Is Amphibious Warfare dead?..... or Evolved

[old_pop2000]

Since the 1930's when the US Marines began to use amphibious warfare in training exercises to develop doctrine, amphibious warfare has been a part of the Navy/Marine tool box. That doesn't mean that we don't see amphibious operations in history, because we do, but it was codified and made part of doctrine. But, warfare has changed in the sixty four years since the end of WWII. The question then is, is amphibious warfare dead as we know it, or simply evolved due to changes in weaponry, sensors, doctrine and just the geostrategic situation in the world.

All things are possible in this thread including the loss of the battleships, but lets start at a higher level and work down to detail.

[steel_selachian]

Since the 1930's when the US Marines began to use amphibious warfare in training exercises to develop doctrine, amphibious warfare has been a part of the Navy/Marine tool box. That doesn't mean that we don't see amphibious operations in history, because we do, but it was codified and made part of doctrine. But, warfare has changed in the sixty four years since the end of WWII. The question then is, is amphibious warfare dead as we know it, or simply evolved due to changes in weaponry, sensors, doctrine and just the geostrategic situation in the world.

All things are possible in this thread including the loss of the battleships, but lets start at a higher level and work down to detail.

I'll list several changes in the equation since WWII/Korea, when we last saw large-scale amphibious invasions:

1) Reduced manpower: Most nations simply cannot muster hundreds of thousands of troops. This affects both the invader and the defender.
2) Reduced sealift/amphibious transport capacity: The USN arguably has the most assets in this department, and we'd be lucky enough to cobble together the ships for a brigade-sized amphibious assault.
3) Reduced fire support: PGMs can only do so much against a dug-in defender, especially if you don't have good intel on his positions ashore. We don't have the kind of on-call saturation fire that heavy naval guns can dish out.
4) Helicopters: Nowadays you can bypass the beach and drop troops off inland. That's a plus, but the minuses are issues with air dominance, air defenses, and the inability to land heavy equipment, supplies, and vehicles.
5) Defenses: Mines, coastal AShMs, and strike aircraft have made littoral operations a lot riskier.
6) Intelligence: This cuts both ways - odds are with satellites and other gadgetry you might have a better idea of what you're up against, but by the same token the other guy is going to have an easier time detecting and countering your pre-assault movements.

Overall, I don't think amphibious warfare is dead, it's just evolved into a smaller-scale mission. I highly doubt you'll see an MEU carrying out a landing against organized opposition these days; you're either going to see them landing in small-scale engagements (Falklands War, where both sides had to conduct amphibious operations with limited troops and assets), short-of-war scenarios like Somalia and Haiti in the early 1990s, landing in friendly territory and then going overland to rapidly reinforce units already engaged, or executing hit-and-run raids where they can land in a vulnerable spot and then get out before enemy reinforcements show up.

One question I will ask is this - during WWII and Korean War amphib assaults, the idea was to land everything over an unprepared beach (possibly building an artificial harbor in the process, as was done in Normandy). Nowadays, do we still have that capability? Or do you need to capture a working port if you want follow-on forces to come in? I know the MPS squadrons are equipped with powered causeways and LCMs to get cargo ashore, but that's probably not something you want to do if there's any chance of enemy action.

[old_pop2000]

I'll list several changes in the equation since WWII/Korea, when we last saw large-scale amphibious invasions:

1) Reduced manpower: Most nations simply cannot muster hundreds of thousands of troops. This affects both the invader and the defender.
2) Reduced sealift/amphibious transport capacity: The USN arguably has the most assets in this department, and we'd be lucky enough to cobble together the ships for a brigade-sized amphibious assault.
3) Reduced fire support: PGMs can only do so much against a dug-in defender, especially if you don't have good intel on his positions ashore. We don't have the kind of on-call saturation fire that heavy naval guns can dish out.
4) Helicopters: Nowadays you can bypass the beach and drop troops off inland. That's a plus, but the minuses are issues with air dominance, air defenses, and the inability to land heavy equipment, supplies, and vehicles.
5) Defenses: Mines, coastal AShMs, and strike aircraft have made littoral operations a lot riskier.
6) Intelligence: This cuts both ways - odds are with satellites and other gadgetry you might have a better idea of what you're up against, but by the same token the other guy is going to have an easier time detecting and countering your pre-assault movements.

Overall, I don't think amphibious warfare is dead, it's just evolved into a smaller-scale mission. I highly doubt you'll see an MEU carrying out a landing against organized opposition these days; you're either going to see them landing in small-scale engagements (Falklands War, where both sides had to conduct amphibious operations with limited troops and assets), short-of-war scenarios like Somalia and Haiti in the early 1990s, landing in friendly territory and then going overland to rapidly reinforce units already engaged, or executing hit-and-run raids where they can land in a vulnerable spot and then get out before enemy reinforcements show up.

One question I will ask is this - during WWII and Korean War amphib assaults, the idea was to land everything over an unprepared beach (possibly building an artificial harbor in the process, as was done in Normandy). Nowadays, do we still have that capability? Or do you need to capture a working port if you want follow-on forces to come in? I know the MPS squadrons are equipped with powered causeways and LCMs to get cargo ashore, but that's probably not something you want to do if there's any chance of enemy action.

I agree with all but point 1. I don't believe it is a lack of manpower, but simply that the attritional nature of amphibious warfare up to and including WWII forced nations afterward to seek alternative combined arms solutions. Another factor is the regional nature of most conflicts since WWII. WWIII never came, so we don't know what would have happened but I suspect that it would have been restricted to the Eurasian continent. Most military operations since the close of WWII have been fairly limited in scope and did not require the manpower needed in WWII. Even Vietnam only required about 500,000 men at its maximum, and compared to the numbers in service, it was modest. At the time of Vietnam, there were 8.744 million personnel in service. As a percentage, that's about 5.7% in actual harms way. In WWII, there were 16.112 million in service. Almost three times as many. The nature of the threats has reduced the need for large conscription armies. Smaller, better equipped and more agile armies are the name of the game. Combined arms and joint operations are the methods.

As to the logistics, which is what you are talking about, I am not certain. I have some amphibious warfare docs which I will scan and see what the story is. Good question.

[Scott Chisholm]

When I taught Weapons and Engineering at the University of Texas NROTC Unit, I used to tell my midshipmen that, in my opinion, the sort of combat amphib ops they would probably see would be akin to the police storming a house. The first team kicks in the door and secures the first room, while everyone else rushes in behind them to secure the house. With the exception of "everyone else rushed in behind them to secure the house", this is simply the first two stages of an opposed non-combatant operation (opposed NEO), something MEU(SOS) are qualified prior to deployment. The third stage is "Get the He!! out of Dodge!"

In an assault/protracted raid, the MEU (basically a reinforced battalion), using its indigenous air assets for close air support, would most likely be tasked with securing a port that would support roll-on/roll-off capability and/or an airfield with facilities capable of handling C-5s. A carrier groups operating in direct support would be tasked with stopping/delaying any ground force interdiction and establishing local air superiority. After that was accomplished, the maritime prepositioned ships would enter the port to offload their gear, while the combat units' troops flew in to marry up with their equipment. That force would then expand and solidify the perimeter.

Amphibious assault was a required mission area for the US Army at the time of my retirement, and they had a bunch of landing craft, mostly used by the Corps of Engineers on the inland waterways, with which to accomplish that mission. Some of those vessels were blue water capable, while others could be transported on barges or heavy-lift platforms. I've trained with the Army landing CH-47s on a big deck amphib (surprisingly, the CH-47 rotor span is actually a bit smaller than that of a CH-53E), and with them debarking from a ship via LCVPs.

You probably will never see Iwo Jima again, but three or four MEUs working together? That's in the realm of possibility in my books.

[old_pop2000]

When I taught Weapons and Engineering at the University of Texas NROTC Unit, I used to tell my midshipmen that, in my opinion, the sort of combat amphib ops they would probably see would be akin to the police storming a house. The first team kicks in the door and secures the first room, while everyone else rushes in behind them to secure the house. With the exception of "everyone else rushed in behind them to secure the house", this is simply the first two stages of an opposed non-combatant operation (opposed NEO), something MEU(SOS) are qualified prior to deployment. The third stage is "Get the He!! out of Dodge!"

In an assault/protracted raid, the MEU (basically a reinforced battalion), using its indigenous air assets for close air support, would most likely be tasked with securing a port that would support roll-on/roll-off capability and/or an airfield with facilities capable of handling C-5s. A carrier groups operating in direct support would be tasked with stopping/delaying any ground force interdiction and establishing local air superiority. After that was accomplished, the maritime prepositioned ships would enter the port to offload their gear, while the combat units' troops flew in to marry up with their equipment. That force would then expand and solidify the perimeter.

Amphibious assault was a required mission area for the US Army at the time of my retirement, and they had a bunch of landing craft, mostly used by the Corps of Engineers on the inland waterways, with which to accomplish that mission. Some of those vessels were blue water capable, while others could be transported on barges or heavy-lift platforms. I've trained with the Army landing CH-47s on a big deck amphib (surprisingly, the CH-47 rotor span is actually a bit smaller than that of a CH-53E), and with them debarking from a ship via LCVPs.

You probably will never see Iwo Jima again, but three or four MEUs working together? That's in the realm of possibility in my books.

Aha! Non-combatant Evacuation Operations Joint Publication 3-68 dtd 23 December 2010, I have it in my library of documents, haven't read it entirely. Gonna have to do that, now. I know, get a life.

Anyway, so we have essentially five types of operations; Amphib. assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids and "others". The idea of two or three MEU's working together however, would present some issues of secrecy and security. I have doubts that a grouping of amphibious assault ships, with a couple of carrier strike groups is going to stealthfully sneak up on any coast in the world today without CNN announcing to everyone. So, there is really going to have to be some sanitization of the area for threats. How do we reconcile that within our operational planning? It will definitely have to be a combined/joint operation. I will have to refer to my copy of Joint Pub JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Ampibious Operations.

Any ideas out there? How does a large grouping of ships sneak up on a coastline? Is OTH or over-the-horizon operations in concert with Army special forces the real answer to avoid shallow water mine, small boats and surface to surface missiles? Could we execute another Inchon, in todays environment with todays sensors? Do we want to?

Has anyone heard the term "phased at sea", it's supposed to eliminate the need for ports?

[Swordfish]

Amphibious landings make only sense when you have no harbour near the theatre of operations that can't be used.
Remember that the infrastructure of a harbour makes discharging and redeployment of military equipment much more easier and quick.
An amphibious landing must be organised very careful, or otherwise it hampers the deployment of the landing forces. A good example for a messed-up amphibious landing is that of the British Army near Tanga in then German East-Africa in WWI. Without good knowledge of the coast, the british expedition force under Aitken simply discharged their equipment at the landing side in the Mangroves. The landing troops then had to crawl over dozens of boxes, which gave the german "Schutztruppe" under von Lettov-Vorbeck time to prepare themselves.
Btw.: This landing ended with a shore bombardment by an elderly RN cruiser, which hit half the time the own, retreating troops.

[old_pop2000]

Amphibious landings make only sense when you have no harbour near the theatre of operations that can't be used.

Remember that the infrastructure of a harbour makes discharging and redeployment of military equipment much more easier and quick.

An amphibious landing must be organised very careful, or otherwise it hampers the deployment of the landing forces. A good example for a messed-up amphibious landing is that of the British Army near Tanga in then German East-Africa in WWI. Without good knowledge of the coast, the british expedition force under Aitken simply discharged their equipment at the landing side in the Mangroves. The landing troops then had to crawl over dozens of boxes, which gave the german "Schutztruppe" under von Lettov-Vorbeck time to prepare themselves.

Btw.: This landing ended with a shore bombardment by an elderly RN cruiser, which hit half the time the own, retreating troops.



Amphibious landings have many purposes, but are usually aimed at seizing an area of enemy-controlled coast to give access to an objective inland. It could be conducted to speed an advance of troops already on land heading up a coastline. In some cases, the capability of amphibious operations is simply enough to tie down valuable troops that could be used other places. Taking control of a large naval base or port or preventing such a capture by the enemy is only one possible operational objective, usually never the primary one. One of the most important factors in a lodgement area, as its called, is the capacity of the ports and beaches in the area. One of the reasons the Allies did not land in the Pas de Calais area was the inability of Boulogne and Calais to support more than nine to twelve divisions after three months. The operational requirement was to maintain thirty divisions so it would have been necessary to include ports from Boulogne to Antwerp to gain that support. The ports soutwestward from Calais to Le Havre and Rouen were in a similar position. For Caen area, Cherbourg and the Brittany ports were expected to be able to support up to forty-five divisions. In the Normandy operation, Overlord, there were four factors including ports and beaches. The number of divisions the opponent can throw against the lodgement is important and the number of landing craft and transports available. If we look back into history at amphibious landings, not all had a requirement for a port just a suitable beach area in order to gain access to the land from which to start offensive operations.

We know that the Sea Peoples regularly raided the Egyptians from the sea with no thoughts of gaining a port, same goes for the Persians. Throughout the intervening years from the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th and into the 19th century, no thought was given to capturing a port. It wasn't until armies needed more logistical support, that we see the need for a major port to facilitate the buildup of forces.

So, yes a port is necessary, but it is not the reason for the amphibious operation, only one operational objective of the campaign in which it is executed.

[old_pop2000]

Some more to consider when examining amphibious operations. WWII was a total war and the unconditional surrender of the opponent was the objective. As such, operations were geared to defeat his armed forces and force him to quit. This required vast amounts of men and material, far more than previous wars and operation. Examples of the size of forces in the numerous amphibious operations in WWII; Invasion of the Philippines on 10 Dec 1942 required over 60,000 men; Algeria 8 Nov 1942 used over 60,000 men; Salerno in 1943 used over 140,000 men, Normandy used close to 160,000 men. It can be seen by those numbers that these large scale amphibious operations would require a major logistics harbor or port from which to maintain the quantity of materials needed to support those size landings. Therefore, in those instances a port was an operational objective.

Now, looking at amphibious operations since that time, Inchon in September 1950; Starlite in 1965; just to name a few, those were all way below 20000 men. In those cases, beaches were more than adequate to support force structure as landed. With the advent of increased airlift capability, airfields might be more important than a port. Airdrops, airlift will all be used to support such a landing, more so than a harbor. With increase airpower capability and threat to ships, amphibious operations have decreased. However, in fact, they have simply returned to their traditional role in theatre operations. They have always been simply turning movements or flanking movements for land operations. The Romans, British against Napoleon all used amphibious operations for that purpose.

[Christian Schwietzke]

We know that the Sea Peoples regularly raided the Egyptians from the sea with no thoughts of gaining a port, same goes for the Persians. Throughout the intervening years from the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th and into the 19th century, no thought was given to capturing a port. It wasn't until armies needed more logistical support, that we see the need for a major port to facilitate the buildup of forces.

So, yes a port is necessary, but it is not the reason for the amphibious operation, only one operational objective of the campaign in which it is executed.


The Sea Peoples (or the Vikings, for that matter) not taking ports had less to do with armies not needing much logistical support in those days, and more with their forces not intending to stay ashore for long. If you just intend to land, take what you like, and leave before your opponent can get an organized response going, you are not going to need port facilities anyway - even today, a force can often carry enough supplies on its soldiers and in its vehicles and aircraft to conduct a short raid without needing resupply.

If, on the other hand, you intend to stay where you land, and your forces are armed with anything more complex than pointy sticks, you will need port facilities of some kind before long.

[old_pop2000]

The Sea Peoples (or the Vikings, for that matter) not taking ports had less to do with armies not needing much logistical support in those days, and more with their forces not intending to stay ashore for long. If you just intend to land, take what you like, and leave before your opponent can get an organized response going, you are not going to need port facilities anyway - even today, a force can often carry enough supplies on its soldiers and in its vehicles and aircraft to conduct a short raid without needing resupply.

If, on the other hand, you intend to stay where you land, and your forces are armed with anything more complex than pointy sticks, you will need port facilities of some kind before long.


The requirement for a port really did not become important until the 20th century with the improvements in technology and larger force structures. But again, as you indicated, how big a force are you going to require and how long are you going to stay all enters into the equation. Even in the days of Napoleon, soldiers really could exist on what they brought with them. Powder could be found and sometimes produced as could balls. Cannons might be the only technology that required a logistics train, but you could just land and support the forward movement from the beach until a suitable port was captured. Armies were not that big and battles were short and fierce. The introduction of breech loading weapons, with higher rates of fire, autoloading guns, rifled cannons along with motor powered vehicles increased the logistic requirements and living off of the land was no longer viable. So, ports became important, under the right circumstances.

[steel_selachian]

One of the nice things about amphibious operations is that it's a capability that creates headaches for the defender as well - you can bet right now the Iranians are trying to figure out what they have available to stop an MEU coming ashore, wrecking something critical like an airfield, naval base, or missile battery, and then leaving before reinforcements show up. The capability to insert an infantry battalion with armor support over an unguarded stretch of beach means the other guy has to figure out possible targets and allocate his own defenses appropriately.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Maybe that´s another role for amphibious forces... sort of an equivalent to the fleet-in-being. Depending on how much shoreline an enemy has to defend, your MEU could tie up many times its own numbers in enemy troops defending beaches. That is even more true if your air superiority (plus possibly naval bombardments) make it harder or impossible for him to react adequately if you land on an undefended stretch of beach.

[old_pop2000]

Maybe that´s another role for amphibious forces... sort of an equivalent to the fleet-in-being. Depending on how much shoreline an enemy has to defend, your MEU could tie up many times its own numbers in enemy troops defending beaches. That is even more true if your air superiority (plus possibly naval bombardments) make it harder or impossible for him to react adequately if you land on an undefended stretch of beach.

The "force-in-being" concept was used in the Gulf War to tie down troops that could have defended Kuwait. So it is a factor. However, your opponent can assess his own coastline and determine the best and only areas that you can effectively use for an amphibious landing and simply build up those areas. Of all the Persian Gulf states, Iran's coastline is the longest. However, that doesn't mean they have to defend the entire coastline. If we wanted to use an amphibious assault it might originate from Kuwait or Saudi Arabian and be in the form of an airborne assault to knock out the air bases. IMO, it would be easier to neutralize them with missile and smart bombs. But an ampibious force threat is one that must be taken serious.

[steel_selachian]

The "force-in-being" concept was used in the Gulf War to tie down troops that could have defended Kuwait. So it is a factor. However, your opponent can assess his own coastline and determine the best and only areas that you can effectively use for an amphibious landing and simply build up those areas. Of all the Persian Gulf states, Iran's coastline is the longest. However, that doesn't mean they have to defend the entire coastline. If we wanted to use an amphibious assault it might originate from Kuwait or Saudi Arabian and be in the form of an airborne assault to knock out the air bases. IMO, it would be easier to neutralize them with missile and smart bombs. But an ampibious force threat is one that must be taken serious.

Mostly I would see a role for amphibious raids in clearing out suspected SSM and FAC hides in the islands and coastal regions around the Strait of Hormuz, especially since hitting an island would largely negate the issue of reinforcements. Those sites might be hard to find from the air and would probably require SEAL or Force Recon teams to pinpoint them. After that you might be able to kill them with an airstrike, but you may want documents, prisoners, and other intel; being able to control some of those islands would also be a nice asset for clearing the Strait of mines and patrol craft. If the Iranian nuclear program was still centered around Bushehr that would have been a prime target for an amphibious raid as it's pretty much right on the coast.

[old_pop2000]

Mostly I would see a role for amphibious raids in clearing out suspected SSM and FAC hides in the islands and coastal regions around the Strait of Hormuz, especially since hitting an island would largely negate the issue of reinforcements. Those sites might be hard to find from the air and would probably require SEAL or Force Recon teams to pinpoint them. After that you might be able to kill them with an airstrike, but you may want documents, prisoners, and other intel; being able to control some of those islands would also be a nice asset for clearing the Strait of mines and patrol craft. If the Iranian nuclear program was still centered around Bushehr that would have been a prime target for an amphibious raid as it's pretty much right on the coast.

I have serious doubts that a theatre commander would waste valuable assets like an MEU to clean up AshM, FACs and other minor annoyances. He can mask them with jamming and other electronic means, monitor them then take them out any time without using boots on the ground. Small SEAL and Special Forces teams can be dropped and used to pinpoint the targets for the the missiles and bombs. As far as the nuke program, you can hit the power grid and essentially bring its operations to a halt. I wouldn't waste troops on such stuff. You can use BLU-109 warheads on missiles and take out those nuke facilities real easily. You can render their communications and control function inoperative, destroy or wreck the transportation system. You don't need to hit the plants themselves. They need infrastructure to operate, just strike those areas. The Israeli's know that, so do we.