WW1 aircraft.. strategic weapons of war?

[Warship NWS]

WW1 aircraft.. strategic weapons of war? What do you think?

Open ended discussion.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

WW1 aircraft.. strategic weapons of war? What do you think?

Open ended discussion.

Thanks.

Chris:

How do you define strategic in this time period?;)

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

How do you define strategic in this time period?;)

Take your pick.. its an open discussion.

[asnrobert]

I would not consider the airplane to be a strategic weapon of war in WW1. They were certainly a tactical weapon of war, being used for artillery spotting, reconaissance, etc, but they did nothing to alter the stalemate of trench warfare (like the tank, it was still too new and the military leaders didn't know how to use it to its potential) or the overall course of the war. Even attempts to use the airplane strategically (like the German bomber and zeppelin raids on London) were only an inkling of the potential of the airplane.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would not consider the airplane to be a strategic weapon of war in WW1. They were certainly a tactical weapon of war, being used for artillery spotting, reconaissance, etc, but they did nothing to alter the stalemate of trench warfare (like the tank, it was still too new and the military leaders didn't know how to use it to its potential) or the overall course of the war. Even attempts to use the airplane strategically (like the German bomber and zeppelin raids on London) were only an inkling of the potential of the airplane.

Robert:

I would say that by 1918, the airplane had begun to achieve a level of strategic importance in the overall conduct of the war. Not as major as in WWII, but aerial superiority was deemed necessary for any attempted ground offensive. The Allies certainly placed great store in the reconaissance role of aircraft to help them achieve breakthroughs. Also the navies were beginning to see just how vital the long range scouting abilities of aircraft were. The fact that the Brits would attempt to take out the Zeppelin hangers at Cuxhaven speaks volumes for the effectiveness of these craft. If you look at the more fluid pace of the war in 1918, you will see that aircraft were a vital part of this shift from stalmate to maneuver.

[Warship NWS]

I would not consider the airplane to be a strategic weapon of war in WW1.


I would beg to differ, personaly, I consider the airplane the most important strategic weapon of the war. However, I will explain my position regarding this topic after more of you have had a chance to voice your opinions.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

In warfare, throughout history, what has been the most important commodity? It is the one commodity, a commander must have for planning his strategy and deploying his forces.

;);)

[djcyclone]

In warfare, throughout history, what has been the most important commodity? It is the one commodity, a commander must have for planning his strategy and deploying his forces.

;);)



Inteligence on the position of enemy troops. If you do not know where the enemy is, then you cannot plan to go to war. You have to have a rough idea as to where you will first deploy your troops, how many troops you need in certain locations. After you have all of this, you start planning the logistics of how to get supply to the troops that you deployed.

[old_pop2000]

Inteligence on the position of enemy troops. If you do not know where the enemy is, then you cannot plan to go to war. You have to have a rough idea as to where you will first deploy your troops, how many troops you need in certain locations. After you have all of this, you start planning the logistics of how to get supply to the troops that you deployed.
Intelligence on the position of enemy troops is one bit of information. But information is the key. Timely information is better. Timely information on position, strength, direction of movement, supplies is important. But what about strategic information? How does that fit into our requirement for planning and deployment? How does the aircraft in WWI fit into this need for timely information? Why was the pursuit plane or scout, developed?

[Warship NWS]

The first forces into battle since man started fighting wars has been the "scouts" thus the reason why airplanes were called "scouts". Scouts had one primary function.. information and TIMING.

The 4th dimension and of warfare - reduce your FOW while increasing the FOW upon your enemy. This is the reason why aircraft went through a multiple generation development cycle - more so then any other weapon in war. The side who could gain control of the skies effectively blinded their opponent. Air superiority meant you could kill observation balloons at will, you could fly behind the enemy lines to find force concentrations and to monitor logistical operations, map out enemy positions for bombardment - including counter battery fire, obtain intelligence within hours covering a wide area of the battlefield - far more so then any other possible means, etc. One example is that bombardments were not nearly as effective if enemy concentrations were not fixed and located in a timely manner - otherwise you just end up moving mud. It is very important to remember that not ALL important targets were in the trenches and not all forces, much less logistics units, stayed in trenches 24 hours a day. Artillery and aerial bombardment were MUCH more effective if they could catch units on open ground and that required explicit timing.

The airplane was by far the most important weapon of WW1 and contributed to battlefield operations more then any other weapon ever developed or deployed during the war. A battlefield commander cannot fight a war without intel and nothing was more valuable then the airplane for gathering intel within effectively useful timing of information.

[Kyle Holgate]

I know it's dealving into the "what if" realm - but would WW1 with NO airplanes have really come out any differently? Germany had air superiority over at least some of the front for quite some time and wasn't able to make enough use of it to crack the trenches. In contrast the Allies in 1918 gained air superiority and did manage to make a crack IMO mostly due to increased fresh forces and supplies, tanks, a largely tired out and starved Germany and some new thinking on how to exploit breakthroughs. I'm far from convinced that the Airplane - if completely gone from the skies, would have made any difference. To be sure they did all the things previously mentioned but their contribution at least as it was historically did very little as far as impact to the way the war ended up.

[old_pop2000]

I know it's dealving into the "what if" realm - but would WW1 with NO airplanes have really come out any differently? Germany had air superiority over at least some of the front for quite some time and wasn't able to make enough use of it to crack the trenches. In contrast the Allies in 1918 gained air superiority and did manage to make a crack IMO mostly due to increased fresh forces and supplies, tanks, a largely tired out and starved Germany and some new thinking on how to exploit breakthroughs. I'm far from convinced that the Airplane - if completely gone from the skies, would have made any difference. To be sure they did all the things previously mentioned but their contribution at least as it was historically did very little as far as impact to the way the war ended up.
I believe that the airplane had the most important and dramatic effect after 1915. That is not to say, that it did not have an effect earlier with the reconnaissance, but after 1915, is when most commander's began to look at the aircraft as a third dimension on the battlefield. In that situation, up to 1915, not much was going to change. After that, without the airplane, only dirigibles and balloons would have been available and they could have provided the same information, but not necessarily as timely. The dirigible's were only ineffective due to the presence of the airplane, without them, the German lead in dirigibles could have been a great advantage.

[Kyle Holgate]

I believe that the airplane had the most important and dramatic effect after 1915. That is not to say, that it did not have an effect earlier with the reconnaissance, but after 1915, is when most commander's began to look at the aircraft as a third dimension on the battlefield. In that situation, up to 1915, not much was going to change. After that, without the airplane, only dirigibles and balloons would have been available and they could have provided the same information, but not necessarily as timely. The dirigible's were only ineffective due to the presence of the airplane, without them, the German lead in dirigibles could have been a great advantage.

To be sure I am clear - I am not suggesting that the airplane had no effect on the war. Certainly the scouting they did was useful and greatly improved how accuracy with artillery and what not.

Did it have a strategic impact on a large scale though - which to me means did the presence of the airplane make a major difference? I don't see it if it did. The large battles (Somme, etc) were stalemates for the most part as the main factor in how they were fought was the ability for the enemy to move forces by train and what not to the point where they were needed. Transportation of troops and supplies in my mind was probably the most important real change in the war.

Both sides - Allies and the Germans had fairly long periods of time when they had air superiority and little of really value occurred. It was only at the very end, with a dead tired Germany - starving population, broken and low morale army (and of course public) and the prospects of the Americans and all their fresh troops and supplies that impressed on the Germans that they had to quit.

[Warship NWS]

The ability to exploit information is a side effect of recon efforts but nothing could be done effectively without recon efforts. What made the airplane strategic is that if one side had eyes in the skies and the other side did not the side that did had a critical advantage.. not just when and where to fire artillery but also knowing when and where to deploy ground units, when the enemy was moving material and supplies, etc.. Imagine playing chess and all you can see is the pawns of the enemy .. only the units that you can see from balloons and forward units while your enemy can see all of your pieces on the board.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

The ability to exploit information is a side effect of recon efforts but nothing could be done effectively without recon efforts. What made the airplane strategic is that if one side had eyes in the skies and the other side did not the side that did had a critical advantage.. not just when and where to fire artillery but also knowing when and where to deploy ground units, when the enemy was moving material and supplies, etc.. Imagine playing chess and all you can see is the pawns of the enemy .. only the units that you can see from balloons and forward units while your enemy can see all of your pieces on the board.

Thanks.

I see no evidence that it really provided any critical advantage. Both sides had air superiority at one time or another and it helped them relatively little based on the progress of ground combat. Did it help, certainly. Was it vital and greatly impacted the overal war? No. From that I see the WW1 aircraft as having little to no strategic influence.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The ability to exploit information is a side effect of recon efforts but nothing could be done effectively without recon efforts. What made the airplane strategic is that if one side had eyes in the skies and the other side did not the side that did had a critical advantage.. not just when and where to fire artillery but also knowing when and where to deploy ground units, when the enemy was moving material and supplies, etc.. Imagine playing chess and all you can see is the pawns of the enemy .. only the units that you can see from balloons and forward units while your enemy can see all of your pieces on the board.

Thanks.

Chris:

I have to agree with Kyle here. You are granting far too much influence to aircraft in this era. I have not seen any battle where aerial superiority could have made a difference. Did it help? Yes, but was it vital. not from anything I've read.

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

I have to agree with Kyle here. You are granting far too much influence to aircraft in this era. I have not seen any battle where aerial superiority could have made a difference. Did it help? Yes, but was it vital. not from anything I've read.
So, if someone was interested in providing convincing information that could show that the aircraft probably had more strategic value than is apparent, what would it take?


So, if someone was interested in providing convincing information that could show that the aircraft probably had more strategic value than is apparent, what would it take?

I am not one of those people, but if there was someone out there, what information is a game winner for all of you? What do you need to see, to convince you that the aircraft, at least after 1916, was a strategic and a tactically valuable weapon system? You see, I don't personally believe any evidence would prove the case to any of you. So, I am not going to waste my time.

I reiterate, information is one of the most valuable commodity's in warfare. Timely information is even more valuable. The aircraft, over time, proved to the commanders that it could provide that timely tactical and strategical information, that could mean the difference between winning a battle or losing, between a successful operation or a failed one. However, information is only valuable if you can take advantage of it, in a timely manner. So, while the aircraft did provide timely information, the land systems in place, in the Great War, were not able, until the advent of storm tactics and the tank, to take advantage of the timely information that the aircraft could provide. Land armies were unable to move resources to another area of the front and exploit any advantage the aircraft's timely information could provide. Does this negate the importance of the aircraft? No, it simply shows the glaring weaknesses in the land armies of the time.

Consider this, the aircraft's performance in the war, was hampered by the poor leadership in command of all armies and archaic land systems currently being used in the war. Had the land systems and commanders been more flexible and mobile, possibly the information provided by the Eyes in the Air, would have been more useful.

[djcyclone]

I think you just hit it on the head right there. Its not that the airplane was not capable of being a strategic weapon, its the fact that the commanders and other big wigs of the time where too damn hard headed to make effective use of it.

Everyone in that war was so stuck on the tactics and weapons of the GENTLMANS WAR ERA, that they could not see the true potential of everything they had. I have seen a live video of British troops making a calvery charge during the WW I. They where hit by an artillery round (tough luck I guess), but it is just the idea of calvery still being used when it is clear they where out dated. Another example of this is the rule of Submarines having too surface and warn the targeted ship that they intend too shoot it. What kind of non sense is that? Then you go to the Trenches, and that is a whole other story. War is War, and as they say "all is fair in Love and War." War is not meant to be pleasent and pretty, but War by its vary nature is chaotic and bloody. The side who has suprise on their side always has the advantage even if they are out numbered.

I think the airplane was fully capable of being more than it was, but as others have pointed out, both sides had significant time frames in which they controlled the skies, and when they did nothing changed. It was simply bragging rights.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I have to agree with Kyle here. You are granting far too much influence to aircraft in this era. I have not seen any battle where aerial superiority could have made a difference. Did it help? Yes, but was it vital. not from anything I've read.

Tell me this then.. where else do you get in depth details of enemy movements and positions that are accurate and timely enough to be of any strategic use? What, so only casualties on the battlefield wins wars? Has anyone stopped to consider that some battles did NOT take place due to LACK of intel caused by lack of air superiority or that some level of effectiveness in terms of defenses would not be possible without knowing where the enemy might attack? How do you plan a major offensive without detailed information about where the enemy defenses are, their lines of communications, reinforcement locations that could result in a counter-attack, troop and artillery positions and concentrations, etc??

Sorry everyone.. observation balloons are only good out to a certain visibility range at best especially considering the optics quality of WW1 industry - and they were extremely vulnerable.. to the airplane. If you tried to gain valuable intel in the trenches you were likely to be picked off by snipers with nothing better to do.

There was NOT ONE asset during WW1 that could give on time and accurate intel as good as the airplane. Everyone knew it.. otherwise why go through nearly 5-6 generations of new aircraft that squeezed out every single ounce of performance just to gain even the slightest edge in air combat? If planes didn't mean squat in the overall strategic scheme of the multi-dimensional battlefield then did all those thousands of pilots, especially observiation pilots/gunners, die in vain? Name ONE day that observation planes were not flying at some point somewhere over the battlefield. I can name MANY days that not a single "battleship" sailed yet some believe they had a "strategic" use in WW1 - yet they ended up being little more then inactive port display rust buckets while firing a few shots in anger that in turn accomplished nearly nothing and they virtually never contributed to any level of battlefield intel at sea.

The last thing you wanted as a battlefield commander during WW1 was some silly plane flying overhead telling the enemy every little thing you were doing. Any movements, buildups, maneuvers, artillery planning, logitics operations, etc.. could be reported efficiently by only one war time asset.. the airplane. NOTHING else compared. If that is not strategic in its use then I do not know what is.

Strategy does NOT occur without information and that requires effective, efficient, and timely intel.. the airplane was the utlimate WW1 satellite/recon asset.. period.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I think the airplane was fully capable of being more than it was, but as others have pointed out, both sides had significant time frames in which they controlled the skies, and when they did nothing changed. It was simply bragging rights.


Bragging rights?

"By early April (1916), the air fighting over Verdun had all but driven the German Air Service from the skies. The Nieuport escadrilles had carried out Petain's desperate February order to win command of the air. Now, the German army below was blind, its reconnaissance and observation planes were shot out of the sky. No longer would the artillery fire be nearly as effective as it was at the outset of the battle. As this happened, both sides realized the importance of air fighting and renewed their efforts to take or maintain air superiority. The struggle took on a desperate intensity."

I personaly think air superiority meant a lot more then just "bragging rights" otherwise thousands of recon pilots/observers lost their lives for nothing.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Bragging rights?

"By early April (1916), the air fighting over Verdun had all but driven the German Air Service from the skies. The Nieuport escadrilles had carried out Petain's desperate February order to win command of the air. Now, the German army below was blind, its reconnaissance and observation planes were shot out of the sky. No longer would the artillery fire be nearly as effective as it was at the outset of the battle. As this happened, both sides realized the importance of air fighting and renewed their efforts to take or maintain air superiority. The struggle took on a desperate intensity."

I personaly think air superiority meant a lot more then just "bragging rights" otherwise thousands of recon pilots/observers lost their lives for nothing.

Thanks.
It was more than bragging rights. The commander's and their land systems just could not react fast enough to take advantage of the airplanes ability to provide up to date, timely information. While they appreciated the value of the information and attempt to react to it, the systems in place simply were not able to perform that quickly. In war, timing is everything. Holes in lines close quickly, far too quick to be exploited.

[Warship NWS]

Some notes about WW1 observation balloons; although balloons did prove valuable throughout WW1 for artillery spotting and observations of enemy units they were obviously static and required heavy protection from fighter attack. Their observers could reportedly spot out to "40" miles [according to one source] but I would personally figure 20 miles at most for possible spotting and 10 miles at most for reliable accuracy - height in itself does not equate into better optical equipment or improved visual identification. Balloons usually operated at 1,000 to 4,000 feet altitude. There is a catch here however.. operating a balloon at higher altitude would possibly put it in greater jeopardy as they had to be wenched down to the ground to avoid being destroyed.. the higher up the longer it took to lower it. Also, the higher up the balloon is the less effective the flak AA, especially MGs, will be. Another problem was that you had to place balloons behind your own lines by several hundreds of yards thus reducing their effective observation range, this was done to avoid enemy ground fire. The observers had piss poor parachutes at best and in many cases did not survive an emergency jump. End result, it was very dangerous work when airplanes got into the game of war.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

It was more than bragging rights. The commander's and their land systems just could not react fast enough to take advantage of the airplanes ability to provide up to date, timely information. While they appreciated the value of the information and attempt to react to it, the systems in place simply were not able to perform that quickly. In war, timing is everything. Holes in lines close quickly, far too quick to be exploited.


This is true to a point, mostly due to lack of mechanized mobile offensive warfare. However, artillery could be put on call and fired once the airplane dropped its information to the forward HQ thus increasing the effectiveness of artillery barrages vs specificly mapped or non-static targets. Knowing where and when a possible attack would come from, one could not defend their entire front line at all times or having some idea of the enemy defenses before planning an attack or just before launching an attack could also prove valuable. Timing of rapid exploitation came about with the advent of mechanized warfare which was first put to good use with tanks during WW1, more so with light tanks then heavy tanks due to their speed, better reliability, and maneuverability.

[Warship NWS]

A further note about obervation balloons.. if one is to believe that balloons were critical to intel and target spotting then one could just as easily believe that the airplane was of strategic use as they were used to shoot down or defend observation balloons. The airplane was also the most effective weapon in both of these roles.

[JMS]

I was about to post yesterday but something cropped up and didn't have time.

To answer the question, clearly no. In contrast to U boats, planes did not impact strategy to the point of having decisions on their use hinge on the highest level of command.

Tactical recon was all well and good and most of the fight in the air was centered in the fight for such information, but there were ready counters like camouflage and movement at night that were able to overcome the limitations imposed under air observation.

Until air photography appeared, all reconaissance was made visually by pilots and observers, with less accuracy than a photograph, but even with air photos there were limitations regarding the resolution of the cameras and the time needed to develop the film, so the value of the information was seriously degraded by the time it reached the commanders who could act on it, being useful mainly for slow, methodical offensive to complete the picture of what lay beyond the first line.

On top of that, aerial navigation was practically non-existant so even spotting something did not guarantee it was where the airedales said it was.

On a strategical level, the Zeppelin/Gotha campaign and the Independent Force were too feeble to have any impact, even though the Zeppelin provoked a massive over-reaction.

War at sea was only started to be impacted by air power in 1918 in the fight against submarines, but that battle would have been won even without planes.

In sum, in WW1 the plane was too inmature to become the strategic weapon it became in WW2.

[Warship NWS]

JMS, there were challenges to aerial recon but aircraft were absolutely strategic in importance - and their is definitive evidence to support my stance. As early as August 1914 the BEF saved 100,000 men from being captured or destroyed by German forces preparing to surround their positions due to aerial recon. Paris was saved by the First Battle of the Marne in September of 1914 due to aerial recon which was supported by General Gallieni - if that was not strategically important then what is? By 1915 photography of the front due to aerial recon contributed to the Battle of Neuve-Chappelle in 1915. By 1915 German and British recon aircraft were taking enough photographs of the front to allow for entire battlemaps of the front to be drawn up on an almost daily basis. By the end of the war nearly 500,000 photos of the front by the English pilots alone were used for the war.

Photography and telegraphy were applied and proved invaluable in the air and as photography improved it had a resolution high enough by the end of the war to see footprints on the ground when "blown up" even from a photographed altitude of 15,000 feet.

As early as 1914 aerial recon had already proven itself and I have no doubt whatsoever that aerial recon likely saved hundreds of thousands of lives by allowing generals to decide on when or where to attack or defend. Just because the weapons on the ground did not always allow for strategic breakthroughs does not discredit the aerial recon importance for information gathering by any means. Even with some inaccuracies there is still something to be said for an airplane flying over your forces telling the enemy what is going on and if your flying enough of them you can counteract some inaccuracies through multiple and continuous reporting. If your going to knock recon aircraft of WW1 then you should do the same with WW2 which was faced with very similar challenges of navigational errors (no one had GPS and maps were far from perfect), incorrect reports (camouflage had improved greatly by then), and night movements (which you can only cover up for 8-12 of the 24 hours of a day and greatly restricts your movements and increases attrition and fatigue rates of your forces - so was this a strategic side effect of aerial recon?), yet it still proved invaluable to the war effort. WW2 aerial recon was improved with technology by WW2 but again we are only talking 20+ years difference from 1918 and 1939 and the only significant upgrades were improved aircraft performance, minor improvements in avionics gear, better photography, and the addition of more communications gear.

If observation balloons were of ANY strategic importance during WW1 (much less prior wars), and EVERYONE used them, then how can anyone believe that aircraft were not?

[Ed Rotondaro]

JMS, there were challenges to aerial recon but aircraft were absolutely strategic in importance - and their is definitive evidence to support my stance. As early as August 1914 the BEF saved 100,000 men from being captured or destroyed by German forces preparing to surround their positions due to aerial recon. Paris was saved by the First Battle of the Marne in September of 1914 due to aerial recon which was supported by General Gallieni - if that was not strategically important then what is? By 1915 photography of the front due to aerial recon contributed to the Battle of Neuve-Chappelle in 1915. By 1915 German and British recon aircraft were taking enough photographs of the front to allow for entire battlemaps of the front to be drawn up on an almost daily basis. By the end of the war nearly 500,000 photos of the front by the English pilots alone were used for the war.

Photography and telegraphy were applied and proved invaluable in the air and as photography improved it had a resolution high enough by the end of the war to see footprints on the ground when "blown up" even from a photographed altitude of 15,000 feet.

As early as 1914 aerial recon had already proven itself and I have no doubt whatsoever that aerial recon likely saved hundreds of thousands of lives by allowing generals to decide on when or where to attack or defend. Just because the weapons on the ground did not always allow for strategic breakthroughs does not discredit the aerial recon importance for information gathering by any means. Even with some inaccuracies there is still something to be said for an airplane flying over your forces telling the enemy what is going on and if your flying enough of them you can counteract some inaccuracies through multiple and continuous reporting. If your going to knock recon aircraft of WW1 then you should do the same with WW2 which was faced with very similar challenges of navigational errors (no one had GPS and maps were far from perfect), incorrect reports (camouflage had improved greatly by then), and night movements (which you can only cover up for 8-12 of the 24 hours of a day and greatly restricts your movements and increases attrition and fatigue rates of your forces - so was this a strategic side effect of aerial recon?), yet it still proved invaluable to the war effort. WW2 aerial recon was improved with technology by WW2 but again we are only talking 20+ years difference from 1918 and 1939 and the only significant upgrades were improved aircraft performance, minor improvements in avionics gear, better photography, and the addition of more communications gear.

If observation balloons were of ANY strategic importance during WW1 (much less prior wars), and EVERYONE used them, then how can anyone believe that aircraft were not?

Chris:

I'll accept that the recon intel obtained by aircraft and balloons was useful to the generals, but it may have been a combination of rigid thinking or timing which prevented the intel from affecting the strategic situation to any great degree. The front lines really didn't shift until the US entered the war and even it was not until the failure of the German offensive in 1918 (Kaiserslacht) that the Allies could take advantage of the German's weakening front with fresh troops.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I'll accept that the recon intel obtained by aircraft and balloons was useful to the generals, but it may have been a combination of rigid thinking or timing which prevented the intel from affecting the strategic situation to any great degree. The front lines really didn't shift until the US entered the war and even it was not until the failure of the German offensive in 1918 (Kaiserslacht) that the Allies could take advantage of the German's weakening front with fresh troops.

So .. for the aircraft to be strategically important the only guage is how much the trenches shifted? How do you blame the airplane for the canceling out of each others abilities on the battlefield due to lack of mechanization? What would have happened if the airplane recon abilities were not involved at all? Personally, I think the losses would have been far greater as both sides would have had far less intel to base their decisions on and would have likely thrown more men into harms way based on far less accurate information - for that matter, the Germans may well have won WW1 by 1914 -- remember, the airplane saved Paris through intel gathering of German operations. If scouting enemy positions was an important, and very much so strategic, feature of warfare since man started beating each other over the heads with clubs how would the ability to gain intel faster and from a better vantage point not be strategically significant in how a war was fought in the industrialized age? If the airplane was not significant then how can anyone believe the balloon was?

This point of view, no offense, just proves to me that historians have underrated the often forgotten realm of warfare, that being FOW, only because people were not directly killed by those without guns much like merchants were considered by many historians less important then big fancy battleships - when in reality it was the other way around, battleships would not have existed if merchants did not exist, especially when you need merchants to even build the damned battleships.

If you don't get the glory of the battlefield.. then hell your useless in many historians eyes. One of the most strategic assets of any war was to inflict more FOW on your enemy then he can inflict on you.. it is by far the most misunderstood and underrated aspect of warfare due to its lack of "glory". That is why most historians flat out ignore, or barely describe, the 4th dimension of warfare.. intel gathering and communications, and with the historical considerations of WW1, this is especially true.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

I have enclosed two photos. One shows an observer using a camera. The other is a resulting photo taken from such a camera by an observer. Both photos are from WWI. They illustrate that aerial photography was available and used.

[Warship NWS]

Tell me someone will get this good of damage assessment and targeting of artillery without aircraft;

http://members.chello.nl/~a.vankan/aerial_photo_%20effect_of_heavy_shelling.jpg

[old_pop2000]

Some interesting figures and facts about the aircaft both before and during The Great War.

1. The Italians used German built aircraft in 1911 to drop grenades on Turkish troops.

2. France started the war with 140 aircraft, ended with 4500.

3. France built 68,000 aircraft and lost 55,000 for a 77% loss rate

4. Speeds went from around 116 mph up to over 138 mph for the SE-5A scout.

5. Tractor design replaced the Wright pusher principle due to its superior performance.

6. General John French acknowledged that without the timely information provided by the RFC, Von Kluck's army would have succeeded in encircling his forces at Mons.

7. Shortly after, at the crucial First Battle of the Marne, General Joseph-Simon Gallieni used information provided by the French Armee de l'Air to send troops to the exposed German flank.

8. On the Eastern Front, both the Russians and the Germans were flying reconnaissance missions. In the prelude to the Battle of Tannenberg, General Alexander Samsonov was to tragically ignore warnings provided by his pilots. Field Marshal von Hindenburg did not. Almost all of Samsonov's army was either killed or captured. Samsonov committed suicide. After the stupendous German victory von Hindenburg acknowledged that "without airmen there would have been no Tannenberg

9 Artillery observation became so important that part of Falkenhayn's strategy at Verdun was to blind the French artillery by knocking out their observation planes and balloons

10. The British used four wireless equipped Henri Farman and Caudron G3's to hunt in Africa for the Konigsberg. Later, they contracted for a Curtis Flying boat.

11. Most of the Red Baron's eighty victories were scored against observation and reconnaissance aircraft.

Hope this helps in the understanding of the strategic value of the aircraft.

[JMS]

Sure but,


Some interesting figures and facts about the aircaft both before and during The Great War.

6. General John French acknowledged that without the timely information provided by the RFC, Von Kluck's army would have succeeded in encircling his forces at Mons.

7. Shortly after, at the crucial First Battle of the Marne, General Joseph-Simon Gallieni used information provided by the French Armee de l'Air to send troops to the exposed German flank.

8. On the Eastern Front, both the Russians and the Germans were flying reconnaissance missions. In the prelude to the Battle of Tannenberg, General Alexander Samsonov was to tragically ignore warnings provided by his pilots. Field Marshal von Hindenburg did not. Almost all of Samsonov's army was either killed or captured. Samsonov committed suicide. After the stupendous German victory von Hindenburg acknowledged that "without airmen there would have been no Tannenberg

9 Artillery observation became so important that part of Falkenhayn's strategy at Verdun was to blind the French artillery by knocking out their observation planes and balloons

10. The British used four wireless equipped Henri Farman and Caudron G3's to hunt in Africa for the Konigsberg. Later, they contracted for a Curtis Flying boat.



All of them are tactical results and the destruction of Königsberg was an irrelevant sideshow, while all other facts are hardly relevant to the strategy of the war. Now, cavalry could have achieved the same results and no battle in the war would have changed its results substantially if aircraft were grounded. The same could not be said of the submarine or the tank, the first brought the US into the war and the second allowed the war to end with an allied victory.

[Warship NWS]

Here is an undeniable fact about aircraft.. there was no better way to patrol the seas, to monitor various naval activities in and out of port, to monitor supply and combat unit movements beyond the range of the trench lines, to monitor occupied towns and cities, to prepare for counter-artillery battery fire or long range battery fire vs rear echellon targets, or to prepare of offensive or defensive operations then the use of the airplane.. nothing else compared to them, not one asset.. not spies, not static short visibility balloons, nothing. They were the eyes of God on the battlefied and the nations that did not respect them suffered for it.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Sure but,

All of them are tactical results and the destruction of Königsberg was an irrelevant sideshow, while all other facts are hardly relevant to the strategy of the war. Now, cavalry could have achieved the same results and no battle in the war would have changed its results substantially if aircraft were grounded. The same could not be said of the submarine or the tank, the first brought the US into the war and the second allowed the war to end with an allied victory.

The USA would have likely entered the war at some point regardless of the submarine IMHO, in all sense of the word we were already involved by supplying the tools, materials, food, and munitions of war. Just because your not firing bullets does not mean your not contributing to the ones who are firing the bullets if your the ones giving them the food and rifles to fire them.

The tanks would have likely NEVER have gotten involved if aircraft were not already helping with recon of the battlefield. You HAD to know where the tanks were going to go and where the defenses/terrain was that could destroy them. Tanks were also nothing to the Germans in comparison to the merchantile economic blockade of their industry which the airplane did contribute to... and the tanks did not. End result.. tanks were not even in the same ballpark of strategic influence as the airplane.

The ultimate counter to the submarine was aerial recon as was proven during WW1 and especially during WW2. That automatically puts them on the strategic map of naval operations. Add to this, the countering of the Zeppelins by aircraft thus negating them from operating in the naval theater as effectively.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

So .. for the aircraft to be strategically important the only guage is how much the trenches shifted? How do you blame the airplane for the canceling out of each others abilities on the battlefield due to lack of mechanization? What would have happened if the airplane recon abilities were not involved at all? Personally, I think the losses would have been far greater as both sides would have had far less intel to base their decisions on and would have likely thrown more men into harms way based on far less accurate information - for that matter, the Germans may well have won WW1 by 1914 -- remember, the airplane saved Paris through intel gathering of German operations. If scouting enemy positions was an important, and very much so strategic, feature of warfare since man started beating each other over the heads with clubs how would the ability to gain intel faster and from a better vantage point not be strategically significant in how a war was fought in the industrialized age? If the airplane was not significant then how can anyone believe the balloon was?

This point of view, no offense, just proves to me that historians have underrated the often forgotten realm of warfare, that being FOW, only because people were not directly killed by those without guns much like merchants were considered by many historians less important then big fancy battleships - when in reality it was the other way around, battleships would not have existed if merchants did not exist, especially when you need merchants to even build the damned battleships.

If you don't get the glory of the battlefield.. then hell your useless in many historians eyes. One of the most strategic assets of any war was to inflict more FOW on your enemy then he can inflict on you.. it is by far the most misunderstood and underrated aspect of warfare due to its lack of "glory". That is why most historians flat out ignore, or barely describe, the 4th dimension of warfare.. intel gathering and communications, and with the historical considerations of WW1, this is especially true.

Thanks.

Chris:

My point is for all the observation performed by aircraft and for all the intelligence gathered, the ground war pretty much stayed the same for four long years. Even tanks couldn't really break the stranglehold of the trenches. That took several developments in terms of infantry combat mainly being the development of infiltration tactics, the development of light weight machine guns and mortars to directly support the infantry attack. Both sides were revising their doctrines and its shows in 1918. Would the ground war have been bloody without the use of aircraft? Possibly, but they certainly didn't make much of an impact at the Somme or elsewhere. How do you measure the success of a weapon system on the course of a war? Is it ground captured? Is it targets destroyed? What you can take away from the aerial war in WWI was the potential was demonstrated and in the inter-war period, all nations began building up their air forces because as the technology improved, so did the capabilities of the airplane in combat.

The point is during WWI, you don't see aircraft making it impossible for an army to move its troops as you did in WWII. You don't see deep interdiction raids or true strategic bombing due to the limitations of the early aircraft. Few had the range or the payload to effectively bomb targets deep inside enemy lines. Only the Zeppelins and a few multi-engined bombers could do that and their record is mixed at best.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Here is an undeniable fact about aircraft.. there was no better way to patrol the seas, to monitor various naval activities in and out of port, to monitor supply and combat unit movements beyond the range of the trench lines, to monitor occupied towns and cities, to prepare for counter-artillery battery fire or long range battery fire vs rear echellon targets, or to prepare of offensive or defensive operations then the use of the airplane.. nothing else compared to them, not one asset.. not spies, not static short visibility balloons, nothing. They were the eyes of God on the battlefied and the nations that did not respect them suffered for it.

Thanks.

Chris:

I happen to agree that the navies seemed to get the value of the airplane sooner. Especially for reconaissance. Admiral Scheer was counting on Zeppelins to locate the British Grand Fleet for him at Jutland.

[old_pop2000]

Obviously, we have differences in the definition of terms:


Strategic Air Warfare -Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems

Tactical Warfare - Of, relating to, used in, or involving military or naval operations that are smaller, closer to base, and of less long-term significance than strategic operations.

Since WWII, a new definition has cropped into our vernacular: operational - Much of what was defined in WW1 was in the area of strategic warfare, has been included into operational. There is a gray area in WWI between tactical and strategical air warfare. Some observation and reconnaissance flights were able to perform both; detecting ammunition factories, supply dumps, railway yards, all of which constitutes strategic targets although they do have an effect on tactical operations. But the targets were strategic targets.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I happen to agree that the navies seemed to get the value of the airplane sooner. Especially for reconaissance. Admiral Scheer was counting on Zeppelins to locate the British Grand Fleet for him at Jutland.

Well, they may well have helped at Jutland had the seaplanes not destroyed their base earlier in the war.. would that be considered strategic?

[Warship NWS]

The problem I think that is acting as a mental block here is that since many historians did not see "tangible" results, AKA direct casualties, from aircraft that those lack of results on the ground directly reflected on the capabilities of aircraft.. to me, this is completely false and utterly bogus. Can we name cases of when WW1 generals did NOT respect their own aerial assets and thus failed to use the potentially strategic information they gathered? Of course.. do you blame the aircraft for that? Hell no. How many times in historical combat did generals ignore the warning signs of recon? The FAILURE to recognize a strategic capability does NOT reduce the strategic significance of a weapon system especially when the capability is PROVEN to be effective.

Again.. how many offensive or defensive operations might have been launched or handled incorrectly without proper aerial recon? How many artillery bombardments would have done nothing but move mud around without aerial recon? What other way do you have to know what the enemy is doing? Maybe the whole trenches not moving thing could be associated with the fact that the French could DEFEND their country through the use of aerial recon as without it the Germans could have attacked with far less chances of detection in force at weak points found in the lines.. problem here, can't buildup forces if the enemy knows where you will attack if that damned airplane buzzing overhead keeps telling the French where your going to attack now can you?

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Reality check time.. WW1 was going to start no matter what.. battleships or not.. war was coming. WW1 starts rolling.. Germany is hammering everything in their path and gets damn close to taking Paris.. which would have ended the war for France. All other 3rd party nations were waiting or siding with who would win the war.. alliances were based on self interests alone, nothing more. Germany takes France.. now she can defeat the naval blockade by default as now they have French ports and other countries side with Germany as they are now the biggest undefeated army in the world with no opposition except Britain, and they likely would not have lasted much longer with far less ability to uphold the economic and political merchantile blockade and the USA would have likely stayed out of the fight. All this could have happened without the flight a few silly flimsy planes letting the French know where and when the Germans would attack to take out Paris and the BEF was also saved due to those same silly planes.

Read between the lines here.. the planes told the French when and where to defend their lines of trenches. The Germans move troops to concentrate their forces and the French move their troops to block it.. no chance in hell that would happen without airplanes telling the French what is going on behind the German front lines. One might think this had a major impact on the war and very likely saved France from total defeat as early as 1914 and then in turn helped them save their country throughout the rest of the war.

Without planes.. the war would have very likely been over with by 1914 or at the least.. most of Europe would have allied or been defeated by Germany. Game over without that silly little plane flying overhead watching the German forces.

If that is not strategic in influence.. then I do not know what is. The airplane was by far the most strategic weapon of the war IMHO and I have yet to see any evidence to prove otherwise.

[Kyle Holgate]

The problem I think that is acting as a mental block here is that since many historians did not see "tangible" results, AKA direct casualties, from aircraft that those lack of results on the ground directly reflected on the capabilities of aircraft.. to me, this is completely false and utterly bogus. Can we name cases of when WW1 generals did NOT respect their own aerial assets and thus failed to use the potentially strategic information they gathered? Of course.. do you blame the aircraft for that? Hell no. How many times in historical combat did generals ignore the warning signs of recon? The FAILURE to recognize a strategic capability does NOT reduce the strategic significance of a weapon system especially when the capability is PROVEN to be effective.

Again.. how many offensive or defensive operations might have been launched or handled incorrectly without proper aerial recon? How many artillery bombardments would have done nothing but move mud around without aerial recon? What other way do you have to know what the enemy is doing? Maybe the whole trenches not moving thing could be associated with the fact that the French could DEFEND their country through the use of aerial recon as without it the Germans could have attacked with far less chances of detection in force at weak points found in the lines.. problem here, can't buildup forces if the enemy knows where you will attack if that damned airplane buzzing overhead keeps telling the French where your going to attack now can you?

Thanks.


Aircraft had (obviously) the potential to have strategic impact on the war and would have in time if the war had progressed - evolution in all forms of warfare was on high in 1918. The criteria for me to consider aircraft strategic is obviously different than yours, and/or I am not privy to enough information. I am no expert on WW1 though have read several good books on the subject of the ground and of course the sea war. I am not being obstinate here - I just do not see things how you do in this case! Is a caterpillar a butterfly? No. Will it be, has it the potential to be a wicked cool butterfly? Yes! Is it there yet? No, but it's growing damn quickly.
Note also to clarify - I'm looking at the system with aircraft as part. Many things from mistakes to just old foggie-ism (Generals not knowing what to do or how to use new technology) greatly inhibited the impact of aircraft in WW1. This is not the fault of the information or the fliers - just learning curve for lack of a better description.

[Warship NWS]

potential

Ok, lets pick a PROVEN historical factual example, so saving France by allowing the French to effectively defend Paris, and thus not being knocked out of the war, was only "potential"? Explain to me exactly how that works and how is my stance on this example as being "strategical significant" only based on my personal opinion? If not for the aerial recon France.. would very likely have been defeated.

[Kyle Holgate]

Ok, lets pick a PROVEN historical factual example, so saving France by allowing the French to effectively defend Paris, and thus not being knocked out of the war, was only "potential"? Explain to me exactly how that works and how is my stance on this example as being "strategical significant" only based on my personal opinion? If not for the aerial recon France.. would very likely have been defeated.

Why is the weight on me here, you need to prove your theory - it's not up to me to disprove it. In any case I'll take a shot (no pun intended).
As German lines lenghened and pushed toward France, French lines of communications and supply shortened. German supply became more and more problematical - French easier. Reading of the first battles of WW1 are - if not for the thousands dead and wounded - almost a comedy of errors on both sides largely due to neither side knowing what the other is up to and where (for sure) troops are massing and not. Many times they tried long artillery barrages in the hopes of clearing wire and knocking down the enemy defenses. Didn't work very well. Sometimes they tried quick ones and a quick attack. Didn't work very well either.
I honestly don't think that aircraft had much impact until perhaps 1916 - heck they didn't even really start shooting at one another until April 1915, until then both sides were able to snoop each other's lines and support areas. I cannot see that it did anyone any good. Even if one side had the "eyes" and the other didn't - for the most part things moved too slow to exploit the advantage to any great extent. I still say - if they DID provide a major advantage, when? Would a complete lack of aircraft in that situation most likely have caused a different out come?
What about the Machine gun. It was way more important and greatly impacted the land war. I think it would be more of a strategic weapon.

[Kyle Holgate]

From a webpage:

As the Battle of Somme began in the summer of 1916, Allied airplanes flew freely over the Front. They strafed the enemy trenches and bombed munitions dumps and supply systems. The German ground troops felt besieged and grew panicky. Any airplane that flew overhead, even those with German markings, was perceived as a threat and would send the troops running for cover. German morale plummeted.

Germany’s loss at the Battle of the Somme proved to German military planners the necessity to gain air superiority. They scrambled to reorganize. National resources were directed toward Albatros production. Oswald Boelke was called back from a war bond propaganda tour. During the preceding year, he had been rallying for a reorganization of the fighter force with specially trained pilots and now he was being given the chance to make it happen.

Note - I'm actually helping Chris prove his point here so hope to also indicate that I DO have an open mind!
Still not sure that I would call the impact of aircraft strategic yet, but admit to getting less sure of my position than I was! Will keep looking...;)

[Warship NWS]

Why is the weight on me here, you need to prove your theory - it's not up to me to disprove it.

Theory??? Really??



From the first days of World War I, the airplane demonstrated its ability to be the "eyes of the army." As the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) retreated from German invaders in France, the roughly two-dozen reconnaissance airplanes of the Royal Air Force watched from above. On August 22, 1914, British Captain L.E.O. Charlton and Lieutenant V.H.N. Wadham reported that German General Alexander von Kluck’s army was starting to prepare to surround the BEF, contradicting all other intelligence. The British High Command listened to the pilots’ report and started a retreat toward Mons--destroying morale but saving the lives of 100,000 soldiers.

A week later, French aerial reconnaissance units began reporting that the Germans were moving toward the east of Paris. Although the intelligence officer refused to listen, General Joseph-Simon Gallieni, the military commander of Paris and a supporter of aviation, did. He issued orders sending French troops to the exposed German flank. The resulting First Battle of the Marne was a victory for the French because it forced the Germans away from Paris. Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front in Poland, aerial reconnaissance reports on the movements of the Russian Army helped the Germans and Austrians stop an advance at the Battle of Tannenburg. But the result of these two battles was to push the armies fighting on both fronts into defensive positions in the trenches--a stalemate that would last almost until the end of the war.


There.. you now have the burden to prove this line of facts incorrect. Note I said "FACTS".. not theory, not opinion... FACTS. Please provide evidence of your own to prove this reference incorrect.. BTW, it comes from the Flight Commission of the United States on the effects of aerial recon.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Obviously, we have differences in the definition of terms:


Strategic Air Warfare -Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems

Tactical Warfare - Of, relating to, used in, or involving military or naval operations that are smaller, closer to base, and of less long-term significance than strategic operations.

Since WWII, a new definition has cropped into our vernacular: operational - Much of what was defined in WW1 was in the area of strategic warfare, has been included into operational. There is a gray area in WWI between tactical and strategical air warfare. Some observation and reconnaissance flights were able to perform both; detecting ammunition factories, supply dumps, railway yards, all of which constitutes strategic targets although they do have an effect on tactical operations. But the targets were strategic targets.

Dennis:

I agree with these definitions. Based on how you have defined Strategic Air Warfare, I can't see that the airplane in WWI was a strategic weapon. With the exception of providing more accurate spotting for artillery, they just don't reach far enough into an enemy's rear to begin to attack manufacturing, etc. At best they are tactical (shooting down the other sides air assets and providing some limited ground attack capability) or operational weapons in this time frame. We have no records of WWI aircraft going after targets deep inside Germany or France. The closest we have to this is the Zeppelin raids on London which did little to effect the strategic conduct of the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Well, they may well have helped at Jutland had the seaplanes not destroyed their base earlier in the war.. would that be considered strategic?

Chris:

The Cuxhaven raid didn't destroy the Zeppelin base. It did very minor damage. What prevented the Zepps from having an effect was the worsening weather conditions that made spotting almost impossible as well as preventing them from staying on station.

[Kyle Holgate]

stra·te·gic http://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngAudio Help (http://dictionary.reference.com/help/audio.html)/strəˈtihttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngdʒɪk/Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[struh-tee-jik]Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation
–adjective 1.pertaining to, characterized by, or of the nature of strategy: strategic movements. 2.important in or essential to strategy. 3.(of an action, as a military operation or a move in a game) forming an integral part of a stratagem: a strategic move in a game of chess. 4.Military. a.intended to render the enemy incapable of making war, as by the destruction of materials, factories, etc.: a strategic bombing mission. b.essential to the conduct of a war: Copper is a strategic material.
2. Aicraft were important in, but not essential to strategy.
3. Forming an integral part of a strategem - Not so sure, maybe later toward 1918.
4. a, NO. B, No.

4 is how I was/am characterizing "strategic". If one of the other definitions is how others take the meaning then I will grant 2 as at least partially true, and 3 also has merit.
Aicraft were not essential to the conduct of WW1 and a lack of them would not have likely made much difference based on my understanding of the war.

[old_pop2000]

Aircraft had (obviously) the potential to have strategic impact on the war and would have in time if the war had progressed - evolution in all forms of warfare was on high in 1918. The criteria for me to consider aircraft strategic is obviously different than yours, and/or I am not privy to enough information. I am no expert on WW1 though have read several good books on the subject of the ground and of course the sea war. I am not being obstinate here - I just do not see things how you do in this case! Is a caterpillar a butterfly? No. Will it be, has it the potential to be a wicked cool butterfly? Yes! Is it there yet? No, but it's growing damn quickly.
Note also to clarify - I'm looking at the system with aircraft as part. Many things from mistakes to just old foggie-ism (Generals not knowing what to do or how to use new technology) greatly inhibited the impact of aircraft in WW1. This is not the fault of the information or the fliers - just learning curve for lack of a better description.
Kyle:
I asked this before to those of you who have disagreements about whether the aircraft, at this stage of its development was a strategic weapon. What kind of evidence is required to, at least, allow you to reevaluate your position? I am not interested in changing anyone's mind, but I would like to see analytical questions or at least, some statements as to what you are looking for. IMHO, just saying the aircraft had potential, is not giving the weapon the consideration it was due.

What evidence or lack of evidence tells you that the aircraft was not a strategic weapon? Is it because it did not perform strategic bombing of cities in any great numbers? Is that the only criteria to decide whether the aircraft were of strategic value? In WWII, ORS teams and post war survey's confirmed that strategic bombing of supply centers, railway yards, road hubs etc. had much more potential for damaging the war making capability than did bombing of cities and factories. Even by WWII, precision bombing was not a realized fact. Potential was there, but it was never actually realized. Hence, fire bombing of Tokyo, Dresden and Hamburg.

Logistics between the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and the Great War of 1914 changed dramatically. The artillery of the Prussian army of 1870 numbered about 1584 whereas 40 years later, it numbered over 8000 guns. The guns of 1914 were bigger, heavier and fired much faster-depleting the German stocks of ammunition very quickly. In 1870, every German gun fired about 199 shells, but the 1000 shells per gun in 1914, was depleted in the first month of the war. The key in 1914 was the railroad. Railways are inflexible. You must dump supplies where the railroad is available near the point of attack. It took 117 trains over 600 miles of track, to move one German corps in 1914, in nine days. In Europe of 1914, there was 180,000 miles of track. Once the supplies and men were unloaded, they had to be moved by roadway by horse drawn carts and later, petrol engined trucks. What actually stopped the Schlieffen plan of 1914 was not the Allied armies, it was General logistics. The Germans simply could not move enough supplies to the front, to maintain the long lines of communication. The opposite was true for the Allies. As they retreated, their LOC's became shorter.

It should be apparent, to even the most casual of observers, the vulnerable point on both side was the railroads, supply dumps and road hubs. Any weapon that could observe or scout those vulnerable points behind the enemy front, was going to be valuable. Cavalry on a static front is not effective. It is only effective on an open front, out in front of a small to medium army, scouting ahead, and protecting the flanks. In the trench warfare of the Great War, there were no flanks to cover. The opponent was not a small to medium army moving though the territory, which could be scouted. He was right in front of you. Cavalry could not get across the no-man's land to perform scouting. It fell to the aircraft and balloons. However, balloons are limited in that they can't move and are limited by altitude, in the distance to their horizon. So, it defaulted to the only weapon that could see over the hill and observe, and reconnoiter the enemies hinterland. The aircraft could observe supply movements by carts and trucks. It could observe large numbers of the trains offloading supplies and men, it could see trucks and carts moving in and out of areas where the supplies are being stockpiled. They could see troop movements. All of these were indications of an offensive action. These are, by any military definition, strategic targets, not tactical targets. Aircraft, not only provided this vital strategic information but in many cases, they were able to attack these positions, later in the war, as the bomber became more powerful along with the size of the bombs.

[old_pop2000]

Well, I believe that I have reached a point, with this format, that I can't really provide anymore information or challenging arguments. I hope that many of you who have dug in your heels on this issue, will, at some point in the future, read and reevaluate your opinions and ideas. If not, so be it.

Enjoy your discussion.

[Kyle Holgate]

Dennis - I think I've clarified what I mean when I hear the word strategic. I don't know what specifically will cause me to change my view on this though.
I'm not going to keep cutting and pasting dictionary terms here - but I just looked up "theory" and "Fact" just to check - and this is pretty clearly in the realm of theory. Unfortuately we can't test it like a scientist would - which is a large part of my background and current job as an engineer. Maybe a reasonably good wargame perhaps, removing aircraft from both sides or one side - and finding that things really radically change when that happens.
Fact - the earth is round. Fact - aircraft were a strategic weapon in WW1? Very, very different.

[Warship NWS]

Air Force Magazine;



The first-ever long-range aerial reconnaissance missions oc- curred in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. In late August three separate crews of Britain's Royal Flying Corps were tasked to establish the position and direction of the German armies then rampaging through France. Information that they gathered enabled the embattled British Expeditionary Force on the Continent to avoid being surrounded, trapped, and destroyed.
French forces benefited from their own airborne eyes. The great aircraft builder Louis Breguet went aloft to observe German forces and reported directly to Gen. Joseph S. Gallieni, the French commander. In response, Gallieni launched an attack that allowed the French to concentrate forces for the Battle of the Marne, where a desperate France, in one of history's decisive military actions, finally managed to halt the German advance.
With these two contributions, long-range reconnaissance forces did much to prevent the Kaiser from knocking France out of action quickly and winning the Great War by winter 1914.


Sounds like facts to me.. no planes, Germany wins WW1. Game over. Is that strategic enough Kyle or do you want more of the same?

[Warship NWS]

American Heritage article on satellites and recon efforts throughout military history;



"Half a century later, in World War I, aerial reconnaissance—this time conducted with heavier-than-air craft in addition to balloons—showed its value from the outset. Less than three weeks after Britain entered the war, three airmen spotted a movement of the German 3d Army near Dinant, Belgium, that threatened the British right flank, and they reported the information in time to allow the British force to retreat.
Two weeks later aerial observation played a critical role in the French decision to fight the Battle of the Marne. The Germans were pouring into France, headed for Paris. Then Gen. Alexander von Kluck suddenly turned his army to the east, hoping to encircle the Allies. French and British commanders learned of this maneuver from several sources, but the airborne ones were particularly important. The intelligence showed that the Germans would be vulnerable to an immediate counterattack, which the Allies executed.
French forces also made good use of aerial photoreconnaissance at Verdun in 1916. That ghastly battle amounted to a vast eight-month artillery duel, and throughout the struggle French field commanders relied on aerial photography for locating targets and assessing the effects of bombardments. Film-developing stations turned out as many as 5,000 prints per day, which corps commanders received within an hour of exposure. During 1917 and 1918 the British took more than half a million reconnaissance photos. Technicians pieced together hundreds of them to form a detailed photographic map of the entire Western Front."


Need more?

[JMS]

Kyle:
I asked this before to those of you who have disagreements about whether the aircraft, at this stage of its development was a strategic weapon. What kind of evidence is required to, at least, allow you to reevaluate your position? I am not interested in changing anyone's mind, but I would like to see analytical questions or at least, some statements as to what you are looking for. IMHO, just saying the aircraft had potential, is not giving the weapon the consideration it was due.

What evidence or lack of evidence tells you that the aircraft was not a strategic weapon? Is it because it did not perform strategic bombing of cities in any great numbers? Is that the only criteria to decide whether the aircraft were of strategic value? In WWII, ORS teams and post war survey's confirmed that strategic bombing of supply centers, railway yards, road hubs etc. had much more potential for damaging the war making capability than did bombing of cities and factories. Even by WWII, precision bombing was not a realized fact. Potential was there, but it was never actually realized. Hence, fire bombing of Tokyo, Dresden and Hamburg.

Logistics between the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and the Great War of 1914 changed dramatically. The artillery of the Prussian army of 1870 numbered about 1584 whereas 40 years later, it numbered over 8000 guns. The guns of 1914 were bigger, heavier and fired much faster-depleting the German stocks of ammunition very quickly. In 1870, every German gun fired about 199 shells, but the 1000 shells per gun in 1914, was depleted in the first month of the war. The key in 1914 was the railroad. Railways are inflexible. You must dump supplies where the railroad is available near the point of attack. It took 117 trains over 600 miles of track, to move one German corps in 1914, in nine days. In Europe of 1914, there was 180,000 miles of track. Once the supplies and men were unloaded, they had to be moved by roadway by horse drawn carts and later, petrol engined trucks. What actually stopped the Schlieffen plan of 1914 was not the Allied armies, it was General logistics. The Germans simply could not move enough supplies to the front, to maintain the long lines of communication. The opposite was true for the Allies. As they retreated, their LOC's became shorter.

It should be apparent, to even the most casual of observers, the vulnerable point on both side was the railroads, supply dumps and road hubs. Any weapon that could observe or scout those vulnerable points behind the enemy front, was going to be valuable. Cavalry on a static front is not effective. It is only effective on an open front, out in front of a small to medium army, scouting ahead, and protecting the flanks. In the trench warfare of the Great War, there were no flanks to cover. The opponent was not a small to medium army moving though the territory, which could be scouted. He was right in front of you. Cavalry could not get across the no-man's land to perform scouting. It fell to the aircraft and balloons. However, balloons are limited in that they can't move and are limited by altitude, in the distance to their horizon. So, it defaulted to the only weapon that could see over the hill and observe, and reconnoiter the enemies hinterland. The aircraft could observe supply movements by carts and trucks. It could observe large numbers of the trains offloading supplies and men, it could see trucks and carts moving in and out of areas where the supplies are being stockpiled. They could see troop movements. All of these were indications of an offensive action. These are, by any military definition, strategic targets, not tactical targets. Aircraft, not only provided this vital strategic information but in many cases, they were able to attack these positions, later in the war, as the bomber became more powerful along with the size of the bombs.

Valuable but not indispensable, because the means to reach out and destroy the production centers or the rail hubs in the rear that could disrupt the whole enemy war effort (i.e. the strategic level) did not yet exist.

Take another examples:

- WW2: It's pretty clear what was strategic and what wasn't. Fighter-bombers and Mediums bombing in France to cut off Normandy was not strategic. B-17s and B-24s bombing at the start of Operation Cobra was not strategic. Same B-17s and B-24s bombing the Leuna oil refinery was strategic.

- Korea: B-29s bombing rail hubs in NK was strategic, same as B-26s doing night interdiction becuase it hampered the national-level war effort.

- Vietnam: B-52s dumping bombs in the jungle was strategic? hardly. F-4s and B-57s interdicting the Ho Chi Minh trail? again no, doesn't fit, but F-4s in route pack VI were (or at least attempted to be).

- ODS: F-117s dumping bombs in a telephone exchange in Bagdagh were performing a strategic mission, F-16s doing the same in Kuwait weren't.

I could go on and on, but the onus is pointing which missions in WW1 aimed at the enemy war-making capability and decission making. The odd leaflet raid that didn't achieve much and little else. In fact, while showing the potential, the way forward was hardly clear in the inter-war years with some countries foregoing strategic bombers altogether, while others ignored the tactical picture.

And France ignored both, in application of WW1 doctrine of subordination of air assets to individual armies.

[old_pop2000]

American Heritage article on satellites and recon efforts throughout military history;



Need more?
Chris:
Good information, but no one is listening except me. Can't you hear the scraping noises from heels being dug in?;)

[Warship NWS]

I could go on and on, but the onus is pointing which missions in WW1 aimed at the enemy war-making capability and decission making

Well.. keeping France in the war sounds pretty strategic to me. No planes.. war over in 1914 and Germany wins. If you can prove otherwise go for it.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:
Good information, but no one is listening except me. Can't you hear the scraping noises from heels being dug in?;)

Must be that "the boss can never be right!" thing.. ;)

[JMS]

American Heritage article on satellites and recon efforts throughout military history;



Need more?

Actually, yes. Good that the BEF wasn't surrounded, but if it had been then...? the Germans keep marching on Paris, but later giving the French the time to pull themselves together and stop them anyway.

The Germans go on unspotted (arguable, that what cavalry was for), outrun their supply lines and the battle of the Marne is fought 50 Km away with the same result since the Germans were moving into a void once they avoid Paris.

Verdun is hardly a decisive battle, except by running up French casualties and nearly knocking them out of the war in 1917.

Where's the 11-day offensive equivalent of WW1? the Battle of Midway?

[JMS]

Well.. keeping France in the war sounds pretty strategic to me. No planes.. war over in 1914 and Germany wins. If you can prove otherwise go for it.

Or not. The German problems were logistic and the distraction of forces to the East and secondary theaters, leaving the right wing weak enough to be stopped. Nothing to do with planes.

[Warship NWS]

- WW2: It's pretty clear what was strategic and what wasn't. Fighter-bombers and Mediums bombing in France to cut off Normandy was not strategic. B-17s and B-24s bombing at the start of Operation Cobra was not strategic. Same B-17s and B-24s bombing the Leuna oil refinery was strategic.


I'm short on time but I would hardly call fighter bombers strafing the crap out of anything and everything that had wheels across all of Germany and France only a tactical effort. The strategic bombers forced Germany to disperse their industry.. which means.. you need wheeled things to move stuff to assembly locations (not including transportation systems to move the fuel, food, ammo, and so on).. so without those wheeled things German forces and industry are severely screwed. IMHO, the fighters of WW2 were more strategic then the bombers as they were extremely effective at RECON, INTERDICTION, ESCORT, and ATTACK, and made it a lot more possible for bombers to even live through a mission. No fighters? You lose. Game over.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Or not. The German problems were logistic and the distraction of forces to the East and secondary theaters, leaving the right wing weak enough to be stopped. Nothing to do with planes.

Really? So.. how would the French have known to attack that flank without planes? So all of the sources I just quoted are just misinformed somehow and you have evidence to prove them wrong and if so using what sources of your own?

[Warship NWS]

Oh almost forgot.. without recon strategic targets of WW2 would likely been far less effectively attacked.. it attacked at all and many important targets would have been missed entirely.. that is fact, not opinion, not theory.. fact.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Reality check time.. WW1 was going to start no matter what.. battleships or not.. war was coming. WW1 starts rolling.. Germany is hammering everything in their path and gets damn close to taking Paris.. which would have ended the war for France. All other 3rd party nations were waiting or siding with who would win the war.. alliances were based on self interests alone, nothing more. Germany takes France.. now she can defeat the naval blockade by default as now they have French ports and other countries side with Germany as they are now the biggest undefeated army in the world with no opposition except Britain, and they likely would not have lasted much longer with far less ability to uphold the economic and political merchantile blockade and the USA would have likely stayed out of the fight. All this could have happened without the flight a few silly flimsy planes letting the French know where and when the Germans would attack to take out Paris and the BEF was also saved due to those same silly planes.

Read between the lines here.. the planes told the French when and where to defend their lines of trenches. The Germans move troops to concentrate their forces and the French move their troops to block it.. no chance in hell that would happen without airplanes telling the French what is going on behind the German front lines. One might think this had a major impact on the war and very likely saved France from total defeat as early as 1914 and then in turn helped them save their country throughout the rest of the war.

Without planes.. the war would have very likely been over with by 1914 or at the least.. most of Europe would have allied or been defeated by Germany. Game over without that silly little plane flying overhead watching the German forces.

If that is not strategic in influence.. then I do not know what is. The airplane was by far the most strategic weapon of the war IMHO and I have yet to see any evidence to prove otherwise.

Chris:

You are over simplifying a very complex military situation here. Most modern studies of the outbreak of WWI up to the Battle of the Marne show that the entire Schlieffen Plan was flawed from the beginning and that the Germany army was dangerously overextended and just waiting to be outflanked. As for more references on this I'll recommend Keegan's recent book on the First World War. I am also not convinced that Germany could have or would have conquered all of France. Her war aims were quite different in WWI versus WWII. Based on the definitions that Dennis provided for Strategic Air Warfare, I am not accepting that aircraft in WWI were strategic weapons. They were mainly operational and tactical weapons that had the potential to evolve into a more strategic weapon. They were not reaching deep enough into the rear of the German army to interdict its operations.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Chris:
Good information, but no one is listening except me. Can't you hear the scraping noises from heels being dug in?;)

Dennis:

By the definition that you supplied for Strategic Air Warfare, aircraft in WWI don't meet the criteria. Are you now saying that the definition is incorrect? That's not scraping heels, it is merely evaluating the weapon in light of the definition.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Well.. keeping France in the war sounds pretty strategic to me. No planes.. war over in 1914 and Germany wins. If you can prove otherwise go for it.

Chris:

You can't simplify it that way. Dennis already showed how logistics slowed down the German army in 1914. I'm not convinced that even capturing Paris would have caused the French to capitulate as long as Britain was still in the fight.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Oh almost forgot.. without recon strategic targets of WW2 would likely been far less effectively attacked.. it attacked at all and many important targets would have been missed entirely.. that is fact, not opinion, not theory.. fact.

Chris:

Stick to the topic, nobody is arguing that aircraft weren't strategic in WWII.:rolleyes:

[Warship NWS]

What bothers me here.. is that those sources I quoted were not just some "others" that agree with my points here. They are aeronautical organizations that are based on aircraft research and their contributions to warfare and Dennis has been studying airpower most of his life - and I was already in this line of belief before I talked to him about it based on the research I have done over the years. I could not find one article, not one source, nothing.. to disprove my stance.. and not one person on this thread has done so either. I have no problem being proven wrong.. but I cannot, and will not, believe that having intel about your enemy while trying to reduce the level of intel he has about you is not considered a strategic asset and the most valuable asset by far during WW1 for gaining on time intel of the enemy was the airplane. If anyone here can disprove that .. give it your best shot and prove me wrong conclusively, otherwise I will consider this a fact of warfare during WW1.

Not trying to be stubborn or blunt but prove me and my sources wrong with sources of your own and then I will be happy to listen.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems

The above highlighted targets as per the DOD dictionary, are qualified as strategic targets. Transportation systems would include railways, highways etc. Stockpiles would include supply dumps, ammunition dumps, ammunition factories. Communication facilities would include telephone exchanges and rear echelon headquarters. Concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces would include reserves and forces deploying for an offensive or counterattack. These are consider, by the DOD as strategic targets.



strategic air warfare
(DOD) Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.

The DOD Dictionary and the Joint Acronyms and Abbreviations master data base are managed by the Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff. All approved joint definitions are contained in Joint Publication 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. As amended through 04 March 2008.

Ok, is that current enough and documented enough.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Stick to the topic, nobody is arguing that aircraft weren't strategic in WWII.:rolleyes:

So what makes WW2 aircraft more strategic then during WW1? Are you basing it on recon abilities or just the fact they could drop bigger bombs? Why is it recon during WW2 was any more important then WW1?

[old_pop2000]

I found an interesting site that has numerous photos taken by a family uncle who was in aerial photoreconnaissance in WWI. Whether you agree with me, these are fascinating photos and should give us all a better understanding of what photo recon could and did do in WWI.

I hope you enjoy it.


http://www.drbill.net/eu_website/ww1_aerial_reconnaissance_photos/index.htm

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

The Cuxhaven raid didn't destroy the Zeppelin base. It did very minor damage. What prevented the Zepps from having an effect was the worsening weather conditions that made spotting almost impossible as well as preventing them from staying on station.

My bad.. it was the raid on Dusseldorf that destroyed a Zeppelin and its protective shed.

[Warship NWS]

To simplify this entire debate it is really down to the basic requirement of intel. If intel is in any way a strategic requirement then the airplane had to be considered a strategic asset of war during WW1. I have shown examples where such intel proved vital to the survival of France, as one example, and have not seen anything to counter those sources. If someone can prove to me that aircraft were not strategically significant in their role as air superiority fighters that in turn could defend or attack the level of aerial recon sources available on the front then please do so. I have no problem being proven wrong.. with evidence, yet so far I have seen none. The thread is wide open to anyone to post something to counter my points with sources.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

My bad.. it was the raid on Dusseldorf that destroyed a Zeppelin and its protective shed.

If we are alluding to the seaplane raid that destroyed Zeppelins, that was on July 19, 1918. They were launched from the Grand Fleet near the Jutland coast and bombed the Zeppelin Sheds at Tondern, Schleswig. The first flight was in the early morning, hitting a large Zeppelin shed. The fire was reported to have reached 1000 ft. A second flight was launched and another smaller shed was destroyed. Four machines were reported missing and the bombing was from a height of 700 to 1000 ft.

Attacks were reported at the Benz Factory at Mannheim, railway station at Heidelsberg, blast furnaces in the Saar, and a powder factory at Oberndorff.

On July 18-19 RAF squadrons bombed the Analine Works Soda Works, Lanz Chemical Factory, and Gebruder Giulini Chemical Works factories and docks.

On the 20th, bombers struck the railway factories at Offenburg and Oberdorf.

Source: NY Times article dtd July 21,1918 in London.

Hmm!! I wonder if DOD dictionary would consider Chemical works, a powder factory and railway yards strategic? The world wonders!!:p

[Warship NWS]

The 1914 raids on the Zeppelin sheds,

http://www.firstworldwar.com/airwar/bombers_britain.htm

http://www.historynet.com/world-war-i-cuxhaven-raid-britains-bold-strike-from-the-sea.htm

[old_pop2000]

In September 1914 four aircraft of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), operating from Antwerp in Belgium, dropped 20lb bombs on the German Zeppelin sheds at Cologne and Dusseldorf - the first attempts at aerial bombardment by British aircraft to be made in anger. Two months later, the Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen was bombed by a number of Avro 504s (a type more suited to training than bombing). To counter the threat of the giant German airships bombing Britain, Handley Page were asked to produce a "bloody paralyser" of an aircraft for the RNAS. This was destined to become the Handley Page 0/100 heavy bomber but it did not enter service (with 5th Wing RNAS) until November 1916.

From RAF History Page


THE FIRST STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGN
By mid-1917, the Zeppelins were almost attacking at will, causing little damage but plenty of panic in the population. The size and apparent invulnerability of the airships to attack caused great concern and caused no less an authority than Trenchard to proclaim that 'The moral effect of bombing stands to the material in a proportion of 20 to 1'. Then, in June, a new threat arrived - the strategic bomber. Eighteen giant Gotha bombers, despite being attacked in broad daylight by over 90 RFC fighters on their inward and outward flights, bombed the East End of London and the City without loss, causing 162 deaths and injuring over 400. This, and subsequent, although less successful, attacks along with the Air Staff's promotion of the aeroplane purely as an offensive, not defensive, weapon ('the aeroplane is not a defence against the aeroplane' - Trenchard, 1916), had a profound effect on the thinking of military planners and politicians for many years to come.

Within weeks of this and subsequent German daylight raids on London, the Air Board had formed a two-man committee to review the nation's air policy and supply. The Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was one member but he delegated his duties to a South African-born Lieutenant-General, Jaan Christian Smuts. Smuts wasted little time in producing two reports - the first dealing with defence against enemy air attack, and the second a remarkably far-sighted document on the future of British air power. In the report, published in August 1917, Smuts said: 'There is absolutely no limit to the scale of its [air power] future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operation with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industries and populous centres on a vast scale may become one of the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subservient.'

At this time, the RNAS was employing its 0/100s on night attacks of key enemy installations in France and Belgium such as railways and headquarters. In October, a dedicated bombing Wing, No 41, was established with the aim of attacking strategic targets inside Germany. The squadrons chosen to form No 41 Wing were No 55 (DH4s), No 100 (FE2b's), RFC, and No 16 (Naval) Squadron with 0/100s. It was based at Ochey in France and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel CLN Newall (who was Chief of the Air Staff during the next global conflict). The Wing mounted its first attack against a factory at Saarbrucken on 17th October with 11 DH4s and a week later, 9 0/100s of 'A' Squadron, RNAS, carried out a night attack against the same factory in Saarbrucken whilst 16 FE2b's bombed railways near the same area. Four aircraft (2 of each type) failed to return. The Wing was expanded with the later addition of Nos 99 and 104 Squadrons, both flying DH4s.

Apparently, even the Official RAF History Page agrees that the aircraft was a strategic weapon.

[Warship NWS]

Here is a question that could be asked, has anyone here read where a historian, researcher, or analyst has stated that the use of aircraft did not prove to be of strategic importance during WW1? If not, then why the debate? Any takers?

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

You can't simplify it that way. Dennis already showed how logistics slowed down the German army in 1914. I'm not convinced that even capturing Paris would have caused the French to capitulate as long as Britain was still in the fight.

I think the French would have capitulated. Losing Paris would have been a massive blow, note also, it took both the French 5th Army and the BEF to roll up the 2 holes reported by the air scouts, and their was no other way to know of these weaknesses in the German lines due to the speed of German advance - no balloons or patrols were going to give that broad or detailed of a picture of the German forces. If the aircraft had not reported that the BEF was about to be cut off and destroyed then Britain would have been knocked out of the war, as that was their entire force available in France as it would have been suicide to try and bring in large enough reinforcements after the Germans had taken Paris, with the French 5th and 6th Armies following close behind - the 6th Army for that matter was almost defeated while defending Paris had they not been brought up quick reserves of 6,000 men at the last moment via taxi cabs. At the least, both armies may well have been decimated. Up to that point the Germans were hammering them at every engagement. The air scouts warned them of when and where the Germans were going to move next and this bought them a valuable and incalculable advantage.. TIMING. To prepare a proper defense you MUST know where you will be attacked in force. The airplane, according to every account I have read over the past several days across at least 5 or more sources.. saved France from being utterly defeated. Somtimes strategic does not require the use of destruction but the use of information. If anyone can prove otherwise please put up your sources.. I will be more then happy to learn more.

Thanks.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

The observer pilots that saved France,

Lt Borton, Cpt Pitcher, and Lt Hosking of the RFC.

[Warship NWS]

The Battle of Vinny Ridge - the Canadian assault,



On April 2, the bombardment was stepped up. By the time the infantry set out, a million artillery shells had battered the Germans. One Canadian commented that shells poured over his head onto enemy positions "like water from a hose". More than 80 per cent of the German guns had been identified by aerial reconnaissance and by other spotting methods which Canadians had perfected. Few survived intact. The Germans called the period "the week of suffering." Trenches were shattered and a new artillery shell-fuse demolished many barbed-wire entanglements, thereby easing the Canadians' dangerous path to combat.
The impact of the air war was significant at Vimy. While aerial reconnaissance yielded valuable intelligence about enemy positions and artillery sites, fighter aircraft prevented the enemy from gaining a clear idea of Allied intentions. German observation aircraft and balloons were attacked and shot down. This work was important and dangerous—balloons were defended by fighters and anti-aircraft guns. The soon-to-be-famous Canadian fighter pilot, Billy Bishop, won the Military Cross on April 7 for shooting down a balloon near Vimy. He had begun his remarkable career in March.


The results of the aerial recon spotting of enemy positions and artillery locations, tied with very carefull planning and blinding of the German air service, helped to keep the casualties to the lowest level yet achieved compared to prior assaults at the same location and allowed for a swift victory.

[JMS]

Really? So.. how would the French have known to attack that flank without planes? So all of the sources I just quoted are just misinformed somehow and you have evidence to prove them wrong and if so using what sources of your own?

No, I don't have to prove you wrong, I am not arguing that planes were not important or useful, what I am arguing is that their role could have been performed by cavalry, not as well or as efficiently but as surely in 1914.

[JMS]

From RAF History Page

Apparently, even the Official RAF History Page agrees that the aircraft was a strategic weapon.

I hate to tell you this, but you can't hardly expect the Air Force magazine or the Royal Air Force to be unbiased sources regarding the importance of the airplane. A good unbiased source would be a German source saying that RAF planes forced a change of strategy or that Zeppelins forced Britain to change its strategy.

Such a source does not exist for the simple reason that air attacks on the strategic plane were just pinpricks on the warmaking capability of the powers. Going further, even the definition of strategic targets you are providing for the XXI century doesn't apply to WW1 because those targets that were hit were on the tactical plane, i.e. close behind the frontlines and impacting mainly frontline forces, a role, BTW, no different from the long range artillery, yet I don't think anyone is going to say that railroad artillery was "strategic".

[JMS]

To simplify this entire debate it is really down to the basic requirement of intel. If intel is in any way a strategic requirement then the airplane had to be considered a strategic asset of war during WW1. I have shown examples where such intel proved vital to the survival of France, as one example, and have not seen anything to counter those sources. If someone can prove to me that aircraft were not strategically significant in their role as air superiority fighters that in turn could defend or attack the level of aerial recon sources available on the front then please do so. I have no problem being proven wrong.. with evidence, yet so far I have seen none. The thread is wide open to anyone to post something to counter my points with sources.

Thanks.

Again a misnomer, Intel could be strategic or tactical, you are trying to equate strategic with useful but it's nothing of the kind.

You have shown examples that you think were critical to the survival of France, but you have yet to demonstrate that they were indeed, that the loss of the BEF meant the surrender of France or that loosing at the Marne automatically meant the French will surrender, and yet that's hardly the case.

Moreover, this are clearly examples of tactical intel, they gave information regarding frontline forces and their maneuvers, they do not fit in the definition of "strategic air warfare":

"Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems."

Did winning the Marne battle or avoiding the encirclement of the BEF impact the war-making capability of anyone? no, does destroying a Zeppelin once or bombing a factory once impact the war-making capability of Germany? not one iota.

[JMS]

The Battle of Vinny Ridge - the Canadian assault,



The results of the aerial recon spotting of enemy positions and artillery locations, tied with very carefull planning and blinding of the German air service, helped to keep the casualties to the lowest level yet achieved compared to prior assaults at the same location and allowed for a swift victory.

Another tactical result. The strategic effects of gaining Vimy ridge were...?

[Ed Rotondaro]

My bad.. it was the raid on Dusseldorf that destroyed a Zeppelin and its protective shed.

Chris:

Which prompted the RN to try the Cuxhaven raid. It might have been more successful if the weather had not been so bad. It did achieve total surprise and demonstrated that seaplanes could attack land based targets. This leads to seaplane tenders which leads to real aircraft carriers by the end of the war. As I mentioned earlier, the RN seemed to grasp airpower's potential very early in the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

If we are alluding to the seaplane raid that destroyed Zeppelins, that was on July 19, 1918. They were launched from the Grand Fleet near the Jutland coast and bombed the Zeppelin Sheds at Tondern, Schleswig. The first flight was in the early morning, hitting a large Zeppelin shed. The fire was reported to have reached 1000 ft. A second flight was launched and another smaller shed was destroyed. Four machines were reported missing and the bombing was from a height of 700 to 1000 ft.

Attacks were reported at the Benz Factory at Mannheim, railway station at Heidelsberg, blast furnaces in the Saar, and a powder factory at Oberndorff.

On July 18-19 RAF squadrons bombed the Analine Works Soda Works, Lanz Chemical Factory, and Gebruder Giulini Chemical Works factories and docks.

On the 20th, bombers struck the railway factories at Offenburg and Oberdorf.

Source: NY Times article dtd July 21,1918 in London.

Hmm!! I wonder if DOD dictionary would consider Chemical works, a powder factory and railway yards strategic? The world wonders!!:p

Dennis:

The Cuxhaven raid which failed was launched on December 25th 1914. How's that for a Christmas present? Those perfidious flyers from Albion don't even respect Christian holidays.:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

From RAF History Page



Apparently, even the Official RAF History Page agrees that the aircraft was a strategic weapon.

Dennis:

When aircraft are used in the bomber role against targets too deep to be reached by artillery, yes they are strategic. My only counter is that the strategic use of aircraft in WWI in such bombing roles was:

A. Limited (what portion of the sorties do all the bombing raids equal? maybe 1%?

B. Never decisively knocked out anything. Yes the examples we've seen some local successes, knocking out a Zeppelin or two (which you will have to allow are highly vulnerable). But there is nothing along the scale of interdicting the enemy's industry, or transportation, and certainly not for any long period of time.

Personally I'll re-iterate that the potential for the strategic use of airpower was demonstrated in WWI, but making the airplane seem as if it dominated the war is hard to support. Does anyone in this discussion feel that if aircraft were not present that the course of the war would have been much different than it played out historically? And I am not buying that Paris will fall without aerial recon. Since the trenches weren't up yet, there was still cavalry available for scouting.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=Warship NWS;4852]I think the French would have capitulated. Losing Paris would have been a massive blow, note also, it took both the French 5th Army and the BEF to roll up the 2 holes reported by the air scouts, and their was no other way to know of these weaknesses in the German lines due to the speed of German advance - no balloons or patrols were going to give that broad or detailed of a picture of the German forces. If the aircraft had not reported that the BEF was about to be cut off and destroyed then Britain would have been knocked out of the war, as that was their entire force available in France as it would have been suicide to try and bring in large enough reinforcements after the Germans had taken Paris, with the French 5th and 6th Armies following close behind - the 6th Army for that matter was almost defeated while defending Paris had they not been brought up quick reserves of 6,000 men at the last moment via taxi cabs. At the least, both armies may well have been decimated. Up to that point the Germans were hammering them at every engagement. The air scouts warned them of when and where the Germans were going to move next and this bought them a valuable and incalculable advantage.. TIMING. To prepare a proper defense you MUST know where you will be attacked in force. The airplane, according to every account I have read over the past several days across at least 5 or more sources.. saved France from being utterly defeated. Somtimes strategic does not require the use of destruction but the use of information. If anyone can prove otherwise please put up your sources.. I will be more then happy to learn more.

Thanks.

Chris:

If the BEF had been destroyed and Paris taken, then it is possible that the Allies might have sued for peace. We don't know to what degree the leadership of both nations would have lost the confidence of their respective peoples. The British have historically refused to knuckle under (remember Dunkirk was an even greater disaster in terms of equipment lost and men captured, but Britain did not fold. If we use the example of the French in WWII, then losing Paris would have probably been enough to make them ask for peace. Yet in the Franco-Prussian war Paris was besieged, and it was the capture of Napoleon III at I believe Sedan that caused France to ask for terms. So which way France goes in WWI is up for debate.

If we are to maintain that the miracle of the Marne changed the course of the war, then it can be said that the airplane was at least at that junction strategically critical. Yet we then have four years of stalemate, at least on the Western Front. Where is the strategic impact of the aircraft? Both sides are gaining lots of targeting information and building excellent maps and scouting for the enemy, yet with all this data, nothing changes. Is a weapon strategically effective if it use doesn't change the overall strategic picture? In that case, then the Royal Navy's dreadnoughts even with little or no use kept the German Seas Fleet bottled up and blockaded. Now you see why when you first posted this thread that I asked you to define strategic?

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Battle of Vinny Ridge - the Canadian assault,



The results of the aerial recon spotting of enemy positions and artillery locations, tied with very carefull planning and blinding of the German air service, helped to keep the casualties to the lowest level yet achieved compared to prior assaults at the same location and allowed for a swift victory.

Chris:

I believe this is an example of what Dennis defined as tactical and operational. The operational aspects being the spotting of the enemy and the tactical being the suppression of his airforce.

[old_pop2000]

One of the problems in this discussion is the disagreement over strategic versus tactical operations. When you review WWII ORS documents, you can see that interdiction missions, where fighters and bombers attacked transportation systems, were always strategic in nature, but had tactical effects on the battlefield. This is true of intelligence information gained from reconnaissance flights into enemy territory. This information was of a strategic nature. It addressed the war making capability of the enemy.

War making capability consists of three basic facets; the flow of raw materials to the factories, production of finished product, and the flow of the finished product to the supply dumps. These three facets constitute war making capability-they are considered strategic targets. The transportation system used to move the products, is part of that war making capability. Also included in this would be storage facilities like ammunition dumps, oil and gasoline tank farms and the like. Information gained about those facilities and attacks on them would be considered-strategic. Do they have tactical implications? Absolutely. But they are considered, by doctrine, to be strategic targets.

As the use of aircraft increased in The Great War, the leaders and commander's became more aware of the value of this strategic intelligence and attacks on those strategic targets. In past wars, these strategic targets were usually out of reach to an army except for the incidental cavalry raid. The use of a weapon against the war making capability of a nation was first explored in The Great War. It took time for doctrine to be developed along with improved weapons. But, it was important.

We will accomplish more in this discussion, if we accept the idea that, in the Great War, aircraft evolved from a novelty to an important tactical and strategic weapon. I would offer the period of 1916 as the period when it was realized that the information from aircraft observations were of strategic value and attacks were initiated. There were attacks in 1914, of course. But they were not contained within a strategic framework of operation. Can we offer proof of its strategic value? Well are pictures of railway junctions and bombing operations proof? What constitutes proof? This isn't courtroom. The only way, is to read post-war documents which survey the whole period, and give us the sense of how the aircraft was used. Using Google books, I have done this. The documents from the period and afterward, show this evolution from a novelty to an important tactical and strategical weapons system.

I will say it simply, the aircraft evolved from a novelty to a strategic weapon by wars end. This is documented with pictures, narratives and post-war assessments by all nations. Was it acknowledged initially as a strategic weapon? Most likely it was not. Warfare evolved in WWI, from 1870's style to modern, shock tactics using tanks and the aircraft. This is the best we can say. Let's just accept it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

One of the problems in this discussion is the disagreement over strategic versus tactical operations. When you review WWII ORS documents, you can see that interdiction missions, where fighters and bombers attacked transportation systems, were always strategic in nature, but had tactical effects on the battlefield. This is true of intelligence information gained from reconnaissance flights into enemy territory. This information was of a strategic nature. It addressed the war making capability of the enemy.

War making capability consists of three basic facets; the flow of raw materials to the factories, production of finished product, and the flow of the finished product to the supply dumps. These three facets constitute war making capability-they are considered strategic targets. The transportation system used to move the products, is part of that war making capability. Also included in this would be storage facilities like ammunition dumps, oil and gasoline tank farms and the like. Information gained about those facilities and attacks on them would be considered-strategic. Do they have tactical implications? Absolutely. But they are considered, by doctrine, to be strategic targets.

As the use of aircraft increased in The Great War, the leaders and commander's became more aware of the value of this strategic intelligence and attacks on those strategic targets. In past wars, these strategic targets were usually out of reach to an army except for the incidental cavalry raid. The use of a weapon against the war making capability of a nation was first explored in The Great War. It took time for doctrine to be developed along with improved weapons. But, it was important.

We will accomplish more in this discussion, if we accept the idea that, in the Great War, aircraft evolved from a novelty to an important tactical and strategic weapon. I would offer the period of 1916 as the period when it was realized that the information from aircraft observations were of strategic value and attacks were initiated. There were attacks in 1914, of course. But they were not contained within a strategic framework of operation. Can we offer proof of its strategic value? Well are pictures of railway junctions and bombing operations proof? What constitutes proof? This isn't courtroom. The only way, is to read post-war documents which survey the whole period, and give us the sense of how the aircraft was used. Using Google books, I have done this. The documents from the period and afterward, show this evolution from a novelty to an important tactical and strategical weapons system.

I will say it simply, the aircraft evolved from a novelty to a strategic weapon by wars end. This is documented with pictures, narratives and post-war assessments by all nations. Was it acknowledged initially as a strategic weapon? Most likely it was not. Warfare evolved in WWI, from 1870's style to modern, shock tactics using tanks and the aircraft. This is the best we can say. Let's just accept it.

Dennis:

I will agree with this mainly because we see the development of large multi-engined bombers to try and exploit the enemy's vulnerabilities just about at the end of the war. I'm not sure if the the Handley Page was operational by war's end, but the Gotha was. Also the inter-war period saw the development of the bomber over the fighter until the experiences of the Spanish Civil War. You may recall Trenchard's mistaken observation that you could build 1,000 bombers for the cost of a battleship (it turned out to be considerably less than that in reality).

Just to throw another observation into the debate, you state that reconnaissance flights that gathered intelligence were strategic in nature. Would you consider the recon flights that both sides performed before Midway or most other naval battles to be strategic or tactical? In the sense that the intel would be of direct benefit to the immediate conduct of a tactical battle. In the sense that winning the battle can turn the tide of the war, then is it strategic or operational?

[old_pop2000]

.....

Just to throw another observation into the debate, you state that reconnaissance flights that gathered intelligence were strategic in nature. Would you consider the recon flights that both sides performed before Midway or most other naval battles to be strategic or tactical? In the sense that the intel would be of direct benefit to the immediate conduct of a tactical battle. In the sense that winning the battle can turn the tide of the war, then is it strategic or operational?

Well, Operation MI was a strategic operation, in that sense, the PBY missions out of Midway and French Frigate Shoals were probably strategic reconnaissance missions. However, the scouting missions from the US and Japanese carriers were tactical, in nature. How do we differentiate them?

I've said that the area between strategic and tactical grays a little. The PBY's were specifically looking for the Japanese attack force that we knew from signal intel, was headed our way. Now, that would indicate it was purely tactical. However, if we equate sea lanes to railroads, then reconnaissance of sea lanes or sea avenues of attack could be considered strategic targets and the PBY missions can be called strategic reconnaissance missions.

Missions using AAF bombers in the SW Pacific against Rabaul, Lae, Truk are and should be considered strategic bombing missions. Aerial reconnaissance of those same targets including the sea lanes connecting them, would be strategic reconnaissance. They all are involved in the war making capability of the enemy. It is much easier when we get close to Japan, many of the target were attacks on war production facilities and these are clearly strategic targets.

These are my feelings, but maybe someone has read something else. If so, then lets hear it and discuss it in a friendly manner. I am open to opinions and other ideas. I do not have all the answers and those that I do have can and will be changed, when sufficient evidence and arguments have been presented in a clear, concise and cogent manner with a little documentation. We have limits on the forum and this media, I understand that.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Well, Operation MI was a strategic operation, in that sense, the PBY missions out of Midway and French Frigate Shoals were probably strategic reconnaissance missions. However, the scouting missions from the US and Japanese carriers were tactical, in nature. How do we differentiate them?

I've said that the area between strategic and tactical grays a little. The PBY's were specifically looking for the Japanese attack force that we knew from signal intel, was headed our way. Now, that would indicate it was purely tactical. However, if we equate sea lanes to railroads, then reconnaissance of sea lanes or sea avenues of attack could be considered strategic targets and the PBY missions can be called strategic reconnaissance missions.

Missions using AAF bombers in the SW Pacific against Rabaul, Lae, Truk are and should be considered strategic bombing missions. Aerial reconnaissance of those same targets including the sea lanes connecting them, would be strategic reconnaissance. They all are involved in the war making capability of the enemy. It is much easier when we get close to Japan, many of the target were attacks on war production facilities and these are clearly strategic targets.

These are my feelings, but maybe someone has read something else. If so, then lets hear it and discuss it in a friendly manner. I am open to opinions and other ideas. I do not have all the answers and those that I do have can and will be changed, when sufficient evidence and arguments have been presented in a clear, concise and cogent manner with a little documentation. We have limits on the forum and this media, I understand that.

Dennis:

I concur. I think the reason you see the gray area between strategic and tactical, especially at sea is primarily due to the reach of aircraft versus ships. Since aircraft can fly hundreds of miles to attack a port, or lagoon or base, these missions can be considered strategic. But if we swoop in with a carrier raid based on recon that shows us that there are supply ships at Truk or that there is a an entire division being moved across the Bismarck Sea, then its tactical. You are using the intel to directly influence a given battle. But no other weapon short of the guided missile has the ability to be both tactical and strategic in the manner that aircraft can.

[Kyle Holgate]

I think it's pretty obvious that we are all defining the term Strategic in our own way. As such we're as much debating the meaning of the word as we are the use of aircraft in WW1.
If information on the enemy strength, location and movements is strategic in your view than you're absolutely on track considering aircraft a strategic asset in WW1.
How green does the color blue have to get before you call it blue instead of green - this is all based on our own views and how we learned the color!

Not being sarcastic here but honestly asking - Is spying strategic? How about forward cavalry pre-aircraft that could snoop behind enemy lines and send back information on enemy forces, movements, etc? Is it dependant on the information obtained?

[JMS]

I, for one, don't agree,


Well, Operation MI was a strategic operation, in that sense, the PBY missions out of Midway and French Frigate Shoals were probably strategic reconnaissance missions. However, the scouting missions from the US and Japanese carriers were tactical, in nature. How do we differentiate them?

I've said that the area between strategic and tactical grays a little. The PBY's were specifically looking for the Japanese attack force that we knew from signal intel, was headed our way. Now, that would indicate it was purely tactical. However, if we equate sea lanes to railroads, then reconnaissance of sea lanes or sea avenues of attack could be considered strategic targets and the PBY missions can be called strategic reconnaissance missions.

Missions using AAF bombers in the SW Pacific against Rabaul, Lae, Truk are and should be considered strategic bombing missions. Aerial reconnaissance of those same targets including the sea lanes connecting them, would be strategic reconnaissance. They all are involved in the war making capability of the enemy. It is much easier when we get close to Japan, many of the target were attacks on war production facilities and these are clearly strategic targets.

These are my feelings, but maybe someone has read something else. If so, then lets hear it and discuss it in a friendly manner. I am open to opinions and other ideas. I do not have all the answers and those that I do have can and will be changed, when sufficient evidence and arguments have been presented in a clear, concise and cogent manner with a little documentation. We have limits on the forum and this media, I understand that.

Depends on the definition of "war-making", advanced naval bases can hardly be described as strategic, loosing them may hinder the enemy war effort but it doesn't hit their potential, Lae, Truk, Midway (not even a decent base in '42) or Rabaul were a drain rather than a source of war-making potential, they needed to be supplied and defended with resources that had to be shipped from the homelands.

Now, strategic recon would be defined by what's being reckoned, a convoy running from Palembang to Osaka would be an strategic target for a strategic weapon, the submarine. A convoy bringing supplies to Rabaul is hardly a strategic target, because it is not needed to increase the war-making potential of Japan. That, of course, does not mean it's not IMPORTANT, or that he effects of loosing x merchants is not felt on a national level.

[old_pop2000]

......
Not being sarcastic here but honestly asking - Is spying strategic? How about forward cavalry pre-aircraft that could snoop behind enemy lines and send back information on enemy forces, movements, etc? Is it dependant on the information obtained?.

Kyle:

As to the strategic nature of cavalry? How about Grierson's Raid on the railroad center at Newton Station during the Vicksburg Campaign? How about Nathan Bedford Forrest raids? Cavalry operations were, for the most part, tactical operations. However, cavalry raids into the areas behind enemy lines against supply dumps, rail yards, etc. are, in most cases, strategic operations.

The classification depends on the targets and a target can be a strategic one but the results can be useful to tactical operations. If I obtain information about enemy troop movements and supply dumps in the Cavalry period of history, that information can be a prelude to a new offensive. Is that tactical or strategical information? Cavalry raids, as such, rarely manage to be strong enough to hamper war production. But it is an interesting topic, good one for another thread.;)

[old_pop2000]

.... advanced naval bases can hardly be described as strategic, loosing them may hinder the enemy war effort but it doesn't hit their potential, Lae, Truk, Midway (not even a decent base in '42) or Rabaul were a drain rather than a source of war-making potential, they needed to be supplied and defended with resources that had to be shipped from the homelands.

Now, strategic recon would be defined by what's being reckoned, a convoy running from Palembang to Osaka would be an strategic target for a strategic weapon, the submarine. A convoy bringing supplies to Rabaul is hardly a strategic target, because it is not needed to increase the war-making potential of Japan. That, of course, does not mean it's not IMPORTANT, or that he effects of loosing x merchants is not felt on a national level.

Consider this, if the advanced base has the capacity to repair and upgrade ships, supply ships, train crews, isn't this a war making capability? Is an attack on the dry docks, fuel depot at Pearl Harbor, tactical or strategic? It strikes at the heart of our ability to make war or war making capability. Japanese Mavis reconnaissance missions over Pearl were strategic missions, not tactical missions. They were aimed at gaining strategic information about our ability to conduct the war. So advanced naval bases can be considered strategic targets. How about Truk, Rabaul, Singapore? The air raids by the 5th AF against Rabaul? Strategic or tactical? Think carefully about the answer.

[Warship NWS]

Ok.. has anyone stopped to consider the difference between tactical (ground unit front line recon) and strategic (rear echellon, support, logistical) recon?? Think this does not exist? Apparently the USAF thought it made a difference as of 1948 with the first strategic recon air wings using long range aircraft to go beyond the front lines of the enemy. Starting in 1948 the USAF officially started to designate recon air wings as "tactical" and "strategic" -- point being, there IS a difference between the levels of intel gathering. Strategic does NOT mean you have to drop bombs, strategic CAN mean you need to FIND and LOCATE strategic targets for bombing or higher level of intel gathering.

Strategic is not contained ONLY to the destruction of the enemy ability to wage war however.. strategic can also mean a direct contribution to strategic events, or the ability to do so. How does one alter strategic course of a war without intel? Blinding the enemy from any knowledge of your activities can have VERY strategic implications and often did change the course of wars.

Many call Coral Sea a "strategic" victory as it altered the course of the Japanese victory progress through the south Pacific.. so saving France from being knocked out of the war in 1914 is any less strategic??

Tactical is simply that.. a victory or defeat that has almost no overall value on the direct course of a campaign or a war. Example, the naval battles around Guadalcanal ended up being all tactical defeats or victories.. there was little chance of altering the course of the war at that point, at least for any reasonable length of time, the CVs held the title of strategic warships throughout the Pacific War and the second strategic naval units were the logistics convoys.

Now can one debate the "value" of what is considered strategic or tactical? Sure.. but one should do so with evidence not just conjecture or opinion alone. This does not mean everyone will always agree on that value but one cannot simply disregard the value of the 4th dimension of warfare, that being the battle over FOW/intel, just because bad guys are not killed by unarmed units doing the intel gathering.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Another tactical result. The strategic effects of gaining Vimy ridge were...?

The primary point was to show that aircraft most certainly contributed to the ground war.. which contradicts what many historians have said for years.. that they did nearly nothing to contribute to the war. It is high time that the 4th dimension of warfare - recon/commn/intel - starts getting the recognition it deserves. If it mattered at this battle, the saving of France, the defense of French trenches (static trenches would not have happened if the French did NOT know where the Germans would attack), and other minor and major battles.. then the airplane cannot just be tossed under the quick and convenient rug of insignificance just because they did not carry big bombs.

[Kyle Holgate]

Ok.. has anyone stopped to consider the difference between tactical (ground unit front line recon) and strategic (rear echellon, support, logistical) recon?? Think this does not exist? Apparently the USAF thought it made a difference as of 1948 with the first strategic recon air wings using long range aircraft to go beyond the front lines of the enemy. Starting in 1948 the USAF officially started to designate recon air wings as "tactical" and "strategic" -- point being, there IS a difference between the levels of intel gathering. Strategic does NOT mean you have to drop bombs, strategic CAN mean you need to FIND and LOCATE strategic targets for bombing or higher level of intel gathering.

Strategic is not contained ONLY to the destruction of the enemy ability to wage war however.. strategic can also mean a direct contribution to strategic events, or the ability to do so. How does one alter strategic course of a war without intel? Blinding the enemy from any knowledge of your activities can have VERY strategic implications and often did change the course of wars.

Many call Coral Sea a "strategic" victory as it altered the course of the Japanese victory progress through the south Pacific.. so saving France from being knocked out of the war in 1914 is any less strategic??

Tactical is simply that.. a victory or defeat that has almost no overall value on the direct course of a campaign or a war. Example, the naval battles around Guadalcanal ended up being all tactical defeats or victories.. there was little chance of altering the course of the war at that point, at least for any reasonable length of time, the CVs held the title of strategic warships throughout the Pacific War and the second strategic naval units were the logistics convoys.

Now can one debate the "value" of what is considered strategic or tactical? Sure.. but one should do so with evidence not just conjecture or opinion alone. This does not mean everyone will always agree on that value but one cannot simply disregard the value of the 4th dimension of warfare, that being the battle over FOW/intel, just because bad guys are not killed by unarmed units doing the intel gathering.

Thanks.



I think my main issue is that for something to have a strategic impact it has to be more than simple information. In the defense of Paris air recon showed something that was reacted to and may have saved the city - I don't dispute this. The move by the French army was perhaps a strategic moved based on the information they learned from the aircraft but in all honesty, not being difficult or sarcastic or disagreeing just due to who started the thread - I don't see it that way.

[old_pop2000]

I think my main issue is that for something to have a strategic impact it has to be more than simple information. In the defense of Paris air recon showed something that was reacted to and may have saved the city - I don't dispute this. The move by the French army was perhaps a strategic moved based on the information they learned from the aircraft but in all honesty, not being difficult or sarcastic or disagreeing just due to who started the thread - I don't see it that way.
Kyle:
The problem that most people have, is attempting to relate to the differences in ranges from The Great War to WWII. In the Great War, heavy bombers might have an endurance, at 80 MPH, of 3-4 hours. That's about 300 miles. The Gotha had a range of 500 depending on the bombload. In WWII, the bombers had ranges of over 2000-3000 miles. They could hit just about any target in Germany and France. From NA, they could hit all of Italy, Greece, and Southern Germany.

This difference in range changes our perspective on WWI aircraft. Based on our current perceptions, they were short ranged machines. However, with static warfare, is 100 miles a strategic distance or is it a tactical distance? When fronts barely moved 20 miles in offensives, then 100 miles is a long way. Enemy actions 100 miles from the front, can be strategic and less tactical. An ammunition factory might be 100 miles or 200 miles from the static front and be within range of heavy bombers. In our definition, it is a strategic target as would any information that we gather of it.

Now, what about troop movements? Again the range issue comes into play. If I observe a troop train moving southward, parallel to the front, is that a strategic target, or a tactical target? In WWII, that is probably a tactical interdiction target. Fighter-bombers could range well over 500 miles behind the front. However, in WWI terms, with static fronts, that target might be a strategic target. It isn't really moving to any particular area of the front, but it whereabouts is important, especially if it is a large train. As a supreme commander, I would want to know about that train and its direction and composition. It's information may reveal valuable strategic information as to the enemy's intentions. That's what strategic reconnaissance and observation can tell you. It can answer the five W's- who, what, when, where and why.

Strategic reconnaissance is more than just the sum of one bit of information from one aircraft, it is the sum total of all the information received from all of the flights. Together they give the supreme commander a picture of what transpiring on the other side of the hill. One flight cannot provide the total picture. Information can be the number of troop trains headed in one direction, movement of horse drawn carts, new supply dumps, troop withdrawals, artillery movements, new airfields, new communication centers and headquarters. All of this and more, constitutes one piece of the puzzle. It is the job of the photo interpreter and the intelligence staff to take this information and create a picture and prepare written intelligence interpretations of the information along with recommendations as to its meaning. This is the job of the intelligence section of any staff and aerial reconnaissance is one tool. The information can be tactical and only effect the local commander or it could be strategic, in which case it will be forwarded to higher headquarters for their appraisal along with other reports from other units.

As the range of aircraft increased in the interwar period and the doctrine of aerial warfare developed, the words tactical and strategical became more definite in terms of targets and range. But it has always been subject to change and interpretation.

I would not become stuck on the two terms. Just keep in mind there is a difference, and it changed as aerial warfare doctrine changed and with the improvement in aircraft, navigation systems, weapons and photography. Was the actions of the aircraft what saved Paris? I doubt it was the only reason the German's failed. The Belgium Armies stubborn defense slowed Von Kluck down, logistic's hampered the speed, Allied resistance. I believe that aerial reconnaissance was more tactical in the Battle of the Marne, than strategic but it did give commander's a view of what the airplane could accomplish. So, after that, it was used more and its role and range expanded.

That's my take on this.

[old_pop2000]

Some simple ways of thinking about these two overused terms.

First, they bookend operational.

Two, Strategic is more of a game changer, while tactical is more of a game player.

Three, in chess, strategic would be check and mate moves, tactical might be opening and castling moves.

Four, strategic focuses on the ends, tactical the means


Don't get too hung up on these two. Remember that we now have tactical, operational and strategic. Targets that used to be strategic, might be operational targets now. This goes for WWI. Targets that were strategic in WWI, were probably tactical in WWII. Possibly due to the speed of the warfare.

[Warship NWS]

I think my main issue is that for something to have a strategic impact it has to be more than simple information. In the defense of Paris air recon showed something that was reacted to and may have saved the city - I don't dispute this. The move by the French army was perhaps a strategic moved based on the information they learned from the aircraft but in all honesty, not being difficult or sarcastic or disagreeing just due to who started the thread - I don't see it that way.

Ok.. define strategic value then? Can intel/comms/recon be strategic in your eyes? How does a commander win a strategic battle or commit to strategic warfare without it? If he cannot win a strategic battle without it then how can such a dimension of warfare be considered only tactical in nature?

[old_pop2000]

After WWII, the new USAF had three commands; Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command and Air Defense command. This belies their thinking at the time. Beale AFB was the home of the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flying SR-71 Blackbirds. We used to called them "high flyers". For obvious reasons. They would deploy forward to Okinawa, before commencing their "flights" to no-where.;)

Now, the org chart shows Air Combat command and Air Mobility command along with Special Operations command and Space command. This reflects a change in doctrine.

Things will change, as they always do.

[Warship NWS]

Was the actions of the aircraft what saved Paris? I doubt it was the only reason the German's failed. The Belgium Armies stubborn defense slowed Von Kluck down, logistic's hampered the speed, Allied resistance. I believe that aerial reconnaissance was more tactical in the Battle of the Marne, than strategic but it did give commander's a view of what the airplane could accomplish. So, after that, it was used more and its role and range expanded.


I would personaly not agree with this based on what I have researched over the past few days. The 6th Army was nearly defeated as the outset of the battle and if not for the 6,000 reinforcements brought up to the front they would have likely collapsed and they were the direct blocking force keeping the Germans from taking Paris. The 5th Army and the BEF drove hard into the right flank but without the knowledge given to the French by the aircraft at that time they would not have been in position to make that offensive move in time. Every account I have read so far have shown that the aircraft proved vital to the defense of Paris as all French Generals, with the exception of one, did not believe their reports of the German operations - fortunately that one French General acted on it. At least that is what I have read so far and have yet to read anything to contradict the information. I do not doubt that the German lines had weak points but the only way for the French to know where they were was by aerial recon.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Yet we then have four years of stalemate, at least on the Western Front. Where is the strategic impact of the aircraft?

Actually I have responded to this several times now.. the aircraft may well have been a major, if not the greatest, reason why the war became a line of trenches. You cannot break through trenches without a) effective artillery, b) reaction mobility, c) concentrated forces. Well.. planes flying over head can mean.. a) counter battery fire, and b) defensive blocking forces. What better way to have a good defense then to know when and where your enemy will attack? There was no possible way for the French to defend the entire line of trenches without knowing when and where they could possibly be attacked in time enough to prepare reinforcements without airplanes. Just because one side could not overrrun the other side due to lack of mobility, which in turn aids in reaction time to updated information, does not make aerial recon any less significant in its strategic use -- in this case the aiding of defending the trench lines.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I hate to tell you this, but you can't hardly expect the Air Force magazine or the Royal Air Force to be unbiased sources regarding the importance of the airplane. A good unbiased source would be a German source saying that RAF planes forced a change of strategy or that Zeppelins forced Britain to change its strategy.

Such a source does not exist for the simple reason that air attacks on the strategic plane were just pinpricks on the warmaking capability of the powers. Going further, even the definition of strategic targets you are providing for the XXI century doesn't apply to WW1 because those targets that were hit were on the tactical plane, i.e. close behind the frontlines and impacting mainly frontline forces, a role, BTW, no different from the long range artillery, yet I don't think anyone is going to say that railroad artillery was "strategic".

Since when did I ever say anything strategic about Zeppelins or bombing?? Never once.. not one time. I said recon/intel gathering.. tell me one source that came close to the airplane? As to biased.. well I can reply with the fact that most historians have reported nothing about the airplane or state they did little in the war. Yet.. every darn major battle that was fought included recon planes. If you can find a source.. with verifiable evidence.. that airplanes did squat in terms of strategic recon then let me know.

Side note.. I came across 4-5 sources now regarding aerial recon.. and I do find it ironic that aircraft development was accellerated faster then any other technology in the history of warfare starting in 1914.. think there might be a reason for that?

[Warship NWS]

No, I don't have to prove you wrong, I am not arguing that planes were not important or useful, what I am arguing is that their role could have been performed by cavalry, not as well or as efficiently but as surely in 1914.

Please describe to me in detail how the horse calvary could perform the same duties in terms of tactical (front lines) and strategic recon (behind the front lines) operations and how many calvary units it would take just to compare to one airplane.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Which prompted the RN to try the Cuxhaven raid. It might have been more successful if the weather had not been so bad. It did achieve total surprise and demonstrated that seaplanes could attack land based targets. This leads to seaplane tenders which leads to real aircraft carriers by the end of the war. As I mentioned earlier, the RN seemed to grasp airpower's potential very early in the war.

Agreed completely. The RN were learning the strategic significance of aircraft, and airships, early on. One airship or airplane could change the course of a surface battle very quickly. Had aircraft been operational over Jutland, and functional, the HSF may not have made it back to base. I would also wager that much of the naval blockade was successful due to the use of patrol aircraft and recon planes monitoring and photographing naval ports.

[old_pop2000]

.....
Now, strategic recon would be defined by what's being reckoned, a convoy running from Palembang to Osaka would be a strategic target for a strategic weapon, the submarine. A convoy bringing supplies to Rabaul is hardly a strategic target, because it is not needed to increase the war-making potential of Japan. That, of course, does not mean it's not IMPORTANT, or that he effects of loosing x merchants is not felt on a national level.

JMS:
For a nation that depends on the sea for commerce and major elements of its economy, shipping is a strategic asset. Whether that asset is going to Japan carrying raw materials or from Japan carrying finished products to the war zone. They are of strategic value to that nation. Sea lanes are the naval equivalent of railways and roads. Are the railroads that carry products from a factory to a supply dump, strategic assets? The Allied strategic bombing forces spent a lot of time, money and men bombing railway yards to hinder those movements. The same goes for sea lanes except we use submarines and aircraft. What about information from long range bombers and flying boats over these island and their ports? Don't they equate to the railway yards on land? If they do, then reconnaissance of their facilities and the ships moving in and out, is strategic information that leads to operations to hinder the war-making capability of the enemy. War-making capability is not just the production of materials, it's also the method of transporting the raw materials and finished products. Those are strategic targets.

[old_pop2000]

From "The International Military Digest" dtd 1917 -


Thus on August 23,1914, aerial reconnaissance developed the fact that there was not a very large force left between the French frontier and Mulhouse. The Allies were informed of German strength and direction of march in Belgium by aviators.....In the course of the Battle of the Marne, a French aviator discovered the gap between two of German armies and thus contributed to the French victory. .... Aviators were so active against railroads that most movements of troops took place at night.

There is more to this piece. It goes on to say that initially, the aircraft was important for reconnaissance to determine the nature of the enemy defenses, etc. Everything that was going on behind the front. It states that aerial photography was valuable for mapping, unmapped areas.

Just thought I would pass this brief information along to illustrate what the thinking in 1917 was about the airplane.

[Warship NWS]

Infantry trench warfare instructions from WW1 archives,



A system of trenches must therefore be designed which facilities the preparation and launching of an unexpected assault, and at the same time is adapted to meet a sudden attack by the enemy. The organization of a trench system to facilitate attack is an important point which is frequently neglected. If additional trenches have to be hastily made when an attack is intended, the intention to attack will be obvious to the enemy by aerial reconnaissance, and surprise will be out of the question.


I fully feel that trench warfare, which became paramount during WW1 due to lack of land mechanized units, was greatly instigated by the use of aircraft for recon duties. Due to aircraft recon surprise attacks became far more difficult to accomplish and without surprise it was far easier to prepare defensive perimeters and artillery/MG kill zones based on the most viable avenues of attack. Also, this is where aircraft are especially strategic in their value, you cannot simply have ample logistical support (deployment of artillery, field hospitals, ammunition, and other support assets) everywhere at once while blindly trying to guess where the enemy will be encountered. Having aerial recon assets allows you to know when and where to deploy logistical support operations in support of defensive and offensive operations.

The article also explained how night operations had to be used more often due to the presence of daylight aerial recon which in turn caused higher fatigue and attrition rates due to the added dangers and obstacles of moving at night. This alone caused major operational changes due to the use of aerial recon.. and persisted througout most of the war. This also ties into the reduced mobility of land warfare without mechanized vehicles and again contributed to the often static operations of trench warfare.

End result.. the airplane changed the face of warfare on all levels, tactical, operational, and strategic.. simply by being the most effective method of gathering intelligence while flying over the battlefield. Even if recon, fighter, or bomber aircraft did not kill that many people on the ground they did alter how and when they could fight on the ground. Indirectly, they also caused far greater casualties due to spotting enemy positions then would have been acheived using any other methods of recon.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Military aviation was still in its infancy when the First World War began, only 11 years after the Wright brothers' flight. Its role was expected to be limited to reconnaissance activities in support of ground forces and the number of operational aircraft available to the air forces of the major powers was small. During the initial war of movement on the Western Front, they quickly demonstrated their value in providing ground forces with regular information about enemy troop dispositions. As trench warfare developed towards the end of 1914, the cavalry was unable to carry out its traditional reconnaissance role and aircraft provided the only reliable source of information about the enemy's activities.

This is part of the Roll of Honour archives collected by WW1 historical researchers. To JMS, if you think you can counter this historical research please feel free to try. Since you felt my sources from RFC and historical aeronautical archives were "biased".. I figured if you heard the same from the guys on the ground and other historical research organizations you might be more inclined to offer some evidence of your own to try and counter my stance with. In any professional debate one should offer some evidence of why they agree or disagree with a point of view.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

A book written by the Defense Dept (over 600 pages) with this basic description of the importance of WW1 aerial recon,



Publisher: Defense Dept., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

Description: Although photography was already a well-established fixture of 19th century society, it was the marriage of photography and the airplane that created the new military art of aerial observation during World War I. Shooting the Front is a pioneering study of the impact of aerial photography on America's fledgling air force during its baptism of fire above the trenches of the Western Front. This comprehensive history from the Defense Intelligence Agency highlights aerial photography's ability to command the high ground and provide a concise view of a battle area, both tactically and strategically. It is an authoritative account of aerial reconnaissance and the interpretation of photographs as they evolved into the most important sources of intelligence along the entire Western Front during the Great War.

[Warship NWS]

USAF essay written by Major James Brasswell in 1993, USAF. Tactical recon was the primary objective of the essay, however, it contains a comment regarding the use of "tactical" and "strategic" recon assets during WW1,



"In WW I, despite the more romantic interests in the feats of the air aces, reconnaissance was the most important function of the military air arm. (11:35) Reconnaissance aircraft played a key role in spotting the split between two German Armies ap-proaching Paris and paved the way for the Battle of the Marne, which stemmed the German tide in 1914. (3:192) In fact, what historians often overlook is that the combat aircraft evolved so rapidly in 1915-16 mainly because it became essential to hamper the other side's aerial reconnaissance capability. (19:20) Yet, why was tactical reconnaissance so important to the ommander? Knowledge of an enemy's dispositions and movement had always been a key to success in a war. (19:17) According H. A. Jones in the official history of the Royal Flying Corps in World War I: Air reconnaissance was now in the nature of a routine insur-ance against surprise. Broadly speaking, it settled to two kinds--tactical and strategical. Tactical reconnaissance may be said to be confined to the immediate battle area to locate and examine trenches, gun emplacements, reserves and rail heads, chiefly to satisfy the corps or divisional commanders who wish to know what there is to their immediate
front, as well as changes that may take place from day to day.. . . (19:23) With the marriage of the camera and airplane, military commanders no longer had to rely on the limited view from the "high ground."
(11:35) In truth, air reconnaissance--or lack of it--was a critical factor in the major ground battles of the war. (4:34)"

[Warship NWS]

The fundamental purpose of the aircraft in trench warfare was reconnaissance and artillery observation. Aerial reconnaissance was so significant in exposing movements, it has been said the trench stalemate was a product of it.


Source: "Aces: A Story of the First World War", written by George Pearson, historical advisors Brereton Greenhous & Philip Markham, 1993

[Warship NWS]

Technical excerpt regarding aerial photography,


World War I

Almost immediately after the onset of WWI, aerial reconnaissance and the airplane gained recognition. It is important to footnote here that aerial combat was first introduced as a means of preventing enemy aerial reconnaissance activities. As early as 1915 the Germans began mounting forward firing machine guns on Fokker monoplanes. The main targets of these aircraft were the British B.E.2c reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial photographic intelligence and reconnaissance operations were influencing the course of the war, and became a critical function.

While aerial photography was not a new idea it was during this violent period that the aerial camera came of age, along with the airplane. Oblique and vertical cameras were used by both sides, despite the fact that automatic sequencing cameras would not be available for a number of years, meaning that a two—man, team operation was essential.
Just to provide some idea of the emphasis placed on aerial photography during this period, it is worth mentioning that the Germans had 2000 mapping cameras and 100 automatic film cameras in service in 1918, and were collecting and processing some 4000 photos per day. They actually mapped the entire Western Front every two weeks using aerial photography. No small feat given the technology of the day.(10) By 1918, what had begun so inauspiciously had become vital. Countless sorties were flown on every day weather permitted. The true magnitude of the effort is demonstrated by the fact that more than 10,000 photos were taken by the Germans during the single week before the March Somme Offensive.

[JMS]

Consider this, if the advanced base has the capacity to repair and upgrade ships, supply ships, train crews, isn't this a war making capability? Is an attack on the dry docks, fuel depot at Pearl Harbor, tactical or strategic? It strikes at the heart of our ability to make war or war making capability. Japanese Mavis reconnaissance missions over Pearl were strategic missions, not tactical missions. They were aimed at gaining strategic information about our ability to conduct the war. So advanced naval bases can be considered strategic targets. How about Truk, Rabaul, Singapore? The air raids by the 5th AF against Rabaul? Strategic or tactical? Think carefully about the answer.

Strategic? no way, unless you consider also an strategic target the repair workshop of a tank battalion or a supply truck. Destroying the fuel tanks and the drydocks of Pearl hinders the war effort but does not destroy it not does it destroy the will to wage war, ships can still be built and men mobilised and I would like to point out that no ship was built in Pearl, Truk, Lae or Rabaul. Recon missions flown over CONUS, or the USSR or Germany were strategic, as they aimed at determining where and how the war-making capability of those nations were, recon missions flown over France in '44 or Russia in '41 were tactical, aimed at determining how enemy forces were deployed.

[JMS]

The primary point was to show that aircraft most certainly contributed to the ground war.. which contradicts what many historians have said for years.. that they did nearly nothing to contribute to the war. It is high time that the 4th dimension of warfare - recon/commn/intel - starts getting the recognition it deserves. If it mattered at this battle, the saving of France, the defense of French trenches (static trenches would not have happened if the French did NOT know where the Germans would attack), and other minor and major battles.. then the airplane cannot just be tossed under the quick and convenient rug of insignificance just because they did not carry big bombs.

Again you are confusing tactical and strategic with useless and useful. I have seen no post arguing that planes were useless in this thread, but you have yet to show that they changed the strategic equation in WW1, like, for example, the submarine.

[JMS]

This is part of the Roll of Honour archives collected by WW1 historical researchers. To JMS, if you think you can counter this historical research please feel free to try. Since you felt my sources from RFC and historical aeronautical archives were "biased".. I figured if you heard the same from the guys on the ground and other historical research organizations you might be more inclined to offer some evidence of your own to try and counter my stance with. In any professional debate one should offer some evidence of why they agree or disagree with a point of view.

Thanks.

Great quotes all of them, none of which contradict my point, that aircraft were useful at a tactical level and none of them supporting your point that they were a strategic weapon, the only one dividing recon between tactical and strategic pointedly failing to provide any example of strategic recon during WW1. Even the possibility of air recon at Jutland, intelligence whose exploitation remains unproven, is a tactical result.

As for biased sources, the RAF certainly was interested in propping up the importance of strategic air warfare, and I hate to quote the same twice, but it seems it was missed the first time around:

Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defence 2005.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/strategic+air+warfare

Why was the RAF so interested on this? because Trenchard had been the driving force behind the Independent Force designed to bomb German factories in 1919 (a strategic operation). This is a fact, not a theory, well supported by any source you care to check. Interwar the RAF was designed to wage strategic warfare and colonial policing, by the same man Trenchard in order to keep it an independent service. You will also note that all the articles you have quoted come from air force sources, who will naturally focus on the importance of the air war, how can they not be biased?

Anyway, I sure will change my mind once you have provided the examples that show how airplanes in WW1 contrubuted to "the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war."

[Warship NWS]

You will also note that all the articles you have quoted come from air force sources, who will naturally focus on the importance of the air war, how can they not be biased?


Ah check again JMS, I came back with the trench warfare infantry guide based on WW1 archives, a photographic research organization, historical researchers of aerial warfare during WW1, and obviously you missed this big time.. you seem to be stuck on a DOD quote from 2005.. well check this out from 2007,


Publisher: Defense Dept., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

Description: Although photography was already a well-established fixture of 19th century society, it was the marriage of photography and the airplane that created the new military art of aerial observation during World War I. Shooting the Front is a pioneering study of the impact of aerial photography on America's fledgling air force during its baptism of fire above the trenches of the Western Front. This comprehensive history from the Defense Intelligence Agency highlights aerial photography's ability to command the high ground and provide a concise view of a battle area, both tactically and strategically. It is an authoritative account of aerial reconnaissance and the interpretation of photographs as they evolved into the most important sources of intelligence along the entire Western Front during the Great War.

I don't see some air force source anywhere in there.. do you? BTW, how do you reduce the ability of the enemy to wage war on a strategic level (land, sea, or air) WITHOUT strategic recon? Not happening.

[JMS]

Ok.. has anyone stopped to consider the difference between tactical (ground unit front line recon) and strategic (rear echellon, support, logistical) recon?? Think this does not exist? Apparently the USAF thought it made a difference as of 1948 with the first strategic recon air wings using long range aircraft to go beyond the front lines of the enemy. Starting in 1948 the USAF officially started to designate recon air wings as "tactical" and "strategic" -- point being, there IS a difference between the levels of intel gathering. Strategic does NOT mean you have to drop bombs, strategic CAN mean you need to FIND and LOCATE strategic targets for bombing or higher level of intel gathering.


That the USAF woke up in '48 does not mean that others did not know the difference, the RAF had set up a unit in 1939 (or it may be 1938) to perform strategic reconnaisance.

[Warship NWS]

Strategic bombing during WW1, every strategic bombing operation during WW1 included strategic recon units for targeting and bombing assessements. This is fact.. not opinion. The French, British, Russians, and Germans ALL had strategic recon aircraft to aid in mapping, targeting, and damage recording for the bomber raids.

Point being.. strategic bombing did not happen without strategic recon.

Let's flip this around.. what is considered strategic land warfare? Aircraft instigated trench warfare which in turn cancelled out cavalry... read above to prove my points. How was that not changing the strategic face of land warfare?

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

That the USAF woke up in '48 does not mean that others did not know the difference, the RAF had set up a unit in 1939 (or it may be 1938) to perform strategic reconnaisance.

I only brought up the USAF to prove that there were differences between strategic and tactical recon .. so you just proved my point again. However, strategic recon already existed in WW1.. otherwise there would have been no strategic bombing during WW1. The recon in all catagories served the same military application purposes.

[Warship NWS]

Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.

Ok JMS, since your stuck on this quote lets hit a few key points,

Air combat and supportive operations.. well, since every strategic air force in the world since airplanes started flying in formation have "supportive" recon aircraft.. I guess they should be included right? How do you find all those stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communications, etc.. (all of which can be near the front or to the rear) without aerial recon? Are you just flying bombers out there without targets or what? Without recon planes.. no targets, no strategic bombing.

[JMS]

Ah check again JMS, I came back with the trench warfare infantry guide based on WW1 archives, a photographic research organization, historical researchers of aerial warfare during WW1, and obviously you missed this big time.. you seem to be stuck on a DOD quote from 2005.. well check this out from 2007,



I don't see some air force source anywhere in there.. do you? BTW, how do you reduce the ability of the enemy to wage war on a strategic level (land, sea, or air) WITHOUT strategic recon? Not happening.

What I am missing big time in your posts is the actual examples of strategic recon in WW1 and the subsequent reduction of the ability to wage war that would be needed to fit the concept "strategic air warfare" in the actual history of World War 1. You have provided a number of quotes which markedly don't provide such examples.

It would also be great if you quoted the article from which you pulled the quotes: "Aerial Tactical Reconnaissance--A Necessity"

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/1993/BJG.htm

[JMS]

Ok JMS, since your stuck on this quote lets hit a few key points,

Air combat and supportive operations.. well, since every strategic air force in the world since airplanes started flying in formation have "supportive" recon aircraft.. I guess they should be included right? How do you find all those stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communications, etc.. (all of which can be near the front or to the rear) without aerial recon? Are you just flying bombers out there without targets or what? Without recon planes.. no targets, no strategic bombing.

You are implying that the only way to spot a target is by aerial recon, which is obviously wrong, the Krupp works were well known as where shipyards, factories, etc. or London. Besides, ever heard of "spies"? they were in vogue in WW1.

[Warship NWS]

What I am missing big time in your posts is the actual examples of strategic recon in WW1 and the subsequent reduction of the ability to wage war that would be needed to fit the concept "strategic air warfare" in the actual history of World War 1. You have provided a number of quotes which markedly don't provide such examples.

It would also be great if you quoted the article from which you pulled the quotes: "Aerial Tactical Reconnaissance--A Necessity"

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/1993/BJG.htm

Yes.. it was a tactical essay primarly that includes a strategic quote.. I know what I read,


According H. A. Jones in
the official history of the Royal Flying Corps in World War I:
Air reconnaissance was now in the nature of a routine insur-
ance against surprise. Broadly speaking, it settled to two
kinds--tactical and strategical.

But thats right.. hes an RFC guy from WW1.. so he is auto-biased according to your point of view.

[Warship NWS]

You are implying that the only way to spot a target is by aerial recon, which is obviously wrong, the Krupp works were well known as where shipyards, factories, etc. or London. Besides, ever heard of "spies"? they were in vogue in WW1.

Ok.. name the spies that gave back as many damage assessment reports or targeting locations as aerial recon or that were attached to air forces.

[Warship NWS]

Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.


Recon planes allowed for the targeting of .... stockpiles (depots), transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommited elements of enemy armed forces.. at the least during WW1 either by bombers or artillery.. heck I posted pictures of a depot that was heavily shelled into destruction.. in thanks to a recon plane mapping it and setting it up for artillery attack. It would seem to me that would contribute to the "war-making" capacity reduction of an army I think. Heck that even fits your DOD 2005 description and you still won't accept it.

[JMS]

Recon planes allowed for the targeting of .... stockpiles (depots), transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommited elements of enemy armed forces.. at the least during WW1 either by bombers or artillery.. heck I posted pictures of a depot that was heavily shelled into destruction.. in thanks to a recon plane mapping it and setting it up for artillery attack. It would seem to me that would contribute to the "war-making" capacity reduction of an army I think. Heck that even fits your DOD 2005 description and you still won't accept it.

Am I saying otherwise? but the warmaking capability and the will to wage war were not affected by the depth of the raids and intelligence of the means available in WW1. Air Corps history mentions the deepest raid as 160 miles, insufficient to hit the German warmaking capability or the will to wage war. What hit them at that level was the blockade, not the planes, and any intelligence they may bring back at that level was wasted because the means to reach out and destroy the targets were yet insufficient.

From the wikipedia:

"World War I

Strategic bombing was first used in World War I, though it was not understood in its present form. The first strategic bombing mission of the war was likely the dropping of five bombs on the Gare L'Est in Paris on August 30, 1914. Within a year or so, specialized aircraft and dedicated bomber squadrons were in service on both sides. These were generally used for tactical bombing: the aim was that of directly harming enemy troops, strongpoints, or equipment, usually within a relatively small distance of the front line. Eventually, attention turned to the possibility of causing indirect harm to the enemy by systematically attacking vital rear-area resources.

The first-ever dirigible aerial bombardment of civilians was on January 19, 1915, in which two German Zeppelins dropped 24 fifty-kilogram (110 pound) high-explosive bombs and ineffective three-kilogram incendiaries on the Eastern England towns of Great Yarmouth, Sheringham, King's Lynn, and the surrounding villages. In all, four people were killed, sixteen injured, and monetary damage was estimated at £7,740 (about US$36,000 at the time). German dirigibles also bombed Liepaja in Latvia on the Eastern Front in January, 1915.

There were a further nineteen raids in 1915, in which 37 tons of bombs were dropped, killing 181 people and injuring 455. Raids continued in 1916. London was accidentally bombed in May, and, in July, the Kaiser allowed directed raids against urban centers. There were 23 airship raids in 1916, in which 125 tons of ordnance were dropped, killing 293 people and injuring 691. Gradually British air defenses improved. In 1917 and 1918, there were only 11 Zeppelin raids against England, and the final raid occurred on August 5, 1918, which resulted in the death of KK Peter Strasser, commander of the German Naval Airship Department. By the end of the war, 51 raids had been undertaken, in which 5,806 bombs were dropped, killing 557 people and injuring 1,358. The Zeppelin raids were complemented by the Gotha bomber, which was the first heavier-than-air bomber to be used for strategic bombing. It has been argued that the raids were effective far beyond the material damage caused, in diverting and hampering wartime production, and diverting twelve squadrons and over 10,000 men to air defenses.

The French army on June 15, 1915 attacked the German town of Karlsruhe, killing 29 civilians and wounding 58. Further raids followed until the Armistice in 1918.

In contrast, the British launched their own form of strategic bombing. At the start of the war, there were attacks by bombers of the Royal Navy Air Service (RNAS) against the Zeppelin production lines and their sheds at Cologne and Dusseldorf on September 22 and October 8, 1914. In late 1915, the order was given for attacks on German industrial targets and the 41st Wing was formed from units of the RNAS and RFC. RNAS took to strategic bombing in bigger way than the RFC who were focussed on supporting the infantry actions of the Western Front. At first the RNAS attacked the German submarines in their moorings then steelworks further in targeting the origin of the submarines themselves.

In early 1918 they operated their "round the clock" bombing raid; with lighter bombs attacking the town of Trier by day and large HP O/400s attacking by night. In April 1918, the Independent Force was created, an expanded bombing group that by the end of the war had aircraft that could reach Berlin but were never used.

Following the war, the concept of strategic bombing developed. The calculations which were performed on the number of dead to the weight of bombs dropped would have a profound effect on the attitudes of the British authorities and population in the interwar years, because as bombers became larger it was fully expected that deaths from aerial bombardment would approach those anticipated in the Cold War from the use of nuclear weapons. The fear of aerial attack on such a scale was one of the fundamental driving forces of British appeasement in the 1930s."

It's really very simple, even though strategic level ops were performed in WW1, their effects were insufficient to consider the plane a strategic level weapon.

[JMS]

Ok.. name the spies that gave back as many damage assessment reports or targeting locations as aerial recon or that were attached to air forces.

Again you are confusing the issue, you have to provide the strategic level intelligence brough back by plane in WW1 or the damage reports or anything at a strategic level. Photos of trenches, artillery or a raid junction behind the front just don't fit.

[Warship NWS]

Again you are confusing the issue, you have to provide the strategic level intelligence brough back by plane in WW1 or the damage reports or anything at a strategic level. Photos of trenches, artillery or a raid junction behind the front just don't fit.

Ok I get it.. so unless the result of a recon flight was strategic it is always only tactical since you are basicaly shoehorning a 2005 DOD statement into early 1900s warfare, well, the BEF was not destroyed and Paris was not taken.. I did state those results previously.. but oh yeah.. cavalry could have saved the day in both counts according to your verified resources right? I will find other occurances.. but I do find it ironic how every major battle fought in WW1 included aerial recon aircraft, but yeah, that is only tactical too since none of those battles were strategic for either side right and it wasnt some big factory being bombed out of existense which in turn won the war. BTW, I did post a picture of a depot that was shelled into rubble due to a recon flight mapping it out for an artillery barrage but I guess that was only tactical too.

You and me will definitely have to agree to disagree here. Even when I quoted a DOD source material you still will not recognize the strategic importance of aerial recon during WW1. IMHO, you may say recon is usefull and even though it did change the face of warfare during WW1, which I also gave resources for, I do not think you will never believe recon to more then of tactical useage - and I am sorry but that is just flat wrong according to every air force doctrine of aerial recon I have ever read.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

It's really very simple, even though strategic level ops were performed in WW1, their effects were insufficient to consider the plane a strategic level weapon.

Because you are entirely stuck on the bombs dropped not the information collected during any battles or campaigns due to aerial recon.

I am done for now.. I have 2 very good sources coming in soon to add to my research materials.

[JMS]

You and me will definitely have to agree to disagree here.


Fine.



I do not think you will never believe recon to more then of tactical useage - and I am sorry but that is just flat wrong according to every air force doctrine of aerial recon I have ever read.

Nope, you are wrong there, strategic recon could be critical and indeed change the course of history, like it did in the Cuban missile crisis, but it did not in WW1.

[Warship NWS]

Nope, you are wrong there, strategic recon could be critical and indeed change the course of history, like it did in the Cuban missile crisis, but it did not in WW1.

Ok.. what is your definition difference between strategic recon and tactical recon? Also, wasn't the fact that France was not defeated a strategic event during WW1 or the BEF not being exterminated? I'm sorry but I have yet to ever read any source, nor have you supplied any, to show that cavalry would have saved the French or the British in either case.

[Warship NWS]

Nope, you are wrong there, strategic recon could be critical and indeed change the course of history, like it did in the Cuban missile crisis, but it did not in WW1.

Wait a minute here.. your 2005 DOD definition includes the "application of force" to reduce the ability of an enemy to wage war.. we did not use any force during the Cuban Missile Crisis.. no shots fired, only the threat of force applies in that scenario, or is your new prerequisite now "changing the course of history".. I do not remember that being in the 2005 DOD definition either.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The primary point was to show that aircraft most certainly contributed to the ground war.. which contradicts what many historians have said for years.. that they did nearly nothing to contribute to the war. It is high time that the 4th dimension of warfare - recon/commn/intel - starts getting the recognition it deserves. If it mattered at this battle, the saving of France, the defense of French trenches (static trenches would not have happened if the French did NOT know where the Germans would attack), and other minor and major battles.. then the airplane cannot just be tossed under the quick and convenient rug of insignificance just because they did not carry big bombs.

Chris:

I would say that once warfare evolved from direct clashes between hunter gathers and you had something approaching a standing organized army, you needed to be able to communicate with the army, supply it and send it off in the right direction. Aircraft are merely a very potent extension of the 4th dimension of warfare as are satellites and probably internet operations.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Kyle:
The problem that most people have, is attempting to relate to the differences in ranges from The Great War to WWII. In the Great War, heavy bombers might have an endurance, at 80 MPH, of 3-4 hours. That's about 300 miles. The Gotha had a range of 500 depending on the bombload. In WWII, the bombers had ranges of over 2000-3000 miles. They could hit just about any target in Germany and France. From NA, they could hit all of Italy, Greece, and Southern Germany.

This difference in range changes our perspective on WWI aircraft. Based on our current perceptions, they were short ranged machines. However, with static warfare, is 100 miles a strategic distance or is it a tactical distance? When fronts barely moved 20 miles in offensives, then 100 miles is a long way. Enemy actions 100 miles from the front, can be strategic and less tactical. An ammunition factory might be 100 miles or 200 miles from the static front and be within range of heavy bombers. In our definition, it is a strategic target as would any information that we gather of it.

Now, what about troop movements? Again the range issue comes into play. If I observe a troop train moving southward, parallel to the front, is that a strategic target, or a tactical target? In WWII, that is probably a tactical interdiction target. Fighter-bombers could range well over 500 miles behind the front. However, in WWI terms, with static fronts, that target might be a strategic target. It isn't really moving to any particular area of the front, but it whereabouts is important, especially if it is a large train. As a supreme commander, I would want to know about that train and its direction and composition. It's information may reveal valuable strategic information as to the enemy's intentions. That's what strategic reconnaissance and observation can tell you. It can answer the five W's- who, what, when, where and why.

Strategic reconnaissance is more than just the sum of one bit of information from one aircraft, it is the sum total of all the information received from all of the flights. Together they give the supreme commander a picture of what transpiring on the other side of the hill. One flight cannot provide the total picture. Information can be the number of troop trains headed in one direction, movement of horse drawn carts, new supply dumps, troop withdrawals, artillery movements, new airfields, new communication centers and headquarters. All of this and more, constitutes one piece of the puzzle. It is the job of the photo interpreter and the intelligence staff to take this information and create a picture and prepare written intelligence interpretations of the information along with recommendations as to its meaning. This is the job of the intelligence section of any staff and aerial reconnaissance is one tool. The information can be tactical and only effect the local commander or it could be strategic, in which case it will be forwarded to higher headquarters for their appraisal along with other reports from other units.

As the range of aircraft increased in the interwar period and the doctrine of aerial warfare developed, the words tactical and strategical became more definite in terms of targets and range. But it has always been subject to change and interpretation.

I would not become stuck on the two terms. Just keep in mind there is a difference, and it changed as aerial warfare doctrine changed and with the improvement in aircraft, navigation systems, weapons and photography. Was the actions of the aircraft what saved Paris? I doubt it was the only reason the German's failed. The Belgium Armies stubborn defense slowed Von Kluck down, logistic's hampered the speed, Allied resistance. I believe that aerial reconnaissance was more tactical in the Battle of the Marne, than strategic but it did give commander's a view of what the airplane could accomplish. So, after that, it was used more and its role and range expanded.

That's my take on this.

Dennis:

Cogent points about scale of operations. What could be considered strategic in the horse and musket period would barely pass for tactical today.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some simple ways of thinking about these two overused terms.

First, they bookend operational.

Two, Strategic is more of a game changer, while tactical is more of a game player.

Three, in chess, strategic would be check and mate moves, tactical might be opening and castling moves.

Four, strategic focuses on the ends, tactical the means


Don't get too hung up on these two. Remember that we now have tactical, operational and strategic. Targets that used to be strategic, might be operational targets now. This goes for WWI. Targets that were strategic in WWI, were probably tactical in WWII. Possibly due to the speed of the warfare.

Dennis:

To stretch a bad analogy:

Strategic: The architect's plan for your house.
Operational: The foreman's plan for what get's done when and what get's ordered first.
Tactical: The day to day work of the plumber, sheet rocker, or carpenter tackling the immediate task at hand.

All governed by the strategic blueprint for your house and subject to the operational needs as to what can be done in a given time period (hate when that load of shingles doesn't arrive on time. Sorta like not getting your ammo or fuel when preparing for a battle).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok.. define strategic value then? Can intel/comms/recon be strategic in your eyes? How does a commander win a strategic battle or commit to strategic warfare without it? If he cannot win a strategic battle without it then how can such a dimension of warfare be considered only tactical in nature?


Chris:

I think what we are seeing in WWI is the acceleration of the strategic aspect of warfare. With aircraft and wireless communication, the decision cycle of operations is enhanced and speeded up. A good example is the battlecruiser. It was in many ways the first "fast reaction force" when combined with intel gathering and wireless communications. The airplane does the same thing on land or at sea. The overall commander now has more timely intel to act on. The limiting factor is how quickly he or his opponent can bring their forces to bear. You mentioned in an earlier post that the failure to exploit the airborne intel was more due to the lack of mechanization on the ground than to the intel itself and I have to agree that this is true. Even by the end of WWI, ground forces were becoming mechanized at a pace that would have startled most generals in 1914.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Strategic? no way, unless you consider also an strategic target the repair workshop of a tank battalion or a supply truck. Destroying the fuel tanks and the drydocks of Pearl hinders the war effort but does not destroy it not does it destroy the will to wage war, ships can still be built and men mobilised and I would like to point out that no ship was built in Pearl, Truk, Lae or Rabaul. Recon missions flown over CONUS, or the USSR or Germany were strategic, as they aimed at determining where and how the war-making capability of those nations were, recon missions flown over France in '44 or Russia in '41 were tactical, aimed at determining how enemy forces were deployed.

JMS:

Be careful not to narrowly define the term strategic here. Pearl Harbor was a tactical Japanese victory mostly because they didn't neutralize Pearl Harbor as a repair and supply base for the Pacific Fleet. Overall, the IJN didn't seriously degrade the ability of the US to build ships, etc., but had Pearl Harbor been fully neutralized, even without nailing the carriers, it becomes much harder to operate in the Pacific if you have to call San Diego your home port. That is the main reason why the Pacific Fleet was shifted to Pearl Harbor even though it was not a fully functional fleet base until late 1942.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Strategic bombing during WW1, every strategic bombing operation during WW1 included strategic recon units for targeting and bombing assessements. This is fact.. not opinion. The French, British, Russians, and Germans ALL had strategic recon aircraft to aid in mapping, targeting, and damage recording for the bomber raids.

Point being.. strategic bombing did not happen without strategic recon.

Let's flip this around.. what is considered strategic land warfare? Aircraft instigated trench warfare which in turn cancelled out cavalry... read above to prove my points. How was that not changing the strategic face of land warfare?

Thanks.


Chris:

WhileI see most of your argument about the role of aircraft in WWI, I am not buying that they created trench warfare. That was the result of a lack of mobility due to an inability to neutralize the firepower of the machine gun and artillery. Aircraft merely reinforced trench warfare by making sure nobody could pull off a flanking manuever. By knowing where the enemy was massing for an attack, you could be ready for the inevitable artillery barrage and position your reserves to plug any holes in the line. You see trench warfare broken by the use of infiltration techniques and increased infantry firepower all of which took four years to evolve.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You are implying that the only way to spot a target is by aerial recon, which is obviously wrong, the Krupp works were well known as where shipyards, factories, etc. or London. Besides, ever heard of "spies"? they were in vogue in WW1.

JMS:

I will agree here that most true strategic targets would be known well before war itself ever broke out. But that does not negate the value of strategic recon to determine if the target was better defended than originally thought, or if there would be an optimal time to attack it. No General Staff has ever complained about too much intelligence.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok.. name the spies that gave back as many damage assessment reports or targeting locations as aerial recon or that were attached to air forces.

Chris:

Be careful here, you are on slippy ground. Bomb damage assetment (BDA) is still a so-so discipline even with satellite intel. During the first Gulf War, the USAF was sure it had destroyed 4,000 AFVs. Turned out that the bulk of the vehicles destroyed were killed the old fashioned way, by tanks, IFVs, artillery or choppers. Aerial intel was very shaky right thru Viet Nam (check out air to air claims some time for an eye opener on this). Even aerial photos can be misinterpreted. The best recon is the guy on the ground up close.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Recon planes allowed for the targeting of .... stockpiles (depots), transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommited elements of enemy armed forces.. at the least during WW1 either by bombers or artillery.. heck I posted pictures of a depot that was heavily shelled into destruction.. in thanks to a recon plane mapping it and setting it up for artillery attack. It would seem to me that would contribute to the "war-making" capacity reduction of an army I think. Heck that even fits your DOD 2005 description and you still won't accept it.


Chris:

With all due respect, what you posted barely passes for operational. That wasn't strategic by any means. You show an example of a depot very close to the front lines being destroyed. But you didn't get the factory that made the shells, the mines that produced the raw materials or the railroads that delivered them to the depot. For all intents and purposes, the aircraft only acted as a foward observer for artillery or a spotter for a sniper, neither of which is strategic.

You have to accept the difference between tactical, operational and strategic. That's what JMS, Kyle and I are debating you on. Define strategic and work from there. I will accept that aircraft were certainly more vital to the conduct of the First World War than I had at the beginning of the debate. But I will remind you again that I asked you to define strategic at the beginning and it appears that this was the focal point of the entire discussion.;)

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

I think what we are seeing in WWI is the acceleration of the strategic aspect of warfare. With aircraft and wireless communication, the decision cycle of operations is enhanced and speeded up. A good example is the battlecruiser. It was in many ways the first "fast reaction force" when combined with intel gathering and wireless communications. The airplane does the same thing on land or at sea. The overall commander now has more timely intel to act on. The limiting factor is how quickly he or his opponent can bring their forces to bear. You mentioned in an earlier post that the failure to exploit the airborne intel was more due to the lack of mechanization on the ground than to the intel itself and I have to agree that this is true. Even by the end of WWI, ground forces were becoming mechanized at a pace that would have startled most generals in 1914.

This concept of strategic targets really has its beginning with Clausewitz;
Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms the plan of the war, and to the said aim it links the series of acts which are to lead to the same, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns, and regulates the combats to be fought in each.

If we use this definition of strategy and extrapolate to strategic targets, we should arrive at targets that do no contribute to the battle, but contribute to the aims of the war; namely victory gained through reducing the will of the people and their ability to continue war making. Ok, what constitutes targets that do not contribute directly to the prosecution of the battle, but to the continued prosecution of the conflict? This is the key here. A strategic target contributes to the overall strategy of the conflict; namely a favorable conclusion.

Now, let's run down some typical targets, and see what category they fall into:

Cities - Can be strategic if they contain factories, rail yards, road junctions, raw material production etc. If attacked by an enemy force, they can also be tactical targets.

Waterways - Can be strategic targets as they allow the transportation of article and goods between areas. Usually vital raw materials are transported along with finished goods. Can also be tactical targets if within a battle zone.

Sea lanes - Generally considered strategic targets, they do not contribute or participate directly in any single or group of battles but contribute to the war making ability of the enemy. If supplies are head toward the enemy nation, they can contribute to the reducing the moral of the people by depriving them of normally available goods.

Telephone exchanges - Generally these are strategic targets however, they can be considered and attacked as tactical targets if they are contributing the conduct of a battle.

Airfields - Most likely these are tactical targets. They are contributing directly to the conduct of an air campaign or battle, and are tactical in nature. Hard to apply the strategic name to airfields.

These are just a few examples. As you can see, the targets can be strategic or tactical. Many targets attacked by tactical air forces in WWII, were also attacked by strategic bombing forces. Same holds true in WWI.

There is also a dicotomy in strategic versus tactical reconnaissance. We can probably apply the same criteria. If the reconnaissance does not directly contribute to the conduct of a battle or series of battles, then it generally considered to be strategic reconnaissance. It is information that will contribute to the overall strategy or conduct of the war.

I say this again, do not get hung up on strict DOD definitions. I provided one simply to give us a starting point. That seems to be a mistake now. But we have to settle on definitions of terms. What are we talking about? Strategic versus tactical? The line blurs.

As for WWI, aerial doctrine was evolving. Warfare in The Great War was static with no flanks, and almost no mobility. It was siege warfare. A train moving toward the front with supplies and troops was headed toward a battlezone, no matter where it was. It could not escape that. This was a unique military conflict, and many of the ideas and definitions are hard to apply without reservations.

[Kyle Holgate]

Chris:

With all due respect, what you posted barely passes for operational. That wasn't strategic by any means. You show an example of a depot very close to the front lines being destroyed. But you didn't get the factory that made the shells, the mines that produced the raw materials or the railroads that delivered them to the depot. For all intents and purposes, the aircraft only acted as a foward observer for artillery or a spotter for a sniper, neither of which is strategic.

You have to accept the difference between tactical, operational and strategic. That's what JMS, Kyle and I are debating you on. Define strategic and work from there. I will accept that aircraft were certainly more vital to the conduct of the First World War than I had at the beginning of the debate. But I will remind you again that I asked you to define strategic at the beginning and it appears that this was the focal point of the entire discussion.;)

Bingo! Ed summed up the gist of my take on this quite well. What he said. :cool:

[Ed Rotondaro]

This concept of strategic targets really has its beginning with Clausewitz;

If we use this definition of strategy and extrapolate to strategic targets, we should arrive at targets that do no contribute to the battle, but contribute to the aims of the war; namely victory gained through reducing the will of the people and their ability to continue war making. Ok, what constitutes targets that do not contribute directly to the prosecution of the battle, but to the continued prosecution of the conflict? This is the key here. A strategic target contributes to the overall strategy of the conflict; namely a favorable conclusion.

Now, let's run down some typical targets, and see what category they fall into:

Cities - Can be strategic if they contain factories, rail yards, road junctions, raw material production etc. If attacked by an enemy force, they can also be tactical targets.

Waterways - Can be strategic targets as they allow the transportation of article and goods between areas. Usually vital raw materials are transported along with finished goods. Can also be tactical targets if within a battle zone.

Sea lanes - Generally considered strategic targets, they do not contribute or participate directly in any single or group of battles but contribute to the war making ability of the enemy. If supplies are head toward the enemy nation, they can contribute to the reducing the moral of the people by depriving them of normally available goods.

Telephone exchanges - Generally these are strategic targets however, they can be considered and attacked as tactical targets if they are contributing the conduct of a battle.

Airfields - Most likely these are tactical targets. They are contributing directly to the conduct of an air campaign or battle, and are tactical in nature. Hard to apply the strategic name to airfields.

These are just a few examples. As you can see, the targets can be strategic or tactical. Many targets attacked by tactical air forces in WWII, were also attacked by strategic bombing forces. Same holds true in WWI.

There is also a dicotomy in strategic versus tactical reconnaissance. We can probably apply the same criteria. If the reconnaissance does not directly contribute to the conduct of a battle or series of battles, then it generally considered to be strategic reconnaissance. It is information that will contribute to the overall strategy or conduct of the war.

I say this again, do not get hung up on strict DOD definitions. I provided one simply to give us a starting point. That seems to be a mistake now. But we have to settle on definitions of terms. What are we talking about? Strategic versus tactical? The line blurs.

As for WWI, aerial doctrine was evolving. Warfare in The Great War was static with no flanks, and almost no mobility. It was siege warfare. A train moving toward the front with supplies and troops was headed toward a battlezone, no matter where it was. It could not escape that. This was a unique military conflict, and many of the ideas and definitions are hard to apply without reservations.

Dennis:

That's as good a summation as you could ask for.

[Kyle Holgate]

This concept of strategic targets really has its beginning with Clausewitz;

If we use this definition of strategy and extrapolate to strategic targets, we should arrive at targets that do no contribute to the battle, but contribute to the aims of the war; namely victory gained through reducing the will of the people and their ability to continue war making. Ok, what constitutes targets that do not contribute directly to the prosecution of the battle, but to the continued prosecution of the conflict? This is the key here. A strategic target contributes to the overall strategy of the conflict; namely a favorable conclusion.

Now, let's run down some typical targets, and see what category they fall into:

Cities - Can be strategic if they contain factories, rail yards, road junctions, raw material production etc. If attacked by an enemy force, they can also be tactical targets.

Waterways - Can be strategic targets as they allow the transportation of article and goods between areas. Usually vital raw materials are transported along with finished goods. Can also be tactical targets if within a battle zone.

Sea lanes - Generally considered strategic targets, they do not contribute or participate directly in any single or group of battles but contribute to the war making ability of the enemy. If supplies are head toward the enemy nation, they can contribute to the reducing the moral of the people by depriving them of normally available goods.

Telephone exchanges - Generally these are strategic targets however, they can be considered and attacked as tactical targets if they are contributing the conduct of a battle.

Airfields - Most likely these are tactical targets. They are contributing directly to the conduct of an air campaign or battle, and are tactical in nature. Hard to apply the strategic name to airfields.

These are just a few examples. As you can see, the targets can be strategic or tactical. Many targets attacked by tactical air forces in WWII, were also attacked by strategic bombing forces. Same holds true in WWI.

There is also a dicotomy in strategic versus tactical reconnaissance. We can probably apply the same criteria. If the reconnaissance does not directly contribute to the conduct of a battle or series of battles, then it generally considered to be strategic reconnaissance. It is information that will contribute to the overall strategy or conduct of the war.

I say this again, do not get hung up on strict DOD definitions. I provided one simply to give us a starting point. That seems to be a mistake now. But we have to settle on definitions of terms. What are we talking about? Strategic versus tactical? The line blurs.

As for WWI, aerial doctrine was evolving. Warfare in The Great War was static with no flanks, and almost no mobility. It was siege warfare. A train moving toward the front with supplies and troops was headed toward a battlezone, no matter where it was. It could not escape that. This was a unique military conflict, and many of the ideas and definitions are hard to apply without reservations.

Good summary - (for once) no arguement from me!

[JMS]

JMS:

I will agree here that most true strategic targets would be known well before war itself ever broke out. But that does not negate the value of strategic recon to determine if the target was better defended than originally thought, or if there would be an optimal time to attack it. No General Staff has ever complained about too much intelligence.

You will get no argument for me regarding this point, my argument was that in WW1 the means to achieve this end were, for all practical purposes, non-existant.

[old_pop2000]

Good summary - (for once) no arguement from me!
I am truly sorry that my quick definition from the DOD dictionary was taken so literally. I should have gone back to Clausewitz and worked from that basic definition.

Don't get a fixation on DOD definitions or categories. In the forty years of direct contact with the US military, I've found that it like's everything neatly packaged, defined and sorted. Unfortunately, warfare rarely works neatly and in well defined packages. Lines blur between theory and practice. Even the USAF cannot decide what is a strategic target and what is a tactical target? Even after these 80 years of trying.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Bingo! Ed summed up the gist of my take on this quite well. What he said. :cool:

Kyle:

See when I'm not too busy at work (I'm mainly creating graphs and charts today) I can actually focus my thoughts and post in a semi-coherent manner. (The jury is still out on that latter assertation). Thanks!

[old_pop2000]

You will get no argument for me regarding this point, my argument was that in WW1 the means to achieve this end were, for all practical purposes, non-existant.
JMS:
While aircraft were rudimentary in The Great War, that does not diminish the value of the information they gathered nor the results of their attacks. In the siege warfare of The Great War, aircraft like the AEG CIV, Albatros CII, Handley Page O/100, just to name a few, had endurances of over 3.5 hours. The HP could stay aloft for 8 hours.

With fronts not moving much in the four years, an aircraft with a 4 hour duration could cover and photograph a lot of territory. In fact, using aircraft photos, France was mapped, by the end of the war, entirely for the first time.

By the end of the war, the aircraft had evolved into both a tactical weapon and a strategic one. But it would take new technological developments like the Sperry gyroscope, improved camera, better engines, more aerodynamics, improved construction techniques to turn the aircraft into a weapon that could decisively affect the war making capability of an enemy nation. But that does not negate its affect on WWI.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You will get no argument for me regarding this point, my argument was that in WW1 the means to achieve this end were, for all practical purposes, non-existant.

JMS:

I think another point to keep in mind was that the mindset of the combatants during WWI was not to attack the infrastructure as much as to clobber the army or navy. Outside of unrestricted submarine warfare, there was still a degree of "chivalry" between the warring sides in WWI. No concentration camps, no ethnic cleansing (outside of what occurred post war in Armenia). When you compare the civilian casualties in WWI to WWII its staggering and mainly due to the all out no-holds bared decision to target everything (strategic bombing being one of the main culprits here) and everybody.

Now whether this was due to the ability of the airplane to attack deeply into the enemy's country, or just a hardening of attitude is a point for debate. There were some advocates of airpower who felt that bombers would make any future war unthinkable because of the ability to wreak havoc on civilians. None of these people were in positions of authority in WWII.

[Ed Rotondaro]

JMS:
While aircraft were rudimentary in The Great War, that does not diminish the value of the information they gathered nor the results of their attacks. In the siege warfare of The Great War, aircraft like the AEG CIV, Albatros CII, Handley Page O/100, just to name a few, had endurances of over 3.5 hours. The HP could stay aloft for 8 hours.

With fronts not moving much in the four years, an aircraft with a 4 hour duration could cover and photograph a lot of territory. In fact, using aircraft photos, France was mapped, by the end of the war, entirely for the first time.

By the end of the war, the aircraft had evolved into both a tactical weapon and a strategic one. But it would take new technological developments like the Sperry gyroscope, improved camera, better engines, more aerodynamics, improved construction techniques to turn the aircraft into a weapon that could decisively affect the war making capability of an enemy nation. But that does not negate its affect on WWI.

Dennis:

Do you think that mono wings also had a major impact on the capabilities of aircraft to carry more fuel and armaments? Or does that fall under aerodynamics and construction? Just curious.;)

[JMS]

JMS:
While aircraft were rudimentary in The Great War, that does not diminish the value of the information they gathered nor the results of their attacks. In the siege warfare of The Great War, aircraft like the AEG CIV, Albatros CII, Handley Page O/100, just to name a few, had endurances of over 3.5 hours. The HP could stay aloft for 8 hours.

With fronts not moving much in the four years, an aircraft with a 4 hour duration could cover and photograph a lot of territory. In fact, using aircraft photos, France was mapped, by the end of the war, entirely for the first time.

By the end of the war, the aircraft had evolved into both a tactical weapon and a strategic one. But it would take new technological developments like the Sperry gyroscope, improved camera, better engines, more aerodynamics, improved construction techniques to turn the aircraft into a weapon that could decisively affect the war making capability of an enemy nation. But that does not negate its affect on WWI.

I would agree on a tactical level, even in the operational depth, but a strategic level? even the mapping of France would only be relevant up to the operational depth, but I go further, even in early WW2 the aircraft as a system was too immature to be a strategic weapon, and not for trying! recon and strike-wise 1939-1941 has little successes to show, and plenty of failures.

[JMS]

JMS:

I think another point to keep in mind was that the mindset of the combatants during WWI was not to attack the infrastructure as much as to clobber the army or navy. Outside of unrestricted submarine warfare, there was still a degree of "chivalry" between the warring sides in WWI. No concentration camps, no ethnic cleansing (outside of what occurred post war in Armenia). When you compare the civilian casualties in WWI to WWII its staggering and mainly due to the all out no-holds bared decision to target everything (strategic bombing being one of the main culprits here) and everybody.

Now whether this was due to the ability of the airplane to attack deeply into the enemy's country, or just a hardening of attitude is a point for debate. There were some advocates of airpower who felt that bombers would make any future war unthinkable because of the ability to wreak havoc on civilians. None of these people were in positions of authority in WWII.

Arguable, no power in WW1 was intent on extermination as an end in itself, as the Germans were, but they certainly had no qualms about introducing new horrors or targetting civilians, to a level without precedent since Napoleonic times.

[old_pop2000]

I would agree on a tactical level, even in the operational depth, but a strategic level? even the mapping of France would only be relevant up to the operational depth, but I go further, even in early WW2 the aircraft as a system was too immature to be a strategic weapon, and not for trying! recon and strike-wise 1939-1941 has little successes to show, and plenty of failures.
JMS:
I understand where you are headed. Take range out of the equation. A target is not designated as a strategic one because of range, but by its contribution to the overall war making capability. This is the essential problem, IMHO, that you are having. You are equating the capability of 300 miles versus 3000 miles as a consideration in the use of the term. There were WWII targets within easy reach of fighters and light bombers. Example: Wilhelmshaven is a major German seaport for the German Navy. It is a strategic target, yet, it is only 316 miles from the nearest RAF bomber base near Colchester and Ipswich. It was bombed in 1939, almost at the start of the war, but due to problems with no self sealing tanks on the twin engined Vickers Wellingtons and no escorts, it was a failure. Range has nothing to do with the terminology of strategic versus tactical. The success of the missions, has nothing to do with its designation as a strategic target. By attacking these targets, the Luftwaffe had to reply by stationing fighters nearby to protect it. Again, these are assets not available at the front. Range is the criteria, contribution is. If a target is close enough to the front, in The Great War, it could have been a strategic and tactical target.

I will agree that the aircraft in The Great War were limited in their capability, but that does not enter into the equation. The designation of a target as strategic or tactical is strictly based on its contribution. It can be both a tactical target and a strategic target.

[Kyle Holgate]

I am truly sorry that my quick definition from the DOD dictionary was taken so literally. I should have gone back to Clausewitz and worked from that basic definition.

Don't get a fixation on DOD definitions or categories. In the forty years of direct contact with the US military, I've found that it like's everything neatly packaged, defined and sorted. Unfortunately, warfare rarely works neatly and in well defined packages. Lines blur between theory and practice. Even the USAF cannot decide what is a strategic target and what is a tactical target? Even after these 80 years of trying.

Whoops! Just to be clear, the "for once" was referring to my now arguement comment NOT your summary! Sorry if you got that wrong, it wasn't until I re-read it later that I realized it could be taken as a comment on the summary itself! To be sure Dennis, you are usually pretty clear in what you say even if I disagree!

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Do you think that mono wings also had a major impact on the capabilities of aircraft to carry more fuel and armaments? Or does that fall under aerodynamics and construction? Just curious.;)
Monoplanes with their internal support structures do lend themselves to aerodynamics better. No guide wires and such to create drag. The development of Duraluminum probably is the key product that allowed for the internally braced wing which, in turn, allowed aerodynamicists to develop cleaner wings and therefore less drag, more lift and lighter on a per pound basis. Duraluminum was discovered in the early 1900's by a German and used, surprisingly, in Zeppelins. It came to prominance in aircraft with the co-development of monocoque construction techniques.

[old_pop2000]

Whoops! Just to be clear, the "for once" was referring to my now arguement comment NOT your summary! Sorry if you got that wrong, it wasn't until I re-read it later that I realized it could be taken as a comment on the summary itself! To be sure Dennis, you are usually pretty clear in what you say even if I disagree!
No worry, mate! I understood the comment.

[JMS]

JMS:
I understand where you are headed. Take range out of the equation. A target is not designated as a strategic one because of range, but by its contribution to the overall war making capability. This is the essential problem, IMHO, that you are having. You are equating the capability of 300 miles versus 3000 miles as a consideration in the use of the term. There were WWII targets within easy reach of fighters and light bombers. Example: Wilhelmshaven is a major German seaport for the German Navy. It is a strategic target, yet, it is only 316 miles from the nearest RAF bomber base near Colchester and Ipswich. It was bombed in 1939, almost at the start of the war, but due to problems with no self sealing tanks on the twin engined Vickers Wellingtons and no escorts, it was a failure. Range has nothing to do with the terminology of strategic versus tactical. The success of the missions, has nothing to do with its designation as a strategic target. By attacking these targets, the Luftwaffe had to reply by stationing fighters nearby to protect it. Again, these are assets not available at the front. Range is the criteria, contribution is. If a target is close enough to the front, in The Great War, it could have been a strategic and tactical target.

I will agree that the aircraft in The Great War were limited in their capability, but that does not enter into the equation. The designation of a target as strategic or tactical is strictly based on its contribution. It can be both a tactical target and a strategic target.

No, you are misunderstanding me, I agree with what you say, it's the target what makes a mission strategic or tactical regardless of range but for a mission success within the parameters of the discussion the target is either destroyed/negated or enough information is gathered (of course, there are other iterations we can add, psy warfare, for example).

Now for WW1 and early WW2 the capability, doctrine and training needed to have success was absent and led to a sequence of failures, the first battle of Britain, the air battle of Helgoland bight, the second battle of Britain or the costly failures of Bomber Command in '41-42, for example. Getting strategic air intelligence right was easier as Sidney Cotton's story shows:

http://www.airrecce.co.uk/WW2/recce_ac/RAFAR.html

"If it had not been for Sidney Cotton and his ideas the Royal Air Force's ability to obtain any form of aerial intelligence would have been found to be wanting. Prior to Cotton tactical photo-reconnaissance for the Army was in the hands of Squadrons of Lysanders, with long-range strategic reconnaissance being undertaken by a number of Squadrons of Blenheim IV bombers of No. 2 Group. Both these types of aircraft were slow and because of the heights they had to flight to obtain the best imagery, they became easy targets for the Luftwaffe.
The first operational sortie of the War was undertaken by a photographic reconnaissance Blenheim of 139 Squadron from RAF Wyton. However, flying at 24,000 feet froze the camera and the aircrafts radio and it returned to base. "

[old_pop2000]

No, you are misunderstanding me, I agree with what you say, it's the target what makes a mission strategic or tactical regardless of range but for a mission success within the parameters of the discussion the target is either destroyed/negated or enough information is gathered (of course, there are other iterations we can add, psy warfare, for example).

Now for WW1 and early WW2 the capability, doctrine and training needed to have success was absent and led to a sequence of failures, the first battle of Britain, the air battle of Helgoland bight, the second battle of Britain or the costly failures of Bomber Command in '41-42, for example. Getting strategic air intelligence right was easier as Sidney Cotton's story shows:

http://www.airrecce.co.uk/WW2/recce_ac/RAFAR.html

"If it had not been for Sidney Cotton and his ideas the Royal Air Force's ability to obtain any form of aerial intelligence would have been found to be wanting. Prior to Cotton tactical photo-reconnaissance for the Army was in the hands of Squadrons of Lysanders, with long-range strategic reconnaissance being undertaken by a number of Squadrons of Blenheim IV bombers of No. 2 Group. Both these types of aircraft were slow and because of the heights they had to flight to obtain the best imagery, they became easy targets for the Luftwaffe.
The first operational sortie of the War was undertaken by a photographic reconnaissance Blenheim of 139 Squadron from RAF Wyton. However, flying at 24,000 feet froze the camera and the aircrafts radio and it returned to base. "
JMS:
Okay, good. I misunderstood, but now we are on the same page.

Your point, If I read you correctly, is that due to poor doctrine, training and capability, strategic warfare either wasn't a success or not viable? All doctrine, training and like evolve through combat. Theories of aerial warfare were just that, theories. The first real use and successes were during the Spanish Civil War. The German's had to develop the finger four fighter formation to improve their combat effeciency.

Early successes in strategic reconnaissance and bombing did occur, but the techniques, equipment and doctrine did have to evolve as they do in all wars. Vietnam was no different. Our aerial strategy and capability did evolve over time. Trust me, I am more than familiar with it. Does it make it less viable and successful, not entirely. Strategic targets are just that, strategic targets. If I observe and photograph them, bomb them, then I am conducting a strategic campaign. It might take me a few missions to hit the target or even get the photos, but nonetheless, the campaign is strategic in nature.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Be careful here, you are on slippy ground. Bomb damage assetment (BDA) is still a so-so discipline even with satellite intel. During the first Gulf War, the USAF was sure it had destroyed 4,000 AFVs. Turned out that the bulk of the vehicles destroyed were killed the old fashioned way, by tanks, IFVs, artillery or choppers. Aerial intel was very shaky right thru Viet Nam (check out air to air claims some time for an eye opener on this). Even aerial photos can be misinterpreted. The best recon is the guy on the ground up close.

My point was that spies were not nearly as utilized in this regards.. you cannot have spied available for every important target.. but you can have planes fly over every available target. That is why they were attached to bomber formations.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

WhileI see most of your argument about the role of aircraft in WWI, I am not buying that they created trench warfare. That was the result of a lack of mobility due to an inability to neutralize the firepower of the machine gun and artillery. Aircraft merely reinforced trench warfare by making sure nobody could pull off a flanking manuever. By knowing where the enemy was massing for an attack, you could be ready for the inevitable artillery barrage and position your reserves to plug any holes in the line. You see trench warfare broken by the use of infiltration techniques and increased infantry firepower all of which took four years to evolve.

According to some historians the aircraft did instigate trench warfare. Foot mobility was not fast enough to beat out the airplane getting information back to the defenders of where the attacks were coming from and thus be defended against. That snippet I posted was from the WW1 archives of infantry trench warfare instructions and how surprise attacks, which were by far the most effective method of foot infantry assaults, were rendered nearly impossible if attempted while enemy aerial recon was watching.

[Ed Rotondaro]

JMS:
I understand where you are headed. Take range out of the equation. A target is not designated as a strategic one because of range, but by its contribution to the overall war making capability. This is the essential problem, IMHO, that you are having. You are equating the capability of 300 miles versus 3000 miles as a consideration in the use of the term. There were WWII targets within easy reach of fighters and light bombers. Example: Wilhelmshaven is a major German seaport for the German Navy. It is a strategic target, yet, it is only 316 miles from the nearest RAF bomber base near Colchester and Ipswich. It was bombed in 1939, almost at the start of the war, but due to problems with no self sealing tanks on the twin engined Vickers Wellingtons and no escorts, it was a failure. Range has nothing to do with the terminology of strategic versus tactical. The success of the missions, has nothing to do with its designation as a strategic target. By attacking these targets, the Luftwaffe had to reply by stationing fighters nearby to protect it. Again, these are assets not available at the front. Range is the criteria, contribution is. If a target is close enough to the front, in The Great War, it could have been a strategic and tactical target.

I will agree that the aircraft in The Great War were limited in their capability, but that does not enter into the equation. The designation of a target as strategic or tactical is strictly based on its contribution. It can be both a tactical target and a strategic target.

Dennis:

I agree. Range can't be used as the only determiner of a target's strategic value. St. Nazaire was easily within range of medium bombers, but was considered such a strategic asset, that the British mounted a costly but successful special operation to neutralize it and prevent Germany from basing it capital ships in France.

[Warship NWS]

Ok.. some of you want a defining point for "strategic".. one must think past "strategic" in the air - if we are only going to stick with "war making ability" - which is not 100% defined as the factories - and consider the effects of the strategic land warfare. How is it that land warfare can be considered strategic without effecting the "war making ability" of a nation but aircraft contributing to strategic land battles cannot? If the aircraft contribute to a strategic land battle do we just kick the aircraft under the bus because it did not fire the bullets? I think not. Just another avenue to consider in this debate.

[Ed Rotondaro]

My point was that spies were not nearly as utilized in this regards.. you cannot have spied available for every important target.. but you can have planes fly over every available target. That is why they were attached to bomber formations.

Chris:

Fair enough, I agree that traditional "spies" certainly weren't able to gather the kind of intel that an overflight could and probably would have trouble visiting some of the targets in question. My only concern was the accuracy or lack thereof that has plagued BDA since the advent of aerial warfare. It still exists today.

[Warship NWS]

Tactical vs operational vs strategic.. if tactical and operational events lead up to a strategic ground victory then where are we at?

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Fair enough, I agree that traditional "spies" certainly weren't able to gather the kind of intel that an overflight could and probably would have trouble visiting some of the targets in question. My only concern was the accuracy or lack thereof that has plagued BDA since the advent of aerial warfare. It still exists today.

True it has never been perfect.. but there is no more effective method in terms of speed, overall vantage point, etc.. especially before the age of someone standing next to it with a digital camera and laptop to transmit the info.

[Warship NWS]

Thought process.. sinking a merchant full of ammo was considered a strategic target of WW1 for U-boats.. yet blowing up a depot, targeted by aircraft, with likely even more ammo then the merchant was carrying is not considered a strategic target.. only operational, or worse yet tactical, at best. Personally, I think this thought process is pretty biased against the airplane doing the targeting for the artillery or bombers (if used). War making ability is all fine and dandy but it means squat if the troops do not get the ammo because it was all blown up. Just a consideration before the airplane is kicked under the "could never be strategic during WW1" rug. So are we going to judge each merchant on its on board materials or kick it to the operational rug because the ship itself is not making war materials? Do we categorize the ship based on its raw material or completed weapons? If not for naval supply lines then why are we doing this against land supply lines which proved just as vital to the front lines? Its all a domino effect.. whether you start in the middle of the dominoes or the far end.. if it all results to a strategic effect on the front lines then we cannot go around being nit picky about the individual targets and start looking at the overall picture of the final effect. Imagine what would have happened if airplanes were NOT overhead.. the war very well could have been over far quicker due to foot soldiers being fast enough to evade viable and useful detection, artillery would not have been as useful and thousands of shells would have been wasted just moving mud around, overall commander intel would have been far less effective, etc..etc..etc.. If aircraft changed the entire face of WW1 starting as early as 1914, more so then any other weapon developed during the war, then how can we just say.. ah hell.. its nothing more then tactical in its use. That to me is pretty hypocritical of the only true Gods eyes of any army or navy of WW1. Imagine one side with planes and one without.. there is no way any other asset can compare to that comparison alone. End result.. there was no a nation without a viable air force was going to win against a nation who had one -- with all else being reasonably equal. That is the facts of the matter.. cavalry, spies.. did not even hold a candle to the airplane in their effect.

[old_pop2000]

sinking a merchant full of ammo was considered a strategic target of WW1 for U-boats.. yet blowing up a depot, targeted by aircraft, with likely even more ammo then the merchant was carrying is not considered a strategic target..

Let's look at this another way. The sea lanes that the merchant was sailing are strategic avenues for supplies and materials required for war making. However, when attacked by a U-boat, a surface ship or an aircraft, the ship is a tactical target carrying strategic materials.

In the overview, submarine warfare against shipping lanes is a strategic form of warfare. It uses strategic reconnaissance and attacks against target or targets that contribute to the overall war-making capability of the enemy.

Aircraft reconnaissance and attacks on shipping lanes and ports on either end of the shipping lane can be placed in the same category. The aircraft is now acting against strategic targets.

Once the supplies, in this case ammunition, reaches the destination, is unloaded and now transported, say by railway to the dump, is the rail line and dump, a strategic target? Possibly. If the ammunition is then moved by truck to a division supply dump, is it still strategic? Probably not. It has now reached the battle area, affecting only the immediate battlefield, so it now is considered a tactical target.

Notice how a target, that was once a strategic target, has now transitioned into a tactical target. I am not attempting to obfuscate the point. Is the ammunition, the strategic target or the conveyance- the ship, rail or truck? Or is it both.

This is the difficulty in attempting to fit targets into nice, neat packages. They don't fit all the time. If I have difficulty attacking or observing strategic targets at the commencement of hostilities, does that affect the target's designation? Of course, it doesn't. Just because the RAF was unsuccessful in its initial attacks against German strategic targets, does this make the British forces any less strategic or their targets. No. If the attacks hampered the German ability to operate the port, if it required the Germans to move fighters to protect the port or even if it psychologically caused the German's to think defensively, then the attack or attacks might have been a partial success, whether physical damage was caused.

This holds true for WWI, the weapons were more rudimentary, the doctrine evolving but there were still strategic targets to be observed and attacked, whether successfully or not, it caused the enemy to operate them differently, possibly camoflage them, operate only at night, move supplies at night. Successful or not, there were strategic reconnaissance missions and bombing missions as the war unfolded.

[Kyle Holgate]

Is the knowledge itself strategic, and if so is the method you get it also strategic, or is it what you do with it? Spy Satillites come to mind - to be honest when I thought of those I shifted a bit in my thinking toward what is and is not a strategic asset. I'm still not convinced WW1 aircraft fit the bill. Knowledge of something in my mind is one thing, what you do with it is another.

Are Strategic and tactical mutually exclusive? Go to the base words of each - tactics and Strategy. So - How you manuver to take your opponent's king is tactial, how you take the king is strategic? No wonder we're all arguing our heads off about this - the terminology is in a gray area to start with, and then add WW1 aircraft ops which were the baby steps of later (and current) aircraft operations and you have quite a pickle - lots of things to sort out and consider and classify!

[Warship NWS]

Is the knowledge itself strategic, and if so is the method you get it also strategic, or is it what you do with it? Spy Satillites come to mind - to be honest when I thought of those I shifted a bit in my thinking toward what is and is not a strategic asset. I'm still not convinced WW1 aircraft fit the bill. Knowledge of something in my mind is one thing, what you do with it is another.

Are Strategic and tactical mutually exclusive? Go to the base words of each - tactics and Strategy. So - How you manuver to take your opponent's king is tactial, how you take the king is strategic? No wonder we're all arguing our heads off about this - the terminology is in a gray area to start with, and then add WW1 aircraft ops which were the baby steps of later (and current) aircraft operations and you have quite a pickle - lots of things to sort out and consider and classify!

Instead of trying to classify specific targets one must look above that and look at the tactical events as being a direction towards a strategic event - strategic events never occur without tactical events. Example, a sub by itself is a tactical weapon but when you deploy enough of them against tactical targets that contribute to the strategic capacity of a military force then you have a strategic operation unfolding. We cannot look at aircraft as single weapon applications.. they were flying by the thousands during WW1.. by themselves they may have been tactical weapons but their overall effect in numbers proved to be a strategic application of intel gathering. It is how the aircraft acted within the system and contributed to the events that lead to a strategic outcome that needs to be examined, not the abilities of the individual aircraft. Weapons are a system within a system that have an objective - sometimes the objective is strategic, sometimes tactical.. but the tactical can contribute to the strategic ends.

The reason I believe aircraft were of strategic use during WW1 is because in *numbers* they provided a strategically valuable intelligence view of the battlefield that lead to tactical victories which in turn lead to strategic victories. If you have a weapon that is part of a system of overall strategy with a strategic objective (winning a war, defeating a nation, etc.. ) then the weapon cannot be simply disregarded as a tactical only weapon. If the intel gathered by aircraft, which was unmatched by any other means available, helped to lead a nation to eventual victory then how can one claim that it was only a tactical asset when used in large numbers?

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Is the knowledge itself strategic, and if so is the method you get it also strategic, or is it what you do with it?


Ok.. example, if the French completely ignored the recon flights that saved Paris then that in turn could be called a strategic failure.. as it turned out it was strategic victory all because one French general listened and acted on the intel given to him. Strategic does not, nor has it ever, fallen under the requirements of victory alone.. a strategic failure can be just as critical to the events of war. How many events can we consider strategic failures due to not believing in intel reports?

[Warship NWS]

Another example of strategic use in numbers.. during WW1 bombers did only tactical damage vs strategic targets in most cases.. why? Primary reason was lack of numbers. This is where many historians have dug in their heels and swept airpower under the generic tactical rug but failed to understand the 4th dimension of warfare - intel/comms/recon. During WW2 it was called "strategic" for the bombers to attack Germany.. however, they were attacking in the thousands. So is that the final requirement -- numbers of tactical weapons being used for a strategic purpose? Ok.. during WW1 flights of recon aircraft were in the thousands.. so is that tactical only just because something was not being bombed? That to me is being somewhat hypocritical. So what is considered a tactical vs strategic view of the battlefield? Parts of the battlefield or the entire battlefield? How can you make any strategic decisions if you do not have a strategic view of the battlefield? Horses didn't cut it - during WW1 you needed all the horses you could find for pulling carts around, spies.. not hardly -- spies I'm sorry to say were not on call for the battlefield commanders.

So how can you make strategic decisions on the battlefield as a commander during WW1 without airplanes? Take those planes away from one commander and see how he does.. oops.. war over. That to me is pretty darn strategic in its overall effect when you consider who has what intel of the battlefield. If knowledge is power then the airplane gave more power to the commander of the battlefield then any other asset, by far, in comparison and still holds true to this day. Would anyone consider a competition of knowledge over the battlefield as being only tactically useful? I would certainly hope not.

I challenge anyone on this thread to play a game of chess with your only knowledge of my forces being my pawns on the table.. try and tell me your going to win, not even the best damned chess player in the world would attempt that one.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Just for the record.. I am now in contact with the author of the Dept. of Defense research book on allied aerial recon during WW1, Terry Finnegan. He has written by far the most recent 600 page analysis on aerial recon called "Shooting the Front". I think his comments should prove very interesting in this discussion. I already ordered his book and also ordered another book covering the evolution of aerial recon starting in WW1.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

While searching Google Books, I came across a manual written in 1917 by an American Major for Army soldiers entitled "Manual of Military Aviation". It is a detailed book about aviation, its uses, aircraft, etc. Here are some snippets concerning reconnaissance that I thought might be interesting:


Efficient aerial reconnaissance should relieve the cavalry of all major reconnaissance operations. .....Armies no longer have to grope and fight in darkness and uncertainty respecting the enemy's movements.

The advent of aircraft into warfare has exercised a decisive influence upon tactics and materially altered the principles of strategy theretofore prevailing.

The chief effect of aircraft service upon land warfare has been to dispel the "fog of War" and to penetrate the veil of uncertainty that formerly concealed grand movements. Since aircraft reconnaissance almost infallibly reveals concentrations of ground forces, the accepted rules of tactics and strategy have necessarily been reconstructed to meet the changed conditions. Aircraft have [blurred] become the eyes of the artillery, enabling these weapons to search out their targets with unerring accuracy, facilitating the use of all calibers of armament alike. .... It is no longer possible to cover the concentration of great massof troops, in the face of an active and enterprising hostile air service, except by means of an effect aircraft screen combined with superior air work over the exterior zone......Unrestricted power of maneuver presupposes victorious action. it is in this particular that aircaft service has seriously curtailed the principles of military tactics and strategy; mainly through elimination of the surprise attack ....Strategy, the science of directing grand military movements, had up to the advent of aircraft into warfare, been largely based on the darkness and obscurity that prevailed behind the lines as far as the opposing forces were concerned. The use of aircraft has served to lift this veil, giving eyes to the general and to his artillery. ....Offensively and defensively, aircraft have broadened the range of military operations, bringing victory with supremacy of the air and disaster to the side whose air forces fail or are defeated.

Obviously, I have had to pick pieces out to shorten but still convey the idea. To download the whole book, simply go to Google Books; type in "aerial reconnaissance" in the search box; restricted the view to only full copies of the books. This book should be the second book on the list. Or simply search for " Manual of Military Aviation".

I hope this helps everyone.

[Warship NWS]

"While other factors certainly contributed to the resulting military stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front, recon aircraft were at least partially responsible because they prevented either side from concealing their disposition of troops who might have otherwise achieved a breakthrough had they caught the opposing forces of guard".

It also noted how the aircraft contributed greatly to the "Race to the Sea" with naval aerial patrols monitoring the movements of naval units.

The point to this is simple.. aircraft changed how commanders could fight their wars in a way no other weapon could compare to during WW1. No more was the ability to hide effective divisions and battalions of troops without the enemy knowing about it unless you dominated the skies overhead.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Ok, just had a short chat with Terry Finnegan (the author of "Shooting the Front") and by the sound of it his book will be a wealth of analysis detail regarding the use of aircraft over the front. He has given me a way to contact him directly after I have a chance to look over his book. He also commented on the fact that General Foch, who commanded the entire French army, even stated that he required the use of aerial recon aircraft to allow for strategic decision making that allowed him to monitor the German forces and their rear area operations. In the end, after I gave him a brief summary of our debate here, I did not hear anything so far that contradicted my stance on this topic. As soon as his book arrives I will let you all know.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

According to some historians the aircraft did instigate trench warfare. Foot mobility was not fast enough to beat out the airplane getting information back to the defenders of where the attacks were coming from and thus be defended against. That snippet I posted was from the WW1 archives of infantry trench warfare instructions and how surprise attacks, which were by far the most effective method of foot infantry assaults, were rendered nearly impossible if attempted while enemy aerial recon was watching.

Chris:

This presumes that you have aircraft on station, but it does go a long way to explaining why planes were launched for a dawn patrol, so that you couldn't attack as daylight broke.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Tactical vs operational vs strategic.. if tactical and operational events lead up to a strategic ground victory then where are we at?


Chris:

Hopefully on your way to winning the war?;)

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

This presumes that you have aircraft on station, but it does go a long way to explaining why planes were launched for a dawn patrol, so that you couldn't attack as daylight broke.

Note this as well.. not only did aerial recon allow you to know of an attack but also if the attack was a diversion, how large the attack was, how many resources were involved (giving an idea of the logistical strength supporting the attack), the ability to target artillery on forward supply points and commander comms positions, etc..

How effective would counter-attacks have been without aerial recon showing the variuos dispositions of the units your fighting and their supporting echellons?

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Just for the record.. I am now in contact with the author of the Dept. of Defense research book on allied aerial recon during WW1, Terry Finnegan. He has written by far the most recent 600 page analysis on aerial recon called "Shooting the Front". I think his comments should prove very interesting in this discussion. I already ordered his book and also ordered another book covering the evolution of aerial recon starting in WW1.

Thanks.

Chris:

That should prove to be an interesting read if nothing else.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

That should prove to be an interesting read if nothing else.

Based on the short conversation I just had with him on the phone.. yeah, I believe it will be. My kind of reading material.. analysis/resarch stuff.. :D

[Ed Rotondaro]

It also noted how the aircraft contributed greatly to the "Race to the Sea" with naval aerial patrols monitoring the movements of naval units.

The point to this is simple.. aircraft changed how commanders could fight their wars in a way no other weapon could compare to during WW1. No more was the ability to hide effective divisions and battalions of troops without the enemy knowing about it unless you dominated the skies overhead.

Thanks.

Chris:

I agree that aircraft had given the commanders on both sides far better intel than any other means at their disposal. It allowed for mapping and spotting of artillery. It gave some limited deep strike capability (I don't think it was the number of planes so much as the small amount of ordanance carried that hindered the strategic use of aircraft, coupled with their very short range, something that you have generally overlooked here).

So with aircraft at their disposal, why did the battlelines stay so static? Either both sides were neutralizing each others airpower, or else there was a limit to what aircraft could provide in this time period. Face it Chris, no break throughs until 1918 even with the use of aircraft, poison gas and tanks. Nothing could stop the firepower of machine guns and entrenched troops. Not even aircraft. Not until the infantry was empowered so to speak with its own firepower in the form of mortars, flamethrowers, light machine guns etc. All the detailed mapping of the other guys position that still lead to ineffectual artillery barrages that fired off thousands of shells to no effect that left strong points intact and able to repulse an attack.

Probably the only way to really compare the effects of aircraft during this time period would be to find a campaign where one side either dominated the air, or else the other side simply had no airpower at all. Possibly Germany versus Imperial Russia or maybe England versus Turkey in Palestine (I don't believe the Turks had much if any aircraft at their disposal). Still even in these two instances, it took three years for Germany to force Russia out of the war and Britain didn't win in the Middle East until 1918. Just some further things to consider.

[Warship NWS]

That is why I believe the aerial recon aircraft contributed to the static warfare to some degree because if the enemy knew your intentions (think of how vicious the war was in the skies) then very likely you could not mount an effective offensive. The airplane I feel did as much to reduce the mobility of combat units as the lack of mechanization because if you prepare your troops for an offensive without aerial dominance blinding the enemy he will know what your up to and you do not have the mobility of mechanization to move in forces fast enough into position before he can prepare some level of defense. The added research materials I have ordered I think will add to this side of the topic considerably as we will then have more detailed accounts of specific battles that can be discussed. I have not overlooked the shorter ranges of aircraft, in actuality some aircraft could fly fairly far.. bomber ranged aircraft were also used for long range recon flights deep into enemy territory, Russian "strategic recon" squadrons were one such example. Also, how far do really have to go into enemy airspace to determine what he is doing? Does one need to watch the factory or the transportation network to determine where enemy logistics and forces are?

Thanks.

[JMS]

That is why I believe the aerial recon aircraft contributed to the static warfare to some degree because if the enemy knew your intentions (think of how vicious the war was in the skies) then very likely you could not mount an effective offensive. The airplane I feel did as much to reduce the mobility of combat units as the lack of mechanization because if you prepare your troops for an offensive without aerial dominance blinding the enemy he will know what your up to and you do not have the mobility of mechanization to move in forces fast enough into position before he can prepare some level of defense. The added research materials I have ordered I think will add to this side of the topic considerably as we will then have more detailed accounts of specific battles that can be discussed. I have not overlooked the shorter ranges of aircraft, in actuality some aircraft could fly fairly far.. bomber ranged aircraft were also used for long range recon flights deep into enemy territory, Russian "strategic recon" squadrons were one such example. Also, how far do really have to go into enemy airspace to determine what he is doing? Does one need to watch the factory or the transportation network to determine where enemy logistics and forces are?

Thanks.

Ejem! you need to dig a bit deeper into why they couldn't mount an effective offensive, so it's time we open a new debate, "The Machine-gun, a strategic weapon?":

- It made the fronts static
- was responsible for casualties on a national scale
- enabled air warfare
- etc.

[Warship NWS]

Ejem! you need to dig a bit deeper into why they couldn't mount an effective offensive, so it's time we open a new debate, "The Machine-gun, a strategic weapon?":

- It made the fronts static
- was responsible for casualties on a national scale
- enabled air warfare
- etc.

Ok, you want to claim the MG as a strategic weapon but not the aerial recon that told your troops where to employ them for best effectiveness? Unless you intend to piss off cows in the pastures and make a lot of noise how do you know where to use them with out recon to tell you where the enemy is moving?

Explain Klucks advances in 1914 then up until the Battle of the Marne? That was not trench warfare. Trench warfare, during WW1, did not start in earnest until AFTER the Battle of the Marne, which ironically was the same year that aerial recon started to show its effective ability to track large formations of troops so as to prepare better known locations for defenses -- AKA TRENCHES. Trench warfare was NOT caused by MGs as such warfare was in use LONG before the MG came out to play in the game of war.. example, 1810 during the Peninsular War, and the first MG was built for war in 1881.. 71 years later.

Early MGs were not as much offensive weapons as they were supportive weapons, for the only exception of being used on planes and early tanks, rifles were the primary offensive bullet firing weapons until single manned infantry portable rapid fire guns came out to play - (Ed got that one dead on). MGs were support weapons on the ground and rifles were far more accurate especially for long ranged fire. Without rifle support an MG crew could easily be flanked and killed or taken out by snipers. The MGs most effective role was to suppress enemy fire so as to give more time for the rifleman to effectively engage targets with accurate fire. On the ground.. the MG was a supportive weapon. Artillery, which claimed 75% of the casualties of WW1, was made far more effective due to aircraft targeting, mapping, and spotting of targets so which weapon was more strategic in its role in terms of killing troops? The artillery or the MGs? I think the answer is obvious. The part I will agree with is the war in the air as then your MGs are engaging the most strategic weapons of WW1.. recon planes. The battle of the flying guns in the air vs the recon planes proved more strategic then any work the MGs did on the ground.

Point being, before you go stating that MGs were the only direct, and from what I can tell by what your stating, cause of "static warfare" I would love to see some facts to back that up based on proper research, not just historical copycats. MGs were around before the static trenches of WW1 took place so they were obviously not the instigator of that type of warfare and you need good intel to know where to transport, deploy, man, and supply your buckets of bullets for those MG crews.. and that during WW1 my friend.. required airplanes to tell you where the enemy was otherwise you have a bunch of noise makers with nothing to shoot at.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

After reading the numerous posts on this thread, I have to concur with Chris that the airplane was a strategic weapon in WW1. At first, I didn't consider the airplane a strategic weapon in that war since it didn't dominate the battlefield the way they did in WW2, and because the use of airplanes in WW1 didn't effect the stalemate on the ground. But that was not the fault of the aircraft.

[JMS]

You are on a roll here, :) I was exaggerating, the machine-gun was a tactical weapon and certainly it was not an inovation in the first part of the war.

WW1-like warfare had already happened during the siege of Port Arthur and the Eastern Front saw plenty of mobile warfare so the "uniqueness" of the Western front wasn't such. What caused a static front was not a single cause but the systemic linking of a number of things, such as a narrow frontage, barbed wire to delay movement in the no-man's land, increased firepower (not just machine-guns, but also artillery), the ability to quickly deploy reserves using railroads and trucks, the inability of the attacker in forcing a quick exploitation of breaches due to shelled terrain, lack of communications and insufficient lethality in removing defenders, improved intelligence thanks to aircraft, improved lighting which meant night attacks were as deadly as daylight assaults, etc.

There was no single factor, all were interlinked and the proof, if any is needed, is that successive innovations were unable, by themselves, to break the deadlock. Gas was used and improved and didn't led to a breakthrough, planes were used and didn`t lead to a breakthrough, tanks were used since 1916 and again failed to create a breakthrough, rolling barrages, the same. What finally broke static warfare was the combination of several innovations: tanks, new artillery tactics, better comms, new tactics and training, etc.

[JMS]

???


After reading the numerous posts on this thread, I have to concur with Chris that the airplane was a strategic weapon in WW1. At first, I didn't consider the airplane a strategic weapon in that war since it didn't dominate the battlefield the way they did in WW2, and because the use of airplanes in WW1 didn't effect the stalemate on the ground. But that was not the fault of the aircraft.

If it didn't dominate the battlefield and didn't effect the stalemate, then how it could have a strategic effect? you are saying it didn't have an impact in the war! :D

[Warship NWS]

After reading the numerous posts on this thread, I have to concur with Chris that the airplane was a strategic weapon in WW1. At first, I didn't consider the airplane a strategic weapon in that war since it didn't dominate the battlefield the way they did in WW2, and because the use of airplanes in WW1 didn't effect the stalemate on the ground. But that was not the fault of the aircraft.

The reason why most historians, and Terry Finnegan (who also visited various international archives in Europe during his research efforts) agreed with me conclusively on this stance, have tossed the airplane under the "tactical only" copycat rug for nearly 90 years is because to date damned little research was ever done regarding their true effect on the battlefield. How many historians have done heavy research, and I mean analysis type work not just story telling, on the 4th dimension of warfare (intel/recon/comms)? I could probably only count a handfull and even now there is information being extrapolated from war archives that was never really researched before recent years.

Dominating the battlefield has always been contributed to the glorified machines of death.. but almost never to the machines that allowed the machines of death to even be in the right place at the right time to do their jobs with the support echellons feeding them food, parts, ammo, etc.. you flat cannot move an army without having some clue of where to move it so it can be of any real use. Speed of information was absolutely vital to respond to any threat on land or at sea. Troops did not just appear out of thin air.. it required huge amounts of coordination and logistics just to move a battallion to the right spot at the right time much less an entire army. The side with the fastest and most information .. usually had the strategic advantage. Knowledge is the ultimate power on the battlefield by far. The "fastest with the mostest" strategy prevailed and that flat did not happen without airpower in WW1 telling the generals what was happening on the ground. Strategic decisions are required for strategy and you cannot have strategy without information.

I started a introductory reading of "Shooting the Front" based on a PDF file that demos the start of the book and it made some very interesting points. Photography over the front was made into such an art that planes started to develop negatives while in flight and finalized printing them on the ground as early as 1913. Contrary to popular belief.. recon squadrons were formed BEFORE WW1 as early as 1912 as their importance was already being recognized. In 1913 the first airborne dedicated camera was deployed with the RFC. Planes could take off before dawn and return within a few hours with intel about ground movements and ground crews were in the ready as soon as the airplanes landed. Air recon units were also completely mobile, unlike static balloons which required over 100-200 men to operate and support one observation ballon, as many of the planes could simply be disassembled and moved to a new location in a very short period of time so as to maintain pace with the battlefield requirements. Early planes could also take off and land from almost any reasonably flat field. There were of course challenges like friendly fire (which instigated the use of underwing insignia), landing sites moving before the airplanes returned, etc.. but the fine art of aerial recon was being developed and refined at a very rapid pace.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

???



If it didn't dominate the battlefield and didn't effect the stalemate, then how it could have a strategic effect? you are saying it didn't have an impact in the war! :D

I think he is referring to the strategic bombing and interdiction efforts of WW2 in regards to "dominating" the battlefield.

[Warship NWS]

Aerial recon units were part of the intial operations during the German attack on Russia and were instrumental to their successful offensives as they were attached in 6 plane groups to each corps and HQ of the German army and highly advocated by the German High Command (OHL). During the Tannenberg battle the aerial recon, along with the first wartime use of critical radio intercepts, the Germans won a decisive victory.

[Warship NWS]

What possibly contributed to the static trench warfare?

As was written in the WW1 Infantry Trench Manual archives.. the problem with the speed of the foot soldier, or even cavalry, is that the airplane could always outrun their ability to prepare for formation movement. Infantry assaults were FAR more effective IF the enemy did not know the assault was coming - thus giving time for the defending MGs and artillery to prepare suppression and kill zones. Cavalry cannot take and hold ground without support units, much like parachute units of WW2 could not last long without ground support echelons or air dropped supplies so their speed was countered by the requirement of supportive infantry which in turn needed supply echelons - and horse drawn carts and pulled weapons could never keep pace with troops on horses. It all comes down to speed of formation movement and the logistics to support such movement. So where does that leave us? Until mechanized warfare could take hold in sufficient force to help counter some of the speed advantage of aerial recon information trench warfare was the only means of keeping troops from being slaughtered -- protection of being below ground level. Without it, troops being formed up would simply be shelled or run into reinforced prepared defenses after being spotted by aerial recon units. This is also why the trench manuals described the use of trenches for "offensive operations" by building trenches closer and closer to the enemy before launching an attack to reduce the kill zone range of the enemy MGs and artillery. This is what caused trench warfare.. lack of mobility which was a direct result of aerial recon spotting and targeting enemy formations before they could effectively be used in an offensive. Without aerial dominance assembling a force for an offensive was near suicide and resulted in catastrophic losses. Mechanized land warfare was the only way to take back some of the advantages of speed of intel that the aircraft offered ground commanders.

[Warship NWS]

To JMS,

I do agree that there were several contributing factors to the use of trench warfare during WW1 but I fully believe that the airplane was very possibly the most critical instigator of the elongated use of static trenches during WW1. I find it ironic that not until 1914 did static trenches start being used on such a wide scale - at the same time the airplane came into its own as an aerial recon asset - immediately after the Battle of the Marne. Never before had this occurred even with the use of obstacles, artillery, trains, rapid fire weapons, mortars, etc.. these all existed before in previous wars .. even as far back as the Civil War in the 1860s, but even with similiar weapons you never saw years of trench warfare pinning down entire armies of hundreds of thousands of men for such lengths of time. I do not believe it was just a coincidence that the airplane changed the face of warfare forever starting in WW1 and that elongated trench warfare only happened at the same time the airplane came of age as a military weapon.

[JMS]

To JMS,

I do agree that there were several contributing factors to the use of trench warfare during WW1 but I fully believe that the airplane was very possibly the most critical instigator of the elongated use of static trenches during WW1. I find it ironic that not until 1914 did static trenches start being used on such a wide scale - at the same time the airplane came into its own as an aerial recon asset - immediately after the Battle of the Marne. Never before had this occurred even with the use of obstacles, artillery, trains, rapid fire weapons, mortars, etc.. these all existed before in previous wars .. even as far back as the Civil War in the 1860s, but even with similiar weapons you never saw years of trench warfare pinning down entire armies of hundreds of thousands of men for such lengths of time. I do not believe it was just a coincidence that the airplane changed the face of warfare forever starting in WW1 and that elongated trench warfare only happened at the same time the airplane came of age as a military weapon.

You would have a point if that happened everywhere, but trench warfare was confined to narrow fronts with a high density in military forces, namely, the Western front where 200+ divisions in each side faced each other, the Italian front, where mountains restricted movement and Gallipoli where there was no possibility of maneuver. The war in the Eastern front was much more fluid and trench warfare was limited, the same happening in the Middle East.

It's not sufficient to have the intelligence, after all what was the intelligence cycle time like? take off before dawn, take the photos, land by mid-morning, send them to the photo-interpreter, at best in the relevant higher HQ by mid-afternoon and orders reaching the guys commanding front units by night. The cycle was faster than in other wars, but still not fast enough.

[thevanderploegs]

Wow! After reading this thread the only thing I'm sure of is that no one can agree on definitions of Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. Not even the extremes of S and T can be agreed upon.

The only thing I'll add is that tactics are used to move the operation forward in order to acheive strategic aims. :)

Regards,
Gary

[Warship NWS]

You would have a point if that happened everywhere, but trench warfare was confined to narrow fronts with a high density in military forces, namely, the Western front where 200+ divisions in each side faced each other, the Italian front, where mountains restricted movement and Gallipoli where there was no possibility of maneuver. The war in the Eastern front was much more fluid and trench warfare was limited, the same happening in the Middle East.

It's not sufficient to have the intelligence, after all what was the intelligence cycle time like? take off before dawn, take the photos, land by mid-morning, send them to the photo-interpreter, at best in the relevant higher HQ by mid-afternoon and orders reaching the guys commanding front units by night. The cycle was faster than in other wars, but still not fast enough.

Granted not all fronts were fought using the same exact tactics but the Western Front was where the two greatest armies met and fought and where the future of Europe was ultimately determined. None of the other nations were in the war for the length of the war or contributed enough to greatly alter the course of the war in the end. Other nationalities did not offer as much in terms of the use of aerial warfare in comparison and often used French, German, and British aircraft designs. The nationalities that used aerial recon to its greatest effect were the British, French, and the Germans overall.

As to the speed of information.. to increase the speed of intel specialized "fast" cars or motorcycles were used to transmit information from the landing sites of aerial recon units to the HQs. An air dropped delivery canister system was also developed with specific ground crews that would pick up the canisters near some of the forward HQs as well. Entire battle maps could eventually be drawn up on a daily basis due to the numbers of intel reports and photographs being taken of the front. It was realized right at the start of aerial recon flights that the speed of which the information was delivered to the correct individuals was critically vital. This is also why I mentioned that the speed of developing photography was greatly increased through the use of developing negatives while in flight and then printing them within minutes after landing.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Early MGs were not as much offensive weapons as they were supportive weapons, for the only exception of being used on planes and early tanks, rifles were the primary offensive bullet firing weapons until single manned infantry portable rapid fire guns came out to play - (Ed got that one dead on). MGs were support weapons on the ground and rifles were far more accurate especially for long ranged fire. Without rifle support an MG crew could easily be flanked and killed or taken out by snipers. The MGs most effective role was to suppress enemy fire so as to give more time for the rifleman to effectively engage targets with accurate fire. On the ground.. the MG was a supportive weapon. Artillery, which claimed 75% of the casualties of WW1, was made far more effective due to aircraft targeting, mapping, and spotting of targets so which weapon was more strategic in its role in terms of killing troops? The artillery or the MGs? I think the answer is obvious. The part I will agree with is the war in the air as then your MGs are engaging the most strategic weapons of WW1.. recon planes. The battle of the flying guns in the air vs the recon planes proved more strategic then any work the MGs did on the ground.

Point being, before you go stating that MGs were the only direct, and from what I can tell by what your stating, cause of "static warfare" I would love to see some facts to back that up based on proper research, not just historical copycats. MGs were around before the static trenches of WW1 took place so they were obviously not the instigator of that type of warfare and you need good intel to know where to transport, deploy, man, and supply your buckets of bullets for those MG crews.. and that during WW1 my friend.. required airplanes to tell you where the enemy was otherwise you have a bunch of noise makers with nothing to shoot at.

Thanks.

Chris:

I think it is important to keep in mind how close the opposing trench lines were to each in many places. No man's land was often less than 200 hundred yards apart. You really don't need to spot where the enemy is coming from since you can keep him under observation from your own trenches.

As far as MGs go, they didn't in themselves create trench warfare. As you pointed out, trenches were used ever since firearms were employed in warfare. What makes WWI so unique is the massive numbers of troops employed that allowed for continous lines of fortification with no real way to outflank them. The famous "Race to the Sea" whereby the Germans and the British each sought to outflank the other was the final curtain for maneuver warfare until 1918. Once both sides had dug in they lost the ability to shift each other out of position until changes in ground warfare occurred.

The point about hiding troops before an offensive is valid. The Germans certainly practiced this before attacking Verdun. Of course it's pretty difficult to achieve tactical surprise when you mount an artillery barrage that lasts for hours or even days. No commander is going to be fooled by that. Even without aerial recon, it becomes pretty obvious where the attack is going to occur.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You are on a roll here, :) I was exaggerating, the machine-gun was a tactical weapon and certainly it was not an inovation in the first part of the war.

WW1-like warfare had already happened during the siege of Port Arthur and the Eastern Front saw plenty of mobile warfare so the "uniqueness" of the Western front wasn't such. What caused a static front was not a single cause but the systemic linking of a number of things, such as a narrow frontage, barbed wire to delay movement in the no-man's land, increased firepower (not just machine-guns, but also artillery), the ability to quickly deploy reserves using railroads and trucks, the inability of the attacker in forcing a quick exploitation of breaches due to shelled terrain, lack of communications and insufficient lethality in removing defenders, improved intelligence thanks to aircraft, improved lighting which meant night attacks were as deadly as daylight assaults, etc.

There was no single factor, all were interlinked and the proof, if any is needed, is that successive innovations were unable, by themselves, to break the deadlock. Gas was used and improved and didn't led to a breakthrough, planes were used and didn`t lead to a breakthrough, tanks were used since 1916 and again failed to create a breakthrough, rolling barrages, the same. What finally broke static warfare was the combination of several innovations: tanks, new artillery tactics, better comms, new tactics and training, etc.

JMS:

I think you are on to something here in breaking down the many factors that caused the trench warfare stalemate. The armies that opened the war in 1914 fought more like armies from the Franco-Prussian War with large massed bodies of troops and frontal assaults. The armies that clashed in 1918 had more in common with the mobile forces that fought in WWII. Four years of slaughter and desperate experimentation had produced a major shift in the military paradigm.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I think it is important to keep in mind how close the opposing trench lines were to each in many places. No man's land was often less than 200 hundred yards apart. You really don't need to spot where the enemy is coming from since you can keep him under observation from your own trenches.

The point about hiding troops before an offensive is valid. The Germans certainly practiced this before attacking Verdun. Of course it's pretty difficult to achieve tactical surprise when you mount an artillery barrage that lasts for hours or even days. No commander is going to be fooled by that. Even without aerial recon, it becomes pretty obvious where the attack is going to occur.

Observing enemy movements from the trenches was not nearly as useful as observation balloons, and even more so the airplane. Balloons could see troops up to a certain range but quite often not the logistical train that was supporting them to good effect due to being behind friendly trenches far enough to avoid enemy fire. At best from the ground the best you may get due to obstacles and non-perfectly flat terrain is a few hundred yards .. but what will you see? Not much.. stick your head up and you will not have a head. So observing from the ground was nearly useless in most cases to detect a force building up in the trenches preparing to "go over the top".

Artillery barrages were of course a give away but if they only lasted hours that did not give you ample time to move in reinforcements until after the offensive had already gotten underway, unless you had them in place before hand due to aerial recon spotting the rear echelon build up of supplies and troops that were beyond the range of observation balloons and trench positions.

Many tactics were tried and many failed due to lack of the ability to maintain an offensive, logistical restraints.. much easier to move men in and out of trenches but moving supplies is another matter.. carts and horses did not like trenches very much.. remember how tanks brought their own batches of wood to fill trenches? Now tie in the reduction of mobility to support the troops with airplanes telling the defenders the overall scope of the assault and now you have a double problem.. the enemy will know where to prepare hasty defensive positions and where to setup counterattacks.

Could these factors have been a serious contributor to the inability to hold ground after an assault? Very possible and it definitely deserves further investigation.

[Ed Rotondaro]

???



If it didn't dominate the battlefield and didn't effect the stalemate, then how it could have a strategic effect? you are saying it didn't have an impact in the war! :D

JMS:

Keep in mind here that we have to be careful as to how we define dominate the battlefield in order to determine the strategic effect of a weapon system and its use in battle. Many historians have pointed out that the daylight strategic bombing campaign in WWII was not very effective in terms of destroying German war making industries. Indeed, it was the tactical use of airpower by both sides that had a far greater effect on the ground war than the use of strategic airpower. It took a good three years to achieve air superiority over the battlefield, so was the use of airpower in the strategic mode a failure? Prior to the advent of long ranged fighter escorts were the B-17 and B-24 raids a waste of time and resources? On paper it would appear to be since they suffered horrendous casualties and really didn't achieve much. Yet they tied up valuable Luftwaffe resources that were desperately needed in North Africa and Russia. They forced German industry to spread out to avoid destruction and thereby made the delivery of war materials more vulnerable to tactical air attack.

In conclusion, I believe that aircraft in WWI had far more effect on the overall strategic picture than most historians have considered. They may not have been war winners themselves, but you will note that all sides considered having aircraft vital to both offense and defense. In a time of limited mechanization, the aircraft really gave commanders a way to scout, spot, attack and extend the reach of battle. Now do I consider them the surpreme strategic weapon that Chris does? No, not in WWI, but they have to be considered a strategic weapon to a degree. Only the submarine surpasses the aircraft as the most powerful strategic weapon of the war.

[Warship NWS]

Only the submarine surpasses the aircraft as the most powerful strategic weapon of the war.

Actually, this may be in question also.. my follow up research is to determine how much aircraft contributed to the aerial recon duties to help enforce the blockade of German naval activities - the blockade itself proved the most strategic weapon in the arsenal of the British vs Germany according to the essay I read recently covering the economic, political, and military blockade of German resources. Even with the mighty RN they could not patrol every square mile of the North Sea continuously without some measure of aerial recon, or at the least dirigible, support.

Submarines did not really prove strategic until after The Battle of the Marne which saved France from being very possibly knocked out of the war which in turn was in thanks to aircraft recon efforts. The naval war would have failed by default had France been defeated by Germany as the other nations that had yet to get involved would have likely joined Germany against Britain, who was already creating tensions due to their politically enforced blockade of Germany.

Point being, even if the blockade did not require the extensive strategic use of naval aerial recon aircraft you still have to leave open the possibility that aircraft may have adverted the war being won by Germany as early as 1914 which could have trumped any strategic value of the submarine by default. It is not out of the question.

As it stands however, the airplane may well have equalled the submarine in terms of how wars were fought due to their large numbers being deployed in the strategic roles. One changed the face of naval warfare through the use of stealth, self-propelled torpedoes, and mines and the other acted as a recon information force multipler for land armies thus changing the face of land warfare.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Trench warfare was not a novelty, limited to The Great War. Trench warfare occurred during the Civil War, there were no machine guns, no airplanes or any of those new weapons. However, there was a disconnect in both armies between maneuver and fire. The evolution to trench warfare was more a product of the failure to fire while maneuvering, the schlieffen plan and logistics. The evolution started with the introduction of the minie ball, the self-sealing cartridge and the rifled cannon. This increased the killing range of weapons and ended the reign of the frontal attack. The Prussian's under Von Moltke realized this, as did the French under Louis Napolean. The Franco-Prussian War showed the value of holding the enemy at the front, and using a flanking attack.

Unfortunately, the French in the intervening years, marvelled only at the Prussian aggressiveness and their general's decided that elan was the key. So, they adopted the frontal attack again, in the Napolean style.

The British were the slowest. They tried to use parade ground tactics against the Boers, and got slaughtered for their trouble. Unfortunately, they did not have time to develop and absorb the lessons by the time The Great War was upon them. They were forced to revert to the tactics that had been tested and proven- the frontal attack with artillery preparation.

Now we come to 1914. At this point, on the Allied side, there was the severe disconnect between fire and maneuver. In most cases, it was fire, then maneuver. This put your troops in a position of facing uncontested enemy fire. In mobile warfare, fire and maneuver were not disconnected, they coincided with each contributing to the success. As you maneuver your troops, fire is emanating from them and from the artillery. The opponent is not given the opportunity to return fire, because his head is down.

Now the Schlieffen plan. It was a basic linear offensive. There were no high concentrations of forces in one sector to overwhelm the enemy and breakthough. There was no flank. It's right flank rested on the North Sea and the left flank on the Franco-Swiss border. There were gaps, at times, bulges, but there was no flanks or wings, to maneuver against. It was linear, and the defense was linear. When the offensive ran out of steam, it was just two long lines of soldiers facing each other, no flanks, no wings and the natural tendency is to dig in. The trenches evolved from those to long lines simply digging in. They did not suddenly pop up over night, they evolved. They evolved when the commander's on both sides, realized that the only tactic was the frontal assault. Frontal assault always require heavy preparation fire to create the gaps or overwhelm a small area of the front. Now the problem of maneuver and fire comes into play, with no coordinated firing and maneuvering, no flanks. It was siege warfare on a grand scale.

The last piece of this puzzle is the heavy consumption of ammunition and supplies due to the increased firepower of the guns. This is where the machine gun, the bolt action rifle and the breech loading, quick firing cannon come into play. They consumed prodigeous amounts of ammunition. The Germans had estimated 199 rounds per gun, they consumed 1000 rounds per gun. Logistics now enter the picture. Even with a breakthough, the cost in lives and supplies put a natural break on how far the offensives could move, until logistics caught up with them.

The last piece is the actual speed of maneuver. Most armies in this war were still horse drawn, foot powered. Artillery had to be dragged into position. There was an increased use of trucks, but for the most part, you walked to your jump off point. This creates a slow moving mass of men and material that can be easily spotted and countered.

The solution was to put speed of maneuver back into the battle. It was to put fire and maneuver together, to accelerate the tempo of the battle. Only the motor can do that.


Trench warfare was never caused by one factor, it was end result of many factors. It was the slow movements of armies, the heavy consumption of supplies, the lack of flanks and wings due to the Schlieffen plan but it was also due to poor pre-war study of previous conflicts, drawing the wrong conclusions. The airplane and machine gun were important and contributed, but they, themselves did not cause trench warfare.

[Warship NWS]

Trench warfare was never caused by one factor, it was end result of many factors. It was the slow movements of armies, the heavy consumption of supplies, the lack of flanks and wings due to the Schlieffen plan but it was also due to poor pre-war study of previous conflicts, drawing the wrong conclusions. The airplane and machine gun were important and contributed, but they, themselves did not cause trench warfare.


Your post is why I assert the possibility that the airplane instigated trench warfare on a grand scale during WW1 as a theory - some historians have stated this same possibility. There was never a force multiplier to compare the aircraft to before it entered the battlefield so simple comparisons are not possible without in depth investigation. I am hoping the analysis books I have ordered can help contribute to this topic. I agree that at the least aerial recon contributed to the trench warfare of the Western Front.. the big question is, how much did they contribute compared to other combat environment scenarios or weapons that were involved. The main reason this question comes into play is because both static trench warfare and the airplane were both, at the same exact time, deployed in large scale in 1914. Was this just a coincidence or was there something to this equation? An interesting question to contemplate IMHO.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

Your post is why I assert the possibility that the airplane instigated trench warfare on a grand scale during WW1 as a theory - some historians have stated this same possibility. There was never a force multiplier to compare the aircraft to before it entered the battlefield so simple comparisons are not possible without in depth investigation. I am hoping the analysis books I have ordered can help contribute to this topic. I agree that at the least aerial recon contributed to the trench warfare of the Western Front.. the big question is, how much did they contribute compared to other combat environment scenarios or weapons that were involved. The main reason this question comes into play is because both static trench warfare and the airplane were both, at the same exact time, deployed in large scale in 1914. Was this just a coincidence or was there something to this equation? An interesting question to contemplate IMHO.

Thanks.

The westrn front is where we all focusing on here for the most part - about Trench warfare - didn't that happen on other fronts as well to a lesser extent? I don't believe it did on the Russian front line very much, but I honestly don't know.
It would be an indication that aircraft influenced the start of trech warfare if we could see if it happened also where aircraft were far fewer in numbers. Some fronts (or areas of the fronts) had very little airial involvement at least until later in the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Actually, this may be in question also.. my follow up research is to determine how much aircraft contributed to the aerial recon duties to help enforce the blockade of German naval activities - the blockade itself proved the most strategic weapon in the arsenal of the British vs Germany according to the essay I read recently covering the economic, political, and military blockade of German resources. Even with the mighty RN they could not patrol every square mile of the North Sea continuously without some measure of aerial recon, or at the least dirigible, support.

Submarines did not really prove strategic until after The Battle of the Marne which saved France from being very possibly knocked out of the war which in turn was in thanks to aircraft recon efforts. The naval war would have failed by default had France been defeated by Germany as the other nations that had yet to get involved would have likely joined Germany against Britain, who was already creating tensions due to their politically enforced blockade of Germany.



Chris:

I would argue that the submarine really became strategic only when Germany accepted the need to use unrestricted submarine warfare. Prior to that, the submarine was vulnerable and also unable to strike as rapidly because of the need to surface, either board or warn the crew to abandon ship. How many prizes can you seize in a day operating like that? The submarine was also strategic in that its use shifted the balance of power by bringing the US into the war.

A land defeat of France poses interesting questions. Since Imperial Germany never had any desire to occupy France as Nazi Germany did, if France surrenders and acceptable terms are worked out, including Germany returning all conquered territory, is Britain going to fight on for Russia or Serbia? She really only declared war when Germany violated Belgian neutrality. Is the game worth the price? Astute British leaders may have well recognized the continuing threat that Imperial Germany posed to Great Britain (after all that's why they allied with France to begin with), but could they persuade Parliament to continue a war that gained Britain nothing, especially if bereft of a continental ally?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Trench warfare was not a novelty, limited to The Great War. Trench warfare occurred during the Civil War, there were no machine guns, no airplanes or any of those new weapons. However, there was a disconnect in both armies between maneuver and fire. The evolution to trench warfare was more a product of the failure to fire while maneuvering, the schlieffen plan and logistics. The evolution started with the introduction of the minie ball, the self-sealing cartridge and the rifled cannon. This increased the killing range of weapons and ended the reign of the frontal attack. The Prussian's under Von Moltke realized this, as did the French under Louis Napolean. The Franco-Prussian War showed the value of holding the enemy at the front, and using a flanking attack.

Unfortunately, the French in the intervening years, marvelled only at the Prussian aggressiveness and their general's decided that elan was the key. So, they adopted the frontal attack again, in the Napolean style.

The British were the slowest. They tried to use parade ground tactics against the Boers, and got slaughtered for their trouble. Unfortunately, they did not have time to develop and absorb the lessons by the time The Great War was upon them. They were forced to revert to the tactics that had been tested and proven- the frontal attack with artillery preparation.

Now we come to 1914. At this point, on the Allied side, there was the severe disconnect between fire and maneuver. In most cases, it was fire, then maneuver. This put your troops in a position of facing uncontested enemy fire. In mobile warfare, fire and maneuver were not disconnected, they coincided with each contributing to the success. As you maneuver your troops, fire is emanating from them and from the artillery. The opponent is not given the opportunity to return fire, because his head is down.

Now the Schlieffen plan. It was a basic linear offensive. There were no high concentrations of forces in one sector to overwhelm the enemy and breakthough. There was no flank. It's right flank rested on the North Sea and the left flank on the Franco-Swiss border. There were gaps, at times, bulges, but there was no flanks or wings, to maneuver against. It was linear, and the defense was linear. When the offensive ran out of steam, it was just two long lines of soldiers facing each other, no flanks, no wings and the natural tendency is to dig in. The trenches evolved from those to long lines simply digging in. They did not suddenly pop up over night, they evolved. They evolved when the commander's on both sides, realized that the only tactic was the frontal assault. Frontal assault always require heavy preparation fire to create the gaps or overwhelm a small area of the front. Now the problem of maneuver and fire comes into play, with no coordinated firing and maneuvering, no flanks. It was siege warfare on a grand scale.

The last piece of this puzzle is the heavy consumption of ammunition and supplies due to the increased firepower of the guns. This is where the machine gun, the bolt action rifle and the breech loading, quick firing cannon come into play. They consumed prodigeous amounts of ammunition. The Germans had estimated 199 rounds per gun, they consumed 1000 rounds per gun. Logistics now enter the picture. Even with a breakthough, the cost in lives and supplies put a natural break on how far the offensives could move, until logistics caught up with them.

The last piece is the actual speed of maneuver. Most armies in this war were still horse drawn, foot powered. Artillery had to be dragged into position. There was an increased use of trucks, but for the most part, you walked to your jump off point. This creates a slow moving mass of men and material that can be easily spotted and countered.

The solution was to put speed of maneuver back into the battle. It was to put fire and maneuver together, to accelerate the tempo of the battle. Only the motor can do that.


Trench warfare was never caused by one factor, it was end result of many factors. It was the slow movements of armies, the heavy consumption of supplies, the lack of flanks and wings due to the Schlieffen plan but it was also due to poor pre-war study of previous conflicts, drawing the wrong conclusions. The airplane and machine gun were important and contributed, but they, themselves did not cause trench warfare.

Dennis:

Very good summation. I agree.

[old_pop2000]

The westrn front is where we all focusing on here for the most part - about Trench warfare - didn't that happen on other fronts as well to a lesser extent? I don't believe it did on the Russian front line very much, but I honestly don't know.
It would be an indication that aircraft influenced the start of trech warfare if we could see if it happened also where aircraft were far fewer in numbers. Some fronts (or areas of the fronts) had very little airial involvement at least until later in the war.

How about the Gallipoli Campaign? Trench warfare appeared in that campaign very soon after the landings.

Roman Legion's would entrench every night to protect their camps.

In the Napoleonic War, in the Peninsular Campaign, Portuguese dug trenches at Torres Vedras in 1810

The Maori's of New Zealand erected a structure called a PA.

In The Great War, on the Italian front between Austria and Italy, in the Alps, trenches were used. Rommel's talks of them in his papers.

Trenches are not new to warfare

[Ed Rotondaro]

How about the Gallipoli Campaign? Trench warfare appeared in that campaign very soon after the landings.

Roman Legion's would entrench every night to protect their camps.

In the Napoleonic War, in the Peninsular Campaign, Portuguese dug trenches at Torres Vedras in 1810

The Maori's of New Zealand erected a structure called a PA.

In The Great War, on the Italian front between Austria and Italy, in the Alps, trenches were used. Rommel's talks of them in his papers.

Trenches are not new to warfare

Dennis:

I would say that trenches are pretty much the logical result of the use of firearms in general and rifled ones in particular. You could no longer stand out in the open as was the case in the horse and musket period. You even see them in the musket and pike period of the late Renaissance, especially during sieges to protect the artillery and to allow for marksmen to harass the walls. Even though the smooth bore weapons of the time were not very accurate, the ranges were also not very long. Siege engineers often had to wear heavy specialized armor as they went about their tasks, at a time when armor was mainly disappearing from the battlefield.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I would say that trenches are pretty much the logical result of the use of firearms in general and rifled ones in particular. You could no longer stand out in the open as was the case in the horse and musket period. You even see them in the musket and pike period of the late Renaissance, especially during sieges to protect the artillery and to allow for marksmen to harass the walls. Even though the smooth bore weapons of the time were not very accurate, the ranges were also not very long. Siege engineers often had to wear heavy specialized armor as they went about their tasks, at a time when armor was mainly disappearing from the battlefield.
Ed:
When mobility is lost, soldiers start digging holes for protection. Very simple principle at work, self-preservation. With no flanks, the only way to the enemy is straight ahead.

[asnrobert]

???



If it didn't dominate the battlefield and didn't effect the stalemate, then how it could have a strategic effect? you are saying it didn't have an impact in the war! :D

The point was, it was USED in a strategic manner. I recall reading that in April 1917, General Hague was planning a major offensive, and required a great deal of reconnaissance. The month was referred to by fliers as "Bloody April" since they were using obsolete crates like the BE2 that British factories continued to crank out. However, they were still able to accomplish their mission. Hague's offensive may not have accomplished much, but the fact remains the efforts of the recce aircraft were used to make strategic decisions.

[JMS]

Now the Schlieffen plan. It was a basic linear offensive. There were no high concentrations of forces in one sector to overwhelm the enemy and breakthough. There was no flank. It's right flank rested on the North Sea and the left flank on the Franco-Swiss border. There were gaps, at times, bulges, but there was no flanks or wings, to maneuver against. It was linear, and the defense was linear. When the offensive ran out of steam, it was just two long lines of soldiers facing each other, no flanks, no wings and the natural tendency is to dig in. The trenches evolved from those to long lines simply digging in. They did not suddenly pop up over night, they evolved. They evolved when the commander's on both sides, realized that the only tactic was the frontal assault. Frontal assault always require heavy preparation fire to create the gaps or overwhelm a small area of the front. Now the problem of maneuver and fire comes into play, with no coordinated firing and maneuvering, no flanks. It was siege warfare on a grand scale.



While I agree on gist of the rest of the post, this is a misstatement on the Schlieffen plan. The original plan was a grand tactical maneuver designed to surround and destroy the French Army in a huge maneuver that would entice the French to advance into Germany while the bulk of the German army moved across Belgium into their rear. There were no fixed geographical objectives like Paris and the right (mobile) wing was to be much more stronger that the left (fixed) wing.

Schlieffen, in the tradition of the Kriegsacademie didn't understand logisitics nor the challenge that would impose on the advancing troops, but he got right the initial French reaction so he could have pulled it off, possibly, though friction in the Clausewitzian sense was barely acknowledged.

When Moltke the younger took over, the plan was modified to satisfy the royals who would command the left wing armies, giving them more forces than needed for their mission, and them then screwing the plan by attacking and helping push the French out of the envelopment.

The Battle of the Marne didn't save Paris, as the Germans were already moving away to the East to try to complete the encirclement of the bulk of the French Army, leaving, BTW, most of the French war-making potential out of it, which is why Gallieni was able to send forces to reinforce the armies that were operating in the Marne. Defeat of the French was unlikely since the Germans were outrunning their supplies and would lack the oompf to close the encirclement and their left wing had already been stopped cold by the border fortifications.

[old_pop2000]

While I agree on gist of the rest of the post, this is a misstatement on the Schlieffen plan. The original plan was a grand tactical maneuver designed to surround and destroy the French Army in a huge maneuver that would entice the French to advance into Germany while the bulk of the German army moved across Belgium into their rear. There were no fixed geographical objectives like Paris and the right (mobile) wing was to be much more stronger that the left (fixed) wing.

Schlieffen, in the tradition of the Kriegsacademie didn't understand logisitics nor the challenge that would impose on the advancing troops, but he got right the initial French reaction so he could have pulled it off, possibly, though friction in the Clausewitzian sense was barely acknowledged.

When Moltke the younger took over, the plan was modified to satisfy the royals who would command the left wing armies, giving them more forces than needed for their mission, and them then screwing the plan by attacking and helping push the French out of the envelopment.

The Battle of the Marne didn't save Paris, as the Germans were already moving away to the East to try to complete the encirclement of the bulk of the French Army, leaving, BTW, most of the French war-making potential out of it, which is why Gallieni was able to send forces to reinforce the armies that were operating in the Marne. Defeat of the French was unlikely since the Germans were outrunning their supplies and would lack the oompf to close the encirclement and their left wing had already been stopped cold by the border fortifications.
You are wrong, JMS. You apparently haven't studied the evolution of the Schlieffen plan which began after the 1870 victory over France. Von Molke the Elder had wanted, in case of another war but on two fronts, to negotiate a peace in the west. Von Schlieffen and his staff did not feel that a negotiated settlement was a proper objective of war. Neither did they want to have to launch an offensive against the French on their small border area. There were aware, the French would and did fortify due to the 1870's preemptive attack. This meant that the German offensive would be a frontal attack and they did not have faith in this. This is where the Schlieffen Plan began. It was to be a flank attack through Belgium and Holland, to outflank the French Army. The right wing was supposed to be the strongest. Schlieffen had been a product of the Prussian Staff system and believed in offensive, maneuver, mass and economy of force. Schlieffen actually presented his plan, after retirement. It would have sent 7/8th's of the German army against the French, in a six week campaign.

Schlieffen allocated 90% of the divisions to the left flank[looking at the German front line] and planned to hook the French defending the Franco-German border and attack them from behind. The centerpoint of the wheel was Metz. 10% of the German army would fight a delaying action on the Franco-German border while the rest of the army wheeled around the French left flank. It was hoped that the Belgian's would allow peaceful transit through their country after guarentees of their neutrality.


In 1905, the plan was weakened to use 5% of the divisions on the eastern front to protect Prussian against the Russians. The key to the plan was speed and surprise. Schlieffen had to supply sufficient men and material to keep the right wing moving as fast as it could. The next problem was Paris. It was the emotional heart of France and had to be isolated and it was also the hub of the French railway system.

Schlieffen's successor, Von Molke the younger, was a more conservative officer and moved the newly created divisions to the Eastern front, and moved reserve divisions from behind the right flank to the German border. Molke's plan weakened the right wing and strengthen the left. This precluded the French from moving forward, which was always the intent of the plan-to entice the French into making a preemptive move into Germany, thereby allowing the right wing to hook them, catching them between the two forces. It was originally designed as a battle of annihilation.

The result of the modifications by Von Molke, was to reduce the right wing from having 95% of the forces to 65% with the remaining percentage in the left wing. The whole offensive was not reduced to 54% of the German Army in the West, versus 95% of the total. This was a drastic reduction in mobility and firepower.

Upon mobilization, the German's had seven armies with 1.5 million men on the Western front. The right wing was composed of three armies of 34 divisions (640,000) men. Von Kluck commanded the army on the farthest right and had the farthest to march. Its pace would dictate the pace of the rest of the army in the West. The center was composed of 20 divisions (400,000 men) was the area around which the right flank would wheel. The left was composed of 16 divisions (320,000) would hold the French in Alsace-Lorraine.

Now, with 640,000 men in the right flank, 400,000 men in the center and 320,000 men in the left flank, I would say that was very nearly a linear offensive. Although the left was half the size of the right, the center was at least two thirds. This is an evenly spaced, linear offensive hampered by a lack of available railroads to support Schlieffen's original plan. This was why Von Molke changed the plan. He had logistic's experience. The German General Staff realized that the roads and railways in that sector could not support 90% of the Western army which, since Schlieffen's time had grown in great measure. It was logistically impossible to now support the right wing, in its original composition.

Now, does this explain my point. If you cannot provide me with detailed responses with some documentation, don't just tell me its wrong. Because, I know that what I am saying is correct.

One of my primary sources is "Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton" by Martine Van Creveld. This is one of the most oft quoted and highly respected books written on the subject of logistics thoughout the ages.

I reiterate, the weakening of the right wing was not due to royals wanting to command the wing, it was due to von Molke's concern about the Russians and their possible entry into the war, and most importantly, the supply concerns about the large right wing.

Anecdotally, new evidence discovered in the Reichsarchiv could actually show that the "Schlieffen Plan" never existed. Schlieffen's planning was to fight defensively on the Western front because the German-Austrian armies were outnumbered. Some archivist now say that the "Schlieffen Plan" was created by the German General Staff to hide their defeat at the Marne and shift the blame onto the dead Chief of the German General Staff. In fact, in the German archives there is no mention of the Schlieffen plan before 1920. It will be interesting to see more information on this, if it is in fact true.

[Warship NWS]

According to a source I just read regarding the Schlieffen plan and how it played out in France.. the BEF was a major reason for why it failed, which in turn was again due to aerial recon.



The presence/effectiveness of the British Expeditionary Force: The BEF (British Expeditionary Force) was small, numbering only 75,000 at the start of the war. The French mobilized millions of recruits, and their goal was to use this number to defeat the Germans quickly in Alsace. To this end, the French commander-in-chief Joseph Joffre placed the small but highly trained BEF on the left flank, where he believed there would not be any fighting. Due to the rapid German advance through Belgium, the British were almost annihilated several times, but they managed to delay the Germans long enough for French and British reinforcements to arrive. While the BEF was forced into retreat throughout the month of August, it provided enough resistance against the German First Army under Alexander von Kluck to help induce the German general to break off the Plan. Instead, von Kluck turned south-east towards Compiegne, showing his flank to the Garrison of Paris under Gallieni, making possible the "Miracle of the Marne".


I will note again.. that Gallieni was a major advocate of aerial recon and was the ONLY French general to listen to the recon reports and in turn knew about the changes in the German offensive - and reacted to it.

A critical reason to why the BEF was saved, and in turn caused delays for the German flanking maneuver, was due to the RFC constantly watching the German lines and keeping them aware of imminent danger. Had the BEF been destroyed the French Army on their own may well have been destroyed shortly afterwards as the 6th French Army was not enough on its own to hold off the Germans - as was proven with the 6,000 man reinforcements rescue during the Battle of the Marne. In turn, recon again montired the Germans near Paris and alerted the Gallieni to make the counter-attack called the "The Battle of the Marne" which in turn saved Paris.

Even though most historians, who still debate the merits and failures of the Schlieffen Plan to this day, have seemingly ignored the importance of aerial recon in their writings keep in mind that aerial recon was NOT a known asset when the plan was devised or modified before the war started, however their contributions were instrumental in the final failure. Debates have been raging ever since the end of WW1 about why the plan failed but the contributions of the airplane have been left out due to the historians almost never bothering to even mention them, again the armies (of which the recon assets were attached to before the war even started) got all the glorified historical writings. Almost no historian bothers with the utilization of aircraft unless they were used in large numbers and dropped lots of bombs.

Final note:


The German retreat between 9 September and 13 September marked the abandonment of the Schlieffen Plan. Moltke is said to have reported to the Kaiser: "Your Majesty, we have lost the war." In the aftermath of the battle, both sides dug in and four years of stalemate ensued.

Winning or losing the war according to Moltke himself hinged on the taking of Paris, possibly knocking France out of the war. A major attrition war was was exactly what the Kaiser had feared most, and what Germany could afford the least.

[djcyclone]

Dennis:

I would say that trenches are pretty much the logical result of the use of firearms in general and rifled ones in particular. You could no longer stand out in the open as was the case in the horse and musket period. You even see them in the musket and pike period of the late Renaissance, especially during sieges to protect the artillery and to allow for marksmen to harass the walls. Even though the smooth bore weapons of the time were not very accurate, the ranges were also not very long. Siege engineers often had to wear heavy specialized armor as they went about their tasks, at a time when armor was mainly disappearing from the battlefield.



Trenches have been around for a long time. You can do research into the Civil War and see that trenches where used by both sides at Chattanooga Tennassee. They where used other places also, but I specificaly remember reading about that somewhere. Anyway they where also used during the French and Indian war. The idea was to dig trenches for the Artilary. They continued to dig for days on end while moving the artilary forward. Eventually they got close enough that cannon shells could be hurled not only into the wall of the fort itself, but also over the wall thus giving engineers reason to creat the cannon ball that exploded a short period of time after it was launched.

Humans are so creative when it comes to designing interesting things that can kill another human being. Nothing like seeing a Cannon ball land right next to you, and before you can look up and think god that it did not hit you, it explodes. BOOM and all you see is a flash of light and now you do not have to think God via Prayer, because you can just tell him face to face. HA,HA,HA,HA,HA,HA,HA,HA.

Don't you just hate when that happens.:D

[Warship NWS]

Just to clarify what some historians have stated from the result of aerial recon, noone has ever claimed that air recon caused trench warfare.. only that it may well have caused such warfare to be used on such a large scale after the Battle of the Marne. Whether other contributing factors were involved or not the massive trenches did not start to be constructed until after that decisive battle of which would not have been a victory without aircraft. Aircraft after that may well have insured that trenches were required from that point on for offensive and defensive operations on the Western Front, where aircraft were used in large scale, since mobility was severely effected by the inability to move, or formations being organized above ground, during daylight without being spotted. This is not a completely out of the question theory. Never before had trench warfare been used on such a large scale and never before had the 3rd dimension of warfare, airpower, been used on such a scale for detecting the operational conduct of an opposing army - especially beyond the front lines. Coincidence? Maybe.. but a theory that cannot be completely disregarded.

Thanks.

[JMS]

You are wrong, JMS. Now, with 640,000 men in the right flank, 400,000 men in the center and 320,000 men in the left flank, I would say that was very nearly a linear offensive. Although the left was half the size of the right, the center was at least two thirds. This is an evenly spaced, linear offensive hampered by a lack of available railroads to support Schlieffen's original plan. This was why Von Molke changed the plan. He had logistic's experience. The German General Staff realized that the roads and railways in that sector could not support 90% of the Western army which, since Schlieffen's time had grown in great measure. It was logistically impossible to now support the right wing, in its original composition.

Now, does this explain my point. If you cannot provide me with detailed responses with some documentation, don't just tell me its wrong. Because, I know that what I am saying is correct.
...
Anecdotally, new evidence discovered in the Reichsarchiv could actually show that the "Schlieffen Plan" never existed. Schlieffen's planning was to fight defensively on the Western front because the German-Austrian armies were outnumbered. Some archivist now say that the "Schlieffen Plan" was created by the German General Staff to hide their defeat at the Marne and shift the blame onto the dead Chief of the German General Staff. In fact, in the German archives there is no mention of the Schlieffen plan before 1920. It will be interesting to see more information on this, if it is in fact true.

Dennis, we are saying the same thing, but I wouldn't call the plan a linear offensive since the left wing was supposed to loose ground to entice the French into the trap. Instead, it advanced forward against the original and the revised intent of the plan, IIRC (short on time to check it) the Army commanded by the Crown Prince, right into the Troueé des Charmes where it was stopped by the French.

It became a linear offensive because someone disobeyed orders and was enabled to do so by the distribution of forces.

Your last is interesting, but I doubt much revisionism will come out of that. IIRC pre-1905 the intent was to hold the French while the Russians were defeated. After the Russo-japanese war, Russia was much less of a menace and the plan to put the French first became the Plan. Since Schlieffen was then the top planner, who else would it be named after? ;)

[Warship NWS]

I started up a seperate thread for discussing WW1 grand strategy here;

http://forums.navalwarfare.net/showthread.php?t=263

WW1 aircraft as a strategic weapon will be continued on this thread.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, we are saying the same thing, but I wouldn't call the plan a linear offensive since the left wing was supposed to loose ground to entice the French into the trap. Instead, it advanced forward against the original and the revised intent of the plan, IIRC (short on time to check it) the Army commanded by the Crown Prince, right into the Troueé des Charmes where it was stopped by the French.

It became a linear offensive because someone disobeyed orders and was enabled to do so by the distribution of forces.

Your last is interesting, but I doubt much revisionism will come out of that. IIRC pre-1905 the intent was to hold the French while the Russians were defeated. After the Russo-japanese war, Russia was much less of a menace and the plan to put the French first became the Plan. Since Schlieffen was then the top planner, who else would it be named after? ;)
JMS:
I am going to reply on the new thread. Let's continue there.

See ya

[Warship NWS]

JMS:
I am going to reply on the new thread. Let's continue there.

See ya

I already posted a reply here;

http://forums.navalwarfare.net/showthread.php?t=263

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

To JMS, please post any further discussion about the Schlieffen Plan here;

http://forums.navalwarfare.net/showthread.php?t=263

Also your maps that you posted were unreadable.

Thanks.

[JMS]

The Field Artillery Journal JAN_MAR_1915

"Misleading Aero Observers.
A French officer in command of an artillery park has stated that every morning a German aviator came and ascertained his position. They watched for his appearance then changed the position of the park as soon as he had turned back to report the information he had secured. In one case a French battery was located by a German aero and one gun badly disabled by the fire. The battery changed its position, leaving the damaged gun, with several mannikins placed around it. The Germans fired on this disabled gun for six days thereafter. The aeroplane has its limitations of use, especially in foggy weather, under which conditions cavalry is indispensable."

:D

But to be fair the next article reckons: "The aeroplane seems to be playing a very important rôle-in connection with artillery work."

;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

You are wrong, JMS. You apparently haven't studied the evolution of the Schlieffen plan which began after the 1870 victory over France. Von Molke the Elder had wanted, in case of another war but on two fronts, to negotiate a peace in the west. Von Schlieffen and his staff did not feel that a negotiated settlement was a proper objective of war. Neither did they want to have to launch an offensive against the French on their small border area. There were aware, the French would and did fortify due to the 1870's preemptive attack. This meant that the German offensive would be a frontal attack and they did not have faith in this. This is where the Schlieffen Plan began. It was to be a flank attack through Belgium and Holland, to outflank the French Army. The right wing was supposed to be the strongest. Schlieffen had been a product of the Prussian Staff system and believed in offensive, maneuver, mass and economy of force. Schlieffen actually presented his plan, after retirement. It would have sent 7/8th's of the German army against the French, in a six week campaign.

Schlieffen allocated 90% of the divisions to the left flank[looking at the German front line] and planned to hook the French defending the Franco-German border and attack them from behind. The centerpoint of the wheel was Metz. 10% of the German army would fight a delaying action on the Franco-German border while the rest of the army wheeled around the French left flank. It was hoped that the Belgian's would allow peaceful transit through their country after guarentees of their neutrality.


In 1905, the plan was weakened to use 5% of the divisions on the eastern front to protect Prussian against the Russians. The key to the plan was speed and surprise. Schlieffen had to supply sufficient men and material to keep the right wing moving as fast as it could. The next problem was Paris. It was the emotional heart of France and had to be isolated and it was also the hub of the French railway system.

Schlieffen's successor, Von Molke the younger, was a more conservative officer and moved the newly created divisions to the Eastern front, and moved reserve divisions from behind the right flank to the German border. Molke's plan weakened the right wing and strengthen the left. This precluded the French from moving forward, which was always the intent of the plan-to entice the French into making a preemptive move into Germany, thereby allowing the right wing to hook them, catching them between the two forces. It was originally designed as a battle of annihilation.

The result of the modifications by Von Molke, was to reduce the right wing from having 95% of the forces to 65% with the remaining percentage in the left wing. The whole offensive was not reduced to 54% of the German Army in the West, versus 95% of the total. This was a drastic reduction in mobility and firepower.

Upon mobilization, the German's had seven armies with 1.5 million men on the Western front. The right wing was composed of three armies of 34 divisions (640,000) men. Von Kluck commanded the army on the farthest right and had the farthest to march. Its pace would dictate the pace of the rest of the army in the West. The center was composed of 20 divisions (400,000 men) was the area around which the right flank would wheel. The left was composed of 16 divisions (320,000) would hold the French in Alsace-Lorraine.

Now, with 640,000 men in the right flank, 400,000 men in the center and 320,000 men in the left flank, I would say that was very nearly a linear offensive. Although the left was half the size of the right, the center was at least two thirds. This is an evenly spaced, linear offensive hampered by a lack of available railroads to support Schlieffen's original plan. This was why Von Molke changed the plan. He had logistic's experience. The German General Staff realized that the roads and railways in that sector could not support 90% of the Western army which, since Schlieffen's time had grown in great measure. It was logistically impossible to now support the right wing, in its original composition.

Now, does this explain my point. If you cannot provide me with detailed responses with some documentation, don't just tell me its wrong. Because, I know that what I am saying is correct.

One of my primary sources is "Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton" by Martine Van Creveld. This is one of the most oft quoted and highly respected books written on the subject of logistics thoughout the ages.

I reiterate, the weakening of the right wing was not due to royals wanting to command the wing, it was due to von Molke's concern about the Russians and their possible entry into the war, and most importantly, the supply concerns about the large right wing.

Anecdotally, new evidence discovered in the Reichsarchiv could actually show that the "Schlieffen Plan" never existed. Schlieffen's planning was to fight defensively on the Western front because the German-Austrian armies were outnumbered. Some archivist now say that the "Schlieffen Plan" was created by the German General Staff to hide their defeat at the Marne and shift the blame onto the dead Chief of the German General Staff. In fact, in the German archives there is no mention of the Schlieffen plan before 1920. It will be interesting to see more information on this, if it is in fact true.


Dennis:

This is interesting in that I had not read that the Schlieffen Plan" was a cover story. I had read that the plan as used was not workable due to logistics, but I am surprised to see that the plan was now a cover story for bad staff work.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Trenches have been around for a long time. You can do research into the Civil War and see that trenches where used by both sides at Chattanooga Tennassee. They where used other places also, but I specificaly remember reading about that somewhere. Anyway they where also used during the French and Indian war. The idea was to dig trenches for the Artilary. They continued to dig for days on end while moving the artilary forward. Eventually they got close enough that cannon shells could be hurled not only into the wall of the fort itself, but also over the wall thus giving engineers reason to creat the cannon ball that exploded a short period of time after it was launched.

Humans are so creative when it comes to designing interesting things that can kill another human being. Nothing like seeing a Cannon ball land right next to you, and before you can look up and think god that it did not hit you, it explodes. BOOM and all you see is a flash of light and now you do not have to think God via Prayer, because you can just tell him face to face. HA,HA,HA,HA,HA,HA,HA,HA.

Don't you just hate when that happens.:D

DJ:

While this discussion about how artillery was moved forward is correct to a degree, exploding shells were a product of the mid-1800s (Henri Paixhen, a French artillery officer created the first true successful shells fired from guns.) Prior to that cannonballs were solid shot. The only explosive ordanance was mortars (very short ranged) or petards (explosive charges placed against a fort (you know the expression "Hoist by your own petard"?)

[Warship NWS]

The Field Artillery Journal JAN_MAR_1915
;)

There were always challenges to any recon, friendly fire was a problem that needed to be solved as one example (many soldiers had never seen an airplane before so they naturaly shot at anything that buzzed overhead). However, their contributions, even at the start, far outweighed their limitations - especially when compared to the limitations of cavalry. If you could use both air recon and cavalry then so much the better but cavalry was chained to the distance they could ride out to in a combat zone and with no radios their communications were often delayed plus they had to consider terrain obstacles (granted it was easier to hide a horse and man then a plane buzzing around).. airplanes only had the limitation of fuel however and could fly over enemy unit dangers that cavalry could not always avoid. For example, there was no way for cavalry to gain any worthy picture of logistical supply lines behind the front lines and estimating the size of troop concentrations from the ground was a much greater challenge. One major attribute of aircraft was the speed of reports and their vantage points.. which proved vital in combat. A horse soldier for example did not spot the "columns of men that went beyond the horizon" when German troops were marching through Belgium.. an airplane did.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There were always challenges to any recon, friendly fire was a problem that needed to be solved as one example (many soldiers had never seen an airplane before so they naturaly shot at anything that buzzed overhead). However, their contributions, even at the start, far outweighed their limitations - especially when compared to the limitations of cavalry. If you could use both air recon and cavalry then so much the better but cavalry was chained to the distance they could ride out to in a combat zone and with no radios their communications were often delayed plus they had to consider terrain obstacles (granted it was easier to hide a horse and man then a plane buzzing around).. airplanes only had the limitation of fuel however and could fly over enemy unit dangers that cavalry could not always avoid. For example, there was no way for cavalry to gain any worthy picture of logistical supply lines behind the front lines and estimating the size of troop concentrations from the ground was a much greater challenge. One major attribute of aircraft was the speed of reports and their vantage points.. which proved vital in combat. A horse soldier for example did not spot the "columns of men that went beyond the horizon" when German troops were marching through Belgium.. an airplane did.

Thanks.

Chris:

It would be interesting to now when wireless was first installed in aircraft. I know that the seaplane used at Jutland had wireless, but it failed and the pilot was unable to communicate the location of the High Seas Fleet to Jellicoe. I imagine that you would need a fairly large aircraft to handle the equipement.

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

It would be interesting to now when wireless was first installed in aircraft. I know that the seaplane used at Jutland had wireless, but it failed and the pilot was unable to communicate the location of the High Seas Fleet to Jellicoe. I imagine that you would need a fairly large aircraft to handle the equipement.

In 1910.


McCurdy and Horton carried out the first demonstration
of airborne radio (or wireless) on 10 August 1910. James
A.D. McCurdy, a Canadian aviation pioneer, transmitted a
message to Henry M. Horton while flying over Sheepshead
Bay, Brooklyn, NY. McCurdy was flying a Curtiss Type D
or E aeroplane, loaned by Glenn Curtiss for the purpose.
Horton designed the airborne transmitter and provided the
receiver that was used for the ground station. Later in
the tests they used this receiver in the air to listen to
ground transmissions, although they did not attempt two
way communication.

Source: Cross and Cockade Online Magazine. http://www.crossandcockade.com/pdf/Wireless.pdf

[Warship NWS]

The Royal Flying Corps was established in May 1912. Major Herbert Musgrave was placed in charge of RFC's experiments. This included research into how wireless telegraphy could be used by military aircraft. By the start of the war in 1914 Musgrave and his team had devised a system where pilots could use wireless telegraphy to help the artillery hit specific targets. The aircraft observer carried a wireless set and a map and after identifying the position of an enemy target was able to send messages such as A5, B3, etc. to the artillery commander.


I will have more detailed info when I recieve my aerial recon resource books this week.