WW1 Strategy.. Schlieffen Plan

[Warship NWS]

This thread is for discussing the Schlieffen Plan and other related topics covering WW1 grand strategy.

[Warship NWS]

It became a linear offensive because someone disobeyed orders and was enabled to do so by the distribution of forces.


Regarding the Schlieffen Plan .. that is not true. Orders were being obeyed.. problem was that the plan did not count on 3 critical factors regarding the right flank,

a) The Belgians not giving right of way to the German army, and instead fought them for a month.

b) The BEF joining the fight due to the Germans attacking the Belgians, which in turn caused delaying actions to the Germany army to the north and then fought alongside the French 5th Army to the south of Paris in a counter-attack at The Battle of the Marne.

c) Aircraft telling the French and British every move the German army was making and also saving the BEF from destruction. Aircraft were also used to some degree by the Belgian army for recon. Aircraft were not a part of the original planning for the grand strategy as they has not taken part in such a war yet.

These critical factors caused the entire right flank to lose its momentum as it was intended to help encircle and defeat the French Army to the south and in turn capture Paris in around 40 days.. that did not happen.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Von Schlieffen's plan, if there ever was such a plan, was really a planning document for a proposed or possible war on two fronts between Germano-Austrian forces and the Allied forces. It was similar, in its purpose to the our War Plan Orange. A plan that was strictly used for gaining funding and building ships for the Navy. It was never, in its entirety, an operational plan.

Von Schlieffen's original work was a study. This study never placed any troops in eastern Germany to face the Russians. It never developed the logistical planning necessary to make it a viable plan. In point of fact, the study never generated the necessary additional divisions that Von Schlieffen had deemed necessary for it to be a success. The study or plan also never envisioned the Belgium resistance to German movement through their country or the BEF being present opposite the German right wing.

When the German General Staff and Von Molke decided or were forced to develop a formal, operational plan which needed to follow national policy, it was forced to place adequate numbers of troops in the east. It also had to develop the necessary logistical plans to implement any western advance. It also had to deal with the knowledge that the Belgians were not going to allow free access to their country or that the BEF was going to be present. The final piece of the puzzle was the knowledge that the railroad and road networks in the north, were not capable of carrying the necessary troops, reserves or supplies to keep 90% of the German forces required by Von Schlieffen's study. Moltke was forced to reduce the right wing, sending much of the reserves to the east, the rest to the south opposite the French.

When the plan was implemented, the French realized that any attack into Germany was going to be a frontal attack against strong German forces, decided just to sit on the defensive. This was not what the Schlieffen plan had planned for. The right wing move quickly at first, but then ran into the Belgians and the fortress system at Liege and the BEF. The pace of the whole offensive was geared from Von Kluck. It eventually ended up being a linear advance, rather than the left wheel, pivoting off of the center.

No one disobeyed orders. Von Moltke and the German General Staff simply had to face reality, which Von Schlieffen never had to do. The staff had to develop a plan that was operationally possible, not just theoretically possible. They had to develop train schedules, supply movement orders etc. All the necessary details required to build a workable offensive plan that could be executed.

Those are the facts.

[old_pop2000]

According to one good source, Europe changed much, in the 44 years between 1870 and the Franco-Prussian War to The Great War.

1. Total manpower available to the French in 1870 was 500,000 men. By 1914, it was 4 million. For Germany, in 1870, only one out of 34 were available for service, in 1914 that figure had jumped to one out of 13.

2. The number of artillery pieces in the armies of Germany in 1870 was 1584. By 1914, it stood at 8000 guns.

3. For the individual soldier, in 1870 he carried 200 rounds of ammo, but only expended 56. In 1914, he carried 280, but those were expended in the first weeks of the war.

4. In 1870 every gun fired an average of 199 shells, in 1914 they had fired over 1000.

5. Weapons wore out also. In 1870, weapons were expected to last the duration of the campaign. In 1914, the amount of artillery fire quickly reduced the number of guns per battery due to failures and worn out barrels.

6 Although the number of horses decreased as a ratio per man, the increased number of men, meant that the number of horses increased. Total subsistence per day, increased by 50%.

7. Railways were limited to transportation to and behind the front. Unloading and loading times reduced the effectiveness of moving goods and men less than a hundred miles. It took 117 trains, moving over 600 miles of track in nine days to move a 1914 corps.

8. There were 180,000 miles of track in Europe in 1914. Thirteen lines moved the 1.5 million men of the German Army up to the front in 10 days.

9. The number of wagons necessary to move supplies and men, from the Rail heads to the front, went from 457 to 1168 per corps.

10 . The maximum distance that a unit could operate from the rail heads went from 100 miles in the 1860's to half that figure in 1914.

11. Traditionally, troops can move 15 miles per day, for three days, fighting not included. Von Schlieffen required the German army to perform this in 25 days, with no fighting.

Just some numbers to help understand how warfare had changed in 1914.

[JMS]

Ok, first of all the maps I posted that didn't quite came out:

http://img260.imageshack.us/img260/4431/marne2qa5.jpg (http://img260.imageshack.us/my.php?image=marne2qa5.jpg)

http://img185.imageshack.us/img185/1702/marneok2.jpg (http://img185.imageshack.us/my.php?image=marneok2.jpg)




Von Schlieffen's plan, if there ever was such a plan, was really a planning document for a proposed or possible war on two fronts between Germano-Austrian forces and the Allied forces. It was similar, in its purpose to the our War Plan Orange. A plan that was strictly used for gaining funding and building ships for the Navy. It was never, in its entirety, an operational plan.

Von Schlieffen's original work was a study. This study never placed any troops in eastern Germany to face the Russians. It never developed the logistical planning necessary to make it a viable plan. In point of fact, the study never generated the necessary additional divisions that Von Schlieffen had deemed necessary for it to be a success. The study or plan also never envisioned the Belgium resistance to German movement through their country or the BEF being present opposite the German right wing.

When the German General Staff and Von Molke decided or were forced to develop a formal, operational plan which needed to follow national policy, it was forced to place adequate numbers of troops in the east. It also had to develop the necessary logistical plans to implement any western advance. It also had to deal with the knowledge that the Belgians were not going to allow free access to their country or that the BEF was going to be present. The final piece of the puzzle was the knowledge that the railroad and road networks in the north, were not capable of carrying the necessary troops, reserves or supplies to keep 90% of the German forces required by Von Schlieffen's study. Moltke was forced to reduce the right wing, sending much of the reserves to the east, the rest to the south opposite the French.


Now, whatever it was it formed the basis of the German strategy for war. Logistics had never been a German forte and remained a weakness into WW2, yet the same network was able to supply a much larger force for four years so it would seem a problem of estimation rather than capabilities.

In contrast with other countries, Germany had a comprehensive plan for the mobilisation of civilian motor vehicles that got them 30.000 vehicles, yet this was hardly decisive on 1914 as the limitations and bottlenecks imposed by trasloading and the support of a disparate park where understated.

Moreover, beyond the original alterations, the right wing was further weakened by the deployment of 2 corps to the East (plus a cavalry division) and another form the 5th to the 4th Army, an strength equivalent to the BEF, though stronger in artillery.



When the plan was implemented, the French realized that any attack into Germany was going to be a frontal attack against strong German forces, decided just to sit on the defensive. This was not what the Schlieffen plan had planned for.


They did not, they attacked in Alsace and Lorraine with their main armies in accordance with Plan XVII and suffered between 200.000 and 300.000 losses (sources vary) even though some try to save Joffre by claiming Plan XVII was just a concentration plan (Doughty, for example: http://www.worldwar1.com/france/jpff1914.htm ). The driving force may have been the politicians, but the fact remains that between the 5th and the 20th the French attacked into the teeth of German armies and fortifications in Alsace and Lorraine, as predicted by the German plan.




The right wing move quickly at first, but then ran into the Belgians and the fortress system at Liege and the BEF. The pace of the whole offensive was geared from Von Kluck. It eventually ended up being a linear advance, rather than the left wheel, pivoting off of the center.


Neither represented a significant delay, Liege surrendered on the 7th of August after 2 days even though some forts held until the 16th, the delay for the Germans amounted to just 36 hours. The battle of Mons slowed down the Germans for 2 days. What was significant was stripping forces from 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies, forcing the wheel to the left (i.e. to the "inside" of Paris rather than the "outside") or run the risk of loosing contact with each other. Even if the Germans had not pulled those forces, taking Paris was not granted and they could have been stopped there as the French rail net made concentration in Paris very easy.
It became a linear advance when 6th Army (commanded by the Crown prince of Bavaria) attacked into the Trouee des Charmes, against the intent of the plan and the commander in chief, who abstained from ordering not to attack.



No one disobeyed orders. Von Moltke and the German General Staff simply had to face reality, which Von Schlieffen never had to do. The staff had to develop a plan that was operationally possible, not just theoretically possible. They had to develop train schedules, supply movement orders etc. All the necessary details required to build a workable offensive plan that could be executed.

Those are the facts.

No, the fact is that Rupprecht against the commander's intent attacked on the 25th until the 29th with 24 divisions, suffering grievous losses in the process, and giving the French enough breathing space to pull out the divisions that later formed the 9th Army.

It is also a fact that von Kluck ignored the 2nd september order to advance in echelon with 2nd Army and left the German right exposed to flank attacks, and opened the gap exploited by Joffre; and then again on the 5th ignored the order to move into the defensive thereby further putting himself into a vulnerable position.

It should also be noted that OHL disengaged itself from the battle as time wore on and the planning did not take into account the limitations, logistical and physical, that entailed the plan.

[JMS]

Just some numbers to help understand how warfare had changed in 1914.

You are forgetting some though,

1) comms and liaison among military units remained more or less the same, but the availability of telephones favored the defender, as the attacker had to resort to couriers and radios were unreliable.

2) As I mentioned above, motor transport now existed and allowed some independence from rail lines.

3) The logistics and firepower of modern weapons were not understood. Lethality had outstripped doctrine on all sides.

[Warship NWS]

I think before we start comparing the mobility issue of 1914 we need to realize that the first motor truck was not even built until 1896 by the German company Diamler. I seriously doubt that trucks were very plentiful between their civilian population and the armed forces within a span of 18 years, much less the French (who needed taxis at the Marne) or the British - who had to be transported by sea to even be involved. Heck, the Germans of WW2 didn't even have enough trucks to go around as horse pulled carts at that time were still in wide use in 1939. Another problem.. crossing trenches with anything wheeled during an offensive was pretty much out of the question, thus the logistics chain ended up being a major ball and chain slow down to offensive operations in the trench lines. No big problem however for defenders.. as they backed up into 2nd lines of defensive trenches they simply got closer to their supplies as well.

In the end... armies basicly had 2 speeds.. foot and rail - if they were to retain any real organization and cohesion. Cavalry could go faster.. but not very far from their logistical support and communications lines.

[Warship NWS]

3) The logistics and firepower of modern weapons were not understood. Lethality had outstripped doctrine on all sides.


On this part I agree.. especially when you add in the aerial recon force multiplier which allowed an army to be at the right place at the right time with the right weapons and prepared killing zones - and then the follow up adjusting of artillery fire and spotted targets - along with the aid of observation balloons. Now you went more from moving mud to actually hitting targets more often.

[JMS]

I think before we start comparing the mobility issue of 1914 we need to realize that the first motor truck was not even built until 1896 by the German company Diamler. I seriously doubt that trucks were very plentiful between their civilian population and the armed forces within a span of 18 years, much less the French (who needed taxis at the Marne) or the British - who had to be transported by sea to even be involved. Heck, the Germans of WW2 didn't even have enough trucks to go around as horse pulled carts at that time were still in wide use in 1939. Another problem.. crossing trenches with anything wheeled during an offensive was pretty much out of the question, thus the logistics chain ended up being a major ball and chain slow down to offensive operations in the trench lines. No big problem however for defenders.. as they backed up into 2nd lines of defensive trenches they simply got closer to their supplies as well.

In the end... armies basicly had 2 speeds.. foot and rail - if they were to retain any real organization and cohesion. Cavalry could go faster.. but not very far from their logistical support and communications lines.

The number was not small, for the British 1.000 trucks and 1914 saw the appearance of the amored car in the Minerva and SAVA, protected using boiler plate. Tactically, armies moved on foot, but the numbers posted by Dennis show that the capabilities went beyond any previous war, and IMO were not fully understood by commanders.

[JMS]

On this part I agree.. especially when you add in the aerial recon force multiplier which allowed an army to be at the right place at the right time with the right weapons and prepared killing zones - and then the follow up adjusting of artillery fire and spotted targets - along with the aid of observation balloons. Now you went more from moving mud to actually hitting targets more often.

Not in 1914.

[Warship NWS]

Not in 1914.

Wrong. One example.. in September of 1914, near Thiaucourt, French artillery were directed to fire at German artillery that were in the process of maneuvering by aerial recon which resulted in destroying half the German artillery corps that was engaged, a feat recognized even by General Joffre. Aerial recon also assisted the Belgians, French, and British forces in their respective defensive and delaying actions by giving them information of German army movements which in turn allowed for the preparation of hasty or prepared defenses -- AKA kill zones.

[Warship NWS]

The number was not small, for the British 1.000 trucks and 1914 saw the appearance of the amored car in the Minerva and SAVA, protected using boiler plate. Tactically, armies moved on foot, but the numbers posted by Dennis show that the capabilities went beyond any previous war, and IMO were not fully understood by commanders.

My main point was that no cohesive army was going faster then the slowest common denominator in speed.. that was the foot soldier, unless you were moving the entire army by train. There were simply not enough trucks for all the troops, supplies, artillery towing, command units, etc..etc..etc.. Trucks in the end supplemented the horses in carrying cargo and towing artillery. Motorized recon units were a new asset but again, you cannot have units going very far from their command and communications especially with the communications available in the early 1900s - which was another ball and chain to the speed of mobility. As an example, aircraft were also used to assist with keeping friendly combat units located and in contact with their HQs which in turn assisted with the reduction of friendly fire incidents.

[Warship NWS]

The number was not small, for the British 1.000 trucks and 1914


The BEF was 75,000 men in strength in 1914.. that would required a minimum of over 4,000 trucks just to move the infantry alone, not including support units, HQs, heavy equipment, etc.. so yes.. 1,000 trucks is nowhere near enough to make them a motorized force... your still moving at foot speed unless your on a train.

[JMS]

So? It's the same I am saying.

I have not claimed that the armies of 1914 were or could be motorised, just that their logistics were affected by motorisation.

[old_pop2000]

Interestingly, a month after Von Moltke took office, LT. Col Groner, head of the railway section of the General Staff concluded that the Schlieffen plan stood little chance of success. Apparently, Von Schlieffen had expected the German Army to live off of the land and Groner had some serious doubts that was possible. Groner clearly saw that horse drawn carts would not be able to keep pace with the army and that it would have to stop, and allow the supply trains to catch up. Schlieffen had also never accounted for destroyed or damaged rail ways. Something that actually did occur in Belgium. Motor transport was the real answer, but Groner understood that sufficient motor transport would require time and much effort to integrate into the German Army.

Von Moltke initiated the first serious study of the logistics of the Schlieffen plan and expressed his opinions that Schlieffen had neglected this aspect entirely. Von Moltke began to stress training in subordinates in the intricacies of transport and supply. Von Moltke always stressed realism and the difficulty of conducting real operations. He also, had serious doubts about the feasibility of the plan. This all speaks to a document designed for mobilization and funding, not operational details. This was the aspect that Von Moltke and the General Staff had to account for.

On the other hand, Von Moltke made his own mistakes in planning. He envisioned that the Dutch would not cooperate but thought two armies could move through the narrow gap between the Dutch frontier and the Ardennes. Had the Maastricht appendix not been bypassed, there is a good chance that the Belgian's would never have escaped from Antwerp to retreat and continue fighting. Von Kluck could have attacked from the NE, instead of creating a congestion at Liege by attacking from the SE. The line from Aix-La-Chapelle would now have to support two armies. This feature of Von Moltke's plan is the very reason the right wing lost troops. The path to take, could not support the number of corps, which now was reduced to 12.

The last area where Schlieffen and Moltke differed was in the area of where the famous turning movement would take place. Moltke decided that it would be Brussels. This would reduce the distance but complicate the marching order of the 1 & 2 armies. However, it reduced the marching distance by over 100 miles. Eventually, it was determined that had they continued to stay on the coast, as Schlieffen had planned, they would have been exhausted long before reaching the Seine River. It was this exhaustion that brought about the halt in the German advance.

In summary, both plans had problems. Schlieffen had neglected the problem of Russia, whose army dwarfed by Austria and Germany's; He had neglected the Alsace-Lorraine issue. He had believed that the two right wing armies could move a distance in a specified time, that was impractical. He had not taken into account international politics, as he would have violated Dutch and Belgian sovereignty in order to gain the two extra double track railroads to provide for the movement of supplies.

Von Moltke, on the other hand, had to deal with these issues. He had to deal with the Russians and the fact that the Italians were not going to occupy the Alsace-Lorraine area as they had indicated to Von Schlieffen. Moltke also had to deal with the Dutch issue. He was forced by these contraints to reduce the right wing and change its path to make the plan workable. But he apparently had little faith in its success. Schlieffen's plan was just a planning document, a table top exercise. Von Moltke and the General Staff had to deal with realities, and modify or design a plan that dealt with those realities.

IMO, neither plan was workable, although the Von Moltke plan almost succeeded. But again, as I have always stated, the opponent always has a say in your plans. Von Moltke's plan was probably the soundest operational plan as it did offer alternatives, accounting for possible enemy actions. It probably came the closest to succeeding.

Note: This is about all I have to say on this subject. I not going to dig up and provide any source documentation. I don't feel the need.

[JMS]

You don't have to, that matches what I have read. IMO the soundest plan was the Kaiser's, march the army to the East and defeat the Russians, but that also had problems, as the German army would have marched into a void. In the end, the biggest flaw was not planning for a long war but rather try to achieve a lightning victory without the means.

[old_pop2000]

You don't have to, that matches what I have read. IMO the soundest plan was the Kaiser's, march the army to the East and defeat the Russians, but that also had problems, as the German army would have marched into a void. In the end, the biggest flaw was not planning for a long war but rather try to achieve a lightning victory without the means.
Rundstedt's advice was the best:

"Make peace, you idiot"

[Warship NWS]

So? It's the same I am saying.

I have not claimed that the armies of 1914 were or could be motorised, just that their logistics were affected by motorisation.

And that means little if your behind the troops that are moving by foot and fighting does it not? You can only advance logistics up to the speed of infantry advances which are mostly on foot when they are not on a train. What motorization DID help with is to reduce the entire dependency on horse and cart and thus added to the ability to move supplies more efficiently as the trucks could haul more per truck then horse and carts.

[Warship NWS]

A noted historian, Martin van Creveld stated this,



That the Army achieved as much as it did, at a time when the standing orders could only be said to have caused no actual harm, is remarkable indeed. Critics of the advance would do well to keep this in mind.

We should take care to note that mistakes were made on both sides and if not for "The Battle of the Marne" and survival of the BEF.. even with all of the problems with the German plans, they did come close to their final objectives. Even the French evacuated the government of France in Paris in fear of the city being lost to the Germans. We need to remember that the Germans had not planned on the BEF being a part of the French defensive operations - for that matter they were put on the northern front in the thought that they would not even take part in the main defensive lines.

I think we need to consider a very plausible alternative scenario.. what if the Belgians had given the right of way to the Germans and retained their neutrality? The French would have been totally on their own at that point.. would they have survived? I think they would have been hard pressed to save Paris, or their country, at that point.

[old_pop2000]

We should take care to note that mistakes were made on both sides and if not for "The Battle of the Marne" and survival of the BEF.. even with all of the problems with the German plans, they did come close to their final objectives. Even the French evacuated the government of France in Paris in fear of the city being lost to the Germans. We need to remember that the Germans had not planned on the BEF being a part of the French defensive operations - for that matter they were put on the northern front in the thought that they would not even take part in the main defensive lines.

I think we need to consider a very plausible alternative scenario.. what if the Belgians had given the right of way to the Germans and retained their neutrality? The French would have been totally on their own at that point.. would they have survived? I think they would have been hard pressed to save Paris, or their country, at that point.

The French could have abandoned Paris, retreating to the Massif Central in Southeastern France and fought in the mountains. This was a fear of the German General Staff and Von Moltke. Twenty six years later, after the Germans had overran Northern France and captured Paris, the French did, in fact, retreat to the southern portion of France-the Massif Central region. Only the fact that the Germans had mobility and fire power along with air superiority, did they finally defeat the French. It was a hard fought campaign. In WWI, it might have been a difficult task especially with the Russians invading Poland, the British blockade and the Italians on the side of the Allies.:D

[JMS]

The French could have abandoned Paris, retreating to the Massif Central in Southeastern France and fought in the mountains. This was a fear of the German General Staff and Von Moltke. Twenty six years later, after the Germans had overran Northern France and captured Paris, the French did, in fact, retreat to the southern portion of France-the Massif Central region. Only the fact that the Germans had mobility and fire power along with air superiority, did they finally defeat the French. It was a hard fought campaign. In WWI, it might have been a difficult task especially with the Russians invading Poland, the British blockade and the Italians on the side of the Allies.:D

Also in WW2 the Germans first defeated the French army in the field (twice) and then went on to take Paris. In WW1 they were unable to decisively engage the allied armies in the field, so taking Paris (not an easy proposition, as shown in 1871) probably wouldn't have decided the war.

[Warship NWS]

I do not think it would be quite that simple for the French. The BEF and 5th Army helped to save the 6th Army from destruction and the 5th Army by itself, had the BEF been knocked out earlier in the German offensive, would not have been enough on its own to stop the German army via The Battle of the Marne. WW2 was an entirely different situation both politicaly and militarily and countries that were not a part of the war in 1914 sided with whoever would have promised them the most and who they thought were winning. Had Paris fallen and the BEF been destroyed Germany could have had a whole new poker hand to play with politicaly and militarily, whether they knocked out the 5th Army completely or not. All they would have had to do is to keep Paris from being recaptured and had the BEF been knocked out that was entirely possible

Yes the German army had its challenges but for the fact that the air recon units were watching their every move, they did not have the transportation capacity planned on, the BEF put up a good delaying action, and the Belgians held up the northern front.. they still did a pretty good job of nearly taking Paris.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

I do not think it would be quite that simple for the French. The BEF and 5th Army helped to save the 6th Army from destruction and the 5th Army by itself, had the BEF been knocked out earlier in the German offensive, would not have been enough on its own to stop the German army via The Battle of the Marne. WW2 was an entirely different situation both politicaly and militarily and countries that were not a part of the war in 1914 sided with whoever would have promised them the most and who they thought were winning. Had Paris fallen and the BEF been destroyed Germany could have had a whole new poker hand to play with politicaly and militarily, whether they knocked out the 5th Army completely or not. All they would have had to do is to keep Paris from being recaptured and had the BEF been knocked out that was entirely possible

Yes the German army had its challenges but for the fact that the air recon units were watching their every move, they did not have the transportation capacity planned on, the BEF put up a good delaying action, and the Belgians held up the northern front.. they still did a pretty good job of nearly taking Paris.

Thanks.
The French had preplanned such a move, it would not be easy, but then the German's were exhausted, the destroyed rail lines had hampered supply movement and reinforcements, the actions on other fronts were increasing. The German's were sensitive to a two front war, the longer the action against the French lasted, the worse the German situation became. This must be kept in perspective. It maybe nice to watch your enemy with aircraft, but if you have no supplies and are exhausted, it really doesn't matter.

[Warship NWS]

The French had preplanned such a move, it would not be easy, but then the German's were exhausted, the destroyed rail lines had hampered supply movement and reinforcements, the actions on other fronts were increasing. The German's were sensitive to a two front war, the longer the action against the French lasted, the worse the German situation became. This must be kept in perspective. It maybe nice to watch your enemy with aircraft, but if you have no supplies and are exhausted, it really doesn't matter.

Actually, the Germans, at least from what I can tell so far, did not really aerial recon the French that much during the initial offensive.. it was the other way around. When the BEF also delayed the Germans to the north that bought the French time to move south and prepare the southern defense near Paris, that being the 6th French Army. The BEF was a major factor in the eventual stopping of the German offensive. I do not doubt that the Germans were nearing the end of their offensive rope but they were putting serious pressure on the 5th French Army which was directly defending Paris and would have defeated them if it had not been for the emergency reinforcements and recon that allowed for 6th Frency and BEF armies to launch their counterattack which completely stopped the German advance cold.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Actually, the Germans, at least from what I can tell so far, did not really aerial recon the French that much during the initial offensive.. it was the other way around. When the BEF also delayed the Germans to the north that bought the French time to move south and prepare the southern defense near Paris, that being the 6th French Army. The BEF was a major factor in the eventual stopping of the German offensive. I do not doubt that the Germans were nearing the end of their offensive rope but they were putting serious pressure on the 5th French Army which was directly defending Paris and would have defeated them if it had not been for the emergency reinforcements and recon that allowed for 6th Frency and BEF armies to launch their counterattack which completely stopped the German advance cold.

Thanks.
Is this thread about the Schlieffen plan or aerial reconnaissance? I thought we left that on the other thread?

[Warship NWS]

Is this thread about the Schlieffen plan or aerial reconnaissance? I thought we left that on the other thread?

If pertaining only to aircraft.. that would be on the other thread. In the case of the Sch. Plan however aircraft played a significant role so they cannot be completely excluded. However, I left this thread open for all grand strategy of WW1 as well including the Balkans and Russians, etc.. which do deserve some discussion as well. When I recieve my aerial recon book sources I will be posting more on the WW1 aircraft thread. I just didn't want the whole aircraft topic to get buried under the grand strategy, political history, and resources of war topics of WW1. ;)

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Von Schlieffen's plan, if there ever was such a plan, was really a planning document for a proposed or possible war on two fronts between Germano-Austrian forces and the Allied forces. It was similar, in its purpose to the our War Plan Orange. A plan that was strictly used for gaining funding and building ships for the Navy. It was never, in its entirety, an operational plan.

Von Schlieffen's original work was a study. This study never placed any troops in eastern Germany to face the Russians. It never developed the logistical planning necessary to make it a viable plan. In point of fact, the study never generated the necessary additional divisions that Von Schlieffen had deemed necessary for it to be a success. The study or plan also never envisioned the Belgium resistance to German movement through their country or the BEF being present opposite the German right wing.

When the German General Staff and Von Molke decided or were forced to develop a formal, operational plan which needed to follow national policy, it was forced to place adequate numbers of troops in the east. It also had to develop the necessary logistical plans to implement any western advance. It also had to deal with the knowledge that the Belgians were not going to allow free access to their country or that the BEF was going to be present. The final piece of the puzzle was the knowledge that the railroad and road networks in the north, were not capable of carrying the necessary troops, reserves or supplies to keep 90% of the German forces required by Von Schlieffen's study. Moltke was forced to reduce the right wing, sending much of the reserves to the east, the rest to the south opposite the French.

When the plan was implemented, the French realized that any attack into Germany was going to be a frontal attack against strong German forces, decided just to sit on the defensive. This was not what the Schlieffen plan had planned for. The right wing move quickly at first, but then ran into the Belgians and the fortress system at Liege and the BEF. The pace of the whole offensive was geared from Von Kluck. It eventually ended up being a linear advance, rather than the left wheel, pivoting off of the center.

No one disobeyed orders. Von Moltke and the German General Staff simply had to face reality, which Von Schlieffen never had to do. The staff had to develop a plan that was operationally possible, not just theoretically possible. They had to develop train schedules, supply movement orders etc. All the necessary details required to build a workable offensive plan that could be executed.

Those are the facts.

Dennis:

While the Schlieffen plan may have not taken the Belgians into consideration, the German General Staff did. They purposely developed some of the largest siege howitzers in anticipation of reducing the fortresses guarding the Belgian frontier. The famous Krupp 16.1 inch gamma howitzer was designed to tackle the most heavily constructed fortifications by use of plunging fire. The Germans also borrowed a few Austro-Hungarian 30 cm howitzers to supplement their siege train.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Rundstedt's advice was the best:

"Make peace, you idiot"

Dennis:

Was that the same Rundstedt from WWII? I imagine it is.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

While the Schlieffen plan may have not taken the Belgians into consideration, the German General Staff did. They purposely developed some of the largest siege howitzers in anticipation of reducing the fortresses guarding the Belgian frontier. The famous Krupp 16.1 inch gamma howitzer was designed to tackle the most heavily constructed fortifications by use of plunging fire. The Germans also borrowed a few Austro-Hungarian 30 cm howitzers to supplement their siege train.
Yes, he said it on the phone with Jodl, at Normandy.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

While the Schlieffen plan may have not taken the Belgians into consideration, the German General Staff did. They purposely developed some of the largest siege howitzers in anticipation of reducing the fortresses guarding the Belgian frontier. The famous Krupp 16.1 inch gamma howitzer was designed to tackle the most heavily constructed fortifications by use of plunging fire. The Germans also borrowed a few Austro-Hungarian 30 cm howitzers to supplement their siege train.
You are talking about the 42 cm Big Bertha's developed by Krupp, of which there were four built. Krupp had been designing and building large siege guns for a decade. These guns were valuable, but not built to destroy Liege, per se.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You are talking about the 42 cm Big Bertha's developed by Krupp, of which there were four built. Krupp had been designing and building large siege guns for a decade. These guns were valuable, but not built to destroy Liege, per se.

Dennis:

No the guns were built to tackle fortifications, no matter whose they were. The Germans liked the performance of the predecessors to Big Bertha so much that Krupp went ahead and built even larger guns based on coastal artillery mortars.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

No the guns were built to tackle fortifications, no matter whose they were. The Germans liked the performance of the predecessors to Big Bertha so much that Krupp went ahead and built even larger guns based on coastal artillery mortars.
I understand, but they were not designed just for Liege, they were designed for any fortification, no matter where it was. Liege was in their sights, but there were other forts.

[old_pop2000]

I've been reading through Sir John French's book "1914" written in 1919. Some interesting comments:


It is easy to be wise after the events; but I cannot help wondering why none of us realized what the most modern rifle, the machine gun, motor traction, the aeroplane and the wire telegraphy would bring about. It seems so simple when judged by the actual results. The modern rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the defense as against the attack. This precludes the use of the old methods of attack, and has driven attack to seek covered entrenchments after every forward rush of at most a few hundred yards.

....The crucial necessity for the effective employment of heavy artillery is observation, and this is provided by the balloon and the aeroplane, which, by means of wireless telegraphy, can keep the batteries instantly informed of the accuracy of their fire.

I feel sure in my own mind that had we realized the true effect of modern appliances of war in August, 1914, there would have been no retreat from Mons, and that if , in September, the Germans had learnt their lesson, the Allies would never have driven them back to the Aisne. I was in the fighting on that river that the eyes of all of us began to be opened.

Now, this is all very comforting to Sir John French, but where was he and his cohorts in the past fifty odd years. In the 1860's, we had the Civil War which introduced the railroad, minie ball and the breech loading rifle along with the repeater. We had the Austro-Prussian War, in 1866, fought with similar weapons including early bolt action rifles. We had the Franco-Prussian War with similar weapons, including machine gun type weapon. In 1890, we had the Spanish-American war fought with Gatlings, and the Mauser 98 bolt action rifle and the Krag-Jorgenson. Between that time and 1914, we had the Boer War fought with machine guns and bolt action rifles along with quick firing guns, The Russo-Japanese War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion and heaven only knows how many other minor conflicts.

Didn't they examine AAR of these actions, have observers on the scene and survey the results of these operations. The aircraft and wireless had been used in 1910 and 1912, only a few years before the war. You mean to tell me, that it took the first few months of the war to finally get them to figure out that they needed some new tactics along with some more mechanization to maintain mobility?

This should give use all, a sense of how far behind the leaders in the field were, in the area of tactics and technology.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I've been reading through Sir John French's book "1914" written in 1919. Some interesting comments:



Now, this is all very comforting to Sir John French, but where was he and his cohorts in the past fifty odd years. In the 1860's, we had the Civil War which introduced the railroad, minie ball and the breech loading rifle along with the repeater. We had the Austro-Prussian War, in 1866, fought with similar weapons including early bolt action rifles. We had the Franco-Prussian War with similar weapons, including machine gun type weapon. In 1890, we had the Spanish-American war fought with Gatlings, and the Mauser 98 bolt action rifle and the Krag-Jorgenson. Between that time and 1914, we had the Boer War fought with machine guns and bolt action rifles along with quick firing guns, The Russo-Japanese War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion and heaven only knows how many other minor conflicts.

Didn't they examine AAR of these actions, have observers on the scene and survey the results of these operations. The aircraft and wireless had been used in 1910 and 1912, only a few years before the war. You mean to tell me, that it took the first few months of the war to finally get them to figure out that they needed some new tactics along with some more mechanization to maintain mobility?

This should give use all, a sense of how far behind the leaders in the field were, in the area of tactics and technology.

Dennis:

I wrote a term paper back in college in a somewhat similar vein, trying to explain why the armies of WWI were so drastically ambushed by technology. It would appear that there was enough evidence of the deadliness of modern weapons so that armies should have either devised new tactics or considered other solutions to the problems of frontal assault.

I think the main culprit was that most of the wars you mention were fought away from Europe proper and were either seen as colonial affairs or aberrations. Europe had been at peace for so long that the impact of a full war was forgotten. The last real fighting in Europe had been the Franco-Prussian war and the lessons learned from that were incorrect to say the least. The Russo-Japanese War should have been an eye opener as it featured just about every aspect of what would occur in WWI. There were foreign observers attached to the various armies (Douglas MacArthur was attached to the Japanese army and was impressed by their courage). The question becomes why wasn't this first hand knowlege more widely diseminated?

It goes back to the fact that militaries are inherently conservative in their outlooks. It takes defeat to cause change. Britain recognized some weaknesses in her doctrine as exposed by the Boer War and made some changes, but Germany had not experienced defeat and so it went out to war fully believing that its army could defeat any opponent. The armies of 1914 were so stunned by the events that transpired, that they had no time to make modifications to established tactical doctrine. Each succeeding year was pretty much a repetion on the last, at least on the Western Front. Incremental changes were occurring, but it is not until 1918 that it comes together and we see mobility return to the battlefield.

[old_pop2000]

For those of you who like and need good maps, here is a link to the index for the West Point index to their WW1 maps.

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/WorldWarOne/index.htm

[Campy]

For those of you who like and need good maps, here is a link to the index for the West Point index to their WW1 maps.

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/WorldWarOne/index.htm

If you check out map 3, you will note, that had the French maintained their original battle plan, the Germans would have fallen on their rear, and encircled their main armies. Taking Paris could have come later. Fortunately, the French caught on quickly, and backpedaled out of the trap. To bad they failed to do so in 1940.

Frank

[old_pop2000]

If you check out map 3, you will note, that had the French maintained their original battle plan, the Germans would have fallen on their rear, and encircled their main armies. Taking Paris could have come later. Fortunately, the French caught on quickly, and backpedaled out of the trap. To bad they failed to do so in 1940.

Frank
That was how Schlieffen had it gamed. Unfortunately, as planned, it was not executable. Von Moltke had to make changes to make the plan workable, that included protecting Alsace-Lorraine and the Ruhr. That made the center stronger, stopping the French. As we always say, no plan survives the first shot.

[old_pop2000]

As I have been researching this issue of Schlieffen and Von Moltke, Fuller states that after leaving the army, he actually changed his plan and the last one, the 1912 version, resembled the Von Moltke plan. He rationalized this based on the knowledge of the aggressive French Plan XVII. The plan, as of 1912, was, as Fuller states, a German phalanx. As I stated early in this thread, the resultant plan of 1914 was a linear offensive, equally strong everywhere, overwhelmingly strong nowhere. I believe that this coupled with the mistake by the German's in Alsace-Lorraine in attacking instead of retreating, doomed the Von Moltke plan.

Fuller also states that he believed the original plan was based on Leuthen, not Cannae but I would disagree. Cannae was a battle of annihilation, this was always the basis for Schlieffen and the General Staff. It was also his mentors-Von Moltke the elder. While Leuthen was decisive, it was not a battle of annihilation although very close.