Naval bombardment,

[Warship NWS]

After our long discussion about the use of battleships maybe its time to re-examine their true effectiveness at naval bombardment missions from the age of sail to modern day.

Where there targets that only battleship could destroy effectively with their larger guns? Was that a reasonable reason to keep them around during various time frames? Could other ships during those time frames, or other weapons, accomplish the same results?

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

I think one advantage that battleships had over other platforms like airplanes was that they could stay in place for days on end lobbing their shells. OTOH, aircraft had a small payload, and if they missed, had to return to base/carrier and reload. Plus they were easier to kill than battleships.

[bridav58]

After our long discussion about the use of battleships maybe its time to re-examine their true effectiveness at naval bombardment missions from the age of sail to modern day.

Where there targets that only battleship could destroy effectively with their larger guns? Was that a reasonable reason to keep them around during various time frames? Could other ships during those time frames, or other weapons, accomplish the same results?

Thanks.

A BB can take a kamikaze , still stay on station much easier then a cruiser or DD, and still carry out bombardment assignments. .

[Warship NWS]

A BB can take a kamikaze , still stay on station much easier then a cruiser or DD, and still carry out bombardment assignments. .

I will note however that no navy in the world expected BBs to take on suicide planes, much less manned or guided missiles. However, someone should have figured out that if they were designed to take punishment then a plane crashing into it, if not filled with lots of explosives or that drops ordnance before impacting, will likely not do much to an armored warship.

[old_pop2000]

Naval Shore bombardment's responsibility is to neutralize:

A. Shore installations that oppose the ships and aircraft as they approach the objective.

B. Defenses that will oppose the landings.

C. Defenses that will impede the post landing movements.

Choice of weapons is determined by the nature and the size of the propective targets. It is also determined by the proximity to friendly forces. Once the landings have occurred, 8 inch guns or higher are forced to move their fire inland, away from the advancing friendly forces. The mobility of such large guns limits their flexibility along with their more complex firing operations. The ships that carry these weapons are far less maneuverable and must stay sizeable distances from their possible targets. The bursting radii of these projectiles precludes their use in a close support operation.

Once the landings have taken place, weapons such as the 6 inch, 5 inch and 3 inch guns, with their higher rates of fire and smaller pattern of fall are far more useful for direct fire support of advancing troops. 40 mm guns are excellent area neutralization weapons due to their very high rates of fire. They are useful for shoreline and especially for enemy soldiers in caves. Accuracy depends on dual fire directors or safe distances must be maintained when near friendly forces.

So, what is the answer.

The battleship is really only effective in preliminary bombardments and experience in WWII shows that preliminary bombardments do not yield the results commensurate with the effort. After the landings, 8 inch guns and larger must move their fire away from friendly forces. However, without adequate and definite sighting through land based or aerial observers, the accuracy of any bombardment is problematic. To alleviate this situation, preliminary aerial reconnaissance and ground mapping must be conducted to ascertain the location, strength and durability of any potential targets. This type of reconnaissance must be conducted on a continuous basis, up to DDay, to ensure targeting information is accurate. The real question then is, how many projectiles are required to effectively neutralize a potential target and is the number, cost effective. Granted, a battleship can fire day or night, realistically shooting at night without adequate observation is useless. So the point that the battleship can fire at night but an aircraft cannot fly, seems weak. An aircraft usually does not need current targeting information, although it is obviously an advantage. It can fly to the last known position of the potential target and search visually for its current location. Then, if and when the target is discovered, strike that target with a variety of weapons including machine guns, cannons, bombs and rockets. In WWII, aircraft bombing was not nearly as accurate as it is currently, and frequent attacks were necessary. However, one aircraft is far more cost effective and flexible than the battleship firing almost blind from many thousands of yards from the target.

Just my musings.

[Campy]

I wonder if landing on an occupied shore without any bombardment would work? Actually that is how Wake was eventually taken by the Japanese. One of the things all those heavy warships did was distract some shore guns form the real targets, the transports and landing craft. It is my understanding that the most effective offshore fire support came from destroyers operating close in. They often paid a heavy price in hitting mines and counter fire from shore.

Frank

[Ed Rotondaro]

Naval Shore bombardment's responsibility is to neutralize:

A. Shore installations that oppose the ships and aircraft as they approach the objective.

B. Defenses that will oppose the landings.

C. Defenses that will impede the post landing movements.

Choice of weapons is determined by the nature and the size of the propective targets. It is also determined by the proximity to friendly forces. Once the landings have occurred, 8 inch guns or higher are forced to move their fire inland, away from the advancing friendly forces. The mobility of such large guns limits their flexibility along with their more complex firing operations. The ships that carry these weapons are far less maneuverable and must stay sizeable distances from their possible targets. The bursting radii of these projectiles precludes their use in a close support operation.

Once the landings have taken place, weapons such as the 6 inch, 5 inch and 3 inch guns, with their higher rates of fire and smaller pattern of fall are far more useful for direct fire support of advancing troops. 40 mm guns are excellent area neutralization weapons due to their very high rates of fire. They are useful for shoreline and especially for enemy soldiers in caves. Accuracy depends on dual fire directors or safe distances must be maintained when near friendly forces.

So, what is the answer.

The battleship is really only effective in preliminary bombardments and experience in WWII shows that preliminary bombardments do not yield the results commensurate with the effort. After the landings, 8 inch guns and larger must move their fire away from friendly forces. However, without adequate and definite sighting through land based or aerial observers, the accuracy of any bombardment is problematic. To alleviate this situation, preliminary aerial reconnaissance and ground mapping must be conducted to ascertain the location, strength and durability of any potential targets. This type of reconnaissance must be conducted on a continuous basis, up to DDay, to ensure targeting information is accurate. The real question then is, how many projectiles are required to effectively neutralize a potential target and is the number, cost effective. Granted, a battleship can fire day or night, realistically shooting at night without adequate observation is useless. So the point that the battleship can fire at night but an aircraft cannot fly, seems weak. An aircraft usually does not need current targeting information, although it is obviously an advantage. It can fly to the last known position of the potential target and search visually for its current location. Then, if and when the target is discovered, strike that target with a variety of weapons including machine guns, cannons, bombs and rockets. In WWII, aircraft bombing was not nearly as accurate as it is currently, and frequent attacks were necessary. However, one aircraft is far more cost effective and flexible than the battleship firing almost blind from many thousands of yards from the target.

Just my musings.

Dennis:

I will only dispute part of your post. I agree that preliminary shore bombardment did not yield the results intended, but that is more a factor of not knowing where the targets are than of the battleship's efforts. Compare the results when a dedicated fire control party is landed to direct the bombardment and suddenly you start getting single hit results.

The entire process of shore bombardment was an evolving science. At first in the age of sail, we have ships firing at targets in direct line of sight, usually fortifications. It has been said that the fortress has the advantage in this kind of duel unless the attacker brings up overwhelming numbers of ships.

Fast forward to the age of the dreanought and the ability to fire at greater ranges and somewhat indirectly. The British experiences in WWI show the problems with shore bombardment. The experience of the Dardenelles and Gallipoli showed that unless you directly hit the gun, mere bombardment even with large battleship guns was not enough. The Germans when attacking the frontier fortifications of Belgium had to resort to their massive siege howitzers to drop plunging fire on the forts to knock them out. Again accuracy was crucial and rate of fire was slow.

Now during the inter-war period, the US Marines began a campaign to get the navy to provide gunfire support for amphibious operations. It was due to their needs that the USN adopted a high capacity bombardment shell for their battleship guns, because prior to this they generally only used AP. The problem with shore bombardments was mirrored with carpet bombing. If you don't have a definitely identified target, you are wasting a lot of ammunition and just making holes in the ground.

Both the British and the USN used dedicated fire control parties that landed as soon as possible to direct effective fire from the ships in the same manner as a forward artillery observer does for land based guns. The US invasion of Salerno was almost pushed into the water had not been for the accurate naval gunfire (primarily from cruisers in this instance) that broke up German panzer attacks. Indeed Rommel did not want to fight to close to the beaches at Normandy with his panzers for just this reason. There are instances in the various invasions in the Pacific were accurately spotted battleship gunfire broke up troop and tank concentrations on islands like Saipan and Okinawa.

By the time of the Korean war, it was common practice to anchor the battleship to improve accuracy and to use a helicopter to spot the fall of the shells and adjust fire. Also the gunnery had gotten so accurate and effective that it was better to fire a single round at time rather than a salvo. There are recorded instances of train yards and storage facilities in North Korea being destroyed by a few well placed 16" shells.

As the battle moves inland, one would expect that the ground forces would use their own artillery to provide direct fire support be it with tanks, self propelled guns or towed artillery. The likelyhood of encountering targets requiring an 8" shell or larger to defeat drops as you penetrate further inland. Of course there is always the possibility of encountering a belt of fortifications like the Siegfried line in which case you either have to use the corps level heavy artillery, railway artillery, or in the case of the US, large amounts of tactical airpower. Indeed, airpower with its greater range and tactical flexibility largely replaced super heavy artillery on land and at sea.

Personally I don't envision any targets today that require a battleship's firepower to defeat them. Even hardened targets have been dealt with effectively by smart bombs modified for greater penetration. Plus in a war of manuever, you can always bypass such hard targets.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I wonder if landing on an occupied shore without any bombardment would work? Actually that is how Wake was eventually taken by the Japanese. One of the things all those heavy warships did was distract some shore guns form the real targets, the transports and landing craft. It is my understanding that the most effective offshore fire support came from destroyers operating close in. They often paid a heavy price in hitting mines and counter fire from shore.

Frank

Campy:

That was also true at Normandy. The most effective fire support came from the DDs and some of the British CLs that had high rates of fire and could get in close. The really big guns were firing much further inland either to interdict enemy movements or to take out enemy artillery when successfully identified.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I will only dispute part of your post. I agree that preliminary shore bombardment did not yield the results intended, but that is more a factor of not knowing where the targets are than of the battleship's efforts. Compare the results when a dedicated fire control party is landed to direct the bombardment and suddenly you start getting single hit results.

The entire process of shore bombardment was an evolving science. At first in the age of sail, we have ships firing at targets in direct line of sight, usually fortifications. It has been said that the fortress has the advantage in this kind of duel unless the attacker brings up overwhelming numbers of ships.

Fast forward to the age of the dreanought and the ability to fire at greater ranges and somewhat indirectly. The British experiences in WWI show the problems with shore bombardment. The experience of the Dardenelles and Gallipoli showed that unless you directly hit the gun, mere bombardment even with large battleship guns was not enough. The Germans when attacking the frontier fortifications of Belgium had to resort to their massive siege howitzers to drop plunging fire on the forts to knock them out. Again accuracy was crucial and rate of fire was slow.

Now during the inter-war period, the US Marines began a campaign to get the navy to provide gunfire support for amphibious operations. It was due to their needs that the USN adopted a high capacity bombardment shell for their battleship guns, because prior to this they generally only used AP. The problem with shore bombardments was mirrored with carpet bombing. If you don't have a definitely identified target, you are wasting a lot of ammunition and just making holes in the ground.

Both the British and the USN used dedicated fire control parties that landed as soon as possible to direct effective fire from the ships in the same manner as a forward artillery observer does for land based guns. The US invasion of Salerno was almost pushed into the water had not been for the accurate naval gunfire (primarily from cruisers in this instance) that broke up German panzer attacks. Indeed Rommel did not want to fight to close to the beaches at Normandy with his panzers for just this reason. There are instances in the various invasions in the Pacific were accurately spotted battleship gunfire broke up troop and tank concentrations on islands like Saipan and Okinawa.

By the time of the Korean war, it was common practice to anchor the battleship to improve accuracy and to use a helicopter to spot the fall of the shells and adjust fire. Also the gunnery had gotten so accurate and effective that it was better to fire a single round at time rather than a salvo. There are recorded instances of train yards and storage facilities in North Korea being destroyed by a few well placed 16" shells.

As the battle moves inland, one would expect that the ground forces would use their own artillery to provide direct fire support be it with tanks, self propelled guns or towed artillery. The likelyhood of encountering targets requiring an 8" shell or larger to defeat drops as you penetrate further inland. Of course there is always the possibility of encountering a belt of fortifications like the Siegfried line in which case you either have to use the corps level heavy artillery, railway artillery, or in the case of the US, large amounts of tactical airpower. Indeed, airpower with its greater range and tactical flexibility largely replaced super heavy artillery on land and at sea.

Personally I don't envision any targets today that require a battleship's firepower to defeat them. Even hardened targets have been dealt with effectively by smart bombs modified for greater penetration. Plus in a war of manuever, you can always bypass such hard targets.

Shore fire teams did improve naval fire support as the troops moved inland, this was in response to problems during early invasions. But, in response to the question asked, were there targets that only the battleship could destroy? How do we answer that question? We have to layout the kinds of targets that will be encountered and the types of weapons that can be used to neutralize them.

It seems to me, that a natural classification presents itself; Those targets that can be neutralized only with precise Naval gunfire. Those that can be neutralized with area fire. I defined that last as being targets where so many rounds per minute per square area must be used to perform a systematic neutralization of this target. Targets in this category would be airfields, supply dumps, truck parks, artillery parks, repair facilities, railroad yards, road centers, field encampments. Each of these types of targets; precision targets and area targets requires a different level of neutralization. I believe that we should be evaluating different landing conditions also. Now, once we have classified targets, we must assign different weapons to each of these. This should give us a better idea of what targets were best suited for battleships and presented themselves. Many of these area targets were far beyond the range, on large island or continental invasions. Many were hidden. This isn't as simple as it may appear.

A figure that I have seen for area neutralization was 16 x 75mm rounds, per minute, per 100 square yards was necessary to neutralize an area target. This was a pre-war determination and definitely found to be inadequate, but it does give us a starting point.

[Kyle Holgate]

Shore fire teams did improve naval fire support as the troops moved inland, this was in response to problems during early invasions. But, in response to the question asked, were there targets that only the battleship could destroy? How do we answer that question? We have to layout the kinds of targets that will be encountered and the types of weapons that can be used to neutralize them.

It seems to me, that a natural classification presents itself; Those targets that can be neutralized only with precise Naval gunfire. Those that can be neutralized with area fire. I defined that last as being targets where so many rounds per minute per square area must be used to perform a systematic neutralization of this target. Targets in this category would be airfields, supply dumps, truck parks, artillery parks, repair facilities, railroad yards, road centers, field encampments. Each of these types of targets; precision targets and area targets requires a different level of neutralization. I believe that we should be evaluating different landing conditions also. Now, once we have classified targets, we must assign different weapons to each of these. This should give us a better idea of what targets were best suited for battleships and presented themselves. Many of these area targets were far beyond the range, on large island or continental invasions. Many were hidden. This isn't as simple as it may appear.

A figure that I have seen for area neutralization was 16 x 75mm rounds, per minute, per 100 square yards was necessary to neutralize an area target. This was a pre-war determination and definitely found to be inadequate, but it does give us a starting point.

The battleship could reach inland further than the cruiser with more accuracy. Somewhere or other I have read of BB's firing and tossing Tiger tanks around like they were feathers and breaking up attacks - belive it was Italy someplace. With an 8" cruiser shell you can probably do that too, but you have to be in range, get closer and/or use more shells to do the same job.
Finally - Cruisers and destroyers are more useful in general that battleships are - particularly older ones that are slow. By all means then use the BB's for bombardment and have the more versitile ships off doing ASW, escorting carriers and convoys and what not. In the many cases where a cruiser would be good enough, may as well use the BB if you have one and have your cruiser off doing more important "cruiser" things.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Shore fire teams did improve naval fire support as the troops moved inland, this was in response to problems during early invasions. But, in response to the question asked, were there targets that only the battleship could destroy? How do we answer that question? We have to layout the kinds of targets that will be encountered and the types of weapons that can be used to neutralize them.

It seems to me, that a natural classification presents itself; Those targets that can be neutralized only with precise Naval gunfire. Those that can be neutralized with area fire. I defined that last as being targets where so many rounds per minute per square area must be used to perform a systematic neutralization of this target. Targets in this category would be airfields, supply dumps, truck parks, artillery parks, repair facilities, railroad yards, road centers, field encampments. Each of these types of targets; precision targets and area targets requires a different level of neutralization. I believe that we should be evaluating different landing conditions also. Now, once we have classified targets, we must assign different weapons to each of these. This should give us a better idea of what targets were best suited for battleships and presented themselves. Many of these area targets were far beyond the range, on large island or continental invasions. Many were hidden. This isn't as simple as it may appear.

A figure that I have seen for area neutralization was 16 x 75mm rounds, per minute, per 100 square yards was necessary to neutralize an area target. This was a pre-war determination and definitely found to be inadequate, but it does give us a starting point.

Dennis:

Based on target classification, I would say that hardened bunkers could only be reliably dealt with in two ways: close infantry assault with explosives and flamethrowers, or else naval bombardment. Air attack would not work unless a very specialized muntion like a blockbuster bomb was used. The example of Fort Drum in the Philippines shows how hard such targets can be. The Fort aka the Concrete battleship withstood air and land based artillery attack for several weeks and was never actually knocked out of action (the largest guns used against it were only 240mm howitzers). It surrendered when food ran out. The U-boat pens in France proved similarly tough against air attack.

I would say that the sort of targets that required battleships to neutralize them would be heavily fortified along the lines of coastal defenses. The US experience in the Pacific showed that even bunkers built from coconut logs were much tougher than expected as were bunkers built from coral rock. Following that, battleships would be useful for the same sort of missions that railroad artillery performed in WWI, namely a deep attack against a target that required maximum damage for the number of shots fired. This mission was obviously co-opted by airpower during WWII.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Based on target classification, I would say that hardened bunkers could only be reliably dealt with in two ways: close infantry assault with explosives and flamethrowers, or else naval bombardment. Air attack would not work unless a very specialized muntion like a blockbuster bomb was used. The example of Fort Drum in the Philippines shows how hard such targets can be. The Fort aka the Concrete battleship withstood air and land based artillery attack for several weeks and was never actually knocked out of action (the largest guns used against it were only 240mm howitzers). It surrendered when food ran out. The U-boat pens in France proved similarly tough against air attack.

I would say that the sort of targets that required battleships to neutralize them would be heavily fortified along the lines of coastal defenses. The US experience in the Pacific showed that even bunkers built from coconut logs were much tougher than expected as were bunkers built from coral rock. Following that, battleships would be useful for the same sort of missions that railroad artillery performed in WWI, namely a deep attack against a target that required maximum damage for the number of shots fired. This mission was obviously co-opted by airpower during WWII.

If hardened targets require naval gunfire, can they, realistically be neutralized? What does experience tell us. We know from Normandy that only direct fire from destroyers neutralized many hardened targets, the others had to be silenced by engineers with satchel charges and flame throwers. Even in the island campaigns, many hardened targets were immune from naval gun fire, no matter how long or how intense. It appears that those targets require a precision that even a battleship cannot provide during that time period. But maybe we are missing something. Do we have to completely destroy a target or can we mask a target, to allow the landings then let the ground engineers finish neutralization?

[old_pop2000]

The battleship could reach inland further than the cruiser with more accuracy. Somewhere or other I have read of BB's firing and tossing Tiger tanks around like they were feathers and breaking up attacks - belive it was Italy someplace. With an 8" cruiser shell you can probably do that too, but you have to be in range, get closer and/or use more shells to do the same job.
Finally - Cruisers and destroyers are more useful in general that battleships are - particularly older ones that are slow. By all means then use the BB's for bombardment and have the more versitile ships off doing ASW, escorting carriers and convoys and what not. In the many cases where a cruiser would be good enough, may as well use the BB if you have one and have your cruiser off doing more important "cruiser" things.
Tiger's may be been blown over on their side in Caen, but don't you think that was probably a lucky shot. I am aware that a battleship can and did stop armor attacks at Normandy, but could that have been accomplished by a cruiser or by aircraft. Just because the battleship was used, does not necessarily mean it was the most cost effective weapon to use. Was the battleship more of a psychological weapon, than a cost effective weapon?

[Kyle Holgate]

Tiger's may be been blown over on their side in Caen, but don't you think that was probably a lucky shot. I am aware that a battleship can and did stop armor attacks at Normandy, but could that have been accomplished by a cruiser or by aircraft. Just because the battleship was used, does not necessarily mean it was the most cost effective weapon to use. Was the battleship more of a psychological weapon, than a cost effective weapon?

I think battleships are probably not cost effective, but if you have them then NGS is a good place to use them. Compared to aircraft a BB can provide support at night and potentially have a much faster response time. Compared to a cruiser the BB can shoot further and packs a bigger punch and as I suggested earlier, frees up a cruiser for other duties that a BB cannot perform. To be clear, I'm talking about WW2 time frame, not suggesting that BB's today would be a good idea.
Was the BB the most effective NGS weapon? In some cases perhaps. They could remain on station night and day and provide fairly quick response to the requirements of land units. One other thing to remember is that they are not always using their big guns. Battleship secondaries (5-6" guns) concentrate a lot of firepower on one platform and can do the job of several destroyers in those places that don't need the bigger "KABOOM" of the main guns.
I also would add that there are probably times when aircraft are better used further inland such as for tank busting behind the lines and what not. A BB may free up aircraft to do other things just as it does a cruiser. Aircraft are more versatile.

[djcyclone]

If hardened targets require naval gunfire, can they, realistically be neutralized? What does experience tell us. We know from Normandy that only direct fire from destroyers neutralized many hardened targets, the others had to be silenced by engineers with satchel charges and flame throwers. Even in the island campaigns, many hardened targets were immune from naval gun fire, no matter how long or how intense. It appears that those targets require a precision that even a battleship cannot provide during that time period. But maybe we are missing something. Do we have to completely destroy a target or can we mask a target, to allow the landings then let the ground engineers finish neutralization?



I read a piece of information in the history section of the game Destroyer Command. I believe that the game was accurate when it was refering to the history section, but I read that a Destroyer approached the shore during Normandy, and fired its guns at point blank range killing a number of pill boxes. The thing that strikes me as odd, is that it is reffered to as the phantom destroyer, because no one ever identified it. It was so close to the shore that it had to be only feet away from running aground. No navy ever claimed responsability for the ship, but soilders who where their sware that they all saw it.

Have any of you ever heard of this, and if so was the ship ever identified.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Tiger's may be been blown over on their side in Caen, but don't you think that was probably a lucky shot. I am aware that a battleship can and did stop armor attacks at Normandy, but could that have been accomplished by a cruiser or by aircraft. Just because the battleship was used, does not necessarily mean it was the most cost effective weapon to use. Was the battleship more of a psychological weapon, than a cost effective weapon?

Dennis:

The combination of psychological impact of a large shell along with it's potential damage certainly kept BBs on the bombardment line. If you have all these old slow ships that aren't doing anything useful, then why not let them keep the defenders heads down while the landing ships make their final runs to the beach?

The problem with cost effectiveness is that it invites you to open the discussion up to many more variables. If the ship has accomplished its mission does that qualify as cost effective? If it takes two or three smaller ships to do what one larger ship can do, is that cost effective? If the BBs bombardment lets the troops land safely, is this cost effective? What's the value of lives saved by a battleship's fire support? Are nuclear weapons cost effective? We don't use them, but they have by and large prevented any major wars between nuclear armed nations.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Dennis:

Based on target classification, I would say that hardened bunkers could only be reliably dealt with in two ways: close infantry assault with explosives and flamethrowers, or else naval bombardment. Air attack would not work unless a very specialized muntion like a blockbuster bomb was used. The example of Fort Drum in the Philippines shows how hard such targets can be. The Fort aka the Concrete battleship withstood air and land based artillery attack for several weeks and was never actually knocked out of action (the largest guns used against it were only 240mm howitzers). It surrendered when food ran out. The U-boat pens in France proved similarly tough against air attack.

I would say that the sort of targets that required battleships to neutralize them would be heavily fortified along the lines of coastal defenses. The US experience in the Pacific showed that even bunkers built from coconut logs were much tougher than expected as were bunkers built from coral rock. Following that, battleships would be useful for the same sort of missions that railroad artillery performed in WWI, namely a deep attack against a target that required maximum damage for the number of shots fired. This mission was obviously co-opted by airpower during WWII.

Hi Guys,

Another useful tactic in the ETO was to use tank destroyers and SP howitzers against German bunkers especially in breaching the Seigfreid line in the fall of 1944. The British had a limited number of modified tanks with howitzers that fired a demolition bomb of considerable weght that was also effective bunkers.

Options for Marine and Army troops were fewer and infantry assaults on bunkers and caves were extremely costly in terms of casualties.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Guys,

Another useful tactic in the ETO was to use tank destroyers and SP howitzers against German bunkers especially in breaching the Seigfreid line in the fall of 1944. The British had a limited number of modified tanks with howitzers that fired a demolition bomb of considerable weght that was also effective bunkers.

Options for Marine and Army troops were fewer and infantry assaults on bunkers and caves were extremely costly in terms of casualties.

Mike:

Yes, the older 155mm guns were used at what would be point blank range against the Siegfried line in certain occasions. I would imagine if I was a German feldwebel manning an MG 42 and I saw a SPG trundle it, it would be a good idea to bug out of the bunker.

[Kyle Holgate]

Hi Guys,

Another useful tactic in the ETO was to use tank destroyers and SP howitzers against German bunkers especially in breaching the Seigfreid line in the fall of 1944. The British had a limited number of modified tanks with howitzers that fired a demolition bomb of considerable weght that was also effective bunkers.

Options for Marine and Army troops were fewer and infantry assaults on bunkers and caves were extremely costly in terms of casualties.

There was a modifcation of the Churchill tank called the Avre that had a 290mm spigot mortar on it. That would probably blow the crap out of most bunkers, though the thing was very short ranged so the tank would have to get close. It was very well armored though, barring a panther or tiger guarding the bunker not much else is going to penetrate the armor.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

The combination of psychological impact of a large shell along with it's potential damage certainly kept BBs on the bombardment line. If you have all these old slow ships that aren't doing anything useful, then why not let them keep the defenders heads down while the landing ships make their final runs to the beach?

The problem with cost effectiveness is that it invites you to open the discussion up to many more variables. If the ship has accomplished its mission does that qualify as cost effective? If it takes two or three smaller ships to do what one larger ship can do, is that cost effective? If the BBs bombardment lets the troops land safely, is this cost effective? What's the value of lives saved by a battleship's fire support? Are nuclear weapons cost effective? We don't use them, but they have by and large prevented any major wars between nuclear armed nations.
One can quibble over the term " cost effective" in order to prove the value of the battleship. However, you all know what the term means. In this instance, it simply means that I want to use the least amount of firepower to neutralize the target. If a cruiser can perform 90% of the missions in place of a battleship and aircraft can perform the other 10%, then the cruiser is the most cost effective weapons platform to use, not the battleship. In WWII, they were available, so they were used. But by the end of the war, it was realized that the aircraft and the 5 and 6 inch guns along with the 40 mm were capable of neutralizing almost any target.

Whether a weapons system accomplished its mission is not germaine to the discussion. It simply boils down to the actual cost per shell per target. What is the cheapest per shell cost per target, I can use? It is just that simple.

[Kyle Holgate]

One can quibble over the term " cost effective" in order to prove the value of the battleship. However, you all know what the term means. In this instance, it simply means that I want to use the least amount of firepower to neutralize the target. If a cruiser can perform 90% of the missions in place of a battleship and aircraft can perform the other 10%, then the cruiser is the most cost effective weapons platform to use, not the battleship. In WWII, they were available, so they were used. But by the end of the war, it was realized that the aircraft and the 5 and 6 inch guns along with the 40 mm were capable of neutralizing almost any target.

Whether a weapons system accomplished its mission is not germaine to the discussion. It simply boils down to the actual cost per shell per target. What is the cheapest per shell cost per target, I can use? It is just that simple.

The problem as I see it is - unless you can find actual figures on the costs - we really don't know the answer to many of the questions brought up. Was an 8" gun cruiser as effective as a battleship? Were there things BB's could do as far as bombardment that other ships simply couldn't do? One has to wonder. The Marines certainly liked having the Iowa's around, and there was talk at one point of modifying one or more of the 4 to be bombardment platforms. I still think that the older BB's in WW2 did bombardment more to free up cruisers than because a BB was needed. In addition it just makes sense as an admiral - if a CA can do the job a BB can really do it. If your job is to pulverise an island you are about to invade 14 and 16 inch rounds will probably do it faster than 8".

[old_pop2000]

The problem as I see it is - unless you can find actual figures on the costs - we really don't know the answer to many of the questions brought up. Was an 8" gun cruiser as effective as a battleship? Were there things BB's could do as far as bombardment that other ships simply couldn't do? One has to wonder. The Marines certainly liked having the Iowa's around, and there was talk at one point of modifying one or more of the 4 to be bombardment platforms. I still think that the older BB's in WW2 did bombardment more to free up cruisers than because a BB was needed. In addition it just makes sense as an admiral - if a CA can do the job a BB can really do it. If your job is to pulverise an island you are about to invade 14 and 16 inch rounds will probably do it faster than 8".
Pulverising the island, is not the point. Neutralizing important targets that can interfere with your invasion is the point. Neutralizing those targets as cost effectively as you can, is the key.

As for the cost, I've seen cost per 16 inch shell at around $500.00. I cannot believe that, but there it is. I believe the GAO report stated that it would cost $70 million per year, in todays dollars, to keep the ships running. I don't know what the cost was in 1944.

[Ed Rotondaro]

One can quibble over the term " cost effective" in order to prove the value of the battleship. However, you all know what the term means. In this instance, it simply means that I want to use the least amount of firepower to neutralize the target. If a cruiser can perform 90% of the missions in place of a battleship and aircraft can perform the other 10%, then the cruiser is the most cost effective weapons platform to use, not the battleship. In WWII, they were available, so they were used. But by the end of the war, it was realized that the aircraft and the 5 and 6 inch guns along with the 40 mm were capable of neutralizing almost any target.

Whether a weapons system accomplished its mission is not germaine to the discussion. It simply boils down to the actual cost per shell per target. What is the cheapest per shell cost per target, I can use? It is just that simple.

Dennis:

Aircraft maybe, but I defy you to take out a fortress with a 6" shell let alone a 40mm shell. You would be hard pressed to take out a tank with one. Too much generalization here. Read about the seige of Sevastopol sometime. The Germans assembly some of history's most formidable seige artillery (Gustav 80CM, Karl Morser 60CM and 54CM self propelled mortars) to reduce the fortress and still needed close infantry assault to finish the deal.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Pulverising the island, is not the point. Neutralizing important targets that can interfere with your invasion is the point. Neutralizing those targets as cost effectively as you can, is the key.

As for the cost, I've seen cost per 16 inch shell at around $500.00. I cannot believe that, but there it is. I believe the GAO report stated that it would cost $70 million per year, in todays dollars, to keep the ships running. I don't know what the cost was in 1944.

Dennis:

I don't believe that they were worried about costs in 1944 as much as they are today. If you look at how much the USN's budget diminished after WWII (along with all military budgets), then sure cost effectiveness becomes paramount. But in the middle of the war, all nations spent like crazy to gain the edge. Do you really think you can equate the number of bombs and torpedoes dropped with the number of ships sunk or land based targets neutralized? If so, strategic bombing was the biggest waste of resources in the entire war. Look at the number of small arms rounds fired versus casualties inflicted (something along the order of 50,000 to 1). You can't break it down this way. Engineers and statisticians can provide useful data, but don't get lost in their analytic means (Remember how McNamarra wanted to fight Viet Nam? His whole cost benefit economic analysis was bogus). I'm not saying that economics don't play a part in war, I merely caution you against a project analysis viewpoint which is what you are (at least to my eyes) advocating here.

[Warship NWS]

Dennis:

Aircraft maybe, but I defy you to take out a fortress with a 6" shell let alone a 40mm shell. You would be hard pressed to take out a tank with one. Too much generalization here. Read about the seige of Sevastopol sometime. The Germans assembly some of history's most formidable seige artillery (Gustav 80CM, Karl Morser 60CM and 54CM self propelled mortars) to reduce the fortress and still needed close infantry assault to finish the deal.

Depends on the tank.. 155mm is about the same as a 6" shell and if they hit close enough, or directly, on a medium tank it would likely not survive the hit. Hit the top of a Tiger and it may well disable it or cause sever concussion effects to the crew.

Mortars do not have the hitting velocity of a 6-16" shell and when your trying to penetrate concrete and this can make a difference depending on the target your trying to destroy. Mortars are intended for getting over a wall to hit inside a walled structure not to go through the wall or to destroy concrete fortifications. They are based on explosive effect and work great vs non-fortified buildings and earthen defenses but not reinforced concrete.

I did not bring this up previously as I wanted to see some answers on this topic before I mentioned it but I did talk to William Miller, Asst. Director of NWS (for those of you who may not know who he is), and he did mention a few interesting points. According to sources he has read based on various bombardment AARs one 16" shell hit was more effective vs some hardened structures then multiple 6-8" hits and the accuracy, with good spotting and pre-mapping of targets due to special operations teams or sub periscope recon, was better then air attacks depending on the accuracy of the spotter vs target. Now does this qualify the requirement for battleships? That is the debatable part of the equation. Where there certain targets that battleships could destroy better then other ships? Very possibly.

My personal thoughts, in modern times we have penetrator bombs capable of going through many feet of earth or concret materials and then destroying the internal sections of a major bunker structure or building. Delayed fuzing, high altitude, rocket assisted, multiple-warhead, etc.. capabilities have made operating a $10k an hour battleship somewhat redundant at best, inefficient at worst as a full BB contributes extremely little to any naval task force and carries weapons that far cheaper, stealthier, and better protected platforms can carry as many of, if not more.

During WW1, there was no larger mobile "artillery" available that could travel like a battleship so in that regards they had some effective use - which is another reason why there is no clear cut answers to their "cost effectiveness" during WW1 - even though they were seldom used for much of any naval or bombardment combat. During WW2 we had other weapons but the accuracy and penetration capability of the aerial weapons was still less then perfect or impractical for naval operations. The battleships big guns were the most, according to some sources, vs some hardened targets and could fire farther inland then smaller gunned warships. Was this enough to keep them in service? That is questionable depending on how you look at "cost effectiveness". Could a landing go on without battleships? Most certainly.. how many lives would be save if they were not around is another good question.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

I know all about the Seige of Sevastopol. A Krupp 800 mm mortar that took a regiment to man, used 60 railway wagons, and a week to setup. It weighed 1350 tons. It could fire a 7 ton shell about 45 kilometers and Krupp stated that it was worthless, but useful for research. It proves nothing, other than the German's certainly wasted a lot of resources, including time on outlandish weapons.

What about Fort Eben Emael? Taken out by glider troops landing on the roof. What about Normandy? Allied troops were moving inland within one day. All that concrete, steel and heavy guns, either silenced or bypassed.

What about Iwo Jima? Starting on 8 December and continuing for 74 days, Naval air forces pounded that island including using PBJ's from VMB-612. Three weeks prior to the invasion, B-24's flew 30 sorties per day, bombing that island and the others in the Bonin's. The pre-landing bombardment consisted of the Battleships NC, Washington, Texas, Arkansas, Idaho, New York and Nevada; 42 LCI ships with varying combinations of 4.5, 5 inch rockets, 40 mm bofors guns, and 4.2 inch mortors. Mount Suribachi received over 10,000 rockets and mortars. 5 inch gunners were required to maintain a 400 yard distance from the advancing Marines.

After all this, it still took the Marines approximately 4 days to put the flag on top of Suribachi. It had to be taken foot by foot, by Marines climbing the hills. The Marine engineers, after all this bombardment, still had to destroy 165 concrete pillboxes and blockhouses, some which had walls 10 feet thick.

FYI:


Thus, the average daily expenditure of artillery ammunition right up to the final phase of the campaign, exceeded 23,000 rounds daily. Enough ammunition of various types was unloaded across the beaches to fill 480 freight cars, plus enough food to feed the entire city of Columbus, Ohio, for an entire month.33 Expressed in definite numbers, for the naval bombardment alone the total of ammunition actually expended came to a staggering 14,650 tons. This amount was divided into 2,400 rounds of 16-inch, weighing 2,280 tons; 5,700 rounds of 14-inch, 3,640 tons; 1,440 rounds of 12-inch, 520 tons; 11,700 rounds of 8-inch high capacity, 2,020 tons; 8,400 rounds of 6-inch high capacity, 440 tons; 152,000 rounds of 5-inch high capacity, 4,160 tons; 17,700 rounds of 5-inch star, 300 tons; 12,000 rounds of 5-inch, 270 tons; 10,000 rounds of 4-inch, 145 tons; and 70,000 rounds of 4.2 mortar, 875 tons.34


The question is this. Is this a typical fortified position or is it just an anomaly. I believe that this island, Sevastapol and possibly Normandy were all abnormal situations that probably are unique. Do we equip for the one or two abnormal invasions situations or the norm? I am certain the preliminary bombardments helped to make it easier, although in Iwo Jima's case, there was almost no beach defenses, everything was on the mountains or inland. Is this an example of why the battleships were important?

[old_pop2000]

Just some information from the AAR from the West Virginia which arrived from Ulithi on the 19th of February. She was ordered to take a position 5000 yards east of Suribachi, 3000 yards off of the beaches.

Her first targets were a gun position firing on the landing craft. She engaged with secondary batteries.

She reports that she is drifting toward the beaches and must move out. She is also concerned about dangers from small shore guns and that at this distance, the trajectory is too flat.

After opening the range, she opened up, with spotters, with her main guns and observed salvo's striking the target area.

She drifted toward the beach again and this time, destroyers got into her line of fire.

It appears that some of the issues were the aircraft bombing the island interfering with WV gunnery and same goes for small boats and destroyers.

She states that she expended: 46 AP, 46 Service Charges, 463 HC charges, 463 Reduced Charges. All these expenditures from the 16 inch 45 caliber guns.

In her statistical report of hits, she reports 22 hits by 16 inch 45 caliber weapons out of 1018 shell expended. This at ranges from 2620 yards out to 11,200 yards. This is over a seven day period from 19 February to 26 Feb. Her best shooting occurred at approximately 10,300 yards and 7280 yards. In both cases, she had 3 hits.

That's a percentage of 2.1% for the 16 inch

She reports 50 hits by her 5 inch 38 guns out of 415 common shells fired

Thats 12.1% for the 5 inch 38's.

So, out of 1433 rounds fired- 16 inch 45 and 5 inch 38- WV achieved 72 hits on targets. That's a hit percentage of 5% (If my math holds out). True, she was an older ship, however, she was completely rebuilt after Pearl Harbor and we must assume she was upgraded.

Just thought that we should attempt to put some numbers in our discussion.

Source: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/BB/bb48-IwoJima.html

[keschofield]

Tiger's may be been blown over on their side in Caen, but don't you think that was probably a lucky shot. I am aware that a battleship can and did stop armor attacks at Normandy, but could that have been accomplished by a cruiser or by aircraft. Just because the battleship was used, does not necessarily mean it was the most cost effective weapon to use. Was the battleship more of a psychological weapon, than a cost effective weapon?


Not sure about Normandy ship versus tank shots, but at Anzio, German armored units attempting to overrun the landing zone were stopped short. IIRC, DD's sortied in close to the beach and a short duel between 5" naval batteries and tank mounted 88mm and 75 mm guns ensued. Some of the reports of the damage to PzKpfW MIV's from direct hits by 5" shell fire were dramatic. End result, the USN stopped the armored attack cold.

This is all from memory so open to correction of course from those with access to their books.

[john964]

Not sure about Normandy ship versus tank shots, but at Anzio, German armored units attempting to overrun the landing zone were stopped short. IIRC, DD's sortied in close to the beach and a short duel between 5" naval batteries and tank mounted 88mm and 75 mm guns ensued. Some of the reports of the damage to PzKpfW MIV's from direct hits by 5" shell fire were dramatic. End result, the USN stopped the armored attack cold.

This is all from memory so open to correction of course from those with access to their books.
IIRC this also happend during Op Husky when the Herman Goring Pz Div attack on the 1ID was broken up when either USS Augusta or USS Nashville fired on them.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I don't believe that they were worried about costs in 1944 as much as they are today. If you look at how much the USN's budget diminished after WWII (along with all military budgets), then sure cost effectiveness becomes paramount. But in the middle of the war, all nations spent like crazy to gain the edge. Do you really think you can equate the number of bombs and torpedoes dropped with the number of ships sunk or land based targets neutralized? If so, strategic bombing was the biggest waste of resources in the entire war. Look at the number of small arms rounds fired versus casualties inflicted (something along the order of 50,000 to 1). You can't break it down this way. Engineers and statisticians can provide useful data, but don't get lost in their analytic means (Remember how McNamarra wanted to fight Viet Nam? His whole cost benefit economic analysis was bogus). I'm not saying that economics don't play a part in war, I merely caution you against a project analysis viewpoint which is what you are (at least to my eyes) advocating here.
I would disagree with that statement about whether they were worried about cost in 1944. It was the development of operations research that opened the door to an analytical approach to defining the requirements, and building the weapons to accomplish a mission. This was pioneered by the British and the US began its development of ORS teams following the armies after Normandy. I suggest that the reason the Montana's were cancelled, was because of the cost per performance issue.

As for McNamara, he was Curt LeMay's Operations research leader in the Pacific and it was his research that led to the lower of the bombing altitude and use of incendiaries against Japanese cities. Unfortunately, he and his team failed to understand the nature of guerrilla and insurgent warfare. Lessons we seemed to have forgotten. All weapons are built, based on project management which defines the requirements, the budget and makes the decision about the characteristics of each system. PM started at the early part of the century with the work of Frederick Taylor. His friend and colleague, Henry Gantt developed the PM chart now bearing his name: The Gantt Chart. By WWII, PM using the Gantt chart was almost a requirement in the massive building projects including the Manhattan Project.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Just some information from the AAR from the West Virginia which arrived from Ulithi on the 19th of February. She was ordered to take a position 5000 yards east of Suribachi, 3000 yards off of the beaches.

Her first targets were a gun position firing on the landing craft. She engaged with secondary batteries.

She reports that she is drifting toward the beaches and must move out. She is also concerned about dangers from small shore guns and that at this distance, the trajectory is too flat.

After opening the range, she opened up, with spotters, with her main guns and observed salvo's striking the target area.

She drifted toward the beach again and this time, destroyers got into her line of fire.

It appears that some of the issues were the aircraft bombing the island interfering with WV gunnery and same goes for small boats and destroyers.

She states that she expended: 46 AP, 46 Service Charges, 463 HC charges, 463 Reduced Charges. All these expenditures from the 16 inch 45 caliber guns.

In her statistical report of hits, she reports 22 hits by 16 inch 45 caliber weapons out of 1018 shell expended. This at ranges from 2620 yards out to 11,200 yards. This is over a seven day period from 19 February to 26 Feb. Her best shooting occurred at approximately 10,300 yards and 7280 yards. In both cases, she had 3 hits.

That's a percentage of 2.1% for the 16 inch

She reports 50 hits by her 5 inch 38 guns out of 415 common shells fired

Thats 12.1% for the 5 inch 38's.

So, out of 1433 rounds fired- 16 inch 45 and 5 inch 38- WV achieved 72 hits on targets. That's a hit percentage of 5% (If my math holds out). True, she was an older ship, however, she was completely rebuilt after Pearl Harbor and we must assume she was upgraded.

Just thought that we should attempt to put some numbers in our discussion.

Source: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/BB/bb48-IwoJima.html

Dennis:

I won't argue your numbers here, you've obviously done the research, but basically you're stated naval gunnery is ineffective and inaccurate. Even really good naval shooting with big guns rarely exceeds 50% at close range if that. But the question becomes how do you engage a hard target that can hurt you as well when launching an amphibious landing. Please don't say airpower, because before the advent of missiles and precision guided bombs, they have nothing to brag about. Hard targets require heavy firepower. In WWI and WWII this was still considered the big gun. Aircraft basically won away this role, but not overnight and not until they had achieved local air superiority. Without that, you still need guns of every caliber to win.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would disagree with that statement about whether they were worried about cost in 1944. It was the development of operations research that opened the door to an analytical approach to defining the requirements, and building the weapons to accomplish a mission. This was pioneered by the British and the US began its development of ORS teams following the armies after Normandy. I suggest that the reason the Montana's were cancelled, was because of the cost per performance issue.

As for McNamara, he was Curt LeMay's Operations research leader in the Pacific and it was his research that led to the lower of the bombing altitude and use of incendiaries against Japanese cities. Unfortunately, he and his team failed to understand the nature of guerrilla and insurgent warfare. Lessons we seemed to have forgotten. All weapons are built, based on project management which defines the requirements, the budget and makes the decision about the characteristics of each system. PM started at the early part of the century with the work of Frederick Taylor. His friend and colleague, Henry Gantt developed the PM chart now bearing his name: The Gantt Chart. By WWII, PM using the Gantt chart was almost a requirement in the massive building projects including the Manhattan Project.

Dennis:

The Montana class was cancelled because the USN knew that BBs were not the top card any more. They still chose to go ahead with two more Iowa class BBs though. You're projecting a little too much of the era you served in here. If WWII had lasted into 1946, we would have seen a lot of one dimensional weapons aimed at defeating Japan. Say 240mm self propelled howitzers? Or god forbid the 940mm Little David Mortar?

[Warship NWS]

My final personal thoughts,

The naval bombardment use of a battleship depended greatly on the target being shot at. IMHO, there was maybe around ~10% of land targets that big naval guns could kill more *efficiently* then using other weapons -- until the advent of aerial guided munitions. There is something to be said for the velocity, range, and hitting power of a large shell over a smaller shell but were there other weapons that could achieve reasonable results? Possibly, depending on target location, accessibility, and available alternate weapons. Overall, the cruiser guns, which matched the largest caliber SPGs at the time of 155mm-203mm (6"-8"), often proved more then effective enough vs the vast majority of non-reinforced concrete targets. Another question would be if a bigger bomb on a bomber could be used? Again possibly and if the aircraft that could carry it could be used and you did not have to worry about covering up a big crater afterwards.

In the end run, I think BBs - for lack of other available missions - were used as AAA and bombardment ships so they would not be port-side display pieces as happened during WW1. A weapon is only as useful as how much it is used. As to cost effective.. that requires multiple variables of consideration including not ONLY cost to build but also time to build and operational costs - how much use do you get out of a ship per the time it serves? A navy could build a handful of cruisers and even more destroyers for the time it took to build a typical battleship and multiple ships that allow for greater naval flexibility and that contribute more to an overall operational naval force are definitely more cost effective. Surface combatants are only as effective as the naval area they can cover and multiple warships have a measure of safety in numbers - thus the reason why 5 DDs or 3 CRs could prove dangerous to a battleship in certain situations if not properly escorted plus they are far more expendable and why CRs and DDs were used for more for escorting, patrolling, naval intercepts, etc.. then battleships.

When combined with what we have discussed regarding the BB strategic value and their use for alternate roles in the end run they started to lose their naval dominance when cheaper weapons could be built in greater numbers and operated at lower expense and then when they lost their primary role - out range enemy targets - to the airplane around the 1920s-1930s their strategic place in the naval spectrum was virtually eliminated, or at the least, rendered effectively redundant, or at worst completely obsolete. In overall flexibility smaller classes of warships proved more flexible in the end and thus after the early 1940s no battleships were ever developed again.

Thanks for the discussion.

[old_pop2000]

My final personal thoughts,

The naval bombardment use of a battleship depended greatly on the target being shot at. IMHO, there was maybe around ~10% of land targets that big naval guns could kill more *efficiently* then using other weapons -- until the advent of aerial guided munitions. There is something to be said for the velocity, range, and hitting power of a large shell over a smaller shell but were there other weapons that could achieve reasonable results? Possibly, depending on target location, accessibility, and available alternate weapons. Overall, the cruiser guns, which matched the largest caliber SPGs at the time of 155mm-203mm (6"-8"), often proved more then effective enough vs the vast majority of non-reinforced concrete targets. Another question would be if a bigger bomb on a bomber could be used? Again possibly and if the aircraft that could carry it could be used and you did not have to worry about covering up a big crater afterwards.

In the end run, I think BBs - for lack of other available missions - were used as AAA and bombardment ships so they would not be port-side display pieces as happened during WW1. A weapon is only as useful as how much it is used. As to cost effective.. that requires multiple variables of consideration including not ONLY cost to build but also time to build and operational costs - how much use do you get out of a ship per the time it serves? A navy could build a handful of cruisers and even more destroyers for the time it took to build a typical battleship and multiple ships that allow for greater naval flexibility and that contribute more to an overall operational naval force are definitely more cost effective. Surface combatants are only as effective as the naval area they can cover and multiple warships have a measure of safety in numbers - thus the reason why 5 DDs or 3 CRs could prove dangerous to a battleship in certain situations if not properly escorted plus they are far more expendable and why CRs and DDs were used for more for escorting, patrolling, naval intercepts, etc.. then battleships.

When combined with what we have discussed regarding the BB strategic value and their use for alternate roles in the end run they started to lose their naval dominance when cheaper weapons could be built in greater numbers and operated at lower expense and then when they lost their primary role - out range enemy targets - to the airplane around the 1920s-1930s their strategic place in the naval spectrum was virtually eliminated, or at the least, rendered effectively redundant, or at worst completely obsolete. In overall flexibility smaller classes of warships proved more flexible in the end and thus after the early 1940s no battleships were ever developed again.

Thanks for the discussion.

I believe that I can agree, in part, with what you say. I have been reading a piece by Marine Corp Major Don Weller titled "Naval Gunfire Support of Amphibious Operations: Past, Present, Future" which indicates that the 5 inch 38 and 54 could only penetrate 2 inches of concrete which, in many cases was inadequate. He states the most important quality was the range; over 30,000 yards. This was one of the key qualities. The other two were projectile lethality and system accuracy. According to his paper, a typical blockhouse on Iwo Jima, one of operations he uses for illustration, shows that for a size of 30 ft. wide by 12 feet high, hit probability was 12% or one hit in nine. At 10000 yards, the hit probability decreased to one hit in 64.

His conclusions are that for ranges over 30000 yards, an 8 inch gun with improved projectiles would have been sufficient.

For hard targets such as coastal defense guns, blockhouses, pillboxes, covered artillery emplacements, and individual tanks, the 5 inch 54 was not adequate to destroy the target.

He makes the statement that, in the past, dispersion caused inaccuracy and that newer projectiles and systems can remedy this problem.

He does state that had the 8 inch medium caliber light weight weapon been available during WWII, Korea and Vietnam that it could have been sufficient to deal with most hardened targets in regards to range and lethality.

He does not address the battleship as such. However, in examining the armor penetration, in a rudimentary way, using the Navweaps data, an 8 inch 55 cal gun Mark12/15 from a Tuscaloosa cruiser had an armor penetration of 10 inches at 10,800 yards, 4 inches at 28,000 yards. I don't know what the equivalency of armor and concrete is, but I am sure there is one. So then the question is, could an 8 inch 55 gun at 10,800 yards which is close to the ranges as depicted by WV at Iwo Jima, have penetrated the 10 feet thick concrete bunkers. I know that figures for the M115 203 mm or 8 inch howitzer at 10,000 yards is 34 inches. I do not know how this corresponds to the 8 inch 55 mark 15 on the Tuscaloosa. The Mark 55 had a barrel about twice as long, IIRC. So, that's the best, I can do with my limited information.

[William Miller]

I'll jump in here with some limited comments.

I present some observations made in the book Operational Experience of Fast Battleships: World War II, Korea, Vietnam (published by the Naval Historical Center, 1989) -- these are from the Korean War era fire support missions by the Iowa class BBs:

a) Spotter-controlled 16" gunfire was the only naval weapon capable of inflicting significant damage against major bridges, even then though they were a difficult target to hit. Smaller naval rounds (5",6",8") did no significant permament damage to these structures. Aircraft of the period also could not normally effectively target these structures & inflict permament damage.

b) Attacks on tunnels: 16" AP rounds apparently were effective in knocking out deep tunnels (no other weapon actually used in Korea could effectively do so); however 16" HC rounds were far less effective due to relatively shallow penetration.

c) 8" rounds were sufficient to destroy 75-85% of targets attacked unless firing at long (30K+ yards) range -- at this long range the 16" guns did relatively better, possibily due to combination of superior ballistic accuracy at long range, superior terminal penetration, plus superior FC systems on the BBs.

For Dennis: Fire at medium/long range by the heavy (335 lb) 8" AP rounds (for example in the Des Moines class) could penetrate no more than 6-7 feet of reinforced concrete. The 2700 lb 16" AP rounds could penetrate 28+ feet of reinforced concrete at most ranges. The 8" M1 Howitzer firing a 203mm HE shell with the longest delay fuze available could only effectively penetrate ~ 3 feet of reinforced concrete (there was no AP round for this gun in service).

[Ed Rotondaro]

I'll jump in here with some limited comments.

I present some observations made in the book Operational Experience of Fast Battleships: World War II, Korea, Vietnam (published by the Naval Historical Center, 1989) -- these are from the Korean War era fire support missions by the Iowa class BBs:

a) Spotter-controlled 16" gunfire was the only naval weapon capable of inflicting significant damage against major bridges, even then though they were a difficult target to hit. Smaller naval rounds (5",6",8") did no significant permament damage to these structures. Aircraft of the period also could not normally effectively target these structures & inflict permament damage.

b) Attacks on tunnels: 16" AP rounds apparently were effective in knocking out deep tunnels (no other weapon actually used in Korea could effectively do so); however 16" HC rounds were far less effective due to relatively shallow penetration.

c) 8" rounds were sufficient to destroy 75-85% of targets attacked unless firing at long (30K+ yards) range -- at this long range the 16" guns did relatively better, possibily due to combination of superior ballistic accuracy at long range, superior terminal penetration, plus superior FC systems on the BBs.

For Dennis: Fire at medium/long range by the heavy (335 lb) 8" AP rounds (for example in the Des Moines class) could penetrate no more than 6-7 feet of reinforced concrete. The 2700 lb 16" AP rounds could penetrate 28+ feet of reinforced concrete at most ranges. The 8" M1 Howitzer firing a 203mm HE shell with the longest delay fuze available could only effectively penetrate ~ 3 feet of reinforced concrete (there was no AP round for this gun in service).


William:


Thanks, I have been trying to get my hands on that book for awhile. One must balance needs versus desires.;)

[old_pop2000]

I'll jump in here with some limited comments.

I present some observations made in the book Operational Experience of Fast Battleships: World War II, Korea, Vietnam (published by the Naval Historical Center, 1989) -- these are from the Korean War era fire support missions by the Iowa class BBs:

a) Spotter-controlled 16" gunfire was the only naval weapon capable of inflicting significant damage against major bridges, even then though they were a difficult target to hit. Smaller naval rounds (5",6",8") did no significant permament damage to these structures. Aircraft of the period also could not normally effectively target these structures & inflict permament damage.

b) Attacks on tunnels: 16" AP rounds apparently were effective in knocking out deep tunnels (no other weapon actually used in Korea could effectively do so); however 16" HC rounds were far less effective due to relatively shallow penetration.

c) 8" rounds were sufficient to destroy 75-85% of targets attacked unless firing at long (30K+ yards) range -- at this long range the 16" guns did relatively better, possibily due to combination of superior ballistic accuracy at long range, superior terminal penetration, plus superior FC systems on the BBs.

For Dennis: Fire at medium/long range by the heavy (335 lb) 8" AP rounds (for example in the Des Moines class) could penetrate no more than 6-7 feet of reinforced concrete. The 2700 lb 16" AP rounds could penetrate 28+ feet of reinforced concrete at most ranges. The 8" M1 Howitzer firing a 203mm HE shell with the longest delay fuze available could only effectively penetrate ~ 3 feet of reinforced concrete (there was no AP round for this gun in service).

Thanks, William. I just don't have the books yet, to be able to put together that kind of information.

[old_pop2000]

Interesting question comes mind. Was there a bomb available, that could have done the same thing? Answer, of course, is yes. The 22,000 lb. Grand Slam and the Tallboy, both of which were used to destroy sub pens, viaducts, dams, ships etc. The Grand Slam penetrated the 30ft reinforced ceiling of the Sub Pens at Huuge.

The 12,000 lb Tallboy was available in 1943, IIRC.

I am not attempting to derail this discussion. I am attempting to show that technology to perform the 15-25% missions that are shown to be the battleships, could have been accomplished by another weapon. These two bombs qualify easily for two out of the three qualities needed: Range, lethality. They can be dropped by a B-29 since its standard bombload was 20,000 lbs. It could, with reduced range, carry a larger bomb load, if needed and did so, on many occasions. This gives them a far greater range than the battleship. They can and did prove to be able to penetrate 30 ft of reinforced concrete. The only drawback, is accuracy. However, if they were dropped from 12000 ft(Minimum altitude for these bombs), accuracy could have been improved, but not by much. Also, the blast effect of a near miss, by one of these bombs, might have been enough to silence the guns. But I will agree that in accuracy, they will take second to a battleship. But, I can now remove some of the targets like bridges etc. from the target regime of the battleships. This gives us a far more cost effective and possibly efficient weapon for performing these missions. Using christmas tree flares at night, they could perform some of these missions, against area targets. But understand, the use of a B-29 carrying a grand slam or tall boy is only viable in a preliminary bombardment situation, prior to landings. It would have to be employed, like the B-24's were, in a week long, advanced bombing of the fortifications. However, consider the use of the tall boy or grand slam on the caves of Mount Suribachi? What would have been the effect? Once the landings had taken place, even the battleships had to move their fire inland to avoid friendly casualties.

Anyway, I have no hope of persuading anyone on this forum, and don't wish to. Thanks for, at least, allowing me to continue to make my case.

[Smiffy]

Interesting question comes mind. Was there a bomb available, that could have done the same thing? Answer, of course, is yes. The 22,000 lb. Grand Slam and the Tallboy, both of which were used to destroy sub pens, viaducts, dams, ships etc. The Grand Slam penetrated the 30ft reinforced ceiling of the Sub Pens at Huuge.

The 12,000 lb Tallboy was available in 1943, IIRC.

I am not attempting to derail this discussion. I am attempting to show that technology to perform the 15-25% missions that are shown to be the battleships, could have been accomplished by another weapon. These two bombs qualify easily for two out of the three qualities needed: Range, lethality. They can be dropped by a B-29 since its standard bombload was 20,000 lbs. It could, with reduced range, carry a larger bomb load, if needed and did so, on many occasions. This gives them a far greater range than the battleship. They can and did prove to be able to penetrate 30 ft of reinforced concrete. The only drawback, is accuracy. However, if they were dropped from 5000 ft, accuracy could have been improved. Also, the blast effect of a near miss, by one of these bombs, might have been enough to silence the guns. But I will agree that in accuracy, they will take second to a battleship. But, I can now remove some of the targets like bridges etc. from the target regime of the battleships. This gives us a far more cost effective and possibly efficient weapon for performing these missions. Using christmas tree flares at night, they could perform some of these missions, against area targets.

Anyway, I have no hope of persuading anyone on this forum, and don't wish to. Thanks for, at least, allowing me to continue to make my case.

I once saw a photograph of a B29 carrying two Grandslams under the wings. Apparently it was a trial of a back up plan to the A-bomb. Had the atomic bomb attacks failed, there was a plan to drop Grandslams on the fault line above Yokohama, with the intention of starting a massive earthquake and sliding Yokohama into the sea.

[old_pop2000]

I once saw a photograph of a B29 carrying two Grandslams under the wings. Apparently it was a trial of a back up plan to the A-bomb. Had the atomic bomb attacks failed, there was a plan to drop Grandslams on the fault line above Yokohama, with the intention of starting a massive earthquake and sliding Yokohama into the sea.
I'd forgotten about that experiment. Seems a little crazy. They did not understand the physics of earthquakes as well then.

Just as a sidelight, the 12,000 pound tall boy displaced a million cubic feet of earth when it struck the ground. It created a crater that required 5000 tons of earth to fill. It had a terminal velocity of 3600 to 3700 FPS.

Link to a google photo of a tall boy crater.
http://www.gearthhacks.com/dlfile27499/Crater-of-a-5-tons-Tallboy-bomb-at-Heligoland.htm

[Smiffy]

I'd forgotten about that experiment. Seems a little crazy. They did not understand the physics of earthquakes as well then.

Just as a sidelight, the 12,000 pound tall boy displaced a million cubic feet of earth when it struck the ground. It created a crater that required 5000 tons of earth to fill. It had a terminal velocity of 3600 to 3700 FPS.

Link to a google photo of a tall boy crater.
http://www.gearthhacks.com/dlfile27499/Crater-of-a-5-tons-Tallboy-bomb-at-Heligoland.htm

I live near the RAF's Battle of Britain Memorial Flight, they have a Grandslam, a Tallboy, and an Upkeep on display outside of their hanger.

[old_pop2000]

Some information to consider about bombing accuracy of heavy bombers when considering the use of tall boys and grand slams.

First, bombing accuracy in Europe was sacrificed for crew safety. The box formation sacrificed bombing accuracy to protect the aircraft crews and give them better firepower against German fighters.

Two, In Europe, the bombers went higher and higher to avoid accurate German flak. This higher altitude added more variable to the Norden which was only calibrated up to 10,000 ft.
In fact, many bombardiers were replaced by "toggliers". These were forward gunners, who simply toggled the bombs on a prearranged signal. Norden bombsights were actually removed and a surplus created, due to this reason.

Three, Europe is notorious for poor weather. This is not necessarily the case in the area of many of the Pacific Islands.

Four, Human error made a definite difference. If the lead bombardier made a simple altitude mistake at 20,000 feet of 250 feet, it made a range error in bombing of over 136 feet on the target. A wind error of 20 mph made an error of 120 feet on the target. The AAF stated that the usual human error caused a 1300 foot error on the target, that's about a quarter of a mile.

So, could a lone or a group of two to four B-29's equipped with tall boys, flying at 12,000 ft, bombing individually have hit a 30 ft wide target. Absolutely, especially with a tall boy. The shockwave effect of those bombs could have detonated the shells in the blockhouses. This is the primary effect of the bombs.

Just wanted you to know, that I was thinking about that factor of accuracy.;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

I'd forgotten about that experiment. Seems a little crazy. They did not understand the physics of earthquakes as well then.

Just as a sidelight, the 12,000 pound tall boy displaced a million cubic feet of earth when it struck the ground. It created a crater that required 5000 tons of earth to fill. It had a terminal velocity of 3600 to 3700 FPS.

Link to a google photo of a tall boy crater.
http://www.gearthhacks.com/dlfile27499/Crater-of-a-5-tons-Tallboy-bomb-at-Heligoland.htm

Dennis:

Obviously the weapon is powerful enough, the only question is do you have enough local air superiority to let the bomber attack unimpeded? I would assume that such a weapon would not be used unless you did have superiority.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some information to consider about bombing accuracy of heavy bombers when considering the use of tall boys and grand slams.

First, bombing accuracy in Europe was sacrificed for crew safety. The box formation sacrificed bombing accuracy to protect the aircraft crews and give them better firepower against German fighters.

Two, In Europe, the bombers went higher and higher to avoid accurate German flak. This higher altitude added more variable to the Norden which was only calibrated up to 10,000 ft.
In fact, many bombardiers were replaced by "toggliers". These were forward gunners, who simply toggled the bombs on a prearranged signal. Norden bombsights were actually removed and a surplus created, due to this reason.

Three, Europe is notorious for poor weather. This is not necessarily the case in the area of many of the Pacific Islands.

Four, Human error made a definite difference. If the lead bombardier made a simple altitude mistake at 20,000 feet of 250 feet, it made a range error in bombing of over 136 feet on the target. A wind error of 20 mph made an error of 120 feet on the target. The AAF stated that the usual human error caused a 1300 foot error on the target, that's about a quarter of a mile.

So, could a lone or a group of two to four B-29's equipped with tall boys, flying at 12,000 ft, bombing individually have hit a 30 ft wide target. Absolutely, especially with a tall boy. The shockwave effect of those bombs could have detonated the shells in the blockhouses. This is the primary effect of the bombs.

Just wanted you to know, that I was thinking about that factor of accuracy.;)

Dennis:

Agreed, that's why the post war strategic bombing studies reduced the effectiveness of high level bombing by a large degree. What took an entire squadron in 1945 can now be accomplished by an F-117 with a pair of 2,000lb smart bombs.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Obviously the weapon is powerful enough, the only question is do you have enough local air superiority to let the bomber attack unimpeded? I would assume that such a weapon would not be used unless you did have superiority.
Actually, that is a fair question. We would have had to have, complete air supremacy over the target. I believe, after the raids by the carriers and B-24's, that was acheived. But I will research to get a better, more definitive answer. Good question.

[old_pop2000]

In response to a good question about whether we had air superiority over Iwo Jima, the answer is a definitive, yes. The Japanese had lost their carriers and aircraft at the Battle of the Philippine Sea and there was only 80 fighters on Iwo Jima. It had never been contemplated that defense was necessary for the islands. When Kuribayashi arrive, only four were operational. The Japanese Imperial High command radioed that no more support would be forthcoming. This was to husband as many fighters and pilots for the defense of the homeland.

So, the answer to Ed's good question is that the B-29's would have had no problems flying missions over Iwo Jima, had they been needed.

[Smiffy]

Europe is notorious for poor weather.

And the Norden bomb sight was designed to win a competition staged in California.

Just one other thing I would like to point out, Grandslams and Tallboys were not meant to hit their targets, the idea was that the deliberate near miss would create an earthquake effect. In shallow water they were deadly against ships, but in deep water they would have been useless.

[old_pop2000]

And the Norden bomb sight was designed to win a competition staged in California.

Just one other thing I would like to point out, Grandslams and Tallboys were not meant to hit their targets, the idea was that the deliberate near miss would create an earthquake effect. In shallow water they were deadly against ships, but in deep water they would have been useless.
Yes, that is a good point. I still believe that against many of the hardened targets their concussive effects could have had some excellent results. Maybe but maybe not. I certainly would have had some great effects on the caves in Suribachi.

[Smiffy]

Yes, that is a good point. I still believe that against many of the hardened targets their concussive effects could have had some excellent results. Maybe but maybe not. I certainly would have had some great effects on the caves in Suribachi.

Indeed. They devastated the heavily hardened V3 sites.

Incidentally, the attack by 617 Squadron, RAF, on the main V3 site was led by their Squadron Commander, Wing Commander Leonard Cheshire, flying a P51 Mustang. 617 had a flight of Mosquitos to mark targets for their Lancasters, but for a precision daylight attack against such a small and heavily defended target an even more nimble aircraft was needed. It was arranged for the US 8th Air Force to lend 617 a Mustang, but it was only made available a couple of hours before the raid. There was not time to fit the British bomb racks for the marker smoke bombs. So Cheshire flew the Mustang himself, the first time he had flown a single engined fighter since 1939, and he marked the target by flying over it and rocking his wings from side to side so that the silver paint flashed in the sun and the Lancaster bomb aimers aimed at him.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In response to a good question about whether we had air superiority over Iwo Jima, the answer is a definitive, yes. The Japanese had lost their carriers and aircraft at the Battle of the Philippine Sea and there was only 80 fighters on Iwo Jima. It had never been contemplated that defense was necessary for the islands. When Kuribayashi arrive, only four were operational. The Japanese Imperial High command radioed that no more support would be forthcoming. This was to husband as many fighters and pilots for the defense of the homeland.

So, the answer to Ed's good question is that the B-29's would have had no problems flying missions over Iwo Jima, had they been needed.

Dennis:

There is a certain logic to it, the B-29s are fighting to gain a bail out landing strip for the next bit push on Japan. Sort of like airbase hopping to stretch an over stretched analogy.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Indeed. They devastated the heavily hardened V3 sites.

Incidentally, the attack by 617 Squadron, RAF, on the main V3 site was led by their Squadron Commander, Wing Commander Leonard Cheshire, flying a P51 Mustang. 617 had a flight of Mosquitos to mark targets for their Lancasters, but for a precision daylight attack against such a small and heavily defended target an even more nimble aircraft was needed. It was arranged for the US 8th Air Force to lend 617 a Mustang, but it was only made available a couple of hours before the raid. There was not time to fit the British bomb racks for the marker smoke bombs. So Cheshire flew the Mustang himself, the first time he had flown a single engined fighter since 1939, and he marked the target by flying over it and rocking his wings from side to side so that the silver paint flashed in the sun and the Lancaster bomb aimers aimed at him.

Smiffy:

One hopes he got an Distinguished Flying Cross or whatever the British equivelant would be for his courage. So guys just get it and do it.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

There is a certain logic to it, the B-29s are fighting to gain a bail out landing strip for the next bit push on Japan. Sort of like airbase hopping to stretch an over stretched analogy.
I am not advocating this strategy or claiming to have an idea that was never considered. Maybe the idea isn't workable for a reason or reasons we are not privy to. I am suggesting that there was a weapon available that might have been an alternative, in certain instances to the expensive use of battleships to defeat 15-25% of the targets. We have a weapon that possibly could have neutralized certain difficult targets, without striking them directly. We have a long range delivery system that can overcome the range issue. We have solved the lethality and range issue, only the accuracy one is still in doubt. But with the blast radius of these weapons, accuracy may not be as critical.

The one problem with this simple solution, is why it was never considered, IMO. Yet, it might have been a far more versatile option. Were the bombs too hard and time consuming to build? Were the British unwilling to part with the manufacturing specifications and production processes? Was the AAF prideful and unwilling to accept that they did not have a good solution, although the British did and used it? The first Tall boy was delivered on 9 June 1944 by 617 Squadron on the French Railway Tunnel at Saumar. 25 of the bombs were used. Crater's 70 feet deep and 100 ft wide were left, with one bomb penetrating the tunnel. The tunnel was constructed in a hill and thought to be inpenetrable. This first use was one year before Iwo Jima, in February 1945.

Or, was it simply, that old line admiral like Halsey, realized that the battleship's days were numbered and simply wanted to get them into the battles for one last time. We know that Halsey felt this way at Leyte Gulf. He wanted to use his Iowa class ships to attack and destroy the Japanese fleet and was very disappointed when that reality wasn't realized. Was it nostalgia that kept the battleship in the fleet?

[JMS]

Smiffy:

One hopes he got an Distinguished Flying Cross or whatever the British equivelant would be for his courage. So guys just get it and do it.

I think it was Leonard Cheshire VC

[Ed Rotondaro]

I am not advocating this strategy or claiming to have an idea that was never considered. Maybe the idea isn't workable for a reason or reasons we are not privy to. I am suggesting that there was a weapon available that might have been an alternative, in certain instances to the expensive use of battleships to defeat 15-25% of the targets. We have a weapon that possibly could have neutralized certain difficult targets, without striking them directly. We have a long range delivery system that can overcome the range issue. We have solved the lethality and range issue, only the accuracy one is still in doubt. But with the blast radius of these weapons, accuracy may not be as critical.

The one problem with this simple solution, is why it was never considered, IMO. Yet, it might have been a far more versatile option. Were the bombs too hard and time consuming to build? Were the British unwilling to part with the manufacturing specifications and production processes? Was the AAF prideful and unwilling to accept that they did not have a good solution, although the British did and used it? The first Tall boy was delivered on 9 June 1944 by 617 Squadron on the French Railway Tunnel at Saumar. 25 of the bombs were used. Crater's 70 feet deep and 100 ft wide were left, with one bomb penetrating the tunnel. The tunnel was constructed in a hill and thought to be inpenetrable. This first use was one year before Iwo Jima, in February 1945.

Or, was it simply, that old line admiral like Halsey, realized that the battleship's days were numbered and simply wanted to get them into the battles for one last time. We know that Halsey felt this way at Leyte Gulf. He wanted to use his Iowa class ships to attack and destroy the Japanese fleet and was very disappointed when that reality wasn't realized. Was it nostalgia that kept the battleship in the fleet?

Dennis:

I don't doubt that there was a certain level of nostaglia regarding the battleship in US naval service, but also there was the practical reasons. As you state, the USAAF apparently didn't have the specialized British bombs in their arsenal. No carrier borne aircraft can carry anything bigger than a pair of 1,000lb bombs. So you fall back on the AP shell from a battleship in hopes that it will do the job mainly because you have nothing else.

As far as nostaglia influencing the use of battleships, I will leave you with the example of the Yamato's death ride in April of 1945. When first detected, Admiral Spruance had a task force of the older battleships organized with intentions of letting them have one last chance to fight. Why he didn't chose the Iowa class is a mystery. At the same time, Admiral Mitscher had prepared a full deck load strike from several of his Essex class carriers in an effort to demonstrate once and for all the carrier was the supreme weapon. He then signalled his superior asking "Do you want me to take them or are you going to take them"? Spruance didn't even hesitate as he issued the shortest operational order of the war "You take them" was his only reply. In the end logic overruled any sentimentality regarding battleships.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I don't doubt that there was a certain level of nostaglia regarding the battleship in US naval service, but also there was the practical reasons. As you state, the USAAF apparently didn't have the specialized British bombs in their arsenal. No carrier borne aircraft can carry anything bigger than a pair of 1,000lb bombs. So you fall back on the AP shell from a battleship in hopes that it will do the job mainly because you have nothing else.

As far as nostaglia influencing the use of battleships, I will leave you with the example of the Yamato's death ride in April of 1945. When first detected, Admiral Spruance had a task force of the older battleships organized with intentions of letting them have one last chance to fight. Why he didn't chose the Iowa class is a mystery. At the same time, Admiral Mitscher had prepared a full deck load strike from several of his Essex class carriers in an effort to demonstrate once and for all the carrier was the supreme weapon. He then signalled his superior asking "Do you want me to take them or are you going to take them"? Spruance didn't even hesitate as he issued the shortest operational order of the war "You take them" was his only reply. In the end logic overruled any sentimentality regarding battleships.
That is the type of decision, that one would have expected from Ray Spruance. He was a coldly logically man, with superior intelligence. He understood the risks, if the battleships failed to sink or even damage Yamato fast enough. He understood his mission and that the safety of his ships was paramount. The aircraft could and did kill Yamato before she ever got into gun range. He had a tool, he used it. Finis to the battleships.

But the question is whether a Halsey or a Lee have made that decision. What about King?

[Mike Malanaphy]

And the Norden bomb sight was designed to win a competition staged in California.

Just one other thing I would like to point out, Grandslams and Tallboys were not meant to hit their targets, the idea was that the deliberate near miss would create an earthquake effect. In shallow water they were deadly against ships, but in deep water they would have been useless.

Hi guys,

Barnes Wallis' original idea for the bomb was to disrupt the German canal system as the carried a large fraction of Germany's industrial transportation needs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

That is the type of decision, that one would have expected from Ray Spruance. He was a coldly logically man, with superior intelligence. He understood the risks, if the battleships failed to sink or even damage Yamato fast enough. He understood his mission and that the safety of his ships was paramount. The aircraft could and did kill Yamato before she ever got into gun range. He had a tool, he used it. Finis to the battleships.

But the question is whether a Halsey or a Lee have made that decision. What about King?

Dennis:

Obviously I'm only speculating here, but I could see Lee making the pitch for a battleship gunnery duel and I could certainly see Halsey going for it. I think in the time period in question, Lee was no longer in the Pacific. He was heading up a special task force that was trying to devise counters for the kamikaze with an eye towards the invasion of Japan. He died in August of 1945 not long after the Japanese surrendered. King probably would have opted for the most cost effective method which was definitely using airpower.

[Kyle Holgate]

That is the type of decision, that one would have expected from Ray Spruance. He was a coldly logically man, with superior intelligence. He understood the risks, if the battleships failed to sink or even damage Yamato fast enough. He understood his mission and that the safety of his ships was paramount. The aircraft could and did kill Yamato before she ever got into gun range. He had a tool, he used it. Finis to the battleships.

But the question is whether a Halsey or a Lee have made that decision. What about King?

While I expect in the battle between old BB's and Yamato that the Yamato would be smothered by radar directed gunfire, torpedoed after she's wrecked and sunk without scoring a hit on the US fleet - the danger to the old ships was very real. At range an 18.1 inch round could penetrate magazines, closer their belts become vulnerable and magazines again are in danger of Yamato. Better to use aircraft than be up before a board of inquiry explaining why you risked old BB's which lead to the Maryland being sunk with all hands when carrier aircraft were available.

[old_pop2000]

While I expect in the battle between old BB's and Yamato that the Yamato would be smothered by radar directed gunfire, torpedoed after she's wrecked and sunk without scoring a hit on the US fleet - the danger to the old ships was very real. At range an 18.1 inch round could penetrate magazines, closer their belts become vulnerable and magazines again are in danger of Yamato. Better to use aircraft than be up before a board of inquiry explaining why you risked old BB's which lead to the Maryland being sunk with all hands when carrier aircraft were available.
I have no doubts that Spruance was more worried about the unarmed transports and supply ships, than the OBB's or the new ones. Those ship's could take care of themselves easily but the unarmed and relatively slow supply and troop transports were the main concern. Why depend on the gunnery of OBB and BB's, when I can kill the target at greater range and lethality, and not even miss a beat. Easy decision for Spruance to make, in spite of what Lee might have been telling him. I suspect Spruance knew better about Naval Gunnery.

[Ed Rotondaro]

While I expect in the battle between old BB's and Yamato that the Yamato would be smothered by radar directed gunfire, torpedoed after she's wrecked and sunk without scoring a hit on the US fleet - the danger to the old ships was very real. At range an 18.1 inch round could penetrate magazines, closer their belts become vulnerable and magazines again are in danger of Yamato. Better to use aircraft than be up before a board of inquiry explaining why you risked old BB's which lead to the Maryland being sunk with all hands when carrier aircraft were available.

Kyle:

I agree there was no logical reason to risk any damage to the old battleships when you had a proven weapon to use against the Yamato and her escorts. Still I am curious as to why the newer battleships weren't an option, unless they were either out of position (hard to believe since they would be tied to the carriers) or needed to protect against kamikaze attacks. A surface task force built around two of the Iowas with a cruiser or two and a DD squadron would have been more than adequate to finish off Yamato.

[Kyle Holgate]

I have heard that the Iowa class were out of position for an early enough intercept, but I don't know for sure. I have also heard that the Richelieu was placed that she could have intercepted. Even with a few Iowas though, why? Yamato can do damage to any ship far and beyond what she was likely to do to any number of attacking aircraft.
So risk perhaps 200 pilots and aircraft Vs Yamato's known fairly mediocre AA or risk ships with 1500 sailors (or whatever) each against Yamato's uknown ability to hit with her 18.1 inch guns?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi guys,

Barnes Wallis' original idea for the bomb was to disrupt the German canal system as the carried a large fraction of Germany's industrial transportation needs.

Mike:

Wallis also created the HESH shell, originally for recoiless guns, but then adopted for tank and anti-tank guns.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have no doubts that Spruance was more worried about the unarmed transports and supply ships, than the OBB's or the new ones. Those ship's could take care of themselves easily but the unarmed and relatively slow supply and troop transports were the main concern. Why depend on the gunnery of OBB and BB's, when I can kill the target at greater range and lethality, and not even miss a beat. Easy decision for Spruance to make, in spite of what Lee might have been telling him. I suspect Spruance knew better about Naval Gunnery.

Dennis:

This battle is a bit unique in that landings of troops were still continuing when Yamaot sortied, mainly due to the use of reserves, etc. Normally, there would have been few transports or supply ships around by this time. As I mentioned, I don't believe Lee was present at Okinawa, but I'll do a little more research. One source mentioned that a surface task force comprising 6 new BBs and the two Alsaka class large cruisers was formed in case the air attacks didn't stop Yamato, but I have not seen this anywhere else.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have heard that the Iowa class were out of position for an early enough intercept, but I don't know for sure. I have also heard that the Richelieu was placed that she could have intercepted. Even with a few Iowas though, why? Yamato can do damage to any ship far and beyond what she was likely to do to any number of attacking aircraft.
So risk perhaps 200 pilots and aircraft Vs Yamato's known fairly mediocre AA or risk ships with 1500 sailors (or whatever) each against Yamato's uknown ability to hit with her 18.1 inch guns?


Kyle:

Obviously Spruance felt the same way and made what was in retrospect the right call. For the cost of 10 planes and 12 aircrew, the USN sank Yamato, CL Yahagi and four out of the 8 escorting DDs.

[djcyclone]

Kyle:

Obviously Spruance felt the same way and made what was in retrospect the right call. For the cost of 10 planes and 12 aircrew, the USN sank Yamato, CL Yahagi and four out of the 8 escorting DDs.



It would have been cooler though. To make one last engagment between Battleships. We would have taken our share of the damage, but that would have been one hell of a story to read about today. The true clash of the Titans.

[Kyle Holgate]

It would have been cooler though. To make one last engagment between Battleships. We would have taken our share of the damage, but that would have been one hell of a story to read about today. The true clash of the Titans.

Indeed. I still think the end would be akin to Bismarck's - Yamato getting a few shots in close or maybe hitting but getting smothered by shells until she's a burning wreck and is finally sunk by torpedoes. I think US BB shells would start hitting at long range and degrade Yamato's ability to return fire - so she may not get any hits at all. Any hit could hurt BAD though.

[john964]

Dennis:

I don't doubt that there was a certain level of nostaglia regarding the battleship in US naval service, but also there was the practical reasons. As you state, the USAAF apparently didn't have the specialized British bombs in their arsenal. No carrier borne aircraft can carry anything bigger than a pair of 1,000lb bombs. So you fall back on the AP shell from a battleship in hopes that it will do the job mainly because you have nothing else.
Ed, Not quite both the SBD-4 Dauntless and SB2C-1 Helldiver could carry the Mk1 1600lbs AP bomb along with the TBF/TBM Avenger.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, Not quite both the SBD-4 Dauntless and SB2C-1 Helldiver could carry the Mk1 1600lbs AP bomb along with the TBF/TBM Avenger.

John:

I'll have to check the stats on that bomb to see how if would fare.

[Warship NWS]

Ed, Not quite both the SBD-4 Dauntless and SB2C-1 Helldiver could carry the Mk1 1600lbs AP bomb along with the TBF/TBM Avenger.

It was far more common them to carry the 1000lb SAP bomb as their heavy load bomb. The Mk1 was not made in large numbers, for that matter, I do not recall of the SBD ever carrying it. It may have had the racks for it but in nearly all naval engagements they carried the standard 500-1000lb HE or SAP bombs.

Thanks.

[john964]

It was far more common them to carry the 1000lb SAP bomb as their heavy load bomb. The Mk1 was not made in large numbers, for that matter, I do not recall of the SBD ever carrying it. It may have had the racks for it but in nearly all naval engagements they carried the standard 500-1000lb HE or SAP bombs.

Thanks.I am not saying they did carry the Mk1 in combat but, I was answering Ed's statement that carrier born aircraft could not carrey anything larger than a 1000lbs bomb.

[old_pop2000]

I am not saying they did carry the Mk1 in combat but, I was answering Ed's statement that carrier born aircraft could not carrey anything larger than a 1000lbs bomb.
John:

The SBD could not perform an arrested landing with a 1600 lb. MK 1 bomb, nor could it exceed 5 g's or catapult. You could not skid, slip or roll the aircraft due to longitudinal stability issues.

I have ordered the SBD-6 pilots manual. Hopefully it will answer some of these questions.


It would appear that this bomb might have been used only by aircraft on land. Carrying this bomb and not being able to be catapult would be a dangerous move, but possible with enough wind across the deck.

[Warship NWS]

I am not saying they did carry the Mk1 in combat but, I was answering Ed's statement that carrier born aircraft could not carrey anything larger than a 1000lbs bomb.

Max payload did not always mean operational, or typical, payload. The Mk1 was in scarce numbers and for most purposes impractical in use. Ironically, the Luftwaffe were the only real users, in significant numbers, of heavyweight AP bombs with their Stukas being capable of dropping 1000lb AP bombs which were better at armor penetration then our 1000lb SAP bombs. However, their targets had armored decks, BBs and CVs, whereas the ships in the Pacific could be penetrated by SAP bombs without too much problem and even capital ships with armored decks could suffer significant damage from SAP bomb hits if they hit at weaker parts of the armored decks or in the superstructure. There was also something to be said for more lbs of explosives per lb of bomb compared to a shell vs unarmored or lightly armored parts of a ship.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Max payload did not always mean operational, or typical, payload. The Mk1 was in scarce numbers and for most purposes impractical in use. Ironically, the Luftwaffe were the only real users, in significant numbers, of heavyweight AP bombs with their Stukas being capable of dropping 1000lb AP bombs which were better at armor penetration then our 1000lb SAP bombs. However, their targets had armored decks, BBs and CVs, whereas the ships in the Pacific could be penetrated by SAP bombs without too much problem and even capital ships with armored decks could suffer significant damage from SAP bomb hits if they hit at weaker parts of the armored decks or in the superstructure. There was also something to be said for more lbs of explosives per lb of bomb compared to a shell vs unarmored or lightly armored parts of a ship.

Thanks.

That is true, and the more payload you carry, the shorter the range of the aircraft. The key is power to weight. Let me demonstrate:

F-18 E/F has a power to weight of .95. It has a power rating with AB of 34,000 lbs of thrust against a gross weight of 37,000 lbs.

SBD-4 has a power to weight of .117. A 1200 HP engine with a gross weight of 10,200 lbs.

Even the F4U with a 2250 hp engine has a power to weight of only .17., even the P-51 has a power to weight of only .18.

Reciprocating engined aircraft are notoriously underpowered. Add weight and you lose forward speed and range. To gain it back, you have to reduce fuel, which gains back the speed but not the range.

[old_pop2000]

Some more about range and payload.

Range is proportional to ground speed times maximum flight time. One important element is a quantity called TSFC or The specific fuel consumption. Maximum flight time is proportional to fuel load divided by the specific fuel consumption, which is usually in gallons per hour. If I add more weight to an aircraft, I must increase my throttle setting to maintain a specific ground speed. When I increase my throttle setting, I am increasing my fuel consumption which translate's into less maximum flight time. This lowers my range proportionally. My only recourse, to maintain range is to reduce ground speed. However, with an increased payload, I need to maintain a higher ground speed to maintain lift on the wings to carry the extra load, so I really can't decrease my indicated air speed which translates into ground speed. So, I lose range.

This is essentially what happens to an SBD when it carries a 1600 lb Mk 1 bomb. Same thing happens if it carries a 1000 lb bomb and a 350 under each wing. Scout bomber versions usually only carried one 350 lb bomb to maintain range and hence, time aloft. Range also translate's into time aloft.

[john964]

Some more about range and payload.

Range is proportional to ground speed times maximum flight time. One important element is a quantity called TSFC or The specific fuel consumption. Maximum flight time is proportional to fuel load divided by the specific fuel consumption, which is usually in gallons per hour. If I add more weight to an aircraft, I must increase my throttle setting to maintain a specific ground speed. When I increase my throttle setting, I am increasing my fuel consumption which translate's into less maximum flight time. This lowers my range proportionally. My only recourse, to maintain range is to reduce ground speed. However, with an increased payload, I need to maintain a higher ground speed to maintain lift on the wings to carry the extra load, so I really can't decrease my indicated air speed which translates into ground speed. So, I lose range.

This is essentially what happens to an SBD when it carries a 1600 lb Mk 1 bomb. Same thing happens if it carries a 1000 lb bomb and a 350 under each wing. Scout bomber versions usually only carried one 350 lb bomb to maintain range and hence, time aloft. Range also translate's into time aloft.
What bomb are you talking about according to my info the US had no 350lbs bombs, the SBD could carry a 325lbs depth charge under each wing. Also Scout bombers usally carried 500lbs when scouting

[Ed Rotondaro]

Max payload did not always mean operational, or typical, payload. The Mk1 was in scarce numbers and for most purposes impractical in use. Ironically, the Luftwaffe were the only real users, in significant numbers, of heavyweight AP bombs with their Stukas being capable of dropping 1000lb AP bombs which were better at armor penetration then our 1000lb SAP bombs. However, their targets had armored decks, BBs and CVs, whereas the ships in the Pacific could be penetrated by SAP bombs without too much problem and even capital ships with armored decks could suffer significant damage from SAP bomb hits if they hit at weaker parts of the armored decks or in the superstructure. There was also something to be said for more lbs of explosives per lb of bomb compared to a shell vs unarmored or lightly armored parts of a ship.

Thanks.


Chris:

Was the 1600lb bomb used by land based twin engined bombers? I know that an Avenger could carry up to 2,000lbs total bomb load, but that was usually in the form of two 1,000lb bombs.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Was the 1600lb bomb used by land based twin engined bombers? I know that an Avenger could carry up to 2,000lbs total bomb load, but that was usually in the form of two 1,000lb bombs.

I would seriously doubt it.. nothing for them to really use it on, plus it likely required a different racking system in the bomb bay. Tactical and strategic bombers normally stuck with 500lb GP or demolition bombs as far as I can recall.. with the exception of some various specialized bombs like parafrags and incendiary.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Ok some further details.. the Mk1 1590lb AP bomb was seldom used with an estimated 20 bombs per CV if they carried them and could only be used by the Avenger and Helldiver. The Mk33 AP bomb was more "widely" used and weighed 1008lb, however, I have yet to read of SBDs using it .. Helldivers would have been more likely but I have not seen any numbers of AP vs SAP payloads for comparison.

[old_pop2000]

The usual determining factor in what the SBD would carry was the range and mission type. On inner patrols, essentially ASW patrols, they would carry an additional 100 lb bomb under each wing. The VS squadrons were usually limited to 500 lb bombs(Not 350, sorry), but since the planes were the same, they could carry 1000 lb bombs.

When on scouting missions, the planes were limited to 500 lb bombs.

On the Midway attack, fifteen aircraft of the aircraft were carrying 1000 lb bombs, sixteen carried one 500 lb and two 100 lb. bombs. This was a typical loadout for the SBD-3's.

On the Kwajalein attack on 1 February 1942, all aircraft were equipped with 500 lb bombs.

On the Taroa attack in the same time frame, all aircraft were equipped with 500 lb bombs and 100 lb bombs.

On the Marcus Island raid, 500 lb and 100 lb were the loadout.

On the afternoon Midway attack, same loadout's as above.

Every NATOPS has a Bomber Cruising Control Chart. It provides the engine rpm, throttle setting, IAS and altitude for a specific aircraft load. A typical entry might be: 1000 pound bomber at gross weight of 9500 pounds, true airspeed of 160 knots, altitude 11,000 feet, outside air temperature of +11 degrees, full throttle setting in low blower(47 percent power) at an engine speed of 1980 RPM.

There is an entry for a 500 pound bomber and a scout bomber, with similar but different settings.

Hope that gives you some idea of how this worked. Remember that the -5 was the most prevalent type. The -4 began to enter the fleet in 1942. It's only difference to the -3 was the voltage system which was 24 volts. The -4 could carry the 1600 lb AP bomb.

[Ed Rotondaro]

What bomb are you talking about according to my info the US had no 350lbs bombs, the SBD could carry a 325lbs depth charge under each wing. Also Scout bombers usally carried 500lbs when scouting

John:

Wasn't there a 250lb bomb used by the USAAF and the USN?

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would seriously doubt it.. nothing for them to really use it on, plus it likely required a different racking system in the bomb bay. Tactical and strategic bombers normally stuck with 500lb GP or demolition bombs as far as I can recall.. with the exception of some various specialized bombs like parafrags and incendiary.

Thanks.

Chris:

Seems like the designed a bomb and forgot to give it a mission. I'm going to do some research on it and see what turns up.

[old_pop2000]

Some more data on the SBD. The Wright R-1820 had a fuel consumption of .43 lb of fuel per horsepower per hour. Now, how does that work?

If you remember from my previous posts, specific fuel consumption governed range. Remember that the settings for the engine under a specific load dictated a specific percentage of full power. Example: For the 1000 lb bomber, it was 47% at cruising speed of 160 knots. The engine's normal takeoff power was rated at about 1000 hp. So, at cruising, the power output at 160 knots was 470 hp. If we are consuming .43 pounds per hp, then we will consume, in one hour, 1093 pounds of fuel per hour cruising. Gasoline weighs 6 pounds per gallon, so we will consume 182 gallons of fuel. Fuel load on a -3 was about 310 gallons. So, we had, not counting engine warm-up, take off, and time to climb to altitude, about 1.7 hours of flying time with a 1000 lb. bomb. At 160 knots, that's about 184 miles. Warm-up and take off consumes about 20 minutes, time to climb might take 10 minutes. For a pilot, he must calculate this very carefully, or he will be going for a swim. Another factor is that gasoline weight per gallon, varies from 6 to 6.3 depending on the octane and season it was produced. Some older engines will consume more fuel per hour, the figure is for a test bench engine, not a flying engine.

Make sense now. Bomb weight affects range by forcing us to use more power and hence, more fuel, which lessens the range.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Max payload did not always mean operational, or typical, payload. The Mk1 was in scarce numbers and for most purposes impractical in use. Ironically, the Luftwaffe were the only real users, in significant numbers, of heavyweight AP bombs with their Stukas being capable of dropping 1000lb AP bombs which were better at armor penetration then our 1000lb SAP bombs. However, their targets had armored decks, BBs and CVs, whereas the ships in the Pacific could be penetrated by SAP bombs without too much problem and even capital ships with armored decks could suffer significant damage from SAP bomb hits if they hit at weaker parts of the armored decks or in the superstructure. There was also something to be said for more lbs of explosives per lb of bomb compared to a shell vs unarmored or lightly armored parts of a ship.

Thanks.

Chris:

Yamato survivors mention how effective the dive bombing was at knocking out their ability to use AA, as well as penetrating deeply into the ship and causing lots of damage.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have no doubts that Spruance was more worried about the unarmed transports and supply ships, than the OBB's or the new ones. Those ship's could take care of themselves easily but the unarmed and relatively slow supply and troop transports were the main concern. Why depend on the gunnery of OBB and BB's, when I can kill the target at greater range and lethality, and not even miss a beat. Easy decision for Spruance to make, in spite of what Lee might have been telling him. I suspect Spruance knew better about Naval Gunnery.

Dennis:

I did some checking, Lee was still in command of the fast battleships at Okinawa during the Yamato's deathride. Whether he conferred with Spruance is unknown. Another interesting fact, Spruance started out in command of the operation, but since it took so long, Halsey relieved him and the 5th fleet reverted to the 3rd fleet during the same operation. I don't recall that ever happening before in the Pacific during a single campaign.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I did some checking, Lee was still in command of the fast battleships at Okinawa during the Yamato's deathride. Whether he conferred with Spruance is unknown. Another interesting fact, Spruance started out in command of the operation, but since it took so long, Halsey relieved him and the 5th fleet reverted to the 3rd fleet during the same operation. I don't recall that ever happening before in the Pacific during a single campaign.

There are some factors that Spruance had to consider before he made his decision.

1. If I move the four Iowa's out to contact and destroy Yamato, they will need escorts. Every escort I remove from the fleet, leaves the fleet with that much less AA against the Kamikaze aircraft.

2. The TF consisting of the Iowa's and destroyers, will most certainly need air cover, so carriers will have to go with them.

3. What if the new TF sent to deal with Yamato, misses her and she gets within range of the assault fleet?

4. The closer I move towards Japan to deal with Yamato, the closer I am to more Kamikazes and submarines, these are still sizeable threats.

5. How much fuel will this operation take? Will it require a refueling after the BB's return to the fleet?


So, Spruance replied to the threat in the simplest and most expedient way he could. He simply used the most powerful, and longest ranged weapon he had. The aircraft. I would bet that the decision was far easier than we may believe. Possibly this scenario had already been gamed and made, before the Operation had even begun.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There are some factors that Spruance had to consider before he made his decision.

1. If I move the four Iowa's out to contact and destroy Yamato, they will need escorts. Every escort I remove from the fleet, leaves the fleet with that much less AA against the Kamikaze aircraft.

2. The TF consisting of the Iowa's and destroyers, will most certainly need air cover, so carriers will have to go with them.

3. What if the new TF sent to deal with Yamato, misses her and she gets within range of the assault fleet?

4. The closer I move towards Japan to deal with Yamato, the closer I am to more Kamikazes and submarines, these are still sizeable threats.

5. How much fuel will this operation take? Will it require a refueling after the BB's return to the fleet?


So, Spruance replied to the threat in the simplest and most expedient way he could. He simply used the most powerful, and longest ranged weapon he had. The aircraft. I would bet that the decision was far easier than we may believe. Possibly this scenario had already been gamed and made, before the Operation had even begun.

Dennis:

I agree. Especially in regards to the Iowas role for AA defense. That may have been part of the reason why Spruance initially entertained the use of the older BBs for the intercept. As far as air cover goes, I don't see that as a problem since the Yamato task force lacked air cover which means the IJN wasn't sparing any planes. Would the Iowa task force act as a kamikaze magnet? We'll never know, but the intercept could have been made fairly close to Okinawa rather than Japan thereby allowing the 5th fleet's fighters to cover the task force. As it was, the air strikes caught Yamato very close to Japan (Mitscher wasn't taking any chances and I can't blame him).

[Kyle Holgate]

There are some factors that Spruance had to consider before he made his decision.

1. If I move the four Iowa's out to contact and destroy Yamato, they will need escorts. Every escort I remove from the fleet, leaves the fleet with that much less AA against the Kamikaze aircraft.

2. The TF consisting of the Iowa's and destroyers, will most certainly need air cover, so carriers will have to go with them.

3. What if the new TF sent to deal with Yamato, misses her and she gets within range of the assault fleet?

4. The closer I move towards Japan to deal with Yamato, the closer I am to more Kamikazes and submarines, these are still sizeable threats.

5. How much fuel will this operation take? Will it require a refueling after the BB's return to the fleet?


So, Spruance replied to the threat in the simplest and most expedient way he could. He simply used the most powerful, and longest ranged weapon he had. The aircraft. I would bet that the decision was far easier than we may believe. Possibly this scenario had already been gamed and made, before the Operation had even begun.

I agree also - he did the right thing. We can do the wrong thing now in wargames where lives arn't at stake all we want!

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Yamato survivors mention how effective the dive bombing was at knocking out their ability to use AA, as well as penetrating deeply into the ship and causing lots of damage.

The questions would be a) which bombs were they using and b) where did they hit? I do know that one bomb knocked out their pumping system which caused a lot of problems with the ability to counterflood after the torpedo hits. One factor I did find interesting is that some, or most, of the fighters and/or dive bombers were also carrying rockets and combined with strafing (20mm and 12.7mm) killed many of the AAA crews within the first few attack runs.

[Warship NWS]

John:

Wasn't there a 250lb bomb used by the USAAF and the USN?

Yes, a 250lb GP bomb was produced but the 500lb and 1000lb versions were used in much greater numbers. 250lb was not enough to do significant damage to a major warship.

[old_pop2000]

Yes, a 250lb GP bomb was produced but the 500lb and 1000lb versions were used in much greater numbers. 250lb was not enough to do significant damage to a major warship.

According the AAR of the Bennington, It was the Bennington's VB-82 flying SB2C's equipped with 2 armor piercing bombs, eight 5 inch rockets and 20 mm cannon fire that struck first accompanied by the Hornet. The bombers pitched over from 20,000 ft. releasing the ordnance at 1500 ft. diving as close to 90 degree's to avoid the 75 degree limitation of the ack ack guns on the Yamato.

First strikes by the leader hit the weather deck on starboard side, destroying two 25mm machine guns, the high angle gun turret and penetrating the flying deck. The second aircraft bombs destroyed the secondary battery fire control station as it penetrated the flying deck. These bombs started a fire that was never extinguished. The third aircraft's bombs hit next to the island, near the number three main gun.

According to Nihon Kaigun website, the bombs were 1000 lb AP. They report two such bombs striking the after crew's quarters, abaft of the type 13 radar. The second bomb, probably the Bennington's, hits between the 155 mm gun magazine and the number 3 gun turret's powder magazine. This is the fire that reportedly was never extinguished and may have caused the explosion.

Five of Hornets TB now attack at low altitude, hitting her on the port side with one torpedo. Aircraft from Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, Bataan, Langley now hit the ship with a total of 110 aircraft. A corsair from Essex drops a 1000 lb AP bomb which strikes the superstructure on the port side. Twelve more Helldivers reported hits near the bridge structure and main guns.

From these accounts, it would appear the primary ordnance was the 1000 lb armor piercing bomb, 5 inch rockets and 20 mm cannon fire along with torpedoes.

Pilots in the Helldivers all commented that it was almost impossible to miss the ship.

[old_pop2000]

I was lucky to find a complete 1950's bomb manual, how much is valid for 1945, is unknown.

It does show a 1000 lb. armour piercing Mk 33 bomb. It is 73 inches long and weighs 1008 pounds. It has 140 lbs of Explosive D.

There is also the Mk1 1600 lb. armour piercing bomb. It is 83.5 inches long and weighs 1590 lbs. with 209 lbs. of Explosive D. According to the manual, the navy bomb version has metal bands surrounding the body called suspension bands. There is also a MK1 mod 1 1600 lb. AP bomb. The suspension bands are bolted through holes in the body and that violent maneuvers with this suspension system are to be avoided. It uses a 14 inch shackle.

Interesting.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The questions would be a) which bombs were they using and b) where did they hit? I do know that one bomb knocked out their pumping system which caused a lot of problems with the ability to counterflood after the torpedo hits. One factor I did find interesting is that some, or most, of the fighters and/or dive bombers were also carrying rockets and combined with strafing (20mm and 12.7mm) killed many of the AAA crews within the first few attack runs.

Chris:

It's obvious by this time that the USN had perfected the combination of supression of the AA with horizontal and vertical attacks to finish off a ship quickly.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Yes, a 250lb GP bomb was produced but the 500lb and 1000lb versions were used in much greater numbers. 250lb was not enough to do significant damage to a major warship.


Chris:

Probably better for ground support against open targets. Especially if dropped in numbers.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Pilots in the Helldivers all commented that it was almost impossible to miss the ship.

Dennis:

Yeah, the Yamato class was one big target LOL! Especially without aircraft covering her.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I was lucky to find a complete 1950's bomb manual, how much is valid for 1945, is unknown.

It does show a 1000 lb. armour piercing Mk 33 bomb. It is 73 inches long and weighs 1008 pounds. It has 140 lbs of Explosive D.

There is also the Mk1 1600 lb. armour piercing bomb. It is 83.5 inches long and weighs 1590 lbs. with 209 lbs. of Explosive D. According to the manual, the navy bomb version has metal bands surrounding the body called suspension bands. There is also a MK1 mod 1 1600 lb. AP bomb. The suspension bands are bolted through holes in the body and that violent maneuvers with this suspension system are to be avoided. It uses a 14 inch shackle.

Interesting.

Dennis:

Note how the AP bombs filler to weight ratio mimic those of AP shells. 1.5% to maybe 3%?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Note how the AP bombs filler to weight ratio mimic those of AP shells. 1.5% to maybe 3%?
Yes. But perfectly understandable.

More on the 250 lb. GP. It was a Mark 57/57A1. Weighed 267.4 pounds with the fin assy. It was filled with 132 lbs of Tritonal. Used various combinations of tail and nose fuzes with .1 to .3 sec delays. Light case bombs are fuzed for blast effect on the surface. The GP are fuzed for blast effect, penetration using .1 sec or less, 4 to 18 sec delays for low to medium altitude, or 1 to hour to 6 day delayed action.

Delayed fuzed GP bombs will fail on impact with armor or reinforced concrete when dropped from high altitude but with instantaneous fuzes and dropped from low to medium altitude they can be used.

Interesting stuff.

[djcyclone]

Dennis:

Yeah, the Yamato class was one big target LOL! Especially without aircraft covering her.



That reminds me of a documentery I saw on the battle of Midway. The pilots interviewed said that from the sky the rising sun on the decks of the carrier looked like a big target. Just aim for that and release the bomb.

Hahaha. Nothing like having a target as your national naval insignia. (SHOOT HERE)

[john964]

That reminds me of a documentery I saw on the battle of Midway. The pilots interviewed said that from the sky the rising sun on the decks of the carrier looked like a big target. Just aim for that and release the bomb.

Hahaha. Nothing like having a target as your national naval insignia. (SHOOT HERE)
So thats what happened to Hiryu she took all her hit right on top of the rising sun. LOL

[old_pop2000]

So thats what happened to Hiryu she took all her hit right on top of the rising sun. LOL
There is a picture of Akagi in a hard turn to starboard, showing the rising sun on her deck. I assume this picture was taken by a dive bomber. The meatball, however, is about fifty feet from the edge of the forward end of the flight deck, probably on the forward elevator or close.

Enclosed a picture of Akagi as a dive bomber would have seen her. Rising sun is on the forward end of the ship.

Second photo of Hiryu during the attack. Notice where the meatball is. Same location up at the forward end.

Based on the last photo, I don't see how a dive bomber could have seen it, until it was just at the lower end of the dive. Just my opinion.

Enjoy

[john964]

There is a picture of Akagi in a hard turn to starboard, showing the rising sun on her deck. I assume this picture was taken by a dive bomber. The meatball, however, is about fifty feet from the edge of the forward end of the flight deck, probably on the forward elevator or close.

Enclosed a picture of Akagi as a dive bomber would have seen her. Rising sun is on the forward end of the ship.

Second photo of Hiryu during the attack. Notice where the meatball is. Same location up at the forward end.

Based on the last photo, I don't see how a dive bomber could have seen it, until it was just at the lower end of the dive. Just my opinion.

EnjoyMaybe maybe not however Hiryu did take all 4 hits forward of the island.

[djcyclone]

Remember the pictures we see today are black and white. If you had been their in person then it would have been a different story. Plus pilots are required to have excelent vision in order to qualify for flight.

I imagine towords the end of the war, the Navy and Army might have been waving the requirments for perfect vision a little, but Midway was at the begining of the war, so all of the Pilots would have had sharp vision. I would say that they could have been able to see that large red dot better than one would imagine.

My reason for this is it would stand out against the brown and gray of the ship. Red is a bright and attractive collor, so if it is surrounded by gray, or brown then it would stand out, escpecially if the Japanese maintained a decent paint schedule. Being that it is the Naval Insignia I would say they kept it clean and well taken care of.

Just a threory of course.

[old_pop2000]

Maybe maybe not however Hiryu did take all 4 hits forward of the island.

Dives began around 15,000 ft and decended, releasing their bombs at around 2000 ft. The hits on Hiryu were by VB-6 which had witnessed misses by VS-6. In this case, they climbed to 19000 and started their bomb runs. The pilots were Richard Best, E.J. Kroeger, F.T. Weber, S.C. Hogan. Three hits were observed and the ship was burning from the stern forward. Photo's taken later show a massive hole right at the point of the forward elevator. Best commented later, that he did not stay around to observe the bomb hit. Survivors state that three bomb hits were observed forward and one amidships next to the island.

As you begin to pick up speed, the plane buffets, especially after you extend the dive flaps. This make the view through the sight difficult. You aim for the middle of the ship, unless obscured with smoke. Then you aim for the part of the deck visible or simply bomb into the previous hit. You release the bomb generally as you pull up to clear the propellor, so I doubt anyone really saw meatballs until he had pulled out and was passing over the ship.

Were the meatballs clearly visible, from any altitude? Remember, this ship had been at sea, a long time, launching aircraft over that area of the deck. How long does any believe that the bright red paint with yellow around it truly lasted, with salt spray etc. hitting it, with tires grinding along over it. Although Parshall shows the hits on the Hinomaru(meatball) and states that the pilots claimed using that as their aiming points. In his AAR, Best never makes that claim that they aimed for that insignia. So, reason asks the question: "If you are diving on a zigzaging carrier, moving at 20 knots, in a buffeting aircraft from 19,000 ft, do you aim for an insignia on the front of the ship, or do you aim for the widest portion, opposite the island? In the bibliography of "Shattered Sword" Parshall only lists two pilot AAR's. One from the CO of VB-6 and one from the CO of VS-6. Here is the link to the AAR for those two officers. Read down the page to the Battle of Midway and see the entries for Bombing Six Action report and Scouting 6 Action reports. Click on those two links and you can read what Best and Gallaher actually stated.

http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/default.htm

I am not questioning the veracity of anyone's work or statements, but isn't it possible that after many years, someone showed them the pictures or drawings of the ship and they answered, "oh yea, we were aiming at that meatball". There were 31 dive bombers in this attack, 15 with 1000 lb bombs and 16 with 500 lb bombs and only four hits were made. That is how difficult it was to hit Hiryu. This dive was the hardest attack of the operation for the dive bombers as Captain Kaku was one of the best ship handlers in the Japanese fleet. His immediate 180 degree turn, upon viewing the dive bombers of VS-6 threw off the bombing of this squadron. The hit ratio was in the neighborhood of 12%. I ask only the simple question; What pilots and when, did they state that they used the meatballs as the aiming point for their attacks?

[old_pop2000]

Here is a quote from Richard Best, about the red meatballs on the forward end of the Japanese ships. When the quote was uttered, I have no idea. But it is not in any official report that I've read.

“Here are the arrogant Japanese with their bright yellow decks with a meatball up on the bow.”
--Lt. Richard Best, U.S. Dive Bomber

[Ed Rotondaro]

There is a picture of Akagi in a hard turn to starboard, showing the rising sun on her deck. I assume this picture was taken by a dive bomber. The meatball, however, is about fifty feet from the edge of the forward end of the flight deck, probably on the forward elevator or close.

Enclosed a picture of Akagi as a dive bomber would have seen her. Rising sun is on the forward end of the ship.

Second photo of Hiryu during the attack. Notice where the meatball is. Same location up at the forward end.

Based on the last photo, I don't see how a dive bomber could have seen it, until it was just at the lower end of the dive. Just my opinion.

Enjoy

Dennis:

One of the dive bomber pilots mentioned using the Rising Sun as an aiming point. I'll have to read up on which one it was.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

One of the dive bomber pilots mentioned using the Rising Sun as an aiming point. I'll have to read up on which one it was.
I would certainly like to know who said it, but more importantly, when did he say it. Forty years later, or what? Why would you aim at the narrowest portion of a maneuvering carrier, moving at 20 knots, while being shot at by Ack-Ack and Japanese Zero's while looking through a foggy gunsight, in a buffetting dive bomber, probably moving at over 300 MPH, downward at an angle of 70 degrees?

Addendum:

Hiryu had width of 85.5 feet at her widest portion of the deck, but only 50 feet at the bow, where the meatball was located.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Remember the pictures we see today are black and white. If you had been their in person then it would have been a different story. Plus pilots are required to have excelent vision in order to qualify for flight.

I imagine towords the end of the war, the Navy and Army might have been waving the requirments for perfect vision a little, but Midway was at the begining of the war, so all of the Pilots would have had sharp vision. I would say that they could have been able to see that large red dot better than one would imagine.

My reason for this is it would stand out against the brown and gray of the ship. Red is a bright and attractive collor, so if it is surrounded by gray, or brown then it would stand out, escpecially if the Japanese maintained a decent paint schedule. Being that it is the Naval Insignia I would say they kept it clean and well taken care of.

Just a threory of course.

DJ:

German capital ships also had a very bright swastika on one or more of their turrets as an aerial recognition symbol. I believe it was a black swastika on a white circle on a red rectangle. Of course since the Brits rarely used dive bombers, it would not have been any help for the Swordfish torpedo bombers as an aiming point.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would certainly like to know who said it, but more importantly, when did he say it. Forty years later, or what? Why would you aim at the narrowest portion of a maneuvering carrier, moving at 20 knots, while being shot at by Ack-Ack and Japanese Zero's while looking through a foggy gunsight, in a buffetting dive bomber, probably moving at over 300 MPH, downward at an angle of 70 degrees?

Addendum:

Hiryu had width of 85.5 feet at her widest portion of the deck, but only 50 feet at the bow, where the meatball was located.

Dennis:

I beginning to believe it was a case of them seeing the insignia either before or after the dive and then the power of suggestion after so many years making them believe that they used it as an aiming point.