Ed Rotondaro
11-29-2011, 03:29 AM
Hi all:
I recently finished a book entitled "Hitler's Panzers" by Professor Dennis Showalter from Berkeley Caliber Press, 2009. While there are books by the dozen on the tanks, the campaigns and the leaders of the German panzer arm, this one is a little different. It is more of an operational study of how Germany developed its mechanized force and how it changed throughout WWII.
Initially with the debut of the tank in WWI, Germany didn't put much stock in the vehicles, preferring to refine its storm trooper infantry tactics. Post war, the Weimar army was a very reduced force that relied on its infantry and artillery. It really wasn't until the late 1920s that the more forward thinking officers began designing maneuvers with ordinary vehicles to simulate tanks. The writings of French and British officers began to take hold and German officers like Guderian became the most vocal supporters of mechanized warfare.
Germany was hobbled by the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles and had to do a lot of its weapons development on the side. WIth tanks it became Russia who supplied Germany with a chance to develop tanks out of sight of French and British eyes. The Russians benefitted from German ideas and began their own programs to better their armored forces.
The Wehrmacht that attacked Poland was far different from the one that would overrun France in June of 1940. Its tanks were small, lightly armored and not exactly well armed either. But the doctrines would be tested and refined in the September 1939 campaign. What the panzer generals learned was the key to mechanized warfare was speed and combined arms. They distances covered by Rommel and others in France meant they could totally disrupt British and French units and leave them helpless. The Germans really didn't envision or want tank versus tank duels and they relied on their superior training and better thought out tank turret designs to let commanders command, gunners shoot and loaders load whereas the French overburdened the tank commander with either acting as gunner or loader. Good communications were also a hallmark of German armored success. Units could be better controlled and directed by superior tank to tank and tank to battalion communications.
The Germans did take away some incorrect lessons from their initial success. Rapid advances are good if your opponent doesn't have the ability to trade space for time to re-group. Also command of the air over the battlefield was essential to the German panzer doctrine. What Germnay would find was once the war shifted to places like North Africa or Russia, they could gain miles but not bring the enemy to heel. While logistics were undestood, too many German generals felt that one more massive push would solve all the problems and end the war that they had not expected to last as along as it did.
Showalter does a good job of pointing out Germany's inability to grasp a stragetic view of the war they had entered into. The panzers went from being the maneuver unit to the arm of decision while never having enough supporting infantry to work in concert with them. The grevious losses that German footsoldiers took from 1939-1941 where never made good. German infantry units were pared down and panzers were asked to do what footsoldiers should have been doing. The Wehrmacht accepted smaller infantry formations and countered by adding lots more automatic weapons to compensate for less boots on the ground. The famous MG-42 with its 1200 rounds per minute rate of fire was meant to suppress larger units. The world's first assault rifles also added to the badly depleted infantry's firepower while the assault guns gave them direct fire capabilities and some badly needed anti-tank units. Showalter's description of tanks trying to fight in Stalingrad in place of infantry are good.
The turf wars of the German ministers are shown to be as much as a reason for defeat as fighting a war on two fronts.The SS was draining away manpower for its panzer divisions as were the Luftwaffe ground units that made no sense at all. But the real kicker is Showlater's analysis that while new German tank designs were superior in armor and firepower, they were costly to build, time consuming to build and ultimately defensive not offensive weapons. By 1943, the panzers were the mobile fire brigade. They could stop a breakthrough, but they couldn't regain lost ground, they could only stabilize for a short time a crumbling front.
Showalter does a good job of presenting the panzers and their de-evolution from forces of exploitation to forces of desperation. No matter how good the panzers were design wise, too many were "mission kills" due to lack of maintenance, spare parts, fuel, etc. Most of the tanks Germya lost in the Normandy breakout were destroyed by airpower as most pundits love to say. Their crews abandonded them because mechanical problems and the fear of Allied tactical airpower.
To their credit, the German panzer soldiers could cobble together a makeshift battlegroup (Kamfgruppe in German) that could consist of as little as two companies of tanks, a battalion of infantry and maybe a company of artillery and still project serious force against much more numerous enemies. The trouble being the kind of attrition Germany needed was no longer possible in 1944.
Problems with this book? A couple. First off the good professor doesn't feel the need to use footnotes. He believes in making the book an easy reader-friendly experience since he felt that he would need too many footnotes per page. While I understand where he is coming from, you still need to footnote, at least the quotes from the heavy hitters like Guderian, etc. Second, the maps are minimal, mainly covering German attacks and nothing on the Allied ripostes in 1944? C'mon, get with the program Showalter, this stuff is available and enhances the narrative. Finally, no photos of anything. OK not a big problem, if I want tank pictures I've got my various Osprey, Squadron/Signal and other specialized books for that. Still, one gets the idea that the publisher wanted to keep expenses down and limit the size of the book by eliminating photos.
Overall despite my criticism this is a good book with some solid information. It is probably better suited to the casual reader than the person looking for heavy duty details. I rate it as B.
I recently finished a book entitled "Hitler's Panzers" by Professor Dennis Showalter from Berkeley Caliber Press, 2009. While there are books by the dozen on the tanks, the campaigns and the leaders of the German panzer arm, this one is a little different. It is more of an operational study of how Germany developed its mechanized force and how it changed throughout WWII.
Initially with the debut of the tank in WWI, Germany didn't put much stock in the vehicles, preferring to refine its storm trooper infantry tactics. Post war, the Weimar army was a very reduced force that relied on its infantry and artillery. It really wasn't until the late 1920s that the more forward thinking officers began designing maneuvers with ordinary vehicles to simulate tanks. The writings of French and British officers began to take hold and German officers like Guderian became the most vocal supporters of mechanized warfare.
Germany was hobbled by the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles and had to do a lot of its weapons development on the side. WIth tanks it became Russia who supplied Germany with a chance to develop tanks out of sight of French and British eyes. The Russians benefitted from German ideas and began their own programs to better their armored forces.
The Wehrmacht that attacked Poland was far different from the one that would overrun France in June of 1940. Its tanks were small, lightly armored and not exactly well armed either. But the doctrines would be tested and refined in the September 1939 campaign. What the panzer generals learned was the key to mechanized warfare was speed and combined arms. They distances covered by Rommel and others in France meant they could totally disrupt British and French units and leave them helpless. The Germans really didn't envision or want tank versus tank duels and they relied on their superior training and better thought out tank turret designs to let commanders command, gunners shoot and loaders load whereas the French overburdened the tank commander with either acting as gunner or loader. Good communications were also a hallmark of German armored success. Units could be better controlled and directed by superior tank to tank and tank to battalion communications.
The Germans did take away some incorrect lessons from their initial success. Rapid advances are good if your opponent doesn't have the ability to trade space for time to re-group. Also command of the air over the battlefield was essential to the German panzer doctrine. What Germnay would find was once the war shifted to places like North Africa or Russia, they could gain miles but not bring the enemy to heel. While logistics were undestood, too many German generals felt that one more massive push would solve all the problems and end the war that they had not expected to last as along as it did.
Showalter does a good job of pointing out Germany's inability to grasp a stragetic view of the war they had entered into. The panzers went from being the maneuver unit to the arm of decision while never having enough supporting infantry to work in concert with them. The grevious losses that German footsoldiers took from 1939-1941 where never made good. German infantry units were pared down and panzers were asked to do what footsoldiers should have been doing. The Wehrmacht accepted smaller infantry formations and countered by adding lots more automatic weapons to compensate for less boots on the ground. The famous MG-42 with its 1200 rounds per minute rate of fire was meant to suppress larger units. The world's first assault rifles also added to the badly depleted infantry's firepower while the assault guns gave them direct fire capabilities and some badly needed anti-tank units. Showalter's description of tanks trying to fight in Stalingrad in place of infantry are good.
The turf wars of the German ministers are shown to be as much as a reason for defeat as fighting a war on two fronts.The SS was draining away manpower for its panzer divisions as were the Luftwaffe ground units that made no sense at all. But the real kicker is Showlater's analysis that while new German tank designs were superior in armor and firepower, they were costly to build, time consuming to build and ultimately defensive not offensive weapons. By 1943, the panzers were the mobile fire brigade. They could stop a breakthrough, but they couldn't regain lost ground, they could only stabilize for a short time a crumbling front.
Showalter does a good job of presenting the panzers and their de-evolution from forces of exploitation to forces of desperation. No matter how good the panzers were design wise, too many were "mission kills" due to lack of maintenance, spare parts, fuel, etc. Most of the tanks Germya lost in the Normandy breakout were destroyed by airpower as most pundits love to say. Their crews abandonded them because mechanical problems and the fear of Allied tactical airpower.
To their credit, the German panzer soldiers could cobble together a makeshift battlegroup (Kamfgruppe in German) that could consist of as little as two companies of tanks, a battalion of infantry and maybe a company of artillery and still project serious force against much more numerous enemies. The trouble being the kind of attrition Germany needed was no longer possible in 1944.
Problems with this book? A couple. First off the good professor doesn't feel the need to use footnotes. He believes in making the book an easy reader-friendly experience since he felt that he would need too many footnotes per page. While I understand where he is coming from, you still need to footnote, at least the quotes from the heavy hitters like Guderian, etc. Second, the maps are minimal, mainly covering German attacks and nothing on the Allied ripostes in 1944? C'mon, get with the program Showalter, this stuff is available and enhances the narrative. Finally, no photos of anything. OK not a big problem, if I want tank pictures I've got my various Osprey, Squadron/Signal and other specialized books for that. Still, one gets the idea that the publisher wanted to keep expenses down and limit the size of the book by eliminating photos.
Overall despite my criticism this is a good book with some solid information. It is probably better suited to the casual reader than the person looking for heavy duty details. I rate it as B.