Air War over Vietnam and Lessons Learned

[old_pop2000]

The Vietnam War evokes memories of social unrest and a defeat for the US, but there were areas of great success. Those successes were mostly in the air. This was the first modern sophisticated airwar fought with first generation missiles, fighters, bombers and ordnance. All the aircraft including the stealth bomber and F-22 came from what we learned in Vietnam. Korea was WWII with swept wing jets, but nothing else. The Gulf War successes in the air, were a direct result of the lessons learned from Vietnam 17 years earlier.

In Vietnam, we started the war with dumb bombs like the 500, 1000 and 2000 lb weapons and ended with TV bombs and early LASER guided bombs. We began with F-100s, F-105s, A4s, F-8s and A1 Skyraiders. All 1950's era aircraft with little or no electronic suites and generally, single engines. We finished the war with F-4Js, F-14s, FB-111s, A6 intruders, A7 Corsairs, F4E's. All with sophisticated AI radars, ECM, and dual engines. It was the first airwar fought against a first generation air defense system with GCI, surface to air missiles, and radar guided guns along with supersonic point defense fighters like the Mig-21s along with subsonic MIG-17's. All Russian built, and supplied. It gave us a look at what we would have faced on the North German Plain in Europe if the Soviets had invaded West Germany.

Vietnam saw the first Wild Weasel aircraft. These were, initially, F-100Fs with 20mm cannons along with rockets to mark or attack a target. Their job was to destroy or suppress the SAM systems in the north. They eventually migrated to F-105Ds with an electronic warfare officer flying in the backseat. Eventually, they migrated to the F-105Gs. After the war, as a result of their success, the F-4G Wild Weasel was inducted into the system. They are still with us today. Now performed by F-16CJ's and EF-18s. They used anti-radiation missiles such as the AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missile which was far faster than the SHRIKE, had a larger warhead and four times the range.

I hope that this thread can generate some interest, especially from our friends across the pond. The air operation in Libya has as its foundation, the lessons the west learned from the US in Vietnam. The Israeli's failed to appreciate what had occurred in the air war over Vietnam and paid the price at the beginning of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Over Vietnam's air space, we paid a heavy price for the lessons learned.

As the title of the thread implys, we can explore the technological evolution that has occurred since Vietnam and the lessons learned.

[old_pop2000]

Yes, there were F-14s in Vietnam. They deployed on board the USS Enterprise in 1975 and provided cover for the withdrawal but saw no action. The two squadrons were VF-1 and VF-2, the wolfpack and the bounty hunters.

[old_pop2000]

The first operational mission of the Vietnam war took place on August 5th, 1964 when sixty-four Naval aircraft from the Tico and Conny, struck the NVA MTB bases in Haiphong Harbor. This was in response to the attacks on the Maddox and the Turner Joy. These types of raids, into the north continued for forty months. They became known as Rolling Thunder. NVA air defenses were minimal, with about 20 early warning radars, 1500 AA guns and no SAMS. there were only two jet capable airfields. One at Gia Lam near Hanoi and Cat Bi near Haiphong harbor. There was another under construction at Phuc Yen. By February of 1965, the NVA had amassed sixty Mig-17s along with Russian supplied GCI equipment including radios and radars. The level of sophistication rose quickly.

[old_pop2000]

Just some facts about Rolling Thunder, the longest sustained aerial bombing campaign in history. It actually started on 4 March 1965. It was not successful. The US pre-war concept of air power was based on strategic bombing. It had two assumptions: that any US war would be waged to destroy the enemy's ability to wage modern war. The second was that we would be engaged with a modern industrialized state. These assumption were not applicable in Vietnam. This was the first hard lesson learned; tailor your operations to the environment and the opponent you are facing. Rolling Thunder was a gradual employment of air power designed convince the NVA of our resolve and destroy their ability to prosecute the war in South Vietnam. It did neither. Blame has always been centered on the civilian leadership, but most studies agree that even with cooperation by the civilian leadership with military operational objectives and methods, it would still have failed. Politics is out of realm of this thread, but the military conduct of the operation isn't. Most post war studies agree that Rolling Thunder illustrated the problems inherent in developing an effective air doctrine in modern war. The Gulf War and the Libyan air operations probably learned this lesson. Rolling Thunder failed to accomplish the purpose for which the campaign was designed.

The doctrine that guided planners of Rolling Thunder was the result of post WWII strategy of nuclear deterent. The aircraft designed and built in 1950's generally were developed around this strategy. The point defense fighters like the F-102,F-106 were designed as bomber killers. The fighter bombers were designed for the delivery of nuclear weapons: the F-105 being the chief tactical nuclear bomber. The B-52 was the higher end, strategic nuclear bomber. All force structure and training were devoted this this concept. SAC became the dominant command in the USAF. The lone voice against this doctrine was General Maxwell Taylor, who wrote that the force structure should be designed to fight small wars with conventional weapons. instead of the big war with a nuclear confrontation. The attitude that strategic bombing with unlimited objectives could destroy the enemy was not limited to the 1950's. During WWII, the USAAF was against the use of aircraft in close air support. It developed it and used it, but strategic bombing was always considered the war winner. This continued into the 1950's. Korea was a limited war, with limited objectives, but the military dismissed it as an aberration. No lessons were learned.

This brings us to 1964, and the start of air combat operations ostensibly a middle of road attempt to increase aid to a faltering South Vietnamese government. It was hoped that it would bring the NVA to the table, if the war was brought home to them. This would avoid the bane of western military experts.... the involvement in a land war on the Asian continent.

Just some background for all you.

Thanks for reading this, hope you weren't too bored.


　

　

[O.K.]

Thanks for reading this, hope you weren't too bored.


No it isn't too boring.

The problem is, that the topic is SO interesting, and so VAST, that somehow I truly don't have a desire to engage in discussion in this thread right now. This topic was discussed countless times, is present in so many sources, that I don't want simply to repeat all old arguments. The topic is very broad and I simply have other matters in mind right now.

Nevertheless, thanks for Your effort. Sometimes I feel the same when I'm writing about Suvorov theory for example, when no one wants to engage in discussions.

[old_pop2000]

No it isn't too boring.

The problem is, that the topic is SO interesting, and so VAST, that somehow I truly don't have a desire to engage in discussion in this thread right now. This topic was discussed countless times, is present in so many sources, that I don't want simply to repeat all old arguments. The topic is very broad and I simply have other matters in mind right now.

Nevertheless, thanks for Your effort. Sometimes I feel the same when I'm writing about Suvorov theory for example, when no one wants to engage in discussions.

The topic is interesting and vast. But to understand modern, twenty-first century air power doctrine, we have to start with Vietnam, Rolling Thunder and the Linebacker operations. The topic can be classified and limited, it doesn't bother me. The most important aspect is to relate how we got to the present day doctrine and weaponry. How do they relate, what did we learn, what didn't we learn? Are we having to relearn the old principles again.

Anyway, I appreciate the nice comment. Come back, and we can discuss any aspect of this issue. If you wish to discuss the Russian first gen air defense system with GCI, SAM's and radar directed guns along with the defensive fighters used, it is applicatable to what should have been in Poland during the Cold War. It might be illustrative to all.

[Christian Schwietzke]

I´m not bored at all. It´s just that I don´t know enough to contribute.

[O.K.]

Anyway, I appreciate the nice comment. Come back, and we can discuss any aspect of this issue. If you wish to discuss the Russian first gen air defense system with GCI, SAM's and radar directed guns along with the defensive fighters used, it is applicatable to what should have been in Poland during the Cold War. It might be illustrative to all.

Thanks, currently I have a different issues in mind than the air defence of the PRL. Too many issues, too little time (and a stack of unread magazines on my desk -including 3-part article about dogfights during Rolling Thunder) :P

But maybe later...

[old_pop2000]

One of the first US aircraft downed by a SAM in Vietnam, was Leopard 02. Leopard flight consisted of four F-4C's cruising in fingertip formation at 23,000 feet about 40 miles west of Hanoi. They had taken off from Ubon AB on an escort mission for USAF planes bombing the North. Date was 24 July 1965. This was the fifth month of Rolling Thunder. At 0805, an RB-66C elint aircraft detected a radar signal from an SA-2 battery. It radioed a warning and a few minutes later two streaks were seen moving upward. The first missile exploded directly underneath Leopard 02. The pilot escaped but the GIB did not. Fragments were found in all of the rest of Leopard flight on their return.

We knew of the SA-2 and its capabilities. In 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down by one over Sverdlovsk. Two years later, a nationalist chinese pilot was also lost in his U-2. A few weeks later, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a SAC U-2 was shot down over Cuba on a photographic mission. The pilot lost was the same pilot that had discovered the missiles.

The missile that destroyed Leopard 02 was a guideline missile, part of the SA-2 weapons system. It was usually clumped together in four to six Guidelines on individual launchers. They were tied to FAN SONG radars to locate targets and Spoon Rest acquistion radar designed to search a distance of 100 miles and detect targets. The missile measured about 35 feet in length, weighed about 5000 lbs and attained a terminal velocity of Mach 4. It had a warhead of 420 lbs and could down a bird at 17 nautical miles from the launcher. It did have a dead zone of 5 miles. That simply means that it took that distance for the warhead to arm. It also had a 3000 foot limitation. An aircraft below that, was safe.... at least from the SAMs, but there was also radar guided AA guns like the 57 mm that were very lethal.

The principle of operation was that the Spoon Rest, basically an orange peel on its side, searched and detected the targets, passing the target information via cable to the Fan Song acquistion system. Fan Song was mounted on a trailer with two trough like antennas which scanned horizontally and vertically. This was a track-while-scan radar which in layman's terms means that while continuing to scan, it also tracked the target of a particular return. It could only fire upon one target at a time. It took about 75 seconds to acquire, lock on and launch the missile. It required about 30-40 seconds to shift to another target. Salvos were possible against one target at 5 sec intervals. Those same antenna's would also track the missiles path and sent command guidance information via the dish antenna. The warhead was a proximity fuze activated about 1000 feet from the intercept point. If the missile missed, it automatically exploded.

The SA-2 consisted of 25 vehicles and vans in a battalion size organization. It usually consisted of the acquistion radar, fan son set, electrical generators, fire control computer and 18 guideline missiles for six launchers. The system was upgraded over the seven years that air operations were conducted over Vietnam and in company with 100 mm, 85mm, 57mm and the other AA guns, along with the Migs, it did offer a deadly air defense system that took time and technology to finally defeat.

Thnx for reading this short informational piece.


　

[old_pop2000]

It's July 25, 1965 and the US has lost one aircraft and three damaged to the SA-2 systems newly implaced in North Vietnam, operated by Russian technicians with NVA students watching. We knew they were there, we detected the increase in PRF which signalled that the Fan Song acquisition radar had switched over to acquisition mode and was tracking the target. The missiles were seen, but with a mach four speed, it was impossible to react. Now what do you do if you are PACAF, Pacific Air Force? How do we solve the triad of medium to high altitude missiles, low to medium altitude optical and radar guided 23mm, 37mm, 57mm cannons and the radar guided 85 and 100mm AAA along with GCI controlled Mig-17s.

The reaction to this event can not be just the introduction of new technologies to neutralize the missile threat. It has to be a complete solution entailing the introduction of a better and more advanced form of tactical air warfare. We now would have to depend on electronics. It was now a battle of technologies between our adversary and ourselves. It had to be an integrated solution of new and old technologies, tactical doctrine and policy.

As with any problem solving plan, you have to start by defining the problem, ensuring that you understand completely what you are facing. After that, you must gather and assess the data so that solutions can be produced. This is exactly how the USAF went about solving the problem of attacking the air defense system in North Vietnam. The USAF compiled all the information that it had gathered in the past, gathered new data from EB-66s, EC-121D Connies and Naval electronic warfare aircraft to understand exactly how the system worked. What was the PRF of the search radar, range and range resolution. What were the frequencies? Same information had to be gathered for the acquistion radars and tracking radars, many times these were the same set. You had to know the characteristics when the set was searching, acquiring and tracking. In the Fan Song acquisition system, the operators would switch to the high PRF position when tracking the target and deriving the intercept point. This would indicate when the missiles would be fired. But this is only one part of the puzzle. You had to perform this kind of data acquisition for each weapon in the system, whether it was a missile, gun-laying or GCI for controlling aircraft.

After you are reasonably certain and have tested your ideas, then you have to solve the problem. It may involve updating old equipment, production of new equipment and borrowing weapons from another force, like the AGM-45 Shrike from the US Navy. In this case, the USAF developed a special force of two seat aircraft with an electronic warfare officer on board to acquire, assess and attack the air defense. This was the beginning of the Wild Weasels. Initially they were F-100Fs with two seats with the second seat being the electronic warfare officer. These aircraft would preceed any attack package, forcing the air defense to react and then attacking them with dumb bombs, TV guided and radar homing missiles. However, the attack package aircraft would also have to have at least one or two aircraft accompanying them with jammers on board, like the QRC-160 to protect the package during ingress and egress from the target area. The whole package would have to have TARCAP fighters to protect the bombers during bomb runs from enemy fighters. These TARCAP fighters would circle the area, waiting for information from Red Crown about any enemy interceptors lifting off of the runways at the three primary bases near Hanoi. The above is really an oversimplication of how the problem was solved. Whole books have been written explaining this. But the process developed what is now termed Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses or SEAD. This was a lesson learned.


　

[old_pop2000]

The story of the electronics war against the NVA did not begin right away. We did gather intelligence from airborne sources but the first attempts at silencing the missile batteries was the brute force method. It failed. The missions were termed "Iron Hand" missions and the first such mission was on July 27, 1965. As you can see, this was only three days after the loss of Leopard 04. It involved 54 F-105s going in at low altitude, due to the dead zone for the Fan Song radar. However, the opponent moved the battery, installed dummies and arrayed 120 AA guns instead. The incoming force lost six F-105s and one RF-101 Voodoo. Not to be outdone, the Navy lost an A-4 and tried a similar attack losing five more aircraft to the AA guns. Even BQM-34 Firebee drones were used to sucker the radar operators into lighting off the sets, and no go. Between August 12th and September 14th, 388 Iron Hand missions were flown without success. It was only then, that the US turned to electronic intelligence or ELINT aircraft to monitor the signals from the sets, to understand better how they worked and their vulnerabilities. An ELINT mission on February 13th, 1966 hit paydirt, finally capturing the command uplink and downlink signals for the Fan Song sets, thus providing the key to detecting and striking the sets during operation.

However, the easiest way was for the CIA just to purchase a Fan Song radar from Indonesia, this made the problem much easier. Money talks. Another lesson learned.

[asnrobert]

I few months ago I came across an Air Force magazine that had an article about the Wild Weasel missions in Vietnam (I wished I had saved it). I recall reading that the first anti-radar missile, the Shrike, had a fairly limited range, so one technique was to fly at high altitude, and pull up the plane when launching the missile, in order to "lob" it and increase the range.

[old_pop2000]

I few months ago I came across an Air Force magazine that had an article about the Wild Weasel missions in Vietnam (I wished I had saved it). I recall reading that the first anti-radar missile, the Shrike, had a fairly limited range, so one technique was to fly at high altitude, and pull up the plane when launching the missile, in order to "lob" it and increase the range.

Hi Robert:
That is entirely true, it was called a lofted trajectory. After reaching its maximum altitude, on the downhill leg, the seeker would activate, detect the radar and lock-on. The missile had other problems including a fixed frequency seeker head and no memory so if the site shut down, it forgot everything. It was eventually replaced by the AGM-88 HARM missile. Remember that if the Fan Song B shut down due to the SHRIKE, that's all you need because it took one minute to fire up and warm up the radar by which time the aircraft probably was out of range. So, it was still effective.

[old_pop2000]

Without getting into politics, I want to raise the issue of ROEs. These are the rules that pilots had to follow, in the air war in Vietnam. Yes, they were politically motivated because of the countries in the immediate area and the war monopoly attitude in Washington. That should end the discussion points for politics. Was it a lesson learned? Absolutely. No air war involving US aircraft has ever been fought since Vietnam, with any sort of ROEs that limited response. If something shoots at you, shoot back. This was the signed order by President Clinton in the no-fly zone operation in Iraq, they shoot, you shoot back. If you want an example from Vietnam, aircraft flying out of Thailand were not allowed to participate in AtoG operations in South Vietnam. They could attack North Vietnam, but not south. In fact, there was a test for new USAF pilots arriving in Thailand, on the ROEs. It was a loose-leaf book that pilots had to go through prior to any combat missions in country. Here is a link to an article that shows what could and did happen if the ROE's were broken.

http://www.historynet.com/air-force-colonel-jacksel-jack-broughton-air-force-general-john-d-jack-lavelle-testing-the-rules-of-engagement-during-the-vietnam-war.htm

Please, no political discussions about this. Politics are not allowed on this forum and this thread will not break that hard and fast rule.

[old_pop2000]

http://12tfw.org/scrap13.htm

The map in the above link, shows Vietnam with US and NVA air bases, but more importantly, the route packages. It also has the air refueling points and anchors. Its a good map for reference.

North Vietnam geographically, resembles a pork Chop with the meaty portion in the north and the boney part in the south. If you reference the map. It was dissected into route packages by the military with the most dangerous being route package 6. That area encompassed Hanoi-Haiphong, with 6A being the USAF area and 6B being the Navy's. There was a valid reason for keeping them separate. At this time in airwarfare history, the Navy and USAF could not communicate well and having mixed force packages flying around might cause some friendly fire incidents. Route package one was USAF area starting at the demilitarized zone and reaching north of Khe Phal. It did not have missiles, so it was used by the new pilots in country as a training area before venturing north into more hostile indian country. However, due to losses in the F-105 community, this was not always possible. Many times, a new pilot from Nellis, got one check flight, one bombing mission over Route Package one and then might be assigned as a spare for a four plane or eight plane group headed north into indian country. New pilots before heading to Thailand had to go to the Philippines for Jungle survival training and I guess that was not fun from the comments I've read.

The primary bomber used during Rolling Thunder was the F-105D Thunderchief or thud. Generally, ordnance loads were varied, being mission specific. One possible external load was the M118 3000 lb HE bomb on each inboard pylon and one 650 gallon tank on centerline. Until the advent of the rocket pods, the outboard wing stations were emptywith these large bombs. With those pods, take-off weight was exceeded so the pilots had to hope that taxing and preparation for take-off would suck enough fuel to put them under the weight limit. One important issue with those bombs was that the pilot had to pickle off both at the same time or the bird became uncontrollable. Normal drop angle was 35-45 degrees at 3500 feet. At that altitude and speed in the dive, there isn't much chance to try to recover. It could be done, but with finesse. One nice feature of the Thud was the 20mm cannon.

The pilots worst enemy was not the Migs or the missiles, they had vulnerabilities that could be exploited but the AAA weapons were the most dangerous. Many were optically aimed but usually just arrayed to produce a barrage and force the bomber to fly through it. The 85 and 100 mm guns were radar directed and were very deadly at medium to high altitudes. The best way to defeat them was by jinking the aircraft. That is difficult when you commence your bomb run. The missiles could be out maneuvered. The smaller caliber AA guns were very deadly. Weapons like the 20mm, 23mm, 37mm,40 mm and 57 mm on single and double mounts could put a lethal barrage up and just one hit might end your flight. These weapons were mobile, and hard to find. They were even harder to hit.

Hope that helps to understand the geography and typical procedures. Note that after Vietnam, actually during the war, the navy, marines and USAF began to develop and coordinate better communications between groups of aircraft. One advancement was JTIDS or joint tactical information data system. This also spurred the development of AEW or airborne early warning aircraft like the E2 Hawkeye for the Navy and the E3 Sentry for the air force. Again, lessons learned for the future. Note that the first test flight of the E3 was in October 1975, with the E2C already in the fleet by that time. I know, I worked on its electronics suite at the depot.


　

[O.K.]

Hey Old Pop ;-)

If I can suggest one topic: can You describe me in details the "supersonic jump" tactics used by F-111s in Vietnam War? In details, with diagrams of flight profiles, air defence detection schemes, and so on.
This is an interesting subject, and with Your large expertise, I can understand better why was this tactic so effective in penetrating North Vietnamese air defenses :-)

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

Interesting 1960s film about F-105s in Vietnam:
Part 1: http://youtu.be/0QduXYUchp4
Part 2: http://youtu.be/VrdRq4BwhZo

[old_pop2000]

Hey Old Pop ;-)

If I can suggest one topic: can You describe me in details the "supersonic jump" tactics used by F-111s in Vietnam War? In details, with diagrams of flight profiles, air defence detection schemes, and so on.
This is an interesting subject, and with Your large expertise, I can understand better why was this tactic so effective in penetrating North Vietnamese air defenses :-)

Thanks.

I will do the best that I can, for sure. The F-111 conops was predicated on its all-weather, night attack capability, extended range and terrain following radar. Typically, the NVA used the night to resupply, move weapons, and rebuild damaged sites along with moving forces into attack positions. They knew that current US warplanes did not have the night attack weapons capability. The F-111 would be used in very low altitudes, 200-1000 feet depending on defenses and terrain, any type of weather and at night. With high drag ordnance, altitudes of 200-500 feet were possible using full military power. AB was not used due to munitions carriages and highly visible plume from the engines. Aircraft carrying external stores cannot exceed Mach 1 due to bomb flutter. No one has solved that issue with the MERs yet.

With low drag weapons, the weapons delivery would be in a stabilized climb. The ballistic Computer Unit would initiate a 10 degree climb about 15-20 seconds prior to releasing the bomb. Altitude for this profile was about 1000 AGL. The aircraft would then maneuver to the desired egress track, and TRF along with military power would be engaged. Bomb loads were twelve MK-82s or four MK-84s. Maximum bomb loads were 24 MK-82s. The mission profiles were High-Low-high with the descent to low level using TFR timed to permit the aircraft to remain below radar and Migs. The F-111 had a limited of 50 degrees on wing sweep with external loads.

The air defenses were mainly from AAA and small arms fire along with SAM activity. Migs were not a significant threat due to time of day the flight would be conducted. AAA was conducted using barrages aimed at the sound of the aircraft. Eventually, they managed to bring their AAA weapons delivery down to 500 feet but they were usually behind the bird due to its speed. SAMS were a threat, but using RHAW indications, in combination with chaff, maneuvering and the ECM pods, there were no losses.
If you are interested, there were six F-111A losses: Ranger 23; Coach 33; Snug 40; Jackel 33; burger 54 and whaler 57. Those are their call signs. The first two were never found and but Coach might have been hit by AAA.

I hope this is sufficient, I have not found a good mission profile drawing as yet. As far as air defense schemes we can continue to explore this, if you wish. Keep in mind it was terrain dependent and target dependent. SAMS were usually in groups of six in a triangular pattern centered around the Fan Song B acquisition radar with a road around the outside for the transports and resupply functions. Large AA guns like the 85 and 100 mm were usually centered on a Spoon Rest or Fire Can search radar providing targeting information. Usually six to eight were present. Small weapons were difficult to pinpoint but usually grouped to provide a coverage near and around the target being protected.

In a personal note, I was stationed Fallon NAS in the USAF and the F-111s from the Nellis Training Base near Las Vegas used our EW/Automatic Bombing Scoring range in the mountains for practice before the first deployment to Takhli RTAFB. We used to watch the christmas tree flares drop and then the birds dived into the valley for their runs. We lost one into the valley floor and had to provide security around the crash site for a week until the crash investigators arrived on-scene. I also watched them doing touch and go's on our runway. They were cool to watch, compared to the usual A6s, F4s and A-7s that used the range prior to deployment on carriers to Vietnam.

[old_pop2000]

Interesting 1960s film about F-105s in Vietnam:
Part 1: http://youtu.be/0QduXYUchp4
Part 2: http://youtu.be/VrdRq4BwhZo

Hey Robert:
Very nice, I downloaded them into RealPlayer for later. I also will download the whole group. I have a Flight manual for the F-105B coming so I can see procedures. Very cool. Thanks a bunch.

[O.K.]

Description of "supersonic jump" attack, from the Jerzy Gotowała book "Lotnictwo we współczesnych konfliktach zbrojnych 1945-2003" (in Polish).

August 12, 1972, the day was windy (...). Even at the end of the night when two F-111F took off from Takhli (...),, to destroy the fuel depots in Tien Yen northeast of Haiphong. (...)
It was to be "supersonic jump", surprising Vietnamese air defense system. First of Bolowen they cut narrow east side of South Vietnam, venturing to the shallow South China Sea, near Qui Nhon to maneuver on the course 320 in the direction of Haiphong. Then, flying in the column, increased speed to 1.6 Ma, lowering gently 8,000 meters of altitude. With such conditions, they "jumped" unnoticed into the zone of Vietnamese radars. Between Chinese Hainan and Than Hoa they lowered speed to 850 km/h, and from the altitude of 4800 m they tracked the target, and dropped bombs from a distance of 32 km, destroying two main pumping stations ... Haiphong air defense system did not have time to react, was completely surprised.

Description is based on an interview "One day over Vietnam..." with Lt. Colonel Tommy Crawford, New Tork 19 June 1992.

So this is quite a different tactics, than You described. First, the attack was (probably) performed in a daylight, not at low or very low, but at hight to medium altitude. Supersonic speed was achieved in a shallow dive, that allowed to go below Vietnamese radar horizons. However the final attack was performed from great distance (32 km -about 18 nm), and on a medium altitude (4800 m -16 000 ft). Then, the AAA should be no threat, MiGs are too slow and have no time to catch F-111, however the aircraft should be vulnerable to well positioned SAMs (in aclose distance to the target).

[old_pop2000]

Description of "supersonic jump" attack, from the Jerzy Gotowała book "Lotnictwo we współczesnych konfliktach zbrojnych 1945-2003" (in Polish).

August 12, 1972, the day was windy (...). Even at the end of the night when two F-111F took off from Takhli (...),, to destroy the fuel depots in Tien Yen northeast of Haiphong. (...)
It was to be "supersonic jump", surprising Vietnamese air defense system. First of Bolowen they cut narrow east side of South Vietnam, venturing to the shallow South China Sea, near Qui Nhon to maneuver on the course 320 in the direction of Haiphong. Then, flying in the column, increased speed to 1.6 Ma, lowering gently 8,000 meters of altitude. With such conditions, they "jumped" unnoticed into the zone of Vietnamese radars. Between Chinese Hainan and Than Hoa they lowered speed to 850 km/h, and from the altitude of 4800 m they tracked the target, and dropped bombs from a distance of 32 km, destroying two main pumping stations ... Haiphong air defense system did not have time to react, was completely surprised.

Description is based on an interview "One day over Vietnam..." with Lt. Colonel Tommy Crawford, New Tork 19 June 1992.

So this is quite a different tactics, than You described. First, the attack was (probably) performed in a daylight, not at low or very low, but at hight to medium altitude. Supersonic speed was achieved in a shallow dive, that allowed to go below Vietnamese radar horizons. However the final attack was performed from great distance (32 km -about 18 nm), and on a medium altitude (4800 m -16 000 ft). Then, the AAA should be no threat, MiGs are too slow and have no time to catch F-111, however the aircraft should be vulnerable to well positioned SAMs (in aclose distance to the target).


The route you are referring to was used in exceptional circumstances when the target was on the coast. To prevent the birds from having to traverse the heavily defended Red River delta area, the F-111's would either ingress from the Gulf of Tonkin or egress in that direction. They would take-off from Tahkli, fly NE and head down the west side of Thud Ridge, then turn east at high speed, and then when hitting the IP, go into their bomb run. After release, the nav-bombing system would guide the bomber straight out to sea and then down the coast. There were two orbiting KC-135 tankers, Tan and Purple orbiting off the coast of the dmz for refueling. The bomb run you described is nothing more than a typical glide bomb attack at an angle of between 30--40 degrees. However, if they went supersonic, they were using internal ordnance storage, not external. You have not given me any ordnance loads for those birds. Generally the target type dictated the ordnance and fuzing. POL targets were generally hit with M117 750 lb bombs with instantaneous fuzes to initiate the blast upon contact with the ground. Any large explosion would set the POL on fire and sympathetic explosions occurred afterward.

Next item is the date of the attack. The F-111s deployed in 1968 but were withdrawn due to structural issues. The next deployment was the 474th TFW out of Nellis AFB. This wing consisted of the 429th and 430th Tactical Fighter squadrons. Based on formally top secret documents titled Project Checo, this deployment wasn't until 29 September 1972. There was a valid reason. The base at Takhli was not ready for the wing. The runway needed a long runout BAK-12 arresting system installed due to the heavier weight of the F-111 over the F4's. This was requested by 13AF on 5 August 1972 to TAC. The equipment did not arrive from TAC until 2 October 1972 and it was inoperative requiring 25 hrs of maintenance. Records show that the 429th deployed to Hickam in Hawaii on 27 Sept. 1972 then to Clark on 28 September then from Clark to Takhli on 30 September, 1972. This was before the long runout BAK-12 was operational, but with no weapons loads and internal fuel, the aircraft could make the landings with little problems. This deployment was perfect because the 49th TFW was leaving Takhli RTAFB on 29 Sept 72 and this would make room for the new F-111s. It removed 36 F-4s and brought in 24 F-111s. Unfortunately due to a tropical storm, the ground crews and supplies were not flown in until 1 October. Now, the first operations began on 28 September, only hours after the first aircraft deployed. It was a six aircraft strike against six targets in RP 1 & 5. Crews had been flown in on 24 September 1972 and were in place, when the birds arrived from Clark. It was on this mission that Ranger 23 was lost, last heard from about 40 minutes after launch. It was the second aircraft launched on the strike. They departed at 2000 hrs, and Ranger 23 was declared missing after 0000 hrs with no further contact. Combat operations were halted due to a SAR operation but after 1 October, the SAR operation was terminated and the birds were back on combat operation. I hope you see my problem with the date. There were no F-111s in country in August. They were still at Nellis doing training exercises. Those were the aircraft we saw at Fallon. With all of the primary documents available, I cannot verify that date.

Later Information: Ranger 23 was F-111A 67-0078 (http://forums.navalwarfare.net/t_no_A.htm) lost on 28 Sep 72. Maj. William Clare "Bill" Coltman and 1LT Robert Arthur "Lefty" Brett Jr. Aircraft lost on the first night of F-111 operations, only hours after deploying
to SEA. Target was in Route Pack 1. Major Coltman was promoted twice to the rank
of Colonel whilst listed as missing before being pronounced presumed killed in
action. POW/MIA Reference # 1929-0-01 / -02.
Loss co-ordinates: 21 35 51N 104 59 21E are
of target position (North Viet Nam).
Wreckage positively identified by JTF-FA team in
Laos in late 1990's, and recovery (http://forums.navalwarfare.net/#F-111A 67-0078 ?) of bone fragments in 2000. (2)

Honolulu Star newspaper article. (3)

http://www.f-111.net/F-111A/ranger23.htm

Source: Project Checo Southeast Asia F-111 in Southeast Asia September 1972-January 1973. Declassified on 8-17-2006

[O.K.]

So it seems to be an interesting subject. I don't persist that everything in that description must be accurate (I found several errors in Gotowała's book), but generaly the whole that action is worth attention. It would be good to find an original source, that means this interview with Lt. Colonel Crawford.

[old_pop2000]

So it seems to be an interesting subject. I don't persist that everything in that description must be accurate (I found several errors in Gotowała's book), but generaly the whole that action is worth attention. It would be good to find an original source, that means this interview with Lt. Colonel Crawford.

This is all I could dig up for Major General Tommy F. Crawford in the Official USAF website - http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5109

If you examine his assignment chronology, he did not get to Vietnam but did fly from Mountain Home AFB in F-111s. He did not join the 429th Fighter Squadron at Nellis AFB until 1975. This was long after combat operations had ceased in Vietnam.

[O.K.]

This is all I could dig up for Major General Tommy F. Crawford in the Official USAF website - http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5109

If you examine his assignment chronology, he did not get to Vietnam but did fly from Mountain Home AFB in F-111s. He did not join the 429th Fighter Squadron at Nellis AFB until 1975. This was long after combat operations had ceased in Vietnam.

So I don't know what to think about this all...

[old_pop2000]

So I don't know what to think about this all...

I don't know, but those are the facts. Sorry.

[O.K.]

I don't know, but those are the facts. Sorry.

Even if so, it doesn't mean, however, that the info about "supersonic jump" is not real. Does one have a full statistics of F-111 sorties in Vietnam? Maybe it would be possible to find missions when those tactics were applied, and eventually correct mistaken informations.

[old_pop2000]

Even if so, it doesn't mean, however, that the info about "supersonic jump" is not real. Does one have a full statistics of F-111 sorties in Vietnam? Maybe it would be possible to find missions when those tactics were applied, and eventually correct mistaken informations.

No, the information I provided calls into question the date of the attack, not the targetting or mission profile. The POL storage facilities near the coast at Haiphong were definitely targets and with the heavy defenses around Hanoi and Red River Delta, a good target for night, nap of earth missions that the F-111 was designed to perform. To hit such coastal targets, the mission flight path probably would mean a flight over Laos, and Vietnam then out to the Gulf of Tonkin. Then a turn to port and high speed low level ingress to the target. The problem with the dive approach at high speed is that your afterburners and sounds would give you away. Another possibility is to come in high until you reach the outer portion of their radar coverage, dive at high speed under the radar then hit the target, hoping that you speed would "jump" the defenses at night before they could react. At night, usually the Mig threat is minimal. Without more detail of the mission, I am speculating. In my spare time, I will research that type of mission or specific mission and hopefully find more concrete information for you.

Note also that the model of F-111s used in Vietnam were A models, not F models.

[O.K.]

The problem with the dive approach at high speed is that your afterburners and sounds would give you away. Another possibility is to come in high until you reach the outer portion of their radar coverage, dive at high speed under the radar then hit the target, hoping that you speed would "jump" the defenses at night before they could react. At night, usually the Mig threat is minimal. Without more detail of the mission, I am speculating. In my spare time, I will research that type of mission or specific mission and hopefully find more concrete information for you.

Note also that the model of F-111s used in Vietnam were A models, not F models.

Well, if you go supersonic, you obviously don't have to worry that the sound will indicate your position - simply because you will be ahead of your sound ;-) And as the attack is performed above the coast, from a great distance (18 nm) and relatively high altitude (16 000 ft) the only problems are SAMs.

Anyway, thanks for Your info. You don't have to worry that nobody is interested Your "lectures" about aerial warfare in Vietnam war ;-)

[old_pop2000]

Well, if you go supersonic, you obviously don't have to worry that the sound will indicate your position - simply because you will be ahead of your sound ;-) And as the attack is performed above the coast, from a great distance (18 nm) and relatively high altitude (16 000 ft) the only problems are SAMs.

Anyway, thanks for Your info. You don't have to worry that nobody is interested Your "lectures" about aerial warfare in Vietnam war ;-)

With experience, you can locate a supersonic aircraft rather easy, even at low altitude. You don't even need sophisticated sound detectors. NVA did it well, even at transonic speeds. It is meant to be a general indicator of the presence of the intruder and his relative direction of travel. But it isn't real precise even with experience. We have jets at near transonic speeds flying over us all the time and I don't have any trouble finding them using sound.

As far as the "lectures", if you want to know where we are going in air warfare, you have understand where we have been. Vietnam is that starting point. Air warfare took some dramatic turns in that war. Thanks for your subject, it is actually an interesting aspect of that war.

[old_pop2000]

In 1966, the Systems Evaluation Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis as directed and in conjunction with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group produced a four volume database titled the Red Baron Reports. It was an extensive series of reports designed to study air to air encounters in SEA. The report was based on 400 encounters through 1 August 1967. It was primarily designed to provide accurate data for future research and development programs for high-performance fighter aircraft. It was also useful in providing data to the services and scientific community. The data was taken from official media reports and personal interviews with the participants. During the compilation, it was found that the first source was totally inadequate and personal interviews were the real main accurate source of data. Another lesson learned for the future.
In the first 23 month period from the first recorded encounter to 1 March 1967, 47 confirmed plus probable MIG kills were reported. In the next six week period, April-May 1967 another 65 engagements resulted in 37 confirmed plus probable MIG kills. The distribution of encounters on a per plane type are as follows:

To 1 March 1967 -
F-4B - 13
F-4C - 55
F-8 - 8
F-104 - 1
U-2 -1
F-105 - 151

Reviewing the list of documented events, it's interesting to note that the first recorded F-4 encounter did not occur until 19 January 1966 at 0950h. No combat results were published. That's about nine months after the first recorded encounter with the MIGs. That encounter was by Navy F-4B's on MIGCAP. These reports along with the Ault Report had much to do with changing tactics and providing material for the improvements in the F-15, F-16 and F-14 aircraft currently under development. The Ault Report was directly responsible for the Navy Fighter Weapons School at Miramar or Top Gun. That was followed by Red Flag at Nellis, the USAF version. These two schools brought air combat maneuvering back into air combat, teaching the pilots skills about how to use the performance advantages of their aircraft to combat the MIG’s superior maneuverability and their disadvantages of low specific excess power and lack of aggressiveness. Equipment and weapons were improved by upgrading current AtoA missiles to integrated circuit technology giving them better capabilities and improved reliability. Aircraft were provided with better look down, shoot down ability to counter the MIG’s standard tactic of diving to the deck and coming underneath the strike packages. This was especially true of the MIG-21s. ECM, smokeless engines, improved navigation with digital INS systems all contributed to the improvements in combat results in AtoA engagements. These are just a few of the improvements in tactics and weapons that gave the pilots a better chance.

Sources: Red Baron Report Vol 1-4, Ault Report

[Christian Schwietzke]

Wait ,the U-2 caused a kill? How´d they do that? I thought it was a high-altitude recon plane.

[old_pop2000]

Wait ,the U-2 caused a kill? How´d they do that? I thought it was a high-altitude recon plane.

Relax Christian, it is an unarmed high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. It encountered a MIG, but did not shoot it down. Remember the reports use all encounters whether there were losses on one side or both. It simply records encounters. In fact, the reports even list sightings with no actual encounters. I suspect, the U-2 was way above the Migs and simply sighted them, attempting to climb up to his altitude.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Relax Christian, it is an unarmed high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. It encountered a MIG, but did not shoot it down. Remember the reports use all encounters whether there were losses on one side or both. It simply records encounters. In fact, the reports even list sightings with no actual encounters. I suspect, the U-2 was way above the Migs and simply sighted them, attempting to climb up to his altitude.

Ah, thanks. My faith in my own rudimentary knowledge of military affairs is restored. :)

[old_pop2000]

Ah, thanks. My faith in my own rudimentary knowledge of military affairs is restored. :)

You're okay, Christian. BTW I actually saw a U-2 take off from Laughlin AFB in the '50's headed to Turkey and other eastern areas. My parents and I stayed at Laughlin AFB BOQ due to car problems. An officer helped us and brought us to the edge of the field and we watched it take off. It was great. They had two pickups under each wing to pickup the wheels as the came off. The plane went vertical, then the lights shut off, and off it went. He told us it would be back in the morning so we got up and watched it land. The pickups had to ride along side to put the wheels on.

[O.K.]

You're okay, Christian. BTW I actually saw a U-2 take off from Laughlin AFB in the '50's headed to Turkey and other eastern areas. My parents and I stayed at Laughlin AFB BOQ due to car problems. An officer helped us and brought us to the edge of the field and we watched it take off. It was great. They had two pickups under each wing to pickup the wheels as the came off. The plane went vertical, then the lights shut off, and off it went. He told us it would be back in the morning so we got up and watched it land. The pickups had to ride along side to put the wheels on.

This story is quite surprising to me. As it is known today, the U-2 was a CIA project. The 50s and early 60s is the top of the Cold War. The flights of U-2 above USSR and Cuba had very high strategic and political importance. The info about deployment of U-2 to Turkey, or somewhere else, the whole observation of U-2, was very important for the Soviet intelligence.

And an Air Force officer allows a kid to watch this all ???

Back to the topic, how about AWACS use in Vietnam war. How effective they were?

[old_pop2000]

This story is quite surprising to me. As it is known today, the U-2 was a CIA project. The 50s and early 60s is the top of the Cold War. The flights of U-2 above USSR and Cuba had very high strategic and political importance. The info about deployment of U-2 to Turkey, or somewhere else, the whole observation of U-2, was very important for the Soviet intelligence.

And an Air Force officer allows a kid to watch this all ???

Back to the topic, how about AWACS use in Vietnam war. How effective they were?

Excellent topic and there were good lessons learned from our experience. The NVAF did not have any airborne early warning aircraft. We used primarily the EC-121D Superconstellations. Both the USN and USAF used them. They supported both Rolling Thunder and Linebacker operations. They served to fill the gaps in radar coverage for the crown ships in the Gulf of Tonkin and the radar unit at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. The aircraft did a 30-90 day temporary deployment from either the 552nd Airborne Early Warning wing at McClellan AFB or the 551st at Otis AFB. Unfortunately, the radar in the Connies was not good over ground so they flew a 50 mile racetrack flight path in the Gulf of Tonkin about 30 miles off of the coast and later, were able to fly over Laos using special techniques developed during the Cuban Missile Crisis. They performed limited fighter control, airborne communications relay centers and assisted Rescap operation. They also guided fighters to tankers during emergency refueling efforts. They were upgraded over time with newer interrogators for snooping on Soviet transponders along with some vietnamese speaking officers flying with the plane. Since the planes were unarmed and very slow, they did have MIGCAP protecting them. In 1970, the USAF sent some of us to McClellan to view operations and see if we wanted to transfer to their operations as airborne radar technicians. I took one look at that old plane and said "no, thank you". The radar had a range of about 150 miles. The aircraft were given the name "warning star" but the Navy aircrews called them "Willie Victors". It used the APS-20 search radar and the APS-45 height finder.

[Christian Schwietzke]

You're okay, Christian.

Thanks, but I know I´m ridiculously outmatched here. I´m no more than an interested layman, whereas some of you have been not just wargaming, but doing the real thing before I was even born.

[old_pop2000]

Thanks, but I know I´m ridiculously outmatched here. I´m no more than an interested layman, whereas some of you have been not just wargaming, but doing the real thing before I was even born.

As long as you have an interest, can read and think, you will do just fine. Keep asking questions, listening and reading. Remember the old adage "The dumbest question is the one you did not ask". We all contribute something to this forum, you included.

[old_pop2000]

One of the most important pieces of equipment on a fighter or any aircraft for that matter, is the radio. In military fighters, the radios were UHF radios transmitting on a frequency band of 200 to 399 MHZ. The frequency 243 MHZ was a special channel termed "guard channel". It was reserved for the emergency beacons and radios for downed pilots. When you tested and repaired a UHF radio, it had to work properly. One of most important concepts in the use of the radio was radio discipline while in the air. The channel for the operation that day, is preselected and in the frag orders to all units. Disco and Red Crown will be transmitting on that frequency. Rescap and the tankers will be on that frequency as will be the weasels and their supporting flight of F-105s or F4s. All of the strike aircraft will be on that frequency. There maybe alternate channels selected and provided to talk to other entities but generally that channel is the one.

Once the preflight briefing is finished, you head to the aircraft, start engines, set switches on the radio and contact the tower. You taxi to the arming area where the crew chiefs and ordnance men remove the red flags on the bombs. Then, in flight order you take off. The weasels are probably already in the air. Takeoff with a heavy load of fuel and bombs means AB and that drains your fuel so its contact the tanker for the day and top off with fuel, then head toward Thud ridge into indian country. The leaders will probably order a combat spread formation, all aircraft line abreast with about .5 to 1 mile between them. All this is really dependent on the mission profile and other variables. At this point, the radio chatter might start getting a little busy. You might start getting MIG calls from Red Crown and Disco as you have probably been detected by the Spoon Rest or Fire Can search sets. The weasels may come on line to inform everyone that a Fan Song B had been lit off and they are now being tracked for SAM firings, that will definitely get your attention especially in cloudy weather. You don't want to be on the top of the clouds, because you can't see the dust from the launches and in the initial climb phase of the missile, they are slow, but once the booster had dropped off, they are now at max speed and almost impossible to outmaneuver. However, if you head below the clouds, now AAA has a good shot at you and that is far more dangerous. Maintaining formation in the clouds, is next to impossible, so as the leader, the information about SAMS is important.

By now the radio chatter is becoming annoying. You as the leader, really are just concerned with your flight of four aircraft. At some point, you tell your flight to "green them up". In other words, arm bombs and get the green light on the armament panel. You may be reaching the bottom of Thud Ridge and are now turning onto the bomb run heading towards the IP. Time to change formation. However, the chatter from Disco and Red Crown might be getting really bad. You might be getting those telltale white puffs of smoke in and around the formation. That's flak, gents. If you have flak, you won't have MIGS, not if they are smart. It would be poor flight control to be shot down by your own flak. If the flak stops, MIGs are probably in the area. If you flew down the west side of Thud Ridge, you flew over Phuc Yen, a primary NVAF fighter base, I am certain they have seen you. You can't bomb the base, you can only attack the MIGS in the air. Silly, but those are the ROEs.

Finally, someone in another flight yells over the R/T, "MIGS". Fine, where, you idiot? How many, from which direction, range and finally, who are you? Identify yourself. Hopefully in the next outburst, he or someone will have the good sense to identify themselves and provide some information about the MIGS. By that time, you won't need it, you have them in sight and are moving to either outrun them or turn into them to engage with maybe sidewinders or most likely with your 20mm gatling. The radio chatter is now unbearable. You are getting barraged with MIG sighting from all sources including Disco and Red Crown, beepers are going off for downed pilots, RHAW equipment is screaming about acquisition radars and you can't properly coordinate your flight because of noise. So, you finally have had enough. "Redword, go to channel 3". Yup, you tell the flight to switch to channel 3 on the UHF so you can hear them and they can hear you.

Radio discipline is vital but in the heat of air action, it can get to be too much. Later radios were crystal controlled and had far less noise. Tactical data systems can now connect the AEW aircraft to the fighters providing targeting information without radio chatter. More lessons learned. However, I suspect if you read about the Gulf War air combat, you will see the same results. Too much radio chatter.

[old_pop2000]

Just some points about the other service involved in air warfare in Vietnam, the US Navy. The navy operated from its carriers at two strategic points; Yankee station and Dixie station. Yankee was off of Da Nang, west of Paracel Islands. From this location, Navy strike aircraft would hit Hanoi and Haiphong harbor. Dixie was off of the Mekong delta and from here the US Navy strike aircraft would provide CAS to the US and ARVN troops. It was 130 km SE of Cam Ranh Bay.

At the time of Vietnam, the US had 16 attack and 10 ASW carriers. Some were the 27-charlie Essex class, three were the Midway class, the other were the Forrestal class, Kitty Hawk class and the USS Enterprise. The same ROE's that applied to the USAF applied to the US Navy. Route 6B was the Navy's area. Their mission was nothing different than the missions flown in Korea; CAS and interdiction of supply lines. Aircraft used were the F-8 Crusader, F4B Phantom, A4 Skyhawk, A3 Skywarrior, A5 Vigilante and the A1 Skyraider. As time passed the F-8 was phased out, the A4, A3, A5 and A1. They were replaced by the F-4J Phantom, A7 Corsair, A6 Intruder, RF-8 Photo Recon. The A-3 Skywarrior continued service as a tanker, fleet reconnaissance aircraft and ECM. Under normal circumstances, there were three carriers on Yankee Station. Each carrier would conduct operations for twelve hours then repair, replenish and perform maintenance for the next twelve hours. Operations were from noon to midnight, midnight to noon and a third carrier covering daylight. This gave twenty-four hours coverage of all targets. Each carrier had about 80-90 aircraft. The carriers operated in two modes: cyuclic operations and alpha Strikes.

Cyclic operations meant 25 to 40 aircraft every 1.5 hours, conducting eight cycles each day. The most aircraft would be 15 to 20.

Alpha strikes were very heavy efforts on a single target. All available aircraft would be used in conjunction many times with USAF efforts.

Interesting feature was the logistical support did not move through far eastern ports, it came from the US ports.

More than half of the sorties flown over North Vietnam were by US Navy aircraft.


　

[ksbearski]

Dennis-

Can you address the topic of the advent of specialized gunships like "Spooky"and "Puff the Magic Dragon" and the legacy left by those units.

Also, Vietnam saw the introduction of helicopter gunships and their use on a wide scale. Can you speak to how they worked into the overall air war scheme.

Also, some specialized ELINT and other 'Black ops" missions were flown over Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail. Can you describe those missions.

thanks,

Barry

[old_pop2000]

Can you address the topic of the advent of specialized gunships like "Spooky"and "Puff the Magic Dragon" and the legacy left by those units.

Also, Vietnam saw the introduction of helicopter gunships and their use on a wide scale. Can you speak to how they worked into the overall air war scheme.

Also, some specialized ELINT and other 'Black ops" missions were flown over Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail. Can you describe those missions.

Hi Barry:

My apologies, I did not see this post.

First, Spooky was the callsign assigned to the AC-47D Gunships, while Puff The Magic Dragon was a nickname due to a reporter seeing the cone of fire emanating from the aircraft resembled a dragon's breath. The project was titled "Project Gunship" and was begun in the early 1960's prior to Vietnam as a method of providing on the spot heavy gun support and pre-planned strikes against suitable targets. Attacks were conducted at KIAS of around 120 knots. The guns provided an area of fire about 52 feet in diameter or about one projectile every 2.4 yards. Every fifth bullet was a tracer and it fired in three second bursts. The guns fired out the left side of the ship, so it had to bank left over the target. It could loiter for hours and the guns were activated by the control on the pilot's yoke.

Interestingly, this was not the first such weapon as in 1926, a suggestion of firing with automatic weapons mounted perpendicular to the axis of the plane was offered from Brooks Field in Texas. In 1942, a similar idea was submitted of mounting .50 cal. machine guns to fire sideways against U-boats. The ideas were not new. The Spooky idea was born in September 1961 and tested at Eglin AFB, Florida. The spooky's flew out of Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Da Nang, Pleik, Bien Hoa and Binh Thuy. Eventually, the concept moved to AC-119 gunships, using the C-119 flying boxcars. This led to the AC-130A Spectre gunships, then AC-120E's. These were the Pave Spectre, Pave Prontos, Pave Aegis and Surprise Package gunships. Apparently, there is a new gunship, the AC-27J Stinger II.

As to helicopter gunships, the advent of the gas turbine really gave rise to the gunship concept. The UH-1 Huey gunships with 7.62mm M60’s in the doors being one of the first. However, they were immediately successful leading to the Aerial Rocket Artillery gunships or ARA gunships carrying the XM-3 Armament subsystems. These carried up to 48 2.75 inch Rockets FFARs. They could also carry M75 40mm grenade launchers. Another configuration was the M156 Multi-armament Mount with two M60’s on a flexible mount on either side. There was also a mount for miniguns. The first purpose built helicopter gunship was the AH-1 Cobra. This helicopter used the powerplant, transmission and rotor system of the UH-1 but with tandem seating and wing stubs along with air to surface and air to air weaponry. This aircraft went into service in September of 1967. They were designed to provide direct fire support, armed escort and recon for ground forces. Its slim design and wider rotor blades made it twice as fast as the UH-1. It also had better protection for the pilot and weapons officer. Vietnam was a helicopter war. The 1st Air Cavalry was the first airborne unit integrated with helicopters. The geography and topography of Vietnam was very conducive to the use of helicopters. Few roads and highways made movement by aircraft mandatory. Para drops in this kind of rocky and forest conditions were not possible. Helicopters could provide SAR support, medevac and direct gun support to any unit. With extended loiter time, they could provide constant reconnaissance until friendly forces could arrive. They could maintain surveillance and then provide fire support until fixed wing support was available. The helicopter gave the army its own indigenous air support. It now created a three dimensional tactical battlefield.

I will address the ELINT and other missions in another post. If you want to go deeper, we can do that. Thnx for the interest.

[ksbearski]

Hi Dennis-

Sorry for the delay in extending my appreciation for the thread and addressing my questions, but I am out of town and had login trouble and requested new credentials to be abale to respond. With that said, thanks for elaborating on the gunship and helicopter topics. I am still interested in the ELINT topic and spme of the missions over the Ho Chi Minh trail. Another topic I would like for you to elaborate on would be the evolution of SAR during Viet Nam.

Really appreciate your vast pool of research material and your willingness to share your materials and your personal experience with us civvies.

Regards,

Barry

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis-

Sorry for the delay in extending my appreciation for the thread and addressing my questions, but I am out of town and had login trouble and requested new credentials to be abale to respond. With that said, thanks for elaborating on the gunship and helicopter topics. I am still interested in the ELINT topic and spme of the missions over the Ho Chi Minh trail. Another topic I would like for you to elaborate on would be the evolution of SAR during Viet Nam.

Really appreciate your vast pool of research material and your willingness to share your materials and your personal experience with us civvies.

Regards,

Barry

Hi Barry:
I am glad to use my time to collect information and give you my assessment. I will work on Search and Rescue Operations along with ELINT. I am getting ready for a cruise at the end of next week, so I will try to complete the research and give you something to work with.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Barry:

I thought I would give you some information on ELINT or electronic intelligence. This is not a new concept; it was in its infancy in WWII and the Korean War. It arrived, as we say, in Vietnam. At the start of the conflict in 1964, the NVN capability was very rudimentary. It consisted of 1426 guns, 22 early warning radars and 4 fire control radars. There were no jets or SAMS. By November of 1968, the numbers had changed to 8050 AAA guns, 31 Mig-21s and 15 Mig-15/17s with another 106 MIGS in China, 35 to 40 active SAM battalions and more than 400 radars of all types.

Initially, there was little to fear from the air defenses if you stayed above 5000 feet, but you can’t bomb from that altitude with dumb bombs, it was only when you went into your dive bomb run that things got a little dicey. Rolling Thunder commenced on 2 March 1965 and on 24 July, an F-4C was downed by a SAM. The game had changed. The Tactical Air Command, in charge of air combat operations in Vietnam had never prepared for the type of fight it now faced in 1965. By the end of 1965, it had been proven, that no air force can survive without ECM or ELINT which leads to good ECM.

In Early 1966, the Radar, AAA's and SAM's began to demonstrate a high degree of integration. They now had an excellent command and control which was extended to the fighter force. SAM sites became more numerous and the SAM rings began to overlap and this would affect orbit patterns and effectiveness of the jamming aircraft like the EB-66. The EB-66C were located at Takhli RTAFB in Thailand while the EB-66Bs were flying out of Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam. With the advent of the SAM network, the EB-66s had to warn the strike force of missile radar activity and jamming the terminal radars for both the AAA and SAMS.

In May 1965, the EB-66C’s finally entered combat, prior to that TAC had no ELINT aircraft in theatre. Confusion always reigns about the designations. Initially, the USAF designated the B-66s as RB-66s whether they were carrying cameras, IR detectors, radar detectors and jamming equipment. Finally, they decided to make a distinction between recon versions, preceded by the R, and electronic warfare versions, preceded by the E. The Navy had its electronic warfare aircraft. The EA-3B, EA-1B and the Marines flew the ancient EF-10B Skyknight. Electronic warfare aircraft had the capability of detecting and analyzing electronic signals along with using that data to jam enemy equipment. It’s hard to separate ELINT operations from ECM. They go hand in hand. The EB-66s orbited in about four locations. One in the Gulf of Tonkin, one north of Thud Ridge, one west of the ridge and one near the 20th parallel in Thailand. Other locations were used below the DMZ, in later campaigns.

One of the more colorful ELINT/EW operations was the famous Wild Weasels. On August 13th, 1965, a special task force was establishd to study the SAM threat and its recommendations were to: modify a number of fighters with electronic equipment to find active SAM sites and mark them for destruction by IRON HAND strike aircraft; develop a missile that could be fired and home in on the radar; develop jamming equipment to counter SAM radars; finally, develop the RHAW capability for all strike aircraft to warn of SAM radar. The USAF acquired the Vector Homing and Warning System, the IR-133 Panoramic Scan Receiver and the WR-300 Receiver. With an EW officer now fitted into a second cockpit and this equipment installed, the new fighers were dubbed "Wild Weasel I". The first test aircraft were four F-100F(two seaters). After extensive testing at Eglin AFB, the test team went to SEA. The tests lasted for sixty days, from November 1965 to January 1966. Some of tests included flying with EB-66s on ELINT missions to collect data. Eventually, of course, Wild Weasels became a mainstay of the TAC forces transitioning from F-100Fs to F-105Fs then to F4Gs after the war.

Another ELINT project was Combat Lightning. It was originally established to develop and field a command and control at Da Nang call sign was MOTEL. It was a Tactical Air Control Center, North Sector. The aircraft were EC-121D Connies, call sign College Eye. In 1966 there were three, College Eye #1 , 2 and 3. One was in Laos and two were in the Gulf of Tonkin. Their job was to give border warnings, SAM and MIG warnings, advising aircraft of current enemy defenses and coordinating overall air operations in North Vietnam.

Here is a good link to extracts from the Checo Report on College Eye with diagrams and pictures. It can do a better job than I can.


http://www.dean-boys.com/552/college_eye_extract_from_the_checo.htm

[ksbearski]

Dennis-

Great, fascinating reading. Enjoyed the Checo document. I had forgotten that A-26's were used for interdiction during the Nam air war. That and the Skyraider, two WW2 era vets( well the Skyraider was a prototype at the end, that and the Mauler and the F8F, right?)

Thanks,

Barry

[old_pop2000]

Dennis-

Great, fascinating reading. Enjoyed the Checo document. I had forgotten that A-26's were used for interdiction during the Nam air war. That and the Skyraider, two WW2 era vets( well the Skyraider was a prototype at the end, that and the Mauler and the F8F, right?)

Thanks,

Barry

Hi Barry:

Actually, 48 F8Fs were scheduled to be deployed from Santa Rosa, California, on board the Hornet in Aug of 1945. They made up VF-19. If the war had continued, the Japanese would have met the F8F Bearcat. The A-26 did see combat starting in Europe in September of 1944, the first AD-1s were not operational until 1946. The report from which the F8F-1 information was extracted, was as of 24 July 1945.

Dennis