Plan Otto... the First Plan against Russia

[old_pop2000]

I'd like to present another counterfactual thought problem. This one involves the OKH Plan Otto prepared by Halder and submitted to Hitler on June 19th, 1940. The OKH had been contemplating the attack on Russia, long before Hitler had even considered the option. The German General staff was always anti-communist and was pushing Hitler after the French campaign, to attack Russia by the end of summer 1940. Halder wanted to attack before the Russian military reforms had taken effect. He and Brauchitsch felt that the Red Army was deficient in modern organization and command. The attack would have entailed the use of 80 divisions and 400,000 men. Halder planned a campaign of nine weeks at the most, during which the Wehrmacht would take and hold the Baltic states, White Russia and the Ukraine. On June 25, the redeployment of the Eighteenth army to East Prussia and the easter portion of Poland. Kuchler's eighteenth had 15 infantry divisions and had Guderian's Panzer group attached to it had been effected. Eventually, after full deployment, at the end of July, 600,000 men were redeployed to the east in preparation for this operation.

Two group were established, one to attack Lvov and the other to attack Bialystok. All of these preparation were commenced without Hitlers knowledge. He was finally informed during the final session of all three branches of the Wehrmacht for the planned invasion of England-Sea Lion. This was somewhere around July 21, 1940.

With this basic information, here are some questions to consider:
1. Could the Wehrmacht have executed such an attack so soon after Fall Gelb had been completed?
2. Could they afford to let England off the hook after Dunkirk. At this time, she was at her weakest, in ground forces. The longer Germany waits, the harder it will be to knock the British out of the war.
3. How does this affect the Mediterranean and the support for Italy?
4. Would a two year summer only operation, one year to the first halt line to await the winter and another to capture Moscow and the oil fields in Kerch and possibly Kuban, have succeeded?
5. How does this operation affect the Japanese planning for the Pacific? Or does it?
6. Could this have been a war winning strategy? and would the US have just sat back and watched?

I hope you will find this interesting.
　
　

[JMS]

Interesting one...


Two group were established, one to attack Lvov and the other to attack Bialystok. All of these preparation were commenced without Hitlers knowledge. He was finally informed during the final session of all three branches of the Wehrmacht for the planned invasion of England-Sea Lion. This was somewhere around July 21, 1940.

With this basic information, here are some questions to consider:
1. Could the Wehrmacht have executed such an attack so soon after Fall Gelb had been completed?

Yes, the distance is nothing special and the last stages of the French campaign were a walk in the park for the mobile forces

2. Could they afford to let England off the hook after Dunkirk. At this time, she was at her weakest, in ground forces. The longer Germany waits, the harder it will be to knock the British out of the war.

Since Sea Lion was non doable under the circumstances, there wouldn't be much difference and even may help since the Italians may be deterred from their adventures...

3. How does this affect the Mediterranean and the support for Italy?

see above

4. Would a two year summer only operation, one year to the first halt line to await the winter and another to capture Moscow and the oil fields in Kerch and possibly Kuban, have succeeded?

this is more doubtful, they Russians would get a breather in the winter and they would reorganise faster, given the circumstances

5. How does this operation affect the Japanese planning for the Pacific? Or does it?

Probably doesn't IMO

6. Could this have been a war winning strategy? and would the US have just sat back and watched?

Me thinks not. Unless a compromise peace is reached with the USSR - which would have been a cold war really - Germany is still deprived of resources to fight a global war with the UK, eventually, sea control, access to resources, and manpower will give advantage to the allies.


I hope you will find this interesting.
　
　

[old_pop2000]

Interesting one...

Hi JMS:
I believe that Plan Otto had a much better chance of succeeding for two reasons. The lines of operation were closer together, concentrated in a smaller area. This gave the German's far more punch in a given area. The operational goals were not territorial although Moscow was the primary objective, but were the destruction of the Red Army. This was not how the actual plan was developed by Hitler. His plan entailed territorial gains and the lines of operation much farther apart. This meant that they were not mutually supporting and the Red Army could counter attack any line of operation without fear of attack from the other. If the first season portion had worked, Moscow would have been captured before the winter rains. This would have caused much trouble for the Russian's in any attempt to rebuild their armies but more importantly, separated northern Russia from southern Russia.

[Gopher]

Impossible on so many counts first and foremost was the infrastructure was not in place in 1940 to launch an attack secondly the logistics were not in place. After the fall of France the Luftwaffe was down to practice bombs. Thirdly an attack at the end of summer in Russia is suicide. Fourthly Halder was a conservative military leader and was proved time and time again not to have the nerve nor imagination for modern warfare. Totally ludicrous idea. Fifthly Hitler realiased being about the only man who actually understood Clausewitz (See campaign of 1812) knew its only chance was that it had to be a massive shock to bring the system down any limited attack would just give the Russians time to gear up. Without the massive disruption of industry in western Russia Germany would be doomed only earlier. Dunno were you are getting that Barbarossa was not an attempt to destroy Russian armies because that was Hitlers primary intention, it is documented everywhere. Hitler's was to be a six week campaign

[old_pop2000]

Impossible on so many counts first and foremost was the infrastructure was not in place in 1940 to launch an attack secondly the logistics were not in place. After the fall of France the Luftwaffe was down to practice bombs. Thirdly an attack at the end of summer in Russia is suicide. Fourthly Halder was a conservative military leader and was proved time and time again not to have the nerve nor imagination for modern warfare. Totally ludicrous idea. Fifthly Hitler realiased being about the only man who actually understood Clausewitz (See campaign of 1812) knew its only chance was that it had to be a massive shock to bring the system down any limited attack would just give the Russians time to gear up. Without the massive disruption of industry in western Russia Germany would be doomed only earlier. Dunno were you are getting that Barbarossa was not an attempt to destroy Russian armies because that was Hitlers primary intention, it is documented everywhere. Hitler's was to be a six week campaign

First problem with your assessment is that Franz Halder was the creator along with his staff, of the plan. So much for his conservatism. He, along with Brauchitsch ordered Kuchler's 18th army along with Guderian to East Prussia in preparation for a possible execution of the Plan Otto. Second issue is that there would have been no BOB. The Luftwaffe and all of the Wehrmacht except for some coastal troops would have been transferred to the east. With no BOB, no lack of bombs although I have never heard of a lack of bombs on the part of the Luftwaffe. As far as logistics, It was the OKH that designed the plan, it would be part of the planning of the staff to check on logistics and infrastructure necessary. The plan was signed off and presented to Hitler. He decided to expand Plan Otto into a three pronged attack but it was delayed due to the Invasion of Yugoslavia. Had Plan Otto been executed immediately, they would have launched the attack in July 1940, August at the latest. They had prepared a stop line in the operation, once the first seasons objectives were captured. They had planned this very carefully. It was the amateur strategist Hitler who caused the failure of the whole later operation. The plan Hitler developed was designed to capture territory, not destroy the Russian Army. Don't necessarily believe Directive 21, it's meaningless. The objective was always territory and natural resources. Leningrad was useless to the Germans, Hitler wanted it because it was the birthplace of the revolution. The only objective worth capturing, initially was Moscow.

[Gopher]

Halder had not the nessecary talents to physically carry out the plan every source from his own diary to his peers paint him as a man of inaction. Look at your copy of Pz Leader page 90 for an example of Halders mediocrity and lack of vision its quite laughable. Milch reported if the battle of France was prolonged any longer planes would be forced to use pratice bombs. Nope Hitlers plan was to collapse the soviet system in 6 weeks in western Russia by destroying her armies. The precarious state of German resources precluded a two campaign operation, only a radical solution was possible Hitler proposed that solution because there was no other.

Interestingly in March 41 Hitler called his army commanders together to tell them the watchword for the campaign was "Destruction of fighting forces-Dissolution of State"


Axis counter factuals are always more amusing than plausible

[old_pop2000]

Halder had not the nessecary talents to physically carry out the plan every source from his own diary to his peers paint him as a man of inaction. Look at your copy of Pz Leader page 90 for an example of Halders mediocrity and lack of vision its quite laughable. Milch reported if the battle of France was prolonged any longer planes would be forced to use pratice bombs. Nope Hitlers plan was to collapse the soviet system in 6 weeks in western Russia by destroying her armies. The precarious state of German resources precluded a two campaign operation, only a radical solution was possible Hitler proposed that solution because there was no other.

Interestingly in March 41 Hitler called his army commanders together to tell them the watchword for the campaign was "Destruction of fighting forces-Dissolution of State"


Axis counter factuals are always more amusing than plausible


Here is what FM Erich Von Manstein states in his memoirs about Hitler's plan. Manstein was and still is considered the best operational brain the Germans produced.

Differences between the aims of the political and military leaders have often arisen in other wars....With the leadership united in Hitler's hands, the result was that his political measures in the east ran entirely counter to the requirements of his strategy, depriving it of whatever chance it may have had of a speedy victory...... Hitler's strategic aims were based primarily on political and economic considerations. There were a) the capture of Leningrad(a city he regarded as the cradle of Bolshevism, by which he proposed to join up with the Finns and dominate the Baltic, and b) possession of the raw material regions of the Ukraine, the armaments centres of the Donetz Basin and later the Caucasus Oilfields. ...
O.K.H., on the other hand, rightly contended that the conquest and retention of these undoubtedly imnportant strategic areas depended on first defeating the Red Army. The main body of which would be met on the road to Moscow, since that city, as the focal point of Soviet power, was one whose loss the regime dare not risk

Essentially Hitler's solution sought to solve the issue on the wings in vast territories, whereas the O.K.H. sought to focus the limited Wehrmacht strength in the centre of the front. Aimed at the most important place, the Soviets had to defend- Moscow. It is axiomatic in combat operations that to defeat an enemy force, you must attack something he has to defend, thereby fixing him in place and allowing him to be destroyed. This is what Plan Otto was designed to do.

While Hitler's intentions might be the destruction of the Red Army, the strategic and tactical planning was never present to accomplish this in one campaign. Had two campaigns been planned for and executed, the Red Army could have been destroyed and Moscow taken along with the industrial center of Gorki.

As for Halder, Manstein states that Halder "had a remarkable grasp of every aspect of staff duties..." Manstein states that Halder only took the job of Chief of Staff to protect the army from Hitler and that on many occasions, did not agree with Hitler, so stating. In the final analysis, he like many simply had to follow orders as they had been taught in the Bavarian academy.

BTW, the actual plan for Barbarossa was drawn up by Oberquartiermeister I, General Paulus on the basis of staff studies from the COS of the army groups. However, it was later modified by Hitler personally.

[Gopher]

Manstein, ah yes, that Manstein who survived the war to write his memoirs. Hitler was of course a fool after the war. Manstein of course would have known Germany was down to one months oil reserve by December 41 and that was with the lull between campaigns . Manstein says more than his prayers Hitler is on record from arguging with Goering to OKH conferences of wishing to destroy the Russian army in a six week campaign. Hadler if you refer to your copy of Panzer Leader was the man who believed the Sedan operation was "Senseless". The Red army fought everywhere and its strength hopelessly underestimated by OKH, fighting it in 1940 would have only ensured a defeat earlier. Hitler and Germany failed because they were stuck in a war they could not exit except with total victory and total victory was beyond their resources that is the bottom line.

[old_pop2000]

Manstein, ah yes, that Manstein who survived the war to write his memoirs. Hitler was of course a fool after the war. Manstein of course would have known Germany was down to one months oil reserve by December 41 and that was with the lull between campaigns . Manstein says more than his prayers Hitler is on record from arguging with Goering to OKH conferences of wishing to destroy the Russian army in a six week campaign. Hadler if you refer to your copy of Panzer Leader was the man who believed the Sedan operation was "Senseless". The Red army fought everywhere and its strength hopelessly underestimated by OKH, fighting it in 1940 would have only ensured a defeat earlier. Hitler and Germany failed because they were stuck in a war they could not exit except with total victory and total victory was beyond their resources that is the bottom line.

I won't debate the culpability of the OKH in underestimating the strength of the Red Army. OKH intelligence, in fact all German intelligence failed to recognize the problem. The OKH also displayed an overly optimistic view in assuming that the Red Army would be an easy victory. We also must realize that surviving German officers scrambled after the war to place the blame for the Einsatzgruppen and SD operations behind their fronts, on Hitler and the SS. That is another tale, much of it told to Liddell Hart in his book-The German Generals Talk. I would like to focus on the operational plans.

The failure, if that is what you call it, of the Barbarossa plan as executed, was probably more caused by the Yugoslavian invasion delay and the change in operational objectives of Army Group Center to head south and encircle 600,000 troops than it was the plans original objectives. However, had the OKH plan Otto or the Marcks plan been executed, those troops in the Ukraine would have been cut off anyway.

One issue that is, of course, unknowable is whether Hitler would have intervened as he did, to change the objectives and cause the failure to reach Moscow. Another principle that even Clausewitz would have agreed on, is maintenance of the the objective. This is vital. With Moscow and Gorki in their hands, the Red Army would be divided and the main north-south transportation systems would be interrupted. This would greatly hamper any defense of the Baltic and Leningrad. I studied the Soviet Union in college for a whole semester, its geography, infrastructure, economics, politics and history. It taught me much about Barbarossa and its failures. It taught me specifically that in 1812, Moscow was not the hub of the Russian nation, as it was in 1940. You can't use the French campaign in 1812 as a guide for 1941 as many historians do.

I would like to focus on just the comparison of the actual plan as executed with Plan Otto.

[Gopher]

Clausewitz's study of the 1812 campaign tells us it failed militarily because Napoleon could not destroy the Russian army in Western Russia, Logistically because in pursuit of that battle he wore out his army and politically because the Russians did not collapse. He could have been writing about 1941. The German Generals Talk is an interesting book but one that must be treated with extreme caution by any Historian especially with regards culpability. The thaw was late in 41 so Yugoslavia did not effect the operation to any great degree. Hitler pursued his objective ruthlessly and kept the operation fluid and had Stalin asking for terms, terms as I have stated was no use for Hitler and Germany. Barbarossa failed because Russia did not collapse, Barbarossa over achieved and Russia still did not collapse. The operation was a one shot campaign. Otto was a conservative general staff nonsense that took no account that Germany was living on borrowed time and needed radical solutions if it was to defeat its enemies. The war Hitler embarked on was not rational very, very view people understood this not least the German Generals who tried to apply their understanding to operations contained within it. Its not as if he did not give them clues at a military conference November 23rd 1939 "I am setting all my achievement on a gamble". For Hitler and Germany their only hope lay in daring operations like Norway and backing at long odds like the Battle of Britain. That was the nature of the war Germany was in no amount of counter factuals will ever change it.

[old_pop2000]

Clausewitz's study of the 1812 campaign tells us it failed militarily because Napoleon could not destroy the Russian army in Western Russia, Logistically because in pursuit of that battle he wore out his army and politically because the Russians did not collapse. He could have been writing about 1941. The German Generals Talk is an interesting book but one that must be treated with extreme caution by any Historian especially with regards culpability. The thaw was late in 41 so Yugoslavia did not effect the operation to any great degree. Hitler pursued his objective ruthlessly and kept the operation fluid and had Stalin asking for terms, terms as I have stated was no use for Hitler and Germany. Barbarossa failed because Russia did not collapse, Barbarossa over achieved and Russia still did not collapse. The operation was a one shot campaign. Otto was a conservative general staff nonsense that took no account that Germany was living on borrowed time and needed radical solutions if it was to defeat its enemies. The war Hitler embarked on was not rational very, very view people understood this not least the German Generals who tried to apply their understanding to operations contained within it. Its not as if he did not give them clues at a military conference November 23rd 1939 "I am setting all my achievement on a gamble". For Hitler and Germany their only hope lay in daring operations like Norway and backing at long odds like the Battle of Britain. That was the nature of the war Germany was in no amount of counter factuals will ever change it.

Ok, Gopher, participation is optional in any of these discussions. Some people don't like counterfactual history including many prominent historians. In this case, the idea was to have an interesting discussion about the plans to attack Russia and see if we can all understand better operational arts and military planning. I have no delusions as to whether this plan or any other would have changed the results of history. I will say that there are books that can make a case that the Marcks plan might have succeeded or that if Hitler had not changed the direction of Army Group Center that they would have reached Moscow and Gorki. With Moscow and Gorki, and the Russian army split into two pieces, could that have made the war last longer? Quite possibly. I am not a historical determinist, events can and will change. They are not predetermined by spirits or anything else. What-if scenarios are used by economists, sociologists and many other professionals to test theories and possible outcomes. Financial analyst do exactly the same thing. Military wargames, whether actual or table top were and are designed to do exactly the same thing.

Thank you for your ideas and thoughts, they are important

[Gopher]

I love counter-factuals, I love conspiracy theories but they are light relief from reality. The elephant in the room with all these WWII counterfactuals is Hitler himself. Without him Germany would not be in that position in July 1940 that is your starting point. So first and foremost you need a leader, Every successful operation in history is attributed to a leader, who? Halder who as I have said felt yellow was "nonsense", Brauschitsch who was a mental and physical wreck. These are not the men to lead the armed forces or nation, the Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe and not least the Army against Russia the army which was totally divided over operational matters. Where is the great personality, the Churchill the Stalin theRoosevelt to lead this counterfactual. When talking about the value operational arts you cant just look at a plan you have to find the pesonality that will carry it through and drag the nation with him. Apart from Hitler who? By July 1940 all the greatest personalities in Germany were in the Nazi party and it is beyond dispute none were his measure. Then you have to consider the parameters, the most prominent was logistics this is the gravity that acts on any theory and in 1941 the Germans more than outstripped theirs. In July 1940 you cant get to Moscow without French trucks and you dont have the oil for two campaigns. Every parameter you miss your what if scenario is of less value and if you are emotionally attached at all to your theories you end up with Japanese style wargames were carriers get raised from the bottom of the sea.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Manstein, ah yes, that Manstein who survived the war to write his memoirs. Hitler was of course a fool after the war. Manstein of course would have known Germany was down to one months oil reserve by December 41 and that was with the lull between campaigns . Manstein says more than his prayers Hitler is on record from arguging with Goering to OKH conferences of wishing to destroy the Russian army in a six week campaign. Hadler if you refer to your copy of Panzer Leader was the man who believed the Sedan operation was "Senseless". The Red army fought everywhere and its strength hopelessly underestimated by OKH, fighting it in 1940 would have only ensured a defeat earlier. Hitler and Germany failed because they were stuck in a war they could not exit except with total victory and total victory was beyond their resources that is the bottom line.

Hi Gopher,

I don't have my copy of the "Blitzkrieg Myth" handy, but I thought Halder supported Manstein's plan and actively resist attempts to slow the panzer spearheads down once the breakthrough had been achieved.

There are any number of imponderables in evaluating the succes of Otto. The 1940 scenario offers a number of advantages for the Germans. As Dennis mentioned, Otto envisioned a more focussed plan to secure a defendable lodgement in western Russia and overunning agricultural and industrial assets. The Soviets were stilll trying to put their army back together after the purges and the "Winter War" in Finalnd whereas the Germans could deploy a finely honed and combat tested army. One year less of production for KV 1s and T 34s to oppose the German inferior tank fleet. A planned stop line without German forces dispersed over a 1500 mile front allows the selection of defensible positions before winter sets in and the Russians counterattack. Once the winter attacks are defeated, the Germans are excellently positioned for future operations.

Waiting a year leaves the Germans in a better position force wise and with a year's worth of production in hand though German industrial production in this period did little more than replace losses. By 1941, the German Army had doubled the number of panzer divisions, but only by the expedient of diluting the original ten. With the replacement of PZkw I and IIs for the most part, the smaller number of tanks were all cannon armed, but captured Czech Pzkw 35t and 38ts still were a fair proportion of the tank fleet. However, the Soviets now have had a year's worth of breathing space.

The Germans may have underestimated Soviet strength, but the Soviet Army would continue to be crushed in any scenario I can envision. The German Army's insufficient logistical base and lack of mobility made the time and space of western Russia the true obstacle to success. Another issue is the German attitude towards the captured territories. Instead of rallying the anti Stalin populace, they oppressed them and worked to exterminate them. As with the battle of Britain, strategy switches during the campaign failed to reinforce success and delayed the ultimate destruction of the enemy.

In retrospect, it is axiomatic that the Germans faced an impossible task to win. I don't believe that is the case. Her remaining opponents had to be militarily defeated because of Germany's clumsy attempts at diplomacy once the war began. Hitler's declaration of war on America sealed his fate. Without America in the war in Europe, Britain could not defeat Germany by herself and without a major land opponent, the German army could defeat the Soviets or fight them to a stalemate.

In both wars, the Germans followed strategies that antagonized America. The risk seemed reasonable as the Germans believed they could win before America could bring its full power to bear. DDDDOOOHHHH! X 2.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I love counter-factuals, I love conspiracy theories but they are light relief from reality. The elephant in the room with all these WWII counterfactuals is Hitler himself. Without him Germany would not be in that position in July 1940 that is your starting point. So first and foremost you need a leader, Every successful operation in history is attributed to a leader, who? Halder who as I have said felt yellow was "nonsense", Brauschitsch who was a mental and physical wreck. These are not the men to lead the armed forces or nation, the Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe and not least the Army against Russia the army which was totally divided over operational matters. Where is the great personality, the Churchill the Stalin theRoosevelt to lead this counterfactual. When talking about the value operational arts you cant just look at a plan you have to find the pesonality that will carry it through and drag the nation with him. Apart from Hitler who? By July 1940 all the greatest personalities in Germany were in the Nazi party and it is beyond dispute none were his measure. Then you have to consider the parameters, the most prominent was logistics this is the gravity that acts on any theory and in 1941 the Germans more than outstripped theirs. In July 1940 you cant get to Moscow without French trucks and you dont have the oil for two campaigns. Every parameter you miss your what if scenario is of less value and if you are emotionally attached at all to your theories you end up with Japanese style wargames were carriers get raised from the bottom of the sea.

Hi Gopher,

I suppose you have to define "personalities". Suppose one of the earlier of the 26 assasination attempts against Hitler had succeeded? Would Germany have fallen apart and sued for peace? I doubt it. Goering, Himmler, or Borman would have picked up the politcal leadership, but would have left military operations to their militaries. Hitler's poor judgement and meddling in military and technical matters did a huge amount of damage to the German war effort. His major claim to fame was his hold order in front of Moscow which may have saved the German Army, but doomed it has he now felt talented enough to direct command of military operations in the East. Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill all had their failings in terms of their military judgement, but none of them took such a direct role in the direction of military operations because of distrust of their military professionals.

[old_pop2000]

There are any number of imponderables in evaluating the succes of Otto. The 1940 scenario offers a number of advantages for the Germans. As Dennis mentioned, Otto envisioned a more focussed plan to secure a defendable lodgement in western Russia and overunning agricultural and industrial assets. The Soviets were stilll trying to put their army back together after the purges and the "Winter War" in Finalnd whereas the Germans could deploy a finely honed and combat tested army. One year less of production for KV 1s and T 34s to oppose the German inferior tank fleet. A planned stop line without German forces dispersed over a 1500 mile front allows the selection of defensible positions before winter sets in and the Russians counterattack. Once the winter attacks are defeated, the Germans are excellently positioned for future operations.

Waiting a year leaves the Germans in a better position force wise and with a year's worth of production in hand though German industrial production in this period did little more than replace losses. By 1941, the German Army had doubled the number of panzer divisions, but only by the expedient of diluting the original ten. With the replacement of PZkw I and IIs for the most part, the smaller number of tanks were all cannon armed, but captured Czech Pzkw 35t and 38ts still were a fair proportion of the tank fleet. However, the Soviets now have had a year's worth of breathing space.

The Germans may have underestimated Soviet strength, but the Soviet Army would continue to be crushed in any scenario I can envision. The German Army's insufficient logistical base and lack of mobility made the time and space of western Russia the true obstacle to success. Another issue is the German attitude towards the captured territories. Instead of rallying the anti Stalin populace, they oppressed them and worked to exterminate them. As with the battle of Britain, strategy switches during the campaign failed to reinforce success and delayed the ultimate destruction of the enemy.

......

Hi Mike:

First, Halder did support Manstein's plan especially after the plane crash in Belgium that revealed the first plan to the Allies.

One of key issues is how the panzer divisions were organized in the beginning of the war and throughout. They started with a tank heavy structure-one panzer brigade of around 400 tanks. It was shown that there needed to be a better balance between the infantry and tanks. By May 1940, most divisions had been reduced to around 300 tanks with more infantry added. The light tanks were reduced, as were the Panzer III which still had the 37mm guns, not the 50 mm originally authorized. This does have a bearing on the combat power of the panzer divisions. Combined arms was vital to the success of the mobile divisions.

As far as plan Otto, you and I both know that a plan is only good to the first shot is fired. However, by focusing the Wehrmacht on the two lines of operation, Hitler might not have been tempted to change the operational objectives of Army Group Center as the southern Russian forces would have been within the area between the two lines of operation. The Russian forces would always be arrayed to defend Moscow. Destroy them and for the most part, you have destroy the cream of the Russian army. This and the capture of Moscow should have always been the primary goal. Under Plan Otto, it was. Plan Otto as another advantage. It only used 80 versus 150 divisions. This allows the Germans to use and deploy more motorized and mechanized divisions. This will not only speed the advance of the mechanized units, but provide more motorized infantry divisions to follow up. This will actually reduce the fuel usage and allow for more maneuvering and faster follow up by the infantry units. The seventy or so units not fielded, can be used in North Africa or to hold the front both north and south of the two lines of operation. They can also be used as fortress troops along the French coast. There are economies in only using 80 divisions versus 150, as you well know.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:

First, Halder did support Manstein's plan especially after the plane crash in Belgium that revealed the first plan to the Allies.

One of key issues is how the panzer divisions were organized in the beginning of the war and throughout. They started with a tank heavy structure-one panzer brigade of around 400 tanks. It was shown that there needed to be a better balance between the infantry and tanks. By May 1940, most divisions had been reduced to around 300 tanks with more infantry added. The light tanks were reduced, as were the Panzer III which still had the 37mm guns, not the 50 mm originally authorized. This does have a bearing on the combat power of the panzer divisions. Combined arms was vital to the success of the mobile divisions.

As far as plan Otto, you and I both know that a plan is only good to the first shot is fired. However, by focusing the Wehrmacht on the two lines of operation, Hitler might not have been tempted to change the operational objectives of Army Group Center as the southern Russian forces would have been within the area between the two lines of operation. The Russian forces would always be arrayed to defend Moscow. Destroy them and for the most part, you have destroy the cream of the Russian army. This and the capture of Moscow should have always been the primary goal. Under Plan Otto, it was. Plan Otto as another advantage. It only used 80 versus 150 divisions. This allows the Germans to use and deploy more motorized and mechanized divisions. This will not only speed the advance of the mechanized units, but provide more motorized infantry divisions to follow up. This will actually reduce the fuel usage and allow for more maneuvering and faster follow up by the infantry units. The seventy or so units not fielded, can be used in North Africa or to hold the front both north and south of the two lines of operation. They can also be used as fortress troops along the French coast. There are economies in only using 80 divisions versus 150, as you well know.

Hi Dennis,

Combat and logistical constraints kept most panzer divisioins from meeting doctrinal structures. Of the original ten panzer panzer divisons, the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th were formed as light divisions and Poland showed them too weak in tank and infantry strength to operate against any significant opposition. Germany produced about 1,000 tanks in 1940, the bulk of them being the more effective Pzkw III and IV. Germany was able to mass about 3200 tanks for Barbarossa. About half of the panzer divisons only had a single tank battalion versus the stated two battalions.

Russia had built an extensive number of tanks between the wars, but only had about 1,000 T-34s. Soviet doctrine had swung away from the British idea of independent tank formations towards infantry support. However, with German success in 1940, a new tank division with 2 tank regiments (about 400 BT, T 34, and KV 1 tanks), a motorized regiment and an artillery regiment became the new goal. The Soviets hoped to group 40 to 50 of these tank divisions into 20 tnak corps by autumn of 1941. The German attack caught them flat footed. The Soviets had about 20,000 tanks in JUne, 1941, but the vasr majority of them were obsolete BT series, the T-28 29 ton medium tank and the 45 ton T-35 heavy tank. These last two were the idylll of British 1920s thought on infantry support sporting large crews and multiple turrets. In addition, about 60% of the fleet were not operational at the tiome of the German attack.

By the end of the summer, the Germans had destroyed about 17,000 Soviet tanks and virually all of their armored formations.

This wholesale destruction wiped the slate clean and the Soviets had to rebuild starting with tank brigades before growing to tank corps ( a divison sized unit ) and eventually tank armies, essentaily a Panzer Corps equvalent. Even so, mass was not enough. Poor tactics, poor intelligence, and a lack of flexibility in operations allowed many German victories against seemingly impossible odds. Germany enjoyed a considerable advantage in communications as many Soviet tanks below battalion level had radios, most had just recievers. The unit commanders ability to see the battle field extended little more than what he could see from his turret.

Looking back it's hard to believe that all of this occured in about an 8 year period from 1937-1945.

[old_pop2000]

Combat and logistical constraints kept most panzer divisioins from meeting doctrinal structures. Of the original ten panzer panzer divisons, the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th were formed as light divisions and Poland showed them too weak in tank and infantry strength to operate against any significant opposition. Germany produced about 1,000 tanks in 1940, the bulk of them being the more effective Pzkw III and IV. Germany was able to mass about 3200 tanks for Barbarossa. About half of the panzer divisons only had a single tank battalion versus the stated two battalions.

...

HI Mike:
I am reminded of the pictures of the Mark IIIs and IVs on Russian roads with jerry cans of gas on the rear of tanks. You don't go into combat with cans of gas strapped to your engine louvers. It points up how this much more of a breakthrough and a race, than a real hard fought combat, this whole operation was. It was a logistical nightmare for the Germans, especially with the partisan's in operation. This one factor should have made Plan Otto or the Marcks plan a much easier operational plan to logistically manage.

As an aside, John Mosier's "The Blitzkrieg Myth" is now on my nook. It eliminates another book. I am reaching a point where I will have a comprehensive reference library on the device. Couple this with the Kindle and look out, world.

[Mike Malanaphy]

HI Mike:
I am reminded of the pictures of the Mark IIIs and IVs on Russian roads with jerry cans of gas on the rear of tanks. You don't go into combat with cans of gas strapped to your engine louvers. It points up how this much more of a breakthrough and a race, than a real hard fought combat, this whole operation was. It was a logistical nightmare for the Germans, especially with the partisan's in operation. This one factor should have made Plan Otto or the Marcks plan a much easier operational plan to logistically manage.

As an aside, John Mosier's "The Blitzkrieg Myth" is now on my nook. It eliminates another book. I am reaching a point where I will have a comprehensive reference library on the device. Couple this with the Kindle and look out, world.

Hi Dennis,

My bad memory I was thinking of the German guys book on France 1940...read it after you recommended it. In that book, he describes the use of "jerry cans" to fuel tanks on the move. Getting full cans from a truck as they moved and dropping the empties off later. You certainly wouldn't carry them into combat, but a lot of the movement in Russia for Panzer divisions was cutting through behind enemy elements until the foot divisions could arrive to form a ring around the enemy so the panzers could continue east. Another common sight on German tanks was firewood for cooking and warmth. You also need to carry water for you and the vehicle plus oil and transmission fluid. Water cans were marked with a white cross.

As you pointed out, there is risk in pushing on and depending on follow on elements to secure your lines of communication. Partisans and organized units can play hob with your supply echelons that have relatively little combat power. The area behind where the panzer groups have swept will contain a lot of enemy units that were disorganized, but not defeated. You have to depend on the shock action of your attack and the isolation from it's parent unit to keep it pinned down. A US Army maintenance company took a wrong turn and was ambushed early on in the invasion of Iraq.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

My bad memory I was thinking of the German guys book on France 1940...read it after you recommended it. In that book, he describes the use of "jerry cans" to fuel tanks on the move. Getting full cans from a truck as they moved and dropping the empties off later. You certainly wouldn't carry them into combat, but a lot of the movement in Russia for Panzer divisions was cutting through behind enemy elements until the foot divisions could arrive to form a ring around the enemy so the panzers could continue east. Another common sight on German tanks was firewood for cooking and warmth. You also need to carry water for you and the vehicle plus oil and transmission fluid. Water cans were marked with a white cross.

As you pointed out, there is risk in pushing on and depending on follow on elements to secure your lines of communication. Partisans and organized units can play hob with your supply echelons that have relatively little combat power. The area behind where the panzer groups have swept will contain a lot of enemy units that were disorganized, but not defeated. You have to depend on the shock action of your attack and the isolation from it's parent unit to keep it pinned down. A US Army maintenance company took a wrong turn and was ambushed early on in the invasion of Iraq.

Interestingly, the reason the tanks were carrying wood is due to the field kitchen's requiring wood. This was a problem for Rommel in North Africa. In the steppe regions of the Ukraine, same issue. In reading different accounts of the Russian attack, the main issues were having to stop the tanks due to the slowness of the infantry. This is why I feel that Plan Otto or the Marcks plan would have lessened the requirements. It might have allowed more motorized vehicles to transport the following infantry.

[Gopher]

Just watched a lecture by Mosier, I am seriously in shock that anyone would take this man seriously.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Dennis,

The book I was trying to remember is "The Blitzkried Legend" by Karl-Heinz Frieser. I am unfamiliar with Mosier's work. Infantry keeping pace was an issue faced by most WW II armies. Trucks were useful, but lacked the necessary cross country ability and lacked any protection while halftracks were expensive, scarce, and harder to maintain. Walking a few miles across the steppes in the summer and then having to fight was an arduous task. The simplest expedient was for most of the infantry to ride on the tanks. Another failing was the lack of self propelled artillery to support such fast moving operations. I understand the Luftwaffe had a role as "flying artillery", but the airfield support folks have to keep up as well. Moving yoru airfield every three or four days is not a task I would look forward too.

Gopher, was this lecture on line?

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

The book I was trying to remember is "The Blitzkried Legend" by Karl-Heinz Frieser. I am unfamiliar with Moiser's work. Infantry keeping pace was an issue faced by most WW II armies. Trucks were useful, but lacked the necessary cross country ability and lacked any protection while halftracks were expensive, scarce, and harder to maintain. Walking a few miles across the steppes in the summer and then having to fight was an arduous task. The simplest expedient was for most of the infantry to ride on the tanks.

Hi Mike:

That is a real good book. Mosier wrote "The Blitzkrieg Myth". It's an interesting approach. I agree that truck borne infantry is real hard on the poor roads found in Russia, it wasn't that bad in France with their extensive infrastructure. However, if you could move your infantry in trucks, then dismount, you could make a vain attempt at maintaining the pace with the mechanized units. It's better than walking.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:

That is a real good book. Mosier wrote "The Blitzkrieg Myth". It's an interesting approach. I agree that truck borne infantry is real hard on the poor roads found in Russia, it wasn't that bad in France with their extensive infrastructure. However, if you could move your infantry in trucks, then dismount, you could make a vain attempt at maintaining the pace with the mechanized units. It's better than walking.

Hi Dennis,

Definitely. Here's a couple of links:

http://www.uni.edu/~licari/review17.html Not sure who this guy is but he didn't like the book either.

http://www.curledup.com/blitzkr.htm This guy liked it.

http://www.johnfmosier.com/ Mosier's website

Love to hear yours and gophers thoughts on this.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Definitely. Here's a couple of links:

http://www.uni.edu/~licari/review17.html Not sure who this guy is but he didn't like the book either.

http://www.curledup.com/blitzkr.htm This guy liked it.

http://www.johnfmosier.com/ Mosier's website

Love to hear yours and gophers thoughts on this.

Hi Mike:
Thanks for the links. As usual, the truth probably lies in the middle. My initial thoughts are that Mosier, while not a military historian, has logical arguments and does support those arguments. His main argument, which he states almost from the beginning, is that politics and strategy play more of a part in the war, than blitzkrieg and strategic bombing. I don't believe he is wrong. I am going back and rereading the book on my nook. It's been a while.

[old_pop2000]

Hey Mike:
Check your email.
;)