Early Decommissioning or Cutting New Construction?

[steel_selachian]

Figured I'd post this and perhaps use it as a launch point for a broader discussion of budget-cutting. The USN has proposed canning several (this says nine, but that may have been revised to 7) Ticonderoga-class CGs and 3 Whidbey Island-class LSDs. The purported logic for canning the Ticos is that the ships in question have either not received the BMD mods or in one case require costly hull repairs. However, what would be more effective - canning these ships early (with 10-15 years of service life ahead of them) or slashing orders for replacement ships like Flight III DDG-51s and San Antonio-class LPDs (in the latter case, just use the four Harpers Ferry-class ships as LPDs instead of LSDs in an Expeditionary Strike Group)? Figured this has some merit since there have been proposals floated to stop RCOH work on the Nimitz-class CVNs and simply ramp up production on the Ford-class.

http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065931706&channel=defence&subChannel=naval (http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065931706&channel=defence&subChannel=naval)

[old_pop2000]

Figured I'd post this and perhaps use it as a launch point for a broader discussion of budget-cutting. The USN has proposed canning several (this says nine, but that may have been revised to 7) Ticonderoga-class CGs and 3 Whidbey Island-class LSDs. The purported logic for canning the Ticos is that the ships in question have either not received the BMD mods or in one case require costly hull repairs. However, what would be more effective - canning these ships early (with 10-15 years of service life ahead of them) or slashing orders for replacement ships like Flight III DDG-51s and San Antonio-class LPDs (in the latter case, just use the four Harpers Ferry-class ships as LPDs instead of LSDs in an Expeditionary Strike Group)? Figured this has some merit since there have been proposals floated to stop RCOH work on the Nimitz-class CVNs and simply ramp up production on the Ford-class.

http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065931706&channel=defence&subChannel=naval (http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065931706&channel=defence&subChannel=naval)

Well, let's start by assessing how many of those ships are actually needed. As of Feb 3rd, 2012 there are four carriers at sea; Enterprise, Carl Vinson, Abe Lincoln and the John C. Stennis. Since there is one Tico class assigned to each carrier strike group, that means four Tico's are at sea. There are also eight guided missile destroyers, four LA class attack submarines and miscellaneous supply ships.

Currently, we have ten Nimitz class carriers and the Enterprise. So, the maximum number of Tico's needed, if all CSG's were at sea, was eleven. There are currently 22 Tico class cruisers in service. Seems to me, that even with five in the yards, one or two on work ups, we still have far too many of those ships in active service than we need. With the planned nine going to inactive reserve, that still leaves us with 13 Tico's and we only normally have four CSG active in the world. I think its a no brainer, especially if there are structural problems with some and they have not been upgraded. I wouldn 't waste the money personally.

As far as the landing ship docks, we have currently twelve in service, and an ARG only uses one, with six currently at sea so there are six extras. Do you need six extra ships, or just three.

It would seem that all of this is within the overall guidance of the one war at a time idea and our emphasis on sea control. We are simply reducing our expenditures to match our needs. If we emphasize coalition operations and joint operations with other services, much of our choke point control, sea control and littoral zone operations can be handled easily. If we reduce OM&N, we can do a better job of preparing for the future. It really depends on who we believe we are going to have to face in the future. No opponents since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 have had much of a fleet to worry about and air force. Even the Chinese aren't really a big naval threat, as yet so we are pretty safe.

EDIT: It should be noted that the ships of the Tico class planned for decommissioning are nearly 25 years old and the Tico's have a bad reputation as lousy sea boats. If we attempting to reduce the size of ships and hence radar cross-section, that ship would be a good start.

[steel_selachian]

Well, let's start by assessing how many of those ships are actually needed. As of Feb 3rd, 2012 there are four carriers at sea; Enterprise, Carl Vinson, Abe Lincoln and the John C. Stennis. Since there is one Tico class assigned to each carrier strike group, that means four Tico's are at sea. There are also eight guided missile destroyers, four LA class attack submarines and miscellaneous supply ships.

Currently, we have ten Nimitz class carriers and the Enterprise. So, the maximum number of Tico's needed, if all CSG's were at sea, was eleven. There are currently 22 Tico class cruisers in service. Seems to me, that even with five in the yards, one or two on work ups, we still have far too many of those ships in active service than we need. With the planned nine going to inactive reserve, that still leaves us with 13 Tico's and we only normally have four CSG active in the world. I think its a no brainer, especially if there are structural problems with some and they have not been upgraded. I wouldn 't waste the money personally.

As far as the landing ship docks, we have currently twelve in service, and an ARG only uses one, with six currently at sea so there are six extras. Do you need six extra ships, or just three.

It would seem that all of this is within the overall guidance of the one war at a time idea and our emphasis on sea control. We are simply reducing our expenditures to match our needs. If we emphasize coalition operations and joint operations with other services, much of our choke point control, sea control and littoral zone operations can be handled easily. If we reduce OM&N, we can do a better job of preparing for the future. It really depends on who we believe we are going to have to face in the future. No opponents since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 have had much of a fleet to worry about and air force. Even the Chinese aren't really a big naval threat, as yet so we are pretty safe.

EDIT: It should be noted that the ships of the Tico class planned for decommissioning are nearly 25 years old and the Tico's have a bad reputation as lousy sea boats. If we attempting to reduce the size of ships and hence radar cross-section, that ship would be a good start.

Also remember that a CG is usually deployed with ESGs, so that adds to the number you'd need. Actually, I wasn't really differentiating between CGs and DDGs - they have more or less the same capabilities. What I was questioning was sinking the money into upgrading the hulls versus adding more Burke-class DDGs at close to $2 billion a pop (when you already have 62 of them and another 12 planned to build in the next couple of decades). Unless it's cheaper to buy entirely new hulls than upgrade the ones you have, it doesn't look much like a budget-cutting or force downsizing move when new construction is still going full throttle. I doubt the age of the ships played much into consideration; one of the ships on the "hit list" there was commissioned in 1993. USS Bunker Hill is already 26 years old and she's not under consideration to be retired in the next couple years, and I seem to recall the USN's projected lifespan for the ships was closer to 30-35 years. I know the Ticonderogas tend to roll like a barrel at an Irish wake and have had past problems with hull cracking, but I thought the latter had been fixed and the former was more a matter of crew comfort than a handling problem.

I'm not sure about the specific listings there - I thought I saw USS Leyte Gulf listed somewhere else as another candidate. So the Jane's list might be off, more current reports have stated 7 Ticos will get the ax. I haven't heard anything about whether the Whidbey Island decommisionings would go forward, but I would think that if you really wanted to save money, you could keep those eight ships, use the four Harpers Ferry-class ships as LPDs (that's what they are, more or less, with the reduced well deck and expanded cargo area), and cut off the San Antonio-class at five or at most six hulls. Cutting some of the Zumwalt-class hulls (preferably all three) would be another saver, as that ship seems to be a technology demonstrator in search of a relevant mission.

[Scott Chisholm]

A DDG-51 is not a 1-for-1 replacement of a CG-52; fewer missiles and I am not sure if the DDGs have flag capability. Helo capability was also a concern with the first flight DDGs.

The primary difference between an LPD and an LSD is the ability to perform aircraft maintenance. An LPD has a dedicated Air Department with hanger facilities to perform minor maintenance on the aircraft; an LSD lacks that capability. Put another way, LSDs do not house aircraft; instead, they "borrow" them from the Big Deck or the LPD. Dispensing with the LPD loses you aircraft capability. There are additional operational differences between the two classes, but there are the heavy hitters in my opinion.

Having said all of that, I was XO on a 29-year old LSD, and I can honestly say it was absolutely no fun. Between hull thinning and obsolescence issues, it was all we could do to keep her operational. Thirty-five years is a noble goal, but that is an average lifespan; some ships live longer, and others not as long. Sort of like people....;)

[old_pop2000]

A DDG-51 is not a 1-for-1 replacement of a CG-52; fewer missiles and I am not sure if the DDGs have flag capability. Helo capability was also a concern with the first flight DDGs.

The primary difference between an LPD and an LSD is the ability to perform aircraft maintenance. An LPD has a dedicated Air Department with hanger facilities to perform minor maintenance on the aircraft; an LSD lacks that capability. Put another way, LSDs do not house aircraft; instead, they "borrow" them from the Big Deck or the LPD. Dispensing with the LPD loses you aircraft capability. There are additional operational differences between the two classes, but there are the heavy hitters in my opinion.

Having said all of that, I was XO on a 29-year old LSD, and I can honestly say it was absolutely no fun. Between hull thinning and obsolescence issues, it was all we could do to keep her operational. Thirty-five years is a noble goal, but that is an average lifespan; some ships live longer, and others not as long. Sort of like people....;)

Thank you, sir. It's nice to have someone who can clear up brochure knowledge for us. Here is a nice link with diagrams on the LPD-17 class of ships. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/navy/amphibious/lpd17.html#initial

Don't drift off, we will need more course corrections in this thread.;)

[Scott Chisholm]

Thank you, sir. It's nice to have someone who can clear up brochure knowledge for us. Here is a nice link with diagrams on the LPD-17 class of ships. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/navy/amphibious/lpd17.html#initial

Don't drift off, we will need more course corrections in this thread.;)

Dennis,

I haven't drifted off; just dealing with some significant personal/family challenges the past couple of years. I haunt the forums, but seldom post. This thread happened to catch my eye.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

I haven't drifted off; just dealing with some significant personal/family challenges the past couple of years. I haunt the forums, but seldom post. This thread happened to catch my eye.

Just kidding and I hope your family challenges get corrected in a positive manner. Life can be difficult, even after you retire... trust me. I've been retired ten years and problems still occurred over the last seven. Thankfully, all are now dealt with, and its fun. Very good luck to you, sir.

[steel_selachian]

Glad this got your attention, Scott - hope things work out okay. Sometimes I find these forums to be an escape, meself.


A DDG-51 is not a 1-for-1 replacement of a CG-52; fewer missiles and I am not sure if the DDGs have flag capability. Helo capability was also a concern with the first flight DDGs.

The primary difference between an LPD and an LSD is the ability to perform aircraft maintenance. An LPD has a dedicated Air Department with hanger facilities to perform minor maintenance on the aircraft; an LSD lacks that capability. Put another way, LSDs do not house aircraft; instead, they "borrow" them from the Big Deck or the LPD. Dispensing with the LPD loses you aircraft capability. There are additional operational differences between the two classes, but there are the heavy hitters in my opinion.

Having said all of that, I was XO on a 29-year old LSD, and I can honestly say it was absolutely no fun. Between hull thinning and obsolescence issues, it was all we could do to keep her operational. Thirty-five years is a noble goal, but that is an average lifespan; some ships live longer, and others not as long. Sort of like people....;)

Hmm. Wonder how much fun the crew of the Ponce is going to have when that old boat goes into the Persian Gulf as a SEAL support ship.

I thought about the aviation requirement, although in theory I suppose you could refit the Harpers Ferry-class boats with a helo hangar. Then again, you are talking about a ship that's considerably smaller than an LPD-17 (2/3rds the displacement), but it's a question of how much capacity you need. IIRC, aren't the most frequent users of the LPD's aviation facilities the AH-1s?

If flag capability and VLS capacity is an issue with the DDG-51s, I wonder if those will be addressed in the Flight III Arleigh Burke-class ships, as those are supposed to be the eventual replacements for the CGs. Wouldn't be hard to do, seeing as the ROKN has already built their KDX-III ships that are essentially bulked-up Flight IIA boats with 128 VLS cells.

[Scott Chisholm]

Glad this got your attention, Scott - hope things work out okay. Sometimes I find these forums to be an escape, meself.



Hmm. Wonder how much fun the crew of the Ponce is going to have when that old boat goes into the Persian Gulf as a SEAL support ship.

I thought about the aviation requirement, although in theory I suppose you could refit the Harpers Ferry-class boats with a helo hangar. Then again, you are talking about a ship that's considerably smaller than an LPD-17 (2/3rds the displacement), but it's a question of how much capacity you need. IIRC, aren't the most frequent users of the LPD's aviation facilities the AH-1s?

If flag capability and VLS capacity is an issue with the DDG-51s, I wonder if those will be addressed in the Flight III Arleigh Burke-class ships, as those are supposed to be the eventual replacements for the CGs. Wouldn't be hard to do, seeing as the ROKN has already built their KDX-III ships that are essentially bulked-up Flight IIA boats with 128 VLS cells.

My experience with PHIBRON3/MEU(SOC)11 (I was the Force Navigator) was that the aviation assets rotated based on who needed what. Normally, aircraft that used things that went "boom" stayed on the Big Deck as that's were all the exciting things were kept. The LPD usually kept a pair of 46s.

The LSDs generally did not keep aircraft overnight as we were unable to effect any repairs; if they broke down on deck we were stuck with them until we could transfer maintenance personnel and their gear to our ship. That usually involved a small boat/LCU/LCAC transfer as having a broken aircraft clobbered our flight deck, which might or might not be possible given what was going on.

I never saw our Av-8s cross-decked to a small deck. I'm not sure their decks satisfied NATOPS requirements.

[old_pop2000]

.... The LPD usually kept a pair of 46s.

.....satisfied NATOPS requirements.

A couple of very OLD CH-46's because there ain't no young ones.

Love NATOPS manuals, they have things like "Harness - Fasten(if not fastened) or "Canopy - Close and Lock" or this one, " Engine Start Switch - Eng ST. " Duh!! Sorry I just couldn't help myself.

[steel_selachian]

My experience with PHIBRON3/MEU(SOC)11 (I was the Force Navigator) was that the aviation assets rotated based on who needed what. Normally, aircraft that used things that went "boom" stayed on the Big Deck as that's were all the exciting things were kept. The LPD usually kept a pair of 46s.

The LSDs generally did not keep aircraft overnight as we were unable to effect any repairs; if they broke down on deck we were stuck with them until we could transfer maintenance personnel and their gear to our ship. That usually involved a small boat/LCU/LCAC transfer as having a broken aircraft clobbered our flight deck, which might or might not be possible given what was going on.

I never saw our Av-8s cross-decked to a small deck. I'm not sure their decks satisfied NATOPS requirements.

Hmm. Usually in NWP I park four AH-1s on the LPD so I can keep my LHD farther offshore, as the Cobras don't have much range to work with. Then again, in most scenarios I set up I'm working with current or future aviation assets, and the MV-22s have considerably longer legs than the old Phrogs. I'll sometimes put two UH-1s on the LSD, but with the idea that those are merely being staged there for a mission in progress. I doubt you'd ever want to land an AV-8 on an LPD; aside from the space issues there'd be the problem of taking off again.

[Scott Chisholm]

Hmm. Usually in NWP I park four AH-1s on the LPD so I can keep my LHD farther offshore, as the Cobras don't have much range to work with. Then again, in most scenarios I set up I'm working with current or future aviation assets, and the MV-22s have considerably longer legs than the old Phrogs. I'll sometimes put two UH-1s on the LSD, but with the idea that those are merely being staged there for a mission in progress. I doubt you'd ever want to land an AV-8 on an LPD; aside from the space issues there'd be the problem of taking off again.

Placement of your Big Deck is going to be determined by what you intend with her well deck. If you are intending for wet well operations (LCUs, etc.), she'll need to be within 10 nm of the beach to keep the LCUs' transit time under an hour each way. LCACs let you operate further off shore, but real world considerations regarding weather and sea state have a big say in just how far. If the LCACs cannot get "on cushion", they are actually much slower than an LCU, carry only 1/3 the cargo, and require considerably more time to load and unload.

Under perfect weather conditions, 10 nm is the break point for LCU/LCAC operations: within 10 nm of land, LCUs can transport material to and from the Big Deck more quickly than an LCAC;outside 10nm, the LCAC is better, weather permitting.

Forward staging helos, especially the AH-1Ws, on the LPD was a common practice when the LSD was going to be taking part in a ship take down. The CH-53s almost always stayed on the Big Deck.

[old_pop2000]

Placement of your Big Deck is going to be determined by what you intend with her well deck. If you are intending for wet well operations (LCUs, etc.), she'll need to be within 10 nm of the beach to keep the LCUs' transit time under an hour each way. LCACs let you operate further off shore, but real world considerations regarding weather and sea state have a big say in just how far. If the LCACs cannot get "on cushion", they are actually much slower than an LCU, carry only 1/3 the cargo, and require considerably more time to load and unload.

Under perfect weather conditions, 10 nm is the break point for LCU/LCAC operations: within 10 nm of land, LCUs can transport material to and from the Big Deck more quickly than an LCAC;outside 10nm, the LCAC is better, weather permitting.

Forward staging helos, especially the AH-1Ws, on the LPD was a common practice when the LSD was going to be taking part in a ship take down. The CH-53s almost always stayed on the Big Deck.

Scott:

Without divulging information we shouldn't have, how effective are the LCU/gunboats? The M-1 only carries about 40 round, which can be expended real quick. Can you use them as gunboats with two M-1s aboard? 10nm seems a bit close and would require some real sanitizing of that stretch of coast. When will we see the new 8 inch guns on the DDG's for fire support?

One of my concerns and this has been a pet peeve about naval war games, is environmental conditions such as oceanography including bathymetry, weather conditions including sand storms and monsoons. The topography of the coastal area is important to know and understand before hitting the beaches with any sort of ampibious operations whether it is feint, a raid, and envelopement or what ever. Helos don't like inclimate weather, they fly but don't like it, especially sand storms. Any ideas?

[Scott Chisholm]

Scott:

Without divulging information we shouldn't have, how effective are the LCU/gunboats? The M-1 only carries about 40 round, which can be expended real quick. Can you use them as gunboats with two M-1s aboard? 10nm seems a bit close and would require some real sanitizing of that stretch of coast. When will we see the new 8 inch guns on the DDG's for fire support?

One of my concerns and this has been a pet peeve about naval war games, is environmental conditions such as oceanography including bathymetry, weather conditions including sand storms and monsoons. The topography of the coastal area is important to know and understand before hitting the beaches with any sort of ampibious operations whether it is feint, a raid, and envelopement or what ever. Helos don't like inclimate weather, they fly but don't like it, especially sand storms. Any ideas?

Dennis,

I don't know much about the LCU/M1 "gunboat" initiative - it was being discussed when I moved on to AIRLANT. On first blush, I cannot see a reason why it wouldn't work as you can physically fit 3 M1s on an LCU. I believe the tank's guns are gyro-stabilized, so other than the fact that they shoot a relatively small round (something smaller than 120mm, right?) and have limited ammo, they should make "effective", albeit slow, gunboats.

Eight-in guns? Heck, it's all I can do to convince Chris that a 5" gun is a good idea! :p We've been talking about that gun for nearly 30 years. Sure would be nice to actually see it in the fleet.

The 10nm thing is driven by the use of displacement craft (LCUs, AAVs, etc.). For planning purposes, you cannot assume an LCU will make much more than 10kts; AAVs make a bit less. Also, you want to drop the AAVs off as close to the coast as you can get or you risk the Marines being too seasick to be effective. On the LST, we usually launched the AAVs from within 2500 yards of the beach. The longest I've ever seen an AAV swim to the beach was about 10 kyds in ideal (Sea State 0/daylight/clear skies/protected anchorage) conditions. If your LCACs cannot get on cushion, they are limited to something less than 10 kts.

I'm not a fan of LCACs, a view resulting from some personal operational experience. The whole over-the-horizon amphibious assault using LCACs and helos is really sexy, but when you consider that you might have a maximum of 5 operational LCACs in an ESG, doing that assault from 50 nm means a 3+ hour round trip just to drop off 5 tanks/LAVs. I think the USN would be better served by a 30-kt LCU and something like the AAAV.

[old_pop2000]

...
I don't know much about the LCU/M1 "gunboat" initiative - it was being discussed when I moved on to AIRLANT. On first blush, I cannot see a reason why it wouldn't work as you can physically fit 3 M1s on an LCU. I believe the tank's guns are gyro-stabilized, so other than the fact that they shoot a relatively small round (something smaller than 120mm, right?) and have limited ammo, they should make "effective", albeit slow, gunboats

.....

The 10nm thing is driven by the use of displacement craft (LCUs, AAVs, etc.). For planning purposes, you cannot assume an LCU will make much more than 10kts; AAVs make a bit less. Also, you want to drop the AAVs off as close to the coast as you can get or you risk the Marines being too seasick to be effective. On the LST, we usually launched the AAVs from within 2500 yards of the beach. The longest I've ever seen an AAV swim to the beach was about 10 kyds in ideal (Sea State 0/daylight/clear skies/protected anchorage) conditions. If your LCACs cannot get on cushion, they are limited to something less than 10 kts.



I'm not a fan of LCACs, a view resulting from some personal operational experience. The whole over-the-horizon amphibious assault using LCACs and helos is really sexy, but when you consider that you might have a maximum of 5 operational LCACs in an ESG, doing that assault from 50 nm means a 3+ hour round trip just to drop off 5 tanks/LAVs. I think the USN would be better served by a 30-kt LCU and something like the AAAV

The LCU/M1 has a 120mm smoothbore flat trajectory cannon. How much use you can get from that kind of weapon depends on the type of topography on the beach and the type of opposition. Even the Japanese did not put pillboxes and other fortifications right on the beach. The gun has a danger zone of firing noise and overpressure zone along with a danger of discarding sabot petals. The first is about 504 M and a width of about 50M to the side. The last is about 1000 M behind it and 400 M in width with an angle of about 90 degrees. The range on the M256 is about 4400 yards using HEAT and APFSDS rounds, all armour piercing rounds. So, unless our opponent is dumb enough to move his armor up to the beach and not hide it until the Marines are ashore, that gun is almost useless if there are birms and raised sand dunes that block the view. Did I miss anything? Plus, firing the gun will draw more fire back.

AAV's are nice, against little resistance but an enemy, dug in with RPG's can have a field day with that vehicle. As I said, the whole area will have to really sanitized or we going to have another Omaha Beach or Iwo Jima on our hands.

And I don't like LCACs, they were an overreaction to Vietnam. Noisy, expensive and probably prone to failure especially in sandy environments. I read, but can't confirm that it takes a specially qualified person to drive one of those machines and good sound judgement.

I just don't want to send our boys... and girls into another slaughter house with fun gadgets that don't work. Call me overprotective.

　

　

　

　

[Scott Chisholm]

The LCU/M1 has a 120mm smoothbore flat trajectory cannon. How much use use can get from that kind of weapon depends on the type of topography on the beach and the type of opposition. Even the Japanese did not put pillboxes and other fortifications right on the beach. The gun has a danger zone of firing noise and overpressure zone along with a danger of discarding sabot petals. The first is about 504 M and a width of about 50M to the side. The last is about 1000 M behind it and 400 M in width with an angle of about 90 degrees. The range on the M256 is about 4400 yards using HEAT and APFSDS rounds, all armour piercing rounds. So, unless our opponent is dumb enough to move his armor up to the beach and not hide it until the Marines are ashore, that gun is almost useless if there are birms and raised sand dunes that block the view. Did I miss anything? Plus, firing the gun will draw more fire back.

AAV's are nice, against little resistance but an enemy, dug in with RPG's can have a field day with that vehicle. As I said, the whole area will have to really sanitized or we going to have another Omaha Beach or Iwo Jima on our hands.

And I don't like LCACs, they were an overreaction to Vietnam. Noisy, expensive and probably prone to failure especially in sandy environments. I read, but can't confirm that it takes a specially qualified person to drive one of those machines and good sound judgement.

I just don't want to send our boys... and girls into another slaughter house with fun gadgets that don't work. Call me overprotective.

　

　

　

　

Dennis,

LCAC operators are senior enlisted personnel, referred to as "pilots", and fall under NATOPS Crew Rest rules. I guess I forgot to mention that in addition to all of its other limitations you need to allow for crew rest when operating LCACs.

The truth is we - well nobody, really - are not equipped to conduct an opposed landing. During Desert Storm, the amphib contingency - the amphibious assault on Kuwait - had 10 LSTs assigned to it. I heard from a friend of my attached to the CENTCOM staff that the LSTs were expected to suffer 70% casualties getting through the mine fields to launch their tracks (I cannot confirm this, but having been the Ops Officer on an LST I believe it) . Each LST carried 15 AAVs, and each AAV carried 15 Marines (put another way, an LST carried a reinforced Company of Marines). Crew complement of an LST was about 250. Seventy percent casualties. After sweeping the mine fields.

There's a reason so many WW2 LST COs received their Medals of Honor posthumously....:eek:

[old_pop2000]

LCAC operators are senior enlisted personnel, referred to as "pilots", and fall under NATOPS Crew Rest rules. I guess I forgot to mention that in addition to all of its other limitations you need to allow for crew rest when operating LCACs.



The truth is we - well nobody, really - are not equipped to conduct an opposed landing. During Desert Storm, the amphib contingency - the amphibious assault on Kuwait - had 10 LSTs assigned to it. I heard from a friend of my attached to the CENTCOM staff that the LSTs were expected to suffer 70% casualties getting through the mine fields to launch their tracks (I cannot confirm this, but having been the Ops Officer on an LST I believe it) . Each LST carried 15 AAVs, and each AAV carried 15 Marines (put another way, an LST carried a reinforced Company of Marines). Crew complement of an LST was about 250. Seventy percent casualties. After sweeping the mine fields.



There's a reason so many WW2 LST COs received their Medals of Honor posthumously

Ok, LCAC operators are "pilots", makes sense since what they are in, is a low flying aircraft and we know what happens to low flying aircraft, don't we. It's called AAA.

I agree about opposed landings and doctrine. I have, oh about 1 or 2GB's of Marine and Navy doctrine manuals and monographs and that is the central theme; No more Iwo Jima's. I hope the opponent is not reading the same documents, because he has a say in your plans. What it tells me is that choice of landing zones were be crucial as will air supremacy.... not air superiority... along with absolute sea control over a wide area and any choke points. MV-22's will be important to sealing off the landing zone and dealing with reinforcements moving toward the LZ. I bet the first order of business is to setup an air defense zone around the LZ along with tanks and other armored vehicles to prevent a counterattack. However, IMHO, the best bet is to land where he ain't, as we say. Again, computer games do a poor job of depicting that.

As to the LST CO's, I agree. My dad used to tell me, while we watched Victory at Sea, that the BB's and cruisers would fire for what seemed like days, yet the opponent was always fresh and ready to fight. SOP was to just let the Marines land and then hit them.


　

[steel_selachian]

Ok, LCAC operators are "pilots", makes sense since what they are in, is a low flying aircraft and we know what happens to low flying aircraft, don't we. It's called AAA.

I agree about opposed landings and doctrine. I have, oh about 1 or 2GB's of Marine and Navy doctrine manuals and monographs and that is the central theme; No more Iwo Jima's. I hope the opponent is not reading the same documents, because he has a say in your plans. What it tells me is that choice of landing zones were be crucial as will air supremacy.... not air superiority... along with absolute sea control over a wide area and any choke points. MV-22's will be important to sealing off the landing zone and dealing with reinforcements moving toward the LZ. I bet the first order of business is to setup an air defense zone around the LZ along with tanks and other armored vehicles to prevent a counterattack. However, IMHO, the best bet is to land where he ain't, as we say. Again, computer games do a poor job of depicting that.

As to the LST CO's, I agree. My dad used to tell me, while we watched Victory at Sea, that the BB's and cruisers would fire for what seemed like days, yet the opponent was always fresh and ready to fight. SOP was to just let the Marines land and then hit them.


　

I think the "opposed landing" has gone the way of the dodo; there are way too many defensive measures available and not enough amphib and fire support assets to overwhelm them. Essentially you have to catch the other guy unawares, sneak ashore, and not start slugging it out until the Marines are on dry land with all their combat gear. In spite of all the carping about the LHA-6 lacking a well deck trading off that for aviation space might have been a smart move.

Scott, might this fit your bill for a 30-knot LCU?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engin_de_D%C3%A9barquement_Amphibie_Rapide

[Scott Chisholm]

I think the "opposed landing" has gone the way of the dodo; there are way too many defensive measures available and not enough amphib and fire support assets to overwhelm them. Essentially you have to catch the other guy unawares, sneak ashore, and not start slugging it out until the Marines are on dry land with all their combat gear. In spite of all the carping about the LHA-6 lacking a well deck trading off that for aviation space might have been a smart move.

Scott, might this fit your bill for a 30-knot LCU?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engin_de_D%C3%A9barquement_Amphibie_Rapide

Thanks for the link.

Interesting design. If the water jets work the same way those on HSV-2 SWIFT worked, she'd be very maneuverable. The cargo capacity allows for only a single tank, however. A great start, however.

[old_pop2000]

Thanks for the link.

Interesting design. If the water jets work the same way those on HSV-2 SWIFT worked, she'd be very maneuverable. The cargo capacity allows for only a single tank, however. A great start, however.

Here is an animated video of the craft, cool music too. http://www.oldsaltblog.com/2011/12/30/eda-r-new-french-navy-landing-craft/

[old_pop2000]

I've been reading in docs about depth under keel. The information shows that ship squat increases in channels less than 600 feet wide or when moving at speeds over 10 knots. The CVN 68 carriers require about 50 feet of water depth at piers, turning basins or inner channels. They have a mean draft of 40.8 however, nomographs I've seen show they need at least 74 feet of unrestricted access. Now, how does this relate to the Straits of Hormuz and the docking area at Bahrain, I hope you all see where I going with this? The Straits of Hormuz have a water depth of 80 meters but it drops off dramatically toward the other coast. I wonder how it really affects operations for these and other large ships. I wonder how it will affect combat operations if someone does something stupid. I never seen a game actually use this variable except submarine games maybe. Any help out there?

[Scott Chisholm]

Dennis,

I may have to tiptoe around some of this issue as some of the specific numbers are probably still sensitive.

For those who may not know of, or understand, the phenomenon of "squatting" with regard to shipping, the Reader's Digest version is that when a ship accelerates in a narrow body of water the screws act as a pump and displace water from underneath the hull, causing the stern to settle, or "squat", deeper than it would normally. Depending on the clearance between the screws (normally the limiting factor for a ship's navigational draft) and the sea bed, there can be a real risk of striking bottom with the screws.

Another concern with squatting is the increased exposure to bottom laid mines. Silly as it may seem, squatting one or two feet could mean the difference between passing safely over a mine and having your rear end blown off. Squatting is a significant concern for amphibs operating close to the beach.

In open water, squatting occurs, but it is much less pronounced as it is physically impossible to displace a sufficient amount of water from underneath the keel to change the ship's draft. It's not like you're going to pump the Pacific out from underneath the ship....

As far as the CVNs are concerned, there is a recorded incident where a CVN scrammed both reactors in the Pearl Harbor turn basin after fouling her reactor plant sea water coolers with silt she kicked up while maneuvering pier side. That was their official story, and I will take it at face value. I was the Main Propulsion Assistant of the next CVN to enter Pearl after that incident, and you wouldn't believe the hoops Naval Reactors made us jump through to ensure we had a specified minimum clearance with the bottom before we entered port. Ensuring that minimum required offloading a metric butt-ton of ammo, aviation fuel, and aircraft, in addition to shifting around the remaining fuel, ammo, aircraft, and "Tilly" to achieve the appropriate draft and trim. Good or bad, we entered and left port without a hitch.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

I may have to tiptoe around some of this issue as some of the specific numbers are probably still sensitive.

For those who may not know of, or understand, the phenomenon of "squatting" with regard to shipping, the Reader's Digest version is that when a ship accelerates in a narrow body of water the screws act as a pump and displace water from underneath the hull, causing the stern to settle, or "squat", deeper than it would normally. Depending on the clearance between the screws (normally the limiting factor for a ship's navigational draft) and the sea bed, there can be a real risk of striking bottom with the screws.

Another concern with squatting is the increased exposure to bottom laid mines. Silly as it may seem, squatting one or two feet could mean the difference between passing safely over a mine and having your rear end blown off. Squatting is a significant concern for amphibs operating close to the beach.

In open water, squatting occurs, but it is much less pronounced as it is physically impossible to displace a sufficient amount of water from underneath the keel to change the ship's draft. It's not like you're going to pump the Pacific out from underneath the ship....

As far as the CVNs are concerned, there is a recorded incident where a CVN scrammed both reactors in the Pearl Harbor turn basin after fouling her reactor plant sea water coolers with silt she kicked up while maneuvering pier side. That was their official story, and I will take it at face value. I was the Main Propulsion Assistant of the next CVN to enter Pearl after that incident, and you wouldn't believe the hoops Naval Reactors made us jump through to ensure we had a specified minimum clearance with the bottom before we entered port. Ensuring that minimum required offloading a metric butt-ton of ammo, aviation fuel, and aircraft, in addition to shifting around the remaining fuel, ammo, aircraft, and "Tilly" to achieve the appropriate draft and trim. Good or bad, we entered and left port without a hitch.

Nice tiptoeing:) Ok, good explanation. So, a CVN or any ship has a concern when passing through narrow straits, etc. especially if the sea or strait is shallow. I don't knw if 80 meters or 262 feet is considered shallow but if you have a draught of 40.8 feet, I imagine the situation is getting a little dicey especially with subs and mines possible. The policy then is too slow down in such areas, is that correct? How about list and pitching, normal for most ships. I doubt a 100,000 carrier does much of that, but other ships do, especially the smaller ships. Just trying to pick your brain of its considerable knowledge, to understand the subtleties of this kind of region. You know me, detail, detail, detail. I am not much on brochure knowledge but am stuck with it.

Note: This is my other pet peeve against modern naval games. Their complete failure to depict environmental conditions adequately. With the NOAA and the Navy providing detailed information online and Google Earth and Ocean, I can't see why this shouldn't be a simple matter. But, I haven't written code in a very long time, so I should shut up. Most people do not realize that our confirmation of plate tectonics came from US Navy MAD information. Our map of the contours of the ocean bottoms came from extensive sonar information from US Navy sources. So has our meterological data throughout the world.

[Scott Chisholm]

Nice tiptoeing:) Ok, good explanation. So, a CVN or any ship has a concern when passing through narrow straits, etc. especially if the sea or strait is shallow. I don't knw if 80 meters or 262 feet is considered shallow but if you have a draught of 40.8 feet, I imagine the situation is getting a little dicey especially with subs and mines possible. The policy then is too slow down in such areas, is that correct? How about list and pitching, normal for most ships. I doubt a 100,000 carrier does much of that, but other ships do, especially the smaller ships. Just trying to pick your brain of its considerable knowledge, to understand the subtleties of this kind of region. You know me, detail, detail, detail. I am not much on brochure knowledge but am stuck with it.

Note: This is my other pet peeve against modern naval games. Their complete failure to depict environmental conditions adequately. With the NOAA and the Navy providing detailed information online and Google Earth and Ocean, I can't see why this shouldn't be a simple matter. But, I haven't written code in a very long time, so I should shut up. Most people do not realize that our confirmation of plate tectonics came from US Navy MAD information. Our map of the contours of the ocean bottoms came from extensive sonar information from US Navy sources. So has our meterological data throughout the world.

Dennis,

There is a rule of thumb I cannot remember which relates draft and water depth with regard to squatting. I want to say 3xdraft, but I am not sure.

Most ships' COs wouldn't want to get into water where squatting is an issue, so if they did find themselves there, I would be shocked if they didn't slow down. The only ships I know of that are comfortable operating within the 10 fathom curve are the amphibs, and even then we took it easy.

Heavy weather in shallow water brings with it more concerns than just squatting. You can get some pretty wicked wave and swell action in shallow water. The preferred options are to find a lee and drop the hook, or head out to the deep blue and find a "comfortable" course. On an LST, "comfortable" frequently meant "rolls less than 45 degrees".

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

There is a rule of thumb I cannot remember which relates draft and water depth with regard to squatting. I want to say 3xdraft, but I am not sure.

Most ships' COs wouldn't want to get into water where squatting is an issue, so if they did find themselves there, I would be shocked if they didn't slow down. The only ships I know of that are comfortable operating within the 10 fathom curve are the amphibs, and even then we took it easy.

Heavy weather in shallow water brings with it more concerns than just squatting. You can get some pretty wicked wave and swell action in shallow water. The preferred options are to find a lee and drop the hook, or head out to the deep blue and find a "comfortable" course. On an LST, "comfortable" frequently meant "rolls less than 45 degrees".

Scott:

I found some information on ship squat. Squat varies approximately to the square of the speed. If we double the speed, we quadruple the squat. Block coefficient causes squat to vary directly. Blockage factor is another. That's the immersed cross-section of the ship's midsection divided by the cross-section of the water in the area under consideration like harbor or river etc. If a ship passes another, squat can double. Anyway, I now have some formulas with one being in the open ocean.

Apparently, squat is due, as you say, because ships push water ahead and a volume of water returns down both sides and under the bottom of the ship. The streamlines of water speed up, under the keel and this causes a lowering of pressure under the bottom of the ship, dropping the ship vertically.

There seems to be two methods of calculating squat: Guliev and Muuska-Icorels.

As an aside, I found a document from the Navy which shows the calculations for clearance for CVN 68 carriers entering SD harbor. It shows a ship squat of 1 foot for the inner channel and 1.3 feet for the outer channel. That's interesting because the ships speed for outer is 15 knots, inner is ten. Kinda cool.

[Scott Chisholm]

Dennis,

What's in been since I wrote that post on damage control and free communication? Ten years? And, you still amaze me with the information you can dig up. You da man! ;)

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

What's in been since I wrote that post on damage control and free communication? Ten years? And, you still amaze me with the information you can dig up. You da man! ;)

Thank you very much, that is nice compliment coming from a person with your engineering background and experience. I just dig this stuff up and read it, you da' man who has done it. Whole lota difference between the two, my friend.

[steel_selachian]

Going back to the question of cutting amphibs, I was going through USN lists of naval auxiliaries to add to the NWP database and saw that in some cases (the last three T-AKE hulls) auxiliaries are being assigned to the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons for extra supply capacity. That might be a viable thing to do with LSD-41 hulls if the Navy decides to take 3 out of service - you have Military Sealift Command crewing the ships rather than active-duty personnel, the ships are kept docked in reserve most of the time which would save running costs, and I imagine it would be a big help in terms of offloading equipment from the MPSRON using LCMs or LCUs in the absence of port facilities. The Marines have been pushing for two extra LHA-6 hulls, unarmed and MSC-crewed, to be assigned to the MPSRONs as mobile seabases but that's unlikely to happen.

[old_pop2000]

Going back to the question of cutting amphibs, I was going through USN lists of naval auxiliaries to add to the NWP database and saw that in some cases (the last three T-AKE hulls) auxiliaries are being assigned to the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons for extra supply capacity. That might be a viable thing to do with LSD-41 hulls if the Navy decides to take 3 out of service - you have Military Sealift Command crewing the ships rather than active-duty personnel, the ships are kept docked in reserve most of the time which would save running costs, and I imagine it would be a big help in terms of offloading equipment from the MPSRON using LCMs or LCUs in the absence of port facilities. The Marines have been pushing for two extra LHA-6 hulls, unarmed and MSC-crewed, to be assigned to the MPSRONs as mobile seabases but that's unlikely to happen.

If my memory serves me, LSD-49 was a cargo version of the Landing Ship Dock. I guess the other two LCAC spots could be replaced with cargo capacity, depends on how much more capacity the Navy/Marines need and the how much refitting the ships might require to bring them up to specifications. Maybe Scott could shed some light.

[steel_selachian]

If my memory serves me, LSD-49 was a cargo version of the Landing Ship Dock. I guess the other two LCAC spots could be replaced with cargo capacity, depends on how much more capacity the Navy/Marines need and the how much refitting the ships might require to bring them up to specifications. Maybe Scott could shed some light.

I was thinking less in terms of carrying the cargo themselves than contributing the landing craft needed to get all the stuff over the beach. I've read that in the absence of a port, it would take an MPSRON three days to get a MAGTF's vehicles offloaded and then another 2-3 days to offload supplies. If you had an LSD with 3 LCUs or 10 LCMs aboard attached to the MPSRON, you could presumably unload those ships a lot faster.

[old_pop2000]

I was thinking less in terms of carrying the cargo themselves than contributing the landing craft needed to get all the stuff over the beach. I've read that in the absence of a port, it would take an MPSRON three days to get a MAGTF's vehicles offloaded and then another 2-3 days to offload supplies. If you had an LSD with 3 LCUs or 10 LCMs aboard attached to the MPSRON, you could presumably unload those ships a lot faster.

That is entirely possible, but I am not certain where you would find that information. I don't know if you want to separate the landing vehicles from the actual troops and logistics. We would need to do some in-depth research. I wouldn't guess that info is readily available. Possibly DTIC has some information on that.

[Scott Chisholm]

The LSD 41/49s used to have engine reliability issues. The Colt-Pielsticks were the largest main propulsion diesel engine we'd installed in a combatant and were quite the pain. Additionally, the ships were hideously underpowered and were at the mercy of the wind at slow speeds. LSD-41 nearly hit my ship coming into Little Creek one afternoon after taking a large wind gust on her beam. She ended up dragging both anchors across the harbor before using a tug as a fender (not good for the tug, although her Craft Master received a Navy Achievement Medal for his quick thinking) to keep her off the railroad jetty. She missed hitting us by less than 10 feet. Did I mention she had about 300 dependents onboard for a Dependents Cruise? Quite the show!

The internal layout of the ships had the 49s sacrificing well space for cargo space, so they cannot carry as many small craft as a 41. If I remember correctly, a 41 could carry 3 LCACs, while a 49 could only carry 2. I can't remember clearly what the footprint of an LCU was, but I believe it was 1.5 LCACs per LCU (LCUs are narrower, but longer). If so, the 49 would only be able to carry 1 LCU. I would recommend using LCUs in lieu of other small crafts (Mike boats, etc) as the U-boats have bow and stern ramps and can more readily perform stern gate marriages, obviating the need to ballast the ship down to recover displacement craft.

The importance of the bow/stern ramps is that a U-boat can be sued as a makeshift causeway by marrying her bow ramp up with a pier/jetty/quay and having other craft marry up with her stern ramp. Pretty cool to watch!

[steel_selachian]

The LSD 41/49s used to have engine reliability issues. The Colt-Pielsticks were the largest main propulsion diesel engine we'd installed in a combatant and were quite the pain. Additionally, the ships were hideously underpowered and were at the mercy of the wind at slow speeds. LSD-41 nearly hit my ship coming into Little Creek one afternoon after taking a large wind gust on her beam. She ended up dragging both anchors across the harbor before using a tug as a fender (not good for the tug, although her Craft Master received a Navy Achievement Medal for his quick thinking) to keep her off the railroad jetty. She missed hitting us by less than 10 feet. Did I mention she had about 300 dependents onboard for a Dependents Cruise? Quite the show!

The internal layout of the ships had the 49s sacrificing well space for cargo space, so they cannot carry as many small craft as a 41. If I remember correctly, a 41 could carry 3 LCACs, while a 49 could only carry 2. I can't remember clearly what the footprint of an LCU was, but I believe it was 1.5 LCACs per LCU (LCUs are narrower, but longer). If so, the 49 would only be able to carry 1 LCU. I would recommend using LCUs in lieu of other small crafts (Mike boats, etc) as the U-boats have bow and stern ramps and can more readily perform stern gate marriages, obviating the need to ballast the ship down to recover displacement craft.

The importance of the bow/stern ramps is that a U-boat can be sued as a makeshift causeway by marrying her bow ramp up with a pier/jetty/quay and having other craft marry up with her stern ramp. Pretty cool to watch!

Yoikes. You say "used to" have engine reliability issues? I know that right now the -41s and -49s are being put through a modernization overhaul slated to go through 2014 at Metro Machine and NASSCO - http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=45774

Last I checked it was 4 LCACs/3 LCUs for the -41s and 2 LCACs/1 LCU for the -49s.

[Scott Chisholm]

Last I checked it was 4 LCACs/3 LCUs for the -41s and 2 LCACs/1 LCU for the -49s.

Thanks for the correction; I wasn't sure if the 4 LCACs/3 LCUs was the 41s or the LPD-17s.

[steel_selachian]

The LPD-17 only has room for 2 LCACs or 1 LCU. IIRC the main role of the LSD is to carry the heavier equipment (tanks, LAVs) and then serve as a "landing craft depot" to assist the LHD and LPD in offloading cargo once its own units are on the beach. I've read that part of the logic behind trading well deck space for cargo capacity in the LSD-49 ships was that with 4 LCACs they were actually too good at the job and were putting stuff on the beach faster than the beachmasters could handle. That's why I suggested assigning any LSDs excess to ESG requirements to the MPSRONs; you'd save on running costs, decrease the unloading time for the Ro-Ro ships, and still keep the extra well decks around in case you needed to reinforce an ESG. Sounds like a winner over scrapping a still-useful hull or selling it off.

[old_pop2000]

The LPD-17 only has room for 2 LCACs or 1 LCU. IIRC the main role of the LSD is to carry the heavier equipment (tanks, LAVs) and then serve as a "landing craft depot" to assist the LHD and LPD in offloading cargo once its own units are on the beach. I've read that part of the logic behind trading well deck space for cargo capacity in the LSD-49 ships was that with 4 LCACs they were actually too good at the job and were putting stuff on the beach faster than the beachmasters could handle. That's why I suggested assigning any LSDs excess to ESG requirements to the MPSRONs; you'd save on running costs, decrease the unloading time for the Ro-Ro ships, and still keep the extra well decks around in case you needed to reinforce an ESG. Sounds like a winner over scrapping a still-useful hull or selling it off.


Steel, I understand what you are proposing, but seriously, you are getting lost in the detail. You are using very expensive hulls, to develop or add a capability for which there is no requirement. How do we maintain these hulls? OM&N funds? These funds are appropriated to finance the day to day costs of operating naval forces and this includes fuel, supplies and maintenance cost of ships, Navy/Marine Corps Aircraft and shore establishments. It's not a bottomless pit of money, it's finite. If these are older hulls, they will harder to maintain. I am certain Scott can elaborate on this far better than I. I only got involved in the aircraft side and IT side. Yep, that's right. Some IT actually comes out of that budget. Training and recruiting comes out of it. Everything in that budget had better have a requirement to be there. It is a shame to eliminate some of these ships, but realistically if we can't justify their existence with an operational requirement, then what do we do.

I know we are just discussing and having fun, and I am really enjoying the discussion, but I believe that reality must be accorded its proper place. I hope you understand my position. I just believe that we must at some point, reflect on what are our overall requirements and what do we need to satisfy that set of requirements.

[steel_selachian]

Steel, I understand what you are proposing, but seriously, you are getting lost in the detail. You are using very expensive hulls, to develop or add a capability for which there is no requirement. How do we maintain these hulls? OM&N funds? These funds are appropriated to finance the day to day costs of operating naval forces and this includes fuel, supplies and maintenance cost of ships, Navy/Marine Corps Aircraft and shore establishments. It's not a bottomless pit of money, it's finite. If these are older hulls, they will harder to maintain. I am certain Scott can elaborate on this far better than I. I only got involved in the aircraft side and IT side. Yep, that's right. Some IT actually comes out of that budget. Training and recruiting comes out of it. Everything in that budget had better have a requirement to be there. It is a shame to eliminate some of these ships, but realistically if we can't justify their existence with an operational requirement, then what do we do.

I know we are just discussing and having fun, and I am really enjoying the discussion, but I believe that reality must be accorded its proper place. I hope you understand my position. I just believe that we must at some point, reflect on what are our overall requirements and what do we need to satisfy that set of requirements.



Understood, I was just playing Devil's Advocate here by suggesting a possible alternative use for those hulls, seeing as the USN is already assigning three brand-new dry cargo ships to the MPSRONs and the Marines have been agitating for a couple of extra LHA-6 helicopter carriers for prepositioning forces (not that I think the latter is a reasonable request). Furthermore, as I understand it the MPF ships are essentially kept in port with minimal civilian crews, which should cut the OM&N costs. At present I haven't heard anything more about cuts to the LSD-41 numbers and given projected force structures (~9 LHD/LHA and 9-10 LPD) we likely won't need 12 LSDs in the future. Scrapping is an option (Whidbey Island turns 30 in 2015); so is Foreign Military Sale, ready reserve, or MPF assignment.

[old_pop2000]

Understood, I was just playing Devil's Advocate here by suggesting a possible alternative use for those hulls, seeing as the USN is already assigning three brand-new dry cargo ships to the MPSRONs and the Marines have been agitating for a couple of extra LHA-6 helicopter carriers for prepositioning forces (not that I think the latter is a reasonable request). Furthermore, as I understand it the MPF ships are essentially kept in port with minimal civilian crews, which should cut the OM&N costs. At present I haven't heard anything more about cuts to the LSD-41 numbers and given projected force structures (~9 LHD/LHA and 9-10 LPD) we likely won't need 12 LSDs in the future. Scrapping is an option (Whidbey Island turns 30 in 2015); so is Foreign Military Sale, ready reserve, or MPF assignment.

I understand and the idea of selling them to a foreign country like one of the Persian Gulf nations would enhance that regions capability. But the scrapping idea has to be entertained seriously. Even in Ready Reserve, those ships will have to maintained. Remember that OM&N funds are used for the MPF status ships also. Keep in mind that Admirals and Generals generally are conservative and see an enemy behind every tree. You have to temper their requirements with some reality both geostrategically and financially. The Pentagon spends most of its time along with State, CIA and others, developing scenarios and ensuring that we are prepared. They are called war games and have been going on since the inception of the department of war. War Plan Red, the plan to invade Canada was real, not just a game. Your idea is workable and interesting. However, let's do a reality check? Sorry, its the way my neurons are wired. Believe me, I catch it from my princess every day. "Do you have to analyze everything". Yep, that's the way I was wired, dear.

Let me make a suggestion. Let's define a requirement, a real world requirement based on what we can find on the net, and then develop what-if scenarios, requirements and specifications to satisfy those requirements.

[steel_selachian]

I understand and the idea of selling them to a foreign country like one of the Persian Gulf nations would enhance that regions capability. But the scrapping idea has to be entertained seriously. Even in Ready Reserve, those ships will have to maintained. Remember that OM&N funds are used for the MPF status ships also. Keep in mind that Admirals and Generals generally are conservative and see an enemy behind every tree. You have to temper their requirements with some reality both geostrategically and financially. The Pentagon spends most of its time along with State, CIA and others, developing scenarios and ensuring that we are prepared. They are called war games and have been going on since the inception of the department of war. War Plan Red, the plan to invade Canada was real, not just a game. Your idea is workable and interesting. However, let's do a reality check? Sorry, its the way my neurons are wired. Believe me, I catch it from my princess every day. "Do you have to analyze everything". Yep, that's the way I was wired, dear.

Let me make a suggestion. Let's define a requirement, a real world requirement based on what we can find on the net, and then develop what-if scenarios, requirements and specifications to satisfy those requirements.

Yep, I know the feeling of being analytical to a fault - hence why I'm floating trial balloons here for the more knowledgeable forum posters to blow holes in and then examining the severity and location of the hits ;)

[Scott Chisholm]

The FMS option is interesting....

I was the Project Officer at MCMCLASSRON tasked with coordinating the decommissioning and FMS of all 12 of the MHCs. We were supposed to sell two to Egypt; two to Greece; a pair to Turkey; and, another pair to Lithuania. Taiwan wanted the remaining four, but we'd only offer them two to avoid ticking off China. I cannot remember exactly where the last two were supposed to go, but I think it might have been Estonia.

In any event, only the Greek and Egyptian sales went through. Following the 2006 elections, the new folks controlling Congress decided that the MHCs were "vital national assets" and had the remaining eight mothballed. I realize the complexion of Congress has changed, but I wonder if we'd actually sell the 41s.

[old_pop2000]

The FMS option is interesting....

I was the Project Officer at MCMCLASSRON tasked with coordinating the decommissioning and FMS of all 12 of the MHCs. We were supposed to sell two to Egypt; two to Greece; a pair to Turkey; and, another pair to Lithuania. Taiwan wanted the remaining four, but we'd only offer them two to avoid ticking off China. I cannot remember exactly where the last two were supposed to go, but I think it might have been Estonia.

In any event, only the Greek and Egyptian sales went through. Following the 2006 elections, the new folks controlling Congress decided that the MCHs were "vital national assets" and had the remaining eight mothballed. I realize the complexion of Congress has changed, but I wonder if we'd actually sell the 41s.

You bring up a good point. Would Congress approve the sale of ships with amphibious capability to a foreign nation? Their neighbors might be a little dismayed. There are niceties in geopolitics that have to be observed. So, these ships might end up in the mothball fleet. Then a change of administration sells them, I've seen that.

[steel_selachian]

You bring up a good point. Would Congress approve the sale of ships with amphibious capability to a foreign nation? Their neighbors might be a little dismayed. There are niceties in geopolitics that have to be observed. So, these ships might end up in the mothball fleet. Then a change of administration sells them, I've seen that.

I recall something similar happened when 15 Newport-class LSTs went up for sale in the mid-1990s; several members of Congress blocked the sale over concerns about reductions in our amphibious shipping capability and the human-rights record of one of the nine countries that was slated to get them.

As a bit of reference, when the Brits put the RFA Largs Bay up for sale, the interested parties were Chile, Brazil, India, and Australia. Australia ended up paying AU$100 million for the ship and has presumably fulfilled its amphib requirement given that the Canberra-class LHDs will enter service in the next four years or so. Canada has been toying with the idea of building or buying amphibious lift ships in addition to 2-3 hybrid AOR/Ro-Ro "Joint Support Ships," although the amphib component appears to be dead for now.

[Scott Chisholm]

I recall something similar happened when 15 Newport-class LSTs went up for sale in the mid-1990s; several members of Congress blocked the sale over concerns about reductions in our amphibious shipping capability and the human-rights record of one of the nine countries that was slated to get them.

As a bit of reference, when the Brits put the RFA Largs Bay up for sale, the interested parties were Chile, Brazil, India, and Australia. Australia ended up paying AU$100 million for the ship and has presumably fulfilled its amphib requirement given that the Canberra-class LHDs will enter service in the next four years or so. Canada has been toying with the idea of building or buying amphibious lift ships in addition to 2-3 hybrid AOR/Ro-Ro "Joint Support Ships," although the amphib component appears to be dead for now.

I was the Operations Officer on USS LA MOURE COUNTY (LST-1194) back in the mid-90s when the LSTs were beginning their decommissionings. It was sort of like watching family members die and having the neighbors come over and strip their bodies. One after another, the NEWPORTs were sold to other countries. The Aussies looked over the 1194 for possible purchase. They wanted to modify the superstructure and tank deck to turn her into a miniature helicopter assault/mother ship. Pretty fascinating concept artwork, but they nixed the idea after learning how badly the ships rolled in relatively calm seas.

In any event, she didn't make it to decommissioning. In 2000, during an amphib exercise with the Chileans, she was run aground while doing about 15kts in fog. What the web won't tell you is the extent of the damage: broken keel; 26 different holes below the waterline; both troop berthing compartments flooded solid; one screw knocked off; both rudders shifted on their posts. Thankfully, she was enroute to a "combat launch" of her AAVs at the time of the grounding, so all of the Marines were in their vehicles on the tank deck.

For interested parties, we normally launched the AAVs doing about 5 kts to make it easier on the Marines when the AAVs hit the water (simple vector math: the AAVs roll off the ramp at about 5-10 mph, so keeping the ship's speed down made for a less bumpy water entry). However, in a "combat launch", the ship's speed was much greater. If you think of a boat lane as a football field, we'd aim for either the left or right corner of the end zone while cutting across the field at a 45-degree angle from the opposite sideline doing between 15 and 18 kts. We'd start launching the AAVs as soon as we crossed onto the "field" (into the boat lane) at about 5 second intervals. The AAVs would be stopped cold as soon as they hit the water (actually, they'd move backwards for a couple of seconds), then turn toward the beach at their maximum waterborne speed. Not a whole lot of finesse involved.

Anyway, that's what the LA MOURE COUNTY Jail was doing when the clowns on the Bridge ran her into Chile.

In epilogue, she was towed to a Chilean naval base and patched up. The Chilean had a pair of NEWPORTs already, so the USN let them strip the 1194. The following year, she was sunk as part of the Chilean phase of the UNITAS. She was subjected to gun fire, bombs, limpet mines, and I believe a couple of missiles before finally being torpedoed. In true fashion, and in keeping with her sometimes cantankerous nature, she went down bow first, showing the world her a$$ end. Sort of a ship's way of flipping the finger to the world. I don't blame her; she didn't deserve what happened to her.

End of trivia moment. :p

[old_pop2000]

I was the Operations Officer on USS LA MOURE COUNTY (LST-1194) back in the mid-90s when the LSTs were beginning their decommissionings. It was sort of like watching family members die and having the neighbors come over and strip their bodies. One after another, the NEWPORTs were sold to other countries. The Aussies looked over the 1194 for possible purchase. They wanted to modify the superstructure and tank deck to turn her into a miniature helicopter assault/mother ship. Pretty fascinating concept artwork, but they nixed the idea after learning how badly the ships rolled in relatively calm seas.

In any event, she didn't make it to decommissioning. In 2000, during an amphib exercise with the Chileans, she was run aground while doing about 15kts in fog. What the web won't tell you is the extent of the damage: broken keel; 26 different holes below the waterline; both troop berthing compartments flooded solid; one screw knocked off; both rudders shifted on their posts. Thankfully, she was enroute to a "combat launch" of her AAVs at the time of the grounding, so all of the Marines were in their vehicles on the tank deck.

For interested parties, we normally launched the AAVs doing about 5 kts to make it easier on the Marines when the AAVs hit the water (simple vector math: the AAVs roll off the ramp at about 5-10 mph, so keeping the ship's speed down made for a less bumpy water entry). However, in a "combat launch", the ship's speed was much greater. If you think of a boat lane as a football field, we'd aim for either the left or right corner of the end zone while cutting across the field at a 45-degree angle from the opposite sideline doing between 15 and 18 kts. We'd start launching the AAVs as soon as we crossed onto the "field" (into the boat lane) at about 5 second intervals. The AAVs would be stopped cold as soon as they hit the water (actually, they'd move backwards for a couple of seconds), then turn toward the beach at their maximum waterborne speed. Not a whole lot of finesse involved.

Anyway, that's what the LA MOURE COUNTY Jail was doing when the clowns on the Bridge ran her into Chile.

In epilogue, she was towed to a Chilean naval base and patched up. The Chilean had a pair of NEWPORTs already, so the USN let them strip the 1194. The following year, she was sunk as part of the Chilean phase of the UNITAS. She was subjected to gun fire, bombs, limpet mines, and I believe a couple of missiles before finally being torpedoed. In true fashion, and in keeping with her sometimes cantankerous nature, she went down bow first, showing the world her a$$ end. Sort of a ship's way of flipping the finger to the world. I don't blame her; she didn't deserve what happened to her.

End of trivia moment. :p

I guess you tend to get attached to a ship, when you have spent enough time on her. My dad felt that way when his ship, the Saratoga went down at Bikini. He had spent the war on her. Thanks for the trivia moment.

[steel_selachian]

I was the Operations Officer on USS LA MOURE COUNTY (LST-1194) back in the mid-90s when the LSTs were beginning their decommissionings. It was sort of like watching family members die and having the neighbors come over and strip their bodies. One after another, the NEWPORTs were sold to other countries. The Aussies looked over the 1194 for possible purchase. They wanted to modify the superstructure and tank deck to turn her into a miniature helicopter assault/mother ship. Pretty fascinating concept artwork, but they nixed the idea after learning how badly the ships rolled in relatively calm seas.

In any event, she didn't make it to decommissioning. In 2000, during an amphib exercise with the Chileans, she was run aground while doing about 15kts in fog. What the web won't tell you is the extent of the damage: broken keel; 26 different holes below the waterline; both troop berthing compartments flooded solid; one screw knocked off; both rudders shifted on their posts. Thankfully, she was enroute to a "combat launch" of her AAVs at the time of the grounding, so all of the Marines were in their vehicles on the tank deck.

For interested parties, we normally launched the AAVs doing about 5 kts to make it easier on the Marines when the AAVs hit the water (simple vector math: the AAVs roll off the ramp at about 5-10 mph, so keeping the ship's speed down made for a less bumpy water entry). However, in a "combat launch", the ship's speed was much greater. If you think of a boat lane as a football field, we'd aim for either the left or right corner of the end zone while cutting across the field at a 45-degree angle from the opposite sideline doing between 15 and 18 kts. We'd start launching the AAVs as soon as we crossed onto the "field" (into the boat lane) at about 5 second intervals. The AAVs would be stopped cold as soon as they hit the water (actually, they'd move backwards for a couple of seconds), then turn toward the beach at their maximum waterborne speed. Not a whole lot of finesse involved.

Anyway, that's what the LA MOURE COUNTY Jail was doing when the clowns on the Bridge ran her into Chile.

In epilogue, she was towed to a Chilean naval base and patched up. The Chilean had a pair of NEWPORTs already, so the USN let them strip the 1194. The following year, she was sunk as part of the Chilean phase of the UNITAS. She was subjected to gun fire, bombs, limpet mines, and I believe a couple of missiles before finally being torpedoed. In true fashion, and in keeping with her sometimes cantankerous nature, she went down bow first, showing the world her a$$ end. Sort of a ship's way of flipping the finger to the world. I don't blame her; she didn't deserve what happened to her.

End of trivia moment. :p

Didn't the Australians actually end up following through with that idea? The two ships they purchased were the Saginaw and Fairfax County, which were converted into pocket LHAs as you described and redesignated the Kanimbla-class. The problem for the Australians was that they apparently hadn't surveyed those two ships before buying them; they picked up the two hulls for AU$61 million and had to spend four years and AU$400 million on the conversion and repairing extensive corrosion issues. In the end they only got about 11-12 years out of the hulls before they were deemed uneconomical to repair. The issues with those two hulls left enough of a bad taste in the RAN's mouth that they turned down an offer to pick up the Kidd-class DDGs for AU$30 million apiece while they were still halfway through sorting out the Kanimbla and ​Manoora, and when Largs Bay was offered they were smart enough to look her over closely.

I can imagine it's not fun to see your ship get sold off or scrapped - Admiral Eugene Fluckey later commented that if he and his crew had known the Italian Navy was selling their old sub (USS Barb, SS-220) to the scrappers for $100,000 in the 1970s they would have tried buying her back for a museum.

[old_pop2000]

Didn't the Australians actually end up following through with that idea? The two ships they purchased were the Saginaw and Fairfax County, which were converted into pocket LHAs as you described and redesignated the Kanimbla-class. The problem for the Australians was that they apparently hadn't surveyed those two ships before buying them; they picked up the two hulls for AU$61 million and had to spend four years and AU$400 million on the conversion and repairing extensive corrosion issues. In the end they only got about 11-12 years out of the hulls before they were deemed uneconomical to repair. The issues with those two hulls left enough of a bad taste in the RAN's mouth that they turned down an offer to pick up the Kidd-class DDGs for AU$30 million apiece while they were still halfway through sorting out the Kanimbla and ​Manoora.

This is the essential problem with ships and aircraft. It isn't that we can't fix or update these ships, we can. It's the cost and the end result. When you get finished, you still have an old ship, and areas that are not addressed. No SLEP get's everything, trust me. SLEP programs are used to simply extend the life, until a new system is produced. This is why we SLEP'd the F-4's, to keep them flying until the F-14s were available for the fleet. Some of the aircraft, even after SLEP, many F-4s had to reduce their flight hours. I am certain that Scott can elaborate far more on the ship end of this, but in the aircraft world, SLEP only gets what you are asked to fix. If the Navy doesn't put it on the SLEP work plan, you don't fix it.

[JMS]

From what I know from out Armada, the experience of receiving hand me downs from the USN is that you need to go through them with a fine coomb before accepting them, as some ships have been better cared than others, and this led to the turning down of Knoxes in the early 90s, which ended up in Greece and Turkey. Don't think the experience of other navies is much different unless they receive ships that were in use when sold (Indonesia and their ex-Dutch and ex-GDR ships)

[old_pop2000]

From what I know from out Armada, the experience of receiving hand me downs from the USN is that you need to go through them with a fine coomb before accepting them, as some ships have been better cared than others, and this led to the turning down of Knoxes in the early 90s, which ended up in Greece and Turkey. Don't think the experience of other navies is much different unless they receive ships that were in use when sold (Indonesia and their ex-Dutch and ex-GDR ships)

Every nation has to develop its own geostrategic objectives and its operational requirements to attain those objectives. It's the old story, I am afraid. Many countries do not have a requirement for a large blue-water navy, more of a coastal naval force to patrol for submarines, smugglers etc. A Knox class frigate is or was well equipped for such a mission. It really depends on where you are located. Some countries really don't need expensive sophisticated naval vessels, so some used is a good deal. But its the old question of let the buyer beware.

[steel_selachian]

Every nation has to develop its own geostrategic objectives and its operational requirements to attain those objectives. It's the old story, I am afraid. Many countries do not have a requirement for a large blue-water navy, more of a coastal naval force to patrol for submarines, smugglers etc. A Knox class frigate is or was well equipped for such a mission. It really depends on where you are located. Some countries really don't need expensive sophisticated naval vessels, so some used is a good deal. But its the old question of let the buyer beware.

It's also the age-old "too good to be true" problem - you can pick up a decommissioned warship from a foreign power for much cheaper than a new-build vessel (late-1970s vintage DDG for US$15-20 million, going one, going twice ...), but then you have to beware the maintenance headaches. An amphib doesn't necessarily need newfangled whiz-bang sensors and weapons (the Australians are building their new LHDs with a grand total of four remote-operated 25 mm mounts for suicide boat-blasting), but if the hull and engines are falling to pieces it's not much use. On the other hand, it is an inexpensive way to train up crews and possibly your own shipyards for later, more sophisticated vessels of the same type. India and China have done quite a bit of that in the past few years with carriers, DDGs and amphibs; I'll be interested to see how much use the Indians get out of the Vikramaditya and Jalashwa over the next few years.

[old_pop2000]

It's also the age-old "too good to be true" problem - you can pick up a decommissioned warship from a foreign power for much cheaper than a new-build vessel (late-1970s vintage DDG for US$15-20 million, going one, going twice ...), but then you have to beware the maintenance headaches. An amphib doesn't necessarily need newfangled whiz-bang sensors and weapons (the Australians are building their new LHDs with a grand total of four remote-operated 25 mm mounts for suicide boat-blasting), but if the hull and engines are falling to pieces it's not much use. On the other hand, it is an inexpensive way to train up crews and possibly your own shipyards for later, more sophisticated vessels of the same type. India and China have done quite a bit of that in the past few years with carriers, DDGs and amphibs; I'll be interested to see how much use the Indians get out of the Vikramaditya and Jalashwa over the next few years.

Buying usable fleet assets from nations that are downsizing can be beneficial as long as there is at least two decades of life still in the hulls. The Chilean navy managed to get four ex-dutch ships and four ex-RN ships. According to records that purchase saved the Chilean's 1400 officers and men, since the new ships were turbine powered and required less crew. The Eastern european nations have acquired ex-US, UK and Belgian frigates built to NATO specs to eliminate Soviet designs. This helps them integrate into NATO and relieves NATO of many naval responsibilities. Even Canada purchased two Upholder class submarines to replace Oberon class. There are risks, of course, as those ships must be able to be integrated into the current fleet and be very cost effective to retain. It's a good fit, if you don't dither. Wait too long and the ship will start to deteriorate. You have to purchase and immediately do any maintenance and upgrades.

[paladin5]

Also remember that a CG is usually deployed with ESGs, so that adds to the number you'd need. Actually, I wasn't really differentiating between CGs and DDGs - they have more or less the same capabilities. What I was questioning was sinking the money into upgrading the hulls versus adding more Burke-class DDGs at close to $2 billion a pop (when you already have 62 of them and another 12 planned to build in the next couple of decades). Unless it's cheaper to buy entirely new hulls than upgrade the ones you have, it doesn't look much like a budget-cutting or force downsizing move when new construction is still going full throttle. I doubt the age of the ships played much into consideration; one of the ships on the "hit list" there was commissioned in 1993. USS Bunker Hill is already 26 years old and she's not under consideration to be retired in the next couple years, and I seem to recall the USN's projected lifespan for the ships was closer to 30-35 years. I know the Ticonderogas tend to roll like a barrel at an Irish wake and have had past problems with hull cracking, but I thought the latter had been fixed and the former was more a matter of crew comfort than a handling problem.

I'm not sure about the specific listings there - I thought I saw USS Leyte Gulf listed somewhere else as another candidate. So the Jane's list might be off, more current reports have stated 7 Ticos will get the ax. I haven't heard anything about whether the Whidbey Island decommisionings would go forward, but I would think that if you really wanted to save money, you could keep those eight ships, use the four Harpers Ferry-class ships as LPDs (that's what they are, more or less, with the reduced well deck and expanded cargo area), and cut off the San Antonio-class at five or at most six hulls. Cutting some of the Zumwalt-class hulls (preferably all three) would be another saver, as that ship seems to be a technology demonstrator in search of a relevant mission.


Keep in mind that we also have to worry about keeping the shipbuilding industry supplied with work since we can't afford to loose those skill an knowledge bases.

BTW hi everyone! It's been a while since I last stopped by. Life just keeps getting busier on me :-\

[old_pop2000]

Keep in mind that we also have to worry about keeping the shipbuilding industry supplied with work since we can't afford to loose those skill an knowledge bases.

BTW hi everyone! It's been a while since I last stopped by. Life just keeps getting busier on me :-\

Hi Mike:

Glad you came by to visit us.

There are economics and capabilities that have to be considered. The capability to build naval vessels especially nuclear powered carriers is important and almost every administration has that battle to fight. The military establishment will say that their responsibility is to attain the political and military goals as set by the civilian administration and economics isn't their purview. Nice, but that is not true. They have to develop scenarios and operations to gain the objectives and then establish requirements for men, ships and planes to reach those objectives. They have to prioritize. So, in fact, what they require and need funding for, is based on economics and you can't avoid that. The military is getting real good at playing the game, believe me.

[steel_selachian]

Found the officially announced plan for the Ticos and Whidbeys - four CGs to retire in FY2013, then three CGs and two LSDs to retire in FY2014.

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/02/navy-budget-request-avoids-deep-cuts-021312/

[old_pop2000]

Found the officially announced plan for the Ticos and Whidbeys - four CGs to retire in FY2013, then three CGs and two LSDs to retire in FY2014.

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/02/navy-budget-request-avoids-deep-cuts-021312/

I think it was pre-ordained that the older ships were gone, just waiting for the formal announcement.

[steel_selachian]

The Ticos being decommissioned are newer ships in the class, actually, commissioned between 1991 and 1994. The oldest hull in the class was commissioned in 1986 and will not be disposed of. The logic for the selections was that six of the ships had not undergone the Aegis BMD upgrade and another one required extensive hull repairs (presumably Port Royal since she was one of the first Ticos to be fitted for BMD testing and ran aground off Oahu in 2009, although she's since been repaired and put back into service).

[old_pop2000]

The Ticos being decommissioned are newer ships in the class, actually, commissioned between 1991 and 1994. The oldest hull in the class was commissioned in 1986 and will not be disposed of. The logic for the selections was that six of the ships had not undergone the Aegis BMD upgrade and another one required extensive hull repairs (presumably Port Royal since she was one of the first Ticos to be fitted for BMD testing and ran aground off Oahu in 2009, although she's since been repaired and put back into service).

The rationale is that the later Tico's did not have the expansion room in their hulls for future upgrades, but the earlier block ships did. The ships of course were based on the Spruance hull design but became a little top heavy. I suspect their role is now being supplanted by the Arleigh Burkes. The Tico's were scheduled for decommmissioning in the 2021-2025 time period but alas budget cuts have caused that plan to be compressed. I would also guess that the new ships have a much stealthier superstructure which is now being considered for all ships.