off the carriers on their speed trip to Pearl. Lots of unanswered questions.

Dennis,
Was Saratoga pushing it though? or just going cruising speed?

[old_pop2000]

Is there an archive section to this board where I might bask in your past collective wisdom on the topic ? I looked briefly but didn't notice anything standing out wrt that.


For clarification, the old forum was lost for some reason. The director can, if he choses illuminate the issue more. Suffice it to say, this is a new forum however, most of us who have been on the NWS forum have discussed this scenario either as its own thread or in the context of other threads, numerous times. We, like other forums, tend to shy away from the subjects that we have explored in detail many times. This is just my personal opinion, I do not speak for the forum or its director.

[Warship NWS]

Regarding the old forums,

The old forums were lost due to a server failure. Sorry, but we do not have the archives for those old forums. As to the invasion of Hawaii, the general consensus is simple.. it was not logistically possible for the IJN to launch and maintain such an invasion and the cost would far outweigh any gains if it was attempted.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

What target is valuable enough for the US fleet to risk their carriers is the question that has to answered. If the carriers are on the coast, it's going to take them, minimum seven days to reach Pearl. Sara did it in seven days, from December 8th to December 15th and she and her sister were faster than Enterprise. See the problem. If they are on the coast or even patroling the coast, it takes them seven days to get close to Pearl Harbor.

Do the Japanese sit and wait for seven days, running out of fuel and being stalked by US submarines. Do they send their I boats to pick off the carriers on their speed trip to Pearl. Lots of unanswered questions.

I think we covered this one on the phone.. The Ent. and Lex. were both stationed out of PH not CA. The Sara. was on her way there. This is just in case I missed something here.. still catching up on my posts and emails. ;)

[old_pop2000]

I think we covered this one on the phone.. The Ent. and Lex. were both stationed out of PH not CA. The Sara. was on her way there. This is just in case I missed something here.. still catching up on my posts and emails. ;)

We're cool. On May 1st, 1940, the fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor over the objections of Admiral Richardson, strenuous objections, I might add.

[old_pop2000]

I think we covered this one on the phone.. The Ent. and Lex. were both stationed out of PH not CA. The Sara. was on her way there. This is just in case I missed something here.. still catching up on my posts and emails. ;)

Clarification. When Pearl was struck, Sara was off of San Diego doing carrier quals. She had just come down from Bremerton and refit. She did not head to Pearl until the morning of the 8th, 1941. She berthed at NI, refuel, revictualed and off loaded some peacetime, unnecessary equipment and left the next morning to join Enterprise at Wake, with a stop at Pearl for refuel.

[Ed Rotondaro]

We're cool. On May 1st, 1940, the fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor over the objections of Admiral Richardson, strenuous objections, I might add.

Dennis:

Was the admiral more concerned that Pearl Harbor was not ready at that time to act as a fleet base, or that the fleet could not be adequately supported that far from the West Coast?

[Ed Rotondaro]

[quote=Ed Rotondaro;6742]

Oh come on Ed you grump you, if they want to spend time on Pearl Harbor invasions it's their time to spend! Ya can't expect all subjects already covered by us long time residents to never crop up again! :p

Kyle:

Why don't you start a thread on that then?;) I'm sure there are new members who would love to discuss it.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Was the admiral more concerned that Pearl Harbor was not ready at that time to act as a fleet base, or that the fleet could not be adequately supported that far from the West Coast?


According to Richardson, it was both. He felt the facilities were not capable of supporting the fleet adequately. When Sara was torpedoed the first time, she had to return to Bremerton to repair and refit. The next time, she was able to return to Pearl for those same repairs. Enterprise was able to return their after her bomb hits.

He also felt the base was not adequately equipped for defense. The radar network and fighter direction center were not installed and tested. There were not enough patrol aircraft available. He listed many different items that he felt precluded the base from adequately protecting and supporting the fleet. I would have to read through the commission reports again, I think it is all in there.

However, IIRC, even in commission hearings, Richardson stated that it would not have made any difference whether the fleet was at Puget Sound or Pearl, the Japanese attack was well planned and a surprise.

[Ed Rotondaro]

According to Richardson, it was both. He felt the facilities were not capable of supporting the fleet adequately. When Sara was torpedoed the first time, she had to return to Bremerton to repair and refit. The next time, she was able to return to Pearl for those same repairs. Enterprise was able to return their after her bomb hits.

He also felt the base was not adequately equipped for defense. The radar network and fighter direction center were not installed and tested. There were not enough patrol aircraft available. He listed many different items that he felt precluded the base from adequately protecting and supporting the fleet. I would have to read through the commission reports again, I think it is all in there.

However, IIRC, even in commission hearings, Richardson stated that it would not have made any difference whether the fleet was at Puget Sound or Pearl, the Japanese attack was well planned and a surprise.

Dennis:

Thanks for the details. Regarding Pearl Harbor's defenses, they were in the process of continually being expanded and augmented, especially coastal artillery wise. There is an Osprey Fortification book covering this and even in late 1943, with the IJN on the run, the USN and Army felt the need to continue to add to PH's defenses. They salvaged one of the 14" turrets from the Oklahoma and put it into service as a shore based battery. of course all the coastal artillery in the world is no defense against an air attack, although it would deter any attempted invasion (Only a fool attacks a fortress as Nelson once said).

Would the IJN have attacked the West Coast if the Pacific Fleet was not based at Pearl Harbor? That could make for a discussion on its own.:cool:

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Thanks for the details. Regarding Pearl Harbor's defenses, they were in the process of continually being expanded and augmented, especially coastal artillery wise. There is an Osprey Fortification book covering this and even in late 1943, with the IJN on the run, the USN and Army felt the need to continue to add to PH's defenses. They salvaged one of the 14" turrets from the Oklahoma and put it into service as a shore based battery. of course all the coastal artillery in the world is no defense against an air attack, although it would deter any attempted invasion (Only a fool attacks a fortress as Nelson once said).

Would the IJN have attacked the West Coast if the Pacific Fleet was not based at Pearl Harbor? That could make for a discussion on its own.:cool:

It certainly would. I wonder about the fuel situation. In other words, the number of tankers available to make the journey, plus the coastal traffic would be a problem. Yea, this could be the proverbial bucket of worms. I've read the limited preview on Google Books. It's got some neat drawings and pictures.

[Warship NWS]

Clarification. When Pearl was struck, Sara was off of San Diego doing carrier quals. She had just come down from Bremerton and refit. She did not head to Pearl until the morning of the 8th, 1941. She berthed at NI, refuel, revictualed and off loaded some peacetime, unnecessary equipment and left the next morning to join Enterprise at Wake, with a stop at Pearl for refuel.

Ok.. so that eliminates Sara from the possibility of being attacked. I did note that the 2nd wave was priorities to 4-5 CVs (showing they did not have exact numbers of CVs via intel) and that the pre-attack recon units were prioritized to try and locate the "chiefly CVs" and the "main body of the fleet".

Basically, it was a somewhat, and to a point - vague, mixed bag of priority targeted naval units. The CVs were mentioned in the first wave after battleships and for the second wave before battleships. I do not think that on the orders alone we can state with 100% certainty that the BBs vs CVs were the priority capital ship targets of the strike, in essence, IMHO they were *possibly* equal. So the big question comes down to would they have planned and sent out the task force for the attack if the CVs were NOT part of the Pacific fleet located at PH? Once they were already deployed, and after war was deemed imminent, I think it was a situation of - might as well hit what they can at that point while either of the priority targets were vulnerable. A lot of interpretation of what information is available here.. and we lack one key ingredient.. what Yamamoto was thinking at the time in specific detail.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Ok.. so that eliminates Sara from the possibility of being attacked. I did note that the 2nd wave was priorities to 4-5 CVs (showing they did not have exact numbers of CVs via intel) and that the pre-attack recon units were prioritized to try and locate the "chiefly CVs" and the "main body of the fleet".

Basically, it was a somewhat, and to a point - vague, mixed bag of priority targeted naval units. The CVs were mentioned in the first wave after battleships and for the second wave before battleships. I do not think that on the orders alone we can state with 100% certainty that the BBs or CVs were the priority capital ship targets of the strike, in essence, IMHO they were *possibly* equal. In the end, I do not think that the orders alone give us the final answers. So the big question comes down to would they have planned and sent out the task force for the attack if the CVs were NOT part of the Pacific fleet located at PH? Once they were already deployed, and after war was deemed imminent, I think it was a situation of - might as well hit what they can at that point while either of the priority targets were vulnerable. A lot of interpretation of what information is available here.. and we lack one key ingredient.. what Yamamoto was thinking at the time in specific detail.

Thanks.


I agree, we can only attempt to read the original orders and books. There is a book called The Pearl Harbor Papers by Goldstein, Dillon and Prange. Another on the Ugaki diaries. Ugaki was Yamamoto's chief of staff. I don't know how much information can be gleaned from the official history written in Japan. We are left to speculate based on limited information and conflicting testimony from other Japanese. We are also hampered or aided, by 20/20 hindsight to cloud our judgement.

[john964]

Dennis:

Thanks for the details. Regarding Pearl Harbor's defenses, they were in the process of continually being expanded and augmented, especially coastal artillery wise. There is an Osprey Fortification book covering this and even in late 1943, with the IJN on the run, the USN and Army felt the need to continue to add to PH's defenses. They salvaged one of the 14" turrets from the Oklahoma and put it into service as a shore based battery. of course all the coastal artillery in the world is no defense against an air attack, although it would deter any attempted invasion (Only a fool attacks a fortress as Nelson once said).

Would the IJN have attacked the West Coast if the Pacific Fleet was not based at Pearl Harbor? That could make for a discussion on its own.:cool:
Ed, I think the guns came from Arizona. IIRC Oklahoma was not rolled upright till mid to late 44. IIRC the battery in question was not completed untill after the war had ended also I think the battery was instaled on Diomend Head.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I agree, we can only attempt to read the original orders and books. There is a book called The Pearl Harbor Papers by Goldstein, Dillon and Prange. Another on the Ugaki diaries. Ugaki was Yamamoto's chief of staff. I don't know how much information can be gleaned from the official history written in Japan. We are left to speculate based on limited information and conflicting testimony from other Japanese. We are also hampered or aided, by 20/20 hindsight to cloud our judgement.

Hi Dennis,

I just ordered a copy of at "Dawn We Slept" by Prange. The book your talking about was printed by his research assistants after his death. The documents were described as compelling and the only available sourse in English., but still doesn not address some of our questions as many other documents were destroyed and many of the key participants did not survive the war.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I just ordered a copy of at "Dawn We Slept" by Prange. The book your talking about was printed by his research assistants after his death. The documents were described as compelling and the only available sourse in English., but still doesn not address some of our questions as many other documents were destroyed and many of the key participants did not survive the war.

I probably should collect a reading list of books for us all to us. I will let you know about God's Samurai by the same authors. It about Mitsuo Fuchida. I have Dr. Goldstein's email address.

There is also a book entitled "The Pearl Harbor Papers" by the same authors and Fading Victory about Ugaki.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, I think the guns came from Arizona. IIRC Oklahoma was not rolled upright till mid to late 44. IIRC the battery in question was not completed untill after the war had ended also I think the battery was instaled on Diomend Head.


John:

You are correct, the turret, one of two came from the Arizona. One was positioned at Kaneohe Bay and named battery Pennsylvania after the Arizona's sister ship. The other was on the weatern side of the island near Kahe Point and named Battery Arizona but was not completed in time before the end of the war. That's what happens when you post from work and don't have your books nearby. Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

John:

You are correct, the turret, one of two came from the Arizona. One was positioned at Kaneohe Bay and named battery Pennsylvania after the Arizona's sister ship. The other was on the weatern side of the island near Kahe Point and named Battery Arizona but was not completed in time before the end of the war. That's what happens when you post from work and don't have your books nearby. Thanks.

You know that some of the guns for the forts were from the Saratoga.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You know that some of the guns for the forts were from the Saratoga.

Dennis:

Yes the 8" guns that were landed when replaced by 5" DP guns. Nice to reuse them for the cause so to speak.

[john964]

John:

You are correct, the turret, one of two came from the Arizona. One was positioned at Kaneohe Bay and named battery Pennsylvania after the Arizona's sister ship. The other was on the weatern side of the island near Kahe Point and named Battery Arizona but was not completed in time before the end of the war. That's what happens when you post from work and don't have your books nearby. Thanks.IIRC the guns for turret 1 are still there the guns for turrets 2 and 3 were used for batteries PA and AZ and the guns from turret 4 were used for replacement guns on Nevada and Penn.

[Ed Rotondaro]

IIRC the guns for turret 1 are still there the guns for turrets 2 and 3 were used for batteries PA and AZ and the guns from turret 4 were used for replacement guns on Nevada and Penn.

John:

A case of waste not want not so to speak? War time makes a nation think on its feet (one would hope).

[john964]

John:

A case of waste not want not so to speak? War time makes a nation think on its feet (one would hope).
From what I understand the US was no longer manufacturing 14in guns of that type is the reason why also IIRC several of the gun from OK were installed on other old BB's after they rolled her uprite.