Carriers a liability?

[Kyle Holgate]

Aticle I found - interesting. It is true that Tomahawks are able to do much of what previousoly only carrier aircraft or aircraft in general did. With the "new" Ohio tomahawk subs with a 154 of the things they are now quite a threat. I am not sure it's time to reture the CVN's but I like the SSGN's. No one will know if there is one off their coast or not where in contrast everyone usually knows when a carrier is around. That can be a good thing though, too.

http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/mburleson_20080526.html

[Ed Rotondaro]

Aticle I found - interesting. It is true that Tomahawks are able to do much of what previousoly only carrier aircraft or aircraft in general did. With the "new" Ohio tomahawk subs with a 154 of the things they are now quite a threat. I am not sure it's time to reture the CVN's but I like the SSGN's. No one will know if there is one off their coast or not where in contrast everyone usually knows when a carrier is around. That can be a good thing though, too.

http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/mburleson_20080526.html

Kyle:

Interesting, but I'm not convinced that the CVN is obsolete by any means. Should we consider the CVX as proposed? I.e. a smaller easier to man ship? The proposed new corvette and the DDX show that the USN is at least aware that its new role in the war on terror may require less vulnerable ships than CVNs, but if you need airpower and there are no friendly allies providing airfields, nothing subsitutes for a carrier. Hey remember when tanks were supposed to be obsolete? Most of these "defense experts" recycle the same old crap that they read somewhere else.

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle:

Interesting, but I'm not convinced that the CVN is obsolete by any means. Should we consider the CVX as proposed? I.e. a smaller easier to man ship? The proposed new corvette and the DDX show that the USN is at least aware that its new role in the war on terror may require less vulnerable ships than CVNs, but if you need airpower and there are no friendly allies providing airfields, nothing subsitutes for a carrier. Hey remember when tanks were supposed to be obsolete? Most of these "defense experts" recycle the same old crap that they read somewhere else.

Being a study of history things like this catch my attention. Most of us are familiar with the slow demise of the battleship as the premiere naval weapon. It seems likely that the carrier may follow the same path some day and like the battleship the change will be fought by those with different opinions until something comes along and decisively makes it clear.
I do agree that if you need air cover you've got to have a carrier, though I suppose AA missiles on smaller ships can do the job in some cases, but you can't really project them over land very far.
I wonder when some one's going to come up with a submarine detection device that makes their only real asset (invisibility) obsolete. It may happen - blue-green lasers, etc.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Being a study of history things like this catch my attention. Most of us are familiar with the slow demise of the battleship as the premiere naval weapon. It seems likely that the carrier may follow the same path some day and like the battleship the change will be fought by those with different opinions until something comes along and decisively makes it clear.
I do agree that if you need air cover you've got to have a carrier, though I suppose AA missiles on smaller ships can do the job in some cases, but you can't really project them over land very far.
I wonder when some one's going to come up with a submarine detection device that makes their only real asset (invisibility) obsolete. It may happen - blue-green lasers, etc.

Kyle:

Definitely something to think about for subs.

[old_pop2000]

Aticle I found - interesting. It is true that Tomahawks are able to do much of what previousoly only carrier aircraft or aircraft in general did. With the "new" Ohio tomahawk subs with a 154 of the things they are now quite a threat. I am not sure it's time to reture the CVN's but I like the SSGN's. No one will know if there is one off their coast or not where in contrast everyone usually knows when a carrier is around. That can be a good thing though, too.

http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/mburleson_20080526.html
That is a very interesting viewpoint, one that is shared by many naval analysts and others. It isn't entirely wrong, and has some grain of truth. I believe the carrier will and is evolving. We see the airwings evolving, possibly the size and expense of the ships may also; more stealth aircraft, more UCAV's, more aircraft like the V-22 Osprey(only hopefully better). The mix of aircraft and missioins might require major changes in how the ships are built. Our national policy and military strategy will dictate the types of the changes.

[Scott Chisholm]

Kyle,

The "Woe is me! We have less than 300 ships!" argument is disingenuous. Back in "The Day" when we had nearly 600 ships, that number included many - whole classes of ships - that were not NTDS capable and survived by teletype. When we started our draw down to 300 ships the ships put on the chopping block were either steam powered or non-NTDS capable. The CGNs then followed.

Does it really come as a surprise that in a Arabian Gulf naval shooting war we would send the CVNs to the North Arabian Sea? More water to play in and the SSK threat is mitigated. Additionally, our response time to land based air is increased.

Also, drawing down the number of carriers is the result of two things: decommissioning the conventional CVs and huge improvements in naval aircraft ordnance. People forget that the USN was the last service to get guided munitions for its aircraft (outside of Harpoon). Smarter weapons require fewer aircraft to to accomplish the mission. Fewer aircraft equates for fewer flight decks, i.e., CVNs.

There are some instances where we absolutely need the flight decks, as has already been mentioned. Also, parking an SSGN off of one's coast is less effective than parking a CVN unless you fully intend to launch a surprise attack. Just as with mines, what you cannot see might not actually be there. That doubt might be enough for someone to call our bluff.

A 100,000 ton CVN operating aircraft 25nm off your coast is quite visable - and a proven commodity.

Finally, I am not a "take the man off the battlefield" proponent. Sometimes you need eyes on the scene - not via remote camera - to get the ground truth before dropping ordnance.

Just as a hammer and screwdriver are tools used for specific purposes, so too are CVNs and SSGNs. You can use a hammer to drive a screw, but it is hard to straighten a bent nail with a screwdriver....

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle,

The "Woe is me! We have less than 300 ships!" argument is disingenuous. Back in "The Day" when we had nearly 600 ships, that number included many - whole classes of ships - that were not NTDS capable and survived by teletype. When we started our draw down to 300 ships the ships put on the chopping block were either steam powered or non-NTDS capable. The CGNs then followed.

Does it really come as a surprise that in a Arabian Gulf naval shooting war we would send the CVNs to the North Arabian Sea? More water to play in and the SSK threat is mitigated. Additionally, our response time to land based air is increased.

Also, drawing down the number of carriers is the result of two things: decommissioning the conventional CVs and huge improvements in naval aircraft ordnance. People forget that the USN was the last service to get guided munitions for its aircraft (outside of Harpoon). Smarter weapons require fewer aircraft to to accomplish the mission. Fewer aircraft equates for fewer flight decks, i.e., CVNs.

There are some instances where we absolutely need the flight decks, as has already been mentioned. Also, parking an SSGN off of one's coast is less effective than parking a CVN unless you fully intend to launch a surprise attack. Just as with mines, what you cannot see might not actually be there. That doubt might be enough for someone to call our bluff.

A 100,000 ton CVN operating aircraft 25nm off your coast is quite visable - and a proven commodity.

Finally, I am not a "take the man off the battlefield" proponent. Sometimes you need eyes on the scene - not via remote camera - to get the ground truth before dropping ordnance.

Just as a hammer and screwdriver are tools used for specific purposes, so too are CVNs and SSGNs. You can use a hammer to drive a screw, but it is hard to straighten a bent nail with a screwdriver....

Obviously the air cover aspect cannot be done via a sub, but I wonder how much of the CVN's utility is simply because it's a big obvious chunk of US foreign policy for all to see.

I wonder about the SSGN. On one hand you never know where one is - and that could give pause to a country bent on mischief. On the other hand as you say, you could take a chance that one's not lurking nearby and go ahead with your plans. With a CVN though, if one's not there you know it and it's not like they're that sneaky what with their emissons and hawkeyes. You may not know exactly where it's at but you know it's out there. When it leaves there is little doubt. Between the two - best of both worlds!

[old_pop2000]

Is the old adage- Speak softly and carry a big stick- still a viable method of diplomacy? Do we have concrete evidence from history that parking a 95,000 ton Aircraft Carrier off of a prospective opponent have any appreciable effect on their attitude? Does anyone truly believe that we have enforced our will, by simply threatening anyone?

[Campy]

Is the old adage- Speak softly and carry a big stick- still a viable method of diplomacy? Do we have concrete evidence from history that parking a 95,000 ton Aircraft Carrier off of a prospective opponent have any appreciable effect on their attitude? Does anyone truly believe that we have enforced our will, by simply threatening anyone?

Doesn't seemed to have helped with Iran. In fact, when they rattle their sabres, and we do nothing in return, they can declare a "victory". Can't park one off Afghanistan. Although, back in the 90's when China was firing missles over Taiwan, sending a CVBG seemed to put an end to that. Not sure it did anything for the Chinese disposition, however.

Frank

[john964]

Here is some problems with the SSGN Ohio's, #1 we only have 4 of them.

Modern combat aircraft operating from CVN's can strike targets in 80% of the worlds land mass. IIRC 2 CVN's operated in the Northren Arabian Sea for 2 months bombing in Afganistan before we were able negotiate the use of several air bases in Kazikstan and Kyergistan. Also when 9/11 happened IIRC USS Enterprise was at or near Diego Garcia in the IO when th CO saw what was happening in New York and Washington DC he imeadiatly ordered his BG north to the coast of Pakistan several hours before before he was ordered to do so.

[JMS]

Is the old adage- Speak softly and carry a big stick- still a viable method of diplomacy? Do we have concrete evidence from history that parking a 95,000 ton Aircraft Carrier off of a prospective opponent have any appreciable effect on their attitude? Does anyone truly believe that we have enforced our will, by simply threatening anyone?

Ask Muammar el-Ghadaffi.

I can think of several instances when that failed: Vietnam, Lebanon, and one in which it worked, Kuwait in 1961 (though the carrier was British). Naval air power also could have helped in keeping the Indonesian confrontation "cool".

[Warship NWS]

My definition of a CVN - I would rather have it and not need it then need it and not have it. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Kyle,

The "Woe is me! We have less than 300 ships!" argument is disingenuous. Back in "The Day" when we had nearly 600 ships, that number included many - whole classes of ships - that were not NTDS capable and survived by teletype. When we started our draw down to 300 ships the ships put on the chopping block were either steam powered or non-NTDS capable. The CGNs then followed.

...

Scott:

What is NTDS capable? I assume it has to do with digital communications?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Is the old adage- Speak softly and carry a big stick- still a viable method of diplomacy? Do we have concrete evidence from history that parking a 95,000 ton Aircraft Carrier off of a prospective opponent have any appreciable effect on their attitude? Does anyone truly believe that we have enforced our will, by simply threatening anyone?

Dennis:

I agree. That old argument about the ovewhelming presence of a carrier battle group has been used by CNOs to get their budgets passed. The problem is unless we actually attack, most nations simply go about their business and ignore the task force.

[old_pop2000]

Scott:

What is NTDS capable? I assume it has to do with digital communications?
NTDS- Naval Tactical Data System

A multi-platform secure data exchange system.

That's all I am going to say about it.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I agree. That old argument about the ovewhelming presence of a carrier battle group has been used by CNOs to get their budgets passed. The problem is unless we actually attack, most nations simply go about their business and ignore the task force.
With assymetric threats, do we just park a CVBG off the coast of a possible source of that threat, even if we do not have hard evidence they were the offending nation? What about multi-national threats, or non-national threats? How do we respond to that?

Just some questions to contemplate.

[old_pop2000]

Ask Muammar el-Ghadaffi.

I can think of several instances when that failed: Vietnam, Lebanon, and one in which it worked, Kuwait in 1961 (though the carrier was British). Naval air power also could have helped in keeping the Indonesian confrontation "cool".
Be careful in assuming that the air raid on Qaddaffi had any effect on him. Possibly economic sanctions and diplomacy had more effect than the CVBG did.In point of fact, it was the fact that we had nuclear missiles pointed at him, that probably brought him to the table. Those missiles would have come from the unseen submarines.


Behind the scenes, advisers to Qaddafi were arguing that Libya's security would be enhanced, not reduced, by giving up the nuclear program. "We had no delivery system," a top Qaddafi adviser tells Insight at the Libyan leader's office outside of Sirte. "I told the guide, 'If Libya were to start a nuclear war, our missiles won't even reach Malta. If the U.S. starts it, Libya will be erased from the map.'" He said he told Qaddafi as the meetings with the United States and the United Kingdom got under way in London last spring that it was better to get rid of the weapons and redirect the resources toward improving the economy than to risk an American attack

[Scott Chisholm]

Scott:

What is NTDS capable? I assume it has to do with digital communications?

Ed,

As Dennis stated, it stands for Naval Tactical Data System and is an information exchange system whereby equipped ships can share tactical sensor data to generate synthetic displays. While you could not share actual raw radar video, the information you inputted for a contact could be shared with anyone in the "Link".

If you've ever played Harpoon II or III you see the effective end result: any of your units up on the link can share data with one another. If you have allied nations operating with you who are link capable, then they can share data also.

The older steam ships built in the 60s and early 70s were not link capable. In order to exhcange sensor/contact information they had to literally transmit the information via teletype. Very slow, and not conducive to warfare against mach 4 missiles....

Any more detail would start to get into the classified realm, so I will stop here.

[old_pop2000]

Ed,

As Dennis stated, it stands for Naval Tactical Data System and is an information exchange system whereby equipped ships can share tactical sensor data to generate synthetic displays. While you could not share actual raw radar video, the information you inputted for a contact could be shared with anyone in the "Link".

If you've ever played Harpoon II or III you see the effective end result: any of your units up on the link can share data with one another. If you have allied nations operating with you who are link capable, then they can share data also.

The older steam ships built in the 60s and early 70s were not link capable. In order to exhcange sensor/contact information they had to literally transmit the information via teletype. Very slow, and not conducive to warfare against mach 4 missiles....

Any more detail would start to get into the classified realm, so I will stop here.
Would you agree that it can be likened to a commercial wireless system with security? WIFI, in other words, only a lot more sophisticated.

[Scott Chisholm]

Would you agree that it can be likened to a commercial wireless system with security? WIFI, in other words, only a lot more sophisticated.

Dennis,

That's fair. I'm told the National Air Traffic Control system used in the US is based on a non-classified version of NDTS, but I do not know if that is fact.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

That's fair. I'm told the National Air Traffic Control system used in the US is based on a non-classified version of NDTS, but I do not know if that is fact.
That is a possibility. I will check on it, if the information is readily available.

[Ed Rotondaro]

NTDS- Naval Tactical Data System

A multi-platform secure data exchange system.

That's all I am going to say about it.

Dennis:

I can read between the lines. I can see where unless the older ships were massively refit, they would not be able to use this system.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,

As Dennis stated, it stands for Naval Tactical Data System and is an information exchange system whereby equipped ships can share tactical sensor data to generate synthetic displays. While you could not share actual raw radar video, the information you inputted for a contact could be shared with anyone in the "Link".

If you've ever played Harpoon II or III you see the effective end result: any of your units up on the link can share data with one another. If you have allied nations operating with you who are link capable, then they can share data also.

The older steam ships built in the 60s and early 70s were not link capable. In order to exhcange sensor/contact information they had to literally transmit the information via teletype. Very slow, and not conducive to warfare against mach 4 missiles....

Any more detail would start to get into the classified realm, so I will stop here.

Scott:

I can see how with AEGIS, this system is crucial especially when considering how much area the CVBG occupies.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis,

That's fair. I'm told the National Air Traffic Control system used in the US is based on a non-classified version of NDTS, but I do not know if that is fact.

Scott:

Please reassure me that this system is fairly hack proof? The last thing we need is the enemy intercepting any of our tactical data.:eek:

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I can read between the lines. I can see where unless the older ships were massively refit, they would not be able to use this system.
NTDS is not entirely new, but its capability has been extended and expanded. It would require some major upgrades and modifications, along with new equipment to be operational in any platform.

[old_pop2000]

Scott:

Please reassure me that this system is fairly hack proof? The last thing we need is the enemy intercepting any of our tactical data.:eek:
I am not certain that is a question that Scott can and should answer. MIB might be listening.

We might want to move on from this subject.

[JMS]

Be careful in assuming that the air raid on Qaddaffi had any effect on him. Possibly economic sanctions and diplomacy had more effect than the CVBG did.In point of fact, it was the fact that we had nuclear missiles pointed at him, that probably brought him to the table. Those missiles would have come from the unseen submarines.

He was brought to the table 20 years after the Sirte incident. At the time Ghaddafi was sponsoring a muslim alliance of the Mediterranean countries to include Morocco and Algeria to bring "interference" by the West to an end, and while us Europeans were carefully trying to avoid provocations of any kind (but, for example, electronic reconnaissance missions were being undertaken to update the Maghreb OOB, not necessarily by the US), Reagan put an end to that with the raids and the line of death antics, as the other countries dropped from the prospective alliance, which together with the defeat of Lybian forces in Chad, pretty much ended Ghaddaffi's antics.

[old_pop2000]

He was brought to the table 20 years after the Sirte incident. At the time Ghaddafi was sponsoring a muslim alliance of the Mediterranean countries to include Morocco and Algeria to bring "interference" by the West to an end, and while us Europeans were carefully trying to avoid provocations of any kind (but, for example, electronic reconnaissance missions were being undertaken to update the Maghreb OOB, not necessarily by the US), Reagan put an end to that with the raids and the line of death antics, as the other countries dropped from the prospective alliance, which together with the defeat of Lybian forces in Chad, pretty much ended Ghaddaffi's antics.
You are, for the most part, correct. But the real work was diplomacy and sanctions. Making Libya a pariah among nations. Much of this was the help of friendly Arab nations. I will say this, it was not force or diplomacy, but a combination of the two. All the saber rattling, threats had no effect until overt action then quiet sanctions and diplomacy. Standing a 95,000 ton bird farm off his coast, had no effect until the Air Force struck his forces, then the diplomats went to work. Would it have worked without force, we will never know.

I submit that Quaddafi found that he had more to fear from the Islamic Fundamentalist that he did from the US and Europe. He attempted contact the Clinton administration early on, and finally got backchannel discussions with the US and Britain. It was not the raid that scared him, or the 95,000 ton bird farm, it was Al Queda. Common enemies can breed strange bedfellows

I am certain the next post will tell me I am becoming too political, but there it is.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You are, for the most part, correct. But the real work was diplomacy and sanctions. Making Libya a pariah among nations. Much of this was the help of friendly Arab nations. I will say this, it was not force or diplomacy, but a combination of the two. All the saber rattling, threats had no effect until overt action then quiet sanctions and diplomacy. Standing a 95,000 ton bird farm off his coast, had no effect until the Air Force struck his forces, then the diplomats went to work. Would it have worked without force, we will never know.

I submit that Quaddafi found that he had more to fear from the Islamic Fundamentalist that he did from the US and Europe. He attempted contact the Clinton administration early on, and finally got backchannel discussions with the US and Britain. It was not the raid that scared him, or the 95,000 ton bird farm, it was Al Queda. Common enemies can breed strange bedfellows

I am certain the next post will tell me I am becoming too political, but there it is.

Dennis:

I think most established Muslim heads of state feared organizations like al-Queda since they could not control them.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I think most established Muslim heads of state feared organizations like al-Queda since they could not control them.
That is a very good possibility. But this is the 21st century. We need a paradigm shift in our policy of using the big stick to threaten nations. With the globalization of the world's economies, sanctions and diplomacy work probably just as well. With assymetric threats coming from organizations and groups not aligned with any nation per se, the big stick might not be the most effective method of persuasion. We need re-evaluate our decision making paradigm. You are a college trained historian, hasn't unending wars caused most empires and great countries to decline? Are we immune from something similar to that, occurring?

[Ed Rotondaro]

That is a very good possibility. But this is the 21st century. We need a paradigm shift in our policy of using the big stick to threaten nations. With the globalization of the world's economies, sanctions and diplomacy work probably just as well. With assymetric threats coming from organizations and groups not aligned with any nation per se, the big stick might not be the most effective method of persuasion. We need re-evaluate our decision making paradigm. You are a college trained historian, hasn't unending wars caused most empires and great countries to decline? Are we immune from something similar to that, occurring?

Dennis:

I agree that the big stick policy is pretty much obsolete unless dealing with a very small rogue state like North Korea. Obviously economic pressure is more effective and if this is backed up by diplomatic pressure and or isolation, the threat can be neutralized. One of the biggest hits that al Queda has taken has been freezing its assets to limit the kinds of operations it can pull off. I would claim that the original lack of success in Iraq was due as much to the unilaterism of the current administration. Instead of building a coalition and getting a better feel for what the post-Saddam Iraq would be like, it used blunt force trauma and is still struggling (albeit much more successfully) to promote stability. Unending wars eventually drain even the most powerful empires of their will to fight. Look at Britain's experience post-WWII with her colonies. It became more acceptable to offer them self government and a place in the Commonwealth should they so desire.

[JMS]

You are, for the most part, correct. But the real work was diplomacy and sanctions. Making Libya a pariah among nations. Much of this was the help of friendly Arab nations. I will say this, it was not force or diplomacy, but a combination of the two. All the saber rattling, threats had no effect until overt action then quiet sanctions and diplomacy. Standing a 95,000 ton bird farm off his coast, had no effect until the Air Force struck his forces, then the diplomats went to work. Would it have worked without force, we will never know.

I submit that Quaddafi found that he had more to fear from the Islamic Fundamentalist that he did from the US and Europe. He attempted contact the Clinton administration early on, and finally got backchannel discussions with the US and Britain. It was not the raid that scared him, or the 95,000 ton bird farm, it was Al Queda. Common enemies can breed strange bedfellows

I am certain the next post will tell me I am becoming too political, but there it is.

To be fair, the Navy also had a lot to do with that.
Another example would be Operation Praying Mantis to end up Iranian antics in the Gulf.
Certainly, diplomacy must be part of the solution, but the mix of the 2 need not be 50/50.

[old_pop2000]

There is no simple formula that is applied and voila!, the answer is given. Every situation must be dealt with, as a unique problem. I do not advocate the scrapping of the 95,000 ton Carrier, it is a very useful weapons system. But I do believe that we need a paradigm shift in our strategy for dealing with nations who continue to live on the edge. The carrier and its airwing must evolve to provide the kinds of platforms that will be useful with the paradigm shift. I believe that we are seeing this change currently on the CVX carriers. The carrier will not necessarily go the way of the battleship, but it will evolve as will its airwing. All the naval weapons will evolve, USAF will too. We must re-evaluate how we deal with other nations both friendly and belligerent. Globalization has changed the face of grand strategy. It has caused the paradigm shift. It makes every country more vulnerable to sanctions, and interruptions in sea and air communications.

[JMS]

There is no simple formula that is applied and voila!, the answer is given. Every situation must be dealt with, as a unique problem. I do not advocate the scrapping of the 95,000 ton Carrier, it is a very useful weapons system. But I do believe that we need a paradigm shift in our strategy for dealing with nations who continue to live on the edge. The carrier and its airwing must evolve to provide the kinds of platforms that will be useful with the paradigm shift. I believe that we are seeing this change currently on the CVX carriers. The carrier will not necessarily go the way of the battleship, but it will evolve as will its airwing. All the naval weapons will evolve, USAF will too. We must re-evaluate how we deal with other nations both friendly and belligerent. Globalization has changed the face of grand strategy. It has caused the paradigm shift. It makes every country more vulnerable to sanctions, and interruptions in sea and air communications.

Depends, a carrier is a weapon, big and expensive, but a weapon and that means that in the end it's just a tool, and insofar as it's able to perform its role it will remain valuable in international diplomacy.

Now, the world has changed some, but some variables remain unaltered: scarce resources, sealines from producers to consumers, territorial disputes... so conventional forces cannot be scrapped and remain as useful as ever, another question is wether the so called "war" against terrorism can be fought with Tomahawks and B-2s rather than fighting by proxy or using unconventional means.

[djcyclone]

Dennis:

I agree that the big stick policy is pretty much obsolete unless dealing with a very small rogue state like North Korea. Obviously economic pressure is more effective and if this is backed up by diplomatic pressure and or isolation, the threat can be neutralized. One of the biggest hits that al Queda has taken has been freezing its assets to limit the kinds of operations it can pull off. I would claim that the original lack of success in Iraq was due as much to the unilaterism of the current administration. Instead of building a coalition and getting a better feel for what the post-Saddam Iraq would be like, it used blunt force trauma and is still struggling (albeit much more successfully) to promote stability. Unending wars eventually drain even the most powerful empires of their will to fight. Look at Britain's experience post-WWII with her colonies. It became more acceptable to offer them self government and a place in the Commonwealth should they so desire.



My personal opinion, is that we have so much trouble in every war that we fight, because we use old tactics. We used WW II tactics as I like to call them, where an army invades with the intention of capturing cities and then trying to hold them. In the case of Iraq it worked to a limited extent. We did catch Husain, or however you spell his name, and then we did stretch his neck.

I am probably just talking out of my butt here, and I know everyone will scream at me for this, but that is okay. I think we should move on to the future, and use unconventional warfare. No I am not talking about Nuke, Chemical, or Biological warfare. I am talking about special forces and stealth operations. If I was in command, I would use fear tactics on nations like Iran, or North Korea. Silent strikes on bases and harbors, and then simply leave.

Consider this as an example: Iran has a significant naval force, not a match for the U.S. Navy, but not something to be taken lightly either. Catch their ships in port and conduct air strikes with Raptors, and then just pull back. We almost always have a rough idea as to where their subs are, and so give the okay for a U.S. sub to retire one of those units. Then go to the Diplomacy table and say, now what? Use special forces to their most effective abilities. Locate an enemy troop concentration, and conduct hit and run operations. Allow Seal teams to engage from a distance with sniper operations, with one goal and one goal only (Personel elimination.) Then use our most effective air craft ( Raptors ) to come in and provide air support while the team dissapears.

I call this kind of warfare fear tactics, because the enemy never knows where you are, and they do not know what your intent is. Your intent is not to conquer them, or even defeat them on the battle field. Your intent is to simply destroy morale amongst the ranks of the army. Then let them destroy themselves. This would work great with the U.S. because we are never willing to stay and finish what we start. Quick operations like this, would allow us to get what we want (which is normally just for the enemy to stop what they are doing) and then we can pull our troops out and go home. The big mouths of the country would not have time to wine and get everyone against the war.

The ultimate goal is that the enemy never knows what you are doing, and they never know what your intent is. Fear would cripple the average soilder when rumers of base camp attacks started to spread. And the U.S. would not have to worry about leaving troops on station where the enemy can use the tactics I mentioned above against us. In a nut shell I am propsing using Terrorism agains Terrorist. The only difference in what I am proposing, is that civilians are not targeted, but only enemy troop concentrations. Turn the fear against them.

This is just my personal thoughts, and I know I am talking out of my butt, so go ahead and tell me all the reasons this would not work.:D

[JMS]

You asked for it :)

The problem is that a superpower that behaves unpredictably becomes a liability and a menace to everyone else, therefore forcing them to ally and destroy said power, like Germany in WW2.

It should be noted that the Iranians were all happy and cozy with Saddam and only started getting antsy when they got the US as neighbour in post-Saddam.

The Chinese in contrast became all happy when attention was focused away from them in the aftermath of the EP-3 crisis.

Countries normally just want to be left alone, though sometimes the occasional rotten apple crops up, but in those cases (the Taleban, for example) it's rather easy to get consensus to stop and or destroy the enemy.

[asnrobert]

I think DJ does have a point though. Big carrier task forces may not be the best weapons in hunting down Bin Laden and others of his ilk. Special Forces, operating covertly if need be, would seem to be the better option.

[Ed Rotondaro]

My personal opinion, is that we have so much trouble in every war that we fight, because we use old tactics. We used WW II tactics as I like to call them, where an army invades with the intention of capturing cities and then trying to hold them. In the case of Iraq it worked to a limited extent. We did catch Husain, or however you spell his name, and then we did stretch his neck.

I am probably just talking out of my butt here, and I know everyone will scream at me for this, but that is okay. I think we should move on to the future, and use unconventional warfare. No I am not talking about Nuke, Chemical, or Biological warfare. I am talking about special forces and stealth operations. If I was in command, I would use fear tactics on nations like Iran, or North Korea. Silent strikes on bases and harbors, and then simply leave.

Consider this as an example: Iran has a significant naval force, not a match for the U.S. Navy, but not something to be taken lightly either. Catch their ships in port and conduct air strikes with Raptors, and then just pull back. We almost always have a rough idea as to where their subs are, and so give the okay for a U.S. sub to retire one of those units. Then go to the Diplomacy table and say, now what? Use special forces to their most effective abilities. Locate an enemy troop concentration, and conduct hit and run operations. Allow Seal teams to engage from a distance with sniper operations, with one goal and one goal only (Personel elimination.) Then use our most effective air craft ( Raptors ) to come in and provide air support while the team dissapears.

I call this kind of warfare fear tactics, because the enemy never knows where you are, and they do not know what your intent is. Your intent is not to conquer them, or even defeat them on the battle field. Your intent is to simply destroy morale amongst the ranks of the army. Then let them destroy themselves. This would work great with the U.S. because we are never willing to stay and finish what we start. Quick operations like this, would allow us to get what we want (which is normally just for the enemy to stop what they are doing) and then we can pull our troops out and go home. The big mouths of the country would not have time to wine and get everyone against the war.

The ultimate goal is that the enemy never knows what you are doing, and they never know what your intent is. Fear would cripple the average soilder when rumers of base camp attacks started to spread. And the U.S. would not have to worry about leaving troops on station where the enemy can use the tactics I mentioned above against us. In a nut shell I am propsing using Terrorism agains Terrorist. The only difference in what I am proposing, is that civilians are not targeted, but only enemy troop concentrations. Turn the fear against them.

This is just my personal thoughts, and I know I am talking out of my butt, so go ahead and tell me all the reasons this would not work.:D

DJ:

Are you talking pre-emptive strikes, or using such tactics during a war? If you're at war, then no holds bared in my mind. The gloves come off and every terrorist or hate spewing mullah becomes a target. But it's difficult to sell the idea of just randomly taking out potential threats to most Americans. We like to consider ourselves the good guys who don't start wars. Obviously the asymetric threats we are facing will cause some shift in the strategy this nation will employ. But as JMS says, acting like a bully will only create a coalition against us and would lead to a wider conflict.

An occasion act of pre-emptiveness with no acknowledgement of who did it would probably have the desired effect of getting the message across, but it does invite retaliation. What we really need is far better human intel on who the bad guys are and where they are. And to get that requires allies we can trust.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I think DJ does have a point though. Big carrier task forces may not be the best weapons in hunting down Bin Laden and others of his ilk. Special Forces, operating covertly if need be, would seem to be the better option.

Robert:

We need more than Spec Ops, we need the will to use them anywhere. We had bin laden trapped in Afghanistan and decided to let the Pakistanis capture him when our own Spec Ops people should have done it.

[Kyle Holgate]

Robert:

We need more than Spec Ops, we need the will to use them anywhere. We had bin laden trapped in Afghanistan and decided to let the Pakistanis capture him when our own Spec Ops people should have done it.

I don't think the US would ever do a surprise attack - it would remind too many people of Pearl Harbor. If we did we'd do it after some declaration of war of course, but that was just what the Japanese planned - the US would seem somewhat hyporcritical to many.
I like options myselfP: Special forces, carriers, stealth aircraft, subs with Tomohawks, probably more. Keep them guessing!

[Warship NWS]

Note, let's keep the conversation within the restraints of historical reference points and political history only, not political debates.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Explain the Libyan attack to me? Was that not a surprise attack on a nation we were not at war with? Did I miss something there? What about Panama? Granada? Haiti? Somalia? All nations we were not at war with. What about the Spanish American War? We invaded Cuba, not the other way around? It was spanish territory and they were having problems with insurgents and we asked the spanish to resolve it, which they were unable to do. Ostensibly, we declared war and invaded over the explosion on the Maine; we did this before we ever had taken the time to examine the wreck and determine the cause, which we claimed was a spanish mine. Hmmm! Maybe a double standard here?


Dennis:

I'm not sure I would group Somalia in as a surprise attack. The US forces were sent in at the request of the UN to aid in the protection of and dispersal of humanitarian relief supplies. It was not until the UN decided that the US should snatch one of the warlords that the actual fighting began. Also neither Korea nor Viet Nam was a declared war as such, they were police actions. Grenada and Haiti were interventions. THe US certainly made enough warning noises. I doubt these nations were really surprised.

[djcyclone]

You asked for it :)

The problem is that a superpower that behaves unpredictably becomes a liability and a menace to everyone else, therefore forcing them to ally and destroy said power, like Germany in WW2.

It should be noted that the Iranians were all happy and cozy with Saddam and only started getting antsy when they got the US as neighbour in post-Saddam.

The Chinese in contrast became all happy when attention was focused away from them in the aftermath of the EP-3 crisis.

Countries normally just want to be left alone, though sometimes the occasional rotten apple crops up, but in those cases (the Taleban, for example) it's rather easy to get consensus to stop and or destroy the enemy.



You have slightly missunderstood what I was trying to say. I am not talking about pre emptive strikes. The enemy can fully be aware of who is doing it, and they must also know why it is being done.

For instance Iran has a nuke program. We do not want them to have a nuke program, and so we tell them to stop. They refuse, thus daring us to stop them. We indicate that we will use force if they do not stop. I guess a better example would be if Iran had invaded someone without cause. Give no room for us to seem as the bad guys. The world must know why we are doing what we are doing. I am simply proposing a new type of open warfare, as opposed to the conventional land marines and take cities and then try to hold the ground.

Instead of defeating armies on open ground with Tanks and massive troop concentrations, I propse using special forces and stealth aircraft to conduct the war for us. A complete hit and run doctrine, with no goal other than stop what you are doing, or get out of the country you invaded. The goal is to create such confusion within the ranks of the enemy that they eventually defeat themselves.

For example, if such strikes where done agains Iran, we may be fortunate enough to force them to the diplomacy table begging us to stop these attacks. On the other hand, we may see a high ranking military leader overthrow the current president. In this case we would then have another problem, but the military leader would be fully aware of our resolve pollicies.

[JMS]

You have slightly missunderstood what I was trying to say. I am not talking about pre emptive strikes. The enemy can fully be aware of who is doing it, and they must also know why it is being done.

For instance Iran has a nuke program. We do not want them to have a nuke program, and so we tell them to stop. They refuse, thus daring us to stop them. We indicate that we will use force if they do not stop. I guess a better example would be if Iran had invaded someone without cause. Give no room for us to seem as the bad guys. The world must know why we are doing what we are doing. I am simply proposing a new type of open warfare, as opposed to the conventional land marines and take cities and then try to hold the ground.

Instead of defeating armies on open ground with Tanks and massive troop concentrations, I propse using special forces and stealth aircraft to conduct the war for us. A complete hit and run doctrine, with no goal other than stop what you are doing, or get out of the country you invaded. The goal is to create such confusion within the ranks of the enemy that they eventually defeat themselves.

For example, if such strikes where done agains Iran, we may be fortunate enough to force them to the diplomacy table begging us to stop these attacks. On the other hand, we may see a high ranking military leader overthrow the current president. In this case we would then have another problem, but the military leader would be fully aware of our resolve pollicies.

This runs into snags. The Iranians have a right to develop a nuclear program for peaceful purposes after all, so far there's little proof that they have the bomb or have weaponized a device. Sure, the sites are hardened but they are making little secret out of that and they can point to their record of zero countries invaded since the Revolution in contrast to some others.

In real life it's not really easy to differentiate the shades of grey, specially when there are elements uninterested in differentiating them, because they are clients, allies or whatever (for example, China vs Myamar)

Occasionally a casus belli may crop up: Pearl Harbor, 9-11, but sometimes that's not the case and it's risky to assume that allies are going to follow up just because.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I'm not sure I would group Somalia in as a surprise attack. The US forces were sent in at the request of the UN to aid in the protection of and dispersal of humanitarian relief supplies. It was not until the UN decided that the US should snatch one of the warlords that the actual fighting began. Also neither Korea nor Viet Nam was a declared war as such, they were police actions. Grenada and Haiti were interventions. THe US certainly made enough warning noises. I doubt these nations were really surprised.
Ed:
As much as I would like to respond, I am constrained by forum rules. Suggest that you reexamine the events and documents leading up to the invasion of Somalia.

Sorry.

[Warship NWS]

Actually, this entire thread is going somewhat off-topic.. lets move on to another discussion. Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed:
As much as I would like to respond, I am constrained by forum rules. Suggest that you reexamine the events and documents leading up to the invasion of Somalia.

Sorry.

Dennis:

Suggest the same back to you, but in deferrence to the boss, I'll drop this subject. Be careful old friend, you are also pushing the limit. Drop me a line if you need to discuss this further.

Respectfully