Oil tanks & Pearl Harbor....

[bridav58]

Just how hard would it have been for Nagumo to take out Pearl Harbor's oil tank farm? That could have been devastating to the Pacific Fleet loosing it's oil supplies.

[old_pop2000]

Just how hard would it have been for Nagumo to take out Pearl Harbor's oil tank farm? That could have been devastating to the Pacific Fleet loosing it's oil supplies.
Well, the above ground fuel tanks at Pearl Harbor stored approximately 4.5 million barrels of oil. They had been just refilled. The Navy oil tankers had a combined capacity of 760,000 barrels of oil. There were ten tanks in the upper farm and six in the lower. At the time of Pearl Harbor, two oil tankers were in Pearl, three at sea, six were on the West Coast. Of those eleven tankers, only four were capable of at-sea refueling. In the first nine days of the war, the Pacific Fleet expended 750,000 barrels of oil.

There was under construction the Red Hill Fuel Storage tanks in Pearl. The project started on Christmas,1940 and was not finished until September 1943. This project consisted of 20 cylindrical tanks, 250 ft high, 100 ft in diameter. It had a design capacity of 6 million barrels of oil. The fuel farm is on Highway 3 near Halawa Farms. They were built underground in basalt rock.

As to whether those large tanks could be hit, John Ford had movies of the air attack on Sand Island with B5N2 hitting small fuel tanks. If they could hit those tanks, I see no reason they could not hit the big tanks at Pearl. However, we know that Kido Butai had trouble destroying the fuel tanks on Trincomalee, Ceylon a few months later. It finally took a kamikaze style attack to finally hit one. Size unknown. My guess would be that using the 20 mm incendiary bullets or small bombs, the Japanese could have easily destroyed those large tanks. Twelve Kates swung in from the Southeast directly over the tank farm, Merry Point and the environs in lining up to launch their torpedoes at the battleships located on the south side of battleship row. They would have flown right over the top of those two tank farms.

That's the best I can do without researching in the books or internet.

[fred8615]

I've heard the Japanese didn't even bother with the oil tanks at PH because they thought they were decoys. Nobody in their right mind would have military fuel in above ground tanks!

[Ed Rotondaro]

I've heard the Japanese didn't even bother with the oil tanks at PH because they thought they were decoys. Nobody in their right mind would have military fuel in above ground tanks!


Fred:

Actually Genda, the air ops officer for Nagumo begged him to launch a third strike to take out the tanks and the repair facilities at Pearl. Nagumo not being an air officer was too worried about sticking around any longer and noted that the US was more prepared. Most of the aircraft the IJN lost at Pearl were lost on the second strike so he may have had a point. Also Halsey was returning to Pearl and might have possibly been able to launch a strike against the IJN. Personally I think a third strike should have been launched. Unless the IJN was low on ordanance, it could have fought off any USN surface force that was available.

[bridav58]

Fred:

Actually Genda, the air ops officer for Nagumo begged him to launch a third strike to take out the tanks and the repair facilities at Pearl. Nagumo not being an air officer was too worried about sticking around any longer and noted that the US was more prepared. Most of the aircraft the IJN lost at Pearl were lost on the second strike so he may have had a point. Also Halsey was returning to Pearl and might have possibly been able to launch a strike against the IJN. Personally I think a third strike should have been launched. Unless the IJN was low on ordanance, it could have fought off any USN surface force that was available.

I don't think there was enough time to ready a 3rd. strike plus I have seen some evidence that Nagumo also had quite a few aircraft damaged in addition to the 29 aircraft he outright lost over Pearl Harbor so maybe that entered into his decision. If I'm not wrong it was something like 80-100 a/c damaged.

[old_pop2000]

I don't think there was enough time to ready a 3rd. strike plus I have seen some evidence that Nagumo also had quite a few aircraft damaged in addition to the 29 aircraft he outright lost over Pearl Harbor so maybe that entered into his decision. If I'm not wrong it was something like 80-100 a/c damaged.
A third strike was not entirely necessary, just a reinforced second strike with realignment of targeting. The second strike was launched at 0855 consisted of 54 type 97 horizontal bombers whose target was Hickam, Kanaohe, Ewa fields, 81 Type 99 dive bombers for attacking carriers, cruisers ( With no carriers present, a fact known by 0200 Hawaii time, these aircraft could have been retargeted to hit the sub base and fuel tanks), 36 type Zero fighters for strafing airfields, 54 aircraft for CAP with 36 still fueled and in the hangers and deck ready for launch. Nine per carrier.

From the above, I see no reason a second strike could not have been retargeted after the message from Tokyo informed the strike group that the carriers were absent from the harbor. The second attack group could easily have hit those tanks as they came in from the southeast over Hickam and Fuel tanks. The dive bombers flew over it, the horizontal bombers flew over Hickam coming from the southeast, with the fuel tanks in sight, dead ahead of them. This error is probably was Mitsuo Fuchida's, as he was in continuous observation of all attacks and was, in fact, the last aircraft to leave the Pearl Harbor area after the attack. He could have redirected the second attack group, himself, in the air to the new targeting. He did not need Admiral Nagumo's permission for the targeting change.

[old_pop2000]

Fuchida, the attack group leader, was over PH for over two hours. His responsibility was to manage the battle. He could see the carriers were not in the harbor, which left some of the dive bombers and horizontal bombers without targets. They were detailed to find and strike any undamaged ship. Many were carrying small bombs that were not capable of damaging armored warships. After Fuchida returns, he can't understand why a third strike hasn't been ordered and he assails Nagumo along with Genda, asking why. Here is my question.

Fuchida was onscene battle commander. He had radio contact with Shimazaki, the Second attack group leader coming in after launching one hour behind the first. By one hour later, Fuchida saw and understood the importance of the sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub base. The first attack group torpedo bombers, 12 in all, had turned directly over them. Why didn't he contact Shimazaki and order him to detail those aircraft designated to bomb carriers to bomb and destroy of sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub pens. If he was so sure those tanks were important, why not manage the battle properly. He did not need a third strike or the permission of Nagumo or Genda. This, IMHO, is poor leadership and poor battle management by Commander Fuchida. He was detailed to destroy any and all ships and functions that could pose a threat to the Japanese southern operations, and the fuel oil in those tanks certainly was a vital target in that vain. Even if he wasn't certain there was fuel in them, the mere presence of the tanks should have made them a target. One or two 500 LB. HE bombs could have set the mess afire along with a few strafing runs from the Zero's carrying 20mm incendiary bullets. Nimitz himself stated that only a few .50 cal. machine gun bullets could have ignited the whole mess.

To me, Fuchida and Genda making claims that their commander, Nagumo, failed to take action is bogus. It was Fuchida's error in judgement and poor battle manangement that caused the failure. Nagumo had to consider the possible loss of the vital carriers, against those tanks and other targets. I believe, considering what he knew and what he did not know, he made cautious decision. Right or wrong, Fuchida and Shimazaki were controlling the attack, not Nagumo or Genda. This is again, an area where the surviving members of a losing nation can write history, and I have never seen any US historian or aviation expert examine or even bring this type of battle management up in any account.

[paladin5]

Fuchida, the attack group leader, was over PH for over two hours. His responsibility was to manage the battle. He could see the carriers were not in the harbor, which left some of the dive bombers and horizontal bombers without targets. They were detailed to find and strike any undamaged ship. Many were carrying small bombs that were not capable of damaging armored warships. After Fuchida returns, he can't understand why a third strike hasn't been ordered and he assails Nagumo along with Genda, asking why. Here is my question.

Fuchida was onscene battle commander. He had radio contact with Shimazaki, the Second attack group leader coming in after launching one hour behind the first. By one hour later, Fuchida saw and understood the importance of the sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub base. The first attack group torpedo bombers, 12 in all, had turned directly over them. Why didn't he contact Shimazaki and order him to detail those aircraft designated to bomb carriers to bomb and destroy of sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub pens. If he was so sure those tanks were important, why not manage the battle properly. He did not need a third strike or the permission of Nagumo or Genda. This, IMHO, is poor leadership and poor battle management by Commander Fuchida. He was detailed to destroy any and all ships and functions that could pose a threat to the Japanese southern operations, and the fuel oil in those tanks certainly was a vital target in that vain. Even if he wasn't certain there was fuel in them, the mere presence of the tanks should have made them a target. One or two 500 LB. HE bombs could have set the mess afire along with a few strafing runs from the Zero's carrying 20mm incendiary bullets. Nimitz himself stated that only a few .50 cal. machine gun bullets could have ignited the whole mess.

To me, Fuchida and Genda making claims that their commander, Nagumo, failed to take action is bogus. It was Fuchida's error in judgement and poor battle manangement that caused the failure. Nagumo had to consider the possible loss of the vital carriers, against those tanks and other targets. I believe, considering what he knew and what he did not know, he made cautious decision. Right or wrong, Fuchida and Shimazaki were controlling the attack, not Nagumo or Genda. This is again, an area where the surviving members of a losing nation can write history, and I have never seen any US historian or aviation expert examine or even bring this type of battle management up in any account.


That is a very interesting assessment dennis. It is one that i think hasn't every really been explored in the past (at least as far as I know, but by simple virtue of age i amagine you have had the chance to read more into it then I have)

[Mike Malanaphy]

Fuchida, the attack group leader, was over PH for over two hours. His responsibility was to manage the battle. He could see the carriers were not in the harbor, which left some of the dive bombers and horizontal bombers without targets. They were detailed to find and strike any undamaged ship. Many were carrying small bombs that were not capable of damaging armored warships. After Fuchida returns, he can't understand why a third strike hasn't been ordered and he assails Nagumo along with Genda, asking why. Here is my question.

Fuchida was onscene battle commander. He had radio contact with Shimazaki, the Second attack group leader coming in after launching one hour behind the first. By one hour later, Fuchida saw and understood the importance of the sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub base. The first attack group torpedo bombers, 12 in all, had turned directly over them. Why didn't he contact Shimazaki and order him to detail those aircraft designated to bomb carriers to bomb and destroy of sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub pens. If he was so sure those tanks were important, why not manage the battle properly. He did not need a third strike or the permission of Nagumo or Genda. This, IMHO, is poor leadership and poor battle management by Commander Fuchida. He was detailed to destroy any and all ships and functions that could pose a threat to the Japanese southern operations, and the fuel oil in those tanks certainly was a vital target in that vain. Even if he wasn't certain there was fuel in them, the mere presence of the tanks should have made them a target. One or two 500 LB. HE bombs could have set the mess afire along with a few strafing runs from the Zero's carrying 20mm incendiary bullets. Nimitz himself stated that only a few .50 cal. machine gun bullets could have ignited the whole mess.

To me, Fuchida and Genda making claims that their commander, Nagumo, failed to take action is bogus. It was Fuchida's error in judgement and poor battle manangement that caused the failure. Nagumo had to consider the possible loss of the vital carriers, against those tanks and other targets. I believe, considering what he knew and what he did not know, he made cautious decision. Right or wrong, Fuchida and Shimazaki were controlling the attack, not Nagumo or Genda. This is again, an area where the surviving members of a losing nation can write history, and I have never seen any US historian or aviation expert examine or even bring this type of battle management up in any account.

Hi Dennis,

I would agree that Fuchida bears much of the responsibility as the man on the spot rather than Nagumo for directing the batttle. He and Genda were the aviation planners. However, he had very limited command and control ability. Remember the flare snafu at the start of the attack because he thought one element had missed the flare as there were seperate attack programs based upon whether surprise had been achieved or not. It would be intersting to see the op order for target priorities as much of the attack would have to be preplanned and dependent on the initative of squadron commanders and pilots. I don't believe he had voice radio either, so any changes or communications were done by morse.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Fuchida, the attack group leader, was over PH for over two hours. His responsibility was to manage the battle. He could see the carriers were not in the harbor, which left some of the dive bombers and horizontal bombers without targets. They were detailed to find and strike any undamaged ship. Many were carrying small bombs that were not capable of damaging armored warships. After Fuchida returns, he can't understand why a third strike hasn't been ordered and he assails Nagumo along with Genda, asking why. Here is my question.

Fuchida was onscene battle commander. He had radio contact with Shimazaki, the Second attack group leader coming in after launching one hour behind the first. By one hour later, Fuchida saw and understood the importance of the sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub base. The first attack group torpedo bombers, 12 in all, had turned directly over them. Why didn't he contact Shimazaki and order him to detail those aircraft designated to bomb carriers to bomb and destroy of sixteen above ground fuel tanks and the sub pens. If he was so sure those tanks were important, why not manage the battle properly. He did not need a third strike or the permission of Nagumo or Genda. This, IMHO, is poor leadership and poor battle management by Commander Fuchida. He was detailed to destroy any and all ships and functions that could pose a threat to the Japanese southern operations, and the fuel oil in those tanks certainly was a vital target in that vain. Even if he wasn't certain there was fuel in them, the mere presence of the tanks should have made them a target. One or two 500 LB. HE bombs could have set the mess afire along with a few strafing runs from the Zero's carrying 20mm incendiary bullets. Nimitz himself stated that only a few .50 cal. machine gun bullets could have ignited the whole mess.

To me, Fuchida and Genda making claims that their commander, Nagumo, failed to take action is bogus. It was Fuchida's error in judgement and poor battle manangement that caused the failure. Nagumo had to consider the possible loss of the vital carriers, against those tanks and other targets. I believe, considering what he knew and what he did not know, he made cautious decision. Right or wrong, Fuchida and Shimazaki were controlling the attack, not Nagumo or Genda. This is again, an area where the surviving members of a losing nation can write history, and I have never seen any US historian or aviation expert examine or even bring this type of battle management up in any account.

Dennis:

In recent years, the reputations of both Fuchida and Genda have come under attack by serious historians. I happen to agree that their interpretations of events are similar to the accounts that surviving German officers give of the war. They conveniently ignore their own mistakes and blame those that are not able to defend themselves. One wonders what they would have written had either Nagumo or Yamamoto survived the war.

The only reason I can think that Fuchida didn't order the attacks on the fuel farm is that the mindset of the Japanese prevents them from deviating from an agreed upon plan. It could be seen as disrepectful to one's superiors. Yet from what you've stated, it appears that he had more leeway to call the shots as it were. Do you think that a possible reason for not attacking the fuel tanks is that they were not as glamorous a target as the warships? You see this problem with the IJN's use of submarines which should have concentrated on Allied shipping, not trying to attack warships.

[Ed Rotondaro]

That is a very interesting assessment dennis. It is one that i think hasn't every really been explored in the past (at least as far as I know, but by simple virtue of age i amagine you have had the chance to read more into it then I have)

Michael:

We don't call Dennis the Forum Hound for nothing!:D If the truth is out there, he'll sniff it out.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I would agree that Fuchida bears much of the responsibility as the man on the spot rather than Nagumo for directing the batttle. He and Genda were the aviation planners. However, he had very limited command and control ability. Remember the flare snafu at the start of the attack because he thought one element had missed the flare as there were seperate attack programs based upon whether surprise had been achieved or not. It would be intersting to see the op order for target priorities as much of the attack would have to be preplanned and dependent on the initative of squadron commanders and pilots. I don't believe he had voice radio either, so any changes or communications were done by morse.
Fuchida had a voice and morse cw set. The voice set was a command set with a range of 50 miles and was installed in all carrier aircraft for air to air communications. His third man in the plane, the radio man used the morse set to inform Nagumo of the surprise, but he could have used the command set to change the targeting.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

In recent years, the reputations of both Fuchida and Genda have come under attack by serious historians. I happen to agree that their interpretations of events are similar to the accounts that surviving German officers give of the war. They conveniently ignore their own mistakes and blame those that are not able to defend themselves. One wonders what they would have written had either Nagumo or Yamamoto survived the war.

The only reason I can think that Fuchida didn't order the attacks on the fuel farm is that the mindset of the Japanese prevents them from deviating from an agreed upon plan. It could be seen as disrepectful to one's superiors. Yet from what you've stated, it appears that he had more leeway to call the shots as it were. Do you think that a possible reason for not attacking the fuel tanks is that they were not as glamorous a target as the warships? You see this problem with the IJN's use of submarines which should have concentrated on Allied shipping, not trying to attack warships.
One question that has been asked but never answer was whether there were two attack plans and that Fuchida's flare mistake actually caused the problem. I doubt it. I believe that the flare mistake simply caused the torpedo and dive bombers to attack simultaneously instead of coordinating like they would normally.

[old_pop2000]

The basic plan was:

First attack unit

First attack group would attack four battleships and four carriers, in that order.

Second attack group would attack land based air strength in the air and on the ground.

Ford Island
Wheeler Field


Second attack unit

First attack group- attack hangers and aircraft on Kanoehe, Ford Island and Barber's Point and Hickam Field

Second attack group - 4 or five carriers - If no carriers, then battleships and cruisers

The second attack group consisted of 72 Val dive bombers with ordinary ground bombs.

In looking over the detailed attack plan, there was no alternative targets that were not airbases or ships, primarily cruisers, battleships or carriers. So, now the question revolves around why wasn't the fuel tanks on the target list? Oversight, lack of planning?

Since Fuchida wanted a third attack, and so did Genda specifically targeting the fuel tanks and docks, one has to assume that pre-attack intelligence had made the attack planners aware of their presence or Fuchida saw them as he entered the Pearl Harbor area. In either case, they could have been added to the possible alternative targets for the second attack unit who were well equipped to deal with them. The other alternative is for Fuchida to contact Shimazaki by command set, and redirect some dive bombers onto the fuel tanks, he had plenty of them with the proper ordnance.

So, we always come back to Fuchida and his direction of the attack. In fact, based on what I know, he actually did nothing more after firing the the flare pistol. He flew around to assess damage and then flew home.

So, if the tanks were known about, why didn't Fuchida order an attack on them with the second attack unit. Who knows? We can speculate but the best answer is that this was a hit and run raid on ships and aircraft, not strategic oil supplies. It may just be that simple.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The basic plan was:

First attack unit

First attack group would attack four battleships and four carriers, in that order.

Second attack group would attack land based air strength in the air and on the ground.

Ford Island
Wheeler Field


Second attack unit

First attack group- attack hangers and aircraft on Kanoehe, Ford Island and Barber's Point and Hickam Field

Second attack group - 4 or five carriers - If no carriers, then battleships and cruisers

The second attack group consisted of 72 Val dive bombers with ordinary ground bombs.

In looking over the detailed attack plan, there was no alternative targets that were not airbases or ships, primarily cruisers, battleships or carriers. So, now the question revolves around why wasn't the fuel tanks on the target list? Oversight, lack of planning?

Since Fuchida wanted a third attack, and so did Genda specifically targeting the fuel tanks and docks, one has to assume that pre-attack intelligence had made the attack planners aware of their presence or Fuchida saw them as he entered the Pearl Harbor area. In either case, they could have been added to the possible alternative targets for the second attack unit who were well equipped to deal with them. The other alternative is for Fuchida to contact Shimazaki by command set, and redirect some dive bombers onto the fuel tanks, he had plenty of them with the proper ordnance.

So, we always come back to Fuchida and his direction of the attack. In fact, based on what I know, he actually did nothing more after firing the the flare pistol. He flew around to assess damage and then flew home.

So, if the tanks were known about, why didn't Fuchida order an attack on them with the second attack unit. Who knows? We can speculate but the best answer is that this was a hit and run raid on ships and aircraft, not strategic oil supplies. It may just be that simple.

Dennis:

Again we come back to the Japanese mindset. They assumed that their attack would so cripple and humiliate the US that the fuel was unimportant. The loss of face would prevent the US from attempting to strike back. How else do we explain the shock that the Doolittle Raid produced?

When you only know victory as Japan did in the period of 1890-1941, you don't learn how to handle a setback. Tokugawa Ieyasu, the shogun who unified Japan, would have understood far better than his descendants that one battle does not win a war.

[Warship NWS]

Fuchida had a voice and morse cw set. The voice set was a command set with a range of 50 miles and was installed in all carrier aircraft for air to air communications. His third man in the plane, the radio man used the morse set to inform Nagumo of the surprise, but he could have used the command set to change the targeting.

That is of course assuming the sets were in good working order and that the other flight leaders could hear them well enough to understand the orders. It is interesting to note that it is very hard to find any evidence that the IJN pilots ever talked to each other much at all while in the air.

[Ed Rotondaro]

That is of course assuming the sets were in good working order and that the other flight leaders could hear them well enough to understand the orders. It is interesting to note that it is very hard to find any evidence that the IJN pilots ever talked to each other much at all while in the air.


Chris:

That's a point I find interesting. Imagine trying to send Morse code in an airplane while under attack and maneuvering violently. Not the most efficient way to maintain command and control.

[old_pop2000]

That is of course assuming the sets were in good working order and that the other flight leaders could hear them well enough to understand the orders. It is interesting to note that it is very hard to find any evidence that the IJN pilots ever talked to each other much at all while in the air.
Sets were working because Fuchida used them to assign aircraft to the Nevada as she began to make a break for the open sea. He redirected Egusa's dive bombers to sink her in the channel. Seems they worked well enough to perform that maneuver which was in sight of the fuel tanks off to the left as Nevada moved toward the channel. Nevada was moored NE of Vestal and Arizona. After breaking loose from her moorings, she moved down the channel and this is where Fuchida noticed her movement, when she was opposite the battleship row. This put CinCpac headquarters and the upper fuel farm to the port side, sw of her course out of the channel. The B5N's of Murata's attack force turned onto their torpedo runs, right over the tanks and CinCPac headquarters. He could not have missed them. In fact, he could have radioed to Shimazaki, to send a shotai of three to six Val's with 250 kg GP to hit the tanks. One or two good hits and the whole works probably might have gone up. It might have taken CinCPac headquarters with it, or at least, made it impossible to occupy.

[keschofield]

Is it possible that in their planning and execution, the Japanese did not consider that the war would last for more than 6 months to a year? This would partially account for their doctrines to downplay seemingly strategic targets such as fuel supplies (in the case of PH) and merchant shipping (in the case of submarine doctrine)?

Remember that the PH raid was made to gain time for the advance on the southern resource areas. The scheduling for the carriers left little time lag between the PH raid and their presence being needed elsewhere.

Certainly Yammamoto has been quoted as believing that the Japanese could only be successful against the US for approximately 6 months.

Just some random thoughts on this topic. :)

[bridav58]

!78 B-24's all carrrying much heavier bombloads then a Kate or Val could carry and from treetop level(and not from high level bombers or dive bombing) couldn't do it to the Poletsi oil complex so I have my doubts that Kido Butai could especially when they had alot of trouble at Colombo/Trincomole when such infrastructure was thier main target . Just MHO .

[old_pop2000]

Is it possible that in their planning and execution, the Japanese did not consider that the war would last for more than 6 months to a year? This would partially account for their doctrines to downplay seemingly strategic targets such as fuel supplies (in the case of PH) and merchant shipping (in the case of submarine doctrine)?

Remember that the PH raid was made to gain time for the advance on the southern resource areas. The scheduling for the carriers left little time lag between the PH raid and their presence being needed elsewhere.

Certainly Yammamoto has been quoted as believing that the Japanese could only be successful against the US for approximately 6 months.

Just some random thoughts on this topic. :)

It is always important to remember, while we consider this a major attack, to the IJN command, it was a supplementary operation. It was a hit and run raid, whose most important consideration was the protection of the valuable carriers and aircraft for later operations.

The selection of targets was based on this limited viewpoint of the IJN planners that carriers, battleships, cruisers along with aircraft and supporting functions were always the primary and secondary targets. The Japanese were just as surprised as we were, at the success they acheived and no thoughts were given to a third attack, or supplementary targets including fuel farms, CinCPac headquarters, sub pens, dry docks etc.

Japanese planners and leaders, never considered logistics or logistical targets as worthy of their consideration. This was a blindside of the IJN. They could never make the connection between logistics and the conduct of the war. Communication intelligence, airfield construction, unrestricted submarine warfare, attacks on logistics targets were never important to the Imperial Japanese Navy, just the destruction of warships.

In reviewing Fuchida's interrogation monographs, his book and other documents, we see him changing his story as to how much control he had, over the target. He claims during interrogation that he was just an air observer, yet we know he ordered Egusa to send dive bombers to hit the Nevada. Does this sound like an observer, or a battle commander? I suspect, Fuchida and Genda, who created the targeting and flight plan for the attack both realized that their leaders had put their faith in their judgment and it was found to be flawed. Genda should have added a third category of targets beyond the carriers, battleships, cruisers, aircraft and airfields. It should have been such targets as the fuel tanks, headquarters, docks, pens, oilers etc. It should have been given to Fuchida, who should have had a subsidiary plan, that if there were available dive bombers and fighters in the second wave, they could be or should have been redirected to strike those targets.

IMO, it was a failure of planning and battle management. Genda should have placed those targets on the list and Fuchida should have redirected attack aircraft on to those targets either before the attack or during the second wave attack period. Using a dead commander like Nagumo or Yamamoto as goats for their own failure, only lessens my respect for them.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It is always important to remember, while we consider this a major attack, to the IJN command, it was a supplementary operation. It was a hit and run raid, whose most important consideration was the protection of the valuable carriers and aircraft for later operations.

The selection of targets was based on this limited viewpoint of the IJN planners that carriers, battleships, cruisers along with aircraft and supporting functions were always the primary and secondary targets. The Japanese were just as surprised as we were, at the success they acheived and no thoughts were given to a third attack, or supplementary targets including fuel farms, CinCPac headquarters, sub pens, dry docks etc.

Japanese planners and leaders, never considered logistics or logistical targets as worthy of their consideration. This was a blindside of the IJN. They could never make the connection between logistics and the conduct of the war. Communication intelligence, airfield construction, unrestricted submarine warfare, attacks on logistics targets were never important to the Imperial Japanese Navy, just the destruction of warships.

In reviewing Fuchida's interrogation monographs, his book and other documents, we see him changing his story as to how much control he had, over the target. He claims during interrogation that he was just an air observer, yet we know he ordered Egusa to send dive bombers to hit the Nevada. Does this sound like an observer, or a battle commander? I suspect, Fuchida and Genda, who created the targeting and flight plan for the attack both realized that their leaders had put their faith in their judgment and it was found to be flawed. Genda should have added a third category of targets beyond the carriers, battleships, cruisers, aircraft and airfields. It should have been such targets as the fuel tanks, headquarters, docks, pens, oilers etc. It should have been given to Fuchida, who should have had a subsidiary plan, that if there were available dive bombers and fighters in the second wave, they could be or should have been redirected to strike those targets.

IMO, it was a failure of planning and battle management. Genda should have placed those targets on the list and Fuchida should have redirected attack aircraft on to those targets either before the attack or during the second wave attack period. Using a dead commander like Nagumo or Yamamoto as goats for their own failure, only lessens my respect for them.

Dennis:

Your point about this being a hit and run raid is probably the key here. It was more successful than the IJN had expected, but also less successful in that the carriers were not present. So Nagumo and company are left with the decision to keep pushing their luck or take the success they had been given and retreat to strike another day. And again I feel that such targets as headquaters, repair facilities, fuel, etc. were not seen as "sexy" or "glorious" to use a more modern parlance when compared to warships or planes.

[old_pop2000]

I've gone back over a book that I've enjoyed for years; Zero by Masatake Okumiya, Jiro Horikoshi and Martin Caiden. In the chapter on Pearl Harbor, here are some interesting statements:

Page 55 At exactly 3:23 a.m. (Tokyo Time) on December 8, Commander Mitsuo Fuchida of the Akagi, supreme air commander of the Pearl Harbor Attack Air Groups, issued the following order to all his pilots in the air over or approaching Pearl Harbor:" All aircraft immediately attack enemy positions."

Page 55 "Under Commander Fuchida's control, Lieutenant Akira Sakamoto led Twenty-five Type 99 dive bombers in the first attacking wave......

Page 56 ...Commander Fuchida's level and torpedo bombers assaulted the enemy battleships anchored in the harbor. Under Commander Fuchida's direct control were forty-nine Type 97 carrier based attack bombers; .......

Now, from a report on his interrogation in August 1945, when asked "What was your status during the Pearl Harbor Attack" He answered: "I was an air observer".

The book I've quoted was first published in 1956. The book "Midway:battle that doomed Japan" coauthored by Fuchida was written in 1953.

Observer my foot!!

He lied in 1945, lied in 1953 and Caiden in this later book finally told the truth. Fuchida and Genda were both lying. It was Genda who wrote the basic operational points to be covered by the planning of the attack: These were:

1. Surprise was paramount

2. The American carriers should be the priority targets at Pearl Harbor

3. Destruction of US aircraft was necessary for air superiority over Pearl Harbor

There are more points, but these are the most important. While this framework was reviewed by Kusaka, Kuroshima, Onishi and others, it was Genda's plan that was ultimately adopted and he along with Fuchida developed the details of the plan. Had he and Fuchida included the oil tanks and other strategic targets and assigned aircraft to them, the plan most likely would have been approved. Both Fuchida and Genda placed the blame for the poor targeting on Nagumo for failing to allow for a third attack knowing full well that his primary responsibility was to return the carriers intact or seek out the US carriers and destroy them. He also blamed Yamamoto's staff for failing to provide better targeting. That's very nice, since the targeting choices were always his and Fuchida's. Fuchida had the most control, he could have changed the plan once the carriers were known to be absent or make on the spot changes as Shimazaki was moving into position.

Either way, these two characters were both lying about their involvement, shoving the blame off onto two dead superiors, who both trusted their judgment. So much for samurai honor.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I've gone back over a book that I've enjoyed for years; Zero by Masatake Okumiya, Jiro Horikoshi and Martin Caiden. In the chapter on Pearl Harbor, here are some interesting statements:

Page 55 At exactly 3:23 a.m. (Tokyo Time) on December 8, Commander Mitsuo Fuchida of the Akagi, supreme air commander of the Pearl Harbor Attack Air Groups, issued the following order to all his pilots in the air over or approaching Pearl Harbor:" All aircraft immediately attack enemy positions."

Page 55 "Under Commander Fuchida's control, Lieutenant Akira Sakamoto led Twenty-five Type 99 dive bombers in the first attacking wave......

Page 56 ...Commander Fuchida's level and torpedo bombers assaulted the enemy battleships anchored in the harbor. Under Commander Fuchida's direct control were forty-nine Type 97 carrier based attack bombers; .......

Now, from a report on his interrogation in August 1945, when asked "What was your status during the Pearl Harbor Attack" He answered: "I was an air observer".

The book I've quoted was first published in 1956. The book "Midway:battle that doomed Japan" coauthored by Fuchida was written in 1953.

Observer my foot!!

He lied in 1945, lied in 1953 and Caiden in this later book finally told the truth. Fuchida and Genda were both lying. It was Genda who wrote the basic operational points to be covered by the planning of the attack: These were:

1. Surprise was paramount

2. The American carriers should be the priority targets at Pearl Harbor

3. Destruction of US aircraft was necessary for air superiority over Pearl Harbor

There are more points, but these are the most important. While this framework was reviewed by Kusaka, Kuroshima, Onishi and others, it was Genda's plan that was ultimately adopted and he along with Fuchida developed the details of the plan. Had he and Fuchida included the oil tanks and other strategic targets and assigned aircraft to them, the plan most likely would have been approved. Both Fuchida and Genda placed the blame for the poor targeting on Nagumo for failing to allow for a third attack knowing full well that his primary responsibility was to return the carriers intact or seek out the US carriers and destroy them. He also blamed Yamamoto's staff for failing to provide better targeting. That's very nice, since the targeting choices were always his and Fuchida's. Fuchida had the most control, he could have changed the plan once the carriers were known to be absent or make on the spot changes as Shimazaki was moving into position.

Either way, these two characters were both lying about their involvement, shoving the blame off onto two dead superiors, who both trusted their judgment. So much for samurai honor.

Dennis:

Bingo counselor! What should jury's verdict be? Obviously a man who didn't have the "courage" to commit seppuku decided to cover his posterior and tell his captors what he thought they wanted to hear.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Bingo counselor! What should jury's verdict be? Obviously a man who didn't have the "courage" to commit seppuku decided to cover his posterior and tell his captors what he thought they wanted to hear.
I don't have the full story. I am certain there are interviews with Genda and Fuchida, books and documents that might shed more light on this issue. But my question is whether any naval analyst or historians have questioned what these two men have said.

If the fuel tanks and other strategic targets in Pearl were not on the target list, why, who made the decision and could Fuchida have made on the spot changes to attack them. He seems to have had sufficient resources to accomplish this, he had the method to contact the aircraft and he had them in sight. When he returned with the second strike, he stated that the third wave was still on the decks. He went up to Genda to discuss why a third wave was not employed to attack the tanks. He and Genda then went to Nagumo, who told them that he had decided to hold them back and leave the area. This seems to indicate to me, that they knew of the tanks prior to the attack and might have understood their importance. Why have historians simply accepted the view of these two men that it was Nagumo's fault for not ordering the third wave or Yamamoto's staff for not adding them to the target list.

Anyway, I doubt anyone will ever dig into this and attempt to find the real answers. Who knows, maybe we know the real answer, I might be wrong.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Is it possible that in their planning and execution, the Japanese did not consider that the war would last for more than 6 months to a year? This would partially account for their doctrines to downplay seemingly strategic targets such as fuel supplies (in the case of PH) and merchant shipping (in the case of submarine doctrine)?

Remember that the PH raid was made to gain time for the advance on the southern resource areas. The scheduling for the carriers left little time lag between the PH raid and their presence being needed elsewhere.

Certainly Yammamoto has been quoted as believing that the Japanese could only be successful against the US for approximately 6 months.

Just some random thoughts on this topic. :)

Kurt:

What's interesting about that is that the IJN doesn't make it possible to keep the USN out of the war for 6 months. Now admittedly they caught bad luck by not nailing the carriers, but then they go and ensure that the remaining USN assets are able to stay in the fight. Most of the ships damaged at Pearl are back in action within 6 months. The fuel keeps the undamaged ships able to fight. The repair facilities enable Yorktown to fight at Midway while the two damaged IJN carriers at Coral Sea are out of the battle. At the the end of the day, one is left realizing that Japan was in many ways lucky to have achieved what she did and certainly didn't have a viable plan to win the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I don't have the full story. I am certain there are interviews with Genda and Fuchida, books and documents that might shed more light on this issue. But my question is whether any naval analyst or historians have questioned what these two men have said.

If the fuel tanks and other strategic targets in Pearl were not on the target list, why, who made the decision and could Fuchida have made on the spot changes to attack them. He seems to have had sufficient resources to accomplish this, he had the method to contact the aircraft and he had them in sight. When he returned with the second strike, he stated that the third wave was still on the decks. He went up to Genda to discuss why a third wave was not employed to attack the tanks. He and Genda then went to Nagumo, who told them that he had decided to hold them back and leave the area. This seems to indicate to me, that they knew of the tanks prior to the attack and might have understood their importance. Why have historians simply accepted the view of these two men that it was Nagumo's fault for not ordering the third wave or Yamamoto's staff for not adding them to the target list.

Anyway, I doubt anyone will ever dig into this and attempt to find the real answers. Who knows, maybe we know the real answer, I might be wrong.

Dennis:

Japan strikes me as tactically gifted, but stragetically flawed during the time period in question. They lacked enough real world experience to understand the big picture.

[old_pop2000]

Kurt:

What's interesting about that is that the IJN doesn't make it possible to keep the USN out of the war for 6 months. Now admittedly they caught bad luck by not nailing the carriers, but then they go and ensure that the remaining USN assets are able to stay in the fight. Most of the ships damaged at Pearl are back in action within 6 months. The fuel keeps the undamaged ships able to fight. The repair facilities enable Yorktown to fight at Midway while the two damaged IJN carriers at Coral Sea are out of the battle. At the the end of the day, one is left realizing that Japan was in many ways lucky to have achieved what she did and certainly didn't have a viable plan to win the war.
Ed and Kurt:
The ironic point is that the IJN pushed for war at that time, due to the freeze on their assets and the oil embargo. They only had, IIRC, about a year and half of reserves for the fleet. They, more than any navy should have understood the importance of fuel supplies for operations. Yet, despite this apparent knowledge, they did not place the fuel tanks at Pearl, on a priority target list. In fact, they actually never actively engaged in a war on supplies against the Allies. It is almost inconceivable that a nation whose economy was based on exports like raw materials, oil etc. would not understand mercantile warfare better. But it appears, that they did not. Fascinating, isn't it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed and Kurt:
The ironic point is that the IJN pushed for war at that time, due to the freeze on their assets and the oil embargo. They only had, IIRC, about a year and half of reserves for the fleet. They, more than any navy should have understood the importance of fuel supplies for operations. Yet, despite this apparent knowledge, they did not place the fuel tanks at Pearl, on a priority target list. In fact, they actually never actively engaged in a war on supplies against the Allies. It is almost inconceivable that a nation whose economy was based on exports like raw materials, oil etc. would not understand mercantile warfare better. But it appears, that they did not. Fascinating, isn't it.

Dennis:

Yes it is ironic. As I've said before. 16th century samurai mindset fighting in the 20th century. Have you finished Miller's book on the economic war? Opinions? I really like Black Shoe Carrier Admiral so far.

[Campy]

One point to remember. Japan had always fought limited wars, and won. China 1894, Russia 1904, Tsingtao 1914. Were all short, victorious wars with the enemy folding rather quickly. No need to even consider strategic targets. Although on a larger scale, this is what Japan was striving for in 1941. Conquering the US or Great Britain were not really considered. Seize some territory, and sue for peace. A winning strategy in the past. And they actually achieved their limited goals. What went wrong, is this that time, the enemy refused to fold. Perhaps that, more than anything, is what they failed to consider.

Frank

[keschofield]

Kurt:

What's interesting about that is that the IJN doesn't make it possible to keep the USN out of the war for 6 months. Now admittedly they caught bad luck by not nailing the carriers, but then they go and ensure that the remaining USN assets are able to stay in the fight. Most of the ships damaged at Pearl are back in action within 6 months. The fuel keeps the undamaged ships able to fight. The repair facilities enable Yorktown to fight at Midway while the two damaged IJN carriers at Coral Sea are out of the battle. At the the end of the day, one is left realizing that Japan was in many ways lucky to have achieved what she did and certainly didn't have a viable plan to win the war.


Yes, they knew that they had missed the carriers. But they also knew that they had a strong numerical superiority in carriers. The same was true for cruisers. They did NOT have a numerical superiority in BB's before PH.

Their biggest mistake of course was their severe underestimation of our damage control, recovery, and repair capabilities. Ours was light years ahead of theirs. This underestimation is what bit them in the a#$ sooner than they expected.

I have always felt that the US fought the Pacific War with one hand tied behind its back and the other hand doing something else half of the time. After 1905, the Japanese never again successfully took on a western power that was concentrating on them. Without the Europe first strategy, I firmly believe that the Pacific War would have been a US victory by late 1942 or early 1943. As a matter of fact, I believe that Corregidor (though not Bataan) would have been successfully relieved. Remember Wainwright's surrender was less than a month before the Battle of Midway (and that was at historical US strength).

Without the ABDA powers concentrating on Germany, Japan would have never successfully expanded beyond Manchuria and the Chinese coastal enclaves. It would have been a whole other war.

[old_pop2000]

Kurt:

What's interesting about that is that the IJN doesn't make it possible to keep the USN out of the war for 6 months. Now admittedly they caught bad luck by not nailing the carriers, but then they go and ensure that the remaining USN assets are able to stay in the fight. Most of the ships damaged at Pearl are back in action within 6 months. The fuel keeps the undamaged ships able to fight. The repair facilities enable Yorktown to fight at Midway while the two damaged IJN carriers at Coral Sea are out of the battle. At the the end of the day, one is left realizing that Japan was in many ways lucky to have achieved what she did and certainly didn't have a viable plan to win the war.
Actually, the assets damaged or sunk at Pearl harbor, were not first line ships. The men were far more important than the ships. Most of those battleships would have spent part of the war in dry dock being upgraded. Others probably would have been used to escort convoys etc. The example is the ships on the West Coast, most just escorted convoys to Australia, New Caledonia etc. The strategic functions like CinCPac headquarters, the fuel tanks, dry docks, runways, were all far more important.

Just some facts. The two fuel farms were separated. The upper consisted of ten tanks behind CinCPac headquarters, the lower was behind the dry docks near Hickam, across from Hospital Point. The lower had sixteen tanks.

But, as Ed has pointed out, the dry docks were far more important. Repairs to Yorktown and Saratoga, just to name a few ships. Enterprise after Eastern Solomons was repaired here. Updates like addition of radars, radios etc. Most readers don't realize how important the fast turnaround of the upgrades was. The importance of Kanoehe as a base for the Naval air wings for reorganization, training and testing cannot be overstated.

I hope this forum will examine and better understand the importance of logistics and the bases that provide the support. The importance of Espiritu Santo, Efate and New Caledonia can never be overstated. Without those bases, the move up the Solomons would never have been possible.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Yes it is ironic. As I've said before. 16th century samurai mindset fighting in the 20th century. Have you finished Miller's book on the economic war? Opinions? I really like Black Shoe Carrier Admiral so far.


Actually, I have and forgot to provide a brief review. It is a well written book, good detail and it does give the behind scenes view of how the freeze and embargo occurred. The timeline and events leading up to those two issues, is vital to understanding how Pearl Harbor came about. As the Export Control Administration went through the process of controlling vital strategic war assets to protect them for our use in the war, the administration knew was coming. In actual fact, we were very relaxed with Japan. We allowed them to continue to buy oil, cotton and other vital war comodities, while restricting other Axis nations. In the process, they were hiding dollars in New York banks. I suspect that when this was discovered, is when everything went downhill. But, you should read the book. It does give a somewhat different perspective how the events leading up to the war.

[old_pop2000]

I was examining some websites with forums and review their discussions. Only one brought up the fact that Fuchida told one story to his captors and another later. None bring up the fact that the tanks could have been bombed if Fuchida had order it, from the air. Almost all state that the Japanese did not have training in bombing shore facilities, or that they did not have time to prepare the third strike or some other excuse. But, none bring up the fact that in the Indian ocean operation conducted after Pearl Harbor, they did attack fuel tanks and during Operation MI, they attacked fuel tanks at Dutch Harbor. So, the idea that they did not have experience is really bogus, these were the best carriers pilots the Japanese would ever have, and hitting a moving ship, is far harder than hitting a round, unmoveable fuel tank, even in smoky, flak filled skies.

Simple fact is, the third wave would have consisted of most of the first wave which returned one hour to two hours prior to the return of the second. They had plenty of time to remove the torpedo racks, install the bomb racks, load 500 lb GP, reload the Val Dive bombers on the deck, refuel all aircraft and launch. This probably would have taken about 1 to 1.5 hours. Damaged aircraft would have stowed below, and the remaining aircraft sent aloft. In fact, you probably would not need the torpedo bombers, as Japanese level bombing accuracy was bad. So, just reload the Val's on the deck, refuel both them and Zero's and send the lot back immediately This might have taken less than 45 minutes. The flak in the area around the tanks was weak and not effective. Most of the flak was around Ford Island from the Battleships and other warships. The torpedo bombers could have reloaded and brought up on deck, in case scouts sight the US carriers.

[Ed Rotondaro]

One point to remember. Japan had always fought limited wars, and won. China 1894, Russia 1904, Tsingtao 1914. Were all short, victorious wars with the enemy folding rather quickly. No need to even consider strategic targets. Although on a larger scale, this is what Japan was striving for in 1941. Conquering the US or Great Britain were not really considered. Seize some territory, and sue for peace. A winning strategy in the past. And they actually achieved their limited goals. What went wrong, is this that time, the enemy refused to fold. Perhaps that, more than anything, is what they failed to consider.

Frank

Exactly Campy. That is why Japan thought she could roll the "decadent western powers" over so easily. You only learn from defeat, not victory.

[old_pop2000]

Sadao Asado in his conclusion, states the following:

In an age of total war, the Japanese navy conceived of the coming conflict essentially in terms of a limited war. Unable to foresee the course of war beyond the initial two years, Japan could not visualize an unlimted war, a war to the finish, or a war that would end only with unconditional surrender.

Reference: From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, Page 287, Conclusion.

He goes on to say and use quotes that the Japanese actually had no war aims other than self-defense and self-existence. The establishment of the Eastern Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was not on their minds because it was always considered a fight for survival. Essentially, they were consumed by the military-strategic viewpoint which means that they neglected broader nonmilitary factors. They never mobilized for total war, because they never considered this a total war.

[old_pop2000]

Here's one for you. The attack on Pearl would never have occurred without tankers and underway refuelling. Yet, they never attacked, to any great extent, the tankers in the harbor like Neosho. Genda even commented later "oil tanks did not enter the original idea". Are all samurai that myopic?

[old_pop2000]

Well, without more information, we probably can't go much farther in this discussion except to explore an alternative history. What if they had struck the fuel farms? How would we have coped?

1. Rush to completion the Red Hill Underground fuel dumps. Unknown whether this facility could have been completed by June 1942.

2. Use commercial oil tankers, parked along the wharf and other locations as fuel storage facilities. A T2-SE-A1 tanker could carry about 141,000 BBL's of oil. To equal the size of the fuel farm, which had 4.5 million barrels of oil, it would have taken 31 such tankers in port to replace those fuel tanks. Probably not feasible.

Those are some possibilities for alleviating the problem of the destruction of the fuel farm.

As to what actually happened. It was a simple failure to plan and execute the attack properly. Both Cmdr. Genda and Fuchida failed to put the fuel farm and tankers on the targeting list and prioritize them above cruisers, destroyers. I feel the targeting list should have been:


Priority 1 targets
Carriers (if not carriers, then priority 2 targets next)
Battleships
Airfields, aircraft

Priority 2 targets
Fuel Farm
Tankers
Dry Docks
other naval vessels including cruiser etc.

I do believe that after surprise was accomplished and air superiority was gained, a limited third strike by dive bombers and Zero's was feasible to strike via the second waves flight path was possible. This flight path would have taken the dive bombers straight to the upper fuel farm and led the others to the lower. If nothing else, emphasize the primary fuel farm of 10 tanks. That would have been 70% of the fuel capacity of the farm, then attack the tankers moored nearby. Time permitting, strike the lower.

Thanks for your patience, guys. I just love these kinds of thought problems.

[john964]

2. Use commercial oil tankers, parked along the wharf and other locations as fuel storage facilities. A T2-SE-A1 tanker could carry about 141,000 BBL's of oil. To equal the size of the fuel farm, which had 4.5 million barrels of oil, it would have taken 31 such tankers in port to replace those fuel tanks. Probably not feasible.

Dennis, You don't have moor the tankers in Pearl Horbor proper ie around Ford Is but maybe in West Lock, Lihihana Roads, and some of the smaller harbors in the islands like Hilo.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, You don't have moor the tankers in Pearl Horbor proper ie around Ford Is but maybe in West Lock, Lihihana Roads, and some of the smaller harbors in the islands like Hilo.
I would agree, I haven't actually researched the idea but have seen maps. I agree those areas that you suggested might work just as well.

Thanks for adding that.

[Warship NWS]

Personally I do find it ironic that the most strategic naval asset of war was the merchant and the Germans knew it but the Japanese completely ignored that fact. The old BBs were of almost no value in the Pacific theater and the USN relied heavily on refueling.. a serious duh moment here since industrialization shifted wooden ships of sail with unlimited fuel - wind - to iron ships with a serious effect of needing fuel - coal and then oil. The entire IJN submarine force should have had only one mission in the Pacific.. sink US tankers. CVs and every escort needed oil and planes needed avgas. Kill our fuel supply or ability to transport fuel and the Pacific theater becomes an entirely different naval war. The IJN relied on oil.. well duh again.. why would any other navy not rely on oil? Kind of boggles the mind a bit.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Personally I do find it ironic that the most strategic naval asset of war was the merchant and the Germans knew it but the Japanese completely ignored that fact. The old BBs were of almost no value in the Pacific theater and the USN relied heavily on refueling.. a serious duh moment here since industrialization shifted wooden ships of sail with unlimited fuel - wind - to iron ships with a serious effect of needing fuel - coal and then oil. The entire IJN submarine force should have had only one mission in the Pacific.. sink US tankers. CVs and every escort needed oil and planes needed avgas. Kill our fuel supply or ability to transport fuel and the Pacific theater becomes an entirely different naval war. The IJN relied on oil.. well duh again.. why would any other navy not rely on oil? Kind of boggles the mind a bit.

Thanks.
It is hard to believe that Genda and Fuchida, or at least Kusaka, Oikawa, Yamamoto, Kuroshima or anyone who reviewed the plans for the Pearl Harbor operation could have missed the fuel tanks and the tankers. It is even more mindboggling that they did not send the I boats after the tankers plying between the west coast cities and Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were buying almost exclusively all their oil from the west coast. Their tankers were in San Pedro, Santa Barbara or any of the coastal ports every month. They had to know exactly how many tankers were moving between the east coast and the west coast, and the western coastal cities. How could they have missed the fact that there was not a pipeline between the east and west coast. All the oil from the fields in the LA, SB area had to go by tanker through the Panama Canal to reach Texas and the east coast cities. Unbelieveable!!

[Warship NWS]

To Dennis,

Considering that the IJN subs were used for silly nuisance attacks like lobbing a few deck gun shells or attempted seaplanes attacks with bombs launched by submarine at a few coastal targets on the west coast.. and yet not one tanker was torpedoed.. yep, serious duh moment. Nice big well built submarines, in some cases the best in the world at the time for oceanic operations and with kick ass torpedoes.. and they accomplished diddly squat. WW1 should have taught the world a lesson about how to use subs.

[ksf1973]

I personally think that the IJN would have been better served by not building such big subs and not wasting time on aircraft-carrying subs. That they were pre-ordained to failure by their stupid operational doctrine is a given.

[old_pop2000]

To Dennis,

Considering that the IJN subs were used for silly nuisance attacks like lobbing a few deck gun shells or attempted seaplanes attacks with bombs launched by submarine at a few coastal targets on the west coast.. and yet not one tanker was torpedoed.. yep, serious duh moment. Nice big well built submarines, in some cases the best in the world at the time for oceanic operations and with kick ass torpedoes.. and they accomplished diddly squat. WW1 should have taught the world a lesson about how to use subs.

In researching the losses, I found that we lost 27 ships on the West Coast.
The period of record is 12/10/41 to 3/31/46. There were eleven tanker attacks, most by shelling, with only three lost to torpedoes. The others were not lost.

There were 51 ships lost near Alaska, with only one tanker, due to structural failure.

With all those subs, and excellent torpedoes, we lost to enemy action only three tankers. Now that's a duh moment.

http://www.usmm.org/shipsunkdamaged.html

[Ed Rotondaro]

Here's one for you. The attack on Pearl would never have occurred without tankers and underway refuelling. Yet, they never attacked, to any great extent, the tankers in the harbor like Neosho. Genda even commented later "oil tanks did not enter the original idea". Are all samurai that myopic?

Dennis:

I think it's that samurai mindset of attacking a worthy opponent. Given the choise between fuel tanks and tankers or a warship the IJN pilots would want the glory of sinking or damaging the warship in my opinion.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Well, without more information, we probably can't go much farther in this discussion except to explore an alternative history. What if they had struck the fuel farms? How would we have coped?

1. Rush to completion the Red Hill Underground fuel dumps. Unknown whether this facility could have been completed by June 1942.

2. Use commercial oil tankers, parked along the wharf and other locations as fuel storage facilities. A T2-SE-A1 tanker could carry about 141,000 BBL's of oil. To equal the size of the fuel farm, which had 4.5 million barrels of oil, it would have taken 31 such tankers in port to replace those fuel tanks. Probably not feasible.

Those are some possibilities for alleviating the problem of the destruction of the fuel farm.

As to what actually happened. It was a simple failure to plan and execute the attack properly. Both Cmdr. Genda and Fuchida failed to put the fuel farm and tankers on the targeting list and prioritize them above cruisers, destroyers. I feel the targeting list should have been:


Priority 1 targets
Carriers (if not carriers, then priority 2 targets next)
Battleships
Airfields, aircraft

Priority 2 targets
Fuel Farm
Tankers
Dry Docks
other naval vessels including cruiser etc.

I do believe that after surprise was accomplished and air superiority was gained, a limited third strike by dive bombers and Zero's was feasible to strike via the second waves flight path was possible. This flight path would have taken the dive bombers straight to the upper fuel farm and led the others to the lower. If nothing else, emphasize the primary fuel farm of 10 tanks. That would have been 70% of the fuel capacity of the farm, then attack the tankers moored nearby. Time permitting, strike the lower.

Thanks for your patience, guys. I just love these kinds of thought problems.

Dennis:

I agree. At the end of the day, all Pearl Harbor gave Japan was six months until the day of Decisive Battle off Midway.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Personally I do find it ironic that the most strategic naval asset of war was the merchant and the Germans knew it but the Japanese completely ignored that fact. The old BBs were of almost no value in the Pacific theater and the USN relied heavily on refueling.. a serious duh moment here since industrialization shifted wooden ships of sail with unlimited fuel - wind - to iron ships with a serious effect of needing fuel - coal and then oil. The entire IJN submarine force should have had only one mission in the Pacific.. sink US tankers. CVs and every escort needed oil and planes needed avgas. Kill our fuel supply or ability to transport fuel and the Pacific theater becomes an entirely different naval war. The IJN relied on oil.. well duh again.. why would any other navy not rely on oil? Kind of boggles the mind a bit.

Thanks.

Chris:

I really think the Japanese Imperial Staff figured that once the US Pacific Fleet was imobilized, they would be able to finish their land grab and set up an imprenetrable defensive perimeter and sit back and wait for the US to accept terms to end the war. They were wishful thinking the strategic situation rather than realistically analyzing it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It is hard to believe that Genda and Fuchida, or at least Kusaka, Oikawa, Yamamoto, Kuroshima or anyone who reviewed the plans for the Pearl Harbor operation could have missed the fuel tanks and the tankers. It is even more mindboggling that they did not send the I boats after the tankers plying between the west coast cities and Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were buying almost exclusively all their oil from the west coast. Their tankers were in San Pedro, Santa Barbara or any of the coastal ports every month. They had to know exactly how many tankers were moving between the east coast and the west coast, and the western coastal cities. How could they have missed the fact that there was not a pipeline between the east and west coast. All the oil from the fields in the LA, SB area had to go by tanker through the Panama Canal to reach Texas and the east coast cities. Unbelieveable!!

Dennis:

The German navy certainly understood the priority of fuel tankers as demonstrated during Operation Drumbeat off the US Eastern coast.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In researching the losses, I found that we lost 27 ships on the West Coast.
The period of record is 12/10/41 to 3/31/46. There were eleven tanker attacks, most by shelling, with only three lost to torpedoes. The others were not lost.

There were 51 ships lost near Alaska, with only one tanker, due to structural failure.

With all those subs, and excellent torpedoes, we lost to enemy action only three tankers. Now that's a duh moment.

http://www.usmm.org/shipsunkdamaged.html

Dennis:

Why did we lose so many ships are Alaska? Were these ships on their way to supplying Russia?

[Ed Rotondaro]

In researching the losses, I found that we lost 27 ships on the West Coast.
The period of record is 12/10/41 to 3/31/46. There were eleven tanker attacks, most by shelling, with only three lost to torpedoes. The others were not lost.

There were 51 ships lost near Alaska, with only one tanker, due to structural failure.

With all those subs, and excellent torpedoes, we lost to enemy action only three tankers. Now that's a duh moment.

http://www.usmm.org/shipsunkdamaged.html

Dennis:

Thanks for the excellent link by the way. I can't believe how many ships were lost in the Med-Black sea area. I would have assumed that the Atlantic would have been more dangerous.

[ksf1973]

Med's far more dangerous, because there's nowhere to hide. Comparing to the Atlantic or the Pacific, the Med is a boating lake.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Personally I do find it ironic that the most strategic naval asset of war was the merchant and the Germans knew it but the Japanese completely ignored that fact. The old BBs were of almost no value in the Pacific theater and the USN relied heavily on refueling.. a serious duh moment here since industrialization shifted wooden ships of sail with unlimited fuel - wind - to iron ships with a serious effect of needing fuel - coal and then oil. The entire IJN submarine force should have had only one mission in the Pacific.. sink US tankers. CVs and every escort needed oil and planes needed avgas. Kill our fuel supply or ability to transport fuel and the Pacific theater becomes an entirely different naval war. The IJN relied on oil.. well duh again.. why would any other navy not rely on oil? Kind of boggles the mind a bit.

Thanks.

Hi NWS,

The Japanese were certainly blind to it. "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II" by Boyd and Akihiko contains excerpts from the general battle instructions for Japanese submarines dated from 1934 and 1943. Nowhere is attacks against merchant shipping mentioned. The primary goal is support of the battle fleet in the decisive battle by reconnaissance of enemy harbors and routes of advance for his fleet. They were seen as a means of attriting the enemy along with land attack aircraft prior to the main engagement. Certainly, German results should have been instructive.

They should have remembered their own war experience from 1904 where a Russian cruiser squadron from Vladivistok made significant raids on their supply lines to Korea in support of their advance on Port Arthur.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Thanks for the excellent link by the way. I can't believe how many ships were lost in the Med-Black sea area. I would have assumed that the Atlantic would have been more dangerous.
The Med is considered an enclosed sea, and naval combat is more aligned with littoral zone warfare. Same rules and problems. Couple this the amount of supplies necessary to maintain the Italo-German Army in NA, it makes perfect sense. Average mechanized division requires 700 tons per day, non-mechanized infantry unit about 500 tons. Three German and two Italian mechanized units equals 3500 tons appr. just for the German Africa Korps and the Italian XX Motorized corp. 3500 time 30 means 105,000 tons of supplies in one month, not counting the non-motorized elements of which there were six. That equals 90000 tons, added up it equals at least 200,000 tons of supplies per month. If my math holds. So, yes, I can believe it.

[old_pop2000]

Hi NWS,

The Japanese were certainly blind to it. "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II" by Boyd and Akihiko contains excerpts from the general battle instructions for Japanese submarines dated from 1934 and 1943. Nowhere is attacks against merchant shipping mentioned. The primary goal is support of the battle fleet in the decisive battle by reconnaissance of enemy harbors and routes of advance for his fleet. They were seen as a means of attriting the enemy along with land attack aircraft prior to the main engagement. Certainly, German results should have been instructive.

They should have remembered their own war experience from 1904 where a Russian cruiser squadron from Vladivistok made significant raids on their supply lines to Korea in support of their advance on Port Arthur.
Absolutely true, Mike. They seemed to have forgotten their Mahan and lessons from the Russo-Japanese War.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Med's far more dangerous, because there's nowhere to hide. Comparing to the Atlantic or the Pacific, the Med is a boating lake.

Kristian:

I also forgot that just about any part of the Med is within air range of land based planes and the Luftwaffe got very proficient at anti-shipping actions.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi NWS,

The Japanese were certainly blind to it. "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II" by Boyd and Akihiko contains excerpts from the general battle instructions for Japanese submarines dated from 1934 and 1943. Nowhere is attacks against merchant shipping mentioned. The primary goal is support of the battle fleet in the decisive battle by reconnaissance of enemy harbors and routes of advance for his fleet. They were seen as a means of attriting the enemy along with land attack aircraft prior to the main engagement. Certainly, German results should have been instructive.

They should have remembered their own war experience from 1904 where a Russian cruiser squadron from Vladivistok made significant raids on their supply lines to Korea in support of their advance on Port Arthur.

Mike:

Good observations. You wonder how the IJN made its decisions? It's not like they didn't have naval attaches at all the major naval powers. Somebody wasn't doing a good job of reporting back to the General Staff. Their attaches in Germany should have been able to inform them of what submarines could do to a nation's merchant marine.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Med is considered an enclosed sea, and naval combat is more aligned with littoral zone warfare. Same rules and problems. Couple this the amount of supplies necessary to maintain the Italo-German Army in NA, it makes perfect sense. Average mechanized division requires 700 tons per day, non-mechanized infantry unit about 500 tons. Three German and two Italian mechanized units equals 3500 tons appr. just for the German Africa Korps and the Italian XX Motorized corp. 3500 time 30 means 105,000 tons of supplies in one month, not counting the non-motorized elements of which there were six. That equals 90000 tons, added up it equals at least 200,000 tons of supplies per month. If my math holds. So, yes, I can believe it.

Dennis:

In this case, I was more interested in the high numbers of Allied and specifically US merchant shipping losses, but with both the 8th Army and the US army in North Africa, it makes more sense. Was any allied shipping going to the Black Sea to supply Russia?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

In this case, I was more interested in the high numbers of Allied and specifically US merchant shipping losses, but with both the 8th Army and the US army in North Africa, it makes more sense. Was any allied shipping going to the Black Sea to supply Russia?

Unknown, but if I have time, I can see how much of the supplies to Russian went through the Black Sea ports.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Guys,

More info from Boyd and Akihiko. The Pearl Harbor attack plan was supported by the Sixth Fleet wiht it's shore HQ in Kwajalein, They were organized as follows:

First Submarine Group: I-9, I-15, I-17, and I-25 were posted NE of Oahu to support carrier operations by screening Nagumo's flank.

Second Submarine Group: I-7, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, and I-6 were stationed close into Pearl Harbor and it's eastern and western to intercept US warships that might escape the air attack by going to sea.

Third Submarine Group: I-8, I-74, I-75, I-68, I-69, I-70, I-71, I-72, and I-73 stationed south of Oahu to rescue pilots and intercept US warships.

Special Attack Units: I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 carried one Type A each.

Reconnaissance Unit: I-10 and I-26 to Aleutians and South Pacific.

The Japanese were disappointed in the results obtained since despite the dense deployment, they torpedoed none of the hundreds of USN warships passing through the area and they were surprised by the USN ASW activity. One boat was lost and several severely depth charged. Surprisingly, I-7 had her seaplance reconnoiter PEarl Harbor on 12/17/41.

On 12/09/41, I-9 spotted the Lexington carrier group. Because of her westward course, the Japanese assumed the US carriers had fled to the west coast and had not been at Pearl Harbor. Two subs were ordered to pursue her and 9 others stationed the length of the US west coast to intercept warships heading to Pearl Harbor or arriving from the west coast. The authors comment that like Doenitz, the chatty talk nightly between the subs and Kwajalein alerted the USN to their location.

In perusing "Kaigun" by Peattie and Evans, there seems to have been little discussion of doctrine since it was established in the early 20's. In 1938-41, the Japanese battle tested their doctrine and found a number of flaws. With no long range sensors, it was hard for submarines to position on the path of enemy targets and once in contact, they didn't have the speed advantage to end around. In one excersise to test ASW in Home Waters, submarines were credited with "sinking" 133 ships. Like the USN pre war, submarine skippers were penalized if discovered, so a passive attack mode was adopted, either long range or by sonar. Japanese submarines were reluctant to surface for any length of time and post war USN interrrogators were struck by how some Japanese skippers were in dense target areas, but never spotted any targets. Unlike US skippers, the Japanese never modified their tactics though they would have most likely failed in the face of USN ASW expertise had they concentrated on warships.

The Japanese were not alone, it took a while for the USN to focus effectively on the Japanese merchant marine. Because of desire for reconnaissance and chasing high value targets, the vital choke point between Luzon and the China coast didin't become a focal point till 1944.

The appearance of the 9 boats off the US west coast trigger an invasion scare and it's primary success was torpedoing if the Saratoga.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Guys,

More info from Boyd and Akihiko. The Pearl Harbor attack plan was supported by the Sixth Fleet wiht it's shore HQ in Kwajalein, They were organized as follows:

First Submarine Group: I-9, I-15, I-17, and I-25 were posted NE of Oahu to support carrier operations by screening Nagumo's flank.

Second Submarine Group: I-7, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, and I-6 were stationed close into Pearl Harbor and it's eastern and western to intercept US warships that might escape the air attack by going to sea.

Third Submarine Group: I-8, I-74, I-75, I-68, I-69, I-70, I-71, I-72, and I-73 stationed south of Oahu to rescue pilots and intercept US warships.

Special Attack Units: I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 carried one Type A each.

Reconnaissance Unit: I-10 and I-26 to Aleutians and South Pacific.

The Japanese were disappointed in the results obtained since despite the dense deployment, they torpedoed none of the hundreds of USN warships passing through the area and they were surprised by the USN ASW activity. One boat was lost and several severely depth charged. Surprisingly, I-7 had her seaplance reconnoiter PEarl Harbor on 12/17/41.

On 12/09/41, I-9 spotted the Lexington carrier group. Because of her westward course, the Japanese assumed the US carriers had fled to the west coast and had not been at Pearl Harbor. Two subs were ordered to pursue her and 9 others stationed the length of the US west coast to intercept warships heading to Pearl Harbor or arriving from the west coast. The authors comment that like Doenitz, the chatty talk nightly between the subs and Kwajalein alerted the USN to their location.

In perusing "Kaigun" by Peattie and Evans, there seems to have been little discussion of doctrine since it was established in the early 20's. In 1938-41, the Japanese battle tested their doctrine and found a number of flaws. With no long range sensors, it was hard for submarines to position on the path of enemy targets and once in contact, they didn't have the speed advantage to end around. In one excersise to test ASW in Home Waters, submarines were credited with "sinking" 133 ships. Like the USN pre war, submarine skippers were penalized if discovered, so a passive attack mode was adopted, either long range or by sonar. Japanese submarines were reluctant to surface for any length of time and post war USN interrrogators were struck by how some Japanese skippers were in dense target areas, but never spotted any targets. Unlike US skippers, the Japanese never modified their tactics though they would have most likely failed in the face of USN ASW expertise had they concentrated on warships.

The Japanese were not alone, it took a while for the USN to focus effectively on the Japanese merchant marine. Because of desire for reconnaissance and chasing high value targets, the vital choke point between Luzon and the China coast didin't become a focal point till 1944.

The appearance of the 9 boats off the US west coast trigger an invasion scare and it's primary success was torpedoing if the Saratoga.
With three of the most important strategic targets missed at Pearl Harbor and all those submarines lurking in the depths of the Ocean but missing our ships, one has to wonder about the real competancy of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Then within ten months, they have lost six carriers, two battleship, numerous cruisers and destroyers, hundreds of aircraft, almost all of their experienced carrier pilots and leaders, plus Guadalcanal.

In hindsight, they don't seem to good at this war business, do they? Should have stuck to China and Russia, they seem to do better.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Unknown, but if I have time, I can see how much of the supplies to Russian went through the Black Sea ports.

Dennis:

I do know that the majority of supplies sent by the US actually went from the West Coast to Vladiavostock (spelling?). And of course Murmansk.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Guys,

More info from Boyd and Akihiko. The Pearl Harbor attack plan was supported by the Sixth Fleet wiht it's shore HQ in Kwajalein, They were organized as follows:

First Submarine Group: I-9, I-15, I-17, and I-25 were posted NE of Oahu to support carrier operations by screening Nagumo's flank.

Second Submarine Group: I-7, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, and I-6 were stationed close into Pearl Harbor and it's eastern and western to intercept US warships that might escape the air attack by going to sea.

Third Submarine Group: I-8, I-74, I-75, I-68, I-69, I-70, I-71, I-72, and I-73 stationed south of Oahu to rescue pilots and intercept US warships.

Special Attack Units: I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 carried one Type A each.

Reconnaissance Unit: I-10 and I-26 to Aleutians and South Pacific.

The Japanese were disappointed in the results obtained since despite the dense deployment, they torpedoed none of the hundreds of USN warships passing through the area and they were surprised by the USN ASW activity. One boat was lost and several severely depth charged. Surprisingly, I-7 had her seaplance reconnoiter PEarl Harbor on 12/17/41.

On 12/09/41, I-9 spotted the Lexington carrier group. Because of her westward course, the Japanese assumed the US carriers had fled to the west coast and had not been at Pearl Harbor. Two subs were ordered to pursue her and 9 others stationed the length of the US west coast to intercept warships heading to Pearl Harbor or arriving from the west coast. The authors comment that like Doenitz, the chatty talk nightly between the subs and Kwajalein alerted the USN to their location.

In perusing "Kaigun" by Peattie and Evans, there seems to have been little discussion of doctrine since it was established in the early 20's. In 1938-41, the Japanese battle tested their doctrine and found a number of flaws. With no long range sensors, it was hard for submarines to position on the path of enemy targets and once in contact, they didn't have the speed advantage to end around. In one excersise to test ASW in Home Waters, submarines were credited with "sinking" 133 ships. Like the USN pre war, submarine skippers were penalized if discovered, so a passive attack mode was adopted, either long range or by sonar. Japanese submarines were reluctant to surface for any length of time and post war USN interrrogators were struck by how some Japanese skippers were in dense target areas, but never spotted any targets. Unlike US skippers, the Japanese never modified their tactics though they would have most likely failed in the face of USN ASW expertise had they concentrated on warships.

The Japanese were not alone, it took a while for the USN to focus effectively on the Japanese merchant marine. Because of desire for reconnaissance and chasing high value targets, the vital choke point between Luzon and the China coast didin't become a focal point till 1944.

The appearance of the 9 boats off the US west coast trigger an invasion scare and it's primary success was torpedoing if the Saratoga.

Mike:

Thanks for more insights into this topic.

[Ed Rotondaro]

With three of the most important strategic targets missed at Pearl Harbor and all those submarines lurking in the depths of the Ocean but missing our ships, one has to wonder about the real competancy of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Then within ten months, they have lost six carriers, two battleship, numerous cruisers and destroyers, hundreds of aircraft, almost all of their experienced carrier pilots and leaders, plus Guadalcanal.

In hindsight, they don't seem to good at this war business, do they? Should have stuck to China and Russia, they seem to do better.

Dennis:

I think the biggest mistakes for the Japanese were their easy successes against China in 1894 and later in 1937, Russia in 1905 and then very little involvement in WWI. It seemed too easy for them without the hard lessons of protracted warfare and they assumed it would be easy in the Pacific. Whit their successes in the first months of the, their planning seemed justified. Then with the reversal of fortune at Midway and the slow response to Guadalcanal, the IJN never could get back on track while the USN just got bigger and better.

[ksf1973]

The Japs definitely had victory disease, that's for sure, but with regards to the submarine arm, it goes back further than that.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I think the biggest mistakes for the Japanese were their easy successes against China in 1894 and later in 1937, Russia in 1905 and then very little involvement in WWI. It seemed too easy for them without the hard lessons of protracted warfare and they assumed it would be easy in the Pacific. Whit their successes in the first months of the, their planning seemed justified. Then with the reversal of fortune at Midway and the slow response to Guadalcanal, the IJN never could get back on track while the USN just got bigger and better.

From the birth of the IJN, it was a narrow sea or littoral zone navy. Designed to fight against its primary opponent or opponents; China and Russian along the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. Its doctrine, hence its tactics and of course, their naval ship designs were all based on that geopolitical reality. Fighting along coast lines or in a narrow, or enclosed sea is different than fighting in a blue water environment. There were and are, threats along coasts and in narrow seas, that blue water navies, in most cases, don't have to contend with. Ships can have shorter ranges, sacrificing range for speed and heavier armor. Heavier guns can be installed because the ships don't have to contend with heavy seas as much. Ships and tactics will be different.

After WWI, when the Japanese began to turn toward Southeast Asia, Dutch East Indies etc. for raw materials that their increased industrialization needed, The IJN now had a paradigm shift in their doctrine. This was greatly enhanced by their total adoption of Mahanian theories, which had occurred before the Russo-Japanese War. They now had to shift their tactics and ship building to a blue water navy, with the possible encounter with the US fleet. Now, the US fleet was not the Chinese Navy. The US Navy had a strong naval tradition based on long distance operations. It had overseas bases, it had its own natural resources and it was over 3000 mile away from Japan. This new opponent presented a whole new set of problems the IJN had to solve. What the US had built up over one hundred and fifty years since its creation, the IJN had to create and instill in its leaders in just 20 short years.

It is my belief that this was just beyond the capability of this small island. They could not redress the lack of a navy for all those years. We understood mercantile warfare, we understood how to fight over long distances and how logistics could and should be used to facilitate those long distance operations. We had inherited lessons from the Royal Navy. The crux of the matter is that on December 7th, 1941, an essentially narrow sea, littoral zone navy with blue water ships, commenced a war with a blue water navy with years of experience and training in exactly the kind of war, the Japanese had started. The Japanese possibly never understood that idea. They had built the ships and aircraft, but had never fully assimilated the necessary information into their doctrine and hence strategy and tactics of how to fight a blue water navy. They understood their lack of economic resources when compared to the US, but they never understood how much they did not know about long distance operations over water.

Their poor targeting at Pearl Harbor, their failure to develop a convoy system to maintain sea communications, overly complicated operational plans, poor reconnaissance, inability to build air bases quickly, even the lack of a second and third phase of planning, after the initial phase of the war had been completed are indicative of this myopic view or total lack of understanding about the necessary ingredients for long range, blue water operations or the elements necessary for a long, war of attrition. They just never understood, until it was too late. Yamamoto understood, possibly some others, but most never got it.

[ksf1973]

I'm not sure Yamamoto did understand. Sure, before the war he made his famous "twelve to eighteen months" comment, but after the initial wave of Japanese victories, he seems to have been swept up in the moment along with everyone else. Look at his lack of consistent leadership during the Midway operation, for example.

[Ed Rotondaro]

From the birth of the IJN, it was a narrow sea or littoral zone navy. Designed to fight against its primary opponent or opponents; China and Russian along the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. Its doctrine, hence its tactics and of course, their naval ship designs were all based on that geopolitical reality. Fighting along coast lines or in a narrow, or enclosed sea is different than fighting in a blue water environment. There were and are, threats along coasts and in narrow seas, that blue water navies, in most cases, don't have to contend with. Ships can have shorter ranges, sacrificing range for speed and heavier armor. Heavier guns can be installed because the ships don't have to contend with heavy seas as much. Ships and tactics will be different.

After WWI, when the Japanese began to turn toward Southeast Asia, Dutch East Indies etc. for raw materials that their increased industrialization needed, The IJN now had a paradigm shift in their doctrine. This was greatly enhanced by their total adoption of Mahanian theories, which had occurred before the Russo-Japanese War. They now had to shift their tactics and ship building to a blue water navy, with the possible encounter with the US fleet. Now, the US fleet was not the Chinese Navy. The US Navy had a strong naval tradition based on long distance operations. It had overseas bases, it had its own natural resources and it was over 3000 mile away from Japan. This new opponent presented a whole new set of problems the IJN had to solve. What the US had built up over one hundred and fifty years since its creation, the IJN had to create and instill in its leaders in just 20 short years.

It is my belief that this was just beyond the capability of this small island. They could not redress the lack of a navy for all those years. We understood mercantile warfare, we understood how to fight over long distances and how logistics could and should be used to facilitate those long distance operations. We had inherited lessons from the Royal Navy. The crux of the matter is that on December 7th, 1941, an essentially narrow sea, littoral zone navy with blue water ships, commenced a war with a blue water navy with years of experience and training in exactly the kind of war, the Japanese had started. The Japanese possibly never understood that idea. They had built the ships and aircraft, but had never fully assimilated the necessary information into their doctrine and hence strategy and tactics of how to fight a blue water navy. They understood their lack of economic resources when compared to the US, but they never understood how much they did not know about long distance operations over water.

Their poor targeting at Pearl Harbor, their failure to develop a convoy system to maintain sea communications, overly complicated operational plans, poor reconnaissance, inability to build air bases quickly, even the lack of a second and third phase of planning, after the initial phase of the war had been completed are indicative of this myopic view or total lack of understanding about the necessary ingredients for long range, blue water operations or the elements necessary for a long, war of attrition. They just never understood, until it was too late. Yamamoto understood, possibly some others, but most never got it.

Dennis:

This is a well thought out argument that could also be applied to several other navies during the same time period. With the exception of Britain and the US, just about all the other major naval powers were more of a littoral force than a blue water force. Only France comes close and then only with certain classes of warships. It is one thing to design ships with longer cruising ranges, but it is another thing to be able to support them when they are far from home. While the IJN base at Truk could perform some repairs, anything major had to occur back in Japan. The IJN had some ability to refuel at sea, but by late 1944 this had been lost due to the tremendous attrition of her tanker force to US subs. Indeed as H.P. Wilmott points out this loss of strategic mobility doomed the IJN well before Leyte Gulf since they could no longer base their navy near the operational areas, but rather at Lingga Roads were the oil supplies were. Imagine not being able to use Subic Bay, and excellent harbor and existing naval base because you don't have the fuel. You could sum up the IJN's problems by paraphrasing British Admiral Andrew Cunningham who said "It takes three years to build a ship, it would take 300 years to rebuild a tradition".

[Ed Rotondaro]

I'm not sure Yamamoto did understand. Sure, before the war he made his famous "twelve to eighteen months" comment, but after the initial wave of Japanese victories, he seems to have been swept up in the moment along with everyone else. Look at his lack of consistent leadership during the Midway operation, for example.

Kristian:

I'm also not impressed by his leadership during the Guadalcanal campaign. He was too slow to realize the seriousness of the situation and then applied his naval forces in dribs and drabs. He kept allowing the USN time to regroup and build up forces on the ground.

[JMS]

With three of the most important strategic targets missed at Pearl Harbor and all those submarines lurking in the depths of the Ocean but missing our ships, one has to wonder about the real competancy of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Then within ten months, they have lost six carriers, two battleship, numerous cruisers and destroyers, hundreds of aircraft, almost all of their experienced carrier pilots and leaders, plus Guadalcanal.

In hindsight, they don't seem to good at this war business, do they? Should have stuck to China and Russia, they seem to do better.

I disagree, they had a limited force built over the years but it proved to be enough to destroy the pre-war US fleet: http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usf.htm

The United States Navy on December 7 1941, consisted of 902 Commissioned Vessels of the following types

Principal Combat Vessels, 345
Aircraft Carriers 7 + 1 Escort Carrier
Battleships 17
Heavy Cruisers 18
Light Cruisers 19
Destroyers 171
Submarines 112

Of this list, the Japs managed to sink

Aircraft Carriers: 4 + 2 damaged severely of which Sara missed Midway
Battleships: 2 + 2 damaged and out of action for 2 years
Heavy Cruisers: 6
Light Cruisers: -
Destroyers: 25
Submarines: 8

In addition to losses inflicted to the Royal Navy, 2 capital ships, several cruisers, 1 carrier, etc, etc... accomplishing all tasks that were assigned to them during the first year. Against an enemy lacking the industrial resources of the US, they would have prevailed (even Britain), but the failure (which by no means was exclusively the Navy's) to asses the war potential of the United States doomed them to loose the war.

[old_pop2000]

I disagree, they had a limited force built over the years but it proved to be enough to destroy the pre-war US fleet: http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usf.htm

The United States Navy on December 7 1941, consisted of 902 Commissioned Vessels of the following types

Principal Combat Vessels, 345
Aircraft Carriers 7 + 1 Escort Carrier
Battleships 17
Heavy Cruisers 18
Light Cruisers 19
Destroyers 171
Submarines 112

Of this list, the Japs managed to sink

Aircraft Carriers: 4 + 2 damaged severely of which Sara missed Midway
Battleships: 2 + 2 damaged and out of action for 2 years
Heavy Cruisers: 6
Light Cruisers: -
Destroyers: 25
Submarines: 8

In addition to losses inflicted to the Royal Navy, 2 capital ships, several cruisers, 1 carrier, etc, etc... accomplishing all tasks that were assigned to them during the first year. Against an enemy lacking the industrial resources of the US, they would have prevailed (even Britain), but the failure (which by no means was exclusively the Navy's) to asses the war potential of the United States doomed them to loose the war.

Well, each of us has his own interpretation of events. But, if one broadens their view of the war, examining other factors, you would begin to realize that after the initial series of victories over meagre Allied forces, the Japanese lost the initiative, had no second phase of their operations and were very slow to consolidate their gains. While they sank four of our carriers over a nine month period, and at least one British carrier, they lost four first line carriers, two battleships, two light carriers, numerous cruisers, destroyers, tankers. They had two of their newest carriers damaged twice and their air groups gutted. Most of their top squadron commanders like Murata were dead as well as 600 other top pilots. They had used up with Operation MI one full years worth of fuel oil from the their supplies that had been calculated to last two years. By the end of the first year of war, the IJN was reduced to land based aircraft and battleships. Their forward bases in the SW Pacific were under constant air attack from Australia, their sea communications between the SW Pacific and Japan were beginning to be attacked by our submarines and we had already secured a forward base from which to begin the slow march up the Solomons. This all occurred with a prewar navy built by the US. Their first line fighter was already having difficulties maintaining air superiority over our aircraft and in most cases, was losing air battles on a regular basis and their two carrier based attack aircraft were now death traps.

Sorry, but you are going to have to give me more than a few old battleships sunk, to convince me that this group knew what it was doing. When you miss tankers, dry docks, and 6.5 million gallons of oil for ships, when you fail to cut off the supplies for a forward base which you knew was valuable to the US for any war in the Pacific and had studied its importance since before the Russo-Japanese war, then I would say you weren't very good at this war business. War is more than surface engagements between ships. An example of good planning is War Plan Orange, a plan that we followed to it's logical conclusion. A plan that was developed over 30 years and our navy was built around. We had developed and trained amphibious landing forces in accordance with the requirements of WPO. All of these factors show me, that the IJN was woefully unprepared to fight a blue water navy in a Pacific War.

[Kyle Holgate]

The Japs definitely had victory disease, that's for sure, but with regards to the submarine arm, it goes back further than that.

I'm not sure the term "japs" should be in use any longer, but then again I am no authority on what is Pollitically correct and what isn't - so just a thought!

[old_pop2000]

I'm not sure the term "japs" should be in use any longer, but then again I am no authority on what is Pollitically correct and what isn't - so just a thought!
I didn't notice that term, but would concur that that wartime term is not appropriate, although probably not as offensive as some others I've heard from vets.

[john964]

I disagree, they had a limited force built over the years but it proved to be enough to destroy the pre-war US fleet: http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usf.htm

The United States Navy on December 7 1941, consisted of 902 Commissioned Vessels of the following types

Principal Combat Vessels, 345
Aircraft Carriers 7 + 1 Escort Carrier
Battleships 17
Heavy Cruisers 18
Light Cruisers 19
Destroyers 171
Submarines 112

Of this list, the Japs managed to sink

Aircraft Carriers: 4 + 2 damaged severely of which Sara missed Midway
Battleships: 2 + 2 damaged and out of action for 2 years
Heavy Cruisers: 6
Light Cruisers: -
Destroyers: 25
Submarines: 8

In addition to losses inflicted to the Royal Navy, 2 capital ships, several cruisers, 1 carrier, etc, etc... accomplishing all tasks that were assigned to them during the first year. Against an enemy lacking the industrial resources of the US, they would have prevailed (even Britain), but the failure (which by no means was exclusively the Navy's) to asses the war potential of the United States doomed them to loose the war.We could afford the losses the IJN could not, of the 4 CV's lost at Midway they were not replaced on a 1 for 1 basses at all. While over the first year of the war the USN lost the same number but replaced all of them and more by the end of 43.

[JMS]

Well, each of us has his own interpretation of events. But, if one broadens their view of the war, examining other factors, you would begin to realize that after the initial series of victories over meagre Allied forces, the Japanese lost the initiative, had no second phase of their operations and were very slow to consolidate their gains. While they sank four of our carriers over a nine month period, and at least one British carrier, they lost four first line carriers, two battleships, two light carriers, numerous cruisers, destroyers, tankers. They had two of their newest carriers damaged twice and their air groups gutted. Most of their top squadron commanders like Murata were dead as well as 600 other top pilots. They had used up with Operation MI one full years worth of fuel oil from the their supplies that had been calculated to last two years. By the end of the first year of war, the IJN was reduced to land based aircraft and battleships. Their forward bases in the SW Pacific were under constant air attack from Australia, their sea communications between the SW Pacific and Japan were beginning to be attacked by our submarines and we had already secured a forward base from which to begin the slow march up the Solomons. This all occurred with a prewar navy built by the US. Their first line fighter was already having difficulties maintaining air superiority over our aircraft and in most cases, was losing air battles on a regular basis and their two carrier based attack aircraft were now death traps.


Yes, we probably will get bogged over the interpretation. If the Midway operation had followed a more "logical" course of events it would have been lumped together with the triumphs of the Japanese (noted that the previous term may be unacceptable) even though it ended up in a strategic dead end.

And to be fair, the US was also reduced to land based aircraft and battleships by the end of the first year, and without any superiority in the air to air arena, yet. All the limitations you note above couldn't be made good not for lack of will but for lack of means, and many of the US advantages (better and more effective use of submarines, better planes, radar, sonar...) where not yet available or adequately exploited. US industrial muscle, mobilised since 1940, only started to be felt in 1943 and from then on, it was downhill for the Japanese.




Sorry, but you are going to have to give me more than a few old battleships sunk, to convince me that this group knew what it was doing. When you miss tankers, dry docks, and 6.5 million gallons of oil for ships, when you fail to cut off the supplies for a forward base which you knew was valuable to the US for any war in the Pacific and had studied its importance since before the Russo-Japanese war, then I would say you weren't very good at this war business. War is more than surface engagements between ships. An example of good planning is War Plan Orange, a plan that we followed to it's logical conclusion. A plan that was developed over 30 years and our navy was built around. We had developed and trained amphibious landing forces in accordance with the requirements of WPO. All of these factors show me, that the IJN was woefully unprepared to fight a blue water navy in a Pacific War.

But War plan Orange was not the plan implemented in the end, since the auxiliaries needed and the forward bases did not exist. Instead, a long attrition battle in a strategic cul de sac like the Solomon islands was adopted, it came out good because the Japanese couldn't make good their losses and due to a lack of accurate intelligence (yet another US advantage) but the ensuing campaigns achieved very little of worth. It was not until 1943 that submarines started to hurt and until 1944 that the Japanese were confronted again over worthwile territory, time enough for attritionto work through diminishing Japanese forces, but the tools for that were built after the start of the war.

[JMS]

We could afford the losses the IJN could not, of the 4 CV's lost at Midway they were not replaced on a 1 for 1 basses at all. While over the first year of the war the USN lost the same number but replaced all of them and more by the end of 43.

Certainly, but that was where the Japanese miscalculated, Russia and China could not afford the losses and lost.

[old_pop2000]

We could afford the losses the IJN could not, of the 4 CV's lost at Midway they were not replaced on a 1 for 1 basses at all. While over the first year of the war the USN lost the same number but replaced all of them and more by the end of 43.
The Japanese started the war, because the IJN was at its peak versus the US Fleet. They had a fleet that was 70% of ours, but that ratio was slowly eroding as the 1940 Navy bill ships were entering service. For every four ships of ours, they had 2.8 ships. If we look at the ratio of the carriers and battleships, we lost four carriers to their six, we lost two battleships to their two within the first year of the war. I don't have the ratio of numbers on cruisers and destroyers at hand. However, when you start out with only 70% of the ships of your opponent, you cannot afford to match him one for one and in this case it was worse. They were also short of fuel and raw materials to build more ships. Their scrap steel supply was dwindling and this is the kind of steel needed for blast furnaces instead of iron ore. All nations used more scrap steel in their furnaces than raw iron ore. The Japanese never understood the concept of fighting a total war.

[ksf1973]

Unless Christopher tells me directly to stop, I will continue to use the term "Japs". Political correctness is a scourge that must be obliterated.

[old_pop2000]

Unless Christopher tells me directly to stop, I will continue to use the term "Japs". Political correctness is a scourge that must be obliterated.
I don't think it has anything to do with political correctness as it does respect for other nationalities. Although much of our discussions are centered on the Japanese nation and the war it started in 1941, respect for the people should still be a cornerstone of our attitudes. I believe that we should continue that respect on this forum. World War II was over sixty-three years ago.

[Warship NWS]

Unless Christopher tells me directly to stop, I will continue to use the term "Japs". Political correctness is a scourge that must be obliterated.

I agree with Dennis on this part. It shows a higher level of professionalism to use the properly titled nationality, not one derived in the 1940s during hostile times.

[ksf1973]

Duly noted.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I disagree, they had a limited force built over the years but it proved to be enough to destroy the pre-war US fleet: http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usf.htm

The United States Navy on December 7 1941, consisted of 902 Commissioned Vessels of the following types

Principal Combat Vessels, 345
Aircraft Carriers 7 + 1 Escort Carrier
Battleships 17
Heavy Cruisers 18
Light Cruisers 19
Destroyers 171
Submarines 112

Of this list, the Japs managed to sink

Aircraft Carriers: 4 + 2 damaged severely of which Sara missed Midway
Battleships: 2 + 2 damaged and out of action for 2 years
Heavy Cruisers: 6
Light Cruisers: -
Destroyers: 25
Submarines: 8

In addition to losses inflicted to the Royal Navy, 2 capital ships, several cruisers, 1 carrier, etc, etc... accomplishing all tasks that were assigned to them during the first year. Against an enemy lacking the industrial resources of the US, they would have prevailed (even Britain), but the failure (which by no means was exclusively the Navy's) to asses the war potential of the United States doomed them to loose the war.

JMS:

If by the timeline of losses you are projecting here, you missed three CLs. The Helena a Brooklyn class and the Atlanta and Juneau which were Atlanta class.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Japanese started the war, because the IJN was at its peak versus the US Fleet. They had a fleet that was 70% of ours, but that ratio was slowly eroding as the 1940 Navy bill ships were entering service. For every four ships of ours, they had 2.8 ships. If we look at the ratio of the carriers and battleships, we lost four carriers to their six, we lost two battleships to their two within the first year of the war. I don't have the ratio of numbers on cruisers and destroyers at hand. However, when you start out with only 70% of the ships of your opponent, you cannot afford to match him one for one and in this case it was worse. They were also short of fuel and raw materials to build more ships. Their scrap steel supply was dwindling and this is the kind of steel needed for blast furnaces instead of iron ore. All nations used more scrap steel in their furnaces than raw iron ore. The Japanese never understood the concept of fighting a total war.

Dennis:

Good points, the IJN certainly couldn not afford to swap ships on a one to one basis with the USN. Even with their plan for a Decisive Battle, they understood the need to attrit the USN as it worked its way across the Pacific. Their tactics, doctrine and ship designs emphasised wearing the USN down with night time torpedo attacks at long range. They planned that by the time they faced the US battleline, they would have at least numeric parity and more hopefully superiority.

If you examine each tactical triumph the IJN achieved in the Guadalcanal area, none of them trumped the fact that Henderson Field was an unsinkable aircraft carrier and that every day the USN was able to send more men and supplies to the island. Personally I don't think even if the attempted reinforcements of the November 1942 naval actions had been successfully landed that it would have been enough to dislodge the Marines. That opportunity was squandered after Savo Island.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Good points, the IJN certainly couldn not afford to swap ships on a one to one basis with the USN. Even with their plan for a Decisive Battle, they understood the need to attrit the USN as it worked its way across the Pacific. Their tactics, doctrine and ship designs emphasised wearing the USN down with night time torpedo attacks at long range. They planned that by the time they faced the US battleline, they would have at least numeric parity and more hopefully superiority.

If you examine each tactical triumph the IJN achieved in the Guadalcanal area, none of them trumped the fact that Henderson Field was an unsinkable aircraft carrier and that every day the USN was able to send more men and supplies to the island. Personally I don't think even if the attempted reinforcements of the November 1942 naval actions had been successfully landed that it would have been enough to dislodge the Marines. That opportunity was squandered after Savo Island.


The problem at Guadalcanal was always the lack of airbases close enough to the island, to provide air cover for the ships and to gain air superiority over the island. The inability of the Japanese to build airbases in a timely manner and to have a second phase plan, when the initial successes were gained, was a deficiency in their war planning. Also included would be a severe lack of transport assets and escorts for those transport, to facilitate landings along with adequate troops. The list of deficiencies in their long range planning begin to multiply, as one can see. Of course, squandering their lead in carriers in the first year of the war, on an unnecessarily complicated operation like MI, did not help. Sending Kido Butai to the Indian Ocean then to attack Darwin was an unnecessary wastage of pilots, aircraft and fuel, along with delaying any necessary upgrades to the ships and rest for the crews.

[JMS]

The problem at Guadalcanal was always the lack of airbases close enough to the island, to provide air cover for the ships and to gain air superiority over the island. The inability of the Japanese to build airbases in a timely manner and to have a second phase plan, when the initial successes were gained, was a deficiency in their war planning. Also included would be a severe lack of transport assets and escorts for those transport, to facilitate landings along with adequate troops. The list of deficiencies in their long range planning begin to multiply, as one can see. Of course, squandering their lead in carriers in the first year of the war, on an unnecessarily complicated operation like MI, did not help. Sending Kido Butai to the Indian Ocean then to attack Darwin was an unnecessary wastage of pilots, aircraft and fuel, along with delaying any necessary upgrades to the ships and rest for the crews.

More to the point, Guadalcanal was in the middle of nowhere and its strategic significance was negligible. Should the allies had landed unopposed and made Henderson a first rate base, there was nothing worthwile to attack.

[JMS]

JMS:

If by the timeline of losses you are projecting here, you missed three CLs. The Helena a Brooklyn class and the Atlanta and Juneau which were Atlanta class.

Helena fell a bit on the outside of the timeframe and the Atlantas were commissioned after Pearl IIRC.

Of course, the overall number don't tell all the story as there was a need to maintain a strong force in the Atlantic, after all, Torch was in November.

[john964]

Helena fell a bit on the outside of the timeframe and the Atlantas were commissioned after Pearl IIRC.
Not by much, USS Atlanta (CL-52) was commissioned 24 DEC 42

[Campy]

More to the point, Guadalcanal was in the middle of nowhere and its strategic significance was negligible. Should the allies had landed unopposed and made Henderson a first rate base, there was nothing worthwile to attack.

Even more to the point. Japan was short on supplies, ships, aircraft. Guadalcanal was at the very end of their logistics tether. Just getting the means of war to the island used resources the Japanese could not afford to waste. And that was before any material and personnel losses.

Frank

[Ed Rotondaro]

More to the point, Guadalcanal was in the middle of nowhere and its strategic significance was negligible. Should the allies had landed unopposed and made Henderson a first rate base, there was nothing worthwile to attack.

JMS:

I cannot completely agree here. While Guadalcanal and the Solomons were not part of War Plan Orange, the Allies were able to adapt to meet the changing circumstances. Guadalcanal helped defend Port Moresby and by extension Australia. It gave the Allies a staging point to attack Rabaul and it also helped them move up the Solomons and isolate Rabaul which in effect became the largest open air POW camp as the Japanese poured men and resources into a stratgetic backwater. Most importantly it allowed the Allies to conduct offensive operations in range of land based air at a time when their carrier strength was greatly depleted. Once the carriers came on line in late 1943, you see the shift from the South West Pacific theater to the Central Pacific.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Helena fell a bit on the outside of the timeframe and the Atlantas were commissioned after Pearl IIRC.

Of course, the overall number don't tell all the story as there was a need to maintain a strong force in the Atlantic, after all, Torch was in November.

JMS:

You never defined the time frame and I was under the impression that we were discussing the IJN's ability to damage the USN. My pardon.:rolleyes:

[Ed Rotondaro]

Even more to the point. Japan was short on supplies, ships, aircraft. Guadalcanal was at the very end of their logistics tether. Just getting the means of war to the island used resources the Japanese could not afford to waste. And that was before any material and personnel losses.

Frank

Campy:

And the fact that the USN could keep Guadalcanal supplied speaks volumes for the lack of strategic planning by Japan. The US had to transport supplies from the West Coast, but with the possesion of New Caledonia, New Zealand and Australia, it had large established staging points to stockpile supplies and acclimate its troops to the South West Pacific. Japan had Rabaul which really wasn't much better than Guadalcanal as a base.

[old_pop2000]

More to the point, Guadalcanal was in the middle of nowhere and its strategic significance was negligible. Should the allies had landed unopposed and made Henderson a first rate base, there was nothing worthwile to attack.


Guadalcanal is actually only 900 miles from the important Pearl Harbor-Australia supply line, a supply line that War Plan Orange always emphasized as important and needed to be protected. While the plan did not predict any landings in this area, the second phase of the plan was to occur after the M + 180 and would be a landing to begin to attack the Japanese defense line. So the Guadalcanal landings were in line with the second phase and did protect important bases at Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia and Efate. It's strategic significance was vital. It began the attrition phase of the war.

[Mike Malanaphy]

The problem at Guadalcanal was always the lack of airbases close enough to the island, to provide air cover for the ships and to gain air superiority over the island. The inability of the Japanese to build airbases in a timely manner and to have a second phase plan, when the initial successes were gained, was a deficiency in their war planning. Also included would be a severe lack of transport assets and escorts for those transport, to facilitate landings along with adequate troops. The list of deficiencies in their long range planning begin to multiply, as one can see. Of course, squandering their lead in carriers in the first year of the war, on an unnecessarily complicated operation like MI, did not help. Sending Kido Butai to the Indian Ocean then to attack Darwin was an unnecessary wastage of pilots, aircraft and fuel, along with delaying any necessary upgrades to the ships and rest for the crews.

Hi Dennis,

The Japanese military had little strategic concensus beyond the first phase and were caught flatfooted by it's successs. While the Army didn't want to invade Australia, they certainly realized it's potential as a staging base for Allied forces. While the supply route was within range of Rikkos from Rabaul of Guadfalcanal, a minor swing to the south puts them out of range to attack convoys.

The long supply line from Hawaii to Australia makes it tempting for cruiser warfare by the Japanese. Such activites would require heavy escorts and tie down US carriers to escort them as they often did. The cruiser raid intio the bay of Bengal in support of the Kido Butai cruise was extremely successful in terms of tonnage sunk. Tone and Chikuma would have been good candidates because of their specialized facilites for float planes.

Dennis makes a good point about the use of Nagumo's carriers. I suspect that once the naval hierarchy saw their striking power, demand for them would be high. Pre Coral Sea, Nagumo could strike hammer blows virtually anywhere in the South Pacific. But the low production of carrier planes and pilots in 1942 made any losses, operational or otherwise, painful. The ships themselves needed maintenance as well. Would have been interesting if there had been time to install one of the prototype radar installations on one of Nagumo's carriers other than one of battleships.

[ksf1973]

As with the submarines, the Japanese let their carriers down with their operational doctrine. If they'd not stuck so religiously to their carrier division organizations, there could have been 5 carriers at Midway instead of four.

[old_pop2000]

As with the submarines, the Japanese let their carriers down with their operational doctrine. If they'd not stuck so religiously to their carrier division organizations, there could have been 5 carriers at Midway instead of four.
No, actually there wouldn't have been. Japanese squadron structure and training would not have been able to combine Shokaku squadrons with Zuikaku squadrons because the squadron personnel were part of ships company. The training of new pilots after basic and intermediate flight training was done in the squadrons on board the ship. During peacetime, that is easy, it isn't so easy during wartime. The US had reserve air groups stationed at Kanoehe to facilitate that.

The better suggestion would have been to move Ryujo from the Aleutian operation, to the First Striking Fleet and allow her to provide long range reconnaissance with her B5N's and CAP Zero's, while the Zero's on board the attack carriers were used to escort the strike groups. Ryujo was a good carrier, fast enough to stay with the fleet carriers. She could carry 38 aircraft. 18 B5N-1,-2's, 20 Zero's. That ratio could have been adjusted to 9 B5N-2's and 29 Zero's. Twenty nine Zero's probably could have been a reasonable number of CAP aircraft to defend the fleet.

[ksf1973]

As I said, "let down by their doctrine". The Japanese were rigid, the Allies (eventually) flexible.

[JMS]

Guadalcanal is actually only 900 miles from the important Pearl Harbor-Australia supply line, a supply line that War Plan Orange always emphasized as important and needed to be protected. While the plan did not predict any landings in this area, the second phase of the plan was to occur after the M + 180 and would be a landing to begin to attack the Japanese defense line. So the Guadalcanal landings were in line with the second phase and did protect important bases at Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia and Efate. It's strategic significance was vital. It began the attrition phase of the war.

Sure, but just how hard is it to move the sealines a few miles away to keep them out of enemy air range? this ain't no railroad, ships could sail further away and Guadalcanal was never going to became a second Rabaul. It began the attrition phase because the Japanese insisted in fighting for such a backwater, had they chosen not to, it would have been right there with the invasions of Attu and Kiska in the worthlessness scale.

[JMS]

No, actually there wouldn't have been. Japanese squadron structure and training would not have been able to combine Shokaku squadrons with Zuikaku squadrons because the squadron personnel were part of ships company. The training of new pilots after basic and intermediate flight training was done in the squadrons on board the ship. During peacetime, that is easy, it isn't so easy during wartime. The US had reserve air groups stationed at Kanoehe to facilitate that.

The better suggestion would have been to move Ryujo from the Aleutian operation, to the First Striking Fleet and allow her to provide long range reconnaissance with her B5N's and CAP Zero's, while the Zero's on board the attack carriers were used to escort the strike groups. Ryujo was a good carrier, fast enough to stay with the fleet carriers. She could carry 38 aircraft. 18 B5N-1,-2's, 20 Zero's. That ratio could have been adjusted to 9 B5N-2's and 29 Zero's. Twenty nine Zero's probably could have been a reasonable number of CAP aircraft to defend the fleet.

Or not, weather and no radar more than lack of aircraft was what doomed the Japanese at Midway. If it had been clear and sunny they would have been detected sooner but the (practically unescorted) US planes could have been massacred leisurely and there would have been little chance for surprise.

[old_pop2000]

Or not, weather and no radar more than lack of aircraft was what doomed the Japanese at Midway. If it had been clear and sunny they would have been detected sooner but the (practically unescorted) US planes could have been massacred leisurely and there would have been little chance for surprise.


Weather was a common factor for both sides, it cancelled itself out. As for radar, the CXAM radar had an optimal range of 50 miles on large aircraft. It was not capable of assisting in the search for the First Striking Fleet, only for the flighter direction officers in managing the combat air patrols.

The most important factor was the signal intelligence. Next was the Japanese failure to concentrate their forces at the point of attack. This last factor caused the Japanese to have less CAP fighters to protect the fleet. This was remedied later when the ratio of fighters to bombers was increased, just like the US. We have moved from 18 fighters per carrier at Coral Sea to 27 at Midway to 36 at Guadalcanal. We can also add to that, poor reconnaissance patterns, using a single plane search instead of a two plane search which was far more effective. But always remember, they had no idea we had read their mail and were waiting for them.

[old_pop2000]

I've been reviewing the accepted timeline for the two strike groups launched at Pearl Harbor and the rearm and refuel times established by Parshall and Tully in Shattered Sword. Here is my assessment.

Takeoff of the first wave was at 0610 hours. It probably took 20 to 30 min. to launch, climb and form up.

Attack was signalled at 0749 by Fuchida


First wave arrived back at the carriers at 1000. If we assume wounded and damaged landed first, then the rest, all aircraft should have been landed by 1030.

According to Parshall, it took 30 minutes to rearm and refuel a chutai or squadron. There were three chutai on each carrier. In the PH attack only half of the squadrons were in the first wave. The other half was with the second wave. With this information, it probably took 15 or 20 minutes to rearm and refuel the first wave or one hour to rearm, refuel, bring them up on the deck and prepare for launch. 20 minutes to launch is probably standard. So, we are looking at 1.5 hours to perform this on the first wave.

Time now is 1130 local time. The first wave has now been launched as the third wave, but the second wave is now returning for landing and rearming for the possibility of the discovery of the US carriers.

Third wave should be able to hit the fuel tanks, tankers, airfields etc. by 1300 hrs. One hour attack time, means they would leave the area by 1400 hrs. They would arrive back on the carriers by 1520, land and now Nagumo's carriers can head north to rendevous with the tankers. Time should be 1540 or thereabouts.

Even with possible accidents etc. This timeline is accurate. If they went with dive bomber only attack, it might be possible to expedite, but I see no reason for that. They had the time. I am waiting for Willmott's book, he supposedly explains why it wasn't possible. I really have to see that explanation because based on the newly accepted times for rearming, refueling and launching, there was sufficient time to execute the third attack.

Addendum: Some accounts state that aircraft were arriving back from 1010 to 1230. I suspect that is the combined first and second wave. A first wave aircraft, taking off at 0610 could not stay aloft for six hours, no matter how good the fuel management was.

[bridav58]

Dennis,
here is a letter I got from a gentleman named Electric Joe over on warships1.com . I think he puts forth a very good argument based largely on Wilmott's book "Pearl Harbor" . It's his authorship though.

"Brian,

See Willmott, Pearl Harbor, page 203 for damages.

See Willmott, Pearl Harbor, Chapter 5 for a pretty good discussion of the third strike fallacy.

In the first strike the Japanese lost 5 B5Ns, 1 D3As, and 3 A6Ms.

In the first strike the Japanese had damaged 18+ B5Ns, 17 D3A,s and 17 A6Ms.

In the second strike the Japanese lost 0 B5Ns, 14 D3As, and 6 A6Ms.

In the second strike the Japanese had damaged 16 B5Ns, 41+ D3As, and 8+ A6Ms.

In total, 5 of 134 B5Ns were lost. 34+ of 134 B5Ns were damaged. 15 of 129 D3As were lost. 58 of 129 D3As were damaged. 9 of 78 A6Ms were lost. 19 of 78 A6Ms were damaged.

That's 29% of B5Ns lost or damaged.
That's 57% of D3As lost or damaged.
That's 36% of A6Ms lost or damaged.
That's 40% of all aircraft lost or damaged.

Put more simply: Ouch! Compared to the romps they were used to in China, this was a painful experience.

As for why the third strike was screwed, the Japanese couldn't even begin planning the thing without battle damage assessment (BDA) information. Unfortunately, the best BDA was Fuchida's and he was literally the last to land. This was at about 1215.

The staff then had to receive Fuchida's information, process it and make a plan. They also had to be informed of the status of all six carriers' air groups. Once the plan was written, it had to be distributed to all six carriers, which would then begin the process of arming and fueling the strike aircraft. Presumably, much repair and possibly refueling work would already be underway, but arming would have to wait for a determination of what types of targets would be attacked.

Of course, there's a little hitch. The first strike recovered and was struck below. Hard on the heels of that strike the second was recovered and struck below. Intermixed with good aircraft are damaged aircraft. Extracting usable aircraft from amongst unusable is going to be a handling officer's nightmare and take a while...slowing everything down.

Once the plan's distributed, the pilots need to be briefed (presumably they've been eating while waiting). This all takes time.

Fuchida recovered at 1215. Sunset is at 1720. That's 5 hours and 5 minutes in which to:
-Process BDA
-Process aircraft status of six carriers
-Feed aircrew
-Formulate a plan
-Distribute the plan
-Brief the pilots
-Unscramble the mess in the hangars
-Fuel the strike aircraft
-Arm the strike aircraft
-Spot the strike aircraft
-Warm up the strike aircraft
-Man the planes
-Launch the planes
-Rendezvous
-Fly at least an hour to the target
-Fight an alerted, pissed off and increasingly effective enemy that improved 450% just between the time your first and second strikes went in
-Fly at least an hour to the carriers
-Marshal for recovery
-Recover all aircraft before sunset, because none of your pilots have longed a night recovery since at least November 25th (and probably considerably longer) and every single one of them is "out of qual" for night landings (not to mention you don't want to risk losing a flammable Japanese aircraft carrier to a deck crash at this juncture).

You must do your follow up strike on the 7th, because if you wait until the 8th, you're playing dice with American submarines, aircraft and surface ships finding you and getting to you, and your destroyers will run out of fuel if you loiter.

The Japanese literally did not have enough daylight to do the job.

Also, the Japanese made the determination after the first two strikes that life was way too hazardous over Oahu for B5Ns to continue to fly there. So what that leaves for a second strike is 44 D3As and fighter escort. And although life was considered too risky for the B5Ns...which bird took the brunt of the losses: the D3A. Not a real cheery picture. Add in that the Americans are really, really, pissed, and shooting a hell of a lot better than absolutely anything you ever saw in China, and you're going to have to make a night recovery, because you'll be lucky if you can launch before 1500 or 1600 (heck, you'll be lucky to have daylight for the attack)...can we say "No!"?

S/ Joe '
end quote....

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,
here is a letter I got from a gentleman named Electric Joe over on warships1.com . I think he puts forth a very good argument based largely on Wilmott's book "Pearl Harbor" . It's his authorship though.

"Brian,

See Willmott, Pearl Harbor, page 203 for damages.

See Willmott, Pearl Harbor, Chapter 5 for a pretty good discussion of the third strike fallacy.

In the first strike the Japanese lost 5 B5Ns, 1 D3As, and 3 A6Ms.

In the first strike the Japanese had damaged 18+ B5Ns, 17 D3A,s and 17 A6Ms.

In the second strike the Japanese lost 0 B5Ns, 14 D3As, and 6 A6Ms.

In the second strike the Japanese had damaged 16 B5Ns, 41+ D3As, and 8+ A6Ms.

In total, 5 of 134 B5Ns were lost. 34+ of 134 B5Ns were damaged. 15 of 129 D3As were lost. 58 of 129 D3As were damaged. 9 of 78 A6Ms were lost. 19 of 78 A6Ms were damaged.

That's 29% of B5Ns lost or damaged.
That's 57% of D3As lost or damaged.
That's 36% of A6Ms lost or damaged.
That's 40% of all aircraft lost or damaged.

Put more simply: Ouch! Compared to the romps they were used to in China, this was a painful experience.

As for why the third strike was screwed, the Japanese couldn't even begin planning the thing without battle damage assessment (BDA) information. Unfortunately, the best BDA was Fuchida's and he was literally the last to land. This was at about 1215.

The staff then had to receive Fuchida's information, process it and make a plan. They also had to be informed of the status of all six carriers' air groups. Once the plan was written, it had to be distributed to all six carriers, which would then begin the process of arming and fueling the strike aircraft. Presumably, much repair and possibly refueling work would already be underway, but arming would have to wait for a determination of what types of targets would be attacked.

Of course, there's a little hitch. The first strike recovered and was struck below. Hard on the heels of that strike the second was recovered and struck below. Intermixed with good aircraft are damaged aircraft. Extracting usable aircraft from amongst unusable is going to be a handling officer's nightmare and take a while...slowing everything down.

Once the plan's distributed, the pilots need to be briefed (presumably they've been eating while waiting). This all takes time.

Fuchida recovered at 1215. Sunset is at 1720. That's 5 hours and 5 minutes in which to:
-Process BDA
-Process aircraft status of six carriers
-Feed aircrew
-Formulate a plan
-Distribute the plan
-Brief the pilots
-Unscramble the mess in the hangars
-Fuel the strike aircraft
-Arm the strike aircraft
-Spot the strike aircraft
-Warm up the strike aircraft
-Man the planes
-Launch the planes
-Rendezvous
-Fly at least an hour to the target
-Fight an alerted, pissed off and increasingly effective enemy that improved 450% just between the time your first and second strikes went in
-Fly at least an hour to the carriers
-Marshal for recovery
-Recover all aircraft before sunset, because none of your pilots have longed a night recovery since at least November 25th (and probably considerably longer) and every single one of them is "out of qual" for night landings (not to mention you don't want to risk losing a flammable Japanese aircraft carrier to a deck crash at this juncture).

You must do your follow up strike on the 7th, because if you wait until the 8th, you're playing dice with American submarines, aircraft and surface ships finding you and getting to you, and your destroyers will run out of fuel if you loiter.

The Japanese literally did not have enough daylight to do the job.

Also, the Japanese made the determination after the first two strikes that life was way too hazardous over Oahu for B5Ns to continue to fly there. So what that leaves for a second strike is 44 D3As and fighter escort. And although life was considered too risky for the B5Ns...which bird took the brunt of the losses: the D3A. Not a real cheery picture. Add in that the Americans are really, really, pissed, and shooting a hell of a lot better than absolutely anything you ever saw in China, and you're going to have to make a night recovery, because you'll be lucky if you can launch before 1500 or 1600 (heck, you'll be lucky to have daylight for the attack)...can we say "No!"?

S/ Joe '
end quote....

I have Willmott's book on Pearl Harbor being delivered in a week or two, this will give me more time to examine his timeline. Willmott is a good researcher, so I will be interested to find out what his sources on the details of recovery, rearming, refueling and launching aircraft are.

Here are some basic facts:

Launch times ran around 20-30 seconds per aircraft. Recovery times were based on the type of aircraft. Fighters-25-30 seconds, bombers-40-45 seconds. Fighters were stowed in the middle to forward section of the upper hanger. Torpedo bombers were stowed in after section of the lower hanger, with the dive bombers stowed in the aft end of the upper and forward end of the lower. There were three elevators which went from the lower hanger to the deck. Cycle times for the older carriers ran around 60 seconds, for Shokaku/Zuikaku it ran around 40 seconds.

At all times, it was cramped and space was limited. Even with modest folding wings, it was close. However, this would not preclude the deck crews from being able to bring up 36 Val's and 20 or more Zero's easily since the Vals and Zero's were generally in the same hangers, each having their own elevator for use. Forward for the Zeros, middle for the Vals.

I hope this gives you a better picture of Japanese carrier operations. As to the information provided, I can only say that a BDA was not necessary to launch a third strike, these were new targets, provided the attack was limited to the fuel tanks, tankers and dry docks. There were enough surviving undamaged Vals-56 in all- to mount another attack. In fact, all the undamaged Vals could have been sent, while the damaged aircraft were repaired, refueled and rearmed. Aircrews could rest and eat during the rearming and refueling period. The targets were not well defended with AA guns except possibly the docks. The flight path of the second wave took them, in one case, over the tanks. In the other, the tanks and docks were off to port. Let's keep in mind, that things happened on the carriers in parallel, not serially. While planes were being readied, men could be eating, commanders planning, and the plans blinkered or telegraphed to the other carriers.

Note also, that sunset was at 1749 on 7 December 1941 however civil twilight did not end until 1814. So, in point of fact, had they launched by 1200, they would have had 6 hrs and 14 minutes for the third wave. Have a nice day. ( As per the U.S. Naval Observatory)

[Campy]

There were enough surviving undamaged Vals-56 in all- to mount another attack.

Would 56 Vals have been enough to cause significant damage to the infrastructure of Pearl? 36 Vals and 36 Kates didn't put Midway out of operation. Again, consider the loss/damage numbers of the first and second waves. Do you really want to risk significant further loss of your strike groups? Also remember that these ships and planes were needed elsewhere after Pearl. When trying to second guess the commander on the scene, it helps to consider his point of view.

Frank

[john964]

Uh, What tankers from everything I have seen on Pearl Harbor there was only one tanker in port during the attack USS Neosheo (AO-23) at the fueling pier on/off loading avgas.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have Willmott's book on Pearl Harbor being delivered in a week or two, this will give me more time to examine his timeline. Willmott is a good researcher, so I will be interested to find out what his sources on the details of recovery, rearming, refueling and launching aircraft are.

Here are some basic facts:

Launch times ran around 20-30 seconds per aircraft. Recovery times were based on the type of aircraft. Fighters-25-30 seconds, bombers-40-45 seconds. Fighters were stowed in the middle to forward section of the upper hanger. Torpedo bombers were stowed in after section of the lower hanger, with the dive bombers stowed in the aft end of the upper and forward end of the lower. There were three elevators which went from the lower hanger to the deck. Cycle times for the older carriers ran around 60 seconds, for Shokaku/Zuikaku it ran around 40 seconds.

At all times, it was cramped and space was limited. Even with modest folding wings, it was close. However, this would not preclude the deck crews from being able to bring up 36 Val's and 20 or more Zero's easily since the Vals and Zero's were generally in the same hangers, each having their own elevator for use. Forward for the Zeros, middle for the Vals.

I hope this gives you a better picture of Japanese carrier operations. As to the information provided, I can only say that a BDA was not necessary to launch a third strike, these were new targets, provided the attack was limited to the fuel tanks, tankers and dry docks. There were enough surviving undamaged Vals-56 in all- to mount another attack. In fact, all the undamaged Vals could have been sent, while the damaged aircraft were repaired, refueled and rearmed. Aircrews could rest and eat during the rearming and refueling period. The targets were not well defended with AA guns except possibly the docks. The flight path of the second wave took them, in one case, over the tanks. In the other, the tanks and docks were off to port. Let's keep in mind, that things happened on the carriers in parallel, not serially. While planes were being readied, men could be eating, commanders planning, and the plans blinkered or telegraphed to the other carriers.

Note also, that sunset was at 1749 on 7 December 1941 however civil twilight did not end until 1814. So, in point of fact, had they launched by 1200, they would have had 6 hrs and 14 minutes for the third wave. Have a nice day. ( As per the U.S. Naval Observatory)

Dennis:

I would be interested in your opinion of Wilmott's book after you've read it. I don't have a book on Pearl Harbor per se, just books that cover the raid as part of a general history.

[old_pop2000]

Would 56 Vals have been enough to cause significant damage to the infrastructure of Pearl? 36 Vals and 36 Kates didn't put Midway out of operation. Again, consider the loss/damage numbers of the first and second waves. Do you really want to risk significant further loss of your strike groups? Also remember that these ships and planes were needed elsewhere after Pearl. When trying to second guess the commander on the scene, it helps to consider his point of view.

Frank


In the Midway attack, John Ford had pictures of the Japanese hitting a small tank containing AVgas. It they could hit that tank, the large fuel tanks in Pearl could easily be struck. These pilots were most highly trained pilots the Japanese ever had, there were no better.

Nagumo's primary goal was to disable the US Pacific Fleet. The Japanese plan had always accepted the loss of possibly one carrier and numerous planes. After the third wave had launched, the bulk of the CAP Zero's could be launched along with a scouting group of B5N's to search for the US Carriers. Either the Japanese should have pursued the goals of the attack to their conclusion, or don't attack at all. However, I still contend that Fuchida and Genda should have added those targets to the target list and contingency plans put in place, using the second wave to strike the targets. Short of that, then a third wave should have been in the plans, to coordinate the rearming and refueling, and launch of the third wave. They had the time to perform this, whether it was planned or not prior to the attack or not. The real question here is why launch an attack if you aren't going to follow it up and finish the job. Genda and Fuchida both agreed that the tanks, docks and other valuable targets were not considered as targets. They agreed that a third wave was possible and that the aircraft losses were very light. They were not worried about the defenses in Pearl Harbor for a third wave, their comments show us, that they were willing to risk those defenses for a final third wave attack. In war, you must take risks to attain your goals. We gambled at Guadalcanal, attacking an island with one Marine division, a few carriers and not much else. It paid dividends.

As for considering Nagumo's viewpoint, Nagumo was not enthusiastic about the attack. His reluctance to stay around is understandable, and frankly, it was the planner's fault for not including the tanks, tanker and docks in the attack targeting plan and developing alternative options for their destruction. Had there been a third wave planned, I reasonably certain, Nagumo would have stayed to destroy it. It wasn't, so he felt he had accomplished his goals. In fact, he essentially had, but had not show any aggressiveness. This is the fault of Admiral Yamamoto for chosing him, if he actually did.

Aggressiveness in a commander or lack thereof, got Nagumo and his counterpart, Fletcher fired from command. Their bosses were not looking for gamblers, but were looking for men who would take calculated risks to acheive a goal. Each situation has to be weighed carefully, risk versus reward. The third wave was a risk that should have been taken to acheive the goal of putting the US Pacific Fleet out of commission.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I would be interested in your opinion of Wilmott's book after you've read it. I don't have a book on Pearl Harbor per se, just books that cover the raid as part of a general history.

I have in my collection, four books on the Pearl Harbor attack, with one more coming. I have one at the library, on reserve as soon as it returns. This is the book by Goldstein and Dillon based on Gordon Prange's interviews with Mitsuo Fuchida. I have read every commission document that was produced and most are on my computer. I have discussed the attack with four survivors and have access through the Midway Museum library and the University of San Diego State's library which has on microfiche, the Japanese Defense Society's massive work on the history of the Pacific War. At some point, I will attend a meeting of the PH association and hopefully, meet a IJN fighter pilot who was on the attack. Hopefully.

As you can see, I have done my homework, as usual.

[robdab]

john964, in response to your question in post #104,

Please see the USS Ramapo on http://militarymaps.org.ua/maps/osprey/062_pearl_harbor/map02.djvu

She was tied up, empty, as several PT boats were being deck loaded aboard her for transport to the Philipines, having arrived at PH on Dec.5'41.

The only other USN oiler/tanker anywhere near Hawaii then was the inbound USS Neches, some 1,200 nmile to the east. afaik.

[robdab]

old pop2000, in response to your posts #100 and #106,

Sorry to spoil your suspense but Willmott's 2001 "Pearl Harbor" concludes in his chatper #5 (which is entirely dedicated to looking at several versions of a possible 3rd strike) that a 1500 launch was possible for some 111 Kates, 68 Vals and 56 Zekes (page #151). And that such a strike was impossible because that timing would have meant an after dark return flight to, and landings on the KB's carriers.

I would also note that on pages #147 & 149 he disagrees slightly with your last daylight times, claiming 1712 for sunset, civilian twilight at 1737 and nautical twilight at 1805. Not that the differences matter all that much.

The question that will be asked of you wrt your posted re-fueling/re-arming schedule will be, how do you eliminate the time historically taken by the Japanese to change from the torpedoes that were loaded onto the Kates, back to bombs for land attack ? Such was a part of the order written by Nagumo for actions to follow the 1st & 2nd wave attacks.

[old_pop2000]

old pop2000, in response to your posts #100 and #106,

Sorry to spoil your suspense but Willmott's 2001 "Pearl Harbor" concludes in his chatper #5 (which is entirely dedicated to looking at several versions of a possible 3rd strike) that a 1500 launch was possible for some 111 Kates, 68 Vals and 56 Zekes (page #151). And that such a strike was impossible because that timing would have meant an after dark return flight to, and landings on the KB's carriers.

I would also note that on pages #147 & 149 he disagrees slightly with your last daylight times, claiming 1712 for sunset, civilian twilight at 1737 and nautical twilight at 1805. Not that the differences matter all that much.

The question that will be asked of you wrt your posted re-fueling/re-arming schedule will be, how do you eliminate the time historically taken by the Japanese to change from the torpedoes that were loaded onto the Kates, back to bombs for land attack ? Such was a part of the order written by Nagumo for actions to follow the 1st & 2nd wave attacks.

My astronomical times were from the Official U.S. Naval Observatory. I am sorry, but I suspect that they are far more accurate than Willmott, with all due respect.

Secondly, I have stated that I would not have used the B5N's as the targeting did not require them nor were they accurate enough to hit those targets. I would have stuck to Val's and Zero's. In fact, the 20 mm cannons on the Zero's could have been effective against the tanks, more so than the bombs. I would have repaired the damaged B5N's, loaded them with torpedoes and prepared them for a possible attack on the US carriers. I would have launched an extensive search in 360 degrees, to maintain vigilance for those missing carriers.

Thirdly, the Japanese pilots had decided that if they were damaged rather than contact the ships, giving away their position, they would land in the water and taken their chances. Sounds to me that if they could not make it back from the third strike, they would have made the same decision.

Willmott's premise is based on a full scale third wave, which I have continously stated, was not entirely necessary. 50 Val's and escorts could have done the job. There were, again, 16 fuel tanks, one tanker, and five fuel oil barges carrying 3563 BBLS each for a total of 16,000 barrels of oil and the dry docks. Not all of those targets could be struck, but the tanks and docks would be primary targets. Now, there would have been losses. If half the aircraft were lost-say around 40 total in the third wave, that puts the losses at 89 aircrft or 24%. Acceptable losses considering the damage done.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have in my collection, four books on the Pearl Harbor attack, with one more coming. I have one at the library, on reserve as soon as it returns. This is the book by Goldstein and Dillon based on Gordon Prange's interviews with Mitsuo Fuchida. I have read every commission document that was produced and most are on my computer. I have discussed the attack with four survivors and have access through the Midway Museum library and the University of San Diego State's library which has on microfiche, the Japanese Defense Society's massive work on the history of the Pacific War. At some point, I will attend a meeting of the PH association and hopefully, meet a IJN fighter pilot who was on the attack. Hopefully.

As you can see, I have done my homework, as usual.

Dennis:

Of the books that you've read, which do you recommend?

[Ed Rotondaro]

My astronomical times were from the Official U.S. Naval Observatory. I am sorry, but I suspect that they are far more accurate than Willmott, with all due respect.

Secondly, I have stated that I would not have used the B5N's as the targeting did not require them nor were they accurate enough to hit those targets. I would have stuck to Val's and Zero's. In fact, the 20 mm cannons on the Zero's could have been effective against the tanks, more so than the bombs. I would have repaired the damaged B5N's, loaded them with torpedoes and prepared them for a possible attack on the US carriers. I would have launched an extensive search in 360 degrees, to maintain vigilance for those missing carriers.

Thirdly, the Japanese pilots had decided that if they were damaged rather than contact the ships, giving away their position, they would land in the water and taken their chances. Sounds to me that if they could not make it back from the third strike, they would have made the same decision.

Willmott's premise is based on a full scale third wave, which I have continously stated, was not entirely necessary. 50 Val's and escorts could have done the job. There were, again, 16 fuel tanks, one tanker, and five fuel oil barges carrying 3563 BBLS each for a total of 16,000 barrels of oil and the dry docks. Not all of those targets could be struck, but the tanks and docks would be primary targets. Now, there would have been losses. If half the aircraft were lost-say around 40 total in the third wave, that puts the losses at 89 aircrft or 24%. Acceptable losses considering the damage done.

Dennis:

I know that late war Zeros could carry at least a 500lb bomb, but could the Zeros at Pearl Harbor carry bombs? Did they need to be modified to do so? If not, could they have hauled bombs as well to augment the proposed strike? I realize the pilots are not trained as dive bombers, but a fuel tank is a large stationary target.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I know that late war Zeros could carry at least a 500lb bomb, but could the Zeros at Pearl Harbor carry bombs? Did they need to be modified to do so? If not, could they have hauled bombs as well to augment the proposed strike? I realize the pilots are not trained as dive bombers, but a fuel tank is a large stationary target.
I believe that an A6M2 Model 21 could carry a 350 kg bomb in place of the centerline external fuel tank. So, that is one possibility, however, I don't believe that would be considered, especially with the Val's available. It would be better to have the centerline fuel tank and maintain their maneuverability. Nice idea, means you are thinking outside the box. Good show, better than just telling me why the third wave wasn't possible because one author says its so. Remember, the pilots and commanders on the scene, never doubted the third wave was possible, just that it wasn't necessary.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Of the books that you've read, which do you recommend?
Well, Gordon Prange's book "At Dawn We Slept" is excellent. Willmott's book is getting good reviews. The book on Fuchida gives you a different insight into the battle. Other books are really into the aftermath, into the area of intelligence, accountability etc.

For details on the Japanese side in regards to deck operations etc., preceding, during and after the attack, I don't know what are good sources. I am hoping Willmott has some good sources. I suspect that the large Japanese Historical document on the whole war, is probably the best. If you can read japanese.

I've pieced together the deck loading etc. from the Naval Mission to Japan in 1946 and Parshall's information in "Shattered Sword". Once I get the other two books, I may have more sources and information.

I don't and have never claimed to be omniscient. But I have used more than one source, as I always do. Some are books, some are eyewitness accounts, some are primary documents. The key to my premise is that proper targeting by Genda and Fuchida, prior to the attack, would have made a third wave either a fact or unnecessary. Genda and Fuchida, in so many words, stated that the tanks were never considered during the planning. However, he and Fuchida both agreed that a third full strike was possible and should have been sent. I would agree but do not believe the fault was with Nagumo.

[old_pop2000]

In surveying Goldstein's book on Fuchida, he states that Fuchida thought a third and possibly a fourth strike should be sent. He stated that the horizontal bombers were converted into torpedo planes for surface action against ships. This is what was happening, when he landed. So the process of rearming, refueling, repairing and reequipping the B5N's to torpedo bombers either was completed, or still in progress at 1230 when he landed. He stated that the horizontal bombers would not be effective in Oahu, since surprise was lost. This indicates that he , like myself, believed the third and possibly fourth wave should have been Dive bombers with Zero's. He also stated that the Zero's could easily gain air superiority over the harbor and was not concerned about that. When asked about the possible targets for the third wave, he stated damaged battleships, other naval warships, docks and fuel tanks.

The above information is from Goldstein and Dillon's work " Gods Samurai". I read this information in Google books, but I will have the entire book here in while from the library.

While I don't believe Fuchida about his involvement, he did design and prepare the precise mission profile with timing, etc. He succeeded admirably, his timing working to perfection. So, I tend to believe that if he was certain the third and fourth attack was feasible then It probably was.

[old_pop2000]

Wikipedia has an interesting map and shows the location of the tanks and other targets. It also has an interesting bibliography of sources.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#CITEREFHoyt2000

[Ed Rotondaro]

Well, Gordon Prange's book "At Dawn We Slept" is excellent. Willmott's book is getting good reviews. The book on Fuchida gives you a different insight into the battle. Other books are really into the aftermath, into the area of intelligence, accountability etc.

For details on the Japanese side in regards to deck operations etc., preceding, during and after the attack, I don't know what are good sources. I am hoping Willmott has some good sources. I suspect that the large Japanese Historical document on the whole war, is probably the best. If you can read japanese.

I've pieced together the deck loading etc. from the Naval Mission to Japan in 1946 and Parshall's information in "Shattered Sword". Once I get the other two books, I may have more sources and information.

I don't and have never claimed to be omniscient. But I have used more than one source, as I always do. Some are books, some are eyewitness accounts, some are primary documents. The key to my premise is that proper targeting by Genda and Fuchida, prior to the attack, would have made a third wave either a fact or unnecessary. Genda and Fuchida, in so many words, stated that the tanks were never considered during the planning. However, he and Fuchida both agreed that a third full strike was possible and should have been sent. I would agree but do not believe the fault was with Nagumo.

Dennis:

Throughout this discussion I been wondering about one thing. Why did Yamamoto chose Nagumo to command this operation? Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, the man who eventually commanded all IJN carriers, had been promoted to vice admiral in November 1940 and was actually the person who advocated combining the carriers into one striking group. He was probably the most air minded admiral in the IJN. The only only explanation I can find is that Nagumo was senior to Ozawa as a Vice Admiral by one year. One wonders what the result would have been in Ozawa was in command and had been part of the planning process.

[old_pop2000]

Wikipedia has an interesting map and shows the location of the tanks and other targets. It also has an interesting bibliography of sources.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#CITEREFHoyt2000
According to Prange, it was seniority, no other reason. Admiral Tsukahara, a long time friend and CinC of the Eleventh Air Fleet stated: " He was wholly unfitted by background, training, experience and interest for a major role in Japan's naval air arm. He had no conception of the real power and potentialities of the air arm when he became the Command in Chief of the First Air Fleet."

However, how many navy's did exactly the same thing. Kimmel was given command of the US Pacific Fleet, and he had no experience with carriers or carrier warfare, as did anyone else. Neither did Fletcher, so I am not certain it was a valid criticism. Nagumo did succeed in the initial stages, but of course failed later. Take your choice.

[old_pop2000]

Some more comments by US and Japanese military officers about the attack.

Admiral Furlong, Commander Battle Forces Pacific stated that Nagumo followed the classic naval doctrine in staying within the established boundaries of the task and refusing to be tempted into alluring side paths." Their mission may have been wrong," said Furlong, "but they stuck with it." " The fault as he saw it lay not in the execution, but in the original assignment of targets".

Admiral Spruance believe that they could have done more by attacking the submarine base, docks and fuel tanks etc.

Yamamoto never forgot Nagumo's opposition to his plan. He thought Nagumo should have gone beyond his orders and exploited the situation fully. He should have ordered the second major attack even though not so ordered.

In late 1942, Yamamoto expressed to Admiral Ozawa that not launching the second major strike and seeking out the US carriers would be the greatest strategical blunder of the war.

It is my belief, that no matter what the risks, those docks, tanks, submarine base etc. should have been attacked once, if not twice. War is a risky business and is won only by those whose take calculated risks to achieve a desired end.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some more comments by US and Japanese military officers about the attack.

Admiral Furlong, Commander Battle Forces Pacific stated that Nagumo followed the classic naval doctrine in staying within the established boundaries of the task and refusing to be tempted into alluring side paths." Their mission may have been wrong," said Furlong, "but they stuck with it." " The fault as he saw it lay not in the execution, but in the original assignment of targets".

Admiral Spruance believe that they could have done more by attacking the submarine base, docks and fuel tanks etc.

Yamamoto never forgot Nagumo's opposition to his plan. He thought Nagumo should have gone beyond his orders and exploited the situation fully. He should have ordered the second major attack even though not so ordered.

In late 1942, Yamamoto expressed to Admiral Ozawa that not launching the second major strike and seeking out the US carriers would be the greatest strategical blunder of the war.

It is my belief, that no matter what the risks, those docks, tanks, submarine base etc. should have been attacked once, if not twice. War is a risky business and is won only by those whose take calculated risks to achieve a desired end.

Dennis:

I find Yamamoto guilty of covering his butt with expecting Nagumo to have gone beyond the mission parameters. This in a culture that to this day still emphasizes conformity and respect for your superiors. Nagumo had a plan that he had no part in designing and he executed it and was satisfied that he had accomplished his mission. There is an awful lot of second guessing by his subordinates after the fact. It interesting how people distance themselves from mistakes and conveniently forget that they accepted the decisions made at the time. Fuchida, I just don't trust at all.

What if Nagumo had gone beyond his orders and by some chance got ambushed by Halsey and lost a carrier or two? Would Yamamoto have been so forgiving, especially in light of the fact that Nagumo had accomplished his mission and then put the carriers at unecessary risk?
You know the old expression "Victory has a thousand fathers, defeat is an orphan".

[Kyle Holgate]

Dennis:

I find Yamamoto guilty of covering his butt with expecting Nagumo to have gone beyond the mission parameters. This in a culture that to this day still emphasizes conformity and respect for your superiors. Nagumo had a plan that he had no part in designing and he executed it and was satisfied that he had accomplished his mission. There is an awful lot of second guessing by his subordinates after the fact. It interesting how people distance themselves from mistakes and conveniently forget that they accepted the decisions made at the time. Fuchida, I just don't trust at all.

What if Nagumo had gone beyond his orders and by some chance got ambushed by Halsey and lost a carrier or two? Would Yamamoto have been so forgiving, especially in light of the fact that Nagumo had accomplished his mission and then put the carriers at unecessary risk?
You know the old expression "Victory has a thousand fathers, defeat is an orphan".

Yamamoto fully expected to loose one or more carriers (pre attack war games). It is a rare time in war to catch an enemy totally with his pants down, such an opportunity should be exploited to the fullest in my view. What if Nagumo had a heart attack or something and Yamaguchi took charge, I would bet there would be multiple attacks. Also think what Halsey would have done were he leading a similar attack.
To be fair though it is armchair quarterbacking - Nagumo was in a tight spot with a lot of responsibility on his shoulders. I can understand the instinct to smack the "monster" hard then run for it with your skin intact!

[old_pop2000]

Yamamoto fully expected to loose one or more carriers (pre attack war games). It is a rare time in war to catch an enemy totally with his pants down, such an opportunity should be exploited to the fullest in my view. What if Nagumo had a heart attack or something and Yamaguchi took charge, I would bet there would be multiple attacks. Also think what Halsey would have done were he leading a similar attack.
To be fair though it is armchair quarterbacking - Nagumo was in a tight spot with a lot of responsibility on his shoulders. I can understand the instinct to smack the "monster" hard then run for it with your skin intact!


What is amazing to me, is for us to criticizing a basically brilliant tactical victory because it did not take more risks. We probably, myself included, should realize the amount of risk already accepted by Nagumo in assembling, training and sailing the First Striking Fleet all the way from Hittokappu Bay to a point 250 miles NE of Pearl Harbor, basically undetected, then launching a 360 plane airstrike against the primary US Pacific Fleet base. At this point, for a conservative minded old men like Nagumo and Captain Kusaka, this was far more risk than they ever wanted to accept. Yamamoto was a gambler, with Fushida and Genda both being younger willing to accept risks. But Nagumo wasn't. This was a real stretch for his limited vision and knowledge of carrier warfare. It is sometimes hard for gamblers to understand the mind of a conservative person.

I believe that Yamamoto was at fault for not replacing Nagumo and Kusaka with men who believed in the attack and who were more likely to take risks to acheive a greater goal. I also believe the basic flaw in the attack was the targeting, the responsibility of Genda, Kuroshima and Fuchida.

It's hard to fault Nagumo for being wary of a third attack considering the amount of risk he already had accept. I suspect he just reached the limited of his risk endurance. Sort of like the old Dirty Harry line "Well, do you feel lucky, Punk. Huh, do yah". I don't think he did.

At sixty one years of age, I can sympathize with Nagumo. I take far less calculated risks than I ever did before. I am not conservative, by any means. But I do act far more carefully than when I was younger.

[Campy]

Yamamoto never forgot Nagumo's opposition to his plan. He thought Nagumo should have gone beyond his orders and exploited the situation fully. He should have ordered the second major attack even though not so ordered.


Ed is correct. You cannot expect a man you already know is against a plan to turn around and go beyond the original parameters. If Yamamoto wanted him to perform contingency operations, he should have ordered him to do such.

Campy

[old_pop2000]

Ed is correct. You cannot expect a man you already know is against a plan to turn around and go beyond the original parameters. If Yamamoto wanted him to perform contingency operations, he should have ordered him to do such.

Campy


I agree and have stated that the targeting and attack profiles were flawed from the beginning. Those strategic targets should have been on the list and the second wave should have dealt with them or a third wave planned. Also, Yamamoto, as I said, should have placed a man in command whom he had complete faith in and who believed in the attack.

We could fault Yamamoto for his conservative actions around Guadalcanal. Had he used his battleships more effectively, he might have retaken the islands. Conservative? Who knows.

[Ed Rotondaro]

What is amazing to me, is for us to criticizing a basically brilliant tactical victory because it did not take more risks. We probably, myself included, should realize the amount of risk already accepted by Nagumo in assembling, training and sailing the First Striking Fleet all the way from Hittokappu Bay to a point 250 miles NE of Pearl Harbor, basically undetected, then launching a 360 plane airstrike against the primary US Pacific Fleet base. At this point, for a conservative minded old men like Nagumo and Captain Kusaka, this was far more risk than they ever wanted to accept. Yamamoto was a gambler, with Fushida and Genda both being younger willing to accept risks. But Nagumo wasn't. This was a real stretch for his limited vision and knowledge of carrier warfare. It is sometimes hard for gamblers to understand the mind of a conservative person.

I believe that Yamamoto was at fault for not replacing Nagumo and Kusaka with men who believed in the attack and who were more likely to take risks to acheive a greater goal. I also believe the basic flaw in the attack was the targeting, the responsibility of Genda, Kuroshima and Fuchida.

It's hard to fault Nagumo for being wary of a third attack considering the amount of risk he already had accept. I suspect he just reached the limited of his risk endurance. Sort of like the old Dirty Harry line "Well, do you feel lucky, Punk. Huh, do yah". I don't think he did.

At sixty one years of age, I can sympathize with Nagumo. I take far less calculated risks than I ever did before. I am not conservative, by any means. But I do act far more carefully than when I was younger.

Dennis:

I think that's true. Start with a commander who doesn't favor the mission but goes along out of duty. Add in a plan that didn't put the fuel tanks on the hit list. Then make two successful strikes and wonder if it's worth the risk of mounting a third one. I think Fuchida and Genda were urging that strike because they belatedly realized that they should have put the fuel tanks and repair facilities on the hit list from the get go. It was their way of covering their butts for not planning more carefully. I certainly can understand Nagumo's attitude. There was no reason to play samurai and seek a glorious death in battle when you have accomplished your task.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I agree and have stated that the targeting and attack profiles were flawed from the beginning. Those strategic targets should have been on the list and the second wave should have dealt with them or a third wave planned. Also, Yamamoto, as I said, should have placed a man in command whom he had complete faith in and who believed in the attack.

We could fault Yamamoto for his conservative actions around Guadalcanal. Had he used his battleships more effectively, he might have retaken the islands. Conservative? Who knows.

Dennis, Campy, et al:

Here are some things to ponder. Yamamoto dreams up the attack on Pearl Habor but does not lead it in person since he's C in C of the fleet. Six months later he does lead the Midway attack, albeit from a distance. Did the experience of Pearl Harbor and the missed oppotunities convince him that he needed to be closer to the action? Was he there to stiffen Nagumo's or any of his other subordinates resolve? If Yamamoto was dissatisfied with Nagumo's performance at Pearl Harbor, why is he still in command of the carriers? Was it due to the fact that Nagumo had for six months basically run wild and defeated the Allies at every turn? Or did Yamamoto want to avoid making Nagumo lose face and possibly commit seppuku? Interestingly, after Midway Ozawa finally gets command of the carriers in November.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I think that's true. Start with a commander who doesn't favor the mission but goes along out of duty. Add in a plan that didn't put the fuel tanks on the hit list. Then make two successful strikes and wonder if it's worth the risk of mounting a third one. I think Fuchida and Genda were urging that strike because they belatedly realized that they should have put the fuel tanks and repair facilities on the hit list from the get go. It was their way of covering their butts for not planning more carefully. I certainly can understand Nagumo's attitude. There was no reason to play samurai and seek a glorious death in battle when you have accomplished your task.


Here is something to ponder(love that word, three times and its mine). Yamamoto and his staff assigned the carriers and battleships, along with the airfields as the primary targets. However, the specifics were Genda, Kuroshima and Fuchida's. But how much control over those targets did they actually have? If Genda and his team had changed the targeting, placing the strategic targets on the list of secondary targets, when the review by Yamamoto and his staff occurred, how would he have reacted. It was always my opinion that Genda picked the targets. But I suspect that overall general targeting was Yamamoto's. In that sense, he is responsible for not allowing an expansion of the targeting list.

What say you all? Prithee, tell me! Ha, a subject to explore, was the general targeting Yamamoto's choice or Genda's.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, Campy, et al:

Here are some things to ponder. Yamamoto dreams up the attack on Pearl Habor but does not lead it in person since he's C in C of the fleet. Six months later he does lead the Midway attack, albeit from a distance. Did the experience of Pearl Harbor and the missed oppotunities convince him that he needed to be closer to the action? Was he there to stiffen Nagumo's or any of his other subordinates resolve? If Yamamoto was dissatisfied with Nagumo's performance at Pearl Harbor, why is he still in command of the carriers? Was it due to the fact that Nagumo had for six months basically run wild and defeated the Allies at every turn? Or did Yamamoto want to avoid making Nagumo lose face and possibly commit seppuku? Interestingly, after Midway Ozawa finally gets command of the carriers in November.

Of course, that is a possibility that he wanted to backup Nagumo. However, I suspect the real reason is because this was the planned decisive battle and the battleships were supposed to apply the coup de grace, as always. Of course, Yamamoto was leaving that act to himself, not Nagumo. I believe that Nagumo was bait. Like Nick Gage said "You know, Agent Sandusky, something I've noticed about fishing? It never works out so well for the bait" It certainly did not for him.

[old_pop2000]

I did some further research and to my amazement, I believe I know the group that did the targeting, in fact, I am certain. First, my apologies as it wasn't Cmdr. Genda or Fuchida. They planned the mission profile. The actual targeting was provided by the following men:

Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki
Capt. Kuroshima
Capt. Miwa
Capt. Fuji
Cmdr. Watanabe
Cmdr. Sasaki
Cmdr. Arima
Cmdr. Nagata
Cmdr. Wada
Cmdr. Targo.

These are the chief members of the Combined Fleet who were aboard the Nagato with Yamamoto.

Apparently, Masatake Chihaya, a noted Japanese war scholar, talked with Watanabe and he stated that a detailed account of the attack was not given to Yamamoto until the 11th of December. Any thought of ordering Nagumo to send a second attack wave, was out of the question by that time.

Watanabe stated "Hearing of the great success of the Nagumo force, nothing was more regretful to me than my having committed a great blunder in planning the Pearl Harbor attack. The fact is that I and my company staff officer never had the slightest plan or ever dreamed of a second attack on the island when we planned the Pearl harbor attack" He goes on to say that planners always had to keep three phases in every situation- They were cases of great success, of expected results and of failure. when they planned PH attack they considered expected results and even thought in their minds of an unsuccessful case, but never dreamed of such a great success as was achieved. Watanabe stated that had they any idea that a great success was possible, they would have indicated that to Admiral Nagumo to assist him in making a decision about the second wave attack.

I am left with the idea then that the mistake in planning was a top to bottom failure. Yamamoto's staff failed to provide the proper targeting, and insert into the detailed orders, a suggestion or order that, in case of a great success, a second wave of attacks was to be executed. This probably would have given Nagumo the urge he needed to proceed with the attack. However, this does not absolve Genda and Fuchida from realizing the planning mistakes and correcting them by informing Ugaki and the Combined Fleet staff of their errors. A checks and balance system is important in any organization, and in this case, it failed. It also does not absolve Nagumo and Kusaka. They were the commanding officer and chief of staff on the scene. They should have recognized the possibilities with the second wave of attacks and proceeded, orders or no orders. Again, a command failure from the top to the bottom. At last, Fuchida, who was the onscene commander, viewing the strategic targets and yet, did not order Egusa to attack the docks and tanks.

Whether a full second wave of attacks was possible is problematic. However, limited second wave attacks with dive bombers and fighters was entirely within the realm of possibility.

Thanks for your forbearance in this thread. How I do go on.

Source: The Pacific War Papers Edited by Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon Pages 263-265

[Mike Malanaphy]

I agree and have stated that the targeting and attack profiles were flawed from the beginning. Those strategic targets should have been on the list and the second wave should have dealt with them or a third wave planned. Also, Yamamoto, as I said, should have placed a man in command whom he had complete faith in and who believed in the attack.

We could fault Yamamoto for his conservative actions around Guadalcanal. Had he used his battleships more effectively, he might have retaken the islands. Conservative? Who knows.

Hi Dennis,

Perhaps Nagumo's roll was to balance younger, less risk averse officers on his staff. I would assume that Yamamoto would be familiar with Nagumo's operating style and would be loath just to asssign him the most powerful slot in the IJN just on seniority. Nagumo followed his orders to the letter. As CinC, Yamamoto bears the responsibility for the plans' target list. As one of the moving forces behind naval aviation, few more than him knew it's capabilites and limitations. Perhaps he felt that strategic targets were inapproriate and not worth the risk. He would have known that Nagumo's carrier represented the heart of the IJN's striking power and wanted someone he could trust to stick to teh plan. Once Nagumo knew the carriers were not present at Pearl, the equation changes. At sea and unlocated, he could be caught unawares by the Americans. Could he search 360 degrees and still strike effectively?

[djcyclone]

That is what it all comes down too. They did not know where the carriers where and why take the risk of being blind sided when you have already gained such success? You know that the commanders had to be sweating a furry when they realized that the carriers where at sea. This means that they can pop up any where any time and catch you with your pants around you ankles.

The pilots where undoubtetly coming back and reporting the success with much enthusiasm from what they saw as an unbelievable success. This gives even a gambler the thought of let me take my winnings and run like hell.

[bridav58]

Dennis,
As I've pointed out on other boards even heavy bombers had alot of porblems knocking out tank farms and they carried far heavier bombs & bombloads then Vals & Kates. The RAF,8th. AF and 15 th. AF (along with the 20th. AF) also encountered severe problems with smoke obscuring the target after first tank or two went up. There's also serious doubts about just how many tanks were knocked out at Midway

[bridav58]

Even if PH is knocked out of use just how much does that change things? just want your views.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,
As I've pointed out on other boards even heavy bombers had alot of porblems knocking out tank farms and they carried far heavier bombs & bombloads then Vals & Kates. The RAF,8th. AF and 15 th. AF (along with the 20th. AF) also encountered severe problems with smoke obscuring the target after first tank or two went up. There's also serious doubts about just how many tanks were knocked out at Midway
The difficulty you allude to is for level bombers flying at 20-30,000 feet using standard high level bombing techniques. I remind you that fuel tanks at Ploesti, with concrete blast walls, circular or octagonal in plan and additional walls enclosed some smaller tank clusters and snaked around the buildings were hit by low level bombing attacks by four engined bombers. Val dive bombers could have easily destroyed the 16 tanks at Pearl Harbor, since they had no protection including dirt berms. If one tank goes, the whole lot goes.

[john964]

Hi Dennis,

Perhaps Nagumo's roll was to balance younger, less risk averse officers on his staff. I would assume that Yamamoto would be familiar with Nagumo's operating style and would be loath just to asssign him the most powerful slot in the IJN just on seniority. Nagumo followed his orders to the letter. As CinC, Yamamoto bears the responsibility for the plans' target list. As one of the moving forces behind naval aviation, few more than him knew it's capabilites and limitations. Perhaps he felt that strategic targets were inapproriate and not worth the risk. He would have known that Nagumo's carrier represented the heart of the IJN's striking power and wanted someone he could trust to stick to teh plan. Once Nagumo knew the carriers were not present at Pearl, the equation changes. At sea and unlocated, he could be caught unawares by the Americans. Could he search 360 degrees and still strike effectively?
Mike, Awarding command to those who were not the best choice was not only an IJN problem. Look at first Guadalcanal Scott was the more seasond commander with a victory under his belt, but Callaghan was more seniore by IIRC 1-2 months. Scott had also worked with several of the ship commanders before and knew there capibilities.

[bridav58]

The difficulty you allude to is for level bombers flying at 20-30,000 feet using standard high level bombing techniques. I remind you that fuel tanks at Ploesti, with concrete blast walls, circular or octagonal in plan and additional walls enclosed some smaller tank clusters and snaked around the buildings were hit by low level bombing attacks by four engined bombers. Val dive bombers could have easily destroyed the 16 tanks at Pearl Harbor, since they had no protection including dirt berms. If one tank goes, the whole lot goes.

Dennis,
In some of the PH era photos it sure look like they have dirt beams between the tanks here's a link below. Ploetsi raid was done at tree top level. However even if they're detroyed fuel tanks proved easy enough to erect during the war so just how long does this really delay things?

http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resim:Pearl_Harbor_submarine_base_and_adjacent_fue l_tank_farms.jpg

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,
In some of the PH era photos it sure look like they have dirt beams between the tanks here's a link below. Ploetsi raid was done at tree top level. However even if they're detroyed fuel tanks proved easy enough to erect during the war so just how long does this really delay things?

http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resim:Pearl_Harbor_submarine_base_and_adjacent_fue l_tank_farms.jpg

Those are oil spill berms designed, as you can imagine, to contain any spillage from the filling of the tanks. They are not bomb or explosion proof. And they are not as high as one would imagine. They are not designed to contain much spillage. The proper berms for protection against explosions are thick, high and made of concrete and the tanks are much wider apart. Only two or three of the tanks were even camoflaged. And trust me, Yoshikawa knew where they were, had placed them on a map and watched them filled. That information was transmitted by boat, back to Tokyo.

[bridav58]

Dennis.
All I'm saying is that targets such as these,even when unprotected by bomb proof berms & such, were rarely destroyed during the war even when targeted. I'm thinking that "Target:Hitler's Oil" spelled that out.

[old_pop2000]

Something else to consider. The naval facilities, dry docks and especially the fuel farms are large open spaces that do not require much planning to strike. With ships in a harbor, you have determine the best approach to fire your torpedoes or the best direction from which to drop you bombs. Ships are very difficult targets, even if lined up side by side, many bombs missed the ships completely. However, large open space targets are relatively easy to spot and target. Especially tanks, just dive, drop the bombs and something is going to go boom. No real extensive planning was necessary. It makes the targeting, even in heavy flak conditions much easier.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis.
All I'm saying is that targets such as these,even when unprotected by bomb proof berms & such, were rarely destroyed during the war even when targeted. I'm thinking that "Target:Hitler's Oil" spelled that out.


As I have said, they were difficult targets from high altitudes, using conventional level bombing techniques. This is not the case for unprotected closely aligned fuel tanks being attacked by dive bombers piloted by some of the most experience dive bomber pilots in the world. I don't believe they were as good as ours, but they were good enough to polish off those unprotected and fragile fuel tanks. And even if you don't get them all, a few explosions will set off the others, for sure.

Even the 20mm cannons of the Zero's could have damaged and exploded those tanks. They were HE rounds, with slow MV but enough to penetrate and ignite those tanks. In fact, to ensure hitting those tanks, that might have been the best choice of weapons.

[bridav58]

Dennis..
Even the Allied medium twin engined tatical bombers flying at low to medium levels had problems with the targets we're talking about here. Now I'm not saying your wrong but it just seems to be far more difficult then some may think. However the next thread maybe be about this how much does this slow down the US?

[bridav58]

what about Trincomalee & Colombo??? It seems they directly targeted shore installations & oil tank farms and didn't do too terrific of a job.Also thier dive bombers frequently missed stationary ships.

[bridav58]

Actually, the attack was a success. It's targeting was the naval base facilities, ammunition dump and the ships in the harbor. Included was the airfields. The ammo dump was destroyed, most of the airfields hit and the naval base badly damaged. The oil tanks were never, are you listening, never on the target list. In fact, the second wave of Egusa's dive bombers were diverted on the way to Trincomalee to attack the Hermes and her escort. The damage described was accomplished by B5N horizontal bombers, led by, none other than Mitsuo Fuchida. The First Striking Fleet left the Indian Ocean just after the sinking of Hermes.


Well I've always understood that Dull in his series said that Nagumo had ordered them(the oil tanks) to be attacked. Also Shores in "Bloody shambles II" says the damage was "easily repaired".

[bridav58]

Well Wilmott is one heck of one too and his books "Pearl Harbor" & "Gathering Darkness" he states about how the US could repair and overcome the damage to the oil farm pretty quickly while also pretty well putting paid to the 3rd. strike possibility!!! LOL!!!
If your getting the "Pearl Harbor" book I'll think you'll really like it. Anyways ain't much else to go over on this other then just how long it would take the US to recover ,any ideas? . I'll guess we'll have to disagree on it.

[robdab]

old pop2000,

A few points to ponder:
Your suggested total of only 16 PH fuel tanks is considerably low ...

As best I can tell the East Pearl Harbor tankfarm was composed of 26 tanks.
As best I can tell the West Pearl Harbor tankfarm was composed of 25 tanks.
As best I can tell the Ford Island tankfarm was composed of 9 avgas tanks.
There were two more large tanks at the Pearl City Electric Power Plant.
So 26 + 25 + 9 + 2 = 62 (not just 16) potential Val targets inside the PH border without even counting ships.

Adding in two USN fleet oilers (3-6 divebombers each just to be sure), your 5 fuel barges, two drydock caisson gates (which each demand 2-3 torpedoes, not bombs), CinCPac HQ, the submarine base (and the 4 US subs tied up outside) to say nothing of the USN warehouses etc scattered nearby, all increase the number of attack aircraft needed for the increased number of infrastructure targets.

An additional two large fuel tanks supplied the Honolulu Electric Power Plant.
Twelve more civilian tanks beside the Honolulu Harbor oil piers kept Oahu's
economy ticking along. So 14 more worth bombing. I had thought to use level bombing Kates against these 14 since US AA defenses at Honolulu were much, much fewer in number than those in/around PH.

There were also many more buried (and thus nearly impossible to deliberately hit) avgas tanks in the 25,000 gallons each range at Oahu's military airfields but only the civilian John Rogers International near Honolulu had above ground avgas tanks afaik.

Sounds to,me like you need lots more aircraft than just the Vals and Zekes available in order for a 3rd wave to "do it right".

The above information is from A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) by Paul Dull Page 108. - page #114 in my copy.

Those are oil spill berms designed, as you can imagine, to contain any spillage from the filling of the tanks. They are not bomb or explosion proof. And they are not as high as one would imagine. They are not designed to contain much spillage. - Actually one of Adm. Bloch's staff indicated during one of the PH inquiry hearings that they were sized to hold the contents of each fuel tank that they surrounded but were designed to catch only "slow leak" type spills, not the nearly instant rupture and violent flow resulting from a direct bomb hit. In such a case much fuel would spill over each berm, whether already flaming or not.

Also discusswed was the fact that no fire suppression system was installed at any of the PH tankfarms. Budget talks had been held in 1940 but as the Red Hill underground storage tank project was about to begin, it seemed a waste of money to install water cannon/foggers for tankfarms soon to be emptied.

It must also be noted that igniting bunker "C" ship fuel oil was not quite as easy as you make it sound. Certainly not impossible as the many photos of floating and flaming fuel on the surface of PH prove, but still, more difficult. It should also be noted that just a very few British "Stringbag" level bombers managed to bomb and burn much of the Itallian Fleet's fuel storage tanks at Taranto, which the Japanese knew about.

And trust me, Yoshikawa knew where they were, had placed them on a map and watched them filled. - Indeed he is recorded as having written that he could tell which tanks were full or not because full tanks almost always leaked ...

-----------------------------------------------------------
Please don't take my posts to indicate that I oppose your views on a 3rd Oahu strike.

Indeed I have been argueing a position close to your "side" of that proposal at warships1 for some time now.

I just want everyone to have accurate information on which to base their opinions.

[Warship NWS]

In case these thoughts were not already considered - some further discussion points;

a) What is everyones estimate as to how many aircraft it would have required to cause at least significant damage to the fuel resources at PH? (Note; keep in mind payloads, mechanical failures, pilot errors, battle attrition, etc..)

b) If such damage was done what would the USN have been able to do about it and how long would it take in terms of logistical restructuring, repairs, or other compensating efforts?

c) Again, if (b) above took place then how would that have effect naval operations in the near and long term tactical and strategic planning?

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Here is something to ponder(love that word, three times and its mine). Yamamoto and his staff assigned the carriers and battleships, along with the airfields as the primary targets. However, the specifics were Genda, Kuroshima and Fuchida's. But how much control over those targets did they actually have? If Genda and his team had changed the targeting, placing the strategic targets on the list of secondary targets, when the review by Yamamoto and his staff occurred, how would he have reacted. It was always my opinion that Genda picked the targets. But I suspect that overall general targeting was Yamamoto's. In that sense, he is responsible for not allowing an expansion of the targeting list.

What say you all? Prithee, tell me! Ha, a subject to explore, was the general targeting Yamamoto's choice or Genda's.

Dennis:

I guess that depends on the style of command exercised by the IJN. In the US, a commander asks his subordinates to come up with plans that give him options and he choses what he wants. The British at least in WWII directed their subordinates to plan for what the commander wanted to accomplish. How did the IJN do it? Did Yamamoto have the grand vision and ask Genda to create the detailed operational plan? Or did Genda offer his commander a plan that he dreamed up? From all I've read, Yamamoto was highly influenced by the Taranto raid and wanted his staff to create a Japanese version to use against the USN. I don't see him getting that deep into the details or micromanaging the development of the operational plan especially as he is not an aviator.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I did some further research and to my amazement, I believe I know the group that did the targeting, in fact, I am certain. First, my apologies as it wasn't Cmdr. Genda or Fuchida. They planned the mission profile. The actual targeting was provided by the following men:

Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki
Capt. Kuroshima
Capt. Miwa
Capt. Fuji
Cmdr. Watanabe
Cmdr. Sasaki
Cmdr. Arima
Cmdr. Nagata
Cmdr. Wada
Cmdr. Targo.

These are the chief members of the Combined Fleet who were aboard the Nagato with Yamamoto.

Apparently, Masatake Chihaya, a noted Japanese war scholar, talked with Watanabe and he stated that a detailed account of the attack was not given to Yamamoto until the 11th of December. Any thought of ordering Nagumo to send a second attack wave, was out of the question by that time.

Watanabe stated "Hearing of the great success of the Nagumo force, nothing was more regretful to me than my having committed a great blunder in planning the Pearl Harbor attack. The fact is that I and my company staff officer never had the slightest plan or ever dreamed of a second attack on the island when we planned the Pearl harbor attack" He goes on to say that planners always had to keep three phases in every situation- They were cases of great success, of expected results and of failure. when they planned PH attack they considered expected results and even thought in their minds of an unsuccessful case, but never dreamed of such a great success as was achieved. Watanabe stated that had they any idea that a great success was possible, they would have indicated that to Admiral Nagumo to assist him in making a decision about the second wave attack.

I am left with the idea then that the mistake in planning was a top to bottom failure. Yamamoto's staff failed to provide the proper targeting, and insert into the detailed orders, a suggestion or order that, in case of a great success, a second wave of attacks was to be executed. This probably would have given Nagumo the urge he needed to proceed with the attack. However, this does not absolve Genda and Fuchida from realizing the planning mistakes and correcting them by informing Ugaki and the Combined Fleet staff of their errors. A checks and balance system is important in any organization, and in this case, it failed. It also does not absolve Nagumo and Kusaka. They were the commanding officer and chief of staff on the scene. They should have recognized the possibilities with the second wave of attacks and proceeded, orders or no orders. Again, a command failure from the top to the bottom. At last, Fuchida, who was the onscene commander, viewing the strategic targets and yet, did not order Egusa to attack the docks and tanks.

Whether a full second wave of attacks was possible is problematic. However, limited second wave attacks with dive bombers and fighters was entirely within the realm of possibility.

Thanks for your forbearance in this thread. How I do go on.

Source: The Pacific War Papers Edited by Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon Pages 263-265

Dennis:

With Ugaki at the top of the list, that explains a great deal about the failure. The man had the mentality of a Tokugawa Shogun. Remember he is one of the fathers of the kamikaze and even flew one of the final missions near the war's end. His dairy is full of delusional nonsense and Even Thomas liberally quotes from it in "Sea of Thunder".

[Campy]

In case these thoughts were not already considered - some further discussion points;

a) What is everyones estimate as to how many aircraft it would have required to cause at least significant damage to the fuel resources at PH? (Note; keep in mind payloads, mechanical failures, pilot errors, battle attrition, etc..)

b) If such damage was done what would the USN have been able to do about it and how long would it take in terms of logistical restructuring, repairs, or other compensating efforts?

c) Again, if (b) above took place then how would that have effect naval operations in the near and long term tactical and strategic planning?
In the long run, it wouldn't have made a difference. The Japanese had no intention of invading Hawaii. Nor even blockading it. I doubt they could have scored 100% on the tank farms. Not every bomb hits a target, and after a couple of hits, smoke obscures the target, degrading accuracy. Eventually we would have replaced the losses. It might take longer, but we're still going to win this one.

In the short term, only the Carriers and their escorts, plus the subs and aircraft, need the oil. The battleships can be left in port. If the Japanese left fuel behind, as is likely, Carrier operations might have continued as they did historically. Any numbers would be guesses, however.

Campy

[old_pop2000]

In case these thoughts were not already considered - some further discussion points;

a) What is everyones estimate as to how many aircraft it would have required to cause at least significant damage to the fuel resources at PH? (Note; keep in mind payloads, mechanical failures, pilot errors, battle attrition, etc..)

b) If such damage was done what would the USN have been able to do about it and how long would it take in terms of logistical restructuring, repairs, or other compensating efforts?

c) Again, if (b) above took place then how would that have effect naval operations in the near and long term tactical and strategic planning?

Thanks.


Bombing accuracy is probably the key. In the second attack by Egusa's dive bombers, an accuracy rate was calculated at 27% for the 80 aircraft available although that number might be as low as 78. That essentially puts 21 bombs on target. It is hard to assess accuracy on widely spread targets like airfields.

1. There were 26 fuel tanks-16 in the upper and 10 in the lower. Mission profile and target placement seems to indicated two separate attack groups or one group breaking into two separate attacking formations. as they pass over Kanoehe on the east coast. Just a rough guess, but 10 bombs in the upper tank farm and 6 in the lower, total of 16 bombs. Using the 27% figure which seems low for an attack on this type of target, 59 dive bombers should be able to destroy both of these fuel farms counting on secondary explosions to finish off the unstruck tanks.

2. As far as the tanks, they would have to let them burn themselves out, which might take days. The air in the Pearl Harbor area would be filled with black smoke, fires burning out of control. Until the fires are out, nothing can be done. The Navy could request more funds for Red Hill underground fuel storage facility and attempt to expedite its completion. That might get finished, tested and filled in six months to a year. However, the fleet would have to retire to the West Coast until the fuel storage situation is rectified, maybe six months or longer.

3. I will let the others fill in this blank.

Note: The first wave launched 54 D3A Val dive bombers and lost one. They probably had enough dive bombers returning to prepare a third wave.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I guess that depends on the style of command exercised by the IJN. In the US, a commander asks his subordinates to come up with plans that give him options and he choses what he wants. The British at least in WWII directed their subordinates to plan for what the commander wanted to accomplish. How did the IJN do it? Did Yamamoto have the grand vision and ask Genda to create the detailed operational plan? Or did Genda offer his commander a plan that he dreamed up? From all I've read, Yamamoto was highly influenced by the Taranto raid and wanted his staff to create a Japanese version to use against the USN. I don't see him getting that deep into the details or micromanaging the development of the operational plan especially as he is not an aviator.

I would agree, it would depend on how Yamamoto layed out his ideas on the attack. I wonder if his biography or any other book might explain that. He was a hands off type of leader. I would say that probably, he would go along with anything his staff suggested. As Watanabe indicates, it was the Combined Fleet staff that prepared the overall concepts and details of the plan. If they missed something, Yamamoto would not have caught it.

[old_pop2000]

old pop2000,

A few points to ponder:
Your suggested total of only 16 PH fuel tanks is considerably low ...

As best I can tell the East Pearl Harbor tankfarm was composed of 26 tanks.
As best I can tell the West Pearl Harbor tankfarm was composed of 25 tanks.
As best I can tell the Ford Island tankfarm was composed of 9 avgas tanks.
There were two more large tanks at the Pearl City Electric Power Plant.
So 26 + 25 + 9 + 2 = 62 (not just 16) potential Val targets inside the PH border without even counting ships.

Adding in two USN fleet oilers (3-6 divebombers each just to be sure), your 5 fuel barges, two drydock caisson gates (which each demand 2-3 torpedoes, not bombs), CinCPac HQ, the submarine base (and the 4 US subs tied up outside) to say nothing of the USN warehouses etc scattered nearby, all increase the number of attack aircraft needed for the increased number of infrastructure targets.

An additional two large fuel tanks supplied the Honolulu Electric Power Plant.
Twelve more civilian tanks beside the Honolulu Harbor oil piers kept Oahu's
economy ticking along. So 14 more worth bombing. I had thought to use level bombing Kates against these 14 since US AA defenses at Honolulu were much, much fewer in number than those in/around PH.

There were also many more buried (and thus nearly impossible to deliberately hit) avgas tanks in the 25,000 gallons each range at Oahu's military airfields but only the civilian John Rogers International near Honolulu had above ground avgas tanks afaik.

Sounds to,me like you need lots more aircraft than just the Vals and Zekes available in order for a 3rd wave to "do it right".

The above information is from A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) by Paul Dull Page 108. - page #114 in my copy.

Those are oil spill berms designed, as you can imagine, to contain any spillage from the filling of the tanks. They are not bomb or explosion proof. And they are not as high as one would imagine. They are not designed to contain much spillage. - Actually one of Adm. Bloch's staff indicated during one of the PH inquiry hearings that they were sized to hold the contents of each fuel tank that they surrounded but were designed to catch only "slow leak" type spills, not the nearly instant rupture and violent flow resulting from a direct bomb hit. In such a case much fuel would spill over each berm, whether already flaming or not.

Also discusswed was the fact that no fire suppression system was installed at any of the PH tankfarms. Budget talks had been held in 1940 but as the Red Hill underground storage tank project was about to begin, it seemed a waste of money to install water cannon/foggers for tankfarms soon to be emptied.

It must also be noted that igniting bunker "C" ship fuel oil was not quite as easy as you make it sound. Certainly not impossible as the many photos of floating and flaming fuel on the surface of PH prove, but still, more difficult. It should also be noted that just a very few British "Stringbag" level bombers managed to bomb and burn much of the Itallian Fleet's fuel storage tanks at Taranto, which the Japanese knew about.

And trust me, Yoshikawa knew where they were, had placed them on a map and watched them filled. - Indeed he is recorded as having written that he could tell which tanks were full or not because full tanks almost always leaked ...

-----------------------------------------------------------
Please don't take my posts to indicate that I oppose your views on a 3rd Oahu strike.

Indeed I have been argueing a position close to your "side" of that proposal at warships1 for some time now.

I just want everyone to have accurate information on which to base their opinions.

Thank you for the correction, I've been looking at the pictures for days, and just lost count. Accuracy is important.

As to the other targets, they might have been important, but not as important as the 26 fuel tanks in the upper and lower fuel farms. The difference in numbers isn't significant, once the fuel farms are ignited, they will probably take out the other tanks.

As to the number of planes, if we stick with the main fuel farms, 60 dive bombers with escorts will get 90% of the tanks. The Japanese might want to hold the third wave and get more aircraft into the attack. I think it would be unnecessary, but the onscene commander would make the call.

[bridav58]

bombings in all of WW2 when did fires spread past more then a few tanks of an oil tank farm? Also about the 3rd. wave weren't there something like 37 US airworthy by then? Also that figure doesn't include Enterprise's fighters ,could be a rude awakening for the possible 3rd. wave.

[old_pop2000]

bombings in all of WW2 when did fires spread past more then a few tanks of an oil tank farm? Also about the 3rd. wave weren't there something like 37 US airworthy by then? Also that figure doesn't include Enterprise's fighters ,could be a rude awakening for the possible 3rd. wave.


According to the Enterprise's action logs, Halsey sent aloft four F4F's, but the rest were retained on board- VF squadrons at this time, had only 18 aircraft. With that number, he would only have 14 available F4F-3's and Pearl Harbor was outside of their range. He did send SBD's to Ford Island. How much good the SBD's would be in the defense of the fuel tanks, is conjecture. The only available aircraft would be the Army P-36's and P-40's.

Army figures show that 96 of 231 aircraft in the Hawaiian AF were lost. Only 79 Army aircraft were still in flyable condition. Comparison of losses and availabilities as presented by the Roberts Commission shows that only 80 pursuit aircraft were available at the time of the attack and only 19 managed to get airborne, with five shot down. 88 pursuit planes were damage of which 80% were repairable. (probably not in time for the third wave as the strips were damaged). Based on that, I would say that the number is probably less than 20, at best. But, if you need 37 for your point, use it. It doesn't really matter in regards to the third wave, flak was more damaging that the pursuit aircraft.

[robdab]

old_pop2000,

As to the other targets, they might have been important, but not as important as the 26 fuel tanks in the upper and lower fuel farms. - I assume that your 26 above is a typo ? The PH photo on Willmott's page #146 clearly shows 17 tanks in the upper east PH tankfarm and 10 in the lower east PH tankfarm, so sorry for my own miscount. The west PH tankfarm is also 27 tanks, not the 25 I had earlier said. So, we end up with 27 + 27 + 2 + 9 + 12 + 2 = 79 large fuel tanks to destroy. Plus all the other vital "stuff" like USN fleet oilers.

As you will see when your copy arrives, Chapter #5 in Willmott's "Pearl Harbor" goes into the other targeting opportunities historically missed by the Japanese in some detail. Repair shops, power facilities and fuel tank dumps are mentioned. I suspect that the reason that he proposes the inclusion of Kates in his 3rd strike is to allow attacks on all of those target categories.

Willmott concludes at the bottom of his page #151 that there could have been no 3rd wave late on the afternoon of Dec.7'41, (of 111 Kates+68 Vals+56 Zekes = 233 aircraft) because preparing that many would delay a lauch time until 1500. Which means a return flight and carrier deck landings, in the dark, at around 1900, well after a 1712(+/-) sunset.

I request your opinion on the following two sources which indicate that as of 1933 the IJN had installed and trained their pilots on the use of a night landing light system on all of the KB's carriers, (at http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/Japanese%20Carrier%20Operations.pdf ).

And that all IJN warplanes were delivered factory equipped with radio compass homing systems (at http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/gregspringer/radios/radio_systems.htm ) that would have allowed any 3rd wave pilot to find his home carrier again, after sunset.

I believe that these two IJN systems would have allowed a major 3rd wave Dec.7'41 attack on Oahu's infrastructure with minimal disruptions to the historical timeline for any readers here to get unduly upset about.

Please note that I'm NOT claiming IJN bombing at night, just return night navigation over water and mostly successful dark-deck landings. Even if "out of practise", the KB's pilots historically had the 10 nights of November 26 thru December 5 to "get sharp" again while on their way across the Pacific, from Japan to Oahu. Each KB carrier transported 9 aircraft (3 Kates, 3 Vals, 3 Zekes) in 'knocked-down' form so there were 54 spares available to replace any warplanes lost in the Pacific. Cressman's book, " A Magnificent Fight" indicates that at least carrier Hiryu brought along replacement aircrew as well so training loss replacements were available, at sea, prior to the Dec.7'41 air raids.

The only fault that I see remaining in this scenario would be the shortage of scouting aircraft to search for US surface and carrier groups. Holding some 54 torpedo armed Kates on deck seems pointless unless such a search is also launched, somehow. KB cruiser and battleship floatplanes were only 14 in number and so could not have provided an all-round search.

I don't know how effective the nearly 30 IJN submarines in Hawaiian waters would have been at scouting, had Nagumo even asked for their assistance ? Which for some unknown reason, he historically did not. Some IJN submarines did have scout floatplanes aboard but I do not yet know what sea conditions were required for their successful launch/recovery.

I can think only of using the torpedo hauling Kates as armed scout aircraft
but I believe this idea to be in contradiction of IJN doctrine at that time ? I do know that a portion of each US carrier's SBDs regularly scouted while carrying bombloads but I have no specific details on the IJN having adopting similar techniques ?

Nagumo's historical orders could have been addressed by the retention, on the KB's decks, of 6 x 9 =54 torpedo loaded Kates, leaving a 3rd strike total of 57+68+54 = 179 warplanes, almost the same size as the 1st wave. I believe that Willmott has already deducted 6 x 9 = 54 Zekes for CAP duties (as were flown during the historical 1st & 2nd wave attacks) prior to concluding that 233 warplanes were available for a 3rd wave.

-------------------------------------------------------
Ickysdad/bridav58, you asked,

Also about the 3rd. wave weren't there something like 37 US airworthy by then ? - This is why there would be some 54 Zekes along as escorts. The Japanese would not likely expect Oahu to be caught asleep and wingtip-to-wingtip for a third time.

Also that figure doesn't include Enterprise's fighters ,could be a rude awakening for the possible 3rd. wave. - True but considering the number of Enterprise aircraft already shotdown by US AA gunners, do you really see Halsey stripping his TF of its only CAP fighters to bolster Oahu's fighter and AA defences which are already supplimented by the survivors of the US Pacific Fleet inside PH ? And at a time when his entire TF was very nearly "running on fumes" as he waited around to enter PH for fuel.

Just as Nagumo had NO idea where the US carriers were, Enterprise had no idea of where the Kido Butai lurked either. I just can't imagine "Bull" giving up his defensive fighter screen because (in his mind anyway) the Japanese MIGHT make a 3rd strike on Oahu. He had to have believed that the KB (with it's 350+ warplanes) would want to sink his own carrier. Any other conclusion would be your own "forsight" based on your knowledge of my proposed scenario.

[old_pop2000]

old_pop2000,

As to the other targets, they might have been important, but not as important as the 26 fuel tanks in the upper and lower fuel farms. - I assume that your 26 above is a typo ? The PH photo on Willmott's page #146 clearly shows 17 tanks in the upper east PH tankfarm and 10 in the lower east PH tankfarm, so sorry for my own miscount. The west PH tankfarm is also 27 tanks, not the 25 I had earlier said. So, we end up with 27 + 27 + 2 + 9 + 12 + 2 = 79 large fuel tanks to destroy. Plus all the other vital "stuff" like USN fleet oilers.

.......
I request your opinion on the following two sources which indicate that as of 1933 the IJN had installed and trained their pilots on the use of a night landing light system on all of the KB's carriers, (at http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/Japanese%20Carrier%20Operations.pdf ).

And that all IJN warplanes were delivered factory equipped with radio compass homing systems (at http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/gregspringer/radios/radio_systems.htm ) that would have allowed any 3rd wave pilot to find his home carrier again, after sunset.

I believe that these two IJN systems would have allowed a major 3rd wave Dec.7'41 attack on Oahu's infrastructure with minimal disruptions to the historical timeline for any readers here to get unduly upset about.

Please note that I'm NOT claiming IJN bombing at night, just return night navigation over water and mostly successful dark-deck landings. Even if "out of practise", the KB's pilots historically had the 10 nights of November 26 thru December 5 to "get sharp" again while on their way across the Pacific, from Japan to Oahu. Each KB carrier transported 9 aircraft (3 Kates, 3 Vals, 3 Zekes) in 'knocked-down' form so there were 54 spares available to replace any warplanes lost in the Pacific. Cressman's book, " A Magnificent Fight" indicates that at least carrier Hiryu brought along replacement aircrew as well so training loss replacements were available, at sea, prior to the Dec.7'41 air raids.

The only fault that I see remaining in this scenario would be the shortage of scouting aircraft to search for US surface and carrier groups. Holding some 54 torpedo armed Kates on deck seems pointless unless such a search is also launched, somehow. KB cruiser and battleship floatplanes were only 14 in number and so could not have provided an all-round search.

I don't know how effective the nearly 30 IJN submarines in Hawaiian waters would have been at scouting, had Nagumo even asked for their assistance ? Which for some unknown reason, he historically did not. Some IJN submarines did have scout floatplanes aboard but I do not yet know what sea conditions were required for their successful launch/recovery.

I can think only of using the torpedo hauling Kates as armed scout aircraft
but I believe this idea to be in contradiction of IJN doctrine at that time ? I do know that a portion of each US carrier's SBDs regularly scouted while carrying bombloads but I have no specific details on the IJN having adopting similar techniques ?

Nagumo's historical orders could have been addressed by the retention, on the KB's decks, of 6 x 9 =54 torpedo loaded Kates, leaving a 3rd strike total of 57+68+54 = 179 warplanes, almost the same size as the 1st wave. I believe that Willmott has already deducted 6 x 9 = 54 Zekes for CAP duties (as were flown during the historical 1st & 2nd wave attacks) prior to concluding that 233 warplanes were available for a 3rd wave.

-------------------------------------------------------
Ickysdad/bridav58, you asked,

Also about the 3rd. wave weren't there something like 37 US airworthy by then ? - This is why there would be some 54 Zekes along as escorts. The Japanese would not likely expect Oahu to be caught asleep yet again.

Also that figure doesn't include Enterprise's fighters ,could be a rude awakening for the possible 3rd. wave. - True but considering the number of Enterprise aircraft already shotdown by US AA gunners, do you really see Halsey stripping his TF of its only CAP fighters to bolster Oahu's fighter and AA defences which are already supplimented by the survivors of the US Pacific Fleet inside PH ? And at a time when his entire TF was very nearly "running on fumes" as he waited around to enter PH for fuel.

Just as Nagumo had NO idea where the US carriers were, Enterprise had no idea of where the Kido Butai lurked either. I just can't imagine "Bull" giving up his defensive fighter screen because (in his mind anyway) the Japanese MIGHT make a 3rd strike on Oahu. He had to have believed that the KB (with it's 350+ warplanes) would want to sink his carrier. Any other conclusion would be your own "forsight" based on your knowledge of my proposed scenario.


Just a couple of points. There were, by US Navy documents, 16 tanks in the upper and 10 tanks in the lower. I am not going to argue with anyone. Those are the only tanks worth going after. Why everyone is discussing the figure of 79 or whatever is simply to win an argument. I am not interested in winning any argument. The number is 26. There is one building in the upper that could be mistaken for a camoflaged tank. It ain't. It's a building.

As for the radio compass, it requires a signal be transmitted from the mother ship. Do you really want Nagumo to betray his position by transmitting a homing signal that our radio detectors can detect and home in on. The radio compass on the early Model 21's was a copy of the Fairchild Aero Compass manufactured in the US. In fact, one recovered from a Zero shot down during the PH attack was manufactured by Fairchild Aerial Camera division. It was Model number RC-4 SN 484. Any attack group returning at night is on its own, Nagumo is not going to betray his position by transmitting a homing signal that is not effective beyond 50 miles however, under certain atmospheric conditions, the signal can be detected and tracked out to over 200 miles. As for my bone fides, I was and still am a trained aircraft electronics technician. I have worked on RDF's, which is what the Japanese radio had built into it. You can see the loop antenna behind the pilot seat, in many photos.

[bridav58]

According to the Enterprise's action logs, Halsey sent aloft four F4F's, but the rest were retained on board- VF squadrons at this time, had only 18 aircraft. With that number, he would only have 14 available F4F-3's and Pearl Harbor was outside of their range. He did send SBD's to Ford Island. How much good the SBD's would be in the defense of the fuel tanks, is conjecture. The only available aircraft would be the Army P-36's and P-40's.

Army figures show that 96 of 231 aircraft in the Hawaiian AF were lost. Only 79 Army aircraft were still in flyable condition. Comparison of losses and availabilities as presented by the Roberts Commission shows that only 80 pursuit aircraft were available at the time of the attack and only 19 managed to get airborne, with five shot down. 88 pursuit planes were damage of which 80% were repairable. (probably not in time for the third wave as the strips were damaged). Based on that, I would say that the number is probably less than 20, at best. But, if you need 37 for your point, use it. It doesn't really matter in regards to the third wave, flak was more damaging that the pursuit aircraft.
and trying to get some figures from a variety of sources . I do thank you for your input though.

[robdab]

old_pop2000,

Why the hostility ?

I'm not interested in whether I win or loose a debate about a hypothetical 3rd wave raid on Oahu. How could I be since its ALL a big guess on all of our parts anyway ? I AM however interested in establishing, as well as we possibly can some 66+ years later, the FACTS of the situation, at that time.

You have made the claim, "There were, by US Navy documents, 16 tanks in the upper and 10 tanks in the lower. I am not going to argue with anyone. Those are the only tanks worth going after." I don't strongly disagree with your upper and lower east PH tankfarm numbers since 26 vs 27 matters little but I must ask you, what is your source for your, "Those are the only tanks worth going after." ???

There are many PH photos that show a large tankfarm located between Hospital Point and Hickham Field that appears, to me anyway, to consist of 27 additional large fuel tanks. ust east of the PH coaling docks. USS Neosho is recorded as having delivered 500,000 gallons of avgas there on the afternoon of Dec.6'41 so I find it difficult to accept that this entire tankfarm was "not worth going after", as you have claimed.

The 9 Ford Island avgas tanks are spread out in a long line, mostly parallel to battleship row rather than being clusterded tighly together, but they also show in several photos.

If you would take the time to go to http://www.usmm.net/honolulu.html you will see a Dec.8'41 dated summary of the substantial volume of fuels held in the Honolulu Harbor civilian tankfarm. IMHO anyway, certainly "worth going after" since Honolulu Harbor was dredged deep enough in 1938 for a fuel starved USS Enterprise to enter to "tank-up", if necessary due to USN fuel losses within PH. The only question being, did Halsey's credit card have a high enough credit limit to allow a good "fill'er up!" ? LOL.

There is one building in the upper that could be mistaken for a camoflaged tank. It ain't. It's a building. If you'd check at http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/prelim/phbr-2.htm you'd see at least two official photo captions that indicate there were indeed two tanks painted to look like buildings, in contradiction of your statement. Have you a source that proves those photo captions to be incorrect ?

------------------------------------------------------------
Wrt the IJN homing equipment you replied,

As for the radio compass, it requires a signal be transmitted from the mother ship. Do you really want Nagumo to betray his position by transmitting a homing signal that our radio detectors can detect and home in on. - Prange tells us in "At Dawn We Slept" that historically Nagumo orderd a KB radio broadcast to Tokyo at 1300 on Dec.7'41 (page #573) to announce the success of his raid so, obviously, at that stage he didn't care much about concealing his strike group's location. Historically. Fortuneately for both he and the KB, the listening US RDF types got the bearing wrong by some 180 degrees as I'm sure that you already know.

Had Nagumo actually been planning to make a 3rd wave attack I'd think that he would have kept his radios shutdown BUT broadcasting a homing signal to his warplanes AFTER DARK would not have been much of a risk, at all. Neither USAAF nor USN strike palnes were good for bombing nor navigation AT NIGHT either (remember the Honolulu radio station homing beacon followed in by those 12 B-17s ?). And even if on for 2-3 hours the KB's known bearing (but not distance) (if not screwed up by 180 degrees as happened historically) would be some 9 hours cold by dawn on Dec.8'41. In 9 hours the KB would be 9x29knots = 260nmiles somewhere else. Plus the flight time of any US strike plane, say another 1.5 hours after dawn gives a KB travel distance of 10.5x29 = 300+ nmiles. and that only IF the US defenders guessed the new location exactly right. And IF there wasn't a rain squall for the KB to hide in and IF the KB CAP didn't splash the scout plane etc., etc.

Any attack group returning at night is on its own, Nagumo is not going to betray his position by transmitting a homing signal that is not effective beyond 50 miles however, under certain atmospheric conditions, the signal can be detected and tracked out to over 200 miles. - My impression of the article was that the radio could broadcast voice (8 watts) out to 50 miles +/- and cw telegraph (30 watts) out to 200 miles +/-. The article indicates that Fuchida used it to home in on the Honolulu commercial radio station while on his way to bomb Oahu so I would assume that his homing gear had the range to to follow an IJN signal BACK to that same carrier group ?

As for my bone fides, I was and still am a trained aircraft electronics technician. I have worked on RDF's, which is what the Japanese radio had built into it. You can see the loop antenna behind the pilot seat, in many photos. - I take this to mean that in your expert opinion, you agree with the contents of that radio homing article.

[Warship NWS]

Just a quick note.. let's all keep in mind the spirit of a debate is to have fun - no one is out to save the world as I like to say, and each are entitled to their opinion or perspective - so long as it stays professionally toned. There are no 100% accurate answers to hypothetical discussions. It is good to see that many of you are putting some serious thought into this historical context however. You can never have too many history enthusiasts that are trying to learn more about their favorite topic. ;)

Thanks.

[john964]

Plus all the other vital "stuff" like USN fleet oilers.

Each KB carrier transported 9 aircraft (3 Kates, 3 Vals, 3 Zekes) in 'knocked-down' form so there were 54 spares available to replace any warplanes lost in the Pacific.



I see two problems according to other posts in this discussion and printed sorces there were only 2 tankers in port during the attack USS Neosho and USS Rampo. Neosho was on/off loading AVgas on Ford Is between CA and OK/MD, Rampo was loading PT boats for PI.

Also the 'Knocked-down' aircraft are stored in the overhead of the lower hanger. These planes are stored with wings removed. It would take several hours to unstow and put together these aircraft. This would probably take on the order of 3-5 hours per plane.

[Campy]

The Japanese tried night attack and landing at the Coral Sea. Hara sent his most highly trained pilots. They couldn't identify their target, and ended up trying to land on the American carriers. I don't know what equipment they may have had to locate their carriers, but apparently it didn't work well.

A question. Apparently the Japanese carriers were carrying more than their optimal loads of planes at Pearl Harbor. I assume this was to compensate for the expected heavy losses that did not occur. Could too many planes aboard have hampered dispatching a third wave? Perhaps there is no answer for this.

Frank

[old_pop2000]

I have just received my Pearl Harbor by H.P. Willmott. Now, in Chapter five, he details the problems with a third strike. He appears, in my opinion, and based on Parshall's work in "Shattered Sword" to have made a timing error. Easy to do, but still a mistake. He states on page 147, that at Midway the Japanese needed 70 minutes to rearm aircraft retained for a second strike and were caught by American dive bombers ....... one would suggest that the two process might well have needed between two and three hours. He is alluding to the refueling, re-arming and repair of recovered aircraft. He also states earlier that this would most likely be a Val only attack.

Here is the problem with that reference. At Midway, the second strike had originally been loaded for a ship attack with AP bombs and torpedoes. When the request from Tomonaga arrived, Nagumo had to order the aircraft rearmed with GP bombs. For a Val, that is easy. But a torpedo bomber must have the torpedo removed, the rack removed and then the bomb rack reinstalled, then the bomb installed. There were only four arming teams per squadron. Now, during this time period, the carriers were attack by aircraft and this process had to be stopped. Then at 0820 hrs, before the first wave had returned, the US carriers were spotted. Nagumo now had to order the reloading and rearming stopped. He now had to order the torpedoes reloaded which meant that the bombs had to be removed, the racks removed, the torpedo launchers restored, and the torpedoes reinstalled. While this process was continuing, the returning first wave was recovered and stowed down below. This prevented the second wave from being lifted on to the deck. After the recovery, the US torpedo bombers attacked, loading had to stop and the decks cleared for recovery and rearming of the CAP Zero's. This whole process took from 0820 to 1020 or two hours.

However, in comparison, at Pearl Harbor, the Vals did not need have their racks removed. In fact, they could be refueled and rearmed on the deck. There was no two hours necessary or 70 minutes because they were not using the horizontal bombers or B5N's. Willmott's two to three hours is not correct. It would have taken 20 seconds to launch every aircraft in the third wave. Remember that there might be 100 aircraft in the strike, but that is on six carriers each launching in parallel. So, if each carrier is launching 30 planes, that will take 12 minutes to clear the decks of the third wave. I believe that the third wave could easily have been launched by 1300 hrs. Fuchida states that he saw the third wave being refueled and rearmed and the horizontal bombers having their racks removed. The third wave, at 1215 was already being rearmed and refueled but how far along, is not known. However, the last of second wave probably landed by 1130. Willmott agrees that the majority of the third wave would have been the first wave aircraft. Those had left the area of PH by 0955 and arrive back by 1100 hrs. They had been refueling and rearming for one hour.


Mr. Willmott made an easy mistake as his book came out before Shattered Sword. He most likely used Lord, Prange and others for his sources although I don't see a bibliography or sources listing.

Thanks for your forebearance.

[bridav58]

Wilmott has alluded to is the shortage of tankers was in fleet oilers not commercial ones. Further fuel tanks can be built pretty fast as the Seebee's showed during the war. Remember too the US in this case might just put "Hitler First" on hold. As far as the 3rd. strike is concerned there was no original plan for a 3rd. strike so I have my doubts about it was really being rearmed & refueled as such Fuchida's testimony not withstanding. As I understand it he has come under some severe criticism for his testimony at times. It also seems that the idea is being put forward here that Vals could be rearmned & refueled on deck to the best of my knowledge the Japanese didn't do it that away.

[old_pop2000]

...

Also the 'Knocked-down' aircraft are stored in the overhead of the lower hanger. These planes are stored with wings removed. It would take several hours to unstow and put together these aircraft. This would probably take on the order of 3-5 hours per plane.


I agree that it would have taken time to restore those aircraft. However, 80 percent of the damaged aircraft could have been repaired . There were 129 D3A dive bombers on those six carriers. Using Willmott's figures on Page 203, he states that 15 Vals were lost, 58 damaged. This leaves 56 Val's for the Third wave. So, they could have launched 56 Vals that were not damaged immediately. We also don't know the state of the damage for the aircraft. Some might have been perfectly flyable. Just my opinion.

[bridav58]

I agree that it would have taken time to restore those aircraft. However, 80 percent of the damaged aircraft could have been repaired . There were 129 D3A dive bombers on those six carriers. Using Willmott's figures on Page 203, he states that 15 Vals were lost, 58 damaged. This leaves 56 Val's for the Third wave. So, they could have launched 56 Vals that were not damaged immediately. We also don't know the state of the damage for the aircraft. Some might have been perfectly flyable. Just my opinion.


just how long would it take to inspect all the damaged aircraft to determine thier flyability & such?

[old_pop2000]

Wilmott has alluded to is the shortage of tankers was in fleet oilers not commercial ones. Further fuel tanks can be built pretty fast as the Seebee's showed during the war. Remember too the US in this case might just put "Hitler First" on hold. As far as the 3rd. strike is concerned there was no original plan for a 3rd. strike so I have my doubts about it was really being rearmed & refueled as such Fuchida's testimony not withstanding. As I understand it he has come under some severe criticism for his testimony at times. It also seems that the idea is being put forward here that Vals could be rearmned & refueled on deck to the best of my knowledge the Japanese didn't do it that away.

Actually Genda makes the same claim that the third strike was being readied for launch. Genda stated that he talked to Fuchida then went to the bridge to talk to Nagumo and Kusaka. It was then that the decision was not to launch the third strike. Genda then went to Fuchida and told him. He then went to the bridge to discuss this with Nagumo. I guess he did not succeed because the order to retire had already been given.

However, some of his testimony is questionable. In this case, we have more than just Fuchida word, we both he and Genda.

[old_pop2000]

just how long would it take to inspect all the damaged aircraft to determine thier flyability & such?

I am not entirely certain. We know there were 111 aircraft on six carriers damaged.

Akagi had 23
Kaga had 28
Soryu had 22
Hiryu no record available
Zuikaku/Shokaku -37

The unflyable ones had been jettisoned to allow the others to land. I believe the figure was 15.

I am guessing that it would take 30 minutes to an hour to determine which ones could be readied for flight. It really depends on the damage incurred and I don't know if those records exist. All those ships went down. Any guesses, mate.

[bridav58]

Actually Genda makes the same claim that the third strike was being readied for launch. Genda stated that he talked to Fuchida then went to the bridge to talk to Nagumo and Kusaka. It was then that the decision was not to launch the third strike. Genda then went to Fuchida and told him. He then went to the bridge to discuss this with Nagumo. I guess he did not succeed because the order to retire had already been given.

However, some of his testimony is questionable. In this case, we have more than just Fuchida word, we both he and Genda.

Of course it's vey convienient that Nagumo wasn't there after the war to defend himself and he's the one that has come under the severe criticism for withdrawing. It's too bad we just don't have his account of it along with maybe some primary source material.

[old_pop2000]

Of course it's vey convienient that Nagumo wasn't there after the war to defend himself and he's the one that has come under the severe criticism for withdrawing. It's too bad we just don't have his account of it along with maybe some primary source material.

That is the point that I made, early on in the discussion Nagumo and Kusaka were not in favor of the attack. The Combined Fleet staff planned the general overall attack and targets, Genda and Fuchida planned the attack profile. Yet their mistakes are blamed on Nagumo.

[robdab]

john964,

... there were only 2 tankers in port during the attack USS Neosho and USS Rampo. - I know.

Neosho was on/off loading AVgas on Ford Is - Historically she pumped the last of the avgas ashore to the Ford Island tanks at 0749 and the first Japanese bomb fell at 0755.

I was the person that told you about USS Ramapo and sent you the map URL back in my post #108 here. I'm sorry but I don't understand what question you are trying to ask with this point ?

These planes are stored with wings removed. It would take several hours to unstow and put together these aircraft. This would probably take on the order of 3-5 hours per plane. - Actually far more "knocked-down" than just the wings removed. Historiclly it took a team of 6 IJN aircraft mechanics some 21 hours to assemble, fuel, test flight and "break-in" the engine of a replacement aircraft so that it was combat-ready certified.

Since the KB had some 10 nights of trans-Pacific travel available to practise their night landings, I would hope that the mechanics could keep up with replacing the damaged/wrecked warplanes sure to result from that after darkness "refresher" work. All IJN pilots had been night landing qualified since the night landing light system was installed carrier fleet wide in 1933 and on each new carrier delivered since. Hosho was the night landing "guinea-pig" test carrier in 1932 but as you can imagine, regular pilot re-training would have been needed for them to stay alive while doing so.

------------------------------------------------------------
Campy,

I assume that you refer to the May 7'42 experiment ?

Yes the Japanese did plan to night bomb (unlike my 3rd wave PH sceanario where bombing would still occur in daylight, with the return flight and landing after dark.) but couldn't find their American targets after dark. Once the decision to return had been made, their bombs were dropped to conserve fuel. Mostly by luck the Japanese strike planes then overflew the US TF which had deck lights on to recover its own aircraft (which had been sent out under radar guidance to intercept the Japanese carrier planes spotted some miles away) after dark. Several of the IJN warplanes did circle the US ships in the mistaken belief that they were IJN but US AA fire soon convinced them otherwise.

Most of the Japanese warplanes not shot down by the radar directed American fighters did get back to their deck, in the dark, eventually. Proving that the radio homing equipment & training worked but that actual successful night ATTACKS were still far off.

It might have been a different ending though (and one of my favourite "what if's") had they not all dropped their bombs etc. before turning back for their carrier.

The IJN did practise night torpedo drops on anchored warships by flarelight but concluded early that this wouldn't have been practical in any wind condition over 5 knots nor while the targets underway were at sea.

IIRC it was a US radar equipped "blackcat" PBY using a Canadian built but British designed radar that first torpedoed a moving IJN tanker the night before Midway, somewhere to the west of that island.

Could too many planes aboard have hampered dispatching a third wave? - Certainly they could have but considering the historical losses (many due to hard landings on pitching carrier decks rather than to combat damage) and the fact that the Japanese were pushing very heavily damaged warplanes "over the side", I don't believe that it was a problem.

[Ed Rotondaro]

old pop2000,

A few points to ponder:
Your suggested total of only 16 PH fuel tanks is considerably low ...

As best I can tell the East Pearl Harbor tankfarm was composed of 26 tanks.
As best I can tell the West Pearl Harbor tankfarm was composed of 25 tanks.
As best I can tell the Ford Island tankfarm was composed of 9 avgas tanks.
There were two more large tanks at the Pearl City Electric Power Plant.
So 26 + 25 + 9 + 2 = 62 (not just 16) potential Val targets inside the PH border without even counting ships.

Adding in two USN fleet oilers (3-6 divebombers each just to be sure), your 5 fuel barges, two drydock caisson gates (which each demand 2-3 torpedoes, not bombs), CinCPac HQ, the submarine base (and the 4 US subs tied up outside) to say nothing of the USN warehouses etc scattered nearby, all increase the number of attack aircraft needed for the increased number of infrastructure targets.

An additional two large fuel tanks supplied the Honolulu Electric Power Plant.
Twelve more civilian tanks beside the Honolulu Harbor oil piers kept Oahu's
economy ticking along. So 14 more worth bombing. I had thought to use level bombing Kates against these 14 since US AA defenses at Honolulu were much, much fewer in number than those in/around PH.

There were also many more buried (and thus nearly impossible to deliberately hit) avgas tanks in the 25,000 gallons each range at Oahu's military airfields but only the civilian John Rogers International near Honolulu had above ground avgas tanks afaik.

Sounds to,me like you need lots more aircraft than just the Vals and Zekes available in order for a 3rd wave to "do it right".

The above information is from A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) by Paul Dull Page 108. - page #114 in my copy.

Those are oil spill berms designed, as you can imagine, to contain any spillage from the filling of the tanks. They are not bomb or explosion proof. And they are not as high as one would imagine. They are not designed to contain much spillage. - Actually one of Adm. Bloch's staff indicated during one of the PH inquiry hearings that they were sized to hold the contents of each fuel tank that they surrounded but were designed to catch only "slow leak" type spills, not the nearly instant rupture and violent flow resulting from a direct bomb hit. In such a case much fuel would spill over each berm, whether already flaming or not.

Also discusswed was the fact that no fire suppression system was installed at any of the PH tankfarms. Budget talks had been held in 1940 but as the Red Hill underground storage tank project was about to begin, it seemed a waste of money to install water cannon/foggers for tankfarms soon to be emptied.

It must also be noted that igniting bunker "C" ship fuel oil was not quite as easy as you make it sound. Certainly not impossible as the many photos of floating and flaming fuel on the surface of PH prove, but still, more difficult. It should also be noted that just a very few British "Stringbag" level bombers managed to bomb and burn much of the Itallian Fleet's fuel storage tanks at Taranto, which the Japanese knew about.

And trust me, Yoshikawa knew where they were, had placed them on a map and watched them filled. - Indeed he is recorded as having written that he could tell which tanks were full or not because full tanks almost always leaked ...

-----------------------------------------------------------
Please don't take my posts to indicate that I oppose your views on a 3rd Oahu strike.

Indeed I have been argueing a position close to your "side" of that proposal at warships1 for some time now.

I just want everyone to have accurate information on which to base their opinions.

Hi:

With all due respect you're missing a point here. The IJN doesn't have to destroy every single tank or storage facillity. It doesn't have to ignite the oil, merely spill it. The PH raid didn't destroy every target by any means, but it still put the bulk of the Pacfic Fleet out of action for a period of time. Now add in the loss of some oil and gas and you begin to limit the actions that Nimitz can attempt.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Japanese tried night attack and landing at the Coral Sea. Hara sent his most highly trained pilots. They couldn't identify their target, and ended up trying to land on the American carriers. I don't know what equipment they may have had to locate their carriers, but apparently it didn't work well.

A question. Apparently the Japanese carriers were carrying more than their optimal loads of planes at Pearl Harbor. I assume this was to compensate for the expected heavy losses that did not occur. Could too many planes aboard have hampered dispatching a third wave? Perhaps there is no answer for this.

Frank

Campy:

Good points sir.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To All Regular Forum Members:
However, in comparison, at Pearl Harbor, the Vals did not need have their racks removed. In fact, they could be refueled and rearmed on the deck. There was no two hours necessary or 70 minutes because they were not using the horizontal bombers or B5N's. Willmott's two to three hours is not correct. It would have taken 20 seconds to launch every aircraft in the third wave. Remember that there might be 100 aircraft in the strike, but that is on six carriers each launching in parallel. So, if each carrier is launching 30 planes, that will take 12 minutes to clear the decks of the third wave. I believe that the third wave could easily have been launched by 1300 hrs. Fuchida states that he saw the third wave being refueled and rearmed and the horizontal bombers having their racks removed. The third wave, at 1215 was already being rearmed and refueled but how far along, is not known. However, the last of second wave probably landed by 1130. Willmott agrees that the majority of the third wave would have been the first wave aircraft. Those had left the area of PH by 0955 and arrive back by 1100 hrs. They had been refueling and rearming for one hour.


Mr. Willmott made an easy mistake as his book came out before Shattered Sword. He most likely used Lord, Prange and others for his sources although I don't see a bibliography or sources listing.

Thanks for your forebearance.

Dennis:

From reading "Shattered Sword", I thought re-arming and re-fueling on the flight deck was not IJN doctrine. Curious.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

From reading "Shattered Sword", I thought re-arming and re-fueling on the flight deck was not IJN doctrine. Curious.


It was not IJN doctrine. On page 120 of "Shattered Sword" Parshall indicates that "unlike torpedo bombers, dive-bombers were normally armed on the flight deck. " In fact, all engine warm ups had to be accomplished on the flight deck. You made me look that up, buddy.;):D

[old_pop2000]

Campy:

Good points sir.

No, because on some carriers they had a third lower hanger. The spare aircraft were either held in the ceiling or stowed in the lower hanger. That was the case at Midway. The carriers had the Midway Air Group on board in the lower hanger. IIRC. But, it was always crowded in the hangers. This is why the Vals would be refueled and rearmed up on the deck.

[robdab]

Ed Rotondaro, you wrote,

With all due respect you're missing a point here. The IJN doesn't have to destroy every single tank or storage facillity. - True but the more the better. It doesn't have to ignite the oil, merely spill it. - I have difficulty in agreeing with that. Bunker "C" has few aromatics left in it so as long as it was contained within a berm it could be pumped thru a simple filter and then be re-used. If not ignited then the vast majority could/would be saved.

The PH raid didn't destroy every target by any means, but it still put the bulk of the Pacfic Fleet out of action for a period of time. -Yes but the US carriers and submarines were NOT taken out of action at all. Now add in the loss of some oil and gas and you begin to limit the actions that Nimitz can attempt. - Why settle for just limiting the actions that Nimitz could order when just a bit more effort could hamstring any and all US counter-attacks that historically operated thru Oahu ? Japan was well aware that the US would very quickly strategically outproduce and swamp them. Every Japanese victory needed to be a maximim victory if the US were to be quickly forced to the peace table. A badly mistaken Japanese assumption (as proved by PH) but I believe it to be the one that they planned their war effort with.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It was not IJN doctrine. On page 120 of "Shattered Sword" Parshall indicates that "unlike torpedo bombers, dive-bombers were normally armed on the flight deck. " In fact, all engine warm ups had to be accomplished on the flight deck. You made me look that up, buddy.;):D


Dennis:

Sorry old friend, I'm out of town until Sunday night and away from my books. Fortunately I can access the forums on my brother-in-law's PC when his daughters let me.;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed Rotondaro, you wrote,

With all due respect you're missing a point here. The IJN doesn't have to destroy every single tank or storage facillity. - True but the more the better. It doesn't have to ignite the oil, merely spill it. - I have difficulty in agreeing with that. Bunker "C" has few aromatics left in it so as long as it was contained within a berm it could be pumped thru a simple filter and then be re-used. If not ignited then the vast majority could/would be saved.

The PH raid didn't destroy every target by any means, but it still put the bulk of the Pacfic Fleet out of action for a period of time. -Yes but the US carriers and submarines were NOT taken out of action at all. Now add in the loss of some oil and gas and you begin to limit the actions that Nimitz can attempt. - Why settle for just limiting the actions that Nimitz could order when just a bit more effort could hamstring any and all US counter-attacks that historically operated thru Oahu ? Japan was well aware that the US would very quickly strategically outproduce and swamp them. Every Japanese victory needed to be a maximim victory if the US were to be quickly forced to the peace table. A badly mistaken Japanese assumption (as proved by PH) but I believe it to be the one that they planned their war effort with.

Hi:

I'm having trouble following your arguments on this thread. At first you state that there are too many targets and not enough IJN planes to do the job. Now you're saying that they should go for the knockout blow? So what is your opinion in plain English on the need for and abilty of the IJN to carry out the 3rd strike against the fuel, etc.? Thank you.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Sorry old friend, I'm out of town until Sunday night and away from my books. Fortunately I can access the forums on my brother-in-law's PC when his daughters let me.;)

Hey, no problem. I couldn't remember, another senior moment. :D

[robdab]

Ed Rontondaro,

At first you state that there are too many targets and not enough IJN planes to do the job. - Sorry for the confusion. I was disagreeing old_pop2000's suggestion that a 3rd wave consisting of ONLY the Vals and Zekes would be enough IJN warplanes to knock out what he says are the USN's only 16 + 10 = 26 fuel oil tanks.

Now you're saying that they should go for the knockout blow? - Yes. I always have proposed just that.

So what is your opinion in plain English on the need for and abilty of the IJN to carry out the 3rd strike against the fuel, etc.? Thank you.

As you have read, I firmly believe that are many fixed infrastructure targets worthy of destruction by a 3rd IJN wave attack on Oahu.

To include:

79 BIG fuel tanks that are mostly around the edges of PH but with 14 around Honolulu Harbor (containing avgas, bunker "C", bunker "A", bunker"B", diesel - no fuel means no attacks and little defense anywhere in the Pacific.

2 (of the only 4 in the Pacific) USN underway re-fueling capable fleet oilers that will hamstring Nimitz's carrier operations until Atlantic Fleet oilers can transfer in. Standard Oil for instance, transferd some 25 civilian tankers to the US energency war tanker program i early 1942 but not a single one could transfer fuel directly to a USN warship whether stopped or underway. Not a one.

5 re-fueling barges inside PH that old_pop2000 mentioned - but not so necessary as more and more fuel tanks are destroyed

2 drydock caisson gates - so no in-the-dry ship hull repairs

1 US submarine base with 4 subs tied up there - kill subs and the skilled mechanics whenever/whereever possible

1 CinCPac HQ - just because its there - you never know when a future Halsey or a Fletcher or a Spruance or a Turner might be at the wrong place at just the wrong time ...

And on the way home, for any Zekes still with ammo, some more USAAF airfield straffing to disrupt repairs and reduce the chance of any long range bomber strikes as the KB retires during Dec.8'41.



Could ALL of them have been destroyed ? Probably not but I'd like as many of the surviving Kates as possible along for an honest attempt at doing just that.

But still leaving a core of torpedo armed Kates ready to attack any USN carriers found outside of PH.

To my mind, including that many more IJN aircraft would (as per Willmott's "Pearl Harbor") delay any 3rd wave launch until late in the afternoon of Dec.7'41.

This would result in bombing on Oahu about an hour prior to sunset with IJN aircraft returning to their KB decks after dark. Guided by their radio compass homing system and night deck landing lights as described by the two sources that I posted previously.

[old_pop2000]

As you have read, I firmly believe that are many fixed infrastructure targets worthy of destruction by a 3rd IJN wave inside of PH.

To include:

79 BIG fuel tanks (containing avgas, bunker"C", bunker "A", bunker"B", diesel - no fuel means no attacks and little defense anywhere in the Pacific.

2 (of the only 4 in the Pacific) USN underway re-fueling capable fleet oilers that will hamstring Nimitz's carrier operations until Atlantic Fleet oilers can transfer in.

5 re-fueling barges inside PH that old_pop2000 mentioned - but not so necessary as more and more fuel tanks are destroyed

2 drydock caisson gates - so no in-the-dry ship hull repairs

1 US submarine base with 4 subs tied up there - kill subs and the skilled mechanics whenever/whereever possible

1 CinCPac HQ - just because its there - you never know when a future Halsey or a Fletcher or a Spruance or a Turner might be at the wrong place at the wrong time ...

And on the way home, for any Zekes still with ammo, some more USAAF airfield straffing.

Could ALL of them have been destroyed ? Probably not but I'd like as many of the Kates as possible along for an honest attempt at doing just that. To my mind, including that many more IJN aircraft would (as per Willmott's "Pearl Harbor") delay any 3rd wave launch until late in the afternoon of Dec.7'41.



While I totally support your idea of a knockout blow by striking all those targets, I am reminded that this was a hit and run supporting raid. If we are exploring alternative history, then we have two scenarios. One might be termed "the knockout blow" and one termed " the limited knockout blow". My analysis is based on the second option, of a limited knockout blow in keeping with the overall strategic goal of the mission. I am attempting to stick within the known parameters of the two previous attacks. Therefore my attack concept is to use a limited number of dive bombers and fighters to strike a limited number of high value targets. These, IMHO, would be the upper and lower base tank farm, docks and the sub pens. I believe that attempting to strike the yard oilers, while a good idea is going to be difficult because they could be anywhere. That is a problem that must be solved. As for CinCPac Headquarters, considering its location, a couple of stray bombs might eliminate it.

Now, if Nagumo could have used the second option, then retired northward to refuel. The question is; Could he have then, on December 8th, returned southward, and conducted a successful next day strike on those other targets? Insufficient data, IMHO, is available. We are now bordering on fantasy. But, it is still a possible alternative solution to the knockout blow scenario.

What do you think?

[bridav58]

Wave 1 launched 51 D3A, and recovered 50, of which 17 were damaged. These
50, including the 33 that were good, were shoved into the farthest
recesses of the hangars of Shokaku and Zuikaku because they still had to
recover Wave 2's B5Ns.

Wave 2 launched 78 D3A, and recovered 64, of which 41+ were damaged.
These 64, including the 23 that were good, were shoved into the remaining
space in the hangars of Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu.

Recovery completed at 1215 and the deck crews immediately commenced
preparing the planes for their next flight. This is simply standard
operating procedure, and this is what was noted by Genda. It does not
mean they were preparing the planes for a "Third Strike," but for a third
strike (i.e. any further flying they might be called upon to perform that
day). For all the deck crews knew, that might be a strike against enemy
carriers, not shore installations.

With recovery running more-or-less continuously from when the first strike
began landing until 1215, the deck crews of Shokaku and Zuikaku really
didn't have time to do much in the way of assessing, repairing, servicing,
refueling and last, but not least rearming with appropriate ordnance. To
do that last, they had to await the BDA and the determination of the
staff, and the dissemination of the load plan. Once that was
disseminated, the magazine crews had to break out, build up and move the
appropriate ordnance to the flight and hangar decks. So with the need to
constantly catch, strike below and and stuff birds, there really wasn't
any time to do any work on those 33 good D3A from the first strike (much
less any fighters going along as escorts).

This means the Japanese don't get started on the turn-around evolution
until 1215 at the earliest.

Now, here's what has to happen with every one of those aircraft:

After it's parked in the hangar, it has to be surveyed for damage. We
can't just trust that the plane is undamaged, we need to verify it. Sure
would suck to splash halfway home because someone failed to notice a
bullet hole on an "undamaged" plane.

Once it's surveyed, then it must be serviced for things like oil, oxygen,
compressed air, hydraulic fluid, and other consumable items. The canopy
must be cleaned, particularly of any oil spray, which is particularly
insidious to remove. Any finickly mechanical items might also need to be
greased, tuned or replaced (like bomb shackles, radios and spark plugs).
No, you can't really skimp on any of this because electronics and high
performance radial engines were cutting-edge technology at this time and
not necessarily entirely reliable.

Once the bird's serviced, it has to be fueled. There is NOT a fueling
hose, station and pump for every single aircraft. There are a limited
number, so that's going to impose time penalties. So too is maneuvering
the hoses around all those other planes.

Hopefully by the time you've done all of this, the brass have figured out
and distributed the load plan, and the guys in the magazines can do their
magic, unpacking and/or unracking the appropriate bomb bodies, fitting and
setting fuzes and attaching tail kits. Then they have to get them to the
bomb 'vaters, and up to the hangar decks. This is NOT a hand truck for
every bomb and every plane, so once again, that's going to impose time
penalties, as is maneuvering around all those other planes.

So, ta-da, you've got 33 armed D3A ready to go in about 90 minutes.
That's 33, armed, fueled D3As, parked in the back recesses of the hangars
on Shokaku and Zuikaku with a bunch of B5Ns in the way. Now, you've got
to break the spot of the hangar deck, extract the armed D3As and get them
to the flight deck, and get the unarmed planes back out of the way to
launch the armed ones. Ah, hell, by the time you've gone through that
whole goat-rope, you might as well just take the extra time to go through
the full cycle with the birds you landed from the second strike on Akagi,
Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. And, of course, this doesn't include servicing and
arming any fighter escorts. Let's say you only send a dozen fighter
escorts. You could potentially have those 12 fighters and 33 dive bombers
on the roof on Sho and Zui in two hours. The time is now 1415. Sunset is
three hours away.

You still need to warm those birds motors up, man-up and launch, so you
probably don't have the planes airborne and south-bound before 1500, with
probably at least an hour's flight south, about 15 minutes of fighting and
another hour's flight north. Which makes the time...(wait for
it...)...1715. You're doing a night recovery...on axial deck
carriers...with fatigued air crew who have flown the two toughest, most
heavily opposed combat missions of their lives...many flying damaged
planes (many more than in the morning, in fact)...all of whom are out of
qual for night landings...

Of course, all of this presumes that everything goes smoothly. Right...

this is another article from EJ.....

I think the main point is that IJN carrier doctrine has to examined we can say do this & do that but what really matters is thier doctrine and how thier flight ops really turned out on that day not how we want it or want to speculate it could possibly have happaned to fit in our own private scenarios. I think to that after Genda later conferred with both Fuchida(asfter getting the Battle Damage Assessment) & Nagumo he did sign off on the retirement.

[robdab]

old_pop2000,

I believe that attempting to strike the yard oilers, while a good idea is going to be difficult because they could be anywhere. That is a problem that must be solved. - Better IMO to adjust the 1st wave target list to give three torpedoes to each of the drydock gate caissons and USS Neosho, with three divebombers to nail USS Ramapo, all in the first few minutes of the surprise attack so that the US AA gunners have no time to get organized.

The 5 shipyard oiler barges won't matter once the big oil tanks crumple and burn ...

Now, if Nagumo could have used the second option, then retired northward to refuel. The question is; Could he have then, on December 8th, returned southward, and conducted a successful next day strike on those other targets? - Certainly possible but not worth the increasing risk that 24 hours would bring. Bombs would be running low and KB aircrews would be TIRED after the Dec.7 extended flight operations.

The Japanese picketline submarines wouldn't be able to gather much useful info overnight but 24 hours at 32 knots brings US carriers into 150 nmile air strike range of Oahu from 918 nmiles out. From any direction. That is mucho ocean. And the Japanese thought (incorrectly) that while 2 US carriers were based at PH, there were a total of 5 operating in the Pacific in December 1941. 5 to 6 carrier odds vs 2 to 6 odds is much less comforting to Nagumo.

24 hours lets US submarines move closer to Oahu and to the two very lightly protected Japanese tanker groups north of Oahu.

Overnight USAAF warplane repairs would add to the total that Nagumo might face on Dec.8'41. Yoshikawa had incorrectly reported 500 modrn warplanes to be on Oahu when there were really only 300+/- mostly obsolete types assigned to Oahu for training purposes. So Nagumo would already be more nervous about air attacks than was really necessary.




The ONLY good reason that I can see for the KB to still be in Hawaiian waters on Dec.8'41 would be if she was covering a large Japanese invasion landing force. Escorted by a large portion of the Combined Fleet battleline ready for a Decisive Battle, followed by shore bombardment.

And we all know that for that to happen, a living god, the Emperor Hirohito himself would have had to so order the Japanese military. With a 0% chance of that ever happening.

We are now bordering on fantasy. - Oh yeah. Big time.

But, it is still a possible alternative solution to the knockout blow scenario.- Possible yes but IMO very unlikely. Better and safer for the KB to hang about for a very strong 3rd wave raid late on the 7th, with a "get out of Dodge" ecape overnight well before any US cavalry in the area can "ride to the rescue".

-------------------------------------------------------
Ickysdad/bridav58,

By just reposting EJ's stuff you miss the simple fact that a 3rd wave Dec.7'41 attack against fixed infrastructure targets on Oahu could have easily been pre-planned days/weeks/months before.

Aircraft landing plans (1st wave landing on 3 carriers and 2nd wave landing on the other three carriers for example) and munitions draws would not have to wait on new mission planning or target damage assements at all. The 3rd wave's targets would ALL be "never before attacked" targets.

Yes, a visual inspection of each returned warplane would have to be done and any minor repairs completed but with pre-planning, little of that effort would be wasted effort.

One thing that would be required would be the re-installation of the Val wing bombracks so that two 30 kg incendiary bombs could be dropped on each US oil tank by each Val, along with its 250kg GP "tank buster" bomb. All the better to get that bunker "C" burning.

You're doing a night recovery...on axial deck
carriers...with fatigued air crew who have flown the two toughest, most
heavily opposed combat missions of their lives...many flying damaged
planes (many more than in the morning, in fact)...all of whom are out of
qual for night landings... - I hate to say it but, "told ya so". And they all just had 10 nights of "touch-and-go" to re-certify, while sneakily approaching Oahu.

[bridav58]

I hope I didn't come across as overbearing in my last post that wasn't my intent. I guess what I'm trying to say is that IF what I'm saying is true about IJN doctrine it's awfully hard to write it out in an alternahe history but just my opinion. Anyways I've seen debate degenerate on other boards and don't want to contribute towards that here.

Brian

[Warship NWS]

Quick note,

I talked to Dennis on the phone about this entire PH 3rd strike concept, (note, I agree with much of what he states but I am also adding notes of my own in this post.)

a) I agree with him that a 3rd strike was tactically plausible and the 500lb GP bomb that the IJN Vals were normally armed with for land strikes would have been effective vs unarmored oil tanks.

A direct response:
One thing that would be required would be the re-installation of the Val wing bomb racks so that two 30 kg incendiary bombs could be dropped on each US oil tank by each Val, along with its 250kg GP "tank buster" bomb. All the better to get that bunker "C" burning.

I am sorry but this is false. The IJN, to the best of my knowledge, did not deploy an incendiary bomb and the GP bomb would have been more then sufficient vs unarmored oil tanks and no rack changing would have been required.

b) The failure was systematic as the entire strike had only one strategic target included, the CVs, and all else being tactical. The only other strategic viable targets were the oil tanks and docks - and both were ignored. The docks would have been far harder targets to destroy however due to the lack of payloads for the Vals and due to the structural integrity and size of the dry docks. As to who was at fault, that all depends on interpretation of the available information and perception but overall it was, IMHO, a systematic failure as the context of the attack was vs naval targets, not vs land targets.

c) The rearming and refueling of sufficient Vals, which most were not damaged, could have taken place in around an hour for a third strike. I have yet to see any records that would dictate otherwise within the context and tactical parameters of IJN CV operational capabilities when not under attack, in other words, during normal flight deck operations.

d) The effective results of such an attack would be the most theoretical part of this discussion as the attack on the harbor itself eliminated the most fuel thirsty ships of all.. the battleships, of which were no more then tactical warships of little value in the Pacific theater at that time due to their terribly slow speeds and high vulnerability to air attack, and thus a major reason why they were not escorting CVs to start with. The underground tanks were nearly completed and knowing how the USA would accelerate its production and construction abilities at time of war they would have been finalized as rapidly as possible. In the meantime, the only USN combat units requiring fuel would be DDs, CRs, CVs, and subs. So could the attack on the oil tanks cause enough damage to the fuel sources to hinder our naval operations based on these facts? Hard to say since again we are talking hypothetical. The one class of ship that needed refueling the most were the DDs. So much would depend on the level of damage done and how quickly the USN could recover or compensate for it. I think at most the damage to our naval operations would have been minimal to moderate at best depending on the effectiveness of the strike and how much compensation we would have deployed to recover the required resources after the fact - example, moving tankers from the east coast, construction acceleration, repairs, etc..

Overall, this is an interesting topic but we all need to keep in mind.. it is hypothetical. The IJN were also not of strategic mindset so their systematic directives of tactical only thinking, with no room for contingencies, often backfired on them for lack of long term strategic effects on their enemies.

This concludes my thoughts on this topic. Enjoy your conversation.

Thanks.

[robdab]

bridav58,

Don't spend a second even worrying about it. I'd be the last one to complain since I so often tick people off, without intending to do so at all. Just ask old_pop2000.

All I ask is a thoughtful, reasoned response to my posts. You don't even have to agree but I always appreciate a detailed explanation (with a source) if you don't. That keeps the conversation, and the information exchange, going. Which is why I'm here.

Doctrine is always a tough one. Its hard not to propose a behaviour change when hindsight clearly shows you how/why something went wrong. Nelson was hailed as a tacticl genius for ignoring the naval doctrine of his day, solely because HE WON. Had he made those changes and then lost that day, he would have been crucified instead.

I've always figured that if you can work in some appropriate level of training time for your proposed change to historical doctrine, then other debaters might/will accept that alteration. Or not.

In the case of the KB, they trained for weeks in dropping shallow water torpedoes so the change in aerial torpedo doctrine is acceptable.

[Warship NWS]

I hope I didn't come across as overbearing in my last post that wasn't my intent. I guess what I'm trying to say is that IF what I'm saying is true about IJN doctrine it's awfully hard to write it out in an alternahe history but just my opinion. Anyways I've seen debate degenerate on other boards and don't want to contribute towards that here.

Brian

Trust me, I will not tolerate debates being degraded into ugliness on our forums. I will always enforce our policies of professional conduct on our forums at all times. Even though I personally monitor the forum activities if there is ever a problem, or question about our policies, please do not hesitate to contact me at anytime.

Thanks.

[bridav58]

Trust me, I will not tolerate debates being degraded into ugliness on our forums. I will always enforce our policies of professional conduct on our forums at all times. Even though I personally monitor the forum activities if there is ever a problem, or question about our policies, please do not hesitate to contact me at anytime.

Thanks.


Well thanks but I just wanted to reassure everybody!!!! LOL !!!
Anyways on wether IJN dive bombers ,what about 60 of them???(which means just 60-500 lb. bombs) could do the job well The 8th. AF,15th. AF and RAF certainly laid more and bigger bombs on a whole lot of oil tank farms, refineries, and other such works in Europe and never wiped them out even ones without bomb proof berms just regular spillaged type berms that I understand is all the the tanks at Pearl Harbor had . Now that's not saying what "wipe out" could mean to different people( I mean is it 50% ??? 80% ???? ,40% ??? ) or just how much it would take to really hinder the USN ? Furthermore just what does the destruction of Pearl Harbor the base along with disabling the fleet get the Japanese as compared to what they did historically in just destroying the fleet? I mean if we allow the USN only limited use of Pearl then we might see no Midway,no Coral Sea and probably no Guadalacanal. However the US probably could get Pearl Harbor back operating fully within 6 months for sure. That could very well mean Japan not loosing Shoho, Ryujo, Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu,and Soryu in 1942 BUT it also means the US probably doesn't loose Lexington, Saratoga,Yorktown and Hornet. Now should Japan capture say more territory then they did historically well they have just over-extended themselves far more then they did historically which proved to be fatal. So by early '43 we have the USN still having 6 CV's operating out of PH with the Essex's/Independence's coming into line real quick . So the next question is(if the Japanese succeed in knocking out PH) where does the USN go from here?
On the amount of bombs necessary to wipe out a tank farm "Target: Hitler's Oil" cites the USSBS documents stating that larger bombs and much,much tighter patterns were needed during the war & even basically unarmored/unmodified/unprotected oil installations furthermore single raids just didn't do the job , follow up raids were always necessary . They also commented on how fast even complicated refineries could be repaired.

[robdab]

Chris, thanks for dropping by, In response to your post #185,

...the 500lb GP bomb that the IJN Vals were normally armed with for land strikes would have been effective vs unarmored oil tanks. - Actually overkill in the extreme. I've personaly blown holes in 100,000 gallon tanks with a 1/4 squre of C4. The problem is NOT in cracking the tank but rather in igniting the hard to get going bunker "C" fuel inside of it. Avgas fumes at the top of a tank of that wouldn't present any problem at all but bunker "c" is low on aromatic compounds and so doesn't produce flamable fumes easily/quickly. And certainly an instantaneous point detonating fuse is needed to prevent the bomb from going off deep within the oil tank where there is NO oxygen to support a long term flame which could ignite the Bunker "c".

I am sorry but this is false. The IJN, to the best of my knowledge, did not deploy an incendiary bomb and the GP bomb would have been more then sufficient vs unarmored oil tanks and no rack changing would have been required. - If you were to check http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/japanese_air_bombs.html you would learn that it is your knowledge that is false in this case. I too am in error in the I reported a 30 kg incendiary when in fact it was 1kg, 60kg and 70 kg incendiaries that were used. I got mixed up with the anti-personnel bomb weights. My bad. Sorry. So, the bomb rack addition goes back in. On page #160 of "Fist From The Sky" Egusa says that the Val wingracks were removed for the 1st & 2nd wave missions. I need them back on for a 3rd wave attack against fuel oil tanks because I want those suckers to BURN. First time, every time.

Also please see http://www.clubhyper.com/reference/japanesebombsdw_1.htm

The docks would have been far harder targets to destroy however due to the lack of payloads for the Vals and due to the structural integrity and size of the dry docks.- True enough and the reason why I have repeatedly said that torpedoes against the precision made hollow steel drydock caisson doors was the best way to destroy them. And to flood the opened up USN ships undegoing repairs inside. Ships falling off their blocks is NOT good for their keels either. Bombing solid reinforced concretre is rarely productive. And lord knows that I've demolished more than enough of it over the years.

... the attack on the harbor itself eliminated the most fuel thirsty ships of all.. the battleships, - True BUT in the first nine days after the historical PH strikes the USN pumped 760,000 barrels of fuel from the PH storage tanks. Without the battleships. At a time when it could only import 750,000 barrles A MONTH to Oahu from the US West Coast. If the PH oil tanks were burnt out not much would have been sailing into or out of Oahu for a very long time.

The underground tanks were nearly completed - Not at all. I am sorry but this is false. It's 20 huge tanks were begun on Dec.26 1940 and not completed until Sept. 1943. The first tank was only completed in Sept.1942. Please see http://www.usskawishiwi.org/Cruises/Hawaii/Red-Hill.html

And considering all of the other war work that needed to be done on Oahu at the time, accelerating the Red Hill tanks would have been impossible in the short term. There just wasn't anywhere near enough skilled manpower on Oahu at the time.

I think at most the damage to our naval operations would have been minimal to moderate at best depending on the effectiveness of the strike and how much compensation we would have deployed to recover the required resources after the fact - example, moving tankers from the east coast, construction acceleration, repairs, etc.. - That is an interesting position since Bloch, Kimmel, Spruance and Nimitz, all men in command positions who would have known the truth, predicted at least a two year USN retreat to the US West Coast had the fuel tankfarms been well hit. What do you know now, that they didn't, then ? A source please.

[Warship NWS]

To Robdad,

a) The IJN, I will repeat, did NOT have incendiary bombs on their CVs, that I have ever seen any evidence of, as of PH 1941 (or at anytime during the war that I know of) .. and your sources do not state otherwise. Just having a bomb in existence does not prove they were deployed on CVs and that the aircraft were equipped to use them that were on board those CVs.

b) GP and SAP bombs were the most used bombs in the IJN by far.. and GP were most definitely nose fused and would have worked fine against the oil tanks, also, if you wanted to you could just explode one next to an oil tank and rupture it.. you don't even have to hit it. Hitting the pumping stations or oil lines could also have a good effect.

c) As to the docks.. was the method of destroying large dry docks as your describing ever attempted with success? If not, then how are you so positive it would work at PH?

d) As to the Red Hill underground tanks, do you not think that if significant damage was done to the above ground oil tanks that we would not have moved extra resources from the main land to Hawaii if needed? Also, your basing what was pumped out on the fact that the tanks were still intact and with full naval operations underway.. all else is hypothetical at best, do you have the numbers specifically required to operate the CVs, DDs, CRs, and subs in the Pacific at full or limited operations?

e) So all of those men your including stated without any doubt in their minds that IF the IJN had attacked the oil tanks that we would have been set back 2 full years without any chance of recovery operations, compensating efforts, alteration of naval and logistical theater operations between the Atlantic, Med, and Pacific, no CV operations, etc?? Where did you find their quotes regarding this matter exactly and WHEN did they state this? Did they realize we could build 175 Fletcher DDs and 24 Essex CVs by the end of the war in the Pacific, massive invasion forces in two theaters of naval operations, Liberty ships being built in 6-7 days, or 18,000 B-24s being built, etc.? If not, what made them experts on what we could have done had we put forth the effort when the situation never presented itself? Not knocking their knowledge but I seriously doubt that anyone in 1941 realized what this nation was capable of if we put forth our full resources into resolving a problem.

Point being is this.. none of us can sit here and estimate specific numbers based on 1940s information in the context of a hypothetical attack with unknown results or exactly how the USA would respond in ways to adjust to such a variable situation. I have no doubt that if the oil tanks were hit that it would have been a problem for the USN.. beyond that is pure speculation. Like I said, at the least it would have had a minimal effect on naval operations, at most a moderate effect.. IMHO. As to setting us back by 2 years in the Pacific.. I seriously doubt it.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To Robdad,

a) The IJN, I will repeat, did NOT have incendiary bombs on their CVs, that I have ever seen any evidence of, as of PH 1941 (or at anytime during the war that I know of) .. and your sources do not state otherwise. Just having a bomb in existence does not prove they were deployed on CVs and that the aircraft were equipped to use them that were on board those CVs.

b) GP and SAP bombs were the most used bombs in the IJN by far.. and GP were most definitely nose fused and would have worked fine against the oil tanks, also, if you wanted to you could just explode one next to an oil tank and rupture it.. you don't even have to hit it. Hitting the pumping stations or oil lines could also have a good effect.

c) As to the docks.. was the method of destroying large dry docks as your describing ever attempted with success? If not, then how are you so positive it would work at PH?

d) As to the Red Hill underground tanks, do you not think that if significant damage was done to the above ground oil tanks that we would not have moved extra resources from the main land to Hawaii if needed? Also, your basing what was pumped out on the fact that the tanks were still intact and with full naval operations underway.. all else is hypothetical at best, do you have the numbers specifically required to operate the CVs, DDs, CRs, and subs in the Pacific at full or limited operations?

e) So all of those men your including stated without any doubt in their minds that IF the IJN had attacked the oil tanks that we would have been set back 2 full years without any chance of recovery operations, compensating efforts, alteration of naval and logistical theater operations between the Atlantic, Med, and Pacific, no CV operations, etc?? Where did you find their quotes regarding this matter exactly and WHEN did they state this? Did they realize we could build 175 Fletcher DDs and 24 Essex CVs by the end of the war in the Pacific, massive invasion forces in two theaters of naval operations, Liberty ships being built in 6-7 days, or 18,000 B-24s being built, etc.? If not, what made them experts on what we could have done had we put forth the effort when the situation never presented itself? Not knocking their knowledge but I seriously doubt that anyone in 1941 realized what this nation was capable of if we put forth our full resources into resolving a problem.

Point being is this.. none of us can sit here and estimate specific numbers based on 1940s information in the context of a hypothetical attack with unknown results or exactly how the USA would respond in ways to adjust to such a variable situation. I have no doubt that if the oil tanks were hit that it would have been a problem for the USN.. beyond that is pure speculation. Like I said, at the least it would have had a minimal effect on naval operations, at most a moderate effect.. IMHO. As to setting us back by 2 years in the Pacific.. I seriously doubt it.

Thanks.

Chris:

Regarding incendary bombs, it reminds me of the discussion we had in the past about the USN's 1600lb AP bomb. It existed but was rarely used as targets for it were scarce.

Regarding damages to the tank farm and fuel supplies, if WWII has taught me anything it is that the US was able to overcome logisitic and material damages that would have crippled any other nation. The ability to repair damage, build bases, tankers, etc was staggering and in 1941 we didn't even have ourselves on a war footing. The CBs didn't even exist yet. The main point being give the US an obstacle and a competetive free market economy would come up with a way to overcome it, especially when backed by a government willing to make decisions that overrode opposition. During WWII, the US government made decisions on issues that today would require months of debate within a matter of days and everybody went along with them because we were in a war. Interesting to contrast later conflicts and the opposition to how the war was fought with WWII.

[Warship NWS]

To Robdad,


http://www.usskawishiwi.org/Cruises/.../Red-Hill.html

Yes, lets look at that link.. the first underground oil tank was completed 9 months ahead of schedule with NO alteration to the work force working on the construction even AFTER the attack occurred. So who is to say that if the work was accelerated along with a larger work force that it could not have been finished sooner and at least had limited emergency operations ready before all the underground tanks were finished? Who is to say that the above ground tank farms would not have been undergoing repairs at the same time with some limited operational capacity within a short time? Do we have all these answers? No. Is it plausible that we would have put an extra effort into emergency repairs? I would certainly think so. Were all the naval critics of the above ground tank farms experts in the abilities of the USA construction, industry, and repair capacity? Did any of them predict what we accomplished in just 4 years of warfare while supplying all of the major allied nations at the same time? I see no evidence that they did as of 1941-1942.

End result..we can only guess at how much damage the IJN aircraft might have inflicted on the above ground tank farms and then guess even less as to how we would have handled the matter which is based on unknown variable damage results. Considering the overall effectiveness of land based attacks by IJN aircraft during WW2 in comparison to other nations I would not give them high chances of doing catastrophic damage. I would also note that Adm. Nimitz, in the link above, stated "50 caliber" shells doing damage to the tanks, well, that is fine and dandy but not one IJN plane had .50 guns.. they had 7.7mm (worthless) and 20mm cannon rounds so his predictions could be questioned in terms of the "2 years of setbacks". Only the Zekes had 20mm cannons and only 7 seconds of ammunition at that so the most likely attack aircraft would be the Val with the Type 98 #25 500lb GP nose fuzed land bombs filled with Type98 explosive or Picric Acid - this was the only IJN deployed land attack bomb and that was actually deployed on the CVs in 1941 with the exception of the 60kg Type 97 #6 that was used in the attack on PH and those were only carried by Kates.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Regarding incendary bombs, it reminds me of the discussion we had in the past about the USN's 1600lb AP bomb. It existed but was rarely used as targets for it were scarce.

I want someone to show me evidence that incendiary bombs were even used by the IJN in any attacks on land targets by the Vals, or even Kates for that matter - especially by the time of PH1941. If not, then it is a moot point to even discuss it.

[robdab]

bridav58. in response to your post #188,

You have posted variations of your 'heavy bomber vs divebomber' theory about a dozen times now, right ? But nobody seems to be buying it so I'll have one last "go" at explaining that, by recent example.

A few years ago when the US was invading Iraq, there existed several bridges across the river that flowed thru Bagdad. The US could have called in ARCLIGHT B-52 missions to take them out with dozens and dozens of 500lb bombs, dropped from 60,000 ft, or higher.

But they didn't.

Instead, just one US fighter/bomber, carrying a 2,000lb laser guided bomb and a laser targeting pod was sent to visit each bridge. We all watched the results on our home TV screens with the nightly news. Don't you remember "the luckiest driver in Iraq" footage ?

Nobody had LGBs in WW2 but they did have divebombers. The Ploesti complex couldn't be accurately bombed by Allied divebombers because back then, none had the range that the B-24 did. And air-to-air refueling had yet to be perfected. So, the B-24s, as inaccurate a weapons system as they were, got sent instead. And had to go back, repeatedly. The ARCLIGHTs of their time. Not a good attack but better than doing nothing about that German oil.

IJN Val divebombers were proven to have the range to hit PH (a 3rd time) on Dec.7'41.

[Ed Rotondaro]

bridav58. in response to your post #188,

You have posted variations of your 'heavy bomber vs divebomber' theory about a dozen times now, right ? But nobody seems to be buying it so I'll have one last "go" at explaining that, by recent example.

A few years ago when the US was invading Iraq, there existed several bridges across the river that flowed thru Bagdad. The US could have called in ARCLIGHT B-52 missions to take them out with dozens and dozens of 500lb bombs, dropped from 60,000 ft, or higher.

But they didn't.

Instead, just one US fighter/bomber, carrying a 2,000lb laser guided bomb and a laser targeting pod was sent to visit each bridge. We all watched the results on our home TV screens with the nightly news. Don't you remember "the luckiest driver in Iraq" footage ?

Nobody had LGBs in WW2 but they did have divebombers. The Ploesti complex couldn't be accurately bombed by Allied divebombers because back then, none had the range that the B-24 did. And air-to-air refueling had yet to be perfected. So, the B-24s, as inaccurate a weapons system as they were, got sent instead. And had to go back, repeatedly. The ARCLIGHTs of their time. Not a good attack but better than doing nothing about that German oil.

IJN Val divebombers were proven to have the range to hit PH (a 3rd time) on Dec.7'41.

Robdab:

IIRC the Ploesti raids actaully were flown at relatively low altitudes when the actual bomb runs were made and as you point still didn't do anywhere near as much damage as one would have hoped for and that would have justified the losses. One sees more success in WWII either with dive bombing or very low level bombing by twin engined bombers used in the tactical role (skip bombing at Bismarck Sea for example). While the debate on the efficacy of strategic bombing still goes on, nobody doubts the impact that tactical low level bombing had on targets ranging from ships, to tanks, to locomotives, to even fuel storage.

[bridav58]

Robdab,
It's just an opinion put forward to show how difficult it might be further Just whoose not buying it? Its seems some posters have ,some fairly knowledgeable ones at that maybe not here but elsewhere. Frankly I'll take the word of Ronald C. Cooke & Roy Conyers Nesbit in "Target:Hitler's Oil" anyday they did use reports from the official USSSBS . Nobody has proven that divebombers could take them out either have they? When did the IJN ever take out more then a couple? Did the USN , using divebombers or whatever,ever take out an oil tank farm? The fact is niether the USN nor the IJN ever did now let's turn to some airforces that did and look what it took them to do the job. Further in support of Warship NWS 's opinion on how much it would affect the US loosing PH as a base for a short period let's look at how Germany a nation with much more limited resources then the US managed to repair thier refineries/tanks farms & such while being bombed around the clock at that something the US doesn't have to worry about.

[bridav58]

Robdab:

IIRC the Ploesti raids actaully were flown at relatively low altitudes when the actual bomb runs were made and as you point still didn't do anywhere near as much damage as one would have hoped for and that would have justified the losses. One sees more success in WWII either with dive bombing or very low level bombing by twin engined bombers used in the tactical role (skip bombing at Bismarck Sea for example). While the debate on the efficacy of strategic bombing still goes on, nobody doubts the impact that tactical low level bombing had on targets ranging from ships, to tanks, to locomotives, to even fuel storage.

Ed,
Your right at Poletsi being low level (tree top level to be exact) and once a couple of tanks went up any follow on bombers had immense troubles in targeting due to thick smoke and even worse being able to to give a decent assessment to the damage done . As far as dive/low level bombers getting the lob done well both the USN & IJN proved equal to one another at times to missing anchored ships.

[old_pop2000]

I hope I didn't come across as overbearing in my last post that wasn't my intent. I guess what I'm trying to say is that IF what I'm saying is true about IJN doctrine it's awfully hard to write it out in an alternahe history but just my opinion. Anyways I've seen debate degenerate on other boards and don't want to contribute towards that here.

Brian

Absolutely not, we learn by offering ideas and then discussing them in a professional analytical manner. Keep it coming. Alternative history is difficult. Almost impossible unless you stick closely to known parameters, and to the original timeline as much as possible. If we stray to far away, then we are in fantasy.

Your timeline is interesting, but can be shortened. It is possible, using Val's and Zero's to launch a limited third wave by 1300 or 1330 hrs against a set of high value targets. Those would be, the fuel tanks, docks, and submarine pens. Using this scenario, we are staying close to the original parameters of the actual event timeline and Japanese capability. They could and did reload and rearm D3A Aichi DB on the deck. There was no need to lower them into the hanger. Once the decision to launch the third strike had been made and targets assigned, it could have been blinkered to the other carriers. The launch would have take no more than 10-12 minutes. During interim period, they could assess the damage, repair the easy ones, and prepare for a possible fleet action against our carriers if detected.

Without changing the original philosophy and goals of the operation, the quick, limited second strike ( I differentiate between the first strike with two waves and a second strike) using a third wave, is consistent with the concept of a hit and run, supporting operation as dictated by Yamamoto. This keeps us as close to the original script as possible, making our alternative history actually as close to reality as possible.

[robdab]

Chris, in response to your post #190,

Touched some nerves have I ? Sorry.

Being very new here I must apologize if I "step on a few toes" as I learn how this particular discussion board functions on a day-to-day basis. I don't yet know what old bonds/rivalries you have all forged over thousands of postings nor what viewpoints are held dearly, nor what "sacred cows" graze here. Please accept my apologies, in advance, for the future sins I (have and) shall surely commit.

And just who is the "Dennis" that keeps being refered to ?

The IJN, I will repeat, did NOT have incendiary bombs on their CVs, that I have ever seen any evidence of, as of PH 1941 (or at anytime during the war that I know of) .. and your sources do not state otherwise. Just having a bomb in existence does not prove they were deployed on CVs and that the aircraft were equipped to use them that were on board those CVs. - This being the trap that historians almost always fall into when trying to discuss alternative history. You have angrily applied the "literal truth" test but not yet the "is it reasonable ?" test.

On Dec.6'41 most of the defenders of PH were no doubt thinking that Japan could never even hope to attack Hawaii yet ...

On 9/10 few realized that American airliners could be used to drop American skyscrapers ...

Imagine for a second that you are Genda and you had just secured the AH agreement of Yamamoto and his "higher-ups" to destroy the US fuel supply, in ALL its forms, at PH. Would you not cast about for any and all Japanese weaponry that would aid in that goal ?

Historically, he certainly did. The man was certainly not an idiot. For example:

Prior to 1941 the Japanese "Zero" needed more range so a centre belly tank was designed, tested and secretly placed into production.

Prior to late 1941 there was NO shallow drop torpedo in IJN inventory so, one was INVENTED, tested and hurridly put into production (100 units only) for the PH raid.

There was NO 800kg AP bomb in IJN inventory so, one was INVENTED (by modifying as battleship AP shell), tested and put into pro9duction for the PH raid.

There was no minisub (well actually there was, but that was still a secret waepon) that got drafted into the PH raid planning.

There was not the underway refueling capacity needed to fuel the entire KB to and from Oahu so additional civilian tankers were modified, in great secrecy, and their crews trained while actually on the mission.

So, after seeing all of those HUGE, in deadly secrecy efforts, please don't try to tell me that the IJN wouldn't have scoured their military warehouses all over Japan, China and Korea to find and borrow some EXISTING incendiary bombs had they been planning to bomb PH's oil tankfarms. It is a very reasonable change from the historical timeline and well within the boundaries of their historical behaviour. No inventing needed. No testing needed. Little pilot training needed. What is the problem here except that you didn't like me pointing out your lack of knowledge in this area ?

...and GP were most definitely nose fused and would have worked fine against the oil tanks, also, if you wanted to you could just explode one next to an oil tank and rupture it.. you don't even have to hit it. - But you miss the entire point of the attack wih this statement. Filling a berm with oil from a pinholed tank will NOT likely ignite that bunker "C". After pumping and filtering it could be reused with very little real loss. And after patches were quickly bolted/welded on, even the tank could be reused. I want the tank blown "to kingdom come" and the oil BURNED. Gone. Toast.

As to the docks.. was the method of destroying large dry docks as your describing ever attempted with success? If not, then how are you so positive it would work at PH? - Mostly due to a 30 odd year career in civil engineering that included construction work with civilian contractors on US naval bases.

Hitting the pumping stations or oil lines could also have a good effect. - Much too small a target for deliberate attack and closed isolation valves would minimize damage. Sure, I'll happily take any accidental hits but I'd rather bomb tanks instead.

As to the Red Hill underground tanks, do you not think that if significant damage was done to the above ground oil tanks that we would not have moved extra resources from the main land to Hawaii if needed? - Do you not realize that even after the historicl raid MASSIVE resources WERE moved onto Oahu ? Rescue operations, barracks construction, airfields to be built/expanded, coastal artillery to be emplaced, warship salvage, HUGE numbers of troops, the list goes on and on and on ... yet if my 3rd wave scenario played out, there would be NO fuel on hand to power any of it. At least until some scare tankers arrived and only then provided that the KB didn't return ? With no avgas, the US couldn't do the long range patrols to be sure that they wouldn't arrive again without warning, nor put up the defensive fighters if radar gave a 132 mile alarm.

If not, what made them experts on what we could have done had we put forth the effort when the situation never presented itself? Not knocking their knowledge but I seriously doubt that anyone in 1941 realized what this nation was capable of if we put forth our full resources into resolving a problem. - Staffs of planners made them the experts. They got paid to update war plans. Regularly. Yet you prove my point by relying on 66+ years of hindsight. I COMPLETELY agree that on Dec.8' 1941 none of those commaders, nor FDR for that matter, knew exactly how much or how fast that the US war effort could produce. They didn't know that an atom bomb would even work, nor if they'd get it first, either. Nor how the war in Europe would go ... All that they'd know under my scenario was that PH was still burning ...

As to setting us back by 2 years in the Pacific.. I seriously doubt it. - Doubt away but I notice that you haven't provided any sources in support of your opinion ?

[old_pop2000]

Robdab,
It's just an opinion put forward to show how difficult it might be further Just whoose not buying it? Its seems some posters have ,some fairly knowledgeable ones at that maybe not here but elsewhere. Frankly I'll take the word of Ronald C. Cooke & Roy Conyers Nesbit in "Target:Hitler's Oil" anyday they did use reports from the official USSSBS . Nobody has proven that divebombers could take them out either have they? When did the IJN ever take out more then a couple? Did the USN , using divebombers or whatever,ever take out an oil tank farm? The fact is niether the USN nor the IJN ever did now let's turn to some airforces that did and look what it took them to do the job. Further in support of Warship NWS 's opinion on how much it would affect the US loosing PH as a base for a short period let's look at how Germany a nation with much more limited resources then the US managed to repair thier refineries/tanks farms & such while being bombed around the clock at that something the US doesn't have to worry about.

Close air support or land attack using dive bombers was not accurate. ORS studies by the RAF and US teams in Europe both during and after the war show those results. IJN dive bombers, as per US Navy reports show a 27% hit rate for PH. That is about as good as it gets, for them.

In ORS Report #2, the number of Heavy bombers and bombs needed to cause obstruction of a 100-yard circle was the following:

Heavily built up areas - 5 bombs per acre - 50 heavy bombers
lightly built up area - 10 bombs per acre - 100 Heavy bombers
Open suburban - 40 bombs per acre - 100-150 heavy bombers

Typical Typhoon efforts against typical targets:

.2 % shots hitting the target against small gun positions

Panther tank .5%

Large gun position .8%

Army hut 2.8%

Large building 10.0%

These are some of the figures and facts discovered. Even by the 1960's and Vietnam, dropping dumb bombs using a pipper, was problematic. Even with roll stabilization and future impact point sights, Mk 82 slicks were usually scattered everywhere but on the target. Usually you would roll in the first fighter, release your load, then compensate with the next aircraft as to horizontal and vertical deflection based on the first drops. It was always area bombing. Bombing the fuel tanks at PH would have similar issues. Smoke from burning ships and fuel, Ack-Ack from every rifle, pistol, MG, etc. shooting at you. If they could have hit the main targets with 25% of the bombs, they would have considered it a good day.

I agree that US ability to repair the damage would have astounded the Japanese. I already put forth my ideas on how they could have alleviated the problem of lack of storage. I believe that the Red Hill Underground storage facility would have been upscaled and completed as rapidly as possible. I would also suggest that the US military would enlist oil companies and petroleum construction teams and crews from LA and other west coast areas, to come to PH and rebuild the fuel tanks as soon as possible. Temporarily, commercial tankers could supply oil through the Yard Oilers, by mooring nearby in the other lochs of the Pearl Harbor. This isn't optimal, but for some of the ships, vital. Without the battleships, the real need is reduced. Destroyers, light cruiser and to some extent, heavy cruisers would be the most affected. The carriers would not be impacted as much. Since the BB's are already out of the picture, the actual affect on our operations might be significantly reduced. It is possible that a focus on the Sub Pens and dry docks would have had far more strategic effect than the oil tanks.


But to neglect to even attempt to hit these high value, strategic targets is a serious strategic blunder.

[robdab]

Ed Rotondaro, in response to your post #195,

IIRC the Ploesti raids actaully were flown at relatively low altitudes when the actual bomb runs were made and as you point still didn't do anywhere near as much damage as one would have hoped for and that would have justified the losses.- Without getting too deeply into that morass, the second raid was complete but tragic comedy of errors. A raid about 9 months earlier had alerted the Germans to the possiblities so they moved in masses of fighters and a radar net. An efficient German manned one.

The raids lead and backup navigator's planes dropped out. 2/5 of the raid's bomber got lost and never found the target, the flak was awesome and the fighters radar vectored, on and on it goes ...

If you read the reports however some 42% of the HUGE 8 refinery complex was still knocked out. Unfortuneatley what gets widely reported is that only 2% was. That because 40% of the oil facilities were mothballed at the time of the raid and could be quickly put back into service to replace most of the 42% losses. The raid was hardly a complete failure yet often gets reported that way.


One sees more success in WWII either with dive bombing or very low level bombing by twin engined bombers used in the tactical role (skip bombing at Bismarck Sea for example). While the debate on the efficacy of strategic bombing still goes on, nobody doubts the impact that tactical low level bombing had on targets ranging from ships, to tanks, to locomotives, to even fuel storage.- I'm sure that the Japanese wished that they had land based bomber strips within range of PH

[old_pop2000]

......
And just who is the "Dennis" that keeps being refered to ?



I am "the Dennis" that is referred to. I have about 33 years of experience working on Navy aircraft. My father flew in the back seat of SBD's off of the Saratoga during WWII, so I have some knowledge of dive bombing. I have spent my entire life around military aircraft mostly on their avionics.

Does that help you.

[bridav58]

"But to neglect to even attempt to hit these high value, strategic targets is a serious strategic blunder.[/quote]"

Dennis,
However can't one also say bombing Pearl Harbor in the 1st. place was a strategic/political/tatical blunder? I mean the Pacific Fleet wasn't going anywhere where it could interfere with the Southern Operations because it didn't have any adequate Western Pacific bases & nothing like the Fleet train necessary. It sure would have avoided enraging the US public near as much.

[old_pop2000]

"But to neglect to even attempt to hit these high value, strategic targets is a serious strategic blunder."

However can't one also say bombing Pearl Harbor in the 1st. place was a strategic/political/tatical blunder? I mean the Pacific Fleet wasn't going anywhere where it could interfere with the Southern Operations because it didn't have any adequate Western Pacific bases & nothing like the Fleet train necessary. It sure would have avoided enraging the US public near as much.

Absolutely, it was a strategic political, economic and military blunder of the first order. In Sadao Asado's book on the prewar IJN activities, he states that after the decision was made to go to war, the Combined Fleet staff gamed out WWII in the Pacific against the US Fleet and they could never win. Yamamoto even told Nagano that they stopped, because they could not find a way to defeat us. Nagano said something to the effect, "This is a hell've time to tell us now".

However, I've been focusing on your original question. However, it could be expanded, since it is your thread. If you want to delve into that question, let's go do it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,
Your right at Poletsi being low level (tree top level to be exact) and once a couple of tanks went up any follow on bombers had immense troubles in targeting due to thick smoke and even worse being able to to give a decent assessment to the damage done . As far as dive/low level bombers getting the lob done well both the USN & IJN proved equal to one another at times to missing anchored ships.

Brian:

I believe that no bombing attack is ever 100% accurate or successful. The stress of battle with flak and possibly enemy air opposition can shake even a veteran pilot and aircrew, especially if they are on their second or third sortie of the day, a routine occurrance for carrier aircrews. Near misses become direct hits, smoke becomes fires on ships not even hit, etc. Still until the advent of laser guided precision bombs or missiles, dive bombing or low level attacks with tactical aircraft were far superior to anything a high level bomber could hope to achieve. It's only advantage would be range and payload carried.

[old_pop2000]

Brian:

I believe that no bombing attack is ever 100% accurate or successful. The stress of battle with flak and possibly enemy air opposition can shake even a veteran pilot and aircrew, especially if they are on their second or third sortie of the day, a routine occurrance for carrier aircrews. Near misses become direct hits, smoke becomes fires on ships not even hit, etc. Still until the advent of laser guided precision bombs or missiles, dive bombing or low level attacks with tactical aircraft were far superior to anything a high level bomber could hope to achieve. It's only advantage would be range and payload carried.

Ed and All:

A good book on this subject is "Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support In Europe 1943-1945" authored by Ian Gooderson. Uses Allied ORS material and is excellent. Only about 260 pages.

Interesting article on bombing accuracy from Maxwell AFB Air University. Oriented towards Vietnam, but interesting:http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/cadre/aspj/airchronicles/aureview/1975/jul-aug/appel.html

[robdab]

old_pop2000,

I am "the Dennis" that is referred to... Does that help you. - Sure does.

Are you calm enough now to go back to the issue of 26 oil tanks vs 79 or would you just prefer to leave that "sleeping dog" alone ?

----------------------------------------------
in response to your post #200,

IJN dive bombers, as per US Navy reports show a 27% hit rate for PH. That is about as good as it gets, for them. - For our other readers I would suggest http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=74 . Yet, not so. In April of 1942 the HMS Dorceshire and HMS Cornwal, both wildly evading at 27 knots off of Ceylon and firing their AA were simply smothered in minutes by Egusa's divebombers with accuracies estimated at 88% and 92%. Last time that I checked oil tanks didn't sail at 27 knots, evade nor fire AA. Granted though, smoke would be a factor for a 3rd PH wave if my raiders are dropping incendiaries to ignite the bunker "C". I would hope that the oil tank attack plan would specify the bombing of downwind tanks first, proceeding upwind, so as to keep smoke screening of unhit tank targets to the minimum.



I agree that US ability to repair the damage would have astounded the Japanese.- Without doubt but the Japanese did know of the US strategic production capability and planned only for a short war with the US as a result.

I believe that the Red Hill Underground storage facility would have been upscaled and completed as rapidly as possible. - I notice that you remain as vague as possible on giving a date on that timing. You really aren't saying much at all since it was already being built as quickly as was possible. Your small 3rd wave attack would leave MUCH unburnt fuel remaining so that the Red Hill construction schedule could easily continue.

OTOH my "knock out blow" scenario imagines taking out so much US fuel stock that even the original construction schedule would be delayed. That is the difference in our two differing 3rd wave approaches. Plus that my bombing of the Honolulu Harbor tank farms would probably result in the combustion of that largely wooden city. With the resulting reduction in the numbers of available skilled workers later on. Could the US Pacific war effort continue on at all without Hotel Street ? LOL.

I would also suggest that the US military would enlist oil companies and petroleum construction teams and crews from LA and other west coast areas, to come to PH and rebuild the fuel tanks as soon as possible. - If you've ever seen the "steel toffee" that is left after an oil tank fire you would know that its complete replacement, not rebuilding that is required. Hence my desire to BURN those tanks. I have mentioned that I really, really, really want to torch all 79, haven't I ?

But with the (much higher than historical) hysteria that would be generated by the news of the US Pacific Fleet being driven out of a flaming PH, would they have gone, in the numbers needed ? When all feared an invasion of Hawaii or even of the US West Coast ?

Today, we KNOW that the Japanese hadn't the capability but in Dec.1941 the US voter wouldn't have been so sure when newspaper photos of fire blackened USN warships entering San Francisco Harbor were published nationwide. You couldn't possibly ask thousands and thousands of oil men and skilled trades construction workers from across the country to go to Oahu and still keep the magnatude of that AH disaster a secret.

Temporarily, commercial tankers could supply oil through the Yard Oilers, by mooring nearby in the other lochs of the Pearl Harbor. - And what happens to the US economy and war production while these tankers are parked in PH for a year or two ?

And that isn't the end of the disruption. In addition to the floating oil storage you'd NEED even more tankers to bring the oil from the US West Coast to Oahu. Thus screwing the US production clamp even tighter.

This ALSO reduces the number of fast civilian tankers available for conversion into USN fleet oilers so your defensive and offensive Pacific movemnet remains mighlily curtailed.

Since this entire 3rd wave AH is BASED on an AH Japanese decision to destroy US oil supplies, do you not think it very likely that this idea would develop into a much higher priority for IJN submarines to sink US tankers sighted between Panama and San Francisco as well as those plying the Pacific between Hawaii and San Fran ? We already know how poorly US DD convoy escorts were doing in the Atlantic at this time so exactly where will the large number of US destroyers come from to keep this oil lifeline open ? With Operation Drumbeat just beginning ?

What will happen if/when the KB comes back to Hawaiian waters ? Thru hindsight we know now that they were busy elsewhere BUT the US defenders remaining on a fuel starved Oahu couldn't have known that. And neither could the nearly 500,000 civilians there that would be eating the meagre and mostly imported food supplies while demanding power that you didn't have the fuel to generate.

[old_pop2000]

Something was bothering me this morning about the ordnance for the D3A. I did some research and we may have miss a point here. How much it affects the end result, should be investigated.

The D3A Aichi Dive Bomber could carry one 250 KG(You were correct, Chris) bomb under the fuselage, but could carry two 30 kg bombs, one under each wing. That's a total load 310 kg of bombs. However, in researching at the Navy Technical Mission Reports, I don't see the IJN having a 30 kg land bomb, the Army had one. The Army bomb was a Type 99, G.P. H.E. They also had thermite incendiary and regular incendiary. The thermite was a type 97, 12kg. The other was a 50 kg phosphorus incendiary. These are all army bombs, however. I am going to continue to check to see, what bombs were dropped. If the Vals were equipped with 30kg. then 36 Val's could release 108 bombs on target in the third wave, at a 25% hit rate that would be 27 bombs on target.

Any thoughts or information?

[bridav58]

Brian:

I believe that no bombing attack is ever 100% accurate or successful. The stress of battle with flak and possibly enemy air opposition can shake even a veteran pilot and aircrew, especially if they are on their second or third sortie of the day, a routine occurrance for carrier aircrews. Near misses become direct hits, smoke becomes fires on ships not even hit, etc. Still until the advent of laser guided precision bombs or missiles, dive bombing or low level attacks with tactical aircraft were far superior to anything a high level bomber could hope to achieve. It's only advantage would be range and payload carried.

Oh I agree but is "more accurate" as in dive bombing or low level tatical bombing accurate enough ? It would seem the answer is no going by actual WW2 expierence.

[bridav58]

Robdab,
Well since this is an alternate history we'll change things for the US a little bit like putting coastal convoys in service much sooner on the East Coast which well reduce losses to U-Boats plus the US can use those 20 some captured Italian/German tankers to help out here further the US had well over 500 commercial tankers so.....Also the US can just scale down operations in Europe a bit.

[old_pop2000]

Robdab,
Well since this is an alternate history we'll change things for the US a little bit like putting coastal convoys in service much sooner on the East Coast which well reduce losses to U-Boats plus the US can use those 20 some captured Italian/German tankers to help out here further the US had well over 500 commercial tankers so.....Also the US can just scale down operations in Europe a bit.

This is the problem with alternative history. After a third wave, depending on the results, bomb damage assessment by the Navy, where do we go? How does the US government, Navy react. We know that the priority for the Allies was Germany First. However, would this event change this? If the fleet is forced to move back to the west coast, how do events proceed from there? Now we are really getting into fantasy.

We could say nothing is changed, but do we really believe that is valid? US Naval operations would change, how much, is conjecture? Now we are in a whole new timeline and anything is possible, as you have just outlined.

[robdab]

Gents,

A quick question if I might since aircraft research is underway ?

I've long wondered why the "normal" Kate bombload is 2x551lbers when she could/did mount a 1,746lb. torpedo ? Wouldn't 3x551 = 1653lbs make more logical sense ?
I assume that there is/was a good reason for just 2x551 but it has so far, escaped me.

Thanks for any related wisdom that you can pass on ...

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=robdab;6640]in response to your post #200,

IJN dive bombers, as per US Navy reports show a 27% hit rate for PH. That is about as good as it gets, for them. - For our other readers I would suggest http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=74 . Yet, not so. In April of 1942 the HMS Dorceshire and HMS Cornwal, both wildly evading at 27 knots off of Ceylon and firing their AA were simply smothered in minutes by Egusa's divebombers with accuracies estimated at 88% and 92%. Last time that I checked oil tanks didn't sail at 27 knots, evade nor fire AA. Granted though, smoke would be a factor for a 3rd PH wave if my raiders are dropping incendiaries to ignite the bunker "C". I would hope that the oil tank attack plan would specify the bombing of downwind tanks first, proceeding upwind, so as to keep smoke screening of unhit tank targets to the minimum.

Use whatever numbers that are appropriate. If they had a 27% effectiveness at Pearl Harbor, then if we are conservative, this is the worst case scenario. Maybe they would do better on stationary tanks, I believe that they would. Maybe 80% is a better, more accurate figure. This is an alternative history. We could use both and have an upper and lower figure for estimates of destruction.


I believe that the Red Hill Underground storage facility would have been upscaled and completed as rapidly as possible. - I notice that you remain as vague as possible on giving a date on that timing. You really aren't saying much at all since it was already being built as quickly as was possible. Your small 3rd wave attack would leave MUCH unburnt fuel remaining so that the Red Hill construction schedule could easily continue.

I am not being vague. You are the civil engineer, the expert, you tell us how fast they could have expedited the construction. I am only making a comment about possibilities.

I would also suggest that the US military would enlist oil companies and petroleum construction teams and crews from LA and other west coast areas, to come to PH and rebuild the fuel tanks as soon as possible. - If you've ever seen the "steel toffee" that is left after an oil tank fire you would know that its complete replacement, not rebuilding that is required. Hence my desire to BURN those tanks. I have mentioned that I really, really, really want to torch all 79, haven't I ?

I don't know, but you are the one who inserted the number 79, not me. Do you believe they should have gone after the whole lot? I don't. I believe that they have to attack known targets? I don't know if they knew about those targets. It's all conjecture.


Temporarily, commercial tankers could supply oil through the Yard Oilers, by mooring nearby in the other lochs of the Pearl Harbor. - And what happens to the US economy and war production while these tankers are parked in PH for a year or two ?

I don't know what happens, because we have now entered the realm of fantasy. In fantasy, just about anything can happen. You tell me. Where does your fantasy take you?

Since this entire 3rd wave AH is BASED on an AH Japanese decision to destroy US oil supplies, do you not think it very likely that this idea would develop into a much higher priority for IJN submarines to sink US tankers sighted between Panama and San Francisco as well as those plying the Pacific between Hawaii and San Fran ? We already know how poorly US DD convoy escorts were doing in the Atlantic at this time so exactly where will the large number of US destroyers come from to keep this oil lifeline open ? With Operation Drumbeat just beginning ?

Again, there are numerous timelines of events that could be generated from this group of scenarios at Pearl Harbor. Which one do you believe is valid or most likely going to happen? Anything set of timelines, as long as it is limited to known factors, could be valid. There is no wrong answer. It's just fantasy. .

[old_pop2000]

Gents,

A quick question if I might since aircraft research is underway ?

I've long wondered why the "normal" Kate bombload is 2x551lbers when she could/did mount a 1,746lb. torpedo ? Wouldn't 3x551 = 1653lbs make more logical sense ?
I assume that there is/was a good reason for just 2x551 but it has so far, escaped me.

Thanks for any related wisdom that you can pass on ...

According to all the documents I have read. She could carry 1 x 1746 lb torpedo or 3 x 550 lb bombs or 6 x 125 lb. bombs. Now, it would depends on the mission. The mission profile would determine the bombload. I can only speculate that on certain missions, the B5N2 would carry only two bombs on the wings, to increase range if required. I have not seen any bomb rack limitations. I have to assume the IJN would provide sufficient bomb racks for every horizontal bomber. I see no configuration or aerodynamic limitation for carrying three bombs unless there was something strange in the release mechanism. Lack of a third bomb rack for each aircraft on the carrier is the only limiting factor to me, that makes sense.

[robdab]

bridav58, in response to your posting #210,

Sure, knock yourself out and start a new thread to discuss your East Coast convoy "what if ?" proposal. If our readers here are interested they will no doubt, join in.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
old_pop2000, in response to your posting #211,

This is the problem with alternative history. After a third wave, depending on the results, bomb damage assessment by the Navy, where do we go? How does the US government, Navy react. - I'm not disagreeing with you. A nearly limitless choice of mostly unsupportable options quickly opens up. In the case of this particular scenario I have found that Nimitz's word on retreating back to the US West Coast for about 2 years is usually accepted by most debaters. But not apparently, here on this board.

I feel that there are still lots of "loose end" details to be tidied up wrt this topic before it can be regarded as a "dead puppy" but bridav58 has already suggested a move onto the the subject of an AH US East Coast convoy scenario.

I feel that it is the subject of 26 oil tanks vs 79 oil tanks that holds the final "determination" of which of our 2 differeing AH 3rd wave scenarios gives the Japanese a better fantasy advantage. Your smaller, quicker 3rd wave attack is a better, less risky, choice for the KB IF there are only 26 tanks. If there are 79 you will leave 67% or more of the US fuel stockpile untouched and your 3rd wave would have been a waste of the KB's time and pilots. If OTOH there are really only 26 tanks then my "knock out blow" scenario exposes the KB to about 2 unnecessary hours of risk of attack from US subamrines and the missing US carriers, plus any USAAF warplanes still flyable. But I'll be able to "make the rubble bounce" just before I loose some veteran aircrews to night landing crashes.

A continued discussion on the 26 vs. 79 point is up to you. Yeah, or nay ?

My own future interests lie in the direction of a AH Pearl Harbor blockship scenario in order to bring things back to a more nautical focus without so much aircraft involvement but I have no idea if this topic has been "kicked around" here recently nor if there is any interest in it at all ? Are the members of this board in the habit of posting interest polls prior to launching a new thread or are such just "run up the flagpole" to see who salutes ?

Perhaps even a brief discussion of how an AH discussion should be approached in the future would be in order ? Or has this group established such ground rules already ? If so, where would I find them ?

-------------------------------------------------------
Many thanks for the Kate bombload confirmation. I have 4 sources on my shelf which say only 2x551 but this didn't make any sense to me. The only question remaining then is, could a 125lber crack a typical oil tank roof and split the side(s) open at the same time ?

[old_pop2000]

bridav58, in response to your posting #210,

Sure, knock yourself out and start a new thread to discuss your East Coast convoy "what if ?" proposal. If our readers here are interested they will no doubt, join in.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
old_pop2000, in response to your posting #211,

This is the problem with alternative history. After a third wave, depending on the results, bomb damage assessment by the Navy, where do we go? How does the US government, Navy react. - I'm not disagreeing with you. A nearly limitless choice of mostly unsupportable options quickly opens up. In the case of this particular scenario I have found that Nimitz's word on retreating back to the US West Coast for about 2 years is usually accepted by most debaters. But not apparently, here on this board.

Look at this document. There are some photos of a kate with a mixed bombload. http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/bill_sanborn/phmod21.pdf

I feel that there are still lots of "loose end" details to be tidied up wrt this topic before it can be regarded as a "dead puppy" but bridav58 has already suggested a move onto the the subject of an AH US East Coast convoy scenario.

My own interests lie in the direction of a AH Pearl Harbor blockship scenario in order to bring things back to a more nautical focus without so much aircraft involvement but I have no idea if this topic has been "kicked around" here recently nor if there is any interest in it at all ? Are the members of this board in the habit of posting interest polls prior to launching a new thread or are such just "run up the flagpole" to see who salutes ?

Perhaps even a brief discussion of how an AH discussion should be approached in the future would be in order ? Or has this group established such ground rules already ? If so, where would I find them ?

-------------------------------------------------------
Many thanks for the Kate bombload confirmation. I have 4 sources on my shelf which say only 2x551 but this didn't make any sense to me. The only question remaining then is, could a 125lber crack open a typical oil tank roof ?

Those are all interesting subjects to discuss. The blockship idea is worth discussing but I am not certain how it would have been implemented.

As to the 125 pound bomb. let me go to the Naval Mission and get some figures on the explosive power in the bomb, if available. How thick was the steel in the tanks? I would have to research it. I expect it would be thick enough to resist the pressure of the oil quantity, but math was never my best subject in College

Look at this document, it has some pictures of a Kate I believe with three bombs and a mixed bombload.http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/bill_sanborn/phmod21.pdf

[old_pop2000]

The 60kg or 132 pound bomb was the standard naval land attack bomb and according to the reference provided in the previous post, was carried by the Shokaku and Zuikaku Kates of the second wave of bombers.

It could penetrate 200 mm of concrete. It was a type 97 # 6 land bomb with a type 92 Model 1 Mod 2 nose fuse or a type 92 Model 2 bomb fuze. It was loaded with type 98 explosive which is Trinitroanisol 70% HND 30%.

Based on the above information, I see no reason that this bomb couldn't penetrate the steel or aluminum tanks at Pearl Harbor.

What do you think?

[robdab]

old_pop2000, in response to your posting #217,

Based on the above information, I see no reason that this bomb couldn't penetrate the steel or aluminum tanks at Pearl Harbor. - All steel construction of the BIG above ground tanks on Oahu in 1941. The tanks of similar vintage that I have worked with over the years all had tops that varied (prior to years of condensation rust) between 3/8 " and 5/8" so I don't see a problem.

This gives 6x57 = 342 more bombs for my Kate flyers to use in pounding those 79(?) oil tanks.

What do you think?- I try very hard not to since doing so nearly always gets me in big trouble with my wife.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Please re-read my post #215 as I was editing it as you were posting your #217.

--------------------------------------------------------
in response to your posting #216,

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/bill_sanborn/phmod21.pdf is an interesting article. I remain surprised that W2 aircraft designers left that much metal hanging out in the slipstream to cause fuel and speed wasting drag. A simple fairing would have smoothed out the airflow greatly ...

The blockship idea is worth discussing but I am not certain how it would have been implemented. - I know that you will be surprised but it just so happens that I have such a plan in mind. An entire AH scenario in fact ! And just to "top it all off" one that doesn't stray too far at all from the historical. What an amazing co-incidence ?? LOL.

And I also predict that you're not going to like it one little bit ... here or in a new thread, which I believe to be a better place ?

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=robdab;6651]
Based on the above information, I see no reason that this bomb couldn't penetrate the steel or aluminum tanks at Pearl Harbor. - All steel construction of the BIG above ground tanks on Oahu in 1941. The tanks of similar vintage that I have worked with over the years all had tops that varied (prior to years of condensation rust) between 3/8 " and 5/8" so I don't see a problem.

This gives 6x57 = 342 more bombs for my Kate flyers to use in pounding those 79(?) oil tanks.

There are other high priority targets, I would unload those 60kg land bombs on the docks and the pens, they should do well on those targets. You can use the smaller bombs on any tanks. I believe, based on my experience with mission planning, you have to prioritize your targeting. I would suggest rethinking your priorities. Although you now have more bombs, there isn't much time to go searching for targets. Any attempt at a recon run wastes more time. You have 27 Base Fuel Tanks, dry docks, pens and the Neosho along with CinCpac. All good high priority targets within easy flying distance of the second groups flight path. Suggest strongly staying within those targets. Once those targets are destroyed, then targets of opportunity can be struck. This is standard mission planning techique, trust me.

in response to your posting #216,

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/bill_sanborn/phmod21.pdf is an interesting article. I remain surprised that W2 aircraft designers left that much metal hanging out in the slipstream to cause fuel and speed wasting drag. A simple fairing would have smoothed out the airflow greatly ...

A fairing is more weight, something the Japanese aircraft could not afford. They were always behind the curve on engine performance. The power to weight of Japenese engines was always low. The replacement engine in the Model 32 and Model 52 Zero's was more powerful, but far more heavy. They also did not use octane rated Avgas beyond 92 and only sparingly. Most was 87. We used avgas up to 120 to 150 octane by the end of the war.

The blockship idea is worth discussing but I am not certain how it would have been implemented. - I know that you will be surprised but it just so happens that I have such a plan in mind. An entire AH scenario in fact ! And just to "top it all off" one that doesn't stray too far at all from the historical. What an amazing co-incidence ?? LOL.

And I also predict that you're not going to like it one little bit ... here or in a new thread, which I believe to be a better place ?

I might not like it, OTOH, I might surprise you. If we are talking about fantasy, let's have at it. But let's advertise it as such, fantasy.

[Warship NWS]

Chris, in response to your post #190,

Touched some nerves have I ? Sorry.

Being very new here I must apologize if I "step on a few toes" as I learn how this particular discussion board functions on a day-to-day basis. I don't yet know what old bonds/rivalries you have all forged over thousands of postings nor what viewpoints are held dearly, nor what "sacred cows" graze here. Please accept my apologies, in advance, for the future sins I (have and) shall surely commit.

Ok... first off, we are not against the concept of being open minded so please do not go off making broad assumptions about any specific members of the forums or points of view that you think are being protected with some form of bias. Every forum is run differently and this one has its set of rules in place that have worked since NWS started operating. I personally designed the policies so as to retain a set of standards that are derived around professional conduct which in turn was designed to produce an intellectually challenging and friendly atmosphere. You have a right to your opinion and everyone else has a right to theirs. Stick within the boundaries of the forum policies and stay out of personal commentaries - professional conduct is always required - you can attack the argument but not the person. You have already stepped on that line several times so this is a warning to make sure you think before you type. Just because someone disagrees with your stance does not mean you have the right to make comments about their personal knowledge on a subject matter.

This is my last response to this topic as my time is limited and I have already stated my final thoughts on the topic. First, I am not some novice about research as I have been analyzing weapons, tactics, and battle histories for nearly 25 years and I did pull up the list of bomb types that the IJN deployed with in 1941 based on archival records and other authoritative sources and you did not prove anything to contradict my information based on the information you posted. To go outside of such facts is to take this entire hypothetical concept into a further realm of alternate history and to change almost the entire mindset of the Japanese planning and doctrinal system at that time and to assume that the USA could not recover to some degree based on unknown damage variables to its fuel sources in Hawaii is going even more into that realm. Weapons, planning, doctrines, and combat systems were not derived from a vacuum - the proper thought processes had to be in place before anything to happen, be made plausible, or to be built first. Personally, I think your trying to fit alternate nit picked historical context into your hypothetical history theory to try and patchwork your arguments. That is my opinion of course, and your choice of how to participate in a debate that I will not agree with.

One thing I think would help matters here is if you would give us some idea of who you are and what your background is so we can try and understand where your coming from and how you derive your research information.

Thank you.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Oh I agree but is "more accurate" as in dive bombing or low level tatical bombing accurate enough ? It would seem the answer is no going by actual WW2 expierence.

Brian:

I'll offer the following observations:

Midway - dive bombers win the battle. You don't need even 50% accuracy to severely damage or destroy a warship.

Yamato and Musashi - again not 100% accuracy but still enough to do the job.

France 1944 - Germany can't even move by dayllight without those less than accurate tactical aircraft disrupting and destroying their mechanized forces.

Russia 1943 - Kursk, the IL2s make it very difficult for the Panzers to advance.

In closing, what level of accuracy do you require for these bombers to be effective? We don't even have 100% accuracy today despite Air Force propaganda. Just curious.:confused:

[Warship NWS]

The 60kg or 132 pound bomb was the standard naval land attack bomb and according to the reference provided in the previous post, was carried by the Shokaku and Zuikaku Kates of the second wave of bombers.

It could penetrate 200 mm of concrete. It was a type 97 # 6 land bomb with a type 92 Model 1 Mod 2 nose fuse or a type 92 Model 2 bomb fuze. It was loaded with type 98 explosive which is Trinitroanisol 70% HND 30%.

Based on the above information, I see no reason that this bomb couldn't penetrate the steel or aluminum tanks at Pearl Harbor.

What do you think?

I agree, and that is the bomb I had mentioned was used in attacks by the Kate attack aircraft. This bomb and the 250kg GP bomb were the only GP bombs, according to any records I have seen, deployed and used by the IJN for land attacks. This was also true for the Midway air attacks which did set afire oil tanks located on Sand Island.. and incidenary bombs were NOT used in those raids either. The IJN did *supposedly* have in their inventory, although no dates are given, incidenary bomb types but I have seen no records of them ever being used in air raids nor when or if they were even deployed on CVs. If someone can prove otherwise please do so.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Just some last minute thoughts,

I also asked William, Asst. Director here at NWS and who also has extensive knowledge regarding the chemical mechanics of explosives, about the use of GP bombs vs oil tanks and he also agreed that it would have been very likely that such bombs would have caused such tanks to be lit afire - especially due to the fact that oil tanks were seldom 100% full so there would be some content of fumes in the tanks. Again, this was also proven during the raids on Sand Island at Midway and, according to sources, Darwin which also had oil tanks that were lit afire.

The main point here is that incendiary bombs were not required to attack oil tanks and since no source can prove that they were used or deployed on IJN CVs I find the entire context about such bombs to be a moot point.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Just some last minute thoughts,

I also asked William, Asst. Director here at NWS and who also has extensive knowledge regarding the chemical mechanics of explosives, about the use of GP bombs vs oil tanks and he also agreed that it would have been very likely that such bombs would have caused such tanks to be lit afire - especially due to the fact that oil tanks were seldom 100% full so there would be some content of fumes in the tanks. Again, this was also proven during the raids on Sand Island at Midway and, according to sources, Darwin which also had oil tanks that were lit afire.

The main point here is that incendiary bombs were not required to attack oil tanks and since no source can prove that they were used or deployed on IJN CVs I find the entire context about such bombs to be a moot point.

Thanks.

Chris and William:

I would say this point is easily proved by examining how many times naval warships caught on fire from hits from AP shells which by their nature contain less explosive filler than HE shells or bombs. The explosion generates high temperatures and red shot fragments. If diesel fuel can be set off by this, just about any fuel can and I believe the bulk of the fuel in these tanks was diesel.

[old_pop2000]

According to some sources, one being a WWII document on Lone Sentry, the Japanese did drop 250 kg. HE and incendiary bombs. Two Float planes dropped them on the forests in Washington, and they were used by the Japanese at New Guinea. The Lone Sentry document is description of the bombs found unexploded after attacks.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/japanese-250kg-bomb.html

http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/raaf/6bdu.htm

This does not prove that they could or would have been carried on board carriers. I believe that they might have been a bit dangerous to be using in an enclosed hanger on Japanese carriers. I hope William can enlighten us better.

[Warship NWS]

Gents,

A quick question if I might since aircraft research is underway ?

I've long wondered why the "normal" Kate bombload is 2x551lbers when she could/did mount a 1,746lb. torpedo ? Wouldn't 3x551 = 1653lbs make more logical sense ?
I assume that there is/was a good reason for just 2x551 but it has so far, escaped me.

Thanks for any related wisdom that you can pass on ...

During the raid on PH they used a mix of 250kg and 60kg bombs on the Kates. Considering the fact that the Kate only had a 1000hp engine, close to the same engine horsepower used for the ~1000lb lighter Zero and the ~500lb heavier Val which carried only a 250kg bomb as its standard payload, along with the fact the Kate had a crew of 3 and more communications equipment the odds of it taking off with 3x250kg bombs would be slim, 2 would likely even be pushing it a bit due to how they would have to be mounted due to the added drag of 2 medium bombs vs 1 large bomb - such as the 1600lb AP bomb. The reduction in performance would also be even lower the the already faster Vals and Zeros if trying to stay in a cohesive formation and drasticaly reduce its range and maneuverability especially if flying with 3 medium bombs.

The above could well be the reasons why the IJN attack on PH included 1 medium and 2 light bombs on the Kates.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

According to some sources, one being a WWII document on Lone Sentry, the Japanese did drop 250 kg. HE and incendiary bombs. Two Float planes dropped them on the forests in Washington, and they were used by the Japanese at New Guinea. The Lone Sentry document is description of the bombs found unexploded after attacks.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/japanese-250kg-bomb.html

http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/raaf/6bdu.htm

This does not prove that they could or would have been carried on board carriers. I believe that they might have been a bit dangerous to be using in an enclosed hanger on Japanese carriers. I hope William can enlighten us better.

I saw the lonesentry article and also checked 2 other archive documents regarding what the IJN used for their carrier raids. Nothing confirmed the deployment of incendiary bombs on IJN CVs and I agree.. I seriously doubt they would want them on already extremely flammable CVs. Again, I find the entire line of these types of bombs a moot point as they were not needed nor ever used by the IJN CVs based on any verifiable evidence.

[old_pop2000]

I saw the lonesentry article and also checked 2 other archive documents regarding what the IJN used for their carrier raids. Nothing confirmed the deployment of incendiary bombs on IJN CVs and I agree.. I seriously doubt they would want them on already extremely flammable CVs. Again, I find the entire line of these types of bombs a moot point as they were not needed nor ever used by the IJN CVs based on any verifiable evidence.


I would agree. Unless the carriers were hitting land targets and even then, one mistake in handling and you have a hanger conflagration like you wouldn't believe. These bombs burn hot, if I remember from the Vietnam era. They were stored at the NI in their own bunker.

I have some other sources, but they appear to have been used sparingly. I would not use them on a carrier.

[robdab]

old_pop2000, in response to your post #217,

I would unload those 60kg land bombs on the docks and the pens, they should do well on those targets.- No, I don't think so. The targets are too big and the reinforced concrete far too thick for any serious damage to be done to those. The hollow steel floating caisson gates, the submarines themselves and the submarine base storage warehouses are far more easily destroyed. Certainly the all steel floating drydock is a valid bomb target but it was sunk in the historical attacks so I have not considered it to be a valid 3rd wave target.

Any attempt at a recon run wastes more time. - A very good point wrt Neosho and Ramapo which could/did move around PH between waves but I planned for them to be destroyed by a slightly altered 1st wave attack, not my 3rd wave. Almost all of my other 3rd wave targets are fixed infrastructure so no further recon would be needed prior to a 3rd wave arrival.

You have 27 Base Fuel Tanks ... So, I'll take that to mean that you don't wish to discuss the issue further. Ok.

A fairing is more weight, something the Japanese aircraft could not afford.- As a child of the 50s/60s I'm used to thinking of lighter weight fibreglass and carbon fibre but you remind me that the WW2 Japanese would have to work with aluminium.

If we are talking about fantasy, let's have at it.- I believe that it is close enough to the real timeline to retain an AH category but you can be the judge of that as it unfolds ... will start another new thread shortly but will post a note here when I have done so.

----------------------------------------------------------------
Chris, in response to your request for information in post #220,

I am in my early 50s, a Canadian, semi-retired, married to a (mostly) wonderful wife of Japanese ancestry, a masters level civil engineer by training and experience on heavy construction projects the world over. About 75% military in nature. Never actually served but have had a lifelong interest. Have worked hand-in-hand with the armed forces of roughly 12 nations, so far. Have been shot at by other than a jealous husband and shot back. A sailor when I can. Prefer the tropics to the Arctic and can't understand why it is that I continue to live in Canada ? Posess a sarcastic sense of humour that gets me in trouble, regularly. As I'm sure you've noticed.

-------------------------------------------------------------

Chris, in respons to your post #223,

... about the use of GP bombs vs oil tanks and he also agreed that it would have been very likely that such bombs would have caused such tanks to be lit afire - especially due to the fact that oil tanks were seldom 100% full so there would be some content of fumes in the tanks.- And were the target tanks I propose filled with "oil", avgas, gasoline or even diesel, I would agree wholeheartedly with you. But we discuss bunker "C" fuel tanks which are an entirely different "kettle of fish". I've built them in 4 countries. All in the tropics. Might I politely suggest that someone look up "flash points", "vapourization temperatures" and then "aromatic hydrocarbons" as a good starting point and then go on from there ? I don't mean to "attack" you by this suggestion but I don't know how else to "attack" the greatly mistaken idea that you have at the moment ?

Bunker "C" is what remains of a barrel of oil AFTER nearly everything else useful has been cracked out of it. Only asphalt tar suitable for paving roads can still be stripped from bunker "C". There is almost NOTHING left to produce fumes unless the temperture is raised for long preiods of time. Ship's fuel tanks often have to be heated via steam pipes inside so that the "C" will even be able to flow, let alone burn in a boiler.

Doh, Its only just occured to me that I am argueing a position which makes my own AH proposal more difficult to achieve so I'm going to stop doing that, right now. I'll wrestle with the situational ethics issues, later.

Chris, you and William are 100% right. Without a doubt, not a single incendiary is needed !! Its GPs "all the way". A hot time in the old town tonight !! And now my 68 Vals can drop on 3x68 = 204 different targetas rather than just 68 fuel tanks. Bonus !

Again, this was also proven during the raids on Sand Island at Midway and, according to sources, Darwin which also had oil tanks that were lit afire. - Yes. Exactly. OIL tanks. Not bunker "C" tanks. You seem to have missed the diesel generator fuel and avgas tanks on Wake and at Dutch Harbor that were lit up by the Japanese too.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
old_pop2000, in response to your posting #228,

Unless the carriers were hitting land targets ... - Which is precisely the use I proposed for the incidiaries, oil tanks on Oahu ...

... one mistake in handling and you have a hanger conflagration like you wouldn't believe. These bombs burn hot, if I remember ... - WP certainly does but would a bomb explosion be any better ? Were incendiary bombs known to be any more sensitive to handling that any other explosive ord. to be found on a WW2 carrier ?

[old_pop2000]

[quote]I would unload those 60kg land bombs on the docks and the pens, they should do well on those targets.- No, I don't think so. The targets are too big and the reinforced concrete far too thick for any serious damage to be done to those. The hollow steel floating caisson gates, the submarines themselves and the submarine base storage warehouses are far more easily destroyed. Certainly the all steel floating drydock is a valid bomb target but it was sunk in the historical attacks so I have not considered it to be a valid 3rd wave target.

Ok, sounds reasonable, scratch the dry docks. go after the Sub Pens.



Any attempt at a recon run wastes more time. - A very good point wrt Neosho and Ramapo which could/did move around PH between waves but I planned for them to be destroyed by a slightly altered 1st wave attack, not my 3rd wave. Almost all of my other 3rd wave targets are fixed infrastructure so no further recon would be needed prior to a 3rd wave arrival.

Actually, none of the two moved because they did not want to have them block a channel. Use the spare 60kg bombs on Neosho.


You have 27 Base Fuel Tanks ... So, I'll take that to mean that you don't wish to discuss the issue further. Ok.

I am sticking with high value, identified targets. The Base fuel Farm is one of those targets. I am not, in my scenario, changing the original planning, simply adding an additional limited attack based on the great success of the morning.


A fairing is more weight, something the Japanese aircraft could not afford.- As a child of the 50s/60s I'm used to thinking of lighter weight fibreglass and carbon fibre but you remind me that the WW2 Japanese would have to work with aluminium.

Specifically, duraluminum.


Unless the carriers were hitting land targets ... - Which is precisely the use I proposed for the incidiaries, oil tanks on Oahu ...

As I have pointed out, I am sticking with known, high value targets. I don't need incendiaries on my carriers.


... one mistake in handling and you have a hanger conflagration like you wouldn't believe. These bombs burn hot, if I remember ... - WP certainly does but would a bomb explosion be any better ? Were incendiary bombs known to be any more sensitive to handling that any other explosive ord. to be found on a WW2 carrier ?

It is a question of do I want more hotter burning explosives than I have already got on my carrier deck. The answer is categorically no. If I can destroy the tanks with conventional GP/He bombs, then that is my choice. In your scenario, use what ever you want.

[Warship NWS]

To Rodbad,

I appreciate you posting your credentials, those that are not willing to put their background on the line while attacking arguments can give off a false impression. As to sarcasm, I can live with that to a point so long as you remember you are on a forum among other professionals, not in person, so body language or humor is harder to recognize. Keep it civil and you should be ok.. just always remember.. think before you type. Professionalism is a key requirement on these forums - and always remember, this is a sharing of knowledge not a competition of knowledge as noted in our forum policies.

As to the Darwin and Midway raids.. IIRC, Darwin did have some oil tanks for ships as it was a major port facility. In any case, GP bombs, when considering their chemical characteristics, would definitely give off considerable heat when exploded so fires in all cases are quite likely so long as something is available to be lit afire.

As to construction of oil tanks.. I would just remind everyone here that we are talking about construction based on 1920s-1930s in designs, not modern day. Now I am no construction expert but I would think the oil tank designs have changed considerably in nearly 70 years since 1941. I will let all of you kick that one around.

As to incendiary bombs.. I do not believe any navy of WW2 wanted them on their expensive CVs as they were often more unstable then typical GP bombs due to their chemical compositions. One mistake and you could lose your valuable CV. Fires are more feared then any other threat to a warship in all time frames.



I would unload those 60kg land bombs on the docks and the pens, they should do well on those targets.- No, I don't think so.


On this point I agree. The IJN did not have the payload capacities, tied with reasonable enough numbers of hits per aircraft, for their attack aircraft when attacking at reasonable attack ranges to do considerable damage to the near fortress type of construction that made up the massive dry docks. We need to keep in mind that Japanese aircraft were not as well evolved in terms of engine power and construction as other nations of the same time frame so their striking power per CV was barely enough to get the job done. The typical feasible payload of the Val was half that of the SBD and Stuka - when looking at the ships severly damaged and/or destroyed by Vals, SBDs, and Stukas.. the Val was left far behind. The Kate was their one true saving grace aircraft for their CV strike packages, it helped to have to an excellent aerial torpedo, and during the attack on PH it was the only plane that could carry a heavy bomb. The other saving grace was their excellent pilot ranks at the start of the war.

We need to keep in mind here that all weapons and ordnance were part of an overall doctrine and system of warfare.. not just individual components of combat.

[Warship NWS]

To Dennis, when you hit the "quote" option make sure to divide up your responses and preview your reply.. your replies are mixing in with previous posts so it is hard to tell them apart.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

To Dennis, when you hit the "quote" option make sure to divide up your responses and preview your reply.. your replies are mixing in with previous posts so it is hard to tell them apart.

Thanks.
Fixed the problem.

[old_pop2000]

FYI

http://www.labo-analytika.com/html/bunker_c_spec.html

[robdab]

For any of those interested I've started an AH Pearl Harbor blockship thread at
http://forums.navalwarfare.net/showthread.php?p=6671#post6671

[bridav58]

Brian:

I'll offer the following observations:

Midway - dive bombers win the battle. You don't need even 50% accuracy to severely damage or destroy a warship.

Yamato and Musashi - again not 100% accuracy but still enough to do the job.

France 1944 - Germany can't even move by dayllight without those less than accurate tactical aircraft disrupting and destroying their mechanized forces.

Russia 1943 - Kursk, the IL2s make it very difficult for the Panzers to advance.

In closing, what level of accuracy do you require for these bombers to be effective? We don't even have 100% accuracy today despite Air Force propaganda. Just curious.:confused:


The 3rd. wave everybody talked about here would only have 60-500 lb bombs on 60 Vals and that's supposed to destroy targets that far more & far heavier bombs failed to destroy elsewhere on similar targets( no not refineries but oil tank farms) without bomb proof berms & such.
I also asked the author of those 3rd. wave articles I posted just what his credentials are and it seems he actually was a naval aviator . It also seems that a very knowledgeable gentleman/author named Mark Horan posted something about a 3rd. wave possibility but I'm still trying to find it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=robdab;6665]
Chris, in respons to your post #223,

... about the use of GP bombs vs oil tanks and he also agreed that it would have been very likely that such bombs would have caused such tanks to be lit afire - especially due to the fact that oil tanks were seldom 100% full so there would be some content of fumes in the tanks.- And were the target tanks I propose filled with "oil", avgas, gasoline or even diesel, I would agree wholeheartedly with you. But we discuss bunker "C" fuel tanks which are an entirely different "kettle of fish". I've built them in 4 countries. All in the tropics. Might I politely suggest that someone look up "flash points", "vapourization temperatures" and then "aromatic hydrocarbons" as a good starting point and then go on from there ? I don't mean to "attack" you by this suggestion but I don't know how else to "attack" the greatly mistaken idea that you have at the moment ?

Bunker "C" is what remains of a barrel of oil AFTER nearly everything else useful has been cracked out of it. Only asphalt tar suitable for paving roads can still be stripped from bunker "C". There is almost NOTHING left to produce fumes unless the temperture is raised for long preiods of time. Ship's fuel tanks often have to be heated via steam pipes inside so that the "C" will even be able to flow, let alone burn in a boiler.

Hello:

I am curious about Bunker C, please excuse my ignorance in light of your obvious technical expertise:). You refer to "cracking out useful hydrocarbons" here. Am I to assume that there was an oil refinery on Oahu? I was under the impression that the various petrochemicals stored would have been previously refined before delivery. Or is bunker C a repository for the gunk left in the tanks after they have been mostly pumped dry? I know that the bottom of an oil tank regardless of what it stores is full of sludge and other unpleasantries which make the disposal of old home oil fuel tanks necessary and dangerous (brief background in energy conservation and oil heating as well as "Dirty Jobs" on the Discovery Channel).

So do we have any idea of what is stored in the tanks? Avgas, ordinary gas, diesel and what other kind of oil? Any ideas as to what proportions? Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

As to incendiary bombs.. I do not believe any navy of WW2 wanted them on their expensive CVs as they were often more unstable then typical GP bombs due to their chemical compositions. One mistake and you could lose your valuable CV. Fires are more feared then any other threat to a warship in all time frames..

Chris:

I am curious about one thing though, US Corsairs were using napalm by the end of the war on ground targets. Did they fly off carriers of were they ground based? I know you're busy, I just tossed this out so that others might run down the details (Dennis, you old forum hound, you've got the scent, now track this data down boy, there's a biscuit in it for you:D)

[Ed Rotondaro]

FYI

http://www.labo-analytika.com/html/bunker_c_spec.html

Dennis:

Damn, I knew I should have gone for either the organic chemistry degree or the chemical engineering degree! Stupid worthless History degree, what good is it? At least Scott's an engineer.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The 3rd. wave everybody talked about here would only have 60-500 lb bombs on 60 Vals and that's supposed to destroy targets that far more & far heavier bombs failed to destroy elsewhere on similar targets( no not refineries but oil tank farms) without bomb proof berms & such.
I also asked the author of those 3rd. wave articles I posted just what his credentials are and it seems he actually was a naval aviator . It also seems that a very knowledgeable gentleman/author named Mark Horan posted something about a 3rd. wave possibility but I'm still trying to find it.

Brian:

I'm familiar with Mark Horan, having posted to him on Navweaps and he is quite respectable both as an author of naval books and as a game designer. I was merely taking issue with your summarily dismissing the effectiveness of tactical, low level bombing as well as dive bombing.

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

I am curious about one thing though, US Corsairs were using napalm by the end of the war on ground targets. Did they fly off carriers of were they ground based? I know you're busy, I just tossed this out so that others might run down the details (Dennis, you old forum hound, you've got the scent, now track this data down boy, there's a biscuit in it for you:D)

Napalm was carried and deliverd by aircraft flying off of the Jeep carriers at Iwo Jima.

Woof, Woof!! I don't like biscuits, baaaaconnnn!!! bacon, bacon, bacon!!!:D:D

[bridav58]

Brian:

I'm familiar with Mark Horan, having posted to him on Navweaps and he is quite respectable both as an author of naval books and as a game designer. I was merely taking issue with your summarily dismissing the effectiveness of tactical, low level bombing as well as dive bombing.


Ed,
I wasn't trying to be so dismissive of low level tatical & dive bombing per se but that the historical evidence shows both were inadequate per attacking oil installations . One thing about dive bimbind is are all the Vals going to be diving at once ? Otherwise after the first few passes the smoke's going to be too thick which was a common problem in attacking oil installations.

[old_pop2000]

Ed,
I wasn't trying to be so dismissive of low level tatical & dive bombing per se but that the historical evidence shows both were inadequate per attacking oil installations . One thing about dive bimbind is are all the Vals going to be diving at once ? Otherwise after the first few passes the smoke's going to be too thick which was a common problem in attacking oil installations.

Standard tactics would prevail. After entering the target area, switch to line astern, with staggered altitudes low to high, and leader first. You can't come in from different directions for fear of hitting another aircraft. Release altitude is around 1500 to 2000 feet depending on conditions. Smoke is always a problem. Best procedure is to bomb up wind, away from the direction the smoke is moving. Trust me mate, this is not an exacting science. With a bombload of one 250 kg and two 30 kg, we should have sufficient bombs to deal with 26 fuel tanks. The exploding tanks should ignite each other. Note also, steep dives would not be necessary, glide bombing at 30 degree angle would be sufficient, depending on ack-ack fire.

[Warship NWS]

Dive bombers would also be attacking from higher levels so they would not have the same attack profiles as low level bombers, like at Polesti, which means they would be diving in a patterns and in quicker succession then bombers dropping multiple bombs in their payloads. Point being, I don't think the smoke would be as much of a problem as the entire attack would likely be over quicker.

[Warship NWS]

Napalm was carried and deliverd by aircraft flying off of the Jeep carriers at Iwo Jima.

Woof, Woof!! I don't like biscuits, baaaaconnnn!!! bacon, bacon, bacon!!!:D:D

I do believe Napalm is more stable then incendiary bombs. The biggest issues with explosives is stability and maintenance. The more stable the chemical composition of the explosives the easier and safer they are to handle. I do not believe we have had any napalm incidents, example "cook offs", on CVs, that I can recall.

[old_pop2000]

Dive bombers would also be attacking from higher levels so they would not have the same attack profiles as low level bombers, like at Polesti, which means they would be diving in a patterns and in quicker succession then bombers dropping multiple bombs in their payloads. Point being, I don't think the smoke would be as much of a problem as the entire attack would likely be over quicker.


Correct, you bomb from back to front. The first aircraft bombs the last set of tanks farthest from the formation, the next plane hits the tanks closest to him. You work back to front, up wind. These means the smoke is moving away and over tanks that have already been hit. Standard dive bombing techniques.

[old_pop2000]

I do believe Napalm is more stable then incendiary bombs. The biggest issues with explosives is stability and maintenance. The more stable the chemical composition of the explosives the easier and safer they are to handle. I do not believe we have had any napalm incidents, example "cook offs", on CVs, that I can recall.

Oriskany fire in 1966 was due to a magnesium flare igniting in the forward magazine, Enterprise fire was due to a zuni touching off and hitting the fuel tanks on John McCain's A4 sitting across the deck. It knocked the tank off and ignited it. John McCain survived, as you might have already guessed.:rolleyes:

[asnrobert]

Oriskany fire in 1966 was due to a magnesium flare igniting in the forward magazine, Enterprise fire was due to a zuni touching off and hitting the fuel tanks on John McCain's A4 sitting across the deck. It knocked the tank off and ignited it. John McCain survived, as you might have already guessed.:rolleyes:

Wasn't the Forrestal's fire started by a Zuni touching off?

[old_pop2000]

Wasn't the Forrestal's fire started by a Zuni touching off?

Both the Forrestal and Enterprise fires were caused by Zuni's lighting off due to hot jet exhaust. McCain was on the Forrestall, not Enterprise. Sorry for the mistake.

I dated a young lady who lost her father, a pilot, on the Oriskany. We had some difficult encounters due to the type of business I was in-working on naval aircraft. It was never that dangerous, she just hated airplanes.

[ksf1973]

McCain flew from the Oriskany, not the Forrestal or the Enterprise.