Lest we forget

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi:

On this day in 1942, the USN turned the tide of war in the Pacific at Midway island. A salute to the brave men who fought and won and especially those who died (remember the torpedo squadrons). Freedom will never be free, it has be earned and defended. End of shameless patriotic rant.

[old_pop2000]

Hi:

On this day in 1942, the USN turned the tide of war in the Pacific at Midway island. A salute to the brave men who fought and won and especially those who died (remember the torpedo squadrons). Freedom will never be free, it has be earned and defended. End of shameless patriotic rant.
I especially want to give a rousing cheer to the Hornet's Torpedo eight who knew what was going to happen, and still went after the Japanese carriers. Waldron knew before he left the carrier that he might have to move into the attack without escorts or the dive bombers taking some of the heat. I suspect that we showed the Japanese that fighting spirit isn't the only from the Japanese Samurai.

[Warship NWS]

Everyone of those TBD flyers and gunners should have recieved a CMOH without question, there was no way they could not have known they were about to enter the teeth of hell in a plane that could barely outrun seagulls - and yet not one turned back. I think it was a lot more then "spirit".. I think our USN personel were just flat out pissed off as hell. Yamamoto knew the hornets nest he had stirred up at Pearl Harbor.. and that was proof of his own prophecy. Rant mode on - what makes me ill is to think Dugout Dug got a CMOH.. for doing squat, yet not one of those TBD crews got one - rant mode off.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Everyone of those TBD flyers and gunners should have recieved a CMOH without question, there was no way they could not have known they were about to enter the teeth of hell in a plane that could barely outrun seagulls - and yet not one turned back. I think it was a lot more then "spirit".. I think our USN personel were just flat out pissed off as hell. Yamamoto knew the hornets nest he had stirred up at Pearl Harbor.. and that was proof of his own prophecy. Rant mode on - what makes me ill is to think Dugout Dug got a CMOH.. for doing squat, yet not one of those TBD crews got one - rant mode off.

Thanks.
I would agree about the CMOH. However, Waldron did not fly the course that the leader of the CAW eight had planned, he decided to take his own route. Waldron flew on the heading of 265 degrees for a while, but realized that in the clouds, the air group would not be able to coordinate its action. Flying at 100 kts, below 1500 ft, he was not visible to the Grumman F4F of the second division under Jim Gray. Gray got a fleeting glimpse of Torpedo eight and that was the last anyone ever saw of them. They found the carriers, and Waldron made the decision to attack without help. Unfortunately, VT-8 was guarding a different channel that VF-8 or VB-8, so the sighting report never arrived at Hornet or with the rest of the Group. In fact, the leadership and planning of the CAG and Mitscher were very poor on this day, so the Hornet squadrons, all new, never contributed anything to the battle.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Everyone of those TBD flyers and gunners should have recieved a CMOH without question, there was no way they could not have known they were about to enter the teeth of hell in a plane that could barely outrun seagulls - and yet not one turned back. I think it was a lot more then "spirit".. I think our USN personel were just flat out pissed off as hell. Yamamoto knew the hornets nest he had stirred up at Pearl Harbor.. and that was proof of his own prophecy. Rant mode on - what makes me ill is to think Dugout Dug got a CMOH.. for doing squat, yet not one of those TBD crews got one - rant mode off.

Thanks.

Chris:

I agree. At the very least they should have gotten a Presidential Unit Citation which is the equivalent of the entire unit receiving the Navy Cross. In the book "Incredible Victory" the author mentions that many of the crews were very green and still they never turned back.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would agree about the CMOH. However, Waldron did not fly the course that the leader of the CAW eight had planned, he decided to take his own route. Waldron flew on the heading of 265 degrees for a while, but realized that in the clouds, the air group would not be able to coordinate its action. Flying at 100 kts, below 1500 ft, he was not visible to the Grumman F4F of the second division under Jim Gray. Gray got a fleeting glimpse of Torpedo eight and that was the last anyone ever saw of them. They found the carriers, and Waldron made the decision to attack without help. Unfortunately, VT-8 was guarding a different channel that VF-8 or VB-8, so the sighting report never arrived at Hornet or with the rest of the Group. In fact, the leadership and planning of the CAG and Mitscher were very poor on this day, so the Hornet squadrons, all new, never contributed anything to the battle.

Dennis:

People forget that Mitscher's early war performance was nowhere's near as good as it was by 1944. He too was learning on the job so to speak. It makes Spruance's performance all the more impressive. I'm having a discussion with a friend on another forum and we were talking about Admiral Fletcher and Lundstrom's book on him. Do you feel that Lundstrom makes a good case for Fletcher as a commander, or do you come away feeling his relief from command and subsequent posting to the North Pacific was the correct action?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

People forget that Mitscher's early war performance was nowhere's near as good as it was by 1944. He too was learning on the job so to speak. It makes Spruance's performance all the more impressive. I'm having a discussion with a friend on another forum and we were talking about Admiral Fletcher and Lundstrom's book on him. Do you feel that Lundstrom makes a good case for Fletcher as a commander, or do you come away feeling his relief from command and subsequent posting to the North Pacific was the correct action?
I believe that Lundstrom's point of view is that Fletcher was in command during a difficult portion of the war. He wasn't aggressive, nor was he as intelligent and analytical as Halsey and Spruance. Unfortunately, King wanted intelligent, aggressive commanders and Fletcher did not fit his profile. Possibly, his actions at the Guadalcanal invasion and the subsequent handling of the Battle of Eastern Solomons was the final straw. I believe that Lundstrom feels that Fletcher got a bad deal, and he was probably correct. The problem was, King was fighting a war, not trying to win a popularity contest. He had to make decisions that would win the war. I believe he accomplished that.

[Citadelvette]

I have to agree with Dennis. King was fighting a war and called it correctley. Fletcher was saddled with a difficult phase of the war and his lack of agression hurt him. It's not that he was a bad commander just not suited for sitauation that was present and I really think it took a toll on him and wore him out. In the end his reassignment probably helped him health wise or else he probalby would died of worry and exhaustion during or just after the war akin to "Slew" McCain, the currnet Republican candidate's grandfather.

[djcyclone]

Just putting my two cense in. I agree that all of the men in the torpedo squadrons should have recieved the highest rewards. I saw a document on the history channel pertaining to the battle, and they managed to find a member of one of the TBD squadrons.

He said that during the briefing prior to taking off, they where told that if one aircraft out of two squadron attacks managed to score a hit, they would consider that to be a successful operation. He indicated that at that moment he knew he was in over his head, yet he and the other members of the squadron still took off and flew the mission. That is either one of two things. Outright stupidity, or absolute bravery. Take your pick, but I would say that they where brave in a way that few people will ever know or understand. If I remember right, he was shot down, and later picked up by a submarine.

[john964]

Just putting my two cense in. I agree that all of the men in the torpedo squadrons should have recieved the highest rewards. I saw a document on the history channel pertaining to the battle, and they managed to find a member of one of the TBD squadrons.

He said that during the briefing prior to taking off, they where told that if one aircraft out of two squadron attacks managed to score a hit, they would consider that to be a successful operation. He indicated that at that moment he knew he was in over his head, yet he and the other members of the squadron still took off and flew the mission. That is either one of two things. Outright stupidity, or absolute bravery. Take your pick, but I would say that they where brave in a way that few people will ever know or understand. If I remember right, he was shot down, and later picked up by a submarine. From my information Torpedo 8 receved the Presidential Unit Citation and at least seven of its members were awarded Navy Crosses and at least 1 DFC on dowm also several members had ships named after them.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I believe that Lundstrom's point of view is that Fletcher was in command during a difficult portion of the war. He wasn't aggressive, nor was he as intelligent and analytical as Halsey and Spruance. Unfortunately, King wanted intelligent, aggressive commanders and Fletcher did not fit his profile. Possibly, his actions at the Guadalcanal invasion and the subsequent handling of the Battle of Eastern Solomons was the final straw. I believe that Lundstrom feels that Fletcher got a bad deal, and he was probably correct. The problem was, King was fighting a war, not trying to win a popularity contest. He had to make decisions that would win the war. I believe he accomplished that.

Dennis:

That's the opinion that my friend was conveying too. Sometimes appearances and nuances can make or break an admiral's career. Many of the fliers serving under Fletcher had lost confidence in him and that may have been a factor in King's decision. The only observation I will offer is that Fletcher at least had more success than Kincaid who should never have commanded a carrier task force. I have no problem with King's decision and I do respect Fletcher for not making an issue out of it and just doing his job. I'm looking forward to reading the book which arrived today.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have to agree with Dennis. King was fighting a war and called it correctley. Fletcher was saddled with a difficult phase of the war and his lack of agression hurt him. It's not that he was a bad commander just not suited for sitauation that was present and I really think it took a toll on him and wore him out. In the end his reassignment probably helped him health wise or else he probalby would died of worry and exhaustion during or just after the war akin to "Slew" McCain, the currnet Republican candidate's grandfather.

Citadel:

Good points. It is scary to look and see how many US commanders suffered from early deaths either during the war or shortly after mainly from the stress of their duties. Admiral Willis Lee comes to mind, dying on his barge just after the Japanese surrendered. Mitscher didn't last too long after the war ended either. Even Admiral Sprague who I sign off with died in April 1955 of heart failure. Of course it must also be noted that these men were usually heavy smokers and drinkers and all Americans diets in those days were enough to give a cardiologist fits.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Just putting my two cense in. I agree that all of the men in the torpedo squadrons should have recieved the highest rewards. I saw a document on the history channel pertaining to the battle, and they managed to find a member of one of the TBD squadrons.

He said that during the briefing prior to taking off, they where told that if one aircraft out of two squadron attacks managed to score a hit, they would consider that to be a successful operation. He indicated that at that moment he knew he was in over his head, yet he and the other members of the squadron still took off and flew the mission. That is either one of two things. Outright stupidity, or absolute bravery. Take your pick, but I would say that they where brave in a way that few people will ever know or understand. If I remember right, he was shot down, and later picked up by a submarine.

DJ:

Ensign, later Lt. George Gay, the only survivor of the torpedo squadrons is the man in question. He got to watch the dive bombers sink three carriers while bobbing around on a life raft. Think he wasn't screaming his head off at the Japanese?

[Ed Rotondaro]

From my information Torpedo 8 receved the Presidential Unit Citation and at least seven of its members were awarded Navy Crosses and at least 1 DFC on dowm also several members had ships named after them.

John:

Thanks for the additional info!

[old_pop2000]

DJ:

Ensign, later Lt. George Gay, the only survivor of the torpedo squadrons is the man in question. He got to watch the dive bombers sink three carriers while bobbing around on a life raft. Think he wasn't screaming his head off at the Japanese?
No, I suspect he was hiding under his mae west to escape detection. After those carriers were sunk, what do you think the Japanese would have done to him?

From an interview with George Gay:

Of course, I was hiding under this cushion and instead of having my head above and out of the water, I presented the side of this little black cushion to him and hoped that they'd figure out that I was a piece of the wreckage. Pretty fair estimate about that time anyway, so I managed to not to be picked up by them somehow.

[Warship NWS]

Regarding Adm Fletcher.. personaly I think he got a bad rap. Fletcher NEVER lost a USN CV due entirely to air attack.. the first to get that reputation as Adm Kinkaid at Santa Cruz when he operated the CVs in seperate forces and Hornet was damaged beyond repair. The Lexington was lost due to avgas fumes not being purged by the DC teams and the Yorktown due to a sub attack. Adm Fletcher ALWAYS walked away with doing more damage to the enemy then the enemy inflicted on his forces - due to air attacks alone, not even counting the numbers of enemy pilots put out of action. He never lost a strategic battle and was a part of two strategic victories and a tactical victory up against the most experienced carrier naval force in the world at the time.. the Japanese.

Yeah.. I think he got a bad rap. He held the Japanese at bay and was a part of their worst defeat in naval history.. and yet gets squat in terms of recognition for it.

Thanks.

[bridav58]

Regarding Adm Fletcher.. personaly I think he got a bad rap. Fletcher NEVER lost a USN CV due entirely to air attack.. the first to get that reputation as Adm Kinkaid at Santa Cruz when he operated the CVs in seperate forces and Hornet was damaged beyond repair. The Lexington was lost due to avgas fumes not being purged by the DC teams and the Yorktown due to a sub attack. Adm Fletcher ALWAYS walked away with doing more damage to the enemy then the enemy inflicted on his forces - due to air attacks alone, not even counting the numbers of enemy pilots put out of action. He never lost a strategic battle and was a part of two strategic victories and a tactical victory up against the most experienced carrier naval force in the world at the time.. the Japanese.

Yeah.. I think he got a bad rap. He held the Japanese at bay and was a part of their worst defeat in naval history.. and yet gets squat in terms of recognition for it.

Thanks.


I think Fletcher was a good man,if not the right one, for the job up until Guadalcanal when the US went over to the offensive. He was more defensive in nature compared to say Spurance or Halsey but weren't we on the defensive before 8/1942?

[john964]

No, I suspect he was hiding under his mae west to escape detection. After those carriers were sunk, what do you think the Japanese would have done to him?

From an interview with George Gay:From several sources the IJN captured at least 12 pilots and air crew during Midway none became POW's.

[Ed Rotondaro]

No, I suspect he was hiding under his mae west to escape detection. After those carriers were sunk, what do you think the Japanese would have done to him?

From an interview with George Gay:

Dennis:

Considering that the IJN executed two aircrew they "rescued" I can understand Gay's caution. But I'll still bet he was cheering like crazy albeit silently.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Regarding Adm Fletcher.. personaly I think he got a bad rap. Fletcher NEVER lost a USN CV due entirely to air attack.. the first to get that reputation as Adm Kinkaid at Santa Cruz when he operated the CVs in seperate forces and Hornet was damaged beyond repair. The Lexington was lost due to avgas fumes not being purged by the DC teams and the Yorktown due to a sub attack. Adm Fletcher ALWAYS walked away with doing more damage to the enemy then the enemy inflicted on his forces - due to air attacks alone, not even counting the numbers of enemy pilots put out of action. He never lost a strategic battle and was a part of two strategic victories and a tactical victory up against the most experienced carrier naval force in the world at the time.. the Japanese.

Yeah.. I think he got a bad rap. He held the Japanese at bay and was a part of their worst defeat in naval history.. and yet gets squat in terms of recognition for it.

Thanks.

Chris:

In the intro to the book "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral", author Lundstrom makes a point that he intended to clear up several misconceptions about Fletcher and was encouraged in his efforts by former officers who had served wtih him. I just started reading it yesterday evening.

[old_pop2000]

Second guessing a wartime decision is a tricky process, that usually decides nothing. This one is exactly the same. We have, if I may remind you, the advantage of historical perspective that Admiral Ernest J. King did not have. He had been handed a two front war, with a navy that was not yet ready. He was fighting an administration that did not understand how much danger lurked in the Pacific with the Japanese. He took over a peacetime Naval administration and had to transform it into a wartime administration. No easy task, I suspect. He did not take command from Stark until the 1st of January and really did not get moving until February. He immediately had to deal with the U-boats on the Atlantic. He was an intelligent, hard driving uncompromising man. He knew what he needed and wanted in the men who served him. If Nimitz had not served him well, he would have fired him, no doubt. I can only recommend that we survey his decisions made throughout the war, instead of focusing on one decision. It was he, who pushed for the Guadalcanal invasion. Which most historians agree was a campaign that spelled the doom of the Japanese Navy. That operation, while flawed at first, was pushed to its completion due to the removal and replacement of officers who did not or could not live up to King's standards. Even Nimitz made comments about Fletcher's lack of aggressiveness.

Admiral Ernest J. King's style and manner of command, may not have won him awards at afternoon tea party's, but this was a war and he was a wartime commander. I believe that he and his decisions should be judged by the results he obtained. On September 2,1945, four years after attacking Pearl Harbor, the Japanese surrendered. Much of the credit for that surrender and destruction of the Imperial Japanese Fleet should go to Admiral Ernest J. King along with the men that he chose lead his fleet into battle.

I will not ask our serving officer in the navy for comments. That would put him on the spot. I will just say this. I was not present during those times, I only have the historical record to judge performances by. Fletcher performed his job, the best that he knew how. He was successful, in some measure, but failed in others. He was helped by the IJN and its officers. Fletcher succeeded at Coral Sea due to Admiral Goto, and his timidity. Admiral Spruance made the key decisions at Midway, it was his battle to win or lose. We really only have the Guadalcanal operation and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons to judge Fletcher by. In both of those operations, he left the battle area to refuel his ships and due to heavy losses in fighters. Both excellent reasons, IMHO. Unfortunately, historical evidence tells us, that there was another big victory waiting for Fletcher at Eastern Solomons had he taken the aggressive stance and kept Wasp in the task force, instead sending it back to refuel. With three carriers in the fold, I believe he could have won an even greater victory, and the Battle of Santa Cruz might never have happened. Now, in all fairness, he did make that decision only after CincPac intel told him that the carrier task force was still in Truk Lagoon. But, he had PBY's and scouts out searching for the IJN carriers, should he have waited to see what they would discover? By 1000 hrs, the next morning, he had his answer. Again, is this a sign of lack of aggressiveness? Apparently, someone did.

In conclusion, I can only remember a line from a John Wayne, Henry Fonda movie-Fort Apache-where Fonda is about to ride into certain death to lead his men, " I'm not asking your opinion, Capt. Yorke. When you command this regiment - and you probably will - command it!. This is my take on the decision to relieve Fletcher. It was Admiral King's decision to make, he made it. Did it win the war? I doubt it, but it might have cleared the war for more intelligent, aggressive officers with flying experience to take command and lead the fleet to victory. While we given much credit to Nimitz, Spruance, Halsey, Turner and the rest of the field commanders, why not give credit to the man who guided, directed and fought the administration, to provide us with the most powerful and effective navy in the world.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Second guessing a wartime decision is a tricky process, that usually decides nothing. This one is exactly the same. We have, if I may remind you, the advantage of historical perspective that Admiral Ernest J. King did not have. He had been handed a two front war, with a navy that was not yet ready. He was fighting an administration that did not understand how much danger lurked in the Pacific with the Japanese. He took over a peacetime Naval administration and had to transform it into a wartime administration. No easy task, I suspect. He did not take command from Stark until the 1st of January and really did not get moving until February. He immediately had to deal with the U-boats on the Atlantic. He was an intelligent, hard driving uncompromising man. He knew what he needed and wanted in the men who served him. If Nimitz had not served him well, he would have fired him, no doubt. I can only recommend that we survey his decisions made throughout the war, instead of focusing on one decision. It was he, who pushed for the Guadalcanal invasion. Which most historians agree was a campaign that spelled the doom of the Japanese Navy. That operation, while flawed at first, was pushed to its completion due to the removal and replacement of officers who did not or could not live up to King's standards. Even Nimitz made comments about Fletcher's lack of aggressiveness.

Admiral Ernest J. King's style and manner of command, may not have won him awards at afternoon tea party's, but this was a war and he was a wartime commander. I believe that he and his decisions should be judged by the results he obtained. On September 2,1945, four years after attacking Pearl Harbor, the Japanese surrendered. Much of the credit for that surrender and destruction of the Imperial Japanese Fleet should go to Admiral Ernest J. King along with the men that he chose lead his fleet into battle.

I will not ask our serving officer in the navy for comments. That would put him on the spot. I will just say this. I was not present during those times, I only have the historical record to judge performances by. Fletcher performed his job, the best that he knew how. He was successful, in some measure, but failed in others. He was helped by the IJN and its officers. Fletcher succeeded at Coral Sea due to Admiral Goto, and his timidity. Admiral Spruance made the key decisions at Midway, it was his battle to win or lose. We really only have the Guadalcanal operation and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons to judge Fletcher by. In both of those operations, he left the battle area to refuel his ships and due to heavy losses in fighters. Both excellent reasons, IMHO. Unfortunately, historical evidence tells us, that there was another big victory waiting for Fletcher at Eastern Solomons had he taken the aggressive stance and kept Wasp in the task force, instead sending it back to refuel. With three carriers in the fold, I believe he could have won an even greater victory, and the Battle of Santa Cruz might never have happened. Now, in all fairness, he did make that decision only after CincPac intel told him that the carrier task force was still in Truk Lagoon. But, he had PBY's and scouts out searching for the IJN carriers, should he have waited to see what they would discover? By 1000 hrs, the next morning, he had his answer. Again, is this a sign of lack of aggressiveness? Apparently, someone did.

In conclusion, I can only remember a line from a John Wayne, Henry Fonda movie-Fort Apache-where Fonda is about to ride into certain death to lead his men, " I'm not asking your opinion, Capt. Yorke. When you command this regiment - and you probably will - command it!. This is my take on the decision to relieve Fletcher. It was Admiral King's decision to make, he made it. Did it win the war? I doubt it, but it might have cleared the war for more intelligent, aggressive officers with flying experience to take command and lead the fleet to victory. While we given much credit to Nimitz, Spruance, Halsey, Turner and the rest of the field commanders, why not give credit to the man who guided, directed and fought the administration, to provide us with the most powerful and effective navy in the world.

Dennis:

I can understand King's desire to plcae command in the hands of the most competent and aggressive individuals possible. And considering that Nimitz shared his commander's opionion of Fletcher, I can't fault their decision to relieve him. I'm just curious as to why they for all intents and purposes exiled him to the North Pacific. If he was that ineffective, he should have been returned stateside and given a desk job. I think the general opinion of Fletcher was that he was basically a good sailor and not a very bright admiral. Even if he had been more effective at Eastern Solomons, I think that King would have wanted more airminded admirals commanding carriers, especially with Admiral Tower constantly pushing for Brown Shoe admirals. I think Fletcher's problem was he was too genial to defend himself post war against his critics. I find Samuel Morison's sneering judgement of him to be fueled more by his own opinions than by unbiased examination of the man's record. I'm beginning to have some problems with a lot of Morison's work. It was written too so after the fact and not free from personal bias to be really good history.

[bridav58]

Isn't true though that it was Yorktown's airgroups,commanded by Fletcher, that did the most damage to Nagumo's carriers? So where does Spurance calling all the shots translate into him getting all and/or most of the credit? I mean I'm not much of an expert on Midway so don't really know and was just wondering.

[Warship NWS]

Isn't true though that it was Yorktown's airgroups,commanded by Fletcher, that did the most damage to Nagumo's carriers? So where does Spurance calling all the shots translate into him getting all and/or most of the credit? I mean I'm not much of an expert on Midway so don't really know and was just wondering.

Fletcher was in command, not Spruance. Spruance was a CR admiral for Halsey and when Halsey got sick Spruance was sent in his place but Fletcher was in charge. Not knocking Spruance as he was a very good admiral.. here is a good article on the topic.

http://www.dcmilitary.com/stories/052908/tester_28159.shtml

I will note however, Fletcher did NOT lose 2 CVs as a direct result of the Japanese air attacks. The Lexington and Yorktown could have been saved if not for circumstances beyond his control. Kinkaid was the first USN admiral to lose a CV that was not able to be returned to port under its own power as a direct result of air attacks - the CV Hornet.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Isn't true though that it was Yorktown's airgroups,commanded by Fletcher, that did the most damage to Nagumo's carriers? So where does Spurance calling all the shots translate into him getting all and/or most of the credit? I mean I'm not much of an expert on Midway so don't really know and was just wondering.

Brian:

As you can see from the link that Chris posted, Spruance and Fletcher have about equal honors for nailing the first three carriers with the dive bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown. With Yorktown later out of the battle, it is Spruance's two carriers that finish off the fourth carrier and a heavy cruiser. Still Fletcher did a good job and deserves more credit than he gets. It doesn't help that Spruance goes on to greater successes later in the war while Fletcher is sidelined in the North Pacific. While Spruance was a modest man and not given to self promotion, he became along with Halsey, one of the heroes of the Pacific campaign because of his highly visible successes, even though he too missed out on a potentially greater victory at the Philippine Sea in June 1944, by being cautious. When Fletcher is cautious in the early days of the war, it's seen as a weakness. When Spruance is cautious defending his invasion force at Saipan, his superiors praise him for doing the right thing. Success can transform how a person is perceived historically.

[Warship NWS]

To Ed,

Regarding the biased points of view by various authors.. that is why I prefer to work in the realm of battle, weapons, and tactics analysis so I can develop my own points of view. By many authors standards the quality of a commander is hit and miss based on what the author deems as mistakes, luck, or glowing moments of inspiration. Quite often commanders are overshadowed by those in greater power or that just happened to be in the right place at the right time. Politics also played heavily on what historians wrote about various commanders.

As they old saying goes... actions speak far louder then words.

[Kyle Holgate]

Everyone of those TBD flyers and gunners should have recieved a CMOH without question, there was no way they could not have known they were about to enter the teeth of hell in a plane that could barely outrun seagulls - and yet not one turned back. I think it was a lot more then "spirit".. I think our USN personel were just flat out pissed off as hell. Yamamoto knew the hornets nest he had stirred up at Pearl Harbor.. and that was proof of his own prophecy. Rant mode on - what makes me ill is to think Dugout Dug got a CMOH.. for doing squat, yet not one of those TBD crews got one - rant mode off.

Thanks.

If I remember right even the Japanese were commenting on the tenacity and bravery of the men in the torpedo squadrons. Honor from the enemy is high praise.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To Ed,

Regarding the biased points of view by various authors.. that is why I prefer to work in the realm of battle, weapons, and tactics analysis so I can develop my own points of view. By many authors standards the quality of a commander is hit and miss based on what the author deems as mistakes, luck, or glowing moments of inspiration. Quite often commanders are overshadowed by those in greater power or that just happened to be in the right place at the right time. Politics also played heavily on what historians wrote about various commanders.

As they old saying goes... actions speak far louder then words.

Chris:

It's easier to objectively analyze a weapon or tactic than say a commander or a campaign. Either the weapon works or it doesn't, although many good weapon systems have failed because the troops using them were not as well trained or led as their opponents. A tactic either is effective or it isn't but again it has to be executed properly which brings you back to the human factor (could every Navy pilot execute the Thatch Weave?). Many a promising commander has seen his plans incompetently executed by his subordinates. The further up the line you go, the harder it is to pinpoint the one thing that made for success because you are examining so may more factors. And that's where it becomes easy to take one's own viewpoint and focus on what interests the writer or what the writer thinks is the key element rather than performing a rigorous analysis of all the factors. Look at how long most writers and some historians have blamed Hood's loss on her being a poorly armored battlecruiser when in reality her armor was just about the same as the QE class BBs. When you look at how long it can take to gather enough relevant data to do a thorough and objective analysis of a subject, you can see why the truly great historians don't crank out a book a year. Lundstrum spent over 30 years gathering the material he uses in Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, a good deal of it was from research for his earlier books on the First Team. I wonder how long it took Parshall and Tully to gather all the new information and discard the outdated concepts on Midway?

[Warship NWS]

To Ed,

That is why there are distinct differences between historians, researchers, and analysts. The further up the chain you go the longer it can take to prepare professionally written documentation on the subject matter -- the first problem is to know how to understand what your writing about through data extrapolation, interpretation of the facts, and the capability of multi-dimensional, and often theoretical, thinking. Also, stories being told too many times with the same slant for interpreted history, bias, and details can often cause ignorance and arrogance and the lack of desire to look into the situation with an open mind. The HMS Hood and Midway battle histories are just two examples of rehashed stories over the last 40+ years and until researchers and analysts disproved the previous historical interpretations the true facts or possibilities were hidden by historical story telling.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

It's easier to objectively analyze a weapon or tactic than say a commander or a campaign.


Not always. Weapons, and the systems they are applied to, are often only as good as those trained to use them and the commanders that deploy them for battle. There is a twisted irony about historical interpretations of weapons and commanders as they are far too often micro-scoped as if they are in a vacuum of war - the classic case of extremism on opposite ends of the spectrum of war. Neither functions without the other and both are part of an overall system of warfare. Quite often weapons and commanders are misjudged due to external mitigating factors, or how they functioned within a system, so it is far more simple to use limited descriptions and terminology for dramatic effect rather then explaining the multi-dimensional scenarios they operated in, or did not have a chance to operate in. Sometimes luck or a simple matter of a dates alone could mean the difference between effective or ineffective weapon systems and/or commanders.

[old_pop2000]

Isn't true though that it was Yorktown's airgroups,commanded by Fletcher, that did the most damage to Nagumo's carriers? So where does Spurance calling all the shots translate into him getting all and/or most of the credit? I mean I'm not much of an expert on Midway so don't really know and was just wondering.

There were two carrier task forces - TF 16 and TF 17. TF 16 was commanded by Spruance consisted of Hornet and Enterprise. TF 17 was commanded by Fletcher, consisted of Yorktown. Yorktown's Air Wing on June 4th was kept in reserve while Spruance intercepted the PBY's message about the location of two Japanese carriers. At 0607 Fletcher radioed to Spruance to "head SW and attack the enemy carriers as soon as definitely located. I will follow as soon as planes recover". The battle was now in the hands of Ray Spruance, it was his to win or lose. He raced SW at 0240 degrees and that's when the message from the PBY was intercepted. At 100 miles, Spruance launched Hornet and Enterprise attack wing in a deferred launch. It was VB-3 from the Enterprise that struck the carriers and sank three of them. It was a composite group of dive bombers from VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3 that eventually struck the Hiryu, while Fletcher was on the damaged Yorktown, it was also Spruance who attacked and sank Mikuma.

So, that is the crux of matter. Fletcher was in overall command, and did provide the initial order on June 4th. Spruance, however, was in tactical command made the important decisions to attack at the correct time. It as been stated in many books over the years, that Spruance always recognized Fletcher as overall commander. However by 0600 hours on the 4th, he had already made his decision and was heading toward the sighting of the IJN carriers. It was always accepted by all subcommanders on the scene, the Hornet and Enterprise and the 125 attack aircraft were the sword upon which the battle would been decided and that Ray Spruance, as Halsey's recommended replacement was the man who was going to lead the attack. There was some conjecture after Coral Sea that Fletcher had not been aggressive enough and that Nimitz was losing confidence in him. He did, however, want an experienced battle tested commander in overall command of the operation.

[Warship NWS]

Even though it was Spruance that launched the death blows on the Japanese CVs I still think Fletcher should be given credit for being professional enough not to interfere with the abilities of Spruance to command his own ships. Things might have happened quite differently if the two admirals had not respected each other. Both understood carrier warfare, both knew what was at stake and how valuable the CVs were to the Pacific Fleet, and both knew that a slight change of luck could effect either of their careers and their roles in history forever. IMHO, we could not have asked for more capable commanders during the crucial battle. Fletcher operated the entire Midway USN force very professionaly and handled the CVs in hostile or contested waters while covering vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean and if not for his actions at Coral Sea the Shokaku and Zuikaku may well have been a part of the Midway operations greatly tilting the odds. In the end though, we were forwarned of danger and Nimitz rolled the dice with our fleet and luck, tied with errors in the IJN operational doctrines, won the day.

It is interesting to think of how long a commander would have to work to move up the ranks and how a few seconds of a decision could change his life, and history, forever.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Even though it was Spruance that launched the death blows on the Japanese CVs I still think Fletcher should be given credit for being professional enough not to interfere with the abilities of Spruance to command his own ships. Things might have happened quite differently if the two admirals had not respected each other. Both understood carrier warfare, both knew what was at stake and how valuable the CVs were to the Pacific Fleet, and both knew that a slight change of luck could effect either of their careers and their roles in history forever. IMHO, we could not have asked for more capable commanders during the crucial battle. Fletcher operated the entire Midway USN force very professionaly and handled the CVs in hostile or contested waters while covering vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean and if not for his actions at Coral Sea the Shokaku and Zuikaku may well have been a part of the Midway operations greatly tilting the odds. In the end though, we were forwarned of danger and Nimitz rolled the dice with our fleet and luck, tied with errors in the IJN operational doctrines, won the day.

It is interesting to think of how long a commander would have to work to move up the ranks and how a few seconds of a decision could change his life, and history, forever.

Thanks.

Chris:

It probably didn't hurt that both men commanded cruiser divisions and knew each other. One wonders how they would have fared if fate had not put them in command of carriers and instead let them command cruisers during the period of 1942-1943? I can't imagine Spruance getting caught flat footed at Savo Island.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

It probably didn't hurt that both men commanded cruiser divisions and knew each other. One wonders how they would have fared if fate had not put them in command of carriers and instead let them command cruisers during the period of 1942-1943? I can't imagine Spruance getting caught flat footed at Savo Island.

I completely agree there. Both Fletcher and Spruance were very competant commanders, we were quite lucky to have such commanders in the USN up against the IJN.

[Kyle Holgate]

I completely agree there. Both Fletcher and Spruance were very competant commanders, we were quite lucky to have such commanders in the USN up against the IJN.

I have often wondered if Halsey would have been too aggressive at Midway, costing the US fleet. Of course there is no way to tell, but caution and thoughtfullness did not seem to be part of his character and that was what was needed at Midway IMO.

[Warship NWS]

I have often wondered if Halsey would have been too aggressive at Midway, costing the US fleet. Of course there is no way to tell, but caution and thoughtfullness did not seem to be part of his character and that was what was needed at Midway IMO.

One thing that I think needs to be seriously considered is that the commanders decided on when and where to cast the combat die in CV combat.. it was up to the pilots to get the scoring hits. Competent commanders were required to operate CV task forces effectively at sea but it was up to the flight leaders directing the pilots in their squadrons to actually hit the targets through angle of attacks, attack patterns, formation flying, navigation, etc... This was not like surface combat warfare where the admiral was right there calling the shots as to when and where the naval artillery could be put into position, IOW, directly controlling the tactical flow of combat and reacting to a fluid battle situation as needed, if possible. I think a lot has to be said for the pilots and the flight leaders here. In CV combat the skill and bravery of the pilots greatly determined the fate of the admirals they served under and once the planes took off.. there was nothing more the admirals could do except sweat it out and pray like hell the pilots found and hit their targets before the enemy could do the same in return and CV combat was far less certain or controllable then surface combat. Once the die was cast as to when to attack.. it was all a waiting game from there to see what the dice would roll... luck was your best friend or worst nightmare. I do not think any of us could even imagine the stress those CV commanders were under as path of the entire Pacific War hinged on their decisions and the pilots who flew those planes.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

One thing that I think needs to be seriously considered is that the commanders decided on when and where to cast the combat die in CV combat.. it was up to the pilots to get the scoring hits. Competent commanders were required to operate CV task forces effectively at sea but it was up to the flight leaders directing the pilots in their squadrons to actually hit the targets through angle of attacks, attack patterns, formation flying, navigation, etc... This was not like surface combat warfare where the admiral was right there calling the shots as to when and where the naval artillery could be put into position, IOW, directly controlling the tactical flow of combat and reacting to a fluid battle situation as needed, if possible. I think a lot has to be said for the pilots and the flight leaders here. In CV combat the skill and bravery of the pilots greatly determined the fate of the admirals they served under and once the planes took off.. there was nothing more the admirals could do except sweat it out and pray like hell the pilots found and hit their targets before the enemy could do the same in return and CV combat was far less certain or controllable then surface combat. Once the die was cast as to when to attack.. it was all a waiting game from there to see what the dice would roll... luck was your best friend or worst nightmare. I do not think any of us could even imagine the stress those CV commanders were under as path of the entire Pacific War hinged on their decisions and the pilots who flew those planes.

Thanks.

Chris:

That defines it exactly. The evolution of carrier warfare was how to deliver your strike in the most effective way. It got to the point where the most experienced pilots acted as coordinators in the air to make sure that targets were hit. The USN's highest scoring ace, Cmdr. David McCampbell was frequently ordered to stay out of the fight and observe and direct the strikes against the Japanese.


As USN carrier doctrine evolved, the emphasis was on find, fix and hit the enemy. The early carrier battles taught the USN that whoever struck first usually won. Philippines Sea was somewhat of an anomaly in that while the IJN found the US first and attacked first, it had nothing to show for its efforts, but this more a reflection on the state of IJN carrier avaition and the quality of its planes versus the ever improving USN.

By late 1943 the cream of the IJN's pilots and leaders were dead and so was their carrier aviation.

[old_pop2000]

It is interesting to examine both carrier task force commanders and how they were viewed by their superiors. Both were considered as having a lack of aggressiveness. Nagumo was criticised for this lack of aggressiveness by Yamamoto after his failure to linger in the area of Hawaii to search out and destroy the US carriers. He was soundly criticised for his failures at Midway, but how much of this was his failure and how much was Yamamoto's for developing such a plan. At Guadalcanal, he was timid and frittered away his combat strength. His losses at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz sealed the fate of Japanese carrier aviation.

Fletcher was criticised almost from the beginning by King for his lack of aggressiveness. It was this perceived lack of aggressiveness that eventually got him relieved. However, carrier task forces under Fletcher's command sank four fleet carriers, two light carriers, one heavy cruiser and essentially destroyed the creme of Japanese naval aviation including all of it great Pearl Harbor leaders like Egusa and Murata.

Nagumo, of course, was credited with five battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers, many transports, merchantman, oilers etc. along with hundreds of aircraft with only a few losses to himself until Midway.

So, the question is why were those two fairly successful admiral's relieved after the apparent successes that they had achieved? Both had been pioneer's in the use of fast attack carrier task force's and their tactics. Both had to suffer through mistakes in prewar doctrine, planning along with aircraft and ship construction. Mistakes that were not corrected until both had left the scene. Is it possible, the system realized the mistakes and did not want men around who had been victims of those mistakes?

[old_pop2000]

One thing that I think needs to be seriously considered is that the commanders decided on when and where to cast the combat die in CV combat.. it was up to the pilots to get the scoring hits. Competent commanders were required to operate CV task forces effectively at sea but it was up to the flight leaders directing the pilots in their squadrons to actually hit the targets through angle of attacks, attack patterns, formation flying, navigation, etc... This was not like surface combat warfare where the admiral was right there calling the shots as to when and where the naval artillery could be put into position, IOW, directly controlling the tactical flow of combat and reacting to a fluid battle situation as needed, if possible. I think a lot has to be said for the pilots and the flight leaders here. In CV combat the skill and bravery of the pilots greatly determined the fate of the admirals they served under and once the planes took off.. there was nothing more the admirals could do except sweat it out and pray like hell the pilots found and hit their targets before the enemy could do the same in return and CV combat was far less certain or controllable then surface combat. Once the die was cast as to when to attack.. it was all a waiting game from there to see what the dice would roll... luck was your best friend or worst nightmare. I do not think any of us could even imagine the stress those CV commanders were under as path of the entire Pacific War hinged on their decisions and the pilots who flew those planes.

Thanks.
Four entities that rarely get any credit for what occurred in the Pacific, were; BuAer, BuShips, BuOrd and Commander, Pacific Air Forces.

BuAer for taking the AAR's and using them to improve our aircraft and the equipment that went into them. Items such as better pilot armor, self sealing tanks, external fuel tanks for the F4F, the F6F, TBF, improved radios;navigation;homing devices, airborne radar. All these items and more, came though BuAer.

BuShips for constantly improving the ships and the on board weapons and damage control equipment and procedures along with extensive training.

BuOrd for upgrading, improving and developing better weapons like unguided rockets, better fuses, bombs, machine guns, etc. to make our aircraft weaponry far better than the Japanese could ever have expected.

Commander, Pacific Air Forces for developing the Air Wing reserve system which kept our air wings fully operational and allowed our combat leaders to transmit their lessons learned and provide training, which steadily improved the average pilots abilities. For recognizing the need to increase the fighters on board the carriers to provide better attack escorts and CAP's. For developing the fighter director school which trained and improved the fighter director operations on our carriers steadily throughout the war.


All of these four naval functional areas made it possible for the fleet air forces to improve, not only in equipment, but in the improvement in tactics which is the implementation of doctrine. We seldom hear of these functions then, and even now.

[djcyclone]

It is interesting to examine both carrier task force commanders and how they were viewed by their superiors. Both were considered as having a lack of aggressiveness. Nagumo was criticised for this lack of aggressiveness by Yamamoto after his failure to linger in the area of Hawaii to search out and destroy the US carriers. He was soundly criticised for his failures at Midway, but how much of this was his failure and how much was Yamamoto's for developing such a plan. At Guadalcanal, he was timid and frittered away his combat strength. His losses at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz sealed the fate of Japanese carrier aviation.

Fletcher was criticised almost from the beginning by King for his lack of aggressiveness. It was this perceived lack of aggressiveness that eventually got him relieved. However, carrier task forces under Fletcher's command sank four fleet carriers, two light carriers, one heavy cruiser and essentially destroyed the creme of Japanese naval aviation including all of it great Pearl Harbor leaders like Egusa and Murata.

Nagumo, of course, was credited with five battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers, many transports, merchantman, oilers etc. along with hundreds of aircraft with only a few losses to himself until Midway.

So, the question is why were those two fairly successful admiral's relieved after the apparent successes that they had achieved? Both had been pioneer's in the use of fast attack carrier task force's and their tactics. Both had to suffer through mistakes in prewar doctrine, planning along with aircraft and ship construction. Mistakes that were not corrected until both had left the scene. Is it possible, the system realized the mistakes and did not want men around who had been victims of those mistakes?



Is it remotely possible that these men where relieved because of jealousy from the higher up ranks??? I know that is far fetched thinking, but it is just a thought.

[old_pop2000]

Is it remotely possible that these men where relieved because of jealousy from the higher up ranks??? I know that is far fetched thinking, but it is just a thought.
I suppose there are many possibilities, however, both of their superiors were gamblers and intelligent, hard driving individuals. I believe those are the qualities they sought in their fleet commanders. They wanted most importantly, intelligence, then aggressiveness. But, there is always that small portion of the human emotion of envy.

I should probably read the biography of Admiral King to seek more, indepth information.

[old_pop2000]

Something King once said that probably gives us an insight into his character


In the early months of 1942, King's strategic brilliance earned him the complete confidence of President Roosevelt. When none of the British or American war planners even dared to think of going on the offensive in the Pacific in 1942-43, King successfully lobbied to do just that. "No fighter ever won his fight by covering up -- merely fending off the other fellow's blows," he wrote. "The winner hits and keeps on hitting even though he has to be able to take some stiff blows in order to keep on hitting." ...

[Ed Rotondaro]

It is interesting to examine both carrier task force commanders and how they were viewed by their superiors. Both were considered as having a lack of aggressiveness. Nagumo was criticised for this lack of aggressiveness by Yamamoto after his failure to linger in the area of Hawaii to search out and destroy the US carriers. He was soundly criticised for his failures at Midway, but how much of this was his failure and how much was Yamamoto's for developing such a plan. At Guadalcanal, he was timid and frittered away his combat strength. His losses at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz sealed the fate of Japanese carrier aviation.

Fletcher was criticised almost from the beginning by King for his lack of aggressiveness. It was this perceived lack of aggressiveness that eventually got him relieved. However, carrier task forces under Fletcher's command sank four fleet carriers, two light carriers, one heavy cruiser and essentially destroyed the creme of Japanese naval aviation including all of it great Pearl Harbor leaders like Egusa and Murata.

Nagumo, of course, was credited with five battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers, many transports, merchantman, oilers etc. along with hundreds of aircraft with only a few losses to himself until Midway.

So, the question is why were those two fairly successful admiral's relieved after the apparent successes that they had achieved? Both had been pioneer's in the use of fast attack carrier task force's and their tactics. Both had to suffer through mistakes in prewar doctrine, planning along with aircraft and ship construction. Mistakes that were not corrected until both had left the scene. Is it possible, the system realized the mistakes and did not want men around who had been victims of those mistakes?

Dennis:

A good topic. Both men were not avaitors, yet they were given command of their navies most potent striking forces. Why? In the case of the US it was because Halsey was on another operation and then fell ill with shingles so Fletcher was the only other admiral with carrier experience. Nagumo was kept around because for six months he was successful against basically weak and disorganized opposition.

I think no matter how well Fletcher did, he would have been replaced as a carrier commander mainly due to the fact that he was seen as a less than brilliant officer and even when his caution was justified he paled in comparison to a Halsey. Yet Bull and Kincaid were not as successful in terms of carriers sunk at least until 1944. By then Spruance could claim three more at Philippines Sea (albeit two sunk by his submarines).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Four entities that rarely get any credit for what occurred in the Pacific, were; BuAer, BuShips, BuOrd and Commander, Pacific Air Forces.

BuAer for taking the AAR's and using them to improve our aircraft and the equipment that went into them. Items such as better pilot armor, self sealing tanks, external fuel tanks for the F4F, the F6F, TBF, improved radios;navigation;homing devices, airborne radar. All these items and more, came though BuAer.

BuShips for constantly improving the ships and the on board weapons and damage control equipment and procedures along with extensive training.

BuOrd for upgrading, improving and developing better weapons like unguided rockets, better fuses, bombs, machine guns, etc. to make our aircraft weaponry far better than the Japanese could ever have expected.

Commander, Pacific Air Forces for developing the Air Wing reserve system which kept our air wings fully operational and allowed our combat leaders to transmit their lessons learned and provide training, which steadily improved the average pilots abilities. For recognizing the need to increase the fighters on board the carriers to provide better attack escorts and CAP's. For developing the fighter director school which trained and improved the fighter director operations on our carriers steadily throughout the war.


All of these four naval functional areas made it possible for the fleet air forces to improve, not only in equipment, but in the improvement in tactics which is the implementation of doctrine. We seldom hear of these functions then, and even now.

Dennis:

You should probably add BuNav which became BuPers since they provided the men that manned the ships and made sure the good ones were fast tracked to command. Basically overall the USN as a whole was responsible for the victory as none of the bureaus existed in a vacuum and had to work as a team. That's where King and Nimitz get the nod for superlative work in the middle of a two ocean war. Plus thousands of unsung staff officers who filed the reports, analyzed the intel and developed the plans and logistics to win the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Something King once said that probably gives us an insight into his character

Dennis:

King was easily the best mind of the joint chiefs and while he had his flaws (who doesn't?), he was possibly the most crucial US commander from Pearl Harbor until D-Day. His bio is out of print I think, but certainly obtainable.