Rockets and Jets and Mauses, oh my!

[Kyle Holgate]

Reading through the book "why the allies won" I encontered a litlte statistic that caught my eye. I'm going from memory here, but I don't think I'm far off: The material and production put into building the V2 missle if put instead into airplane production would have produced about 23,000 aircraft.
While I'm certian there was no way for the Germans to win the war after roughly fall 1941 unless they somehow invented "the bomb" some of their efforts sure seem to have been a major misdirection of manpower!
I think perhaps if they'd put some real money and scientists behind the Jets in 1940-41 that may have paid off for them well, and to be fair - rocket technology certainly did have a future. In any case though more conventional fighters such as the FW-190A-8 and the D models would have been much more worth the investment as opposed to the V2. Guided air to air and ground to air missiles would have been useful though to be sure!
The Maus - it would have been interesting to see how they'd have actually used the mosnters if they'd gotten some to the army or SS units. IMO they'd have been better off building Panthers and just skipped the King Tiger and Maus tanks.

[Warship NWS]

The Germans would have caused far more damage to the Allies if they stuck with the Panthers, late PzIVs, the better tank destroyer designs, FW-190s, more Panzershrecks, more SPWs (they never had enough), more prime movers and/or trucks, more mobile 20mm and 37mm AA units to cover their columns, more radars, more Type XXIs (if they could have produced them sooner), more anti-fighter effective jet aircraft, etc.. dump the Tigers, King Tigers, Me-262s, Maus, V-2s, V-1s, Gigants, Elefant, heavy TDs, heavy assault mortars, railguns, etc... basically eliminate any weapon that could NOT be flexible, expendable, effective, or hard to manufacture or maintain. Their super-weapons mentality very possibly ended the war for them 2-3 years sooner then if they would have stuck with proven weapon systems that did not severely drain their industry. This is of course assuming the war stays conventional.

[djcyclone]

Simple answer, they where stupid. All of the monster weapons did hurt morale on the Allies side, but in the end it just kept Germany down. Forget all of the weapons, Hitler was told by a good majority of his military commanders to leave the U.S.S.R. alone. If he had listened, then Britain would have been the only enemy. The United Kingdom would have put up a vary valient fight, but they would have eventually lost.

If the attack on the U.S.S.R. had never happened, then Germany would never have signed the alliance with Japan (In hopes of Japan harrassing the U.S.S.R.)

Thus even if Japan attacked the United States, Germany and Italy would not have been compelled to declare war on the United States. They ended the war for themselves when they made it a two front war, which led to it becoming a three front war.

[bridav58]

in the English language. If we allow the Axis to change how they conduct the war then we must allow others to allow the Allies to change thier conduct of the war.

[asnrobert]

in the English language. If we allow the Axis to change how they conduct the war then we must allow others to allow the Allies to change thier conduct of the war.

Definitely, as Dennis (aka Old Pop 2000) points out on this forum often, things do not occur in a vacuum. If the Germans fielded jets earlier, then you can be sure the Allies would have accelerated their jet programs.

[Rick]

I'm going from memory here, but I don't think I'm far off: The material and production put into building the V2 missle if put instead into airplane production would have produced about 23,000 aircraft.


But could they have trained that many pilots? (naturally they wouldnt need 23000 just like that but its still a lot of men to train) not to mention aircrew (i wouldnt think they would all be single seat fighters), ground crews, and i would guess they'd need to greatly expand the number of airbases too, so they'd need lots more support personel and attached flak units for defense.

[djcyclone]

But could they have trained that many pilots? (naturally they wouldnt need 23000 just like that but its still a lot of men to train) not to mention aircrew (i wouldnt think they would all be single seat fighters), ground crews, and i would guess they'd need to greatly expand the number of airbases too, so they'd need lots more support personel and attached flak units for defense.



Lets not forget the ratio of time in the air vs. maintance required to fly again, that the first jets had. Could they have turned the war around with that kind of down time? Even if your planes can pounce on the enemys planes, they have to be in the air just as much as the enemy otherwise they are just bomb targets.

[old_pop2000]

The issue with the Luftwaffe was not the quality or quantity of aircraft, they had both. It was the lack of fuel and lack of qualified pilots. The advantage of the missiles was that they could not be intercepted, they were unmanned and they were an unknown quantity with a psychological effect. They also used three fuels that were easier to produce than AVgas or Jet fuel; Alcohol, hydrogen peroxide for the pumps and liquid oxygen. I do not believe that these were difficult to produce. Misguided ideas, but when you are grasping at straws, you will try anything.

[Smiffy]

The one "if" that I think would have changed things significantly would have been if the V Weapons had been ready just a few months sooner. Londoners found them far worse than conventional bombing to endure. More people left London during the period of the V2 bombardment than did so during the Blitz. Earlier deployment of both the V1 and V2 could have seen them used against the invasion build up areas and against the beachheads in significant numbers.

The V3 guns were not such a problem, as they couldn't be moved and were within easy range for Lancasters with "earthquake" bombs.

[old_pop2000]

Let's get out of 20/20 hindsight vision, and attempt to put ourselves into the late 1930's. While Germany probably hoped it would not have to fight another World War, she was rebuilding her economy and military with the eventuality in the 1943 timeframe. She was perfectly aware of her economic limitations. If the future war involved the US and Britain, she was not economically going to be able to outproduce them. So, if I don't have quantity, I need to augment that deficiency with quality.

If I am a luftwaffe general and a noted aircraft designer comes to me with an idea for a 500 mph + aircraft, when the current aircraft can only make 300, I might fund a small research project to investigate the requirements for development. If he says that it will fly with fuel that it easier to produce, I might jump at it even more.

Everyone in the world knew of Goddard's work and Oberth's in Germany in rocketry. They knew of the potential military possibilities, it was no secret. The Allies never really put an effort into it. But the German's needed an edge in the coming war. They probably reasoned that this could augment their twin engined bombers and allow for a simpler method of terror bombing why not attempt to develop these weapons. It was not a wasted effort, it was simply a case of the technology was not developed enough to be able to really be a potent weapon. Attempting this development in wartime, is almost impossible with the German's economic conditions, especially with the apparent disconnect between peacetime and wartime requirements.

Developing improved weapons or revolutionary weapons is not a poor idea, although the diffusion of effort on some wild ideas like the Me-163, Maus etc was wasted. But seriously, does anyone believe that another 23,000 fighters would have really stopped the Allies? What had to be stopped was the Normandy Invasion and the bomber offensive. The German's had sufficient fighters to cope, but never moved them to gain air superiority over the battlefield. It was strategy and tactics that defeated the Germans along with total industrial capacity of the Allied nations. It was not the proliferation of effort into newer advanced technologies.

[Warship NWS]

Hi Dennis, good to see you back. Obviously since this entire discussion is based on theory and hindsight it will be entirely theoretical to some degree. However, terror weapons do not gain ground or destroy the ability of the enemy to wage war. In the case of Germany building heavy tanks that could not cross the bulk of smaller bridges, bog down in snow or mud, break down due to their sheer weight causing mechanical issues, complexity causing longer build/maintenance problems, etc.. does not help your cause. They had tanks that were inferior or roughly equal to their opponents and beat the tar out of them until Hitler got stupid and did not listen to his competant generals. The Me-262 I can see being built to some degree but it was a limited use weapon compared to the P-80, Vampire, and updated Meteors which could kill fighters AND bombers with reasonable effectiveness. The Me-262 was only primarly good against bombers but if you cannot gain complete air superiority by killing the fighters in good numbers it matters little as you cannot keep them from destroying your fighters on the ground - as was proven during WW2.

Good debate topic however and I am sure we will see some interesting and passionately debated points of view.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Reading through the book "why the allies won" I encontered a litlte statistic that caught my eye. I'm going from memory here, but I don't think I'm far off: The material and production put into building the V2 missle if put instead into airplane production would have produced about 23,000 aircraft.
While I'm certian there was no way for the Germans to win the war after roughly fall 1941 unless they somehow invented "the bomb" some of their efforts sure seem to have been a major misdirection of manpower!
I think perhaps if they'd put some real money and scientists behind the Jets in 1940-41 that may have paid off for them well, and to be fair - rocket technology certainly did have a future. In any case though more conventional fighters such as the FW-190A-8 and the D models would have been much more worth the investment as opposed to the V2. Guided air to air and ground to air missiles would have been useful though to be sure!
The Maus - it would have been interesting to see how they'd have actually used the mosnters if they'd gotten some to the army or SS units. IMO they'd have been better off building Panthers and just skipped the King Tiger and Maus tanks.


Kyle:

Germany still lacked many of the strategic materials needed to make these weapons work. With her overseas trade strangled, she was scrambling for vital materials. Oh why don't any of you alt-history junkies mention the fact that Germany was so dependent on oil from outside of Germany? Her wonder weapons could protect the Reich (maybe), but not her badly needed resources.

[Ed Rotondaro]

But could they have trained that many pilots? (naturally they wouldnt need 23000 just like that but its still a lot of men to train) not to mention aircrew (i wouldnt think they would all be single seat fighters), ground crews, and i would guess they'd need to greatly expand the number of airbases too, so they'd need lots more support personel and attached flak units for defense.

Rick:

Ahh, yes the voice of reason. Logistics and infrastructure, all being burdened by manpower needs in the army on the Eastern Front. Good post Rick.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The issue with the Luftwaffe was not the quality or quantity of aircraft, they had both. It was the lack of fuel and lack of qualified pilots. The advantage of the missiles was that they could not be intercepted, they were unmanned and they were an unknown quantity with a psychological effect. They also used three fuels that were easier to produce than AVgas or Jet fuel; Alcohol, hydrogen peroxide for the pumps and liquid oxygen. I do not believe that these were difficult to produce. Misguided ideas, but when you are grasping at straws, you will try anything.


Dennis:

Welcome back! Add in the feudal nature of the German government with various groups competing instead of working together and one is more impressed with how much Germany was able to accomplish rather than what she could have accomplished.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let's get out of 20/20 hindsight vision, and attempt to put ourselves into the late 1930's. While Germany probably hoped it would not have to fight another World War, she was rebuilding her economy and military with the eventuality in the 1943 timeframe. She was perfectly aware of her economic limitations. If the future war involved the US and Britain, she was not economically going to be able to outproduce them. So, if I don't have quantity, I need to augment that deficiency with quality.

If I am a luftwaffe general and a noted aircraft designer comes to me with an idea for a 500 mph + aircraft, when the current aircraft can only make 300, I might fund a small research project to investigate the requirements for development. If he says that it will fly with fuel that it easier to produce, I might jump at it even more.

Everyone in the world knew of Goddard's work and Oberth's in Germany in rocketry. They knew of the potential military possibilities, it was no secret. The Allies never really put an effort into it. But the German's needed an edge in the coming war. They probably reasoned that this could augment their twin engined bombers and allow for a simpler method of terror bombing why not attempt to develop these weapons. It was not a wasted effort, it was simply a case of the technology was not developed enough to be able to really be a potent weapon. Attempting this development in wartime, is almost impossible with the German's economic conditions, especially with the apparent disconnect between peacetime and wartime requirements.

Developing improved weapons or revolutionary weapons is not a poor idea, although the diffusion of effort on some wild ideas like the Me-163, Maus etc was wasted. But seriously, does anyone believe that another 23,000 fighters would have really stopped the Allies? What had to be stopped was the Normandy Invasion and the bomber offensive. The German's had sufficient fighters to cope, but never moved them to gain air superiority over the battlefield. It was strategy and tactics that defeated the Germans along with total industrial capacity of the Allied nations. It was not the proliferation of effort into newer advanced technologies.

Dennis:

None of those technolgies was sufficiently enough of a war winner to give Germany victory. Most were tactical and short ranged at best. The Maus was a totally defensive weapon not at all in keeping with the strategy of manuever warfare (typical German insecurity complex weapon, 'Ja mine's bigger!').

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

None of those technolgies was sufficiently enough of a war winner to give Germany victory. Most were tactical and short ranged at best. The Maus was a totally defensive weapon not at all in keeping with the strategy of manuever warfare (typical German insecurity complex weapon, 'Ja mine's bigger!').
The only war winner was numbers, not the types of technologies. Radar, A bombs, were excellent examples of technologies, but in and of themselves, did not win the war. It was war production that won the war. It was a war of attrition. We defeated Germany's attempt to interdict oil sources from Venezuela to the the US and then to Great Britain because we could outproduce her in merchant ships and ASW platforms, along with some help from signal intelligence. We destroyed the luftwaffe on the ground and in the air because we could produce four engined bombers and long range fighters faster than she could shoot them down. It was a war of attrition and all the terror weapons in the worlds were not going to change that. The German's lost the eastern front due to Russian numbers, not lack of good tanks and men.

[asnrobert]

I agree. The Sherman was no match for a Panther or Tiger, but we many more Shermans than the Germans had of Panthers or Tigers (supposedly, a German tank commander said something to the effect of "We could destroy 10 Shermans for every tank of ours we lost. The problem was, there was always an eleventh Sherman.").

[Warship NWS]

I agree. The Sherman was no match for a Panther or Tiger, but we many more Shermans than the Germans had of Panthers or Tigers (supposedly, a German tank commander said something to the effect of "We could destroy 10 Shermans for every tank of ours we lost. The problem was, there was always an eleventh Sherman.").

I beg to differ.. .the Sherman with the 76mm gun (E8 models) or the 17lb gun (Firefly) and upgraded armor could stand their ground against a Panther. The Tiger.. no, but they at least could kill it with the better guns if they could get in close enough .. which with their maneuverability and rapid response turrets they could nail them if the opportunity presented them a good target. You just did not want to face a Tiger out in the open where its armor and 88mm could out range your ability to do anything in return. The problem with the Tigers was reliability .. if it broke it became a pillbox and eventually abandoned. When me and Dennis were discussing Market Garden we came up with the most simple plan possible to kill the tight schedule.. park 2 Tigers (or Tiger 2s) on Arnhem Bridge and remove the tracks.. nothing the Allies could do about it. 2 pillboxes you cant get close to and you cant bomb without blowing up the bridge itself. This is why Tigers proved so good at being defensive tanks.. if they did not have to move they worked fine. Tiger 2s were even a bigger waste.

The Panther however was more then good enough after they fixed the bugs in the tank to challenge anything the Allies had and was more cost effective, by far, then building only enough Tigers to irritate us and to cause all tank crews to say "TIGER!!" -- even it was a silly PzIII.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

The only war winner was numbers, not the types of technologies. Radar, A bombs, were excellent examples of technologies, but in and of themselves, did not win the war. It was war production that won the war. It was a war of attrition. We defeated Germany's attempt to interdict oil sources from Venezuela to the the US and then to Great Britain because we could outproduce her in merchant ships and ASW platforms, along with some help from signal intelligence. We destroyed the luftwaffe on the ground and in the air because we could produce four engined bombers and long range fighters faster than she could shoot them down. It was a war of attrition and all the terror weapons in the worlds were not going to change that. The German's lost the eastern front due to Russian numbers, not lack of good tanks and men.

To a point I will agree. However, technology did have its role.. example.. radars were a big advantage for those that could build enough of them and upgrade them faster then the enemy -- but the technology race for the intelligence gear, spying operations, war of the electrons, communications, navigation aids, did make a difference in the war. In the Cold War it ended up being who could spend the most on technology rather then who could build the most targets to shoot at. Quantity being a quality of its own is only valid if your not producing nothing more then a target rich environment.

[Warship NWS]

It was a war of attrition and all the terror weapons in the worlds were not going to change that. The German's lost the eastern front due to Russian numbers, not lack of good tanks and men.

On this part I do agree. However, Germany also lost the war vs Russia due a lot to Hitler's stupidity for not listening to those who knew how to fight a war.

[bridav58]

I beg to differ.. .the Sherman with the 76mm gun (E8 models) or the 17lb gun (Firefly) and upgraded armor could stand their ground against a Panther. The Tiger.. no, but they at least could kill it with the better guns if they could get in close enough .. which with their maneuverability and rapid response turrets they could nail them if the opportunity presented them a good target. You just did not want to face a Tiger out in the open where its armor and 88mm could out range your ability to do anything in return. The problem with the Tigers was reliability .. if it broke it became a pillbox and eventually abandoned. When me and Dennis were discussing Market Garden we came up with the most simple plan possible to kill the tight schedule.. park 2 Tigers (or Tiger 2s) on Arnhem Bridge and remove the tracks.. nothing the Allies could do about it. 2 pillboxes you cant get close to and you cant bomb without blowing up the bridge itself. This is why Tigers proved so good at being defensive tanks.. if they did not have to move they worked fine. Tiger 2s were even a bigger waste.

The Panther however was more then good enough after they fixed the bugs in the tank to challenge anything the Allies had and was more cost effective, by far, then building only enough Tigers to irritate us and to cause all tank crews to say "TIGER!!" -- even it was a silly PzIII.

Thanks.

Well yes & no on wether Shermans with 76mm or 17pdr could stand up to a Panther ,equally that is . The 80mm glacis plate on the Panther couldn't hardly be penetrated by the 76mm even with HVAP . The APDS of the 17pdr also was widely inaccurate. The US did develop AT33 shells for it's 90mm which gave them tremendous penetrating power against steeply sloped armor as on the Panther & Tiger II along with HVAP but it was a little late getting to N.W. Europe. Actually the Panther was probably better protected frontally then the Tiger I Of course the Tiger II is a totally different story it's glacis plate was never penetrated during the war though a few had thier turrent fronts penetrated.. Of course about 40-60% of hits on tanks during the war were turret hits and in that case the German tanks weren't as well off.In the Battle of Arracourt however you had 75mmM3 armed M4's whipping an equal number of Panthers without any interference from Allied airpower.
However one group of 75mm armed M4's were very adapt at knocking out Panthers, Tiger I's and Tiger II's by simply using different tatics . They would always fire white phosporous at the German tanks so if the tank's ventillators sucked it in the crew got out in one hell of a hurry . If the German tank crews shut thier vents off they still couldn't see to shoot whereupon the US Shermans had plenty of time to manuver around and get them on thier flanks.

[Warship NWS]

To Bridav58, please do not misunderstand me about the Panther, IMHO, it was the finest medium tank of the war -- good gun, good frontal armor, fast, and far more reliable then its big brother.. the Tiger. If Germany had simply stuck with PzVs and PzIVs they would have done just fine. I was only noting that the E8s and Fireflys could challenge them and defeat them .. it all depended on the crews and tactics. That is why I noted they were "roughly" equal. We could debate the particulars for a while, but lets save that for another thread. ;)

[old_pop2000]

On this part I do agree. However, Germany also lost the war vs Russia due a lot to Hitler's stupidity for not listening to those who knew how to fight a war.
I think one could make the argument, that the failure was less Hitler's and more the German General Staff and their intelligence arm which failed to assess correctly the economic capacity of the Russians and the actual size of the Russian military.

After WWII, most historians fell for the line the surviving German officers were able to offer for the explanation of their failure- it was all Hitler's fault. Now that's convenient. Liddell Hart, Hugh Trevor-Roper, to name few, all fell for it. This is not to minimize his role or anything, but seriously, wasn't he at the mercy of the General staff and its analysts? Funny how all the General's were right and Hitler was always wrong. That wasn't true about the Anschluss, or Munich or even the Battle of France. But, that was different, wasn't it.

I think a more balance approach to understanding how WWII unfolded is probably closer to the truth. They lost because the Allies out produced them, not because we had better equipment. We just had more adequate equipment and could get it to the front better. Logsitics was key.

[Warship NWS]

To Dennis, logistics was a huge factor in WW2.. I will definitely agree there. If they could not destroy our war production then the only other choice was to destroy our logistics but at best they could only damage it.

Hitler, I fully believe, decided to attack Russia without FIRST knocking Britian out of the war. He also decided the fate of the army that was attacking Stalingrad - it was his orders to stand or die.. well, they died. A complete waste of an entire army. However, lets get back to the original topic before we find other avenues to go down.. there is just too many tangents we could go into with such a general topic. ;)

[old_pop2000]

To Bridav58, please do not misunderstand me about the Panther, IMHO, it was the finest medium tank of the war -- good gun, good frontal armor, fast, and far more reliable then its big brother.. the Tiger. If Germany had simply stuck with PzVs and PzIVs they would have done just fine. I was only noting that the E8s and Fireflys could challenge them and defeat them .. it all depended on the crews and tactics. That is why I noted they were "roughly" equal. We could debate the particulars for a while, but lets save that for another thread. ;)
Just some figures from German sources to consider:

The primary source of tank losses on the Eastern and Western fronts was due to "miscellaneous, non-enemy action". In other words, mechanical failures. The figure goes as high as 60-70%.

After that, considering the remainder as 100%, 15% to mechanical failure in combat, 20% to air attacks, tanks and tank accounted for 45%. In fact, post war battlefield inspection confirmed that. Tanks killed tanks. The German tank crews feared Allied tanks and tank destroyers more than anything. But the greatest tank killer was German engineering.

[Kyle Holgate]

Funny putting out a post late Friday (Pacific daylight time) that was generally just to pass along the figure that 23,000 more planes could have been produced if the V2 program hadn't used the manpower and materials and see what's been hatched as far as the discussion!
Of course there are manpower requirements and fuel requirements and maintenance requirements. I did not say or imply that dropping the V2 would have won the war for the Germans, which it appears that some of you have read my original post as saying!
As I said and repeat, IMO nothing would have won the war for the Germans after roughly fall of 1941 short of perhaps the atomic bomb. The diversion of resources to all the screwy weapon systems though probably did shorten the war some - though there's no way to know how much.
Not to derail my own thread - and maybe it's worth hashing over again - I still am of the view that the Germans could have defeated the Soviets in 1941. Hitler's fault that they didn't? Perhaps, he's the main one that meddled in the original invasion plans and meddled in everything else. Heck had generals in France not "accidently" gone against his orders it's quite possible that France wouldn't have fallen in 1940.

I am with Dennis to some extent re- the idea that a country that is being defeated will probably grasp at straws to try to turn the tide. Missile and rocket technology had a lot of potential as you can see with today's thousands of kinds with various purposes - they were not necessarily wrong in developing them. Jets too for that matter - if they had development financed and backed a couple years earlier may have had a bigger impact. A lot of these weapon systems weren't bad ideas, just not things they could afford when standard conventional weapons were sorely needed.

[old_pop2000]

Some actual numbers from the period 1944-1945

sampling size losses Cause

520 43.2% Gunfire

53 4.4% 75mm, 76mm, 90mm, artiller

91 7.5% Air Attack

3 .2% Mines

9 .7% Miscellaneous enemy action

522 43.8% Miscellaneous non-enemy action

One of the findings of post-war US army investigations found that hollow charge weapons climbed to 25-30% of failures. This would be the panzerfaust, panzershreck and bazooka.

Average range of tank engagement was 785 yards. Canadian figures around Caen show 900 yards.

Fascinating, isn't it.

[Kyle Holgate]

Some actual numbers from the period 1944-1945

sampling size losses Cause

520 43.2% Gunfire

53 4.4% 75mm, 76mm, 90mm, artiller

91 7.5% Air Attack

3 .2% Mines

9 .7% Miscellaneous enemy action

522 43.8% Miscellaneous non-enemy action

One of the findings of post-war US army investigations found that hollow charge weapons climbed to 25-30% of failures. This would be the panzerfaust, panzershreck and bazooka.

Average range of tank engagement was 785 yards. Canadian figures around Caen show 900 yards.

Fascinating, isn't it.

Is this losses of tanks or what Dennis? You forgot to put what the statistics are for my friend! Hope you didn't freeze your toosh off on your cruise, April weather is usually about 10-15 degrees (or more) warmer.

[djcyclone]

Well yes & no on wether Shermans with 76mm or 17pdr could stand up to a Panther ,equally that is . The 80mm glacis plate on the Panther couldn't hardly be penetrated by the 76mm even with HVAP . The APDS of the 17pdr also was widely inaccurate. The US did develop AT33 shells for it's 90mm which gave them tremendous penetrating power against steeply sloped armor as on the Panther & Tiger II along with HVAP but it was a little late getting to N.W. Europe. Actually the Panther was probably better protected frontally then the Tiger I Of course the Tiger II is a totally different story it's glacis plate was never penetrated during the war though a few had thier turrent fronts penetrated.. Of course about 40-60% of hits on tanks during the war were turret hits and in that case the German tanks weren't as well off.In the Battle of Arracourt however you had 75mmM3 armed M4's whipping an equal number of Panthers without any interference from Allied airpower.
However one group of 75mm armed M4's were very adapt at knocking out Panthers, Tiger I's and Tiger II's by simply using different tatics . They would always fire white phosporous at the German tanks so if the tank's ventillators sucked it in the crew got out in one hell of a hurry . If the German tank crews shut thier vents off they still couldn't see to shoot whereupon the US Shermans had plenty of time to manuver around and get them on thier flanks.



I have to disagree that a Sherman could stand up equally to a Panzer. I say this, because everything I have ever seen and read say different. I remember seeing a document on the History Channel about the tank war. A veteran of the U.S. Armored Calvery was interviewed, and he said.

"When we went to training, we where told that the Sherman was the best and newest tank in the world. However when we got over their we found out quite differently." He said if you saw an enemy panzer, you could send 10 Shermans after that Panzer, and yes you would kill it, but you would lose those 10 Shermans in the process.

My Grandfather use too work with a man who had served under Patton, and he told my Grandfather that in most battles, it was not uncommon at all to see tank crews get out of their tanks, and run as fast as they could. They called the Sherman the iron casket, and the men where scared to death of the Panzer.

In the end, simple numbers overwhelmed the enemy tanks, but if we had not been able to maintain air supieriority then the tank war would have been much more difficult.

[Warship NWS]

To Djcyclone,

I didn't say just the "Sherman".. I said the E8 which had Jumbo extra frontal armor and the same 76mm gun as the Wolverine. This gave the Sherman *roughly* equal chances vs the Panther. It all depended on ammunition, firing angle, engagement setting, range to target, tank crews, tactics, etc... you simply cannot put tank vs tank and say.. well that is all there is to it.

Thanks.. and lets all get back on topic.

[Warship NWS]

My personal thoughts on who would win WW2.. it was actually fairly simple.. the side that could build, maintain, and upgrade the largest fighter force that was capable of destroying enemy fighters. End of story, its that simple. Look at who won? The side that did just that.

What does this accomplish? The most effective force at achieving, maintaining, and utilizing air superiority to destroy anything in the air, at sea, and on land. Fighters won WW2 above and beyond any other weapon ever developed.. bar none, without anything close to another weapon competing for that rank. For that matter.. this started in WW1.. the side who saw those on the ground the most won. Nothing was more important for aircraft in WW1.. eyes in the skies.. both sides knew it and both sides raced like bats out of hell in a fireball hurry to build the better, faster, more maneuverable aircraft to take away the eyes in the skies.

In WW2 Germany should have junked the idea of multi-engined bombers and built NOTHING but 1 and 2 engined fighters (2 engined as night fighters) - and ONLY build jet fighters that could EFFECTIVELY engage other fighters.. if you can do that then the bombers would stand a chance once you gain air superiority - only shooting down bombers WILL NOT GAIN AIR SUPERIORITY. If you cannot kill fighters you cannot protect your airbases..game over.

2nd to 1-2 engined fighters.. medium tanks, half-tracks, artillery, AA static/vehicles, trucks, and troops. That is what Germany built the best of regarding their armed forces.. stuff that worked, that was fairly upgradeable, not specialized, and well trained. Screw the ships.. they did squat. Build buckets of subs - by far THE MOST effective sea-lanes interdiction weapons. Any excess.. build buckets of naval mines... worked pretty damn good in WW1 and naval recon aircraft with what is left over and use those to help coordinate sub warfare.

The KM was a huge waste of resources.. the subs did the 99% of naval destruction of anything that mattered.. merchants. If you cannot kill the ability to build weapons or to transport them then your wasting your resources. That is what killed the Germans.. they could build weapons but when they could NOT maintain air superiority so we blasted every damned thing that moved.. and I mean everything. Interdiction was by far the hardest warfare to defend against as you flat cannot be everywhere at once to defend your troops and supply lines unless you have AIR SUPERIORITY.

That was the ultimate war of attrition.. air power.. who won the air war would win the war. This had held true since planes could blow stuff up on the ground with reasonable accuracy and if done so PERSISTENTLY AND RELENTLESSLY. You never let the enemy have time to repair or breathe.. you pound him until he gives up without stopping.

Once Germany had itself a war it knew it could not win, whether Hitler wanted to believe it or not, they should have done everything in their power to attrit our forces with cost effective weapons as much as possible.. that was not done and they lost the war that much faster because of it.

That is my few cents anyways..;)

[bridav58]

I have to disagree that a Sherman could stand up equally to a Panzer. I say this, because everything I have ever seen and read say different. I remember seeing a document on the History Channel about the tank war. A veteran of the U.S. Armored Calvery was interviewed, and he said.

"When we went to training, we where told that the Sherman was the best and newest tank in the world. However when we got over their we found out quite differently." He said if you saw an enemy panzer, you could send 10 Shermans after that Panzer, and yes you would kill it, but you would lose those 10 Shermans in the process.

My Grandfather use too work with a man who had served under Patton, and he told my Grandfather that in most battles, it was not uncommon at all to see tank crews get out of their tanks, and run as fast as they could. They called the Sherman the iron casket, and the men where scared to death of the Panzer.

In the end, simple numbers overwhelmed the enemy tanks, but if we had not been able to maintain air supieriority then the tank war would have been much more difficult.

German tanks accounted for very few Allied tanks relatively speaking. It was anti-tank guns, PanzerFausts, and SP guns that did the real damage to Allied tanks. In fact some of those legends like one Tiger holding up a whole armored column a just a little bit of a stretch when in fact post war analysis showed that in that one case most of the Allied tanks knocked out in the encounter were done in by other SP's and anti-tank guns.

[Warship NWS]

Hindsight completely ignored.. WW1.. the HSF did squat, WW2 the KM is nothing compared to the RN in size.. why the hell do you build the Bismarck when WW1 already proved BBs were worth squat if they just sat in port? Hello.. reality knocking! What did 20 years make them think .. "Hey we can do more with less!".. whatever. Trash the KM.. build lots and lots and lots of U-boats.. as was proven during WW1 those were the only darn things in the KM that did any good at all vs the enemy with the slight exception of a few merchant raiders.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Is this losses of tanks or what Dennis? You forgot to put what the statistics are for my friend! Hope you didn't freeze your toosh off on your cruise, April weather is usually about 10-15 degrees (or more) warmer.
This system does not format tables well. These German Tank losses and are based on a sampling size of German tanks lost and evaluated post war in Europe. Sorry.

[Smiffy]

Hindsight completely ignored.. WW1.. the HSF did squat, WW2 the KM is nothing compared to the RN in size.. why the hell do you build the Bismarck when WW1 already proved BBs were worth squat if they just sat in port? Hello.. reality knocking! What did 20 years make them think .. "Hey we can do more with less!".. whatever. Trash the KM.. build lots and lots and lots of U-boats.. as was proven during WW1 those were the only darn things in the KM that did any good at all vs the enemy with the slight exception of a few merchant raiders.

Thanks.

Absolutely correct, but only if you know for sure that you are going to fight Britain. The KM was ample against anything else in the Baltic. War in the East was almost a certainty and with France it was highly likely. Given Britain's attitude to rearmament in the first half of the 1930s, and some samplings of British public opinion even later, the Germans could hope that Britain would not get involved.

[asnrobert]

Absolutely correct, but only if you know for sure that you are going to fight Britain. The KM was ample against anything else in the Baltic. War in the East was almost a certainty and with France it was highly likely. Given Britain's attitude to rearmament in the first half of the 1930s, and some samplings of British public opinion even later, the Germans could hope that Britain would not get involved.

True, but the Bismarck (and even the S&G) were overkill against anything in the Baltic (except maybe the Russian battlewagons, and they rarely went far). For the Baltic, the only thing the Germans would really need would be a couple panzerschiffe with more armor and less speed.

[Smiffy]

True, but the Bismarck (and even the S&G) were overkill against anything in the Baltic (except maybe the Russian battlewagons, and they rarely went far). For the Baltic, the only thing the Germans would really need would be a couple panzerschiffe with more armor and less speed.

Spot on, but there was a very real possibility that Germany would have had to fight France, without Britain involved in the conflict, or so they thought.

We also have to remember that it takes years to build ships but political climates can change overnight. We must also consider that public opinion still saw capital ships as important and worth spending money on. The HSF may have archived little in WW1, but it had not been physically beaten into submission. Maybe, with different leadership and tactics, a battle fleet was still a viable weapon, after all, no one had yet proved otherwise.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hindsight completely ignored.. WW1.. the HSF did squat, WW2 the KM is nothing compared to the RN in size.. why the hell do you build the Bismarck when WW1 already proved BBs were worth squat if they just sat in port? Hello.. reality knocking! What did 20 years make them think .. "Hey we can do more with less!".. whatever. Trash the KM.. build lots and lots and lots of U-boats.. as was proven during WW1 those were the only darn things in the KM that did any good at all vs the enemy with the slight exception of a few merchant raiders.

Thanks.

Chris:

The KM realized it could not catch up with the RN, but it believed that by building modern more powerful warships, it could best them in single actions and tie down large amounts of ships due to the commerce raider threat. In hindsight this obviously didn't work, especially without naval aviation to help neutralize the RN's planes. Had Plan Z been undertaken, the German navy would have had once of the most advanced fleets in the world in 1944, although it would still have been small.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

The KM realized it could not catch up with the RN, but it believed that by building modern more powerful warships, it could best them in single actions and tie down large amounts of ships due to the commerce raider threat. In hindsight this obviously didn't work, especially without naval aviation to help neutralize the RN's planes. Had Plan Z been undertaken, the German navy would have had once of the most advanced fleets in the world in 1944, although it would still have been small.

I understand what Plan Z was about.. but without naval aircraft and a full run of escorting and support ships.. it was doomed before it started. Hindsight should have proven from the age of sail that the only true reason to have any navy at all during war is to interdict and control the sea lanes vs your naval opponent and a naval power that cannot consistently and persistently operate in that doctrine is a waste of a navy. Only a true blue water navy can accomplish this role with enough naval projection power to accomplish it. Again, they could not do this during WW1 with a far more powerful navy.. why would they think they could do this in WW2 with a pewny navy that was already 20 years behind the times with DDs that were not even good escorts, cruisers that could not go far without problems, battleships that could not be escorted properly, and no naval air power? Of course I am asking a rhetorical question but it just struck me as "duh" when they did have the hindsight to consider this problem with nearly hundreds of years of naval history, starting with the age of sail, and at the absolute least.. WW1. At best the KM was an upgunned and modernized coastal defense navy

[Warship NWS]

Absolutely correct, but only if you know for sure that you are going to fight Britain. The KM was ample against anything else in the Baltic. War in the East was almost a certainty and with France it was highly likely. Given Britain's attitude to rearmament in the first half of the 1930s, and some samplings of British public opinion even later, the Germans could hope that Britain would not get involved.

Ok.. Germany had hindsight again.. how many times did the British navy get involved in a European theater naval conflict? What .. did WW1 not give them a "duh" moment to consider even the slightest possibility that they would fight them on the water yet once more? The British did restrict their building of a blue water navy after the WW1 armistice.. that should have been another "duh" moment. Sorry, I can't buy this one. ;)

[Kyle Holgate]

The KM allowed for the invasion of Norway and that's about it. The threat of the KM did keep allied shipping deployed differently than it would have been without any KM threat. In general though, I agree with Chris - they'd have done better to build Subs and possibly destroyers to help patrol their coastline & make mischief at night laying mines and what not. As for the Z plan, even if England and France had "chickened out" and not gone to war over Poland and Germany hadn't done something else to start the war - would they really have had all those ships ready in 1944?

The idea that fighters won the war means of course that they were the required umbrella under which the war was won. Obviously fighters alone didn't do it - they facilitated the war winning by the ground troops and bombers. I take this to be what Chris meant anyway (sure he'll correct me if I got it wrong!).
If that's what he meant then I have to agree with him another time! Pretty much everything in WW2 supports the notion that without air superiority if not air dominance a force (naval or ground) is very limited in what it can accomplish particularly offensively.
Maybe defending with success is possible to a point under enemy air superiority but attacking and gaining ground is virtually impossible.

[Warship NWS]

It was a simple equation.. no nation without airpower could hope to win against a nation with airpower.. so that alone leads to the requirement of air superiority.. without it all else is an act of futility, even a war of "defense". If you cannot move supplies and materials due to aerial interdiction warfare you will lose, period. Ground forces during WW2, for most intensive purposes, were in support of building forward airbases and taking airbases away from the enemy. If other objectives happened to be in the general direction you were taking ground then all the better. When the P-51s could fly with the bombers to Germany and back what was the most critical part of that equation was the ability to kill the enemy air superiority fighters - they came up to attack bombers and got shot down by P-51s. This of course got started however when the RAF/USAAF bombers started to raid German captured terriority and were taking on the best of the best of the Luftwaffe.

As to the KM forcing the RN to deploy differently.. to me, no big deal.. the RN needed something to do rather then sit in port like they did during WW1. That is what they were meant to do anyways.. engage surface warships. They had no real need for bombardment missions so the only other secondary role was floating AA batteries. That is why I will not agree with the "draining of resources" for the RN.. that was what they were meant for so let them do their jobs. Raiders in both wars didn't last long anyways when they started gaining attention by sinking ships.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Let's step back from the details of the German Naval building program and understand their traditional position, geopolitically. They are land locked. They have been since the Holy Roman Empire. Their traditional enemies and trading partners until the advent of the industrial age have been the British, French, Italian states, Danes, the Baltic nations and a few miscellaneous balkan countries and empires. Most of these nations have had good to excellent navies, and a strong naval tradition. The Germans are relative newcomers to the problem of sea communications.

Now, with the coming of the industrial age and machines, the search for natural resources got fairly complicated. It began to require a naval presence in the worlds oceans to protect trade lanes especially to the east and west. The Germans never participated in the age of discovery and exploration. Those goods that they needed were available within land routes.

German naval building and strategy was a result of further industrialization and the requirements for more sophisticated natural resources and market goods. This, of course, brought her into direct competition with England and France. At the same time, the separate states of the old Holy Roman Empire aggregated into Imperial Germany. All newly aggregated nations have their aggressive periods of expansion. We did, the Lousiana Purchase, the Lewis and Clark Expedition which caused the Spanish to send four separate military teams to attempt to intercept and destroy the Corp of Discovery. The War of 1812, The Mexican War. The list goes on and on. All nations have gone through that period.

The Germans were no different except that their continent was already fully populated, which caused them no end of problems. Their other problem, was the nature of their sea frontier. It was enclosed and surrounded by two major naval powers with far more naval traditions and forces than they had.

What we see in the period leading to WWI was the German attempt to enter that exclusive club of naval powers, which the German General Staff knew was the key to a world wide trade network. The building of the HSF was a direct result of Germany's attempt to join that club. But as we have seen, joining that exclusive club is far harder than simply building the ships and sailing out into the North Sea.

WWII, as historians have agreed in most cases, was an extension of WWI. The naval strategy in WWII was the same as in WWI. How to break the almost certain, naval blockade of German shipping and impose on the Allies, a similar commercial blockade.

Plan Z was a naval building program, begun in the late 1930's designed to produce an 800 ship fleet by 1946. It was designed to challenge the traditional naval powers of Europe. But, it was beyond the realities of German industry. The plan ended on September 3, 1939- the day the war started. Apparently, German leaders finally realized that you cannot build an 800 ship fleet in the middle of a war.

Discussing Plan Z is almost pointless, unless we are delving into alternate history dating back to 1934, when the Nazi's took control. To have achieved even a 400 ship fleet by 1939, would have required the building and maintenance of over 80 ships per year, for the five years preceeding the war. All military spending is a question of what do you actually want, how much are you willing to spend and what are willing to sacrifice to get it. Since Germany is a landlocked power, spending that much time, resources and money on a fleet that is essentially encircled by two powerful naval countries, is pointless. What the German's built, they were stuck with and had to put to some use, but after the war started, any thoughts of a sizeable German navy was gone. The ships already built could be used for commerce raiding in concert with the U-boats, but I have doubts that this was their primary strategy.

Now, if the German's could not hope to compete with the Allied navies, what was their most effective strategy? That is the question that should be explored. Commerce raiding using surface raiders like Atlantis, Orion etc. with U-boats and possibly land based, long range four engined bombers and large seaplanes probably would have been a better mix. Maybe a small, coastal surface fleet consisting of long ranged, heavily gunned cruisers, destroyers and gunboats might have complimented this grouping.

[Smiffy]

Ok.. Germany had hindsight again.. how many times did the British navy get involved in a European theater naval conflict? What .. did WW1 not give them a "duh" moment to consider even the slightest possibility that they would fight them on the water yet once more? The British did restrict their building of a blue water navy after the WW1 armistice.. that should have been another "duh" moment. Sorry, I can't buy this one. ;)

It only becomes a "European naval conflict" if the British get involved. The British had stayed out of most European wars between 1815 and 1914. After 1918 they had not stopped Italian aggression in East Africa, they kept out of the Spanish Civil War, they remained neutral between Japan and China, they stood back during the annexation of the Rhineland, the Sudatenland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. As late as August of 1939, one major British newspaper, "The Daily Mail" was still saying that Herr Hitler was a good man overall. Some could easily assume that Britain would not get involved again.

[Warship NWS]

It only becomes a "European naval conflict" if the British get involved. The British had stayed out of most European wars between 1815 and 1914. After 1918 they had not stopped Italian aggression in East Africa, they kept out of the Spanish Civil War, they remained neutral between Japan and China, they stood back during the annexation of the Rhineland, the Sudatenland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. As late as August of 1939, one major British newspaper, "The Daily Mail" was still saying that Herr Hitler was a good man overall. Some could easily assume that Britain would not get involved again.

Granted Chamberlin likely would not have gone up against Hitler but Churchill was an entirely different matter. In any case they had to count one of the worlds largest navies to get involved if the spark of a war expanded, as it so often does. WW1 should have been a clue of that possibility.

[JMS]

Besides, German rearmament in the 30s was haphazard to start with. Long lead items like warships were ordered on the basis of one better than the previous one, so the "pocket battleships" had a useful niche, commerce raiding, but the next class, the Scharnhorst didn't, too weak to go head to head with battlehips, their saving grace was that they were fast. Go one more, the Bismarcks, what was the point? the ship was faster than most, but not al battleships, but equal or inferior in gun power, and the next generation was going to make them obsolete within a couple of years.

Much of the same caveats apply to the whole surface fleet program, heavy cruisers that are large, but retain the same armament as their enemies and are equipped with an unreliable powerplant to boot, light cruisers that are weak and short-ranged, destroyer armed like light cruisers that in the event prove to be overgunned, not to speak about Graf Zeppelin, an absolute waste of resources. On the other hand, Dönitz knew what he wanted and drove relentlessly to get it, and was much more successful in the end.

[Warship NWS]

Now, if the German's could not hope to compete with the Allied navies, what was their most effective strategy? That is the question that should be explored. Commerce raiding using surface raiders like Atlantis, Orion etc. with U-boats and possibly land based, long range four engined bombers and large seaplanes probably would have been a better mix. Maybe a small, coastal surface fleet consisting of long ranged, heavily gunned cruisers, destroyers and gunboats might have complimented this grouping.


On this, with some variations, I agree. Contrary to popular belief and mythology due to the glorified historical context of the big gunned ship.. overall, after Tsushima they did squat. The TRUE strategic ships of the sea --- WERE NOT THE BATTLESHIPS.. it was the MERCHANTS. Battleships did less then 1% of the sinkings of merchants during WW1 or WW2. As it goes with land warfare it was all about how do you keep the enemy from bringing more weapons to the front? Until you do this.. you are banging your fists into the sand. The ONLY purpose of a navy is to support and protect the sea lanes and to keep the enemy from doing the same.. nothing else, zero, nada. If your not sinking merchants with your naval power your not doing any damn good at all. When more cost effective weapons vs the merchants were built, the subs and mines, the battleships started to lose their stragetic value in terms of the merchant war and CVs finished off any strategic value they had left as the airplane was even more effective and cheaper then a sub. This is how WW2 was won at sea. We proved it vs Japan and the Germans could have proven it IF they had enough subs to do the job during WW1 and WW2 - in 1916 they came damn close to knocking Britain out of the war -- even with all their fancy battleship that were little more then port rust buckets. Doenitz knew they did not have the subs when Germany started the war during WW2 however but he did what he could with what he had. That was their only real chance against Britain..everything else was a waste of effort other then coastal defenses and naval patrol aircraft. All those fancy battleships did not interdict squat in WW1 or WW2. If you can kill a merchant with a silly 88mm gun why do you need a big bad expensive battleship to do it?

That is the primary point to this entire "battleship" debate. Battleship were only cost effective when there were not enough cheaper and more viable weapons that could counter them or do their jobs better. A battleship once fixed and located can be destroyed .. a sub was FAR harder to detect and could kill merchants FAR more cost effectively and without the potential loss of "naval prestige". Aircraft could kill battleships in a way that they could not do a damn thing about, especially after around the late 1920s to 1930s. End of story for the battleship.. subs and planes rendered them virtually useless in the strategic naval battlefield.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

On this, with some variations, I agree. Contrary to popular belief and mythology due to the glorified historical context of the big gunned ship.. overall, after Tsushima they did squat. The TRUE strategic ships of the sea --- WERE NOT THE BATTLESHIPS.. it was the MERCHANTS. If your not sinking merchants with your naval power your not doing any damn good at all. When more cost effective weapons vs the merchants were built, the subs and mines, the battleships started to lose their stragetic value in terms of the merchant war and CVs finished off any strategic value they had left as the airplane was even more effective and cheaper then a sub. This is how WW2 was won at sea. We proved it vs Japan and the Germans could have proven it IF they had enough subs to do the job during WW1 and WW2 - in 1916 they came damn close to knocking Britain out of the war -- even with all their fancy battleship that were little more then port rust buckets. Doenitz knew they did not have the subs when Germany started the war during WW2 however but he did what he could with what he had. That was their only real chance against Britain..everything else was a waste of effort other then coastal defenses and naval patrol aircraft. All those fancy battleships did not interdict squat in WW1 or WW2. If you can kill a merchant with a silly 88mm gun why do you need a big bad expensive battleship to do it?

Commerce raiding has some keys. One of them is stealth. To be able to get close enough to merchant ships in the middle of a war, you must resemble a similar ship. Like a fox in the chicken coop, you tend to stand out. But if you look like a chicken, you have a much easier time. German commerce raiders were typically remodelled merchant ships. This made them slow and really not good warships. A better ship would have been a merchant ship hull with steam turbines geared to two props. You could use one, low pressure turbine for cruising and the other two high pressure turbines for dash speed. I would not armour them, but I would give them an enlarged bunkerage, with torpedoes on the deck in rotatable launchers. 4 x 6 inch guns is adequate, maybe even 4 inch guns, with extra deck cannons like 40mm and 20 mm. A speed of 15-20 knots would allow them to move from one area of operation to another quickly and out run opponent warships. An aircraft catapult system is required with two aircraft with folding wings. They must have a complete signal intercept unit on board and search radar in folding antenna. Just a few ideas

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let's step back from the details of the German Naval building program and understand their traditional position, geopolitically. They are land locked. They have been since the Holy Roman Empire. Their traditional enemies and trading partners until the advent of the industrial age have been the British, French, Italian states, Danes, the Baltic nations and a few miscellaneous balkan countries and empires. Most of these nations have had good to excellent navies, and a strong naval tradition. The Germans are relative newcomers to the problem of sea communications.

Now, with the coming of the industrial age and machines, the search for natural resources got fairly complicated. It began to require a naval presence in the worlds oceans to protect trade lanes especially to the east and west. The Germans never participated in the age of discovery and exploration. Those goods that they needed were available within land routes.

German naval building and strategy was a result of further industrialization and the requirements for more sophisticated natural resources and market goods. This, of course, brought her into direct competition with England and France. At the same time, the separate states of the old Holy Roman Empire aggregated into Imperial Germany. All newly aggregated nations have their aggressive periods of expansion. We did, the Lousiana Purchase, the Lewis and Clark Expedition which caused the Spanish to send four separate military teams to attempt to intercept and destroy the Corp of Discovery. The War of 1812, The Mexican War. The list goes on and on. All nations have gone through that period.

The Germans were no different except that their continent was already fully populated, which caused them no end of problems. Their other problem, was the nature of their sea frontier. It was enclosed and surrounded by two major naval powers with far more naval traditions and forces than they had.

What we see in the period leading to WWI was the German attempt to enter that exclusive club of naval powers, which the German General Staff knew was the key to a world wide trade network. The building of the HSF was a direct result of Germany's attempt to join that club. But as we have seen, joining that exclusive club is far harder than simply building the ships and sailing out into the North Sea.

WWII, as historians have agreed in most cases, was an extension of WWI. The naval strategy in WWII was the same as in WWI. How to break the almost certain, naval blockade of German shipping and impose on the Allies, a similar commercial blockade.

Plan Z was a naval building program, begun in the late 1930's designed to produce an 800 ship fleet by 1946. It was designed to challenge the traditional naval powers of Europe. But, it was beyond the realities of German industry. The plan ended on September 3, 1939- the day the war started. Apparently, German leaders finally realized that you cannot build an 800 ship fleet in the middle of a war.

Discussing Plan Z is almost pointless, unless we are delving into alternate history dating back to 1934, when the Nazi's took control. To have achieved even a 400 ship fleet by 1939, would have required the building and maintenance of over 80 ships per year, for the five years preceeding the war. All military spending is a question of what do you actually want, how much are you willing to spend and what are willing to sacrifice to get it. Since Germany is a landlocked power, spending that much time, resources and money on a fleet that is essentially encircled by two powerful naval countries, is pointless. What the German's built, they were stuck with and had to put to some use, but after the war started, any thoughts of a sizeable German navy was gone. The ships already built could be used for commerce raiding in concert with the U-boats, but I have doubts that this was their primary strategy.

Now, if the German's could not hope to compete with the Allied navies, what was their most effective strategy? That is the question that should be explored. Commerce raiding using surface raiders like Atlantis, Orion etc. with U-boats and possibly land based, long range four engined bombers and large seaplanes probably would have been a better mix. Maybe a small, coastal surface fleet consisting of long ranged, heavily gunned cruisers, destroyers and gunboats might have complimented this grouping.

Dennis:

A soild summary. I think Germany was caught in the need to be a world power with a navy and an inability to realize that she would be at a permanent disadvantage in trying to build and maintain one. Smaller nations were able to accept this, but Kaiser Whilhem with all his issues and problems never understood this. His idea was grand naval reviews with excellent banquets and decorations shared to all the participants. His desperate inferiority complex coupled with his physical challenges made him thrust his chin into the face of his British cousins and start the rivalry that would led to WWI.

Britian absolutely had to be a naval power in order to maintain her far flung empire. Everyone else could afford to let her do so unless she interfered with their trade. Britain spent most of the time up to the end of WWI maintaining a navy capable of defeating the next two largest navies. Once the war ended and Britain was practically bankrupt, she was willing to accept parity with the USN, something she had never done in her naval history.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

A soild summary. I think Germany was caught in the need to be a world power with a navy and an inability to realize that she would be at a permanent disadvantage in trying to build and maintain one. Smaller nations were able to accept this, but Kaiser Whilhem with all his issues and problems never understood this. His idea was grand naval reviews with excellent banquets and decorations shared to all the participants. His desperate inferiority complex coupled with his physical challenges made him thrust his chin into the face of his British cousins and start the rivalry that would led to WWI.

Britian absolutely had to be a naval power in order to maintain her far flung empire. Everyone else could afford to let her do so unless she interfered with their trade. Britain spent most of the time up to the end of WWI maintaining a navy capable of defeating the next two largest navies. Once the war ended and Britain was practically bankrupt, she was willing to accept parity with the USN, something she had never done in her naval history.

The Washington Naval Treaty, IMO, was aimed at keeping the US from becoming a greater naval power. Britain did not mind parity, but would not allow the US to surpass her in naval power. Since we were firm Allies, who better to have parity with, than your best trading partner and a nation who could safely protect your eastern asian interests. Interests that you are now beginning to have difficulty protecting and maintaining yourself. The British, in case of war with japan, could not adequately protect India and Australia, so who better to have help, than the US. Requesting the US Navy place ships at Singapore should be a good indication of their thinking.

Just good geopolitics, IMO.

[Smiffy]

Granted Chamberlin likely would not have gone up against Hitler but Churchill was an entirely different matter. In any case they had to count one of the worlds largest navies to get involved if the spark of a war expanded, as it so often does. WW1 should have been a clue of that possibility.

And so it should, because they read it wrong, and even Chamberlain honoured the treaty with Poland.

Yet the evidence suggests that Hitler did not expect Britain to fight, or, after a token show of intent, to withdraw from the conflict. That withdrawal may well have happened without Churchill, Lord Halifax the other possible candidate for Prime Minister in May 1940, was suggesting an armistice. Churchill was, of course, made of sterner stuff, something that he proved beyond doubt by destroying the French Fleet.

By the way, Chamberlain was for fighting on although he realised that he was not the man for the job. He actually recommended Churchill as his successor. The only time that a British Prime Minister has ever advised the Monarch on his replacement.

[bridav58]

The Washington Naval Treaty, IMO, was aimed at keeping the US from becoming a greater naval power. Britain did not mind parity, but would not allow the US to surpass her in naval power. Since we were firm Allies, who better to have parity with, than your best trading partner and a nation who could safely protect your eastern asian interests. Interests that you are now beginning to have difficulty protecting and maintaining yourself. The British, in case of war with japan, could not adequately protect India and Australia, so who better to have help, than the US. Requesting the US Navy place ships at Singapore should be a good indication of their thinking.

Just good geopolitics, IMO.

Some British observers have stated that the US pushed the treaty because it was a way of stopping construction of obsolesence ships being built at the time. They also state that the Congress wasn't going to fund the whole 1916 Program anyways and that's why the USN came up with the brilllliant idea of the WNT .

Ed,
The same British observers state the UK could have easily afforded to build both the 4 G3's and 4 N3's. They say the UK was nowhere near bankrupt.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Commerce raiding has some keys. One of them is stealth. To be able to get close enough to merchant ships in the middle of a war, you must resemble a similar ship. Like a fox in the chicken coop, you tend to stand out. But if you look like a chicken, you have a much easier time. German commerce raiders were typically remodelled merchant ships. This made them slow and really not good warships. A better ship would have been a merchant ship hull with steam turbines geared to two props. You could use one, low pressure turbine for cruising and the other two high pressure turbines for dash speed. I would not armour them, but I would give them an enlarged bunkerage, with torpedoes on the deck in rotatable launchers. 4 x 6 inch guns is adequate, maybe even 4 inch guns, with extra deck cannons like 40mm and 20 mm. A speed of 15-20 knots would allow them to move from one area of operation to another quickly and out run opponent warships. An aircraft catapult system is required with two aircraft with folding wings. They must have a complete signal intercept unit on board and search radar in folding antenna. Just a few ideas

Dennis and Chris:

With all due respect, that sort of commerce raiding by the disguised merchant ship may have actually been more effective than large surface ships, I agree. But do you take one of those into a convoy? The only ships capable of tackling an escorted convoy would have been a large well organized U-boat pack or a couple of really big surface raiders like a pocket battleship or one of the twins with support.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis and Chris:

With all due respect, that sort of commerce raiding by the disguised merchant ship may have actually been more effective than large surface ships, I agree. But do you take one of those into a convoy? The only ships capable of tackling an escorted convoy would have been a large well organized U-boat pack or a couple of really big surface raiders like a pocket battleship or one of the twins with support.

Quick comparison:

Flower Class Corvette had a speed of 16 knots, 1 x 4 in. gun and 2 x .50 cal machine guns.

German raider Atlantis had a speed of 17 knots, 6 x 5.9 inch guns, 1 x 75mm gun, 2 x 37mm guns, 4 x 20mm guns, 2 aircraft, 4 torpedo tubes, 92 mines

I dunno Ed, but that sounds like a pretty fair fight to me.

Even an Evarts class DE had only 3 x 3 inch guns, 7 x 20 mm and a speed of 19 knots

A Buckley class was similarly equipped, with a max speed of 24 knots. The latter did not enter service until 1943.

[Warship NWS]

Quick comparison:

Flower Class Corvette had a speed of 16 knots, 1 x 4 in. gun and 2 x .50 cal machine guns.

German raider Atlantis had a speed of 17 knots, 6 x 5.9 inch guns, 1 x 75mm gun, 2 x 37mm guns, 4 x 20mm guns, 2 aircraft, 4 torpedo tubes, 92 mines

I dunno Ed, but that sounds like a pretty fair fight to me.

Even an Evarts class DE had only 3 x 3 inch guns, 7 x 20 mm and a speed of 19 knots

A Buckley class was similarly equipped, with a max speed of 24 knots. The latter did not enter service until 1943.

Heck the Kormoran took on the Sydney and sunk her. The AMCs were just as well armed as most treaty light cruisers and you could build a bucket of them for the cost of a single battleship. Considering the fact that single AMCs sank more shipping then all combat ships combined.. I think it would be worth the risk of sending a few after a big convoy. How do you protect convoys with big battleships when you have dozens of AMCs running around being a serious pain in the ass? At most.. the Deustchlands were just fine, if you have to have a warship.. anything bigger then that was a serious waste for raider operations. Even during WW1 the biggest raiders, and very effective in some regards, were CLs.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Dennis and Chris:

With all due respect, that sort of commerce raiding by the disguised merchant ship may have actually been more effective than large surface ships, I agree. But do you take one of those into a convoy? The only ships capable of tackling an escorted convoy would have been a large well organized U-boat pack or a couple of really big surface raiders like a pocket battleship or one of the twins with support.

And exactly how many times in naval history did that work out? Total = Zero. The instant your big fancy ship leaves port the enemy hunts it down like a rabid dog. Now send out 10-20 AMCs for the cost of one BB and the enemy goes insane trying to hunt them all down. Even a handfull of escorting DDs, if they felt the requirement to use DDs instead of typical convoy escorts, could push away your big fancy raider. Point being.. in a big fat ocean it is FAR easier to counter a single threat then many threats.

[bridav58]

Quick comparison:

Flower Class Corvette had a speed of 16 knots, 1 x 4 in. gun and 2 x .50 cal machine guns.

German raider Atlantis had a speed of 17 knots, 6 x 5.9 inch guns, 1 x 75mm gun, 2 x 37mm guns, 4 x 20mm guns, 2 aircraft, 4 torpedo tubes, 92 mines

I dunno Ed, but that sounds like a pretty fair fight to me.

Even an Evarts class DE had only 3 x 3 inch guns, 7 x 20 mm and a speed of 19 knots

A Buckley class was similarly equipped, with a max speed of 24 knots. The latter did not enter service until 1943.

Stephen Hopkins sank the Stier though armed with only 1-4".

[old_pop2000]

Stephen Hopkins sank the Stier though armed with only 1-4".
Well, we've proved that on any given day, any ship can sink any other ship. One liberty ship lost, for one old, rebuilt auxiliary cruiser. So, to prevent that, we will spend 100 times the cost of the Stier, to build a cruiser, or a battleship. I don't think so. Stanley Hopkins got some lucky hits on Stier's engine room. That does not diminish the concept of replacing battleships with commerce raiders.

[bridav58]

Well, we've proved that on any given day, any ship can sink any other ship. One liberty ship lost, for one old, rebuilt auxiliary cruiser. So, to prevent that, we will spend 100 times the cost of the Stier, to build a cruiser, or a battleship. I don't think so. Stanley Hopkins got some lucky hits on Stier's engine room. That does not diminish the concept of replacing battleships with commerce raiders.


with what your saying that German BB's were a big mistake . However what really stopped German AMC's was the RN's interception of the supply ships & discontinuation of independent sailings . There was an IJN AMC also sunk by an armed trawler and a Bangor class MS if I'm not wrong. I'm just saying a convoy with a bunch of merchantmen armed with a 3" or 4" gun along with an escort of a few corvettes and/or DD's might be quite a handfull for an AMC. However your right the AMC concept is alot better then building all those BB's .

[Warship NWS]

with what your saying that German BB's were a big mistake . However what really stopped German AMC's was the RN's interception of the supply ships & discontinuation of independent sailings . There was an IJN AMC also sunk by an armed trawler and a Bangor class MS if I'm not wrong. I'm just saying a convoy with a bunch of merchantmen armed with a 3" or 4" gun along with an escort of a few corvettes and/or DD's might be quite a handfull for an AMC. However your right the AMC concept is alot better then building all those BB's .

Note this however, convoys required extreme amounts of coordination and organization of ships at sea which did considerably slow down how fast supplies arrived at their destinations and you needed enough merchants and escorts to make it work. This is also why subs were so dangerous.. surface gunnery does squat against a sub unless its on the surface itself and even then its a very hard target to spot and kill due to its very low sillouette on the water, at night this makes it virtually invisible especially if it is not firing its guns. Flip this over.. battleships without good gunnery radar lost every advantage of their big guns at night.. BIG GUNS NEED LONG RANGE.. otherwise they are pointless. If the battleships started pressing the matter the USN or RN would have added torpedo armed fast escorts to their convoys, cruisers, or battleships (as sometimes was done).. now your raider has lost any advantage it started out with -- and is now rendered worthless. The last thing a battleship wants to be is located and fixed at sea.. that is the beginning of the end of its life -- especially if it is operating on its own.

The purpose of the AMCs is to make it more difficult to detect them vs a big fat battleship which any silly pilot in the world could figure out what it is while at sea.. they are just flat out the least stealthy ships at sea which means using them as raiders is automatically a bad idea. This is also why AMCs proved far more potent then any ship that even appeared to look like a warship, they just flat out attract too much attention - even the silly Graf Spee had almost as many warships hunting her down as her bigger brother the Bismarck. Got big guns?!.. KILL IT!

The point to this is that we MUST think multi-dimensions of warfare, thus in this case FOW. Inflicting FOW upon your enemy is a very potent weapon in itself. Having the RN chase down one lonely BB is no problem.. chasing down VERY hard to detect subs and AMCs is a geometricaly more complex problem as they can be almost anywhere at anytime.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

with what your saying that German BB's were a big mistake . However what really stopped German AMC's was the RN's interception of the supply ships & discontinuation of independent sailings . There was an IJN AMC also sunk by an armed trawler and a Bangor class MS if I'm not wrong. I'm just saying a convoy with a bunch of merchantmen armed with a 3" or 4" gun along with an escort of a few corvettes and/or DD's might be quite a handfull for an AMC. However your right the AMC concept is alot better then building all those BB's .

The concept that we are proposing is simply to utilize the resources poured into the battleships, and battlecruisers like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck etc., into a more cost effective, commerce raiding strategy that can cause more disruption to the British supply system, than a single, large ship. If we can disrupt British supplies to the Far East, Middle East, and to and from South America, the US and Russia, we might be able to delay any Allied buildup, possibly allowing our land forces a chance to defeat the Russians and force the Allies to stay on the defensive longer. If enough assets can be placed astride the sea lanes of the world, we can force the Allied navies to disperse their few naval assets into hunting them down. Remember the idea is to delay the Allied buildup. We probably can't stop it, but delaying it by a year or two, could mean the end of Russia and possibly the British forces in North Africa.

The raider Atlantis, sank 22 ships in two years of sailing. How much effort in ships, and assets were required to hunt her down. If we could put 10 or 20 of those raiders, along with 50 to 100 U boats on the high seas on September 3, 1939, how much damage to British supplies could be effected? How would the war in North Africa or the Battle of Britain have been altered without the supplies from other nations. Examine the ships required to hunt down Graf Spee. She was easy to spot, but what about a ship that looks like a regular freighter. That isn't as easy.

[djcyclone]

Ther is one concept that everyone is leaving out is this. Hitler had promised the KM that there would be no war until 1945. He did not expect Britain, or France to declare war. The death toll of WW I was still on everyone's avoid at all cost list.

In my opinion, the KM built the mighty ships not in hopes of fighting the British, or French, or even the Russians. They did not even build those ships with Merchant raiding in mind. They built the Bismarck and Tripitz, and all the other ships to keep the peace. It only makes sense, that if they had expected a war sooner, then they would have dumped all of those resouces into ships that could win like the U-Boat, or better and more planes.

Just like we see today. The United States has enough Nuclear Weapons to destroy the world 200 times over, and Russia has enough to do it over 100 times. Why build this stuff, because it will never be used. You build it to keep the other guy from wanting to declare war on you. Is the ability to destroy the World once not enough? Who cares after that? The world is gone, and no one survived to say "hay at least we can still destroy ourselves another 199 times."

Psychological warfare is the worst form of warfare anyone can accomplish. If you can make your enemy afraid of you then you have already won the war. Their own fear will destroy them in the long run. The KM knew that they did not stand a chance against the British Navy, or even the French Navy. They Russians they could have beaten, because all of their big guns where sunk by their own crews during the Revolution. They just wanted some insurance to make the other guys think twice before declaring war on them.

In the end none of it worked, because of the resolve of the Allies. I do believe that the Battleships where simply built to make the other guy scared. Everyone knew that they had been obsolete since WW I, but they also knew that the sight of a Battleship was still enough to make any enemy sea crew wet themselves. (not literally of course, but you get the idea)

[Warship NWS]

To dj, I would buy the "fear factor" if the other navies had equal or lesser numbers of warships.. but their greatest threats in terms of military power at sea far outnumbered their navy. The only plausible reason other then "fear" would be coastal defense... but even then they could do little except maybe vs the Russian navy.

[Warship NWS]

Examine the ships required to hunt down Graf Spee. She was easy to spot, but what about a ship that looks like a regular freighter. That isn't as easy.

The problem with the Graf Spee was not in spotting her but in catching her.. 28 knots was faster then any ship in the RN except for CVs, CRs, DDs, and the 3 BCs. Nothing else could force an engagement. In the end.. she could outgun any single ship in the RN that could catch her except for the BCs. Stealth was not her first attribute as a raider.. her speed and guns were. Stealth belonged to the subs and AMCs. Damn hard to spot an ACM from the air compared to a big gun ship, especially for identification purposes, or a tiny sub and even if you spot the sub it can submerge and hide.

Look at it from this standpoint.. it took an entire pattern of seaplanes to spot Nagumos Strike Force of CVs and escorts, and we had a good idea of where to look and the planes to do it. It took a good number of aircraft to spot the Bismarck, and then to maintain a shadow of cruisers to keep track of her with radar. Now lets compare that to trying to spot and identify accurately an AMC all by itself or a sub -- remember there are buckets of shipping running around.. its not an empty ocean out there. That would be almost like trying to find a spec of sugar in 6x6 foot sandbox. This would explain why most of the AMCs and subs were reported through networking of various assets, or by those under attack if they could, to try and hunt them down. Now toss out there 20 AMCs at once and compound that with a bucket of subs.. now we can talk about "draining the resources" of the British.. that would be a nightmare.

Thanks.

[bridav58]

Note this however, convoys required extreme amounts of coordination and organization of ships at sea which did considerably slow down how fast supplies arrived at their destinations and you needed enough merchants and escorts to make it work. This is also why subs were so dangerous.. surface gunnery does squat against a sub unless its on the surface itself and even then its a very hard target to spot and kill due to its very low sillouette on the water, at night this makes it virtually invisible especially if it is not firing its guns. Flip this over.. battleships without good gunnery radar lost every advantage of their big guns at night.. BIG GUNS NEED LONG RANGE.. otherwise they are pointless. If the battleships started pressing the matter the USN or RN would have added torpedo armed fast escorts to their convoys, cruisers, or battleships (as sometimes was done).. now your raider has lost any advantage it started out with -- and is now rendered worthless. The last thing a battleship wants to be is located and fixed at sea.. that is the beginning of the end of its life -- especially if it is operating on its own.

The purpose of the AMCs is to make it more difficult to detect them vs a big fat battleship which any silly pilot in the world could figure out what it is while at sea.. they are just flat out the least stealthy ships at sea which means using them as raiders is automatically a bad idea. This is also why AMCs proved far more potent then any ship that even appeared to look like a warship, they just flat out attract too much attention - even the silly Graf Spee had almost as many warships hunting her down as her bigger brother the Bismarck. Got big guns?!.. KILL IT!

The point to this is that we MUST think multi-dimensions of warfare, thus in this case FOW. Inflicting FOW upon your enemy is a very potent weapon in itself. Having the RN chase down one lonely BB is no problem.. chasing down VERY hard to detect subs and AMCs is a geometricaly more complex problem as they can be almost anywhere at anytime.

Thanks.

1. German subs for the most part operated on the surface and at nite. They also scored for the vast part against individual sailings. As far as gunnery not meaning squat well when Commander Walker was runnung the GUK convoys and a sub was located he would immediately have every ship fire starshell , The subs would then submerged because they knew the even a merchantman with a 3" pop gun could make life miserable for them if located.
2. Where AMC's score thier points? Certainly not around the North Atlantic . Also remember that a convoy/individual merchantmen is a speck on the ocean too so the raider has to find it.However there are focal points around the world where one can't help but see or be seen by other ships this is where the best hunting is. The RN tried to keep ships around these focal points to protect against raiders. The mistake the RN did was go speck hunting instead of luring the speck to them . They should have organised convoys alot sooner as WW1 should have told them.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some British observers have stated that the US pushed the treaty because it was a way of stopping construction of obsolesence ships being built at the time. They also state that the Congress wasn't going to fund the whole 1916 Program anyways and that's why the USN came up with the brilllliant idea of the WNT .

Ed,
The same British observers state the UK could have easily afforded to build both the 4 G3's and 4 N3's. They say the UK was nowhere near bankrupt.

Brian:

Could they have built them? I don't doubt that, but at the expense of what other part of their military? Read any account of British attempts at rearmament during the inter-war period and it always comes back to being strapped for cash. Weapons development was curtailed on many systems due to this problem. Certainly you can always prioritize you needs and in terms of the RN, they would have gotten some of what they wanted, but not all. Regarding US ships, I concur, many of the designs would have been obsolesent by the time they were completed. This also acted as a motivator in calling for the Naval Conference.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Quick comparison:

Flower Class Corvette had a speed of 16 knots, 1 x 4 in. gun and 2 x .50 cal machine guns.

German raider Atlantis had a speed of 17 knots, 6 x 5.9 inch guns, 1 x 75mm gun, 2 x 37mm guns, 4 x 20mm guns, 2 aircraft, 4 torpedo tubes, 92 mines

I dunno Ed, but that sounds like a pretty fair fight to me.

Even an Evarts class DE had only 3 x 3 inch guns, 7 x 20 mm and a speed of 19 knots

A Buckley class was similarly equipped, with a max speed of 24 knots. The latter did not enter service until 1943.

Dennis:

Most convoys usually had several corvettes and sloops and usually at least one DD. Individually Atlantis is more powerful, but the Graf Spee shows what happens when your opponent can swarm you. Take a look at how disguised raiders worked. They usually picked off lone victims. You youself made they point that they required stealth. There is very little stealth in attacking a convoy, then add in that the ship in question is too slow to escape a real warship. Reveal youself to a convoy and you are asking to get hunted down.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Heck the Kormoran took on the Sydney and sunk her. The AMCs were just as well armed as most treaty light cruisers and you could build a bucket of them for the cost of a single battleship. Considering the fact that single AMCs sank more shipping then all combat ships combined.. I think it would be worth the risk of sending a few after a big convoy. How do you protect convoys with big battleships when you have dozens of AMCs running around being a serious pain in the ass? At most.. the Deustchlands were just fine, if you have to have a warship.. anything bigger then that was a serious waste for raider operations. Even during WW1 the biggest raiders, and very effective in some regards, were CLs.

Thanks.

Chris:

Kormoran sunk Sydney because she caught her by surprise. Do you think that the result would have been the same if Sydney was pursuing her and already at action stations? By the time the really convoys were sailing, they generally had a pretty good escort and had larger ships providing distant cover. Two AMCs would first have to handle the convoy escort and then maybe sink 6-8 merchants and then run like hell because the distant cover is going to come looking for them. Also I would it interesting to see how this little AMC task force is going to operate? if they are sailing in a group, they're going to be conspicious. If instead they rendezous at a given spot, then they will be dependent on radio traffic to coordinate their plans. We all know that the British were able to read German naval codes and used this to either coordinate hunting down their opponents, or else to steer convoys from potential danger. AMCs have two purposes: lone wolf commerce raiding, or else as the British did, supplemanting a convoy's escort (HMS Rawalpindi comes to mind).

[Ed Rotondaro]

And exactly how many times in naval history did that work out? Total = Zero. The instant your big fancy ship leaves port the enemy hunts it down like a rabid dog. Now send out 10-20 AMCs for the cost of one BB and the enemy goes insane trying to hunt them all down. Even a handfull of escorting DDs, if they felt the requirement to use DDs instead of typical convoy escorts, could push away your big fancy raider. Point being.. in a big fat ocean it is FAR easier to counter a single threat then many threats.

Chris:

You're missing the point here. You don't take AMCs up against a convoy. That was what I trying to state. I realize that lots of threats are more effective OK? Give me some credit here.

The only ships that could possibly go up against a convoy with some reasonable chance of success were U-boats and large capital ships. And while they didn't do it often, there are instances where the KM caught and scattered convoys. Unfortunately the effort and time needed to sink the merchants allowed the bulk to escape. If the threat of large commerce raiders was so over exxagerated, then why did the RN make it a point to include an old R class battleship with a convoy if there was any possibility of surface action? Does the example of PQ-17 shed any light on this subject? The mere threat of the Tirpitz causes the RN (well mainly Admiral Pound who was out of his depth) to panic and scatter the convoy. We all know what happened next.

[clacton2]

Chris:

Kormoran sunk Sydney because she caught her by surprise. Do you think that the result would have been the same if Sydney was pursuing her and already at action stations? By the time the really convoys were sailing, they generally had a pretty good escort and had larger ships providing distant cover. Two AMCs would first have to handle the convoy escort and then maybe sink 6-8 merchants and then run like hell because the distant cover is going to come looking for them. Also I would it interesting to see how this little AMC task force is going to operate? if they are sailing in a group, they're going to be conspicious. If instead they rendezous at a given spot, then they will be dependent on radio traffic to coordinate their plans. We all know that the British were able to read German naval codes and used this to either coordinate hunting down their opponents, or else to steer convoys from potential danger. AMCs have two purposes: lone wolf commerce raiding, or else as the British did, supplemanting a convoy's escort (HMS Rawalpindi comes to mind).

Ed,
I think you mean HMS Jervis Bay, she was a convoy escort, whereas HMS Rawalpindi was part of the Northern Patrol Force, sunk whilst monitoring the area for German raiders breaking out into the Atlantic.
Jon;)

[clacton2]

Chris:

You're missing the point here. You don't take AMCs up against a convoy. That was what I trying to state. I realize that lots of threats are more effective OK? Give me some credit here.

The only ships that could possibly go up against a convoy with some reasonable chance of success were U-boats and large capital ships. And while they didn't do it often, there are instances where the KM caught and scattered convoys. Unfortunately the effort and time needed to sink the merchants allowed the bulk to escape. If the threat of large commerce raiders was so over exxagerated, then why did the RN make it a point to include an old R class battleship with a convoy if there was any possibility of surface action? Does the example of PQ-17 shed any light on this subject? The mere threat of the Tirpitz causes the RN (well mainly Admiral Pound who was out of his depth) to panic and scatter the convoy. We all know what happened next.

Ed,
Part of the reason, Dudley Pound was out of his depth in this particular instance, was because he was terminally ill at the time, but was battling on out of what turned out to be, unfortunately for all concerned, a misguided sense of duty.
Jon:(

[Kyle Holgate]

And exactly how many times in naval history did that work out? Total = Zero. The instant your big fancy ship leaves port the enemy hunts it down like a rabid dog. Now send out 10-20 AMCs for the cost of one BB and the enemy goes insane trying to hunt them all down. Even a handfull of escorting DDs, if they felt the requirement to use DDs instead of typical convoy escorts, could push away your big fancy raider. Point being.. in a big fat ocean it is FAR easier to counter a single threat then many threats.

What about Scharnhorst and Gneisenau's cruise? They did fairly well, though were chased off by any battleship with the convoy. Also, just because it didn't happen doesn't mean it could not have happened, surely wargaming has taught you that lesson.
But for a few changes in chance things we could be looking back on a history where Bismarck escaped and got into a troop convoy, or any number of other things.
To be clear, I agree that Battleships aren't raiders, but given the situation the Germans were in it wasn't necessarily a bad idea. Might as well use the ship as opposed to having it set around in port. IMO in fact they should have been more aggressive than they were - they lost the ships anyway, with a bit more agreessiveness they may have taken more enemy ships with them.
The biggest "flub up" the Germans had in their naval stragegy was that they didn't get good coordination with the Luftwaffe - but that was the fat one's fault along with Hitler who could have ordered more cooperation.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Ther is one concept that everyone is leaving out is this. Hitler had promised the KM that there would be no war until 1945. He did not expect Britain, or France to declare war. The death toll of WW I was still on everyone's avoid at all cost list.

In my opinion, the KM built the mighty ships not in hopes of fighting the British, or French, or even the Russians. They did not even build those ships with Merchant raiding in mind. They built the Bismarck and Tripitz, and all the other ships to keep the peace. It only makes sense, that if they had expected a war sooner, then they would have dumped all of those resouces into ships that could win like the U-Boat, or better and more planes.

Just like we see today. The United States has enough Nuclear Weapons to destroy the world 200 times over, and Russia has enough to do it over 100 times. Why build this stuff, because it will never be used. You build it to keep the other guy from wanting to declare war on you. Is the ability to destroy the World once not enough? Who cares after that? The world is gone, and no one survived to say "hay at least we can still destroy ourselves another 199 times."

Psychological warfare is the worst form of warfare anyone can accomplish. If you can make your enemy afraid of you then you have already won the war. Their own fear will destroy them in the long run. The KM knew that they did not stand a chance against the British Navy, or even the French Navy. They Russians they could have beaten, because all of their big guns where sunk by their own crews during the Revolution. They just wanted some insurance to make the other guys think twice before declaring war on them.

In the end none of it worked, because of the resolve of the Allies. I do believe that the Battleships where simply built to make the other guy scared. Everyone knew that they had been obsolete since WW I, but they also knew that the sight of a Battleship was still enough to make any enemy sea crew wet themselves. (not literally of course, but you get the idea)


Hi Cyclone,

I have to disagree with you about the KM building ships to keep the peace. Even more than the in the first world war, German was a continental power. There was no conflict between the two as England was no threat to Germany. Hitler wanted to restore Germany to her previous greatness and the military went along. He hoped to avoid war, but was not afraid to use it as an instrument to get what he wanted. KM building desires were limitied by German industrial capacity and the setting of priorites for that capacity by the Nazis.

Raeder and the navy wanted a conventional fleet because that is what they would need to beat the British. Remember, U boats were defeated in WW I by convoys and there was no evidence other than Doenitz's advocacy that those boats would do better in the second. In addition, it was America's objection to unrestricted submarine warfare that lead to her intervention and sealed Germany's defeat.

Other than commentators and advocates, there was no evidence that battlewships were obsolete. They were replaced when aircraft carriers were able to strike targets at a longer range than their guns. The bi plane airgroups of 1939 had not been tested. As Peter C. Smith points out in "The Great Ships Pass", the battleship remained the only effective all weather ship killer until near the end of the war. On the Arctic convoy routes, the British could not risk their carriers in range of land based air.

[old_pop2000]

What about Scharnhorst and Gneisenau's cruise? They did fairly well, though were chased off by any battleship with the convoy. Also, just because it didn't happen doesn't mean it could not have happened, surely wargaming has taught you that lesson.
But for a few changes in chance things we could be looking back on a history where Bismarck escaped and got into a troop convoy, or any number of other things.
To be clear, I agree that Battleships aren't raiders, but given the situation the Germans were in it wasn't necessarily a bad idea. Might as well use the ship as opposed to having it set around in port. IMO in fact they should have been more aggressive than they were - they lost the ships anyway, with a bit more agreessiveness they may have taken more enemy ships with them.
The biggest "flub up" the Germans had in their naval stragegy was that they didn't get good coordination with the Luftwaffe - but that was the fat one's fault along with Hitler who could have ordered more cooperation.

Let's examine the cruise of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in terms of cost versus results. The two ships sank a total of 22 ships for a total of 115,000 tons in that cruise.
That is an average(yes, Scharnhorst sank 8, I know that) of 11 ships per vessel. Think of the building and operational costs for those two ships, and figure that against 22 ships.

Now, the Auxilliary Cruiser Atlantis sank the same number of ship, in a very similiar time frame during the war, and she was far cheaper to build, remodel and maintain operationally. She stayed at sea for over two years.

Remember also, that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were never able to accomplish a successful mission again. That mission, along with the sinking of the Glorious was all they accomplished.

Does anyone, on this forum, seriously believe that the Bismarcks and Scharnhorst class of ships were a cost effective commerce raiding weapon system? The principle in developing weapons is to build the most cost effective weapon system that is needed to accomplish the mission.

What was the primary mission of the German Navy?

Is that where the problem actually resided? Was there a primary mission? Was it to confront the British Royal Navy? Was it to interdict supply lines and lines of communication to hinder and impede British strategy and logistics?

IMO, if the primary mission was the latter, then the capital ship was the wrong weapon. It was too complicated, expensive and difficult to maintain to be an effective commerce raider.

Let's quit grasping at straws by relating single instances where the capital ship might have contributed to the overall strategy. Single instances or examples simply distract the discussion from its primary points.

Let's answer the question at hand? What was the German Navy's role in the overall strategy of the war? Was it to gain control of the sea lanes thereby controlling the sea communications of the Allies? Was it to raid commerce and delay any buildup of supplies necessary to maintain the British in the War? Just what was their strategy and what should it have been, based on their geopolitical situation? They are landlocked, that has been stated. How do they cope with that situation? How does an essentially landlocked nation, attack it's opponents sea lanes and sea communications? Can it? How? Has any landlocked or partially landlocked nation ever done it?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,
I think you mean HMS Jervis Bay, she was a convoy escort, whereas HMS Rawalpindi was part of the Northern Patrol Force, sunk whilst monitoring the area for German raiders breaking out into the Atlantic.
Jon;)

Hi Jon:

Thanks for the correction. Actually what I was trying to do was find examples of AMC engaging conventional warships in combat, and that one sprang to mind first.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,
Part of the reason, Dudley Pound was out of his depth in this particular instance, was because he was terminally ill at the time, but was battling on out of what turned out to be, unfortunately for all concerned, a misguided sense of duty.
Jon:(

Jon:

I know Pound retired not long after the PQ-17 disaster and that he had at least one stroke before he died. Was he ill with cancer? Or was it heart disease? I don't recall the details.

[Ed Rotondaro]

What about Scharnhorst and Gneisenau's cruise? They did fairly well, though were chased off by any battleship with the convoy. Also, just because it didn't happen doesn't mean it could not have happened, surely wargaming has taught you that lesson.
But for a few changes in chance things we could be looking back on a history where Bismarck escaped and got into a troop convoy, or any number of other things.
To be clear, I agree that Battleships aren't raiders, but given the situation the Germans were in it wasn't necessarily a bad idea. Might as well use the ship as opposed to having it set around in port. IMO in fact they should have been more aggressive than they were - they lost the ships anyway, with a bit more agreessiveness they may have taken more enemy ships with them.
The biggest "flub up" the Germans had in their naval stragegy was that they didn't get good coordination with the Luftwaffe - but that was the fat one's fault along with Hitler who could have ordered more cooperation.

Kyle:

In keeping with this topic, I did some quick on-line research and found that during their initial operations, the twins encountered two convoys and sank a grand total of 22 ships, including 13 in one action. Now these convoys were unescorted, but it shows the potential and why the RN had to either provide heavier escorts when German capital units were at sea, or else try and hunt these ships down.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Cyclone,

I have to disagree with you about the KM building ships to keep the peace. Even more than the in the first world war, German was a continental power. There was no conflict between the two as England was no threat to Germany. Hitler wanted to restore Germany to her previous greatness and the military went along. He hoped to avoid war, but was not afraid to use it as an instrument to get what he wanted. KM building desires were limitied by German industrial capacity and the setting of priorites for that capacity by the Nazis.

Raeder and the navy wanted a conventional fleet because that is what they would need to beat the British. Remember, U boats were defeated in WW I by convoys and there was no evidence other than Doenitz's advocacy that those boats would do better in the second. In addition, it was America's objection to unrestricted submarine warfare that lead to her intervention and sealed Germany's defeat.

Other than commentators and advocates, there was no evidence that battlewships were obsolete. They were replaced when aircraft carriers were able to strike targets at a longer range than their guns. The bi plane airgroups of 1939 had not been tested. As Peter C. Smith points out in "The Great Ships Pass", the battleship remained the only effective all weather ship killer until near the end of the war. On the Arctic convoy routes, the British could not risk their carriers in range of land based air.

Mike:

Very true. Also consider if the battles are taking place at night where airpower is not a factor. This debate has focused on the battleships as being obsolete and worthless but I think the problem is that all navies tended to save them up for the decisive action. Now does fall into the area of building a powerful weapon but being afraid to risk it in action. I can't think of any time during WWII where the loss of single capital ship would alter the strategic situation so much that a navy should have been afraid to risk them. In the Med, the Italians had three of their BBs crippled at Taranto, but were still able to threaten the British supply lines to Africa and Malta. The Brits end up losing one BB and having two badly damaged, but the Italians can't take advantage of this. The US Pacific Fleet has six BBs sunk or knocked out and it can still function. Now part of this is due to the new capital ship, the carrier, taking over the duties of the battleship. Another part is due to the sheer size of the battlefield (only the Med and the English Channel were really narrow, everywhere else there is plenty of room to maneuver.)

[Warship NWS]

the battleship remained the only effective all weather ship killer until near the end of the war.

I do not agree with this in either war. In WW1 BBs were extremely ineffective at night and during WW2 you gave up the only advantage you have unless you have good radar.. gunnery range. Contrary to popular belief building bigger guns was primarly and intentionally meant to be able to hit targets further away then they could hit back. This goes the same for land artillery.. range mattered. If you allowed yourself to get into a fight at night vs ships that could hurt you with torpedoes and/or guns, not even saying subs at night would be terribly dangerous, then that big fancy battleship could get sunk right quick, also, the last thing you want to do in a battleship that could be laid up for repairs for months is to have some silly DD or CR put a torpedo into your ship or have some cruisers hammer your superstructure to shreds. There is a reason why screening ships were important.. to keep those pesky DDs and CRs at bay. Now if your talking being able to sink some silly merchant at night..again it was a waste of resources and you still had to concern yourself with the fact that the enemy might respond by putting in ships with better armament with the convoys to help counter your threat.

Thanks.

[bridav58]

1. A raider above all must be expendable...BB's and even cruisers are not expendable and any nation that can risk BB's,CA's and CL's because they are expendable doesn't need to commerce raid and if they did they have ample resources to build subs & long range maritime aircraft to do it. The RN/Coastal Command sowed an immesne amount of mines in WW2 and because of this minesweeping was probably the largest operastional issue of the Kriegsmarine.
2. Raiders & convoys..another thing a raider never does is attack a convoy because attacking a convoy mean s attacking a warship. Any amount of damage inflicted on a raider can be fatal witness what Prince of Wales did to Bismarck her one shot cut her raiding trip completely out & even if it didn't the Suffolk & Norfolk were shadowing her so how much damage can she really do? Also look at Scharnhorst & Gneisenau when they took out Glorious the CV only had 2 DD's for escort and despite being so weakly escorted one of the DD's managed to torpedo the Schrnhorst. Could the Twins(or Bismarck for that matter) make minemeat out of say Ramailles or Malaya? Probably but if 1-15" shell hits in the right place say goodbye to one expensive raider while the British can swap 1 for 1 all day long.If that torpedoing happened out in the Atlantic write off one 32,000 ton CB which cost probably in the area of $100,000,000.00 while merchantmen come in at around $1,000,000.00 though thier cargo's maybe worth alot more. So sending a big capital ship to destroy merchant ships is bound to be a loosing proposition.
3. Convoy escorts and large combatants.. Looking at the battles of the Bering Sea, Sirte Gulf, Admiral Scheer verse Jervis bay,Scharnhorst verse the cruiser covering force at battle of North Cape and Rawalpindi verse the Twins/S & G one thing pops out the escort by sacraficing itself can preserve the safety of the convoy while also showing that British light forces did indeed have a very good doctrine of how to handle large combatants. Now if escorts can half way handle a Scharnhorst or Gneisenau ,or both or a Littorio then an AMC or 2 will achive absolutely squat. Of course if the large units can cause the convoy to scatter then that might give any subs & aircraft nearby a better chance then if the convoy was still intact this is what happened to PQ17.

[old_pop2000]

Kyle:

In keeping with this topic, I did some quick on-line research and found that during their initial operations, the twins encountered two convoys and sank a grand total of 22 ships, including 13 in one action. Now these convoys were unescorted, but it shows the potential and why the RN had to either provide heavier escorts when German capital units were at sea, or else try and hunt these ships down.
Correct! But Atlantis and Orion, together , sank 34.5 ships for a gross tonnage of 225,976 tons. Two old, rebuilt, slow auxilliary cruisers together, sank more vessels, caused more British ships to chase around the Atlantic and Pacific after them, than those two expensive battlecruisers which were pummelled as soon as they reached Brest.

One U-boat,U-99, sank 35 ships for a gross tonnage of 198,218 GRT, 3 Aux. Warships, 1 ship captured and 3 damaged.

So, three fairly inexpensive warships, sank over 69.5 ships, for a GRT of over 424,194 tons.

Now, what kind of tactics can we devise for attacking convoys with teams of auxiliary cruisers and subs. We can use the surface raiders to attack the rear of the convoy to draw the escorts toward the rear to defend that section of the convoy. The U-boats can slip into the center of the convoy, and now proceed to attack with torpedoes. During the night, with the convoy in disarray, they can use night surface attacks. This strategy will be effective for the first year or two of the war, until late 1941 or early 1942. Tactics must evolve during the conflict. What might work in 1939-1941, will be ineffective over time, say 1943, possibly even as early as 1942. This is the key. Evolution of tactics. But if our strategy is to delay and hamper build ups in key operational fronts like the Far East, Middle East, Russia, then these tactics will be effective but only over a limited time period. During this early period, we would have to concentrate our efforts in building larger, better U-boats, with longer ranges, more torpedoes, higher underwater speeds, better living conditions. Improved electronic technology like surface radars, hydrophones, etc can all contribute.

This can be accomplished, provided we are not wasting valuable resources on large capital ships with short lives, that tend to become bomb sponges in the harbor.

[Kyle Holgate]

Correct! But Atlantis and Orion, together , sank 34.5 ships for a gross tonnage of 225,976 tons. Two old, rebuilt, slow auxilliary cruisers together, sank more vessels, caused more British ships to chase around the Atlantic and Pacific after them, than those two expensive battlecruisers which were pummelled as soon as they reached Brest.

One U-boat,U-99, sank 35 ships for a gross tonnage of 198,218 GRT, 3 Aux. Warships, 1 ship captured and 3 damaged.

So, three fairly inexpensive warships, sank over 69.5 ships, for a GRT of over 424,194 tons.

I think we're talking what 'could' happen here not so much what did. The twins cruise showed that it was possible to intercept a convoy and sink lots of ships. This is why the Bismarck cruise was tried - thinking that even with an escort Bismarck could keep it busy while the Prinz Eugen destroys merchants. This conclusion may be suspect and I can think of several holes in the idea, but I can see why they thought to try it.
Ships in France was a totally bad idea and it seems like one doesn't need 20/20 hindsight to see that this would be the case. I'm not sure what sort of air defense would be needed to really protect the ships, but it's obvious that even in 1941 they couldn't manage it.
So in any case, the potential is there for major warships to really blast convoys out of the water, and also even one being around caused havoc in the convoy schedules as the RN had to round up escorting BB's.
My question - the alternative is to just keep the major ships in port and don't use them. The Japanese did this to some extent, waiting for their decisive battle and ended up with finally deploying them when the war was lost. In spring '41 the war wasn't yet lost and I can't really blame the Germans for trying - it could have worked out much better than it did though as previously said, heading into French ports is a bad idea.

[Warship NWS]

To Kyle and Ed,

Instead of asking if "could it happen" you should ask yourself "why didn't it happen more often?". What better bait to sucker out a big fancy battleship being used for raiding then to give it a juicy convoy to go after without it knowing that there might be surface combatants covering it or other task forces nearby waiting for a kill.. now you can sink that big fancy battleship because you know where it is. One shot flash in the pan and it sinks shipping worth less then the ship you used to sink the shipping.. again, a waste and a major morale blow to the KM for each one lost - remember the human factor. Wargaming has NEVER taken into account the complete complexities of naval navigation, intel operations, detection and indentification, communications, dynamic environments, convoy doctrinal operations, etc.. SAS might be the closest yet to be published that I know of. Oh BTW, any German port was in range of RAF bombers.. not just France. The RAF started bombing German ports right from the start -- all they needed to know is WHERE and WHEN the BBs were in port.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Regarding AMCs not attacking convoys.. don't have to. There was MORE then enough shipping out there NOT in convoys. Use the AMCs to go after single ships and then use the subs to attack the convoys in packs. Now you have both problems covered, rather then using a single battleship to sink shipping worth less then the ship itself. The idea of the KM operating 4 BBs together at once would have been a disaster also because now the RAF/RN know where all 4 are at one time... well, the rest would have been history from there.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

I think we're talking what 'could' happen here not so much what did. The twins cruise showed that it was possible to intercept a convoy and sink lots of ships. This is why the Bismarck cruise was tried - thinking that even with an escort Bismarck could keep it busy while the Prinz Eugen destroys merchants. This conclusion may be suspect and I can think of several holes in the idea, but I can see why they thought to try it.
Ships in France was a totally bad idea and it seems like one doesn't need 20/20 hindsight to see that this would be the case. I'm not sure what sort of air defense would be needed to really protect the ships, but it's obvious that even in 1941 they couldn't manage it.
So in any case, the potential is there for major warships to really blast convoys out of the water, and also even one being around caused havoc in the convoy schedules as the RN had to round up escorting BB's.
My question - the alternative is to just keep the major ships in port and don't use them. The Japanese did this to some extent, waiting for their decisive battle and ended up with finally deploying them when the war was lost. In spring '41 the war wasn't yet lost and I can't really blame the Germans for trying - it could have worked out much better than it did though as previously said, heading into French ports is a bad idea.

I can go along with your conclusions. The German Navy was hoping that war would not start until 3-5 years had passed to allow for the building of the 800 ship fleet. Whether that would have ever come to pass, is doubtful. When the war started in 1939, they had ships, so they had to use them. How do you do that? Well, as surface raiders. They weren't really built for that purpose, but it was better than leaving them in the harbors to become ordnance sponges or target practice for Bomber Command. I believe the underlying failure was a lack of a realistic strategic assessment of their geopolitical situation and how could a rebuilt German Navy contribute to that strategic assessment. Possibly, lack of a naval tradition might have blinded them to their real capabilities and possibilies. In terms of a naval strategy, they had few real, options except surface raiders and u-boats coupled with a small coastal fleet of Panzerschiffes, heavy cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers along with motor torpedo boats. This mix of weapons, with an enlarged seaplane fleet with large, long ranged four engined reconnaissance aircraft would have given them far more flexibility in dealing with the British fleet.

[Warship NWS]

I will agree that the KM might as well use the surface combatants for something but here is an option not considered... use them to attack combatants while operating in numbers. If the AMCs and subs have the RN scattered all about then various naval units might be operating with inadequate protection .. example the Glorious. Losing the Glorious was the greatest blow to the RN the KM ever achieved second only to the Hood. At least then they would either (a) die a warrior so as not to be such a blow to the morale of the KM or (b) gain a naval victory bits and pieces at a time thus being a huge morale boost to the KM -- IOW, hit and run victories. Another option, although this may be a bit more complicated, move them down to the Med and have them bolster the Italian fleet. Not sure how well the Italians would have liked that but it could be discussed, also this would at least allow for more adequate Luftwaffe coverage. Now if your ONLY option is to be used as a raider.. then go after single merchants, not convoys. Why? Well, the Duestchlands and AMCs were successful in that role and it provided the least amount of risk of enemy escorts and at least they accomplished more then the big ships did and they had the speed to keep the RN off of their tails and the chances of a single merchant getting of a radio location message compared to a convoy of ships is FAR less likely.

[Warship NWS]

Swap out the Graf Spee with the Scharnorst or Bismarck.. attacking single merchants.. what would have happened then? Anyone want to take a crack at this one?

[old_pop2000]

Just some numbers on costs:

Bismarck cost somewhere in the area of $71 million dollars to build, I suspect.

The Goldenfels, or later Atlantis, cost $424,000 to build. This does not include the upgrade cost when she was taken over from Hansa in 1939. She was a 7862 ton motor vessel and building costs are figured on a per deadweight ton, which might be around $68 per ton. The cost would vary for each shipyard. Even a conservative cost of $500,000 is far less than Bismarck cost.

[old_pop2000]

Swap out the Graf Spee with the Scharnorst or Bismarck.. attacking single merchants.. what would have happened then? Anyone want to take a crack at this one?
Probably the same results, although the British might have lost Exeter. But they would have sent bigger surface ships like battleships or battlecruisers to deal with her. If they knew it was Bismarck, they would have reacted accordingly. They might have included an aircraft carrier like Ark Royal or Courageous to give the fleet some long range eyes.

[john964]

Jon:

I know Pound retired not long after the PQ-17 disaster and that he had at least one stroke before he died. Was he ill with cancer? Or was it heart disease? I don't recall the details.Admiral Sir Dudley Pound was suffering from a undiagnosed brain tumour, he was said to be suffering from blinding headaches to quote Sir Dudley "like the top of my head was coming off". His tumour was not discovered untill a autopsey was preformed after his death. From what I understand his type of tumour was not operable in any meaningful way untill the 1970's.

[Warship NWS]

Probably the same results, although the British might have lost Exeter. But they would have sent bigger surface ships like battleships or battlecruisers to deal with her. If they knew it was Bismarck, they would have reacted accordingly. They might have included an aircraft carrier like Ark Royal or Courageous to give the fleet some long range eyes.

I think it would have been a bit more interesting then that. This pushes the RN into a far greater range of operations compared to being closer to their home bases in England with the exception of Gibraltar. However, the Bismarck would be pressed for finding a way to be re-provisioned with fuel and supplies. I do not think the 3 CRs would have engaged her however and had waited for backup warships to be involved giving the Bismarck time to escape.. the question would be in which direction would she escape. Having 30 knots of speed when you need it though would come in handy and the guns to outrange anything smaller then a battleship and the ability to kill a battlecruiser if operating alone - which were the only ships that could catch and gunfight her. The biggest drawback to the RN was capital ship speeds .. thus the CVs had to be pressed to get where needed when needed the most.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Kormoran sunk Sydney because she caught her by surprise.


My point exactly.. if it had been a big battleship the Sydney would have reported in a spotting report rather then get close.. much easier to identify a big fat battleship then a merchant looking ship. That proves how difficult it was to detect and hunt down AMCs.

[Warship NWS]

AMCs attacking a convoy; if it could be coordinated they would work best by attacking from different points, as subs did when possible. This way they would force a greater dispersion of the convoy ships, thus picking off individual targets, and the escorts and have better chances of sinking individual targets while not being swarmed by warships. Imagine if the KM could coordinate a AMCs/U-boat combination attack.. that would be interesting.

[Warship NWS]

As to PQ17... folks, it was a fluke and one time occurance due to a snap decision caused by panic. Let's not get hung up on one incident to base the idea that battleships could be valuable for attacking convoys when in this case the Tirpitz did not do a darn thing except rot in a port. The Tirpitz cost the KM far more in maintenace, building, and operational costs then anything that happened to the PQ17 convoy. Did the incident show that the Admiralty feared the Tirpitz? Sure.. but that was all it ever accomplished on its own.

My personal opinion of course. ;)

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let's examine the cruise of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in terms of cost versus results. The two ships sank a total of 22 ships for a total of 115,000 tons in that cruise.
That is an average(yes, Scharnhorst sank 8, I know that) of 11 ships per vessel. Think of the building and operational costs for those two ships, and figure that against 22 ships.

Now, the Auxilliary Cruiser Atlantis sank the same number of ship, in a very similiar time frame during the war, and she was far cheaper to build, remodel and maintain operationally. She stayed at sea for over two years.

Remember also, that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were never able to accomplish a successful mission again. That mission, along with the sinking of the Glorious was all they accomplished.

Does anyone, on this forum, seriously believe that the Bismarcks and Scharnhorst class of ships were a cost effective commerce raiding weapon system? The principle in developing weapons is to build the most cost effective weapon system that is needed to accomplish the mission.

What was the primary mission of the German Navy?

Is that where the problem actually resided? Was there a primary mission? Was it to confront the British Royal Navy? Was it to interdict supply lines and lines of communication to hinder and impede British strategy and logistics?

IMO, if the primary mission was the latter, then the capital ship was the wrong weapon. It was too complicated, expensive and difficult to maintain to be an effective commerce raider.

Let's quit grasping at straws by relating single instances where the capital ship might have contributed to the overall strategy. Single instances or examples simply distract the discussion from its primary points.

Let's answer the question at hand? What was the German Navy's role in the overall strategy of the war? Was it to gain control of the sea lanes thereby controlling the sea communications of the Allies? Was it to raid commerce and delay any buildup of supplies necessary to maintain the British in the War? Just what was their strategy and what should it have been, based on their geopolitical situation? They are landlocked, that has been stated. How do they cope with that situation? How does an essentially landlocked nation, attack it's opponents sea lanes and sea communications? Can it? How? Has any landlocked or partially landlocked nation ever done it?

Dennis:

I recently finished Vincent O'Hara's book "The German Fleet at War 1939-1945". One of the most important missions that was expected of the KM was escorting coastal convoys, hence the plethora of small escorts: torpedo boats, minesweepers, sub chasers, etc. Late in the war, the surviving large units of the KM did provide naval gunfire support in the Baltic for retreating German ground forces as well as escorting refugees from the Baltic states out of the grip of the Red Army.

Commerce raiding was obviously a waste of a capital ship's potential. Sinking merchant ships by gunfire is inefficient and I'm amazed that the twins did as well as they did in their one successful cruise. The submarine is obviously the way to go and we've seen the tonnages that were sunk by a mere handful of subs and top skippers. About the only good thing one can say about using large ships for commerce raiding is that it kept RN ships tied down.

When one reviews the rebuilding of the German navy in the 1930s, you can't forget the influence that the scuttling of the Imperial German fleet at Scapa Flow had on the thoughts of the naval command. The new large modern capital ships were more symbolic than anything else: they demonstrated to the world that the German navy had risen from the ashes. The question one should ask is supposed Germany had waited until 1944-45 and had built the bulk of the Plan Z fleet, would she have had a viable overall strategy to employ this fleet? It's obvious that the navy had learned some lessons in by seizing Holland and Denmark as well as Norway, it had more ways to get out into the oceans. Add in France, and the RN now has a lot more areas to look out for. But conversely, France at least for surface ships is more vulnerable to air attack than the Kiel or Wilhelmshaven. Even without the destruction of the locks at St. Nazaire, the KM realized it couldn't operate capital ships out of France. With the Luftwaffe's resources strained to provide ground support to the army there was little left over to protect the navy. Perhaps if Hitler had overruled Goering and allowed the KM to develop a true naval aviation capability, then the KM might have been able to perform more operations and better protect its own assets.

Britain was vitally dependent on her overseas trade with other nations and especially with the various members of the Empire. Germany saw how close it came to strangling that trade in 1917. So the KM opts for a strategy of commerce raiding and interdiction based on a variety of platforms: large capital ships, disguised raiders and U-boats. It's obvious that even a full battleline of say 8 Bismarck's won't be able to effectively interdict shipping. These are prestige ships more suited to the Royal navy who could get them out to sea, than Germany who was essentially landlocked. What dooms the overall KM strategy is a combination of technology (radar, Huff Duff, code breaking, Hedge Hog mortars), tactics (the hunter killer group with new escort ships especially carriers, the increased use of long ranged airpower) and having the US as a source of merchant ships tp replace losses. On her own, Britain probably could not have sustained the losses in merchant shipping, but with the US feeding ships into the pipeline, the KM had no chance of sinking enough of them to make a difference. I think the problem for Germany was that she came of age as a nation without the experiences of using naval power effectively. Her kaiser and his admirals read Mahan but neglected to study their own geography.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I do not agree with this in either war. In WW1 BBs were extremely ineffective at night and during WW2 you gave up the only advantage you have unless you have good radar.. gunnery range. Contrary to popular belief building bigger guns was primarly and intentionally meant to be able to hit targets further away then they could hit back. This goes the same for land artillery.. range mattered. If you allowed yourself to get into a fight at night vs ships that could hurt you with torpedoes and/or guns, not even saying subs at night would be terribly dangerous, then that big fancy battleship could get sunk right quick, also, the last thing you want to do in a battleship that could be laid up for repairs for months is to have some silly DD or CR put a torpedo into your ship or have some cruisers hammer your superstructure to shreds. There is a reason why screening ships were important.. to keep those pesky DDs and CRs at bay. Now if your talking being able to sink some silly merchant at night..again it was a waste of resources and you still had to concern yourself with the fact that the enemy might respond by putting in ships with better armament with the convoys to help counter your threat.

Thanks.

Chris:

You may be missing part of Mike's point. As an all weather ship, it's hard to beat a battleship. Review the Scharnhorst's final battle. She was leaving all the RN ships behind because the seas were to rough for the DDs to keep up. Only a lucky shot by another battleship slowed her down to the point were the smaller combatants could make their presence felt. Carrier ops could be closed down by weather that would not stop a battleship from sailing and fighting (albeit at reduced effectiveness). The surface battles fought in the Pacific up till mid-1943 showed that a force without radar, but with good night fighting training could in fact fight effectively at night as the USN found out to its dismay on numerous occasions.

The problem with using capital ships as commerce raiders is that unless you have enough ships to support them with, you are sending them out alone with no margin for error. The Battle of the Barents Sea had the possibility of being a big German victory. For once the larger ships had some support in the form of destroyers, but poor ship handling, ambigious orders from above and tenacious defense by the RN scuttled the KM's chances and almost scuttled the KM as well when Hitler went ballistic.

[Ed Rotondaro]

1. A raider above all must be expendable...BB's and even cruisers are not expendable and any nation that can risk BB's,CA's and CL's because they are expendable doesn't need to commerce raid and if they did they have ample resources to build subs & long range maritime aircraft to do it. The RN/Coastal Command sowed an immesne amount of mines in WW2 and because of this minesweeping was probably the largest operastional issue of the Kriegsmarine.
2. Raiders & convoys..another thing a raider never does is attack a convoy because attacking a convoy mean s attacking a warship. Any amount of damage inflicted on a raider can be fatal witness what Prince of Wales did to Bismarck her one shot cut her raiding trip completely out & even if it didn't the Suffolk & Norfolk were shadowing her so how much damage can she really do? Also look at Scharnhorst & Gneisenau when they took out Glorious the CV only had 2 DD's for escort and despite being so weakly escorted one of the DD's managed to torpedo the Schrnhorst. Could the Twins(or Bismarck for that matter) make minemeat out of say Ramailles or Malaya? Probably but if 1-15" shell hits in the right place say goodbye to one expensive raider while the British can swap 1 for 1 all day long.If that torpedoing happened out in the Atlantic write off one 32,000 ton CB which cost probably in the area of $100,000,000.00 while merchantmen come in at around $1,000,000.00 though thier cargo's maybe worth alot more. So sending a big capital ship to destroy merchant ships is bound to be a loosing proposition.
3. Convoy escorts and large combatants.. Looking at the battles of the Bering Sea, Sirte Gulf, Admiral Scheer verse Jervis bay,Scharnhorst verse the cruiser covering force at battle of North Cape and Rawalpindi verse the Twins/S & G one thing pops out the escort by sacraficing itself can preserve the safety of the convoy while also showing that British light forces did indeed have a very good doctrine of how to handle large combatants. Now if escorts can half way handle a Scharnhorst or Gneisenau ,or both or a Littorio then an AMC or 2 will achive absolutely squat. Of course if the large units can cause the convoy to scatter then that might give any subs & aircraft nearby a better chance then if the convoy was still intact this is what happened to PQ17.

Hi:

I agree. Basically the amount of resources needed to attack a convoy with surface ships is so large that the return on the investment just isn't there. To provide a similar analogy look at the battle of Samar. In exchange for sinking a CVE, 2 DDs and one DE, the IJN loses three CAs. That's not even remotely efficient.

[Warship NWS]

You may be missing part of Mike's point. As an all weather ship, it's hard to beat a battleship.


I understand his point but will respectfully, yet completely, disagree. By FAR the most combat effective ship at night was a destroyer next up was the cruiser -- ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THEY NORMALLY OPERATED IN GROUPS. Name one successfull surface combatant action night fight using a battleship without the use of radar? Scharnhorst does not count.. she was RUNNING AWAY from a fight and her gunnery/detection ability was crippled by a silly cruiser shell. Hiei was destroyed .. why? Too damned close to the cruisers.. could not use long range gunnery.. game over. Surigoa proved it again. The last thing a BB captain wants.. some silly DD or CR putting a torpedo in his big fancy ship or being raked from stem to stern with gunfire that causes fires and superstructure damage. Lee even got extremely lucky he didn't lose the South Dakota or Washington at night in restricted waters -- and he had radar.

Battleships had only one true purpose in life.. outrange the enemy gunfire if possible or defeat the ships that could do the same otherwise they had no reason to require escorting by much smaller, and far more expendable, warships. Smaller warships were more then capable of causing mission kill damage to a big fancy battleship during WW2 and even in some cases during WW1 -- sinking was NEVER a requirement.

This is also why I call the "destroyers" the ultimate "mess with the enemy cohesion warships".

Thanks.

[bridav58]

As to PQ17... folks, it was a fluke and one time occurance due to a snap decision caused by panic. Let's not get hung up on one incident to base the idea that battleships could be valuable for attacking convoys when in this case the Tirpitz did not do a darn thing except rot in a port. The Tirpitz cost the KM far more in maintenace, building, and operational costs then anything that happened to the PQ17 convoy. Did the incident show that the Admiralty feared the Tirpitz? Sure.. but that was all it ever accomplished on its own.

My personal opinion of course. ;)

Thanks.


PQ17 was that it showed the value of keeping a convoy together it's losses were minimal till the order to scatter was recieved. It had a close escort of 4 cruisers & 3 DD's in addition to it's actual escort of 6 DD's, 4 Corvettes, 7 Mine Sweepers, 2 Auxilliary AA vessels, and 2 subs. Before the order to scatter was recieved it typically was about 1 German sub and 4 German aircraft for every Allied merchantman sunk not the best trading odds for the Germans. Now it was reported that the Tirpitz plus Hipper ,6 DD's and 2 TBD's had moved up the Norwiegion coast so if the German force had attacked you have 1 BB,1 CA, and 8 DD/TBD's up against 4 cruisers , 9 DD's, and 2 subs leaving the Corvettes/MS's/AA vessel to get the convoy out of harms way. All the British escort has to do is protect the convoy from the heavy guns using smokescreens helps alot there . The point is do the Germans have enough surface power to assure of getting the job done before the distant covering force of 2 BB's and thier escorts come around?

[Warship NWS]

Guys.. as has happened so many times before in naval circles this debate will never be completely solved.. and likely never will. It is fun to re-examine the topic though. Fun chat but I must get back to my duties now at NWS. Thanks everyone and please continue to enjoy the discussion. :)

[bridav58]

I understand his point but will respectfully, yet completely, disagree. By FAR the most combat effective ship at night was a destroyer next up was the cruiser -- ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THEY NORMALLY OPERATED IN GROUPS. Name one successfull surface combatant action night fight using a battleship without the use of radar? Scharnhorst does not count.. she was RUNNING AWAY from a fight and her gunnery/detection ability was crippled by a silly cruiser shell. Hiei was destroyed .. why? Too damned close to the cruisers.. could not use long range gunnery.. game over. Surigoa proved it again. The last thing a BB captain wants.. some silly DD or CR putting a torpedo in his big fancy ship or being raked from stem to stern with gunfire that causes fires and superstructure damage. Lee even got damned lucky he didn't lose the South Dakota or Washington at night in restricted waters -- and he had radar.

Battleships had only one true purpose in life.. outrange the enemy gunfire if possible or defeat the ships that could do the same otherwise they had no reason to require escorting by much smaller, and far more expendable, warships. Smaller warships were more then capable of causing mission kill damage to a big fancy battleship during WW2 and even in some cases during WW1 -- sinking was NEVER a requirement.

This is also why I call the "destroyers" the ultimate "mess with the enemy cohesion warships".

Thanks.

BB's, fast ones that is, moving at speed & manuvering in tight turns even as close as 8,000-9,000 yards are damn hard targets to hit even with Long Lances.

[Warship NWS]

BB's, fast ones that is, moving at speed & manuvering in tight turns even as close as 8,000-9,000 yards are damn hard targets to hit even with Long Lances.

Yeah.. and how much harder is it to hit cruisers and destroyers that are a lot smaller targets and how many did we lose of both? The difference is here.. which one can you more readily afford to lose? A single torpedo hit COULD mean that battleship is slowed down and killed off by surface action or other means on the way home.

BTW, the SD and Washington were missed very likely due to being crossing targets moving in the opposite direction during the engagement... not due to their speed alone or maneuvers. A BB without excellent radar will not be zig-zagging all over the place to avoid torpedo hits while trying to maintain good gunnery solutions. The only time BBs usually went to evasive maneuvers was IF they spotted torpedo tracks, which in turn is why you need escorts to help report them if they are screening correctly.. screening ships also help disrupt torpedo attack maneuvers of the enemy. This is why we lost so many CRs during the night engagements.. lack of proper DD operational indepedent divisional doctrines.

Thanks.

[bridav58]

Guys.. as has happened so many times before in naval circles this debate will never be completely solved.. and likely never will. It is fun to re-examine the topic though. Fun chat but I must get back to my duties now at NWS. Thanks everyone and please continue to enjoy the discussion. :)


I wasn't criticisng your comments or posts or anything but just bringing up some issues . Hope it didn't come across that away. Another issue that hasn't been brought up is that at time the Bismarck was sunk several German re-supply ships were also sunk . The RN just became too good at sinking these ships and that was what really doomed German surface raiding in the North Atlantic or elsewhere other then maybe those of the AMC's though I only think the Thor, Stier, and Michel were active in anyways after late'41, early '42 .
We must also look at German naval strategy Donitz believed in the total tonnage strategy and in doing so sometimes took the fight away from the most important area of the commerce war,the North Atlantic. The North Atlantic was the main fulrum of the naval war . Donitz achieved some spectacular successes off the US coast BUT his force also the long tansit times back & forth to the US coast that the U-Boat wouldn't have had if they stuck to attacking the GUK or HUK routes. Of course sticking to attacking those routes meant far heavier losses in U-Boats.

[Warship NWS]

I wasn't criticisng your comments or posts or anything but just bringing up some issues .


I did not take it that way at all. I just don't have as much time to post on forums as some of the forum hounds around here. ;) This topic will always be highly debated in naval circles.

Thanks.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I understand his point but will respectfully, yet completely, disagree. By FAR the most combat effective ship at night was a destroyer next up was the cruiser -- ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THEY NORMALLY OPERATED IN GROUPS. Name one successfull surface combatant action night fight using a battleship without the use of radar? Scharnhorst does not count.. she was RUNNING AWAY from a fight and her gunnery/detection ability was crippled by a silly cruiser shell. Hiei was destroyed .. why? Too damned close to the cruisers.. could not use long range gunnery.. game over. Surigoa proved it again. The last thing a BB captain wants.. some silly DD or CR putting a torpedo in his big fancy ship or being raked from stem to stern with gunfire that causes fires and superstructure damage. Lee even got extremely lucky he didn't lose the South Dakota or Washington at night in restricted waters -- and he had radar.

Battleships had only one true purpose in life.. outrange the enemy gunfire if possible or defeat the ships that could do the same otherwise they had no reason to require escorting by much smaller, and far more expendable, warships. Smaller warships were more then capable of causing mission kill damage to a big fancy battleship during WW2 and even in some cases during WW1 -- sinking was NEVER a requirement.

This is also why I call the "destroyers" the ultimate "mess with the enemy cohesion warships".

Thanks.

Hi NWS,

Smith's point actually. : ) He was speaking in the context of heavy weather where other ships could not keep up. Specifically in the case of Scharnhorst, she was outdistancing the British cruisers and destroyers until D of Y slowed her down with gunfire. The location of Scharnhorst and Tirpitz in Norway were an effective threat and any actions would likely be at night and in bad weather. In that set of circumstances, his assessment would be true.

I would agree with your point about the effectiveness of cruisers and destroyers in night combat. Battleships, especially without radar, need sea room and visibility for effective gunnery against their own kind.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I wasn't criticisng your comments or posts or anything but just bringing up some issues . Hope it didn't come across that away. Another issue that hasn't been brought up is that at time the Bismarck was sunk several German re-supply ships were also sunk . The RN just became too good at sinking these ships and that was what really doomed German surface raiding in the North Atlantic or elsewhere other then maybe those of the AMC's though I only think the Thor, Stier, and Michel were active in anyways after late'41, early '42 .
We must also look at German naval strategy Donitz believed in the total tonnage strategy and in doing so sometimes took the fight away from the most important area of the commerce war,the North Atlantic. The North Atlantic was the main fulrum of the naval war . Donitz achieved some spectacular successes off the US coast BUT his force also the long tansit times back & forth to the US coast that the U-Boat wouldn't have had if they stuck to attacking the GUK or HUK routes. Of course sticking to attacking those routes meant far heavier losses in U-Boats.

Hi guys,

Doenitz knew that the North Atlantic was the decisive theater in the tonnage war. He wasn't a fan of the larger Type IXs and sent them to areas where their range and size would be assets. The results were meager, but it forced the RN to esacort all over the world and a ship sunk is a ship sunk.

He was not helped in his struggle when Hitler orded a third of his boats to Norway and teh Med, just as his numbers were building and Allied convoys were still week. He was also on the verge of a one year black out of enigma info when the went to Shark in February, 1942. The weight of Allied escorts, VLR aircraft, and centimeter radar in numbers was till a year off.

[Kyle Holgate]

To Kyle and Ed,

Instead of asking if "could it happen" you should ask yourself "why didn't it happen more often?". What better bait to sucker out a big fancy battleship being used for raiding then to give it a juicy convoy to go after without it knowing that there might be surface combatants covering it or other task forces nearby waiting for a kill.. now you can sink that big fancy battleship because you know where it is. One shot flash in the pan and it sinks shipping worth less then the ship you used to sink the shipping.. again, a waste and a major morale blow to the KM for each one lost - remember the human factor. Wargaming has NEVER taken into account the complete complexities of naval navigation, intel operations, detection and indentification, communications, dynamic environments, convoy doctrinal operations, etc.. SAS might be the closest yet to be published that I know of. Oh BTW, any German port was in range of RAF bombers.. not just France. The RAF started bombing German ports right from the start -- all they needed to know is WHERE and WHEN the BBs were in port.

Thanks.

The Bismarck episode indicated that RN radar was at such a level so as to make future Atlantic forrays far more problematical. They tried it twice and it worked once. The reason it didn't work the second time was surmised - so don't do it again. The RN hunted down the supply ships anyway. If Bismarck had been built earlier or the twins hadn't been making trouble up in Norway who knows, maybe several sorties could have been made - we'll never know. If wargames such as the old Bismarck game or TAS are to be even remotely believed, then they certainly lead one to think that the Bismarck sortie and/or more forrays by the twins could have done quite a bit of damage.

As for morale, we have only to look toward WW1 to see how well sitting around in port helps it. Germany had a fairly small window before the soviet invasion in which to make a real blow against England - having Bismarck and PE setting around in port doing nothing seems a waste of a good asset, pluss they wanted to tie down forces that could head to the Med and interfere with the Create invasion. As far as I'm concerned a battleship langquishing in port is only marginally more useful than one sunk - particularly if the one that was sunk had a fair chance of doing something useful or if Bismarck had really raised havoc potentially almost war winning.

As for PQ-17 - Fluke or not the Tirpitz pressence lead not only to the destruction of the convoy but a delay in future convoys which slowed supplies to the Soviets. Earlier in 1941 the Twins had simply to be at sea and undetected and they disrupted the flow of materials to England almost as well as they had if they'd been sinking ships. Reduction of tonnage shipped to England was the aim - if that meant sinking ships great. If that meant "mission kill" of a convoy because it can't leave for 2 weeks waiting for BB escort then that works too in combination with everything else going on (u-boats, merchant raiders, etc)

[Ed Rotondaro]

I will agree that the KM might as well use the surface combatants for something but here is an option not considered... use them to attack combatants while operating in numbers. If the AMCs and subs have the RN scattered all about then various naval units might be operating with inadequate protection .. example the Glorious. Losing the Glorious was the greatest blow to the RN the KM ever achieved second only to the Hood. At least then they would either (a) die a warrior so as not to be such a blow to the morale of the KM or (b) gain a naval victory bits and pieces at a time thus being a huge morale boost to the KM -- IOW, hit and run victories. Another option, although this may be a bit more complicated, move them down to the Med and have them bolster the Italian fleet. Not sure how well the Italians would have liked that but it could be discussed, also this would at least allow for more adequate Luftwaffe coverage. Now if your ONLY option is to be used as a raider.. then go after single merchants, not convoys. Why? Well, the Duestchlands and AMCs were successful in that role and it provided the least amount of risk of enemy escorts and at least they accomplished more then the big ships did and they had the speed to keep the RN off of their tails and the chances of a single merchant getting of a radio location message compared to a convoy of ships is FAR less likely.

Chris:

Moving large surface elements of the KM to the Med was never an option. If you think operating out of France was difficult, then the Med would have been a disaster. Between land based and carrier based air, the KM would have been hard pressed to go to sea. And remembering the example of the Goeben in WWI, once you have the KM in the Med, you can easily bottle them up and neutralize them. Germany would have need just about virtual air supremacy in the Med to even have considered such a desperate option and if she had than, she didn't her capital ships there. The Italian fleet with a good air umbrella could have dealt with the situation (as it almost did in 1942).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Admiral Sir Dudley Pound was suffering from a undiagnosed brain tumour, he was said to be suffering from blinding headaches to quote Sir Dudley "like the top of my head was coming off". His tumour was not discovered untill a autopsey was preformed after his death. From what I understand his type of tumour was not operable in any meaningful way untill the 1970's.

Hi John:

Thanks! I did some further research and apparently the naval surgeons knew about this but chose not to inform the Admiral or his superiors. I've noticed this strange behavior also in the case of King George the VI, who had a cancerous tumor in his lung that caused his surgeons to remove the lung. They didn't see fit to notify him of his condition. Perhaps they felt it was a foregone conclusion, but then allowing his daughter the future Queen Elizabeth to to on a tour to Australia when he was obviously dying was in my opinion criminally negligent.

[Ed Rotondaro]

AMCs attacking a convoy; if it could be coordinated they would work best by attacking from different points, as subs did when possible. This way they would force a greater dispersion of the convoy ships, thus picking off individual targets, and the escorts and have better chances of sinking individual targets while not being swarmed by warships. Imagine if the KM could coordinate a AMCs/U-boat combination attack.. that would be interesting.

Chris:

I don't think any navy pre-1970 could coordinate a sub and surface force attack against a single target. Certainly not in WWII.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I understand his point but will respectfully, yet completely, disagree. By FAR the most combat effective ship at night was a destroyer next up was the cruiser -- ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THEY NORMALLY OPERATED IN GROUPS. Name one successfull surface combatant action night fight using a battleship without the use of radar? Scharnhorst does not count.. she was RUNNING AWAY from a fight and her gunnery/detection ability was crippled by a silly cruiser shell. Hiei was destroyed .. why? Too damned close to the cruisers.. could not use long range gunnery.. game over. Surigoa proved it again. The last thing a BB captain wants.. some silly DD or CR putting a torpedo in his big fancy ship or being raked from stem to stern with gunfire that causes fires and superstructure damage. Lee even got extremely lucky he didn't lose the South Dakota or Washington at night in restricted waters -- and he had radar.

Battleships had only one true purpose in life.. outrange the enemy gunfire if possible or defeat the ships that could do the same otherwise they had no reason to require escorting by much smaller, and far more expendable, warships. Smaller warships were more then capable of causing mission kill damage to a big fancy battleship during WW2 and even in some cases during WW1 -- sinking was NEVER a requirement.

This is also why I call the "destroyers" the ultimate "mess with the enemy cohesion warships".

Thanks.

Chris:

You are cherry picking here. Mike and I are saying that in just about any weather, a battleship could operate. Very few cruisers could and most destroyers could not. Why is it that Bismarck and Scharnhorst are eventually sunk by capital ships? Air power and DDs all contributed, but take the British BBs out of the equation and can you guarantee that the KM loses those ships?

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

You are cherry picking here. Mike and I are saying that in just about any weather, a battleship could operate. Very few cruisers could and most destroyers could not. Why is it that Bismarck and Scharnhorst are eventually sunk by capital ships? Air power and DDs all contributed, but take the British BBs out of the equation and can you guarantee that the KM loses those ships?

Where is the evidence that the battleship was the only naval ship that could operate in any weather? Battleships are just as susceptible to heavy seas and stormy weather as any other ship. Where is the documentation to prove that statement? Murmansk, Denmark Straits, North Cape. Do we have hit comparisons in heavy seas, between cruisers and battleships? In battles where both battleships and other naval vessels were in actions, were the battleships the only ships firing? If not, do we have concrete evidence or just the opinion of some writer?

Bismarck's seaboat quality was average and her roll period was 17.2 seconds. South Dakota's seaboat quality was always rated below average and her roll period was 18.4 seconds. Her rating as a gun platform has been viewed as below normal.

Alaska was actually as good or better in all qualities including gun platform steadiness and recoil effect as the Bismarck and Alaska was built on a cruiser size hull.

We have very little empirical data from actual actions involving battleships to make a statement that they were the best ships in all weather conditions. Granted, in heavy weather, aircraft carriers cannot launch aircraft. But battleships can't hit anything either, even though they have stable platforms for their gunnery tables. Those stable elements are only adequate up to a certain roll and pitch angle, after that, the cage locks up. Did battleships have a wider beam than most ships? Absolutely, along with a higher freeboard and greater depth of keel. All of these and more, provided them with better stability, under certain conditions. But those same factors can work against you in high seas. Slamming is a problem with long vessels. Water over the bow can make the ship very wet, causing problems with the forward turrets and any electronic device on or near those turrets.

I am not disagreeing as much as asking for something more than "this writer said". How about Friedman, Campbell and other noted warship experts? What comments do they make about the ability of battleships to continue in action under heavy sea conditions and bad weather?

I don't have the books that all of you have, so I am relying on you to examine the experts like those I have indicated. What are their comments? Do they make any comments? If not, why? Do they just provide numerical data and design comments, or do they make value judgements based on those design elements about the ability of a particular ship to maintain itself in action under varying sea and meteorological conditions. I believe that I have asked a valid question.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

You are cherry picking here. Mike and I are saying that in just about any weather, a battleship could operate. Very few cruisers could and most destroyers could not. Why is it that Bismarck and Scharnhorst are eventually sunk by capital ships? Air power and DDs all contributed, but take the British BBs out of the equation and can you guarantee that the KM loses those ships?

First Bismarck never needed to be sunk at all.. she was never going home, Second, the Scharnhorst had to run away from a fight and was only succeeding due to her high speed in rough seas. However, she was being pelted by CR and DD fire due to the low visibility conditions.. only her speed was keeping her alive, and the fact that the torpedos initially shot at her hit her belt due to being fired too shallow.

Here is the problem.. your looking at only sea state, which all ships suffered problems if the seas are bad enough - then you have to consider seakeeping, but also their ability to hit anything. Hitting a small ship in rough seas will not be easy as even hitting a DD or CR pushing 30 knots at long range was difficult to start with. ROF may often suffer more for the larger ships due to mechanical limitations of moving around bigger shells. However, the MOST LIKELY weather conditions are daylight, night, and variable visibility. You are faced with these types of weather conditions every single 24 hour cycle of a calendar day. In ANY visibility conditions that reduces your RANGE of engagement DDs and CRs can still operate effectively.. why? They do NOT require long range gunnery to be effective in their intended roles for that matter the lower the visibility the more dangerous they are to larger ships. Their typical effective and decisive battle ranges are FAR lower then a typical battleship so lower visibility reduces the advantage of the BB but increases the ability for the smaller ships to hit back, sometimes with devastating results. BBs, to be effective without good radar, needed good visibility to do what they were intended to do.. hit targets at longer range then the enemy can respond at.

End result.. lower visibility conditions reduced the tactical effectiveness of BBs more then it did CRs and DDs and BBs could not easily hit fast moving smaller targets at extreme to long ranges very easily. What does this all mean? In surface warfare DDs and CRs - within their combat capabilities - where more efficient in more typical weather conditions then BBs ever were.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Hi NWS,

Smith's point actually. : ) He was speaking in the context of heavy weather where other ships could not keep up. Specifically in the case of Scharnhorst, she was outdistancing the British cruisers and destroyers until D of Y slowed her down with gunfire. The location of Scharnhorst and Tirpitz in Norway were an effective threat and any actions would likely be at night and in bad weather. In that set of circumstances, his assessment would be true.

I would agree with your point about the effectiveness of cruisers and destroyers in night combat. Battleships, especially without radar, need sea room and visibility for effective gunnery against their own kind.

Note, in bad weather a BB trying to hit a smaller ship won't usually work well either.. so neither side is likely to accomplish much in that regards.. but, as often happens, in bad sea conditions you usually have reduced visibility so now you have to consider the possibility of those smaller ships firing faster then you and firing torpedoes. Scharhorst was hit by multiple torpedoes.. problem was, hitting the belt did squat to her, that is why the DoY was the first to slow her down.

At night your correct.. just do not forget, night was not the only time of reduced visibility and that is the part of the equation that worked against the effectiveness of a big gunned ship. I will say this however, it did not hurt to have 11" guns vs CRs an DDs as they did have a better effectiveness vs fast moving smaller targets then slower firing guns at those battle ranges.. the Scharnhorst did get a few good hits. This is probably also what mostly saved the Graf Spee in her engagement vs 3 CRs.. not her range of fire, but higher ROF when on target.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Moving large surface elements of the KM to the Med was never an option. If you think operating out of France was difficult, then the Med would have been a disaster. Between land based and carrier based air, the KM would have been hard pressed to go to sea. And remembering the example of the Goeben in WWI, once you have the KM in the Med, you can easily bottle them up and neutralize them. Germany would have need just about virtual air supremacy in the Med to even have considered such a desperate option and if she had than, she didn't her capital ships there. The Italian fleet with a good air umbrella could have dealt with the situation (as it almost did in 1942).

So if the KM moved to the Med before war broke out they could not operate with the Italians? I find it ironic that you feel the Italians could operate in the Med but not the KM - especially considering the fact that the Luftwaffe operated in the Med far more effectively then the RA. The biggest question would be where the port facilities would be in the Med for the KM, not if they could function in the Med when at sea. RN CVs on both counts would obviously be dangerous - as was proven vs the RM.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I don't think any navy pre-1970 could coordinate a sub and surface force attack against a single target. Certainly not in WWII.

So the KM could coordinate subs but not surface AMCs? Why not? Also, you would not necessarily have to attack at the same time.. often multiple wolf packs attacked in sequence vs the same convoy.

BTW, I asked Dennis on the phone to look into this possibility in more detail via KM communications capabilities and doctrines. My time right now is too limited to dig that deep at this point but I fully believe it was quite possible.

[Warship NWS]

The Bismarck episode indicated that RN radar was at such a level so as to make future Atlantic forrays far more problematical. They tried it twice and it worked once. The reason it didn't work the second time was surmised - so don't do it again. The RN hunted down the supply ships anyway. If Bismarck had been built earlier or the twins hadn't been making trouble up in Norway who knows, maybe several sorties could have been made - we'll never know. If wargames such as the old Bismarck game or TAS are to be even remotely believed, then they certainly lead one to think that the Bismarck sortie and/or more forrays by the twins could have done quite a bit of damage.

I think SAS will allow more of the complex multi-dimensional modeling of such operations then TAS or the old "Bismarck" game could allow for. TAS is more of a campaign handler for a sequence of dynamic battles and is not as complex in terms of CV/air ops handling, communications, identification, etc. as SAS is. I will note, doing a bit of damage is one thing.. having more then a flash in the pan of success is another. S&G got one successful run.. and then were effectively nuetralized. Bismarck and Tirpitz did nothing.



As for morale, we have only to look toward WW1 to see how well sitting around in port helps it. Germany had a fairly small window before the soviet invasion in which to make a real blow against England - having Bismarck and PE setting around in port doing nothing seems a waste of a good asset, pluss they wanted to tie down forces that could head to the Med and interfere with the Create invasion. As far as I'm concerned a battleship langquishing in port is only marginally more useful than one sunk - particularly if the one that was sunk had a fair chance of doing something useful or if Bismarck had really raised havoc potentially almost war winning.


On the point of "morale" I agree.. but then again that can be reversed if your stuck in port constantly repairing damage, example the Tirpitz. The KM was stuck between a rock and a hard place.. when and how to use big expensive ships, a never ending debated topic. No matter which way they went the ships were marked targets. I do agree though, better to do something then nothing, on that part I have never disagreed. As to "almost war winning", IMHO, not a chance - at least for the major surface combatants.


As for PQ-17 - Fluke or not the Tirpitz pressence lead not only to the destruction of the convoy but a delay in future convoys which slowed supplies to the Soviets. Earlier in 1941 the Twins had simply to be at sea and undetected and they disrupted the flow of materials to England almost as well as they had if they'd been sinking ships. Reduction of tonnage shipped to England was the aim - if that meant sinking ships great. If that meant "mission kill" of a convoy because it can't leave for 2 weeks waiting for BB escort then that works too in combination with everything else going on (u-boats, merchant raiders, etc)

The interesting part is .. was the fear justified? In reality, no. Personaly, I would have attempted to bait the raiders into a trap whenever possible or reverse the fear by giving off false signals that a convoy was "escorted" by heavy units. The Brits were great at deception tactics and counter-intel. In any case, what drove the RN crazier then anything else was the subs and AMCs - in terms of persisted threats that not only caused fear but also caused sinkings. Forcing the enemy into convoys though I do agree that it did cause delays in supply movements... but again, not all ships were in convoys which is why I think it would have been best to use the speed of the major warships to hunt down and target single merchants as the AMCs accomplished while the subs engaged the convoys.

[old_pop2000]

I just wanted make some comments about this and other discussions we have on this forum, that seem to devolve into discussions about battleships, dreadnoughts and battlecruisers.

I know this is a forum owned and operated by a naval surface warfare simulation game company and it does make perfect sense that we would emphasize surface warfare. But how many threads end up discussing a weapons system that had a useful lifespan of sixty years- 1890-1950. (I think 1890 is pushing it, but I will go with it). How many documentatable actions between battleships can we actually chart in that sixty years and two major world wars?

The most important and extensive was Jutland, which occurred some twenty-six years after the beginning of life for this ship. But after that, how many actions can we document for data? Let's see- Denmark Straits, North Cape, Surigao Straits, 2nd Battle of Guadalcanal. That seems to be the major ones. So the list includes five major engagements between battleships. Of those five, Surigao Straits, IMO, was just target practice. One battleship was already sinking, the other, without radar was opposed by a complete battleline which had good surface and fire control radar. So, IMHO, there were only four usable engagements between battleship that can provide for us, data from which to draw conclusions about the usefulness of battleships. Other roles for these majestic ships included AA defense, shore bombardment, just to name a few. You will all, disagree about the details here, and I frankly don't care, the data is basically valid.

But step back a moment. How many forums dedicate all this time, energy, and words to a ship, that, while imposing, was almost useless. The dreadnought, as we know it actually post dated the invention of its chief rival, the airplane. Even in WWI, the torpedo and the mine were already recognized by fleet commanders as ship killers. I won't bore you with more details that you are already, or should already be familiar with.

But isn't it interesting, how much time and effort is placed on discussing such an infrequently used warship. When I say infrequently used, I mean in its original purpose, not the ones that have arisen for it. But this is true of most weapons, they are used for purposes for which they were never intended. It speaks well for their designs, if they adapt well.

This is not a criticism of this or any other forum, forum members or books etc. It is simply an observation from someone who has never had a fascination with battleships. They were a weapons system, nothing more, nothing less. I am not even certain whether we can actually say that the battleship had an appreciable effect on naval warfare. The one major engagement they were involved in, was never conclusive. The geopolitical situation before and after Jutland, was exactly the same. So was Naval warfare. The presence of the battleship changed nothing.

I find this very interesting and fascinating that we should place so much emphasis on such system. Just my musings.

[clacton2]

Jon:

I know Pound retired not long after the PQ-17 disaster and that he had at least one stroke before he died. Was he ill with cancer? Or was it heart disease? I don't recall the details.

Ed,
Not absolutely sure, but he had a tumour removed from a lung, not too long proir to his death, so it was probably some form of cancer.
Jon:confused:

[clacton2]

Admiral Sir Dudley Pound was suffering from a undiagnosed brain tumour, he was said to be suffering from blinding headaches to quote Sir Dudley "like the top of my head was coming off". His tumour was not discovered untill a autopsey was preformed after his death. From what I understand his type of tumour was not operable in any meaningful way untill the 1970's.

John,
Thanks for clarifying that, I was'nt sure, hence my earlier post, which turned out to be wrong.
Jon:eek:

[Kyle Holgate]

Hypothetical situation: Bismarck sinks the Hood as historical, then gets into the Atlantic ocean and destroys the troop convoy (WS something) and falls on a second convoy and does serious damage then gets into port unscathed. The RN has egg all over their face and the people toss Churchill out on his ear. The next PM decides that the war is idiotic as Poland can't be liberated, makes peace.
Longshot? Maybe. Something like this was potentially possible though if a battleship in the Atlantic could do enough damage and at least temporarily get away to port. Remember, the propaganda value and face saving value and all that are almost as important as actual military value

Which leads into the second part... The Tirpitz's actual danger to Pq-17 was there, but given the defenses that were in place I think the allies over reacted badly. In my mind this was an opportunity to lure out the battleship and sink her. Yes, PQ-17 was in danger but was it that much more than any other convoy? Keep them together, then bounce the Tirpitz with the surface ships available.

It's hard to quantify the value of BB's "terrorist" value. Without the BB's how much would change? I believe that their real danger was probably inflated and they were feared far more than they really needed to be - but they certainly did have the potential (if rarely realized in either war) to do great damage.

[Mike Malanaphy]

So the KM could coordinate subs but not surface AMCs? Why not? Also, you would not necessarily have to attack at the same time.. often multiple wolf packs attacked in sequence vs the same convoy.

BTW, I asked Dennis on the phone to look into this possibility in more detail via KM communications capabilities and doctrines. My time right now is too limited to dig that deep at this point but I fully believe it was quite possible.

Hi NWS,

Doenitz could only coordinate at the strategic level forming patrol lines and concentrations. The inital locating U boat guided in the others and each captain attacked individually. Merchant raiders operatied on a different commnications net. Post Feb, 1942, all U boats operated off of a four wheel enigma that remained secure until late Novemner when U559 was captured by Petard in the Med. I have a book on U boat communications and I don't believe they had a voice radio capability ala TBS for tactical coordination.

You could coordinate the two throretically, but considering the low rate of success of wolfpacks against convoys generally, I'm skeptical. With AMCs, you have a number of problems, the least of which is U boats in the area looking for stragglers and rompers. An AMC is going to have little if any speed advantage over other merchants and only rudimentary fire control compared to an escort.

[Ed Rotondaro]

First Bismarck never needed to be sunk at all.. she was never going home, Second, the Scharnhorst had to run away from a fight and was only succeeding due to her high speed in rough seas. However, she was being pelted by CR and DD fire due to the low visibility conditions.. only her speed was keeping her alive, and the fact that the torpedos initially shot at her hit her belt due to being fired too shallow.

Here is the problem.. your looking at only sea state, which all ships suffered problems if the seas are bad enough - then you have to consider seakeeping, but also their ability to hit anything. Hitting a small ship in rough seas will not be easy as even hitting a DD or CR pushing 30 knots at long range was difficult to start with. ROF may often suffer more for the larger ships due to mechanical limitations of moving around bigger shells. However, the MOST LIKELY weather conditions are daylight, night, and variable visibility. You are faced with these types of weather conditions every single 24 hour cycle of a calendar day. In ANY visibility conditions that reduces your RANGE of engagement DDs and CRs can still operate effectively.. why? They do NOT require long range gunnery to be effective in their intended roles for that matter the lower the visibility the more dangerous they are to larger ships. Their typical effective and decisive battle ranges are FAR lower then a typical battleship so lower visibility reduces the advantage of the BB but increases the ability for the smaller ships to hit back, sometimes with devastating results. BBs, to be effective without good radar, needed good visibility to do what they were intended to do.. hit targets at longer range then the enemy can respond at.

End result.. lower visibility conditions reduced the tactical effectiveness of BBs more then it did CRs and DDs and BBs could not easily hit fast moving smaller targets at extreme to long ranges very easily. What does this all mean? In surface warfare DDs and CRs - within their combat capabilities - where more efficient in more typical weather conditions then BBs ever were.

Thanks.

Chris:

The entire North Cape action shows that until the Scharnhorst was slowed down:

A. She was outdistancing both the DOY and the cruisers and DDs

B. The DDs could not make an effective torpedo attack until the Scharnhorst was slowed down, the seas were too rough. Yet DOY is able to engage with gunfire that proves decisive as did the hit by CA Norfolk that waxed Scharhorst's forward fire control.

C. Had Admiral Bey chosen to man his secondaries rather than let the crew sit out the storm, he may have been able to fight off the torpedo attacks by the DDs.

For cruisers or destroyers to be effective, they need much closer ranges than a BB does, especially if you are relying on torpedo attacks. While all ships fire control and hit probabilties are degraded by heavy seas, you don't see any BBs capsizing in typhoons now do you?

Point being that a BB usually has superior fire control than a cruiser and certainly a destroyer. Add in the fact that her sheer mass lets her pound through seas that would slow down a smaller warship. In stormy weather the BB has a better chance to operate than a smaller warship. She may not hit well, but at least she can engage. A carrier is no use in heavy stormy seas, she just has to ride it out.

[Ed Rotondaro]

So if the KM moved to the Med before war broke out they could not operate with the Italians? I find it ironic that you feel the Italians could operate in the Med but not the KM - especially considering the fact that the Luftwaffe operated in the Med far more effectively then the RA. The biggest question would be where the port facilities would be in the Med for the KM, not if they could function in the Med when at sea. RN CVs on both counts would obviously be dangerous - as was proven vs the RM.

Chris:

You didn't stipulate a pre-war deployment of the KM to the Med. Where's that come from and why do you deploy the KM to the Med outside of a war occuring? As you already mentioned port facilities would be stretched. How about fuel? The Italian navy was frequently forced to remain in port due to fuel shortages. Now add in a sizable KM task force and you only compound the problem. Parts and supplies can come by land, but you still have a bottled up KM unless it tries to take out either Port Alexandria and then seize the Suez canal or else tries to run the Straits of Gibralta. You talk about a choke zone? Your favorite weapon, mines, would channel the KM into a kill zone. About the only positive I can see from this scenario would be for the combined KM and RM fleets to try for a single decisive fleet action to mission kill the RN Med Fleet. With the lack of coordinated air support, that might prove very difficult. But let's allow that the Axis inflict enough of a defeat on the RN to force it to abandon the Med. Well the Italians and the Afrika Korps win, but the KM is still stuck in the Med unless it wants to attempt a breakout along the lines of the Channel Dash, but through much more constricted waters and over a much longer period of time.

[Ed Rotondaro]

So the KM could coordinate subs but not surface AMCs? Why not? Also, you would not necessarily have to attack at the same time.. often multiple wolf packs attacked in sequence vs the same convoy.

BTW, I asked Dennis on the phone to look into this possibility in more detail via KM communications capabilities and doctrines. My time right now is too limited to dig that deep at this point but I fully believe it was quite possible.


Chris:

All navies kept their subs separate from their surface assets for similar reasons, namely the difficulty of coordinating attacks and the real possible of a friendly fire incident. Can you name any instance where subs and surface units on the same side attacked the same targets? You see with subs and airstrikes, but not surface units.

If you attack separately, what is the real gain? Unless you have the subs target the escorts and then send in the AMCs to pick off the merchants. In that case, you might as well just use a larger wolf pack, divided into dedicated escort killers and then dedicated merchant hunters.

The only other possibility is to do the reverse: send the AMCs in to engage the escorts and then let the subs run wild. Again this requires very good coordination between all the players. Also I think you are forgetting something about all AMCs. They are not warships, but rather ships with guns mounted on them. They don't have sophisticated fire control or good gun mounts. They are not meant to fight other warships, they are meant to get in close (say about a mile) and then unmask their guns and seize their prize. With their slow speed, they won't put up a good fight against a properly roused enemy DD or worse yet a true cruiser. Remember Koroman got lucky in that Sydney tumbled onto her identity too late. You send three AMCs into a convoy and the escorts would be all over them. The only thing working in the AMCs favor is that most RN escorts lacked torpedo tubes, but usually each convoy had a few DDs. God forbid if there is a small CL attached.

I remain unconvinced that AMCs could coordinate with subs, especially in light of general communications difficulties that all navies of that time period suffered from. I also feel that tactically the concept is cumbersome at best and totally unworkable at worst.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,
Not absolutely sure, but he had a tumour removed from a lung, not too long proir to his death, so it was probably some form of cancer.
Jon:confused:

Jon:

Yes, further research shows that he had cancer and the naval doctors chose not to inform him. Bloody civilized of them eh?

[Warship NWS]

Regarding AMCs and subs attacking a convoy or the KM operating in the Med.. note, these are just theoretical ideas, the KM was desperate for anything that might work so almost anything was possible to take a chance on. It never hurts to consider possible options that they might have contemplated. I never said they were "good" ideas.. just options to think over as to why they were good ideas or not so as to understand the challenges facing the KM.

In any case, what I would think would be plausible for attacking the same convoy would be in a series of possible events.. escorts cannot be everyhere at once within a convoy and it usually took multiple escorts to effectively engage one submarine... this could possibly leave holes in the defense.

However, what proved the most effective vs convoys in the end run was the U-boat wolf packs due to their stealth and ability to surprise the enemy from multiple directions. AMCs of course worked best as independently operating raiders.

Now lets change out the AMCs with the Deustchlands. Why do you need a big fancy battleship when you could build 3+ Deustchlands for the price of one Bismarck? The "armored cruisers" could do what the Bismarck was intended for and was almost as fast.. now you could scatter a convoy using a far less expensive ship that can outfight the typical escorts or at least cause them to bunch up leaving holes in the defense. Any thoughts on this one?

As to the KM operating in the Med.. well, better then doing nothing in the Atlantic. Any positive results is better the no results at all and at least there they are not terribly outnumbered and without any air cover whatsoever as they were in the majority of the Atlantic. So, was it possible for the KM to operate in the Med? What do the rest of you think?

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

The entire North Cape action shows that until the Scharnhorst was slowed down:

A. She was outdistancing both the DOY and the cruisers and DDs

Yes.. true, she was a FAST ship running away from a fight. Personaly, I find this entire context ironic as we are trying to see if a warship can fight effectively in a surface action in poor weather conditions yet we are debating about a BC that was engaged in a withdrawal from combat.


B. The DDs could not make an effective torpedo attack until the Scharnhorst was slowed down, the seas were too rough. Yet DOY is able to engage with gunfire that proves decisive as did the hit by CA Norfolk that waxed Scharhorst's forward fire control.

I will note here that the CR division and Sch. opened fire at the same time.. 13,000 yards. That is hardly a range that a BB/BC wants to be engaging CRs at and in turn the CRs got in the first hits before the BC did.. both sides took damage. As to the DD attack, you are correct (I had remembered reading somewhere before that she took a few torpedo hits before the shellfire but it was the other way around) and the only reason for this is because the Sch. could get up to higher speed in rougher weather. The point I am making here however is that the big guns were greatly reduced in effectiveness due to the low visibility.. this made the CRs a serious threat to the Sch. Rough seas may not effect the stability of a BC as much as a CR but it matters little if the CRs are firing at near max ROF (one fired 6 salvoes in 2 minutes) and are within their effective combat engagement ranges. Remember, the greatest advantage of a warship with big guns vs a warship with smaller guns is its gunnery range -- poor visibility negates this advantage sharply.


C. Had Admiral Bey chosen to man his secondaries rather than let the crew sit out the storm, he may have been able to fight off the torpedo attacks by the DDs.

Actually the SB scored some good hits on one of the DDs.


For cruisers or destroyers to be effective, they need much closer ranges than a BB does, especially if you are relying on torpedo attacks. While all ships fire control and hit probabilties are degraded by heavy seas, you don't see any BBs capsizing in typhoons now do you?

No warships fought during Typhoons.. and losing a BB to a bunch of CRs and DDs in a low visibilty fight is a lot more damaging then losing a few tin cans in a Typhoon.


Point being that a BB usually has superior fire control than a cruiser and certainly a destroyer. Add in the fact that her sheer mass lets her pound through seas that would slow down a smaller warship. In stormy weather the BB has a better chance to operate than a smaller warship. She may not hit well, but at least she can engage. A carrier is no use in heavy stormy seas, she just has to ride it out.

Interesting.. the RN DDs engaged the S&G along with the Renown, for that matter, Lutjens was worried about being attacked by torpedoes - the Acasta did score a hit for that matter when defending the Glorious. I will note quite clearly.. hitting a DD with BB/BC guns in rough weather was often quite difficult - especially if using primarly optical only gunnery. This is not entirely about fire controls either.. it is about which ships are more effected in their combat performance in poor weather conditions which quite often coincides with reduced visiblity. The BB might retain more stability in higher sea states but the CRs and DDs gain effectiveness vs the BBs in lower visibility conditions, which may well lose its greatest advantage.. gunnery range.

[Kyle Holgate]

The Bismarck in her final night fought off a pretty hot destroyer attack at night and in moderately rough weather - while virtually dead in the water. No, the ship did not sink any of the DD's, but fire was so "hot" that they didn't manage to get any hits.
Just adding a log to the fire here, not drawing any conclusion from this little tid-bit of info!

Scharnhorst was almost just an extended Deutchland. If not for the short range and finicky boilers they'd have been pretty good raiders. Even more than the Deutchlands, they were able to beet feet from anything they couldn't kill including the Hood, Renown and Repulse and don't forget at wars start - Strasbourg and Dunkerque. Even the RN cruisers couldn't catch the twins, though they could maintain range.
The German plan to follow the Deutchland class with the O or P class (faster ships with 11 or 15" guns) indicates they were thinking of raider types that could do about what the Deutchlands could except probably better (as they'd be faster).

I think Hitler was thinking as much of Germany's prestige as he was of actual military usefulness when the Z plan was hatched. A "real" country that wants to be taken seriously as a world power needs a navy with battleships, carriers and cruisers in it - after all! Only little poor second rate countries build a navy of subs and raiders and what not - and that's not the mighty Third Reich! :rolleyes:

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hypothetical situation: Bismarck sinks the Hood as historical, then gets into the Atlantic ocean and destroys the troop convoy (WS something) and falls on a second convoy and does serious damage then gets into port unscathed. The RN has egg all over their face and the people toss Churchill out on his ear. The next PM decides that the war is idiotic as Poland can't be liberated, makes peace.
Longshot? Maybe. Something like this was potentially possible though if a battleship in the Atlantic could do enough damage and at least temporarily get away to port. Remember, the propaganda value and face saving value and all that are almost as important as actual military value

Which leads into the second part... The Tirpitz's actual danger to Pq-17 was there, but given the defenses that were in place I think the allies over reacted badly. In my mind this was an opportunity to lure out the battleship and sink her. Yes, PQ-17 was in danger but was it that much more than any other convoy? Keep them together, then bounce the Tirpitz with the surface ships available.

It's hard to quantify the value of BB's "terrorist" value. Without the BB's how much would change? I believe that their real danger was probably inflated and they were feared far more than they really needed to be - but they certainly did have the potential (if rarely realized in either war) to do great damage.

Kyle:

One thing that I think we've missed, or only alluded to in this entire discussion is the pride factor of the Royal Navy. Britain watches as Germany re-arms with modern potentially superior capital ships. Sure Britain has more ships and would probably win, but in both wars, every time the German navy scored a success (Coronel, Sinking Royal Oak, Glorious and Hood, Channel Dash) it was a slap in the face of three hundred years of tradition. Imagine if a convoy did get savaged by a KM task force? Even though it's only one convoy, it has an effect similar to what terrorists try to achieve today. It shouts to the world that Britain no longer rules the waves and that her navy cannot protect its merchant shipping. Cold logical reasoning should tell the RN that the U-boat is the main threat, but when you have a leader like Churchill, with his naval background and penchant to interfere, surface threats will be exaggerated and given far more attention than need be. Face it, the entire German surface fleet was for all intents and purposes blockaded in the Baltic and Norway from 1943 onward. There wasn't even any need to waste time and resources on sinking the Tirpitz, just keep her fixed in one place and she is no longer a threat. But as long as she stays afloat she is symbol of the RN's inability to rule the seas.

It interesting to note that Britain took far more losses in surface ships in a shorter period of time in the Pacific and Indian Oceans in 1941-1942, yet Churchill and the RN went on the defensive and concentrated on Germany. They were able to see that the IJN was not a threat to them and chose to keep their ships near Madagascar.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi NWS,

Doenitz could only coordinate at the strategic level forming patrol lines and concentrations. The inital locating U boat guided in the others and each captain attacked individually. Merchant raiders operatied on a different commnications net. Post Feb, 1942, all U boats operated off of a four wheel enigma that remained secure until late Novemner when U559 was captured by Petard in the Med. I have a book on U boat communications and I don't believe they had a voice radio capability ala TBS for tactical coordination.

You could coordinate the two throretically, but considering the low rate of success of wolfpacks against convoys generally, I'm skeptical. With AMCs, you have a number of problems, the least of which is U boats in the area looking for stragglers and rompers. An AMC is going to have little if any speed advantage over other merchants and only rudimentary fire control compared to an escort.

Mike:

Exactly! Thanks for the details on German naval communications, a topic I have little direct reference on.

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle:

One thing that I think we've missed, or only alluded to in this entire discussion is the pride factor of the Royal Navy. Britain watches as Germany re-arms with modern potentially superior capital ships. Sure Britain has more ships and would probably win, but in both wars, every time the German navy scored a success (Coronel, Sinking Royal Oak, Glorious and Hood, Channel Dash) it was a slap in the face of three hundred years of tradition. Imagine if a convoy did get savaged by a KM task force? Even though it's only one convoy, it has an effect similar to what terrorists try to achieve today. It shouts to the world that Britain no longer rules the waves and that her navy cannot protect its merchant shipping. Cold logical reasoning should tell the RN that the U-boat is the main threat, but when you have a leader like Churchill, with his naval background and penchant to interfere, surface threats will be exaggerated and given far more attention than need be. Face it, the entire German surface fleet was for all intents and purposes blockaded in the Baltic and Norway from 1943 onward. There wasn't even any need to waste time and resources on sinking the Tirpitz, just keep her fixed in one place and she is no longer a threat. But as long as she stays afloat she is symbol of the RN's inability to rule the seas.

It interesting to note that Britain took far more losses in surface ships in a shorter period of time in the Pacific and Indian Oceans in 1941-1942, yet Churchill and the RN went on the defensive and concentrated on Germany. They were able to see that the IJN was not a threat to them and chose to keep their ships near Madagascar.

Actually in my hypothetical Bismarck cruise - and Churchill getting sacked was directly aimed at England's pride and traditional rule of the seas. My point to Chris was that a big enough success by a German ship in the Atlantic 'could' profoundly impact GB far and above the economic damage of a convoy being sunk. The Sinking of the HMS Hood for example probably was a bigger blow to civilian morale in England than the blitz was (honestly don't know, but that is the impression I get). Imagine a convoy or two getting clobbered and the bandid (twins, Bismarck, Tirpitz or whatever) getting away? It would not be a pretty time to be the leadership of England and the RN.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Actually in my hypothetical Bismarck cruise - and Churchill getting sacked was directly aimed at England's pride and traditional rule of the seas. My point to Chris was that a big enough success by a German ship in the Atlantic 'could' profoundly impact GB far and above the economic damage of a convoy being sunk. The Sinking of the HMS Hood for example probably was a bigger blow to civilian morale in England than the blitz was (honestly don't know, but that is the impression I get). Imagine a convoy or two getting clobbered and the bandid (twins, Bismarck, Tirpitz or whatever) getting away? It would not be a pretty time to be the leadership of England and the RN.

Kyle:

In a similar vein, we are familar with the strengths and weaknesses of the Bismarck class, but throughout the war and for decades afterwards she was always considered near invincible and unsinkable. There are some who feel that Churchill deliberately encouraged that line of thought for two reasons: One to make it easier to accept the loss of HMS Hood. After all if you are sunk by the most powerful battleship afloat, it less of a blow to your pride and people won't question Holland's tactics, or the ship's construction.
Two, it made the threat of the German navy more exaggerated in FDR's eyes. Now personally I think that FDR was no fool and his own intel people probably could give him a breakdown refuting a good deal of Churchill's nonsense, but with the president wanting to get into the war and then when the US does enter the war and starts taking shipping losses, this helps reinforce Churchill's Germany first strategy, much to the dismay of a more coldly logical Admiral Ernst King.

[john964]

Kyle:

In a similar vein, we are familar with the strengths and weaknesses of the Bismarck class, but throughout the war and for decades afterwards she was always considered near invincible and unsinkable. There are some who feel that Churchill deliberately encouraged that line of thought for two reasons: One to make it easier to accept the loss of HMS Hood. After all if you are sunk by the most powerful battleship afloat, it less of a blow to your pride and people won't question Holland's tactics, or the ship's construction.
Two, it made the threat of the German navy more exaggerated in FDR's eyes. Now personally I think that FDR was no fool and his own intel people probably could give him a breakdown refuting a good deal of Churchill's nonsense, but with the president wanting to get into the war and then when the US does enter the war and starts taking shipping losses, this helps reinforce Churchill's Germany first strategy, much to the dismay of a more coldly logical Admiral Ernst King.
Ed, Churchill probably didn't want it getting out that Hood had a glass jaw ie weak deck armor.

[old_pop2000]

The total cost of the two Bismarcks, two Scharnhorst's along with the four Panzerschiffes was 216 million dollars in 1939 dollars. Total enemy ships either captured or sunk for those eight ships was 45. Based on those numbers, each merchant ship cost $4.8 million dollars to kill.

The nine Auxiliary Cruisers cost about $500,000 dollars to build new but were upgraded for military use. I suspect that cost probably raised their total cost to over $1,000,000 dollars. Those nine ships cost about $10,000,000 to send to sea. From 1940 to 1943, these nine AMC's sank 140 ships. Based on their total cost of ownership and the 140 ships sunk, the cost per kill was, $71,428.57.


Per kill cost for the eight warships- $4.8 million dollars.

Per kill cost for the nine Auxiliary Cruisers - $71,428.57

It would be interesting to cost out the per kill cost for the U-boats. There were 1100 U-boats of numerous designs and cost built. So it would be an interesting task.

It would seem to me, if I were a budget analyst for the Reichmarine, that the Auxiliary Cruisers were a very cost effective weapons platform. Isn't math fun:D:D

[Mike Malanaphy]

Jon:

Yes, further research shows that he had cancer and the naval doctors chose not to inform him. Bloody civilized of them eh?

Hi Guys,

A few years ago a Japanese doctor discovered a woman soon to be married had cervical cancer and had but months to live. He didn't tell her so as not to ruin her happiness. After her death, the family sued him, but he was upheld by the Japanese Supreme court.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hypothetical situation: Bismarck sinks the Hood as historical, then gets into the Atlantic ocean and destroys the troop convoy (WS something) and falls on a second convoy and does serious damage then gets into port unscathed. The RN has egg all over their face and the people toss Churchill out on his ear. The next PM decides that the war is idiotic as Poland can't be liberated, makes peace.
Longshot? Maybe. Something like this was potentially possible though if a battleship in the Atlantic could do enough damage and at least temporarily get away to port. Remember, the propaganda value and face saving value and all that are almost as important as actual military value

Which leads into the second part... The Tirpitz's actual danger to Pq-17 was there, but given the defenses that were in place I think the allies over reacted badly. In my mind this was an opportunity to lure out the battleship and sink her. Yes, PQ-17 was in danger but was it that much more than any other convoy? Keep them together, then bounce the Tirpitz with the surface ships available.

It's hard to quantify the value of BB's "terrorist" value. Without the BB's how much would change? I believe that their real danger was probably inflated and they were feared far more than they really needed to be - but they certainly did have the potential (if rarely realized in either war) to do great damage.

Hi Kyle,

I think you can make a compelling argument as to how much the RN watched KM capital ships. Huge resources were devoted to hunting groups for surface raiders including the panzer schiffs world wide. The presence of the twins and the Bismarck/Tirpitz prevented the sending of more powerful or newer capital ships to the Med to face the Littorios.n Two KGVs stayed at Scapa until the Tirpitz was finally puit out of action Retention of capital ships prevented the RN from sending more than P of W and Rpeulse to the pacific. Deployment of Washington, Alabama and other US fast battleships to the Atlantic prevented their presence in the Pacific where their AA batteries might have helped at Midway and Coral Sea. The sailing of Shnarnhorst and Gneisenau totally disrupted the convoy cycle until the RN could provide battleship escorts not to mention the mere threat of Tirpitz sailinig caused the scattering of PQ17.

Even though Churchill sais nothing worried him more than the U boats, it's clear they retained a healthy respect for German capital ships.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

Exactly! Thanks for the details on German naval communications, a topic I have little direct reference on.

Hi Ed,

There were several enigma nets for the KM and only the U boats used Shark or the four rotor machine. One of the problems the patrol lines had was the size of teh area they covered. If the convoy was contacted near the far end of teh line, the others might not have enough speed to catch up. If the escorts drove down the shadowing boat and caused her to lose contact, without radar or air recon the cahnces of recontacting the convoy were small.

A relative handfull of dedicated Luftwaffe planes scouting for convoys could have made a trmendous impact on U baot effectiveness for a tiny investment in resources.

[Kyle Holgate]

Hi Ed,

There were several enigma nets for the KM and only the U boats used Shark or the four rotor machine. One of the problems the patrol lines had was the size of teh area they covered. If the convoy was contacted near the far end of teh line, the others might not have enough speed to catch up. If the escorts drove down the shadowing boat and caused her to lose contact, without radar or air recon the cahnces of recontacting the convoy were small.

A relative handfull of dedicated Luftwaffe planes scouting for convoys could have made a trmendous impact on U baot effectiveness for a tiny investment in resources.

Göring was secretly working for the Allies, shhhhh. :rolleyes:

[Warship NWS]

I know this is a forum owned and operated by a naval surface warfare simulation game company and it does make perfect sense that we would emphasize surface warfare. But how many threads end up discussing a weapons system that had a useful lifespan of sixty years- 1890-1950. (I think 1890 is pushing it, but I will go with it). How many documentatable actions between battleships can we actually chart in that sixty years and two major world wars?


Actually we work in the realm of all matters regarding naval warfare covering from the age of sail to modern naval combat. ;)

However, around 1890 was the start of the iron and steel battleships and the wooden battleships were around much longer AKA "man of war" - wooden battleships and "frigates" - wooden cruisers, and so forth.

Ironically, for the hundreds of years the wooden ships reigned the seas they also did not see very many strategic battles but they had to be maintained in the navies that had them for self preservation or conquest of the sea lanes. The difference during the age of sail was that there was no real cost effective replacement, or counter, for what the wooden ships were built for.

This is why I feel the decline of the strategic use for battleships started after around 1905 when subs, torpedoes, and/or mines started to be present in effective numbers. Even admiral Jellicoe was fearful of the pewny torpedo boats and submarines as they could kill his big expensive fancy battleships. The irony is that the battleship created fear and in turn counters were developed, as it goes with many weapon systems in history.

Battleships are fascinating and yet controversial warships and it would have been very interesting to see more of them fight and it will always be debated as to why they did not fight more often and if something more useful could have been built.

This has to be my last post on this topic as again my time is limited but I appreciate the posts everyone have contributed to the discussion.

Thanks. :)

[john964]

Hi Kyle,

I think you can make a compelling argument as to how much the RN watched KM capital ships. Huge resources were devoted to hunting groups for surface raiders including the panzer schiffs world wide. The presence of the twins and the Bismarck/Tirpitz prevented the sending of more powerful or newer capital ships to the Med to face the Littorios.n Two KGVs stayed at Scapa until the Tirpitz was finally puit out of action Retention of capital ships prevented the RN from sending more than P of W and Rpeulse to the pacific. Deployment of Washington, Alabama and other US fast battleships to the Atlantic prevented their presence in the Pacific where their AA batteries might have helped at Midway and Coral Sea. The sailing of Shnarnhorst and Gneisenau totally disrupted the convoy cycle until the RN could provide battleship escorts not to mention the mere threat of Tirpitz sailinig caused the scattering of PQ17.

Even though Churchill sais nothing worried him more than the U boats, it's clear they retained a healthy respect for German capital ships.Mike the US fast BB's were doing workups at the time of Coral Sea and Midway. The South Dakotas' were all commissioned around that time SD in March, IN in April, MA in May and AL in Augest. NC and WA were suffering from engineering problems (IIRC shaft vibrations to both ships) this was not fixed untill early 42.

[Rick]

Deployment of Washington, Alabama and other US fast battleships to the Atlantic prevented their presence in the Pacific where their AA batteries might have helped at Midway and Coral Sea.

You are thinking of Mid 1943 when they were helping cover North Russia convoys. I think other than that the only fast BB to do major time in the Atlantic was the Massachussetts for the N. Africa landings in November of '42.

[Mike Malanaphy]

You are thinking of Mid 1943 when they were helping cover North Russia convoys. I think other than that the only fast BB to do major time in the Atlantic was the Massachussetts for the N. Africa landings in November of '42.

Hi Rick,

Darn memory, but they still served in the Atlantic because the Tirpitz and Scharnhorst were operational and a mid Atlantic sortie was seen as a viable threat.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Guys,

Got home and looked in "The Enigma U Boats" by Jak P. Mallmann Showell. He covers the German naval communications system and confirms U boats did not have a voice communication capability. He describes an experiment on 25 July 1942 where Doenitz "talked" to Karl Topp of the U 552 in mid Atlantic. To pass the equivalent of 18 lines of text, it took 75 minutes using the Enigma machine. It would be difficult for Doenitz to keep track of and coordinate at any tactical level a convoy battle.

Showell also has a companion book "German Naval Code Breakers".

He lists the following Enigma commnications nets:

Hydra: For ships in the Baltic, North Sea, and coastal waters of occupied countries.

Thetis: For non operation U boats in the Baltic and North Sea.

Special Key 100: A general code for auxiliary cruisrs and suipply ships in foreign waters.

Tibet: For supply ships that had taken refuge in neutral waters att he start of the war.

Freya: Reconnaissnace units and radio link between Supreme Naval Command in Berlin and Coatal Command Groups.

Sleipner: For units assigned to the torpedo trials center in the Baltic.

Bertok: Connection between naval attache in Japan and headquarters in Berlin.

Potsdam: Naval units in Baltic for Barbarrosa.

Triton: Four wheeled enigma net for U boats, called SHark by Allies.

Medusa: U Boats in teh Med.

South: Geenral code for ships and U boats in the Med and Black Sea.

Hermes: For German naval units in the Med.

Neptun: For large surface units on special operations.

Aegir: For surface ships expected to be away from Germany for longer periods.

[Rick]

Hi Rick,

Darn memory, but they still served in the Atlantic because the Tirpitz and Scharnhorst were operational and a mid Atlantic sortie was seen as a viable threat.


Heh well it helps that I have all 15 volumes of Morrison sitting about 5 feet from my PC;)

[old_pop2000]

I was researching the Z-plan and its economic effects in Adam Tooze book " The Wages of Destruction". He states that the plan was signed on January 17th, 1939. It was a nine year plan that was slated to build 797 ships at a cost of 33 Billion RM's. The construction included 6 giant battleships, 249 U-boats and 8 cruisers for long range operations. Tooze states that the costs for infrastructure improvements were enormous including cavernous new dry docks at Wilhelmshaven and Hamburg. The island of Reugen was to be hollowed out to house the enormous fleet. The plan gave the Reichsmarine veto control over all non-naval construction in the shipyards.

Now, we know that this grandiose plan died on September 3rd, 1939. But was it really possible. No, but not for the reasons you might think. The one primary reason the plan was unworkable was the increased requirements for heating oil and diesel fuel. In 1936, the heating oil requirements were established at 1.4 million tons, but the Z-plan would have increased this to 6 million tons per annum by 1947-1948. Diesel fuel requirements would have risen from 400,000 tons per annum to 2 million tons per annum. It was estimated that the domestic production would not exceed 2 million tons of oil and 1.34 million tons of diesel fuel by 1947-1948. It was determined that the Kriegsmarine would have build protected storage for over 9.6 million cubic meters.

What makes this even more interesting is the fact that at the end of 1938, due to the Sudenten issue, the German government had a cash flow problem. The Nazi government was essentially out of money.

If only the Allies had known of these issues, maybe they would have been patient and watched the Nazi government simply spend itself into anarchy and possibly the overthrow of the government. Or maybe they knew of the issues, since much of the Nazi money was coming from foreign banks, providing loans. I wonder if World War II was simply started to cover up the fact, that the Nazi's were never going to pay those loans back.

But that is finance and politics, outside the scope of this forum. However, it does make one pause to think more about the causes of WWII. If domestic production is incapable of providing the necessary natural resources to build this gigantic fleet, then you have to go looking for it elsewhere; say the USSR, maybe. Remember also, that the Luftwaffe was slated to have over 800 He-177 and a fleet of aircraft totaling 21,000. I am certain that the nations of Europe were not going to sell the Nazi's the oil and resources to build a fleet of ships and aircraft that would enable them to take over the whole Eurasian continent. Or would they.:rolleyes:;)

Fascinating

Source: The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze - Pages 288,292, 294, 298.

[bridav58]

How well were the German ports/rivers/estuaries setup to handle the H-class which were much larger then Bismarck as per water depth & such ??? What about the Kiel Canal? I know some of the later H-41 , H-42 and H-43/44 designs drew too much water for German ports & such.

[old_pop2000]

How well were the German ports/rivers/estuaries setup to handle the H-class which were much larger then Bismarck as per water depth & such ??? What about the Kiel Canal? I know some of the later H-41 , H-42 and H-43/44 designs drew too much water for German ports & such.
Bismarck had a draft of 9.9 meters, the H class was 10.2. Not much difference, actually. That's about 33 feet in the english system.

Kiel canal had a depth of 36 feet. Depth of water at Wilhelmshaven is 18 meters, IIRC.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, Churchill probably didn't want it getting out that Hood had a glass jaw ie weak deck armor.

John:

I think most naval officers were aware of Hood's armor, since she was probably the most famous ship in the world at the time. She had made more good will tours than any other ship in the RN. Also, recent research has debunked the theory that Hood caught a plunging shell on her deck. The range and angle of the shot points more to a belt hit and Hood's belt armor wasn't much different than the Queen Elizabeth class BBs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Guys,

A few years ago a Japanese doctor discovered a woman soon to be married had cervical cancer and had but months to live. He didn't tell her so as not to ruin her happiness. After her death, the family sued him, but he was upheld by the Japanese Supreme court.

Mike:

Good thing it wasn't an American jury, that doctor's malpractice insurance would have gone through the roof!

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Kyle,

I think you can make a compelling argument as to how much the RN watched KM capital ships. Huge resources were devoted to hunting groups for surface raiders including the panzer schiffs world wide. The presence of the twins and the Bismarck/Tirpitz prevented the sending of more powerful or newer capital ships to the Med to face the Littorios.n Two KGVs stayed at Scapa until the Tirpitz was finally puit out of action Retention of capital ships prevented the RN from sending more than P of W and Rpeulse to the pacific. Deployment of Washington, Alabama and other US fast battleships to the Atlantic prevented their presence in the Pacific where their AA batteries might have helped at Midway and Coral Sea. The sailing of Shnarnhorst and Gneisenau totally disrupted the convoy cycle until the RN could provide battleship escorts not to mention the mere threat of Tirpitz sailinig caused the scattering of PQ17.

Even though Churchill sais nothing worried him more than the U boats, it's clear they retained a healthy respect for German capital ships.

Mike:

A good solid summation of the British view towards large surface ships.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

There were several enigma nets for the KM and only the U boats used Shark or the four rotor machine. One of the problems the patrol lines had was the size of teh area they covered. If the convoy was contacted near the far end of teh line, the others might not have enough speed to catch up. If the escorts drove down the shadowing boat and caused her to lose contact, without radar or air recon the cahnces of recontacting the convoy were small.

A relative handfull of dedicated Luftwaffe planes scouting for convoys could have made a trmendous impact on U baot effectiveness for a tiny investment in resources.

Mike:

Imagine a KM naval air arm with an aircraft along the lines of the B-24? Capable of attack or better yet searching for targets. We can thank Hitler for allowing his subordinates to carve out their own little feudal empires and thereby sabatoge Germany's overall war effort.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You are thinking of Mid 1943 when they were helping cover North Russia convoys. I think other than that the only fast BB to do major time in the Atlantic was the Massachussetts for the N. Africa landings in November of '42.

Rick:

USS Wasington was serving with the RN in 1942, before she transferred to the Pacific. Indeed on March 27th she lost the commander of her task force Rear Admiral Wilcox when he fell overboard and was seen floating face down. It is surmised that he may have had a massive heart attack. She served in Atlantic waters from April until July 14 1942. She subsequently went to the South Pacific in September of 1942 until April 1943.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I was researching the Z-plan and its economic effects in Adam Tooze book " The Wages of Destruction". He states that the plan was signed on January 17th, 1939. It was a nine year plan that was slated to build 797 ships at a cost of 33 Billion RM's. The construction included 6 giant battleships, 249 U-boats and 8 cruisers for long range operations. Tooze states that the costs for infrastructure improvements were enormous including cavernous new dry docks at Wilhelmshaven and Hamburg. The island of Reugen was to be hollowed out to house the enormous fleet. The plan gave the Reichsmarine veto control over all non-naval construction in the shipyards.

Now, we know that this grandiose plan died on September 3rd, 1939. But was it really possible. No, but not for the reasons you might think. The one primary reason the plan was unworkable was the increased requirements for heating oil and diesel fuel. In 1936, the heating oil requirements were established at 1.4 million tons, but the Z-plan would have increased this to 6 million tons per annum by 1947-1948. Diesel fuel requirements would have risen from 400,000 tons per annum to 2 million tons per annum. It was estimated that the domestic production would not exceed 2 million tons of oil and 1.34 million tons of diesel fuel by 1947-1948. It was determined that the Kriegsmarine would have build protected storage for over 9.6 million cubic meters.

What makes this even more interesting is the fact that at the end of 1938, due to the Sudenten issue, the German government had a cash flow problem. The Nazi government was essentially out of money.

If only the Allies had known of these issues, maybe they would have been patient and watched the Nazi government simply spend itself into anarchy and possibly the overthrow of the government. Or maybe they knew of the issues, since much of the Nazi money was coming from foreign banks, providing loans. I wonder if World War II was simply started to cover up the fact, that the Nazi's were never going to pay those loans back.

But that is finance and politics, outside the scope of this forum. However, it does make one pause to think more about the causes of WWII. If domestic production is incapable of providing the necessary natural resources to build this gigantic fleet, then you have to go looking for it elsewhere; say the USSR, maybe. Remember also, that the Luftwaffe was slated to have over 800 He-177 and a fleet of aircraft totaling 21,000. I am certain that the nations of Europe were not going to sell the Nazi's the oil and resources to build a fleet of ships and aircraft that would enable them to take over the whole Eurasian continent. Or would they.:rolleyes:;)

Fascinating

Source: The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze - Pages 288,292, 294, 298.

Dennis:

All wars except those fought by hunter gather tribes come down to economics.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Heh well it helps that I have all 15 volumes of Morrison sitting about 5 feet from my PC;)

Hi Rick,

LOL, thanks...mine are in the other room.....alomg with my copies of Dulin and Garke that summarize their careers.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

All wars except those fought by hunter gather tribes come down to economics.
In most cases that is true, but the real issue is Plan Z which was still born. Schacht, Goering, and Raeder knew that this plan would never be built. They might build a few of the ships, but there was never enough oil, steel or manpower to build the fleet, fleet anchorage or protected storage facilities. Since Germany was a land based power, this would have deprived her primary striking force; the Germany army, of most of its assets. So, why be concerned about it. It isn't even a good discussion subject for alternative history. Alternative history, if done correctly, should have had some basis in truth. This did not. There was not enough money, natural resources or shipbuilding facilities to build such a fleet in the Germany in 1939 or the future.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

Imagine a KM naval air arm with an aircraft along the lines of the B-24? Capable of attack or better yet searching for targets. We can thank Hitler for allowing his subordinates to carve out their own little feudal empires and thereby sabatoge Germany's overall war effort.

Hi Ed,

Luftwaffe assistance in locating conoys or ships in the first 2/1/2 years of the war could have had a huge impact. Especially with the really aggressive, effective skippers still in the fight. With only their eyeballs and some passive sonar help, U boats had a very limitied ability to search. Condors would have been adequate as their was no fighter opposition and even catapult ships would be a limited deterrent. The first "Happy Time" could have started in JUly, 1940 rather than October and continued on as the force grew. Enough to make a difference? Thankfully, we never had to find out.

[Mike Malanaphy]

In most cases that is true, but the real issue is Plan Z which was still born. Schacht, Goering, and Raeder knew that this plan would never be built. They might build a few of the ships, but there was never enough oil, steel or manpower to build the fleet, fleet anchorage or protected storage facilities. Since Germany was a land based power, this would have deprived her primary striking force; the Germany army, of most of its assets. So, why be concerned about it. It isn't even a good discussion subject for alternative history. Alternative history, if done correctly, should have had some basis in truth. This did not. There was not enough money, natural resources or shipbuilding facilities to build such a fleet in the Germany in 1939 or the future.


Hi Dennis,

I'm gonna have to get that book. Be interesting to speculate how long Hitler would have avoided ( if he really wanted too ) war if Britain and France had not intervened. The need for resources and his plan to carve out a aryan homeland in the east would have forced his hand eventually. It's hard to imagine him attacking east with France still on his western border though the British had no real power to intervene on land.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Ed,

Luftwaffe assistance in locating conoys or ships in the first 2/1/2 years of the war could have had a huge impact. Especially with the really aggressive, effective skippers still in the fight. With only their eyeballs and some passive sonar help, U boats had a very limitied ability to search. Condors would have been adequate as their was no fighter opposition and even catapult ships would be a limited deterrent. The first "Happy Time" could have started in JUly, 1940 rather than October and continued on as the force grew. Enough to make a difference? Thankfully, we never had to find out.
The only aircraft, as we know, was the FW 200 Condor with a nominal range of 2200 miles. Allowing for a 10% allowance in the tanks for any necessary flight problems, this gives them a range outbound of 1000 miles. This takes them to the 30 degree longitude line. Brest is near the 5 degree longitude line. This just isn't enough range and loiter time, to be able to assist U-boats except in the area of the Irish Sea, English Channel or Iceland. If we include loiter time to develop an adequate search pattern, cut the range down by over 50%. This now puts them at 500 miles. This range puts them at the 15 degree longitude line. They can now search the Bay of Biscay and part of the Irish Sea. That isn't enough to help the U-boats. From that point 500 miles from Brest, to Halifax, Nova Scotia is over 2200 miles on the great circle route that the convoy will be travelling.

[Mike Malanaphy]

The only aircraft, as we know, was the FW 200 Condor with a nominal range of 2200 miles. Allowing for a 10% allowance in the tanks for any necessary flight problems, this gives them a range outbound of 1000 miles. This takes them to the 30 degree longitude line. Brest is near the 5 degree longitude line. This just isn't enough range and loiter time, to be able to assist U-boats except in the area of the Irish Sea, English Channel or Iceland. If we include loiter time to develop an adequate search pattern, cut the range down by over 50%. This now puts them at 500 miles. This range puts them at the 15 degree longitude line. They can now search the Bay of Biscay and part of the Irish Sea. That isn't enough to help the U-boats. From that point 500 miles from Brest, to Halifax, Nova Scotia is over 2200 miles on the great circle route that the convoy will be travelling.

Hi Dennis,

Condor obviously not the best maritime patrol aircraft, but being able to search to the west of England would be a great help. Lacking adequate escorts, British convoys broke up to go to their individual destinations in the UK an area reachable by the Condors. I'm sure a reduction in weight such as deleting their normal bomb load could allow more fuel. U boats concentrated to the west of England to take advantage of this shipping concentration and did not move west into the wider Atlantic until forced to by Coastal Command. Like discounting radar and the effectiveness of aircraft against U boats, Doenitz failed to see the need for a long range reconnaissance that was crucial for his boats to succeed.

As you mentioned in your earlier post about Plan Z, the German industrial base and economy were unable to support everyone's grand vision. Hitler tried to fight on the cheap and refused to rationalize production and focus on weapons that would be the most effective.

[old_pop2000]

Here is an alternate history that might have worked. With the invasion and occupation of Denmark, German could have invaded and occupied Iceland. This would have given them a base for U-boats but more importantly, a base for Luftwaffe aircraft including the Condor's for interdicting the convoy's. Condor's flying out of Iceland could have reached as far as the tip of Greenland and a little beyond for convoy search.

Could it have been done? Maybe with a combination of land invasion and paratroopers like the Crete invasion. Iceland was not defended well at all, at the beginning of the war.

[Smiffy]

Here is an alternate history that might have worked. With the invasion and occupation of Denmark, German could have invaded and occupied Iceland. This would have given them a base for U-boats but more importantly, a base for Luftwaffe aircraft including the Condor's for interdicting the convoy's. Condor's flying out of Iceland could have reached as far as the tip of Greenland and a little beyond for convoy search.

Could it have been done? Maybe with a combination of land invasion and paratroopers like the Crete invasion. Iceland was not defended well at all, at the beginning of the war.

Britain invaded Iceland in May 1940, just a few weeks after the fall of Denmark. This was partly to stop a German invasion and also to secure bases. I doubt that Germany would have risked an invasion. It was too far away for an airborne invasion and, with the Home Fleet based on the southern flank of the invasion route, too risky to invade by sea.

[Warship NWS]

John:

I think most naval officers were aware of Hood's armor, since she was probably the most famous ship in the world at the time. She had made more good will tours than any other ship in the RN. Also, recent research has debunked the theory that Hood caught a plunging shell on her deck. The range and angle of the shot points more to a belt hit and Hood's belt armor wasn't much different than the Queen Elizabeth class BBs.

Almost any battleship of that time frame would have had trouble keeping out a 15" high velocity AP shell at that range... 15kyd is under the decisive battle range for battleships to start with, its within the decisive range of most CAs at that point... which is why Holland's maneuver will always be a hotly debated topic.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Here is an alternate history that might have worked. With the invasion and occupation of Denmark, German could have invaded and occupied Iceland. This would have given them a base for U-boats but more importantly, a base for Luftwaffe aircraft including the Condor's for interdicting the convoy's. Condor's flying out of Iceland could have reached as far as the tip of Greenland and a little beyond for convoy search.

Could it have been done? Maybe with a combination of land invasion and paratroopers like the Crete invasion. Iceland was not defended well at all, at the beginning of the war.

Hi Dennis,

That would be an intersting state of affairs. I'm thinking the germans probaly could have successfully invaded the isalnd by sea in a stealth attack similar to Norway. The KM big ships could cause a diversion and the transports could infiltrate around the North of England. Holding it in the face of the RN is an entirely different case. It would be very difficult for the Germans to supply or reinforce the garrision. I'm sure teh airfield would beed upgrades to handle and supply the Condors.

My instinct is that Churchill would immendiately counter invade which could have delayed reiforcements to the Western Desert which he dispatched after teh cancellation of Sea Lion in the fall of 1940.

With your knowledge of aircraft, am I being reasonable to believe that the Condor could be made to extend it's range by carrying additional fuel?

[old_pop2000]

Britain invaded Iceland in May 1940, just a few weeks after the fall of Denmark. This was partly to stop a German invasion and also to secure bases. I doubt that Germany would have risked an invasion. It was too far away for an airborne invasion and, with the Home Fleet based on the southern flank of the invasion route, too risky to invade by sea.
They could have take out the British garrison on Iceland. It probably was pretty thin and not well equipped. If they had done it soon after the British landed, they would never have had time to build defenses.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In most cases that is true, but the real issue is Plan Z which was still born. Schacht, Goering, and Raeder knew that this plan would never be built. They might build a few of the ships, but there was never enough oil, steel or manpower to build the fleet, fleet anchorage or protected storage facilities. Since Germany was a land based power, this would have deprived her primary striking force; the Germany army, of most of its assets. So, why be concerned about it. It isn't even a good discussion subject for alternative history. Alternative history, if done correctly, should have had some basis in truth. This did not. There was not enough money, natural resources or shipbuilding facilities to build such a fleet in the Germany in 1939 or the future.

Dennis:

I read a figure somewhere that had Germany built one of the real monster H class BBs, the ones with 20" guns and over 100,000 tons displacement, that they would have used the equivalent steel for ten panzer divisions.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

That would be an intersting state of affairs. I'm thinking the germans probaly could have successfully invaded the isalnd by sea in a stealth attack similar to Norway. The KM big ships could cause a diversion and the transports could infiltrate around the North of England. Holding it in the face of the RN is an entirely different case. It would be very difficult for the Germans to supply or reinforce the garrision. I'm sure teh airfield would beed upgrades to handle and supply the Condors.

My instinct is that Churchill would immendiately counter invade which could have delayed reiforcements to the Western Desert which he dispatched after teh cancellation of Sea Lion in the fall of 1940.

With your knowledge of aircraft, am I being reasonable to believe that the Condor could be made to extend it's range by carrying additional fuel?
I dunno, Mike. The Condor was an airliner conversion. I don't know if its wings could hold any sort of load, especially with four engines. Maybe an extra internal fuel tank for ferry purposes like the US bombers carried. Then she becomes a flying gas tank. I can research the possibilities.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

Luftwaffe assistance in locating conoys or ships in the first 2/1/2 years of the war could have had a huge impact. Especially with the really aggressive, effective skippers still in the fight. With only their eyeballs and some passive sonar help, U boats had a very limitied ability to search. Condors would have been adequate as their was no fighter opposition and even catapult ships would be a limited deterrent. The first "Happy Time" could have started in JUly, 1940 rather than October and continued on as the force grew. Enough to make a difference? Thankfully, we never had to find out.

Mike:

When you examine the entire German approach to the war, it seems very hapzard. They had plan for up to 1940 and then they started winging it.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I read a figure somewhere that had Germany built one of the real monster H class BBs, the ones with 20" guns and over 100,000 tons displacement, that they would have used the equivalent steel for ten panzer divisions.
I've read that also, somewhere. It makes sense. I am certain Guderian would have screamed bloody murder, if one of those bomb sponge's had taken 10 of his precious panzer divisions

[Ed Rotondaro]

Here is an alternate history that might have worked. With the invasion and occupation of Denmark, German could have invaded and occupied Iceland. This would have given them a base for U-boats but more importantly, a base for Luftwaffe aircraft including the Condor's for interdicting the convoy's. Condor's flying out of Iceland could have reached as far as the tip of Greenland and a little beyond for convoy search.

Could it have been done? Maybe with a combination of land invasion and paratroopers like the Crete invasion. Iceland was not defended well at all, at the beginning of the war.

Dennis:

The only drawback I could see would be the logistics of keeping an Icelandic garrison supplied, but since you wouldn't need a large garrison, possibly U-boats could deliver supplies. I wonder how the US would have reacted to such a move? We pretty occupied Iceland with their permission once we entered the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Almost any battleship of that time frame would have had trouble keeping out a 15" high velocity AP shell at that range... 15kyd is under the decisive battle range for battleships to start with, its within the decisive range of most CAs at that point... which is why Holland's maneuver will always be a hotly debated topic.

Chris:

I agree. One wonders if perhaps the RN didn't use cordite would Hood have gone boom? The propellant used by the USN seems to have been far safer and just as effective although possibly generated more flash at night.

[old_pop2000]

Quick research shows that the FW 200 was gutted during conversion and added two internal fuel tanks, just like I had thought. So, they actually had no more room for extra fuel. 2212 miles was the maximum range for the aircraft. Allowing 200 miles for contingencies, it gives her a range of 2000 miles. If she uses a 30 degree search pattern, simply meaning that she flies out at say 270 degrees, makes turn to starboard and flies 50 miles, then turns back on a reciprocal heading of 90 degrees, her outbound and inbound legs might be 750 miles, at best. It also depends on altitude and headwinds. She would most likely encounter headwinds outbound, but might have a tail wind on the return trip. I am not certain as to the altitude, but anything above 15,000 feet requires oxygen and with the weather in the North Atlantic, I doubt you could see anything. so, altitudes less than 10,000 feet would be standard, probably closer to 5000 feet depending on ceiling.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I've read that also, somewhere. It makes sense. I am certain Guderian would have screamed bloody murder, if one of those bomb sponge's had taken 10 of his precious panzer divisions

Dennis:

Not mention that you could probably build the divisions faster than that ship.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

The only drawback I could see would be the logistics of keeping an Icelandic garrison supplied, but since you wouldn't need a large garrison, possibly U-boats could deliver supplies. I wonder how the US would have reacted to such a move? We pretty occupied Iceland with their permission once we entered the war.
Interesting possibilities, though. Logistics could be a problem, but local food stuffs could help. U-boat supply could work along with aux cruisers. I am certain the Allies would make every effort to retake it, quickly.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I agree. One wonders if perhaps the RN didn't use cordite would Hood have gone boom? The propellant used by the USN seems to have been far safer and just as effective although possibly generated more flash at night.

This would be for another thread entirely..;)

[Kyle Holgate]

Dennis, you seem able to find facts and figures quite well... The earlier discussion about the Z plan concluded that Germany wouldn't have sufficient fuel for all the ships. No problem, just go back to coal! Seriously the Soviets were selling fuel to Germany, one wonders how long that would last or how much more they'd be willing to sell. Germany was going to supply cruisers and other ships to them though, it's not outside the realm of possibility that Stalin would fuel the German fleet.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, you seem able to find facts and figures quite well... The earlier discussion about the Z plan concluded that Germany wouldn't have sufficient fuel for all the ships. No problem, just go back to coal! Seriously the Soviets were selling fuel to Germany, one wonders how long that would last or how much more they'd be willing to sell. Germany was going to supply cruisers and other ships to them though, it's not outside the realm of possibility that Stalin would fuel the German fleet.
Oil from cartel's including the Roumanian and Russian oil fields was certainly a possibility, but there was two other sources. One was the hydrogenation process of oil from coal tar using the Haber-Bosch process owned by Krupp, and the other was the Fischer-Tropsch system of making oil from coal. Both system were capital intensive using high pressure chemistry. Auschwitz was such a plant.

Now, could all these sources including increased research into local supplies, have provided enough oil. I have doubts. It might have provided the fleet enough fuel, but what about airforce and army requirements, not to mention domestic requirements like home heating oil, automobile and truck fuel, industrial fuels etc. To be precise, one would have to estimate the total requirement for the military per year in tons of oil, and add that to the estimated increased in requirements for domestic use as the German industries increased production. I can try to get some estimates.

[Kyle Holgate]

Oil from cartel's including the Roumanian and Russian oil fields was certainly a possibility, but there was two other sources. One was the hydrogenation process of oil from coal tar using the Haber-Bosch process owned by Krupp, and the other was the Fischer-Tropsch system of making oil from coal. Both system were capital intensive using high pressure chemistry. Auschwitz was such a plant.

Now, could all these sources including increased research into local supplies, have provided enough oil. I have doubts. It might have provided the fleet enough fuel, but what about airforce and army requirements, not to mention domestic requirements like home heating oil, automobile and truck fuel, industrial fuels etc. To be precise, one would have to estimate the total requirement for the military per year in tons of oil, and add that to the estimated increased in requirements for domestic use as the German industries increased production. I can try to get some estimates.

What did the Germans circa 1935-45 use for their heating? Today we use oil, natural gas and electricity - back then... coal? Woodstoves? I honestly don't know. Just trying to get some very rough idea on if and how much civilian heating requirements may draw on the limited oil supplies. Civilians would still want their petrol in any case, though of course that could easily be rationed.
Hmm.... hijack alert... wonder if the cost of gas is getting high enough for the US to start gasoline extraction from coal yet?
Ahem... you may now return to your regularly scheduled thread...

[old_pop2000]

Hmm.... hijack alert... wonder if the cost of gas is getting high enough for the US to start gasoline extraction from coal yet?


Yes, it is. I believe the figure I've heard was that it was cost effective when gas got to $3.00 per gallon. If you are interested in the connection between I.G.Farben, the German chemical combine in Nazi Germany and Standard Oil of New Jersey, read this:

http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_igfarben02.htm#Contents

I have the original first printing of this book, which came out in the 1960's. I have validated much of the connection information.

[john964]

John:

I think most naval officers were aware of Hood's armor, since she was probably the most famous ship in the world at the time. She had made more good will tours than any other ship in the RN. Also, recent research has debunked the theory that Hood caught a plunging shell on her deck. The range and angle of the shot points more to a belt hit and Hood's belt armor wasn't much different than the Queen Elizabeth class BBs.Ed I was refering to the British public, as you know most people out side the military are truly ignorant about the military in general.

[john964]

To answer question about the H-44 design. It was to weigh 122,000tn which is somthing like 90-95% of germanies steel production for one year IIRC German steel production in 1940 amounted to 135-140,000tn. So in other words the building of B, T, S&G was more than a years worth of production.

[Smiffy]

Interesting possibilities, though. Logistics could be a problem, but local food stuffs could help. .

Fish and more fish

[bridav58]

To answer question about the H-44 design. It was to weigh 122,000tn which is somthing like 90-95% of germanies steel production for one year IIRC German steel production in 1940 amounted to 135-140,000tn. So in other words the building of B, T, S&G was more than a years worth of production.


"The Rise & Fall of the Great Powers" Germany produced 23.2 million tons of steel in 1938 I doubt it would have went down to around 140,000 tons in 1940.

[old_pop2000]

"The Rise & Fall of the Great Powers" Germany produced 23.2 million tons of steel in 1938 I doubt it would have went down to around 140,000 tons in 1940.

First, that is a good book. I have a first edition of it in my library.

Germany produced the following: (figures are in million metric tons)

1939 23.7

1940 21.5

1941 28.2

1942 28.7

1943 30.6

1944 25.8

1945 1.4

Total axis production - 191.8

Total Allied production - 497.1 - US portion was 334.5

Total Axis crude oil production - 50.45

Total Allied crude oil production - 1,043 - US portion was 833.2

Total German producton of machine guns - 674,280 units

Total Allied production of machine guns - 4,744,484 units


God certainly does fight on the side of the bigger battalions!:D:D

[asnrobert]

Rick:

USS Wasington was serving with the RN in 1942, before she transferred to the Pacific. Indeed on March 27th she lost the commander of her task force Rear Admiral Wilcox when he fell overboard and was seen floating face down. It is surmised that he may have had a massive heart attack. She served in Atlantic waters from April until July 14 1942. She subsequently went to the South Pacific in September of 1942 until April 1943.

One of the patients I took care of at the VA was an 89 year old man who had served aboard the USS Washington during that time (he was there for the battle with the Kirishima as well). He was at his duty station (one of the AA guns) at the time the Admiral went overboard and he was adamant the Admiral JUMPED, and even refused to grab a life ring that had been thrown to him. The patient telling me this was alert and oriented, not confused, so I had no reason to doubt him (He also knew Ching Lee and had great respect for him).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Interesting possibilities, though. Logistics could be a problem, but local food stuffs could help. U-boat supply could work along with aux cruisers. I am certain the Allies would make every effort to retake it, quickly.

Dennis:

I checked a map showing the relative locations of Iceland, Ireland, Britain, Denmark and Norway and an invasion of Iceland is a lot more possible than I had at first thought. The KM did sortie through that area, so it is within the realm of possibility that a quick strike could take the island. The question becomes how much of threat does Churchill and his commanders see German occupied Iceland as. Would they expend the effort to re-take it? It certainly would have the potential to interdict British merchant shipping. The moral of the story: Always check the maps to fix the potential battlefield in your head.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Oil from cartel's including the Roumanian and Russian oil fields was certainly a possibility, but there was two other sources. One was the hydrogenation process of oil from coal tar using the Haber-Bosch process owned by Krupp, and the other was the Fischer-Tropsch system of making oil from coal. Both system were capital intensive using high pressure chemistry. Auschwitz was such a plant.

Now, could all these sources including increased research into local supplies, have provided enough oil. I have doubts. It might have provided the fleet enough fuel, but what about airforce and army requirements, not to mention domestic requirements like home heating oil, automobile and truck fuel, industrial fuels etc. To be precise, one would have to estimate the total requirement for the military per year in tons of oil, and add that to the estimated increased in requirements for domestic use as the German industries increased production. I can try to get some estimates.

Dennis:

If Germany wanted a fleet anywhere near the size of the Z plan, she would have had to procure a reliable source of oil. You might have seen an emphasis on trying to seize oilfields in the Middle East instead of invading Russia. The KM would have found itself in the same situation as the IJN did prior to Pearl Harbor. Low on fuel and tempted to strike out and seize what it needed (albeit the Army would have to do this).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed I was refering to the British public, as you know most people out side the military are truly ignorant about the military in general.

John:

Ahh that's different. Actually though, many Brits had a good deal of knowledge about their navy due to the pride that the fleet engendered in the average citizen. During the run up to WWI, both Britain and Germany had "naval leagues" which were basically groups of amatuer naval enthusiasts (i.e. people like us forum hounds) who eagerly sought out information on their nation's navy. The famous publication "Jane's Warships of the World" pretty started about this time to cater to public's interest in naval matters. I don't know to what degree that sort of enthusiasm was around during WWII, but a good deal of government propoganda touting the might of the fleet existed in both Britain and the US.

[Ed Rotondaro]

First, that is a good book. I have a first edition of it in my library.

Germany produced the following: (figures are in million metric tons)

1939 23.7

1940 21.5

1941 28.2

1942 28.7

1943 30.6

1944 25.8

1945 1.4

Total axis production - 191.8

Total Allied production - 497.1 - US portion was 334.5

Total Axis crude oil production - 50.45

Total Allied crude oil production - 1,043 - US portion was 833.2

Total German producton of machine guns - 674,280 units

Total Allied production of machine guns - 4,744,484 units


God certainly does fight on the side of the bigger battalions!:D:D

Dennis:

Or as Comrade Stalin said "The war will be won on the factory floor". Now I have to go out and get that book. Thanks old friend:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

One of the patients I took care of at the VA was an 89 year old man who had served aboard the USS Washington during that time (he was there for the battle with the Kirishima as well). He was at his duty station (one of the AA guns) at the time the Admiral went overboard and he was adamant the Admiral JUMPED, and even refused to grab a life ring that had been thrown to him. The patient telling me this was alert and oriented, not confused, so I had no reason to doubt him (He also knew Ching Lee and had great respect for him).

Robert:

There is a very good chance that's correct, since eyewitnesses said the same thing. I think the USN covered it up out of respect for the Admiral. War can stress a person to the breaking point. Tell your patient we appreciate his service and a job well done.

[john964]

"The Rise & Fall of the Great Powers" Germany produced 23.2 million tons of steel in 1938 I doubt it would have went down to around 140,000 tons in 1940.
I was refering to the specialized steel used in armor plate. It is like today with HY-80 and HY-100 steel used in US submarine hulls there are only 3 and 2 manufacturers in the US.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I checked a map showing the relative locations of Iceland, Ireland, Britain, Denmark and Norway and an invasion of Iceland is a lot more possible than I had at first thought. The KM did sortie through that area, so it is within the realm of possibility that a quick strike could take the island. The question becomes how much of threat does Churchill and his commanders see German occupied Iceland as. Would they expend the effort to re-take it? It certainly would have the potential to interdict British merchant shipping. The moral of the story: Always check the maps to fix the potential battlefield in your head.

This is a procedure that I always follow. I have Google Earth Pro, some of the USMA map set etc. It is the first step in analysis, look at a map and measure distances, look at topography, roads, lakes, rivers. It is absolutely imperative to understand the geography of the location in question.

As to the Iceland invasion, airborne is probably not possible due to distance. However, getting an invasion force of any size might be possible if they sailed dispersed, assembled when they are passed the British threat. Simply transports, sailing alone, early in the war, probably won't draw much attention. Just a few ideas.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

If Germany wanted a fleet anywhere near the size of the Z plan, she would have had to procure a reliable source of oil. You might have seen an emphasis on trying to seize oilfields in the Middle East instead of invading Russia. The KM would have found itself in the same situation as the IJN did prior to Pearl Harbor. Low on fuel and tempted to strike out and seize what it needed (albeit the Army would have to do this).
These figures came from the book "Brute Force" by John Ellis. Sorry for the apparent deception. But that book and Adam Tooze book are good for this information.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

If Germany wanted a fleet anywhere near the size of the Z plan, she would have had to procure a reliable source of oil. You might have seen an emphasis on trying to seize oilfields in the Middle East instead of invading Russia. The KM would have found itself in the same situation as the IJN did prior to Pearl Harbor. Low on fuel and tempted to strike out and seize what it needed (albeit the Army would have to do this).

The most reliable and accessible oil supplies were the Roumanian which was key to the German war effort. The other was the Russian oil reserves in the Kuban area. These were already developed and could be piped to the Germans. The Middle East oil is not as accessible and as well developed. It wasn't developed until after the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The most reliable and accessible oil supplies were the Roumanian which was key to the German war effort. The other was the Russian oil reserves in the Kuban area. These were already developed and could be piped to the Germans. The Middle East oil is not as accessible and as well developed. It wasn't developed until after the war.

Dennis:

I thought Britain was getting some of her oil from Iraq? She fought a brief campaign there in 1941 to retain control of the country in the face of a revolution.

[bridav58]

I was refering to the specialized steel used in armor plate. It is like today with HY-80 and HY-100 steel used in US submarine hulls there are only 3 and 2 manufacturers in the US.


if maybe you meant special armor type plates & such. The US for instance could turn out 78,000,000 tons of steel if necessary but only maybe a few hundred thousand tons of say special naval armor type steels.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I thought Britain was getting some of her oil from Iraq? She fought a brief campaign there in 1941 to retain control of the country in the face of a revolution.
She was developing the area, but she was getting the bulk of her oil from Venezuela via Texas refineries to the east coast and on to Britain. She was also getting it from the newly discovered areas of Texas like the Permian area.