Oil tanks & Pearl Harbor....

[ksf1973]

I do believe Napalm is more stable then incendiary bombs. The biggest issues with explosives is stability and maintenance. The more stable the chemical composition of the explosives the easier and safer they are to handle. I do not believe we have had any napalm incidents, example "cook offs", on CVs, that I can recall.

From what little I know of napalm, it's a binary system (fuel and gel) which has to be mixed and exposed to the air before it ignites.

[old_pop2000]

McCain flew from the Oriskany, not the Forrestal or the Enterprise.

When he was shot down, he was flying off of the Oriskany on his 23rd mission in 1967. However, he was flying off of the Forrestal, in 1966 when the fire occurred. ;):)

[old_pop2000]

From what little I know of napalm, it's a binary system (fuel and gel) which has to be mixed and exposed to the air before it ignites.


True, that is why it isn't as volitile as incendiary bombs.

[robdab]

Ed Rotondaro, in response to your questions in post #237,

Sorry for the delay but I've been having ISP problems due to old service wires and rainfall ... and its not over yet. Great lightning here at the moment !

"cracking out useful hydrocarbons" - In EXTREMELY simplified terms a refinery "cracking tower" is a tall thin steel tube which is continuously filled with crude oil and then heated (amongst many other simultaneous alchemistic, arcane and mysterious activities) to various carefully controlled temperatures in order to break natural molecular bonds between the various (hundreds of) hydrocarbon chains found within crude oil.

Once so "cracked" the various, now shorter and so lighter, molecules collect at a specific level of the tower, related to their new densities, and are then syphoned off, via valved pipes, into seperate refinery storage tanks. EXTREMELY simplified.

Am I to assume that there was an oil refinery on Oahu ? - Not a single one. The refineries were on the US West and Gulf coasts.

I was under the impression that the various petrochemicals stored would have been previously refined before delivery. - Yes, although most tankers could carry differing fuels in different, seperate compartments and pump same into different on-shore storage tanks. Usually though, one tanker specialized in one fuel type. USN fleet oilers of course, carried some of everything so as to be able to supply any and all USN TF fuel requirements (in theory anyway).

Or is bunker C a repository for the gunk left in the tanks after they have been mostly pumped dry? - It is pretty much literaly the "bottom of the barrel" but having said that, it IS still a good fuel, if handled properly. LOTS of energy still remains in it but it MUST be pre-heated in order to burn, even inside an engine. Very difficult to get it to "explode" since it doesn't give off much vapour or fumes at all, unless extremely pre-heated. Some ships use bunker "A" or bunker "B" which is just bunker "C" with different percentages of diesel fuel mixed back into it in order to inprove it's flow and pre-heat temperature requirements (by lowereing them). Much pricier "at the pumps" than plain old bunker "C" though, due to the diesel additions.

So do we have any idea of what is stored in the tanks? Avgas, ordinary gas, diesel and what other kind of oil? Any ideas as to what proportions? Assuming that you refer to Oahu, I have a fairly good idea of the contents of most (but certainly not all) of the 79 big above-ground tanks scattered about the island but I have no wish to further antagonize old_pop2000 by discussing it further. He apparently wishes to remain convinced that only 26 tanks were in use by the USN on Dec.7'41 and I will respect his (to me, inexplicable) desire. To each, his own.

I've long ago given up on tallying all of the many smaller (25,000 gallon range) tanks buried at Oahu's (and Hawaii's many other military and civilian) airfields since most seemed to hold avgas and aircraft lubricant related hydrocarbons and couldn't be bombed anyway, save by blind dumb luck.

Thanks. - Happy to help, sorry for the delay in my response. Damn rain.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Napalm was carried and deliverd by aircraft flying off of the Jeep carriers at Iwo Jima.

Woof, Woof!! I don't like biscuits, baaaaconnnn!!! bacon, bacon, bacon!!!:D:D

Dennis:

I guess that's because the jeep carriers were expendable and less likely to be a target than a fleet carrier? We'll get you a nice bacon cheeseburger doggy. Thanks!:D You need to go on another cruise LOL!

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I guess that's because the jeep carriers were expendable and less likely to be a target than a fleet carrier? We'll get you a nice bacon cheeseburger doggy. Thanks!:D You need to go on another cruise LOL!

Maybe September up the NE coast from Boston to Halifax and back to New York.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,
I wasn't trying to be so dismissive of low level tatical & dive bombing per se but that the historical evidence shows both were inadequate per attacking oil installations . One thing about dive bimbind is are all the Vals going to be diving at once ? Otherwise after the first few passes the smoke's going to be too thick which was a common problem in attacking oil installations.

Brian:

As Dennis mentioned, different tactics for different targets, but in your defense, how often did dive bombers get to attack such targets? I would imagine that a veteran dive bomber crew could adjust to about any stationary target with a few tries.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Oriskany fire in 1966 was due to a magnesium flare igniting in the forward magazine, Enterprise fire was due to a zuni touching off and hitting the fuel tanks on John McCain's A4 sitting across the deck. It knocked the tank off and ignited it. John McCain survived, as you might have already guessed.:rolleyes:

Dennis:

A magnesium flare is essential thermite and that's going to burn anything. JP-4 back in the Viet Nam was a more volatile compound than current jet fuels if I recall correctly?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Both the Forrestal and Enterprise fires were caused by Zuni's lighting off due to hot jet exhaust. McCain was on the Forrestall, not Enterprise. Sorry for the mistake.

I dated a young lady who lost her father, a pilot, on the Oriskany. We had some difficult encounters due to the type of business I was in-working on naval aircraft. It was never that dangerous, she just hated airplanes.

Dennis:

Sometimes the events of war touch those not directly involved. Hope she came to terms with her loss.:(

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

A magnesium flare is essential thermite and that's going to burn anything. JP-4 back in the Viet Nam was a more volatile compound than current jet fuels if I recall correctly?

The Air Force uses JP-4 but for safety reasons, I believe the Navy uses JP-5. Maybe Scott is listening and can clarify. I believe that is what my later father-in-law told me. I probably should research that, but heck, its father's day.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Sometimes the events of war touch those not directly involved. Hope she came to terms with her loss.:(


It was about three or four years after the fire, so she probably was still smarting from it. When I went out to the Test Line at NI to work, I always had an experienced navy carrier deck person working with me. In order to work permanently out there, that was a requirement-still is. I wasn't so, they gave me pair of monkeys (ear protectors) and told me to follow them carefully. Which I did religiously. I was always told not to be scared around the aircraft, but have a healthy respect and follow procedures carefully. But in all seriousness, it could be dangerous but I always had good, well trained and experienced men who looked after me. It was a symbiotic relationship. I fixed their nasty problems, they kept me alive. Worked well. But I have an immense amount of respect for the men and ladies who work on carrier decks. Brave lot. A lot braver than this little italian boy.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed Rotondaro, in response to your questions in post #237,

Sorry for the delay but I've been having ISP problems due to old service wires and rainfall ... and its not over yet. Great lightning here at the moment !

"cracking out useful hydrocarbons" - In EXTREMELY simplified terms a refinery "cracking tower" is a tall thin steel tube which is continuously filled with crude oil and then heated (amongst many other simultaneous alchemistic, arcane and mysterious activities) to various carefully controlled temperatures in order to break natural molecular bonds between the various (hundreds of) hydrocarbon chains found within crude oil.

Once so "cracked" the various, now shorter and so lighter, molecules collect at a specific level of the tower, related to their new densities, and are then syphoned off, via valved pipes, into seperate refinery storage tanks. EXTREMELY simplified.

Am I to assume that there was an oil refinery on Oahu ? - Not a single one. The refineries were on the US West and Gulf coasts.

I was under the impression that the various petrochemicals stored would have been previously refined before delivery. - Yes, although most tankers could carry differing fuels in different, seperate compartments and pump same into different on-shore storage tanks. Usually though, one tanker specialized in one fuel type. USN fleet oilers of course, carried some of everything so as to be able to supply any and all USN TF fuel requirements (in theory anyway).

Or is bunker C a repository for the gunk left in the tanks after they have been mostly pumped dry? - It is pretty much literaly the "bottom of the barrel" but having said that, it IS still a good fuel, if handled properly. LOTS of energy still remains in it but it MUST be pre-heated in order to burn, even inside an engine. Very difficult to get it to "explode" since it doesn't give off much vapour or fumes at all, unless extremely pre-heated. Some ships use bunker "A" or bunker "B" which is just bunker "C" with different percentages of diesel fuel mixed back into it in order to inprove it's flow and pre-heat temperature requirements (by lowereing them). Much pricier "at the pumps" than plain old bunker "C" though, due to the diesel additions.

So do we have any idea of what is stored in the tanks? Avgas, ordinary gas, diesel and what other kind of oil? Any ideas as to what proportions? Assuming that you refer to Oahu, I have a fairly good idea of the contents of most (but certainly not all) of the 79 big above-ground tanks scattered about the island but I have no wish to further antagonize old_pop2000 by discussing it further. He apparently wishes to remain convinced that only 26 tanks were in use by the USN on Dec.7'41 and I will respect his (to me, inexplicable) desire. To each, his own.

I've long ago given up on tallying all of the many smaller (25,000 gallon range) tanks buried at Oahu's (and Hawaii's many other military and civilian) airfields since most seemed to hold avgas and aircraft lubricant related hydrocarbons and couldn't be bombed anyway, save by blind dumb luck.

Thanks. - Happy to help, sorry for the delay in my response. Damn rain.

Hi:

Thanks for the additional details and don't worry about the delay in replying, Mother Nature affects us all, plus I was posting from my brother-in-law's PC and lucky to get on and keep up with the discussions.

I find it interesting that fuel oil would be further processed in the tanks, but it may be due to economies of scale to provide for various needed hydrocarbons on site rather than wait to have them shipped. Or is this just a natural occurance in refined crude oil that petroleum engineers took advantage of and speeded up?

Hope your weather improves (I'm just south of Canada in upstate NY and we had our share of unsettled weather lately).

[john964]

Hope your weather improves (I'm just south of Canada in upstate NY and we had our share of unsettled weather lately).Ed, you don't know the half of it look at the other side of the country on June 10 it snowed almost 2 inches in Pullman WA, the WA DOT had to plow 18 inches of snow off of Stevens Pass on US 2 and nearly a foot off of Snoqualmi Pass on I 90. Pullman is a small collage town (WSU)about 85 miles south of Spokane WA. According to the NWS there is no record of any snow fall in June since records have been kept.

[old_pop2000]

A picture of me has been painted that I am unwilling to discuss the issue of the fuel tanks. My unwillingness is not based on ignorance of the location of other fuel tanks or their value to the Navy but on the premise that we must stay within the basic attack parameters. That being a hit and run raid, designed to strike quickly and return. We do not know whether Yoshikawa ever identified all the tanks, we don't know if Fuchida saw every tank or even part of them. If the other tanks were never identified, how does the IJN find them? The only method would be aerial reconnaissance over the target area. When and how do they execute that aerial reconnaissance? The second wave took substantial losses. To have flown over that area, with B5N kate torpedo bombers carrying land bombs, or to fly around looking for those other tanks would have subjected the air groups to more losses for little possible gain. In staging and planning air attacks, we must always calculate acceptable risk versus the possible reward. It will be risky to attack the 26 known fuel tanks, As we have all stated, there is no expectation that we will get the entire 26 fuel tanks that were identified. What are our expectations of finding, and successfully attacking the other tanks? Some are easily identifiable by the pilots after landing as they might have flown over them. But how long is it going to take to assess the information and then plan a detailed, large scale attack to destroy every tank within reach. Everyone is saying that we don't have enough daylight. Willmott states that although I believe he is incorrect. However, a limited strike using first wave dive bombers launched as soon as possible can, with acceptable risk, attack the known targets we have discussed. This is the only course of action that makes sense.


It is for this reason only, that I feel discussing an attack on the other tanks or any other targets, does not make any sense. However, some of you might feel differently. If you do, I will provide you with any information that you feel I might have or can develop to assist your discussion. I will be an information source, if you feel that I can assist. I am always here to help any member.

Thanks.

[robdab]

they cannot see ?

old_pop2000, in your post #264 you wrote,

If the other tanks were never identified, how does the IJN find them? The only method would be aerial reconnaissance over the target area. When and how do they execute that aerial reconnaissance? - It was already done, pre-war. Months BEFORE Dec.7'41.

Air recon. is reported by Prange in "ADWS" pages 254-255. Yoshikawa is detailed as having taken civilian "sightseeing" flights on several occassions, in the company of pretty young ladies for cover, beginning in autumn.

Considering that most of the large fuel storage tanks around Oahu were painted white to reduce solar heating and thus vapour/fume production, could he have failed to see the vast majority of them while looking for USN warships ? Civilian "sightseeing" flights were not allowed directly over PH or the naval base on the shores of, but there are many air photos on the WWW that give a good sample view of the "sights" that Yoshikawa was still likely to have seen.

What are our expectations of finding, and successfully attacking the other tanks? - About 100% for finding and attacking under my civilian air recon with "knock out blow" scenario, although the "successfully" part would depend on the fortunes of combat and the skill of the KB's pilot. Its much easier now that Chris has said that I have no need to plan to drop incindiaries any more. I think that he used the term "a moot point".

As for your, 'we are not going to look any further than the 26' version, I'd have to guess 0% for all those other tanks. To each, his own.

[bridav58]

Brian:

As Dennis mentioned, different tactics for different targets, but in your defense, how often did dive bombers get to attack such targets? I would imagine that a veteran dive bomber crew could adjust to about any stationary target with a few tries.


Points well taken however However I'm hard headed !!! LOL !!! Just callme the forums Ultimate Skeptic!!!! LOL !!!

[Kyle Holgate]

Points well taken however However I'm hard headed !!! LOL !!! Just callme the forums Ultimate Skeptic!!!! LOL !!!

You have hard headed company here too - heh heh heh. :D

[old_pop2000]

You have hard headed company here too - heh heh heh. :D

And darn proud of it, too. :D:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

It was about three or four years after the fire, so she probably was still smarting from it. When I went out to the Test Line at NI to work, I always had an experienced navy carrier deck person working with me. In order to work permanently out there, that was a requirement-still is. I wasn't so, they gave me pair of monkeys (ear protectors) and told me to follow them carefully. Which I did religiously. I was always told not to be scared around the aircraft, but have a healthy respect and follow procedures carefully. But in all seriousness, it could be dangerous but I always had good, well trained and experienced men who looked after me. It was a symbiotic relationship. I fixed their nasty problems, they kept me alive. Worked well. But I have an immense amount of respect for the men and ladies who work on carrier decks. Brave lot. A lot braver than this little italian boy.

Dennis:

I recall reading once that at least one accident occurs amongst deck crew on every carrier cruise. Wonder if that is still true?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, you don't know the half of it look at the other side of the country on June 10 it snowed almost 2 inches in Pullman WA, the WA DOT had to plow 18 inches of snow off of Stevens Pass on US 2 and nearly a foot off of Snoqualmi Pass on I 90. Pullman is a small collage town (WSU)about 85 miles south of Spokane WA. According to the NWS there is no record of any snow fall in June since records have been kept.

John:

Even though its the mountains, that is plain weird weather my friend. Just got back from Northern Virginia and it was hot and muggy (typical summer weather down there). I'm glad to be in upstate NY where its low humidity and mid-70s and beautiful at least for now.;)

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I recall reading once that at least one accident occurs amongst deck crew on every carrier cruise. Wonder if that is still true?

I don't know, probably. Scott might be able to enlighten us. The decks are still dangerous places to be.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A picture of me has been painted that I am unwilling to discuss the issue of the fuel tanks. My unwillingness is not based on ignorance of the location of other fuel tanks or their value to the Navy but on the premise that we must stay within the basic attack parameters. That being a hit and run raid, designed to strike quickly and return. We do not know whether Yoshikawa ever identified all the tanks, we don't know if Fuchida saw every tank or even part of them. If the other tanks were never identified, how does the IJN find them? The only method would be aerial reconnaissance over the target area. When and how do they execute that aerial reconnaissance? The second wave took substantial losses. To have flown over that area, with B5N kate torpedo bombers carrying land bombs, or to fly around looking for those other tanks would have subjected the air groups to more losses for little possible gain. In staging and planning air attacks, we must always calculate acceptable risk versus the possible reward. It will be risky to attack the 26 known fuel tanks, As we have all stated, there is no expectation that we will get the entire 26 fuel tanks that were identified. What are our expectations of finding, and successfully attacking the other tanks? Some are easily identifiable by the pilots after landing as they might have flown over them. But how long is it going to take to assess the information and then plan a detailed, large scale attack to destroy every tank within reach. Everyone is saying that we don't have enough daylight. Willmott states that although I believe he is incorrect. However, a limited strike using first wave dive bombers launched as soon as possible can, with acceptable risk, attack the known targets we have discussed. This is the only course of action that makes sense.


It is for this reason only, that I feel discussing an attack on the other tanks or any other targets, does not make any sense. However, some of you might feel differently. If you do, I will provide you with any information that you feel I might have or can develop to assist your discussion. I will be an information source, if you feel that I can assist. I am always here to help any member.

Thanks.

Dennis:

Regarding the fuel tanks, my guess is that the IJN would only go after the ones that they had already indentified during the planning phase. By this I mean the ones that they displayed on the scale model they built of Pearl Harbor and its environs. This of course assumes that they would go after them at all.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Points well taken however However I'm hard headed !!! LOL !!! Just callme the forums Ultimate Skeptic!!!! LOL !!!

There is room for that in this world.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Regarding the fuel tanks, my guess is that the IJN would only go after the ones that they had already indentified during the planning phase. By this I mean the ones that they displayed on the scale model they built of Pearl Harbor and its environs. This of course assumes that they would go after them at all.


To my knowledge, and I could be wrong, none were planned to be struck. Watanabe and Genda both agreed during interviews in later years, that striking the fuel tanks was never considered. Fuchida claims that he only spotted them on his last circuit of the battle area, before returning to the ship. However, Yoshikawa did note them on his reports. How many, where, is only conjecture. Do we know what was depicted on the sand table model? Fuchida and Genda planned the third strike to hit those tanks, docks and any ships missed in the first two strikes, or targets of opportunity. We only have their interviews and some Japanese records in the Japanese history of the Pacific War. There is also an interview with Yoshikawa.

[john964]

Dennis:

I recall reading once that at least one accident occurs amongst deck crew on every carrier cruise. Wonder if that is still true?
More than likely as carrier flight decks are places were accidents are just waiting to happen.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Regarding the fuel tanks, my guess is that the IJN would only go after the ones that they had already indentified during the planning phase. By this I mean the ones that they displayed on the scale model they built of Pearl Harbor and its environs. This of course assumes that they would go after them at all.

Hey Ed:
I was researching in Admiral Edwin T. Layton's book "And I was there:Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the Secrets". Layton was the combat intelligence officer on Kimmel's staff at the time of Pearl Harbor. Here is something he states:

Page 322

The failure of the Japanese to attack us again, as we expected them to do that afternoon, was their biggest strategic miscalculation since the decision to start the war. Destruction of the huge collection of exposed oil tanks at the southwest corner of the southeast loch would have ensured them a far greater victory than sinking the battleships.

The lack of fuel--and shortage of tankers to resupply the base-- woiuld have prevented any of our carrier task forces from operating in the western Pacific for more than six months. As Kimmel himself was to testify, "It would have forced the withdrawal of the fleet to the West Coast because there wasn't any oil anywhere else out there to keep the fleet operating.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To my knowledge, and I could be wrong, none were planned to be struck. Watanabe and Genda both agreed during interviews in later years, that striking the fuel tanks was never considered. Fuchida claims that he only spotted them on his last circuit of the battle area, before returning to the ship. However, Yoshikawa did note them on his reports. How many, where, is only conjecture. Do we know what was depicted on the sand table model? Fuchida and Genda planned the third strike to hit those tanks, docks and any ships missed in the first two strikes, or targets of opportunity. We only have their interviews and some Japanese records in the Japanese history of the Pacific War. There is also an interview with Yoshikawa.

Dennis:

Since the tanks were not on the target list, they may have only included them on the sand table as reference points for the planes? As I recall, the IJN had a small basin with models of the ships floating in it for operational planning. You have to respect that level of detail even if they skipped the fuel farm.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hey Ed:
I was researching in Admiral Edwin T. Layton's book "And I was there:Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the Secrets". Layton was the combat intelligence officer on Kimmel's staff at the time of Pearl Harbor. Here is something he states:

Page 322

Dennis:

That obviously reinforces the basic theme of this thread, that the IJN was guilty of poor planning on the strategic level. Tactically they pulled off a great attack, but they failed strategically, although as Kristian pointed out, attacking the US itself was a strategic blunder of the worst magnitude. How do you rate that book compared to others on Pearl Harbor?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

That obviously reinforces the basic theme of this thread, that the IJN was guilty of poor planning on the strategic level. Tactically they pulled off a great attack, but they failed strategically, although as Kristian pointed out, attacking the US itself was a strategic blunder of the worst magnitude. How do you rate that book compared to others on Pearl Harbor?

That is the concensus of everyone that I have read, including the Japanese themselves. However, remember that Yamamoto's concept and goals were vastly different from the Naval General Staff's. In fact, the Naval General Staff was pleased with Nagumo's performance. They believed that this was a supporting, hit and run raid. The priority for them was to bring the carriers home for more tasks. Nagumo fulfilled that desire. Probably that is the motivation for his decision. He knew he was supported by Nagano and the Naval General Staff and they would protect him.

As for the book, I liked it. He is a little hard on Rochfort about some failures to use certain sources but is honest in saying that this was a problem for all of the intelligence team. So, he is including himself. I found it in a used bookstore. Using used books online and locally, I can save a lot of money. But, the money isn't really a problem. I am just cheap. I get a kick out of seeing how much I can buy, with as little money as possible. I get that from my italian mother and my wife. Both fine ladies.;):D:D

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Since the tanks were not on the target list, they may have only included them on the sand table as reference points for the planes? As I recall, the IJN had a small basin with models of the ships floating in it for operational planning. You have to respect that level of detail even if they skipped the fuel farm.


Hey Ed:
I was reading Nagumo's Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3:

Highlited area is interesting. If your third strike is carrying torpedoes, then they can't be targeting fuel tanks, can they?


The Operation of the Air Attack Forces

The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.

Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.

After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.

Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.

[old_pop2000]

Don't companies like Red Adair's oil fire fighting teams use explosives to blow out fires. While the GP bombs would ignite the oil, wouldn't the explosion blow them out. The oil in the tanks had a flash point of 150 degrees and according industry information, has less aromatics(fumes). Just curious. I wonder how that would play out.

[Ed Rotondaro]

That is the concensus of everyone that I have read, including the Japanese themselves. However, remember that Yamamoto's concept and goals were vastly different from the Naval General Staff's. In fact, the Naval General Staff was pleased with Nagumo's performance. They believed that this was a supporting, hit and run raid. The priority for them was to bring the carriers home for more tasks. Nagumo fulfilled that desire. Probably that is the motivation for his decision. He knew he was supported by Nagano and the Naval General Staff and they would protect him.

As for the book, I liked it. He is a little hard on Rochfort about some failures to use certain sources but is honest in saying that this was a problem for all of the intelligence team. So, he is including himself. I found it in a used bookstore. Using used books online and locally, I can save a lot of money. But, the money isn't really a problem. I am just cheap. I get a kick out of seeing how much I can buy, with as little money as possible. I get that from my italian mother and my wife. Both fine ladies.;):D:D

Dennis:

I am exactly the same with books otherwise I wouldn't have as many as I do. And sometimes used is the only way to find certain titles, especially in hardcover. I'll have to keep that title on the radar.

[bridav58]

Hey Ed:
I was researching in Admiral Edwin T. Layton's book "And I was there:Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the Secrets". Layton was the combat intelligence officer on Kimmel's staff at the time of Pearl Harbor. Here is something he states:

Page 322


Of course that is "IF" they could have gotten a 3rd wave off and IF those 50-60 Vals each carrying just 1-500 lb . bomb could have done it which really hasn't been estanlished at least IMHO LOL !!!!!. Now on that issue where in "Shattered Sword" does it refute Wilmott's "Pearl Harbor" assertions pertaining to a 3rd .wave? My local library has a copy of it and was thinking about checking it out.

Signed....
The Obnoxious Obstinate Hard Headed Forum memeber known as Bridav58....LOL !!!!!!!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hey Ed:
I was reading Nagumo's Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3:

Highlited area is interesting. If your third strike is carrying torpedoes, then they can't be targeting fuel tanks, can they?

Dennis:

Sounds like they were planning on finishing off any crippled warships or maybe the steel drydock that was previously mentioned. You can't torpedo a fuel tank unless its a tanker.:D
Was that from a book, or did you find it on-line?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Sounds like they were planning on finishing off any crippled warships or maybe the steel drydock that was previously mentioned. You can't torpedo a fuel tank unless its a tanker.:D
Was that from a book, or did you find it on-line?


Senior moment again, Ed.:o:confused:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html

This is a monograph with a collection of the orders and plans. You have to scroll down. But it is there along with others. Good reading.

However, they would have most certainly sent the Val's to hit the tanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Of course that is "IF" they could have gotten a 3rd wave off and IF those 50-60 Vals each carrying just 1-500 lb . bomb could have done it which really hasn't been estanlished at least IMHO LOL !!!!!. Now on that issue where in "Shattered Sword" does it refute Wilmott's "Pearl Harbor" assertions pertaining to a 3rd .wave? My local library has a copy of it and was thinking about checking it out.

Signed....
The Obnoxious Obstinate Hard Headed Forum memeber known as Bridav58....LOL !!!!!!!

Brian:

Which book, Shattered Sword or Wilmott's?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Senior moment again, Ed.:o:confused:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html

This is a monograph with a collection of the orders and plans. You have to scroll down. But it is there along with others. Good reading.

However, they would have most certainly sent the Val's to hit the tanks.

Thanks Dennis. I'll try and peruse that one this evening. Assuming the thunderstorms we're getting don't knock out power or my cable modem.;)

[old_pop2000]

Of course that is "IF" they could have gotten a 3rd wave off and IF those 50-60 Vals each carrying just 1-500 lb . bomb could have done it which really hasn't been estanlished at least IMHO LOL !!!!!. Now on that issue where in "Shattered Sword" does it refute Wilmott's "Pearl Harbor" assertions pertaining to a 3rd .wave? My local library has a copy of it and was thinking about checking it out.

Signed....
The Obnoxious Obstinate Hard Headed Forum memeber known as Bridav58....LOL !!!!!!!


Brian:
My reasoning is this. Wilmott claims that at Midway it took them 70 minutes to rearm and refuel the aircraft for the second wave. He then claims that based on that figure, it would have taken them 2 to 3 hrs to launch the aircraft. In Shattered Sword, Parshall gives a detailed description of what transpired in the hangers. In that action, they removed and replace the land bombs with torpedoes because they had discovered our ships. However, they were also under air attack also, which stopped delayed the action. My point is that he is gauging his timing on an action that occured with extenuating circumstances. At Pearl Harbor, the carriers were not being attacked at any time. The Val's were rearmed and reloaded on the deck. Basically, the two sequences were different due to different situations. Therefore, a 30 plane strike group of Vals will be able to get airborne faster than he claims based on Midway. I am probably not explaining this correctly.

In Shattered Sword the best chapters to read are:

Chapter 7 completely. The beginning is detailed description of Japanese carriers deck procedures.

Page 154-155 These pages have a timeline that shows at what time actions were taking place.

Chapter 9 is where he shows how things transpired during the period of recovery of the first strike and the discover of the US ships.

I hope you enjoy the book.

[john964]

Don't companies like Red Adair's oil fire fighting teams use explosives to blow out fires. While the GP bombs would ignite the oil, wouldn't the explosion blow them out. The oil in the tanks had a flash point of 150 degrees and according industry information, has less aromatics(fumes). Just curious. I wonder how that would play out.IIRC in an oil well fire the oil is constanly being replenished from underground pressure. When they blow it with explosives, the explosion uses up all the avalable oxgen snuffing out the fire.

[old_pop2000]

IIRC in an oil well fire the oil is constanly being replenished from underground pressure. When they blow it with explosives, the explosion uses up all the avalable oxgen snuffing out the fire.

That's how it works, from what I've read, but how does that relate to the a fire in a fuel tank?

[john964]

That's how it works, from what I've read, but how does that relate to the a fire in a fuel tank?I don't know what they used back then but in modern firefighting they use a fire fighting foam that looks like soapsuds. In the navy we used AFFF(Aquaious Film Forming Foam) IIRC this stuff seperates the liquid fuel from it explosive vapors. But what they used back then I have know idea. I think Red Adair did not develope his fire fighting methods untill the 50's

[bridav58]

Brian:

Which book, Shattered Sword or Wilmott's?
They have Parshall's book I altready have Wilmott's but not to worry I got Shattered Sword as a belated Father's Day gift tonite!!!! Yippeeeee !!!!!!!! LOL !!!! I Really don't have time to read very much of it though since right now I'm really reading (or trying to that is if I can stay off the net long enough!!! LOL !!!!) about the Civil War era type stuff.

[bridav58]

Brian:
My reasoning is this. Wilmott claims that at Midway it took them 70 minutes to rearm and refuel the aircraft for the second wave. He then claims that based on that figure, it would have taken them 2 to 3 hrs to launch the aircraft. In Shattered Sword, Parshall gives a detailed description of what transpired in the hangers. In that action, they removed and replace the land bombs with torpedoes because they had discovered our ships. However, they were also under air attack also, which stopped delayed the action. My point is that he is gauging his timing on an action that occured with extenuating circumstances. At Pearl Harbor, the carriers were not being attacked at any time. The Val's were rearmed and reloaded on the deck. Basically, the two sequences were different due to different situations. Therefore, a 30 plane strike group of Vals will be able to get airborne faster than he claims based on Midway. I am probably not explaining this correctly.

In Shattered Sword the best chapters to read are:

Chapter 7 completely. The beginning is detailed description of Japanese carriers deck procedures.

Page 154-155 These pages have a timeline that shows at what time actions were taking place.

Chapter 9 is where he shows how things transpired during the period of recovery of the first strike and the discover of the US ships.

I hope you enjoy the book.

Yes but weren't those aircraft originally equipeed with torpedoes ,then when it was found out they needed to give Midway a seconds going over they euipped them with 2 -550 lb. bombs ,then when our ships were discovered they changed thier minds again? How long did it take each sequence? Are there any other actions during 1942 that showed how long it took where there weren't extenuating circuimstances?

[bridav58]

The last aircraft landed at 12:15 ,sunset is at 17:12 so you have 5 hours 1. to make the decision after Nagumo get's all the info he needs(for there wasn't any orders for a 3rd. wave) , 2.refuel the Vals, 3.about 40-55 minutes to spot them, 4.another 10 to arm the Vals(which I think is an extremly low amount of time) , 5. another 10 minutes to launch them, 6.then take time to form up 7.then allow about 4 hours to get there , fight and get back??? Further Vals are armed on the flight deck which means the deck has to be clear for that to be done. This also doesn't cover inspecting the a/c , sorting the good ones out from the bad, maybe making some necessary repairs and such.

Just MHO....Other opinions definately wanted..


signed...

This forums biggest skeptic on the matter....LOL !!!!!

[old_pop2000]

Yes but weren't those aircraft originally equipeed with torpedoes ,then when it was found out they needed to give Midway a seconds going over they euipped them with 2 -550 lb. bombs ,then when our ships were discovered they changed thier minds again? How long did it take each sequence? Are there any other actions during 1942 that showed how long it took where there weren't extenuating circuimstances?

It took one and a half hours to rearm an entire 18 plane torpedo bomber squadron because of this special sequence. According to Parshall, all in all, including dive bombers, it would take 2.5 hours to do the removal, reinstallation, loading and lifting of all aircraft and readying them for launch. But remember, this is a special case. It took thirty minutes to do six aircraft, while the other 12 sat waiting for the armament carts. It would take another 30 minutes to do another six aircraft, another 30 minutes to another.

If they did not have to wait to remove and replace the torpedo rack and mounting hardware, they would use six special carts, designed for each type of bomb, and install six bombs, then go get six more bombs, load them, then finish the other six. This is a much faster cycle because the planes have ordnance on them, they only need to be loaded. At Midway, they had to unload ordnance, remove the rack and mounting hardware, the reload a torpedo.

I don't know of any other situation to judge by. The action at Pearl Harbor would not take 2-3 hours to perform because you can't base it on Midway.

[old_pop2000]

The last aircraft landed at 12:15 ,sunset is at 17:12 so you have 5 hours 1. to make the decision after Nagumo get's all the info he needs(for there wasn't any orders for a 3rd. wave) , 2.refuel the Vals, 3.about 40-55 minutes to spot them, 4.another 10 to arm the Vals(which I think is an extremly low amount of time) , 5. another 10 minutes to launch them, 6.then take time to form up 7.then allow about 4 hours to get there , fight and get back??? Further Vals are armed on the flight deck which means the deck has to be clear for that to be done. This also doesn't cover inspecting the a/c , sorting the good ones out from the bad, maybe making some necessary repairs and such.

Just MHO....Other opinions definately wanted..


signed...

This forums biggest skeptic on the matter....LOL !!!!!

The first group of aircraft began arriving back at the ships at 1000 hrs. You can start refueling and rearming for a proposed second strike as each aircraft arrives, lower it into the hanger, assess damage, rearm and refuel. By 1215, you could have completed enough returning aircraft to launch the third strike by 1300.

[bridav58]

The decision is already made to launch the 3rd. wave(remember the 3rd. wave wasn't part of the original plan) and it's been decided what to target, IF the tatical commander(Nagumo) is sure the US CV's aren't around . Launching at 13:00 leaves very little time to get there conduct thier attack return and be recovered.
IMHO it maybe able to be done if Nagumo throws caution to the wind by not being ready in case the USN CV's pop up or if the USAAF gets off a counterstrike and the decision to carry out the 3rd wave is decided upon real early. To me even if your right on your timetable the rub is Nagumo needs to make the decision before the 1st . wave even returns with what would be imperfect battlefield intel .
But please correct me if I'm wrong.

[Ed Rotondaro]

They have Parshall's book I altready have Wilmott's but not to worry I got Shattered Sword as a belated Father's Day gift tonite!!!! Yippeeeee !!!!!!!! LOL !!!! I Really don't have time to read very much of it though since right now I'm really reading (or trying to that is if I can stay off the net long enough!!! LOL !!!!) about the Civil War era type stuff.

Brian:

I think you will enjoy "Shattered Sword" and find it very informative. Happy Father's Day. I spent mine driving 400 miles from Virginia back home to upstate NY with two young boys asking to be left on the side of the road LOL!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Yes but weren't those aircraft originally equipeed with torpedoes ,then when it was found out they needed to give Midway a seconds going over they euipped them with 2 -550 lb. bombs ,then when our ships were discovered they changed thier minds again? How long did it take each sequence? Are there any other actions during 1942 that showed how long it took where there weren't extenuating circuimstances?

Brian:

You will find the answers to that question and others about IJN carrier ops in the book. Read on.

[old_pop2000]

The decision is already made to launch the 3rd. wave(remember the 3rd. wave wasn't part of the original plan) and it's been decided what to target, IF the tatical commander(Nagumo) is sure the US CV's aren't around . Launching at 13:00 leaves very little time to get there conduct thier attack return and be recovered.
IMHO it maybe able to be done if Nagumo throws caution to the wind by not being ready in case the USN CV's pop up or if the USAAF gets off a counterstrike and the decision to carry out the 3rd wave is decided upon real early. To me even if your right on your timetable the rub is Nagumo needs to make the decision before the 1st . wave even returns with what would be imperfect battlefield intel .
But please correct me if I'm wrong.

The third wave was authorized and in the battle orders.


Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.

This quote is from Nagumo's battle order, he did not have to order the attack, just let it proceed. He could stop it, and this is what he did. The aircraft would have been readied for another attack based on this order. The only change might be to inform armourers to leave the bomb racks on the B5N's if the decision was to use them. But they were being removed, according to Fuchida. I suspect this means that the third wave was a Val only attack.

[old_pop2000]

In researching the tanks still remaining as a part of the Historic Engineering buildings archive, There were two types of tanks. One of 50,000 bbls and 80,000 bbls.

50,000 bbls - 106 ft by 32 ft. Fixed top- Constructed of 1/2 inch steel, 66 inch high and 19 inches wide riveted together. Pressure considerations shows that there were more rivets on the bottom than the top. Many of the remaining tanks were for refueling ships berthed at bravo and mike piers.

80,000 bbls - 123 ft by 34 ft same construction.

These were constructed in 1924, at a cost ranging from $124,000 to $200000. No construction drawings are available. They are 280 meters from Merry Loch.

[bridav58]

The third wave was authorized and in the battle orders.



This quote is from Nagumo's battle order, he did not have to order the attack, just let it proceed. He could stop it, and this is what he did. The aircraft would have been readied for another attack based on this order. The only change might be to inform armourers to leave the bomb racks on the B5N's if the decision was to use them. But they were being removed, according to Fuchida. I suspect this means that the third wave was a Val only attack.

Well it seems it can work only if everything goes right and even then by a razor thin margin but just MHO. The so-called 3rd wave it seems was just a standby if the US fleet decided to give battle right?

[old_pop2000]

Well it seems it can work only if everything goes right and even then by a razor thin margin but just MHO. The so-called 3rd wave it seems was just a standby if the US fleet decided to give battle right?


No, the third wave was designed to hit Pearl Harbor if the first wave of two groups succeeded. This is why Fuchida was puzzled when he landed and saw the third wave still on the decks. He went to Genda and they went to Kusaka and found out the third wave was scrapped and they were heading home. He fully expected the third wave to have been launched or at least prepared for launch.

[bridav58]

No, the third wave was designed to hit Pearl Harbor if the first wave of two groups succeeded. This is why Fuchida was puzzled when he landed and saw the third wave still on the decks. He went to Genda and they went to Kusaka and found out the third wave was scrapped and they were heading home. He fully expected the third wave to have been launched or at least prepared for launch.

Dennis,
Yes but the wave your talking about was loaded with torpedoes right or rather anti-shipping strike right? Now I know where not using Kates here but Vals. One question though Parschall says that before the age of angled flight decks you could do only one of 3 things launching aircraft,recover aircraft or spot them how can there be a 3rd .strike ready to go when Fuchida landed at 12:15 & recovery operations were going on almost continuously up till then? I know I got Parschall's book but it'll take awhile to get to it!!! LOL !!!! Anyways I'll try to go ahead & read it so I don't have to bother you anymore!!! LOL !!!!!

[robdab]

Excellent find there old_pop2000 ! I've been going blind for months trying to measure accurately from poor quality air photos.

50,000 bbls - 106 ft by 32 ft. - gives a footprint from above of 6,067 sq.ft.

80,000 bbls - 123 ft by 34 ft - gives a footprint from above of 8,170 sq.ft.

Now if someone can just provide the horizontal footprint size of some of the US's PH stationary battleships, we should be able to approximate the difficulty which both IJN divebombers and level bombers might have had in hitting those tanks ...

Also, 26 x 80,000 barrels = 2,080,000 barrels when we know that historically the US had military had about 4,500,000 on hand at PH.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,
Yes but the wave your talking about was loaded with torpedoes right or rather anti-shipping strike right? Now I know where not using Kates here but Vals. One question though Parschall says that before the age of angled flight decks you could do only one of 3 things launching aircraft,recover aircraft or spot them how can there be a 3rd .strike ready to go when Fuchida landed at 12:15 & recovery operations were going on almost continuously up till then? I know I got Parschall's book but it'll take awhile to get to it!!! LOL !!!! Anyways I'll try to go ahead & read it so I don't have to bother you anymore!!! LOL !!!!!

You are not bothering me however keep reading. I will continue to help. There is no reason that you have to believe me. However, question Willmott a little. We thought, based on Walter Lord, Prange and others, certain facts were valid about Midway, and now John Parshall using Japanese squadron logs and recreated ships logs has changed those facts and our perception of the time between 0800-1020 on June 4th, 1942. Keep something in mind, as aircraft are returning the decks will be cleared and the planes landed, they will usually return in groups. However, if the third strike is readied for launch, the incoming aircraft can be held at altitude to circle, then the launch can proceed. That is SOP during the war. Sometimes, a plane is told to ditch and he will be picked up if he runs out of gas.

[old_pop2000]

Excellent find there old_pop2000 ! I've been going blind for months trying to measure accurately from poor quality air photos.

50,000 bbls - 106 ft by 32 ft. - gives a footprint from above of 6,067 sq.ft.

80,000 bbls - 123 ft by 34 ft - gives a footprint from above of 8,170 sq.ft.

Now if someone can just provide the horizontal footprint size of some of the US's PH stationary battleships, we should be able to approximate the difficulty which both IJN divebombers and level bombers might have had in hitting those tanks ...

Also, 26 x 80,000 barrels = 2,080,000 barrels when we know that historically the US had military had about 4,500,000 on hand at PH.


I'll leave that quest to you.

[old_pop2000]

Navy Summary of War-Damage to Battleships, Cruisers, and Destroyers - October, 1941 to December 1942.

http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/museum/War_Damage/A374.pdf

[bridav58]

You are not bothering me however keep reading. I will continue to help. There is no reason that you have to believe me. However, question Willmott a little. We thought, based on Walter Lord, Prange and others, certain facts were valid about Midway, and now John Parshall using Japanese squadron logs and recreated ships logs has changed those facts and our perception of the time between 0800-1020 on June 4th, 1942. Keep something in mind, as aircraft are returning the decks will be cleared and the planes landed, they will usually return in groups. However, if the third strike is readied for launch, the incoming aircraft can be held at altitude to circle, then the launch can proceed. That is SOP during the war. Sometimes, a plane is told to ditch and he will be picked up if he runs out of gas.
As far as planes from a previous strike orbiting while another wave launched did the IJN do that actually during the war? I mean at Midway they landed the Midway raiders first and alot of them were running short of fuel why would that be any different here,i.e. running low on fuel?

[old_pop2000]

As far as planes from a previous strike orbiting while another wave launched did the IJN do that actually during the war? I mean at Midway they landed the Midway raiders first and alot of them were running short of fuel why would that be any different here,i.e. running low on fuel?


We did it, I have no reason to expect that the Japanese might not do it also. It has to be considered. However, in researching through John Toland's book "The Rising Sun"(a pulitzer prize book), when Fuchida landed at around 1200 hrs, Soryu, Hiryu and Kaga had already signalled to Kusaka that their aircraft were ready for the second strike. Yamaguchi and the Captain of the Kaga both wanted the second strike launched. This would indicate that most of the first attack group aircraft had been refueled and rearmed. Also, the battle orders specifically stated that the aircraft would rendevous 20 miles north of Oahu, wait for 30 minutes for the fighters, then return to the carriers together. We know that the first group arrived back at 1000 hrs. I give them 30 minutes to land. It would seem that the second attack was prepared from 1030 to 1200 hrs.

[bridav58]

I hate to say this but Shattered Sword especially what I read on pages 153 & 158 convinces me even more that it couldn't be done. On page 153 is a paragraph stating that the returning strike force couldn't possibly be turned around for several hours meaning early afternoon at best,if nothing went wrong and depending what is meant by "early afternoon". Tomonaga's force got back to his CV's at 8:15 the PH raiders didn't start getting back till 10:00. On page 158 it states at least 2:30 is needed for refueling,rearming,then spotting on the flight deck, then warming the engines up and on top of that 2:30 you'll need about 20 minutes at least to launch.
Oh well I'll duck for cover!!! LOL!!!!

[old_pop2000]

I hate to say this but Shattered Sword especially what I read on pages 153 & 158 convinces me even more that it couldn't be done. On page 153 is a paragraph stating that the returning strike force couldn't possibly be turned around for several hours meaning early afternoon at best,if nothing went wrong and depending what is meant by "early afternoon". Tomonaga's force got back to his CV's at 8:15 the PH raiders didn't start getting back till 10:00. On page 158 it states at least 2:30 is needed for refueling,rearming,then spotting on the flight deck, then warming the engines up and on top of that 2:30 you'll need about 20 minutes at least to launch.
Oh well I'll duck for cover!!! LOL!!!!

I don't care, everyone reads and interprets things different. However, we know the rearming and refueling started for the first wave at 1030 and was completed by 1200 hrs. The other ships notified Kusaka that they were ready for launch of the second attack. We know then, that the second attack was rearmed and refueled in 1.5 hours. I stated that they could get the second attack into the air by 1300 hrs. That is, at least 2.5 hours. From 1030 to 1300 hrs. Seems to match what Parshall states, doesn't it. However, I contend, that it could be done faster, if it was a Val only attack. Parshall's timing was based on Vals and Kates. As soon as the first attack group landed at 1030, the arming and refueling crews would start, no one is standing around for a signal to reload. Its starts as soon as the plane is moved to the hanger. Anyway, its been fun. It's a good book.

[bridav58]

Yeah it has been fun!!!

[bridav58]

I'd be curious as to whether Toland
gives logged times for the supposed messages from Soryu, Hiryu and Kaga
to that effect. Were they reporting this at 1215? Or was this reported
later...as in while or after Fuchida reported to the staff? That could
have been anywhere from 1215 to 1300 and a 45 minute span is not
inconsequential in this issue. It is entirely possible that he was
confusing the anti-shipping contingency strike. It seems highly unlikely
that Soryu - Hiryu could have had a dive-bomber strike armed up and
ready to go as they had just landed their dive bombers in the second wave.
What Genda apparently stated later was that the primary discussion of a
third strike, and the beginning of recriminations for not launching one
brewed up a couple of days later as the staff took in the BDA and the
situation in hind-sight. He presents it as more of a wistful regret.
Fuchida makes it out a betrayal. And Fuchida places the discussion on the
bridge of Akagi the day of, not a couple of days later as Genda and Kusaka
do. Had Genda felt forcefully about the matter, he would have
remonstrated wtih Kusaka and Nagumo; that he didn't indicates his tacit
agreement with their decision.

[old_pop2000]

I'd be curious as to whether Toland
gives logged times for the supposed messages from Soryu, Hiryu and Kaga
to that effect. Were they reporting this at 1215? Or was this reported
later...as in while or after Fuchida reported to the staff? That could
have been anywhere from 1215 to 1300 and a 45 minute span is not
inconsequential in this issue. It is entirely possible that he was
confusing the anti-shipping contingency strike. It seems highly unlikely
that Soryu - Hiryu could have had a dive-bomber strike armed up and
ready to go as they had just landed their dive bombers in the second wave.
What Genda apparently stated later was that the primary discussion of a
third strike, and the beginning of recriminations for not launching one
brewed up a couple of days later as the staff took in the BDA and the
situation in hind-sight. He presents it as more of a wistful regret.
Fuchida makes it out a betrayal. And Fuchida places the discussion on the
bridge of Akagi the day of, not a couple of days later as Genda and Kusaka
do. Had Genda felt forcefully about the matter, he would have
remonstrated wtih Kusaka and Nagumo; that he didn't indicates his tacit
agreement with their decision.

No times were given, however the terminology was that it was recommended that the second strike be launched. Soryu and Hiryu were under the command of Admiral Yamaguchi who signaled suggesting the second launch. It was at that time that both ships under his command notified Kusaka, they were ready. It was received either at or before Fuchida landed.

I am still waiting for Goldstein and Dillon's book "God's Samurai" about Mitsuo Fuchida. Hopefully it will clear up some items. I am also going to purchase their book entitled "The Pearl Harbor Papers" . Best I can do, but I believe it is accurate.

I want you to know that I am interested in the facts and the truth of what happened, whether I am right or wrong. It does not matter.. However, I suspect that we may reach a point where there are no further elements that can help us.

[bridav58]

Dennis..
I agree wholeheartedly . On the page Toland's book mentioned about the strike there's a foot note about a 1966 interview with Kusaka & in that interview Kusaka said niether Fuchida or Genda " repeatedly pleaded" but just had a discussion where they "merely suggested" a 2nd. strike but after his words " We will withdraw " ended the discussion, thereafter no one expressed a "Forcefull Opinion".
I don't know about you but it seems sometimes the more you find out the more you need to know. I mean just what is meant by "repeatedly pleaded" or "forcefull opinion" ?????

[old_pop2000]

Dennis..
I agree wholeheartedly . On the page Toland's book mentioned about the strike there's a foot note about a 1966 interview with Kusaka & in that interview Kusaka said niether Fuchida or Genda " repeatedly pleaded" but just had a discussion where they "merely suggested" a 2nd. strike but after his words " We will withdraw " ended the discussion, thereafter no one expressed a "Forcefull Opinion".
I don't know about you but it seems sometimes the more you find out the more you need to know. I mean just what is meant by "repeatedly pleaded" or "forcefull opinion" ?????

I read that at the bottom. I've found that sometimes you have to keep focused on the ball and that some information can be a red herring. It might be misleading. I feel Kusaka's comments were self serving because the Captain of the Kaga and Yamaguchi both urged Kusaka and Nagumo to launch the second attack. Yamamoto was disturbed, days later when he found out the circumstances. The problem for Kusaka is that he was probably all that was left, to protect Nagumo's decision which he supported. It's like a "he said, she said". I would not let that distract you from your quest, it is a red herring. It does not contribute to the question of whether a second strike was possible.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I would agree, it would depend on how Yamamoto layed out his ideas on the attack. I wonder if his biography or any other book might explain that. He was a hands off type of leader. I would say that probably, he would go along with anything his staff suggested. As Watanabe indicates, it was the Combined Fleet staff that prepared the overall concepts and details of the plan. If they missed something, Yamamoto would not have caught it.

Hi Dennis,

Just got my copy of Prange's "At Dawn We Slept". I've just gotten to the point where Yamamoto is giving his concept to Genda in March, 1941. Yamamoto's original concept saw the carriers launching all their torpedo armed Kates well outside their radius of action to keep the carriers safe from counter attack. There would be no fighter escort. The entire effort to be spent against ships in the harbor. He hoped to use submarines and destroyers along the flight path to rescue survivng air crew. I was a little shocked at this as Yamamoto would be losing his most powerful striking force in the opening hours of the war. Having been associated with Japanese naval aviation, he must have known that the slow production rate of crews and air craft meant no replacements for the battles ahead.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Just got my copy of Prange's "At Dawn We Slept". I've just gotten to the point where Yamamoto is giving his concept to Genda in March, 1941. Yamamoto's original concept saw the carriers launching all their torpedo armed Kates well outside their radius of action to keep the carriers safe from counter attack. There would be no fighter escort. The entire effort to be spent against ships in the harbor. He hoped to use submarines and destroyers along the flight path to rescue survivng air crew. I was a little shocked at this as Yamamoto would be losing his most powerful striking force in the opening hours of the war. Having been associated with Japanese naval aviation, he must have known that the slow production rate of crews and air craft meant no replacements for the battles ahead.

I am not certain that he fully understood the problems with that concept, which Onishi, Genda and Fuchida quickly dispensed with. Remember that to Yamamoto, this was a major operation at this point, not the hit and run raid that Nagano and the Naval General staff allowed. To them, bringing home the carriers and crews for further operations was imperative. For Yamamoto, this was a hammer blow, a decisive battle. He want to roll the dice, and win the war on the first day.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Navy Summary of War-Damage to Battleships, Cruisers, and Destroyers - October, 1941 to December 1942.

http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/museum/War_Damage/A374.pdf


Dennis:

Excellent document. Interesting to note how many times the USN attributed torpedo hits on warships to submarines when it turns out to have been from an IJN DD or cruiser.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Excellent document. Interesting to note how many times the USN attributed torpedo hits on warships to submarines when it turns out to have been from an IJN DD or cruiser.

It is an early document, without the benefit of years of research that we have now, but it is still useful, IMO.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It is an early document, without the benefit of years of research that we have now, but it is still useful, IMO.

Dennis:

You feel like you're handling a piece of history when you download a copy of it.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

You feel like you're handling a piece of history when you download a copy of it.

That is true and if you go through the bibliography of many of the books we use, you will find that these authors are using the same primary documents that we all provide each other. I guess my ego tells me, given the primary documents, I can analyze and assess situations and factors just as well as anyone else, especially in regards to overall strategy and aircraft.


I like and appreciate primary documents because my interpretation is somehow unique, not being copied from someone else.

[Ed Rotondaro]

That is true and if you go through the bibliography of many of the books we use, you will find that these authors are using the same primary documents that we all provide each other. I guess my ego tells me, given the primary documents, I can analyze and assess situations and factors just as well as anyone else, especially in regards to overall strategy and aircraft.


I like and appreciate primary documents because my interpretation is somehow unique, not being copied from someone else.

Dennis:

The best advantage of the primary document is that it can dispel mistakes that have become accepted as historical facts. We're fortunate that there is as much declassified stuff out there for research.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Dennis:

The best advantage of the primary document is that it can dispel mistakes that have become accepted as historical facts. We're fortunate that there is as much declassified stuff out there for research.

Hi Ed,

Yes, unfortunately, Prange said Yamamoto didn't put much down on paper other than in some person letters to confidants and eh japanese destroyed a large number of documents. The set publisahed by Prange's assistants is good, but teh review of teh book says a lot of questuions will go unanswerered.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

Yes, unfortunately, Prange said Yamamoto didn't put much down on paper other than in some person letters to confidants and eh japanese destroyed a large number of documents. The set publisahed by Prange's assistants is good, but teh review of teh book says a lot of questuions will go unanswerered.

Hi Mike:

More Japanese primary material is available these days in translation than ever before. Parshall certainly benefited from it in his book "Shattered Sword". But there will always be gaps due to the destruction of Japanese primary records at the war's end.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Mike:

More Japanese primary material is available these days in translation than ever before. Parshall certainly benefited from it in his book "Shattered Sword". But there will always be gaps due to the destruction of Japanese primary records at the war's end.

The official Japanese War Histories ordered compiled by MacArthur took, IIRC, 24 years to compile and write, along with four editors. I don't believe the full document was ready until the early '70's. This was after Prange died. So, historians and scholars have much more material to work with than Prange. But Prange did get key interviews right after the war, with many individuals. His work was ground breaking, but only a start. Everyone built upon his work.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The official Japanese War Histories ordered compiled by MacArthur took, IIRC, 24 years to compile and write, along with four editors. I don't believe the full document was ready until the early '70's. This was after Prange died. So, historians and scholars have much more material to work with than Prange. But Prange did get key interviews right after the war, with many individuals. His work was ground breaking, but only a start. Everyone built upon his work.

Dennis:

I would say that Prange's work like Morison's has stood the test of time. Isn't the official Japanese history something like 60 plus volumes?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I would say that Prange's work like Morison's has stood the test of time. Isn't the official Japanese history something like 60 plus volumes?

Sixty-four, IIRC.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Sixty-four, IIRC.

Dennis:

I wonder if it is available in English? Most English speaking authors state that exact translations between the two languages is difficult at times.

[Mike Malanaphy]

The official Japanese War Histories ordered compiled by MacArthur took, IIRC, 24 years to compile and write, along with four editors. I don't believe the full document was ready until the early '70's. This was after Prange died. So, historians and scholars have much more material to work with than Prange. But Prange did get key interviews right after the war, with many individuals. His work was ground breaking, but only a start. Everyone built upon his work.

Hi Guys,

Dull use it as a source in his book "A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1941-1945" published in 1978. It was compiled by the Japanese Defense Agency History Section and is called "Boeicho Kenshujo Senshishitsu" generally referred to as BKS. When he wrote his book he said there were more than 90 volumes at 600 pages each mostly dealing with the Army. Perhaps more have been published regarding the Navy since. Dull described them as useful and unbiased. He says any college library likely would have a set, but doesn't mention if they were translated or he read them in Japanese.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Guys,

Dull use it as a source in his book "A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1941-1945" published in 1978. It was compiled by the Japanese Defense Agency History Section and is called "Boeicho Kenshujo Senshishitsu" generally referred to as BKS. When he wrote his book he said there were more than 90 volumes at 600 pages each mostly dealing with the Army. Perhaps more have been published regarding the Navy since. Dull described them as useful and unbiased. He says any college library likely would have a set, but doesn't mention if they were translated or he read them in Japanese.


Mike:
My alma mater, San Diego State University does have a copy accessible to the public. However, I believe it is in Japanese and has to be translated. There might be sections that are translated, like the one I posted for the Australian-Japanese History project for the New Guinea operations.