China, The Far East and War in the Pacific

[old_pop2000]

The coming of war to the Far East and the Pacific is a complicated story made worse by the lack of primary documents for many of the Japanese conferences and meetings. In the 1960's and 70's, copies of documents were discovered for this period and the remains of personal diaries and a more willingness on the part of the surviving particulars to discuss the period, helped to shed more light on the events

So, what is the period in question? Most historians state that it began with the Mejii Restoration in 1868 and the subsequent industrialization of Japan. With industrialization comes the requirement for the raw materials and the technological education. The requirement for the technology, meant dealing with the industrialized Western nations and contact beween a feudal Japanese society, and the more modern Western democratic ideas and economic theory. If we are connecting the dots, this is the first dot.

The next dot would be the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. For the Japanese, it was totally logical to look westward toward Korea, Manchuria and China putting themselves in conflict with Imperial China and Russia. This region would always be the purview of the Imperial Japanese Army. Specifically the Kwantung Army. This army became increasingly independent with less and less control exhibited from Tokyo. Many of the incidents occurred in Manchuria and China because of this excessively nationalist and aggressive army
.
The next dot would be the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. While this was another successful war, it was an economic disaster for Japan. It nearly bankrupted the country. It is a time when the IJN began to become a more powerful force in Japanese military policy. It's focus was eastward into the Pacific. This was also the time when both the Army and Navy began to vie for resources and power in the government. This was also the time for the emergence in the US of a drive for a stronger navy and of War Plan Orange.

The next and very important dot is WWI. This war did many things. It gave the japanese a piece of the world scene, reduced the western powers in the Far East and increased Japanese wealth through shipping. But it had the negative effect on the importance of Western ideas in Japan. This is important.

The period of Twenties, was a time for experiment in the politics of Japan. They were a parlimentary democracy during this period, but still expansionist. There was a civil war in China that engaged both Britain, and the US . They were very reserved during this period as evidenced by the Naval treaty of 1922. It was also a time of prosperity. The Crash of '29 and resultant depression around the world struck hard at the Japanese and their feelings about Western ideals. The democratic experiment ended with excessive nationalism and government change by assassination. The subordinates in the military began to take control of politics and strategy. The move toward war in the Pacific could be identified with this period. Specifically, the Mukden Incident of 1931. This incident eventually led to the invasion of China in 1937, and spirally down of relations between the US and Japan.

This is a long period, but I hope we can get some interesting discussions going about this subject, possibly even some counterfactual ideas about how the road could have been different. One point needs to be made. Racism in the US and other Western nations did play a part in how the west dealt with Japan but it must be left out of our discussions as per forum rules. I just wanted to acknowledge it as a factor.

[Christian Schwietzke]

One thing to keep in mind when calling Japanese society (primarily pre-Meiji) "feudal" is that, unlike the West, it was not a strict top-down structure with an Emperor and his subordinates, but one where the nominally second-highest level, the shogun, wielded a lot more power than it would have in a Western feudal society - depending on the shogun and the emperor, the shogun might be the real ruler and the emperor a mere figurehead.

So, looking at the role the Army had played ca. 1895 to 1945, you could look at it with Western eyes and call it the tail wagging the dog - or your can look at it with Japanese eyes and see the Army general staff moving into the same position the shogun used to fill.

As for counterfactuals - what if, with Japan as an island nation with no enemies on its own landmass(es), the role of shogun-in-all-but-name had gone the Navy admiralty?

[old_pop2000]

One thing to keep in mind when calling Japanese society (primarily pre-Meiji) "feudal" is that, unlike the West, it was not a strict top-down structure with an Emperor and his subordinates, but one where the nominally second-highest level, the shogun, wielded a lot more power than it would have in a Western feudal society - depending on the shogun and the emperor, the shogun might be the real ruler and the emperor a mere figurehead.

So, looking at the role the Army had played ca. 1895 to 1945, you could look at it with Western eyes and call it the tail wagging the dog - or your can look at it with Japanese eyes and see the Army general staff moving into the same position the shogun used to fill.

As for counterfactuals - what if, with Japan as an island nation with no enemies on its own landmass(es), the role of shogun-in-all-but-name had gone the Navy admiralty?

Well, Christian, we could get into a debate over the use of the term "feudal" but it might be better to just accept it. They were, according to their own scholars, a feudal society even when industrializing. These are not entirely my words, but others. So, believe what you will. We do have understand how a closed society, for want of a better term, would react to industrialization and exposure to democratic ideas and economic systems. Talk about culture shock.

As your counterfactual, It's hard to fathom that concept as the IJN wasn't really a force until the 1900's probably after 1905 in fact.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Well, Christian, we could get into a debate over the use of the term "feudal" but it might be better to just accept it. They were, according to their own scholars, a feudal society even when industrializing. These are not entirely my words, but others. So, believe what you will. We do have understand how a closed society, for want of a better term, would react to industrialization and exposure to democratic ideas and economic systems. Talk about culture shock.

As your counterfactual, It's hard to fathom that concept as the IJN wasn't really a force until the 1900's probably after 1905 in fact.

Maybe if the Army got really humiliated in the Russo-Japanese, while the Navy shone as it did historically?

[old_pop2000]

Maybe if the Army got really humiliated in the Russo-Japanese, while the Navy shone as it did historically?

Quite possibly, but remember that the Army really did not begin to become radicalized until the democratic period in the 1920's. This was also the period of the Chinese Civil War. This would be a catalyst for radical Japanese officers in the Kwantung Army. One of those was the Chief of Staff of that Army, Lt. General Hideki Tojo. I believe that the march toward the Pacific war really starts with the failure of the parlimentary democracy during the '20's. With no oversight from a moderate government, these radicalist were allowed to continue to operate freely.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Quite possibly, but remember that the Army really did not begin to become radicalized until the democratic period in the 1920's. This was also the period of the Chinese Civil War. This would be a catalyst for radical Japanese officers in the Kwantung Army. One of those was the Chief of Staff of that Army, Lt. General Hideki Tojo. I believe that the march toward the Pacific war really starts with the failure of the parlimentary democracy during the '20's. With no oversight from a moderate government, these radicalist were allowed to continue to operate freely.

But if the Army got humiliated... let´s say they failed to defeat the Russians in Manchuria, and Manchuria ends up either in Russian or Chinese hands. Either way, the Kwantung Army does not have the prestige it had historically, there is no Japanese Manchuria from which to attack China... I think that changes the equation.

What if the civilian government and the Navy had decided that the "China Adventure" has failed once and for all after a hypothetical Japanese defeat in Manchuria 1905? What if that same government and Navy decided, once the more radical Army officers started getting restless, to break the Army´s strength and independent spirit once and for all? After all, what need does an inland nation with a strong Navy have for a strong Army? At worst that would lead to another round of civil war as in the 1870s, but I dare say even that would be less stressful for the rest of Asia than the historical road Japan took.

[old_pop2000]

But if the Army got humiliated... let´s say they failed to defeat the Russians in Manchuria, and Manchuria ends up either in Russian or Chinese hands. Either way, the Kwantung Army does not have the prestige it had historically, there is no Japanese Manchuria from which to attack China... I think that changes the equation.

What if the civilian government and the Navy had decided that the "China Adventure" has failed once and for all after a hypothetical Japanese defeat in Manchuria 1905? What if that same government and Navy decided, once the more radical Army officers started getting restless, to break the Army´s strength and independent spirit once and for all? After all, what need does an inland nation with a strong Navy have for a strong Army? At worst that would lead to another round of civil war as in the 1870s, but I dare say even that would be less stressful for the rest of Asia than the historical road Japan took.

　
All of what you say, is entirely possible with a strong democratically elected government. Something not available in Japan. The strife between the war lords in China, the eventual Chinese civil war was to Japan's advantage. The easiest way to stop the China adventure was for one side in the civil war to win and establish a strong nationalistic government. With that government and help from the Russians, any further incursions by the Japanese would have ended. Always keep in mind, that the move south into the southern islands was entirely the Navy's idea. It needed the oil, not the army. The army was a walking army, not well motorized. It is difficult to know whether a failure in China would have stopped the Navy. OTOH, it might have encouraged the army to cooperate more with the Navy, providing the troops no longer in China for invasions like Midway, New Guinea, Solomons, Ceylon etc. This would have also released Japanese army transports for use in the Navy's move into the south. As you can see, the "China Adventure" was the best restraint, the Allies had on Japanese aggression in the southern Pacific. The war in the Far East can be thought of as a two front war; China and the Pacific. Japan was never capable of maintaining a two front war.

It really boils down to civilian control of military, which western nations have in their constitutions. These were not available in Japan. Without them, nothing was going to stop the aggressive behavior of the military. Only a complete discrediting of the military, as you have said, by a defeat such as the loss in WWII. The Japanese had experienced defeats in both previous wars, on land and sea, but that never stopped them.

Could the discrediting of the army have led to a loss of power by the military and no war? With other factors, that is possible, I suppose. The Navy was always defensive in its view. Possibly if the moderates in the Navy, had been able to take a stronger hold. The Japanese government was attempting to reduce its dependence on the oil from the US by discussing increases from the Dutch. Those talks did not work out, why, I am not certain. The road to the Pacific war had many forks in it and it's possible that one of those paths might have led to peace. Maybe we can explore this idea, especially with your area of expertise. How did the Wall Street crash and the depression affect the democratically elected government? This maybe a key component of the road to the Pacific war.

[old_pop2000]

On Google books, I've found a book from Forgotten books, titled a History of Japan by Hisho Saito. It is a translation and the complete book. In Chapter XVIII, he discusses Bushido which as the author states reached its zenith during the Tokugawa Shogunate. The organization of this shogunate was different, apparently from others. The feudal system in place was reformed and the existing class of warlords, titled Daimios were divided into three classes. There were over 260 of these. These were large landowners in Japan.

The first class of the Daimyios were the Shimpan, feudal princes related to the Shogun. Second class was the Fudai, feudal princes who held fiefs from the Shogun and Tozama, princes who had been subjucated by the shogun. These daimyio held power under the Shogun. The system he describes, in detail, is a feudal system where the king or emperor is not in actual control of the government, the shogun and his Daimyios were. All this fell apart in 1862, when the Daimyos and samurai gathered at Kyoto, criticizing shogunate. Reforms were enacted and the emperor began to take more control. With the eventual resignation of the shogun, the new emperor took control of the government. This was the birth of the imperial army. The industrialization and reintroduction of western ideas and products seems to have dated from this time. However, the daimyos were still in power, so large land owners still had control. This means that the feudal system was still in place with the shogun simply replaced by the emperor and his imperial army.

I've used this and a few others from the 1912-1919 time period, because the last of the 1868 principals were still alive at this time. In my way of thinking, these period books are primary documents, of sorts.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Could the discrediting of the army have led to a loss of power by the military and no war? With other factors, that is possible, I suppose. The Navy was always defensive in its view. Possibly if the moderates in the Navy, had been able to take a stronger hold. The Japanese government was attempting to reduce its dependence on the oil from the US by discussing increases from the Dutch. Those talks did not work out, why, I am not certain. The road to the Pacific war had many forks in it and it's possible that one of those paths might have led to peace. Maybe we can explore this idea, especially with your area of expertise. How did the Wall Street crash and the depression affect the democratically elected government? This maybe a key component of the road to the Pacific war.

I would venture a guess that economic dire straits always weaken democratic governments to a greater or lesser degree. Implicitly or explicitly, a democratic government promises to strive for the benefit of the people, who are its sovereign -as opposed to an autocratic government, which looks out for its ruler or ruling clique or whatever is in power. So, if the economy falters, the people might come to the conclusion that the government has lied to them about working for their benefit, or is incapable of doing so; contrast this to an impression that autocratic governments leave of being efficient ("Say what you want about Mussolini, but at least he got the trains to run on time!"), and you may see how autocracy looks more appealing - or at least democracy looks less appealing.
Some data points to support this:
- both in Germany and Japan (not sure about Italy and Spain), autocratic government arose as a consequence of the economic troubles of the 20´s
- confidence in democracy in 90´s and 00´s East Germany decreased steadily as East Germany failed to catch up to West Germany economically
- support for both communist and neo-Nazi parties, while low, is higher than it used to be, and support for the communists in particular is rising in Germany since the beginning of the crisis
- not sure how anti-democratic you in the USA consider folks like the Oath Keepers, the Sovereign Citizen crowd, Birthers and extremist militias, but they seem to be on the rise ever since the financial crisis hit

Perhaps for Japan, what led to the Pacific War was both the factors outlined above, and a combination of two experiences. First, as seen in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, they knew that military expansionism worked, or at least could work if they did it right. And second, in the 20´s they might have come to the conclusion that peaceful economic build-up as a road to prosperity wasn´t all it was cracked up to be. So they went back to sharpening their swords, both metaphorically and literally.

[old_pop2000]

I would venture a guess that economic dire straits always weaken democratic governments to a greater or lesser degree. Implicitly or explicitly, a democratic government promises to strive for the benefit of the people, who are its sovereign -as opposed to an autocratic government, which looks out for its ruler or ruling clique or whatever is in power. So, if the economy falters, the people might come to the conclusion that the government has lied to them about working for their benefit, or is incapable of doing so; contrast this to an impression that autocratic governments leave of being efficient ("Say what you want about Mussolini, but at least he got the trains to run on time!"), and you may see how autocracy looks more appealing - or at least democracy looks less appealing.
Some data points to support this:
- both in Germany and Japan (not sure about Italy and Spain), autocratic government arose as a consequence of the economic troubles of the 20´s
- confidence in democracy in 90´s and 00´s East Germany decreased steadily as East Germany failed to catch up to West Germany economically
- support for both communist and neo-Nazi parties, while low, is higher than it used to be, and support for the communists in particular is rising in Germany since the beginning of the crisis
- not sure how anti-democratic you in the USA consider folks like the Oath Keepers, the Sovereign Citizen crowd, Birthers and extremist militias, but they seem to be on the rise ever since the financial crisis hit

Perhaps for Japan, what led to the Pacific War was both the factors outlined above, and a combination of two experiences. First, as seen in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, they knew that military expansionism worked, or at least could work if they did it right. And second, in the 20´s they might have come to the conclusion that peaceful economic build-up as a road to prosperity wasn´t all it was cracked up to be. So they went back to sharpening their swords, both metaphorically and literally.

Hi Christian:

Interesting comments and of course, with your expertise probably closer to the truth. However, oligarchies and dictatorships, I distinguish between the two, seem to be able to control the society and hence, the economic cycles either with propanda or with decrees. In Japan's case, I would say she was a true oligarchy until the turn of the century then the daimyos lost power and a parlimentary democracy began to take shape. However, I believe those were just trappings of a western syle democracy. The underlying society was still feudal. As Japan industrialized and urbanized along with it, you would have, in my opinion, a dicotomy in their society. The average Japanese would be tied to the land owner and his property, but some would start migrating to the industrial centers like Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe and the seaports. Harbors would be very important for the exporting and importing of goods and raw materials. So, world wide economic downturns or just the normal business cycle might affect the urban areas and heavy industries, but might not affect the small land owners and tenant farmers. This is more your area but I think I am close.

So, it would seem to my way of thinking, that as Japan urbanized and industrialized, she would naturally be more likely to seek areas with natural resources. She acquired rights in Manchuria after the 1895 Sino-Japanese War. These rights included the right to station troops to protect her economic endeavors. One of the more interesting tables of data is one that shows GDP from 1900 to 1950 for Japan proper, Japan + Manchuria and the US. It is established in 1990 International dollars. Examples:
1900 - Japan proper was 52 billion, with Manchuria 55 billion. By 1937, Japan Proper was at 165 billion, with Manchuria it was 228 billion. The later peaked in 1941/1942 at 311 billion dollars. I've seen figures that show the Japanese tripled the RR trackage in the area, and tripled the output of coal and iron ore. Manchuria became an important market for finished Japanese goods. Some of the problems was the low productivity of Japanese workers and poor maintenance of equipment.

With all this information at hand, it appears to me, that much of her westward expansion was based more on economics than anything. I believe that the Kwantung Army did become radicalized and with the poor trappings of a democratic government, the period of 1935 to 1937 saw the death of many moderate ministers, premiers and former premiers to such an extent that military rule by the army was almost the only way to keep order in the country. I hope what I've said makes sense, I am not an economist but I believe the trinity of politics, economics and military are important to the understanding of historical events.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Christian:

Interesting comments and of course, with your expertise probably closer to the truth. However, oligarchies and dictatorships, I distinguish between the two, seem to be able to control the society and hence, the economic cycles either with propanda or with decrees. In Japan's case, I would say she was a true oligarchy until the turn of the century then the daimyos lost power and a parlimentary democracy began to take shape. However, I believe those were just trappings of a western syle democracy. The underlying society was still feudal. As Japan industrialized and urbanized along with it, you would have, in my opinion, a dicotomy in their society. The average Japanese would be tied to the land owner and his property, but some would start migrating to the industrial centers like Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe and the seaports. Harbors would be very important for the exporting and importing of goods and raw materials. So, world wide economic downturns or just the normal business cycle might affect the urban areas and heavy industries, but might not affect the small land owners and tenant farmers. This is more your area but I think I am close.

So, it would seem to my way of thinking, that as Japan urbanized and industrialized, she would naturally be more likely to seek areas with natural resources. She acquired rights in Manchuria after the 1895 Sino-Japanese War. These rights included the right to station troops to protect her economic endeavors. One of the more interesting tables of data is one that shows GDP from 1900 to 1950 for Japan proper, Japan + Manchuria and the US. It is established in 1990 International dollars. Examples:
1900 - Japan proper was 52 billion, with Manchuria 55 billion. By 1937, Japan Proper was at 165 billion, with Manchuria it was 228 billion. The later peaked in 1941/1942 at 311 billion dollars. I've seen figures that show the Japanese tripled the RR trackage in the area, and tripled the output of coal and iron ore. Manchuria became an important market for finished Japanese goods. Some of the problems was the low productivity of Japanese workers and poor maintenance of equipment.

With all this information at hand, it appears to me, that much of her westward expansion was based more on economics than anything. I believe that the Kwantung Army did become radicalized and with the poor trappings of a democratic government, the period of 1935 to 1937 saw the death of many moderate ministers, premiers and former premiers to such an extent that military rule by the army was almost the only way to keep order in the country. I hope what I've said makes sense, I am not an economist but I believe the trinity of politics, economics and military are important to the understanding of historical events.


Hi Dennis,

Your correct about the Japanese adopting the trappings of Western ideas. Despite a feudal backgorund and it's two century isolation, the powers that be recognized the power of the west and Japan would have to adapt to avoid becoming another asian colony. Just how much to adopt without losing what was uniquely Japanese was a tough decision and hard fought at all levels of society.

I just finished reading Edward Drea's "Japan's Imperial Army It's Rise and Fall 1853-1945". Leap of 800 years in less than 80 years made the transition difficult and in the Army's case self destructive. The army sought from the start to be associated with the Emperor and the protector of kokutai, the unique spirit of Japan. The collective ideal was "rich nation and strong army". Throughout it's history however, the army remained fractured and at war with itself and other parts of society. As Drea opines that instead of serving the nation, the nation was made to serve the army.

The domination of the Satsuma clan in the army faded after WW I as more middle class people entered the officer corps and the old guard retired. Japan's experience in WW I impressed many in the army regarding the concept of total war, an integration of military and industrial effort of the entire country. The interwar period saw the struggle between the reform movement and traditional methods. The issue was never resolved and the army went to war neither modernized or fully mobilized.

The traditional view saw the major combat power of the army as the Japanese infantryman and his unique fighting spirit. That fighting spirit and "cold steel" would carry the day and that modern techniques and weapons were useful as long as they didn't undermine the traditional view. Since Japan's experience was that she needed to strike first before a larger enemy could mobilize, the traditional view saw the need for a large standing army that could attack immediately with few supporting arms and poor logisitcs support. They argued that the poor road conditions in NE Asia did not require the need of a highly mechanized army. The reformers saw the need to adopt an integrated national industrial and military strategy and have a natural resources base to fight a protracted war. The army needed to have smaller, more mobile divisions with good artillery, communications, and logistics support. To pay for these, the size of he regular army needed to be reduced and the reserves enlarged. The argument see sawed through the interwar period and was often bitter, leading to the the sword assasination of a reform minded Army minister. The shock of their defeat to the Soviets in 1939 finally settled the argument, but the war in China absorbed the money that could have been used to modernize the army.

All sides however saw the need for Japanese expansion into Manchuria and China to garner natural resources and to provide a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Army elements tired with vacillating and corrupt politicians who were thwarting the Emperor's will and Japanese destiny would trip actions in China and Indo China to force the issue. In almost all these cases, there was no punishment to the offenders and the government accepting the outcome. There were four army mutinies in the early 30s.

The 1923 Imperial Defense Strategy saw America named as Japan's enemy as the the Soviet Union had collapsed and was not a threat. Even so, the army never lost it's focus on the Soviet Union. Hence, both services budgeted for and trained for two entirely different types of war. The national economy could not support both. The Japanese economy was shackled by the rebuilding costs from the 1923 earthquake, the depression, and the war in China. The army didn't even begin assigning forces to the move south until September, 1941.

Under the Japanese constitution, no government couldbe formed without a war minister who had to be an army officer. By resigning or withholding a nominee, the army held a veto over the civilian government. Nor did the throne choose to restrain the army. It's an almost incredible story about how the Japanese staggered from crisis to crisis seemingly unable to avert disaster.

[old_pop2000]

Your correct about the Japanese adopting the trappings of Western ideas. Despite a feudal backgorund and it's two century isolation, the powers that be recognized the power of the west and Japan would have to adapt to avoid becoming another asian colony. Just how much to adopt without losing what was uniquely Japanese was a tough decision and hard fought at all levels of society.

I just finished reading Edward Drea's "Japan's Imperial Army It's Rise and Fall 1853-1945". Leap of 800 years in less than 80 years made the transition difficult and in the Army's case self destructive. The army sought from the start to be associated with the Emperor and the protector of kokutai, the unique spirit of Japan. The collective ideal was "rich nation and strong army". Throughout it's history however, the army remained fractured and at war with itself and other parts of society. As Drea opines that instead of serving the nation, the nation was made to serve the army.

The domination of the Satsuma clan in the army faded after WW I as more middle class people entered the officer corps and the old guard retired. Japan's experience in WW I impressed many in the army regarding the concept of total war, an integration of military and industrial effort of the entire country. The interwar period saw the struggle between the reform movement and traditional methods. The issue was never resolved and the army went to war neither modernized or fully mobilized.

The traditional view saw the major combat power of the army as the Japanese infantryman and his unique fighting spirit. That fighting spirit and "cold steel" would carry the day and that modern techniques and weapons were useful as long as they didn't undermine the traditional view. Since Japan's experience was that she needed to strike first before a larger enemy could mobilize, the traditional view saw the need for a large standing army that could attack immediately with few supporting arms and poor logisitcs support. They argued that the poor road conditions in NE Asia did not require the need of a highly mechanized army. The reformers saw the need to adopt an integrated national industrial and military strategy and have a natural resources base to fight a protracted war. The army needed to have smaller, more mobile divisions with good artillery, communications, and logistics support. To pay for these, the size of he regular army needed to be reduced and the reserves enlarged. The argument see sawed through the interwar period and was often bitter, leading to the the sword assasination of a reform minded Army minister. The shock of their defeat to the Soviets in 1939 finally settled the argument, but the war in China absorbed the money that could have been used to modernize the army.

All sides however saw the need for Japanese expansion into Manchuria and China to garner natural resources and to provide a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Army elements tired with vacillating and corrupt politicians who were thwarting the Emperor's will and Japanese destiny would trip actions in China and Indo China to force the issue. In almost all these cases, there was no punishment to the offenders and the government accepting the outcome. There were four army mutinies in the early 30s.

The 1923 Imperial Defense Strategy saw America named as Japan's enemy as the the Soviet Union had collapsed and was not a threat. Even so, the army never lost it's focus on the Soviet Union. Hence, both services budgeted for and trained for two entirely different types of war. The national economy could not support both. The Japanese economy was shackled by the rebuilding costs from the 1923 earthquake, the depression, and the war in China. The army didn't even begin assigning forces to the move south until September, 1941.

Under the Japanese constitution, no government couldbe formed without a war minister who had to be an army officer. By resigning or withholding a nominee, the army held a veto over the civilian government. Nor did the throne choose to restrain the army. It's an almost incredible story about how the Japanese staggered from crisis to crisis seemingly unable to avert disaster.
　
Hi Mike:
That is a textbook, and part of the Modern War Studies series from the UKansas. I am putting that on my B&N wish list. The information sounds excellent. It's interesting about the industry, the Miyazaki plan was designed to build the nations industry to a point where it could sustain a total war for 2 to 3 years. However, the invasion of China in 1937 began the bleeding of money to the operational area. At same time, the 1937 naval building which would finish in 1941. All of these caused the Miyazaki plan to fall by the wayside.
In 1938, the Kaigun went on full mobilization which meant that all refits, modernizations had to be completed in 18 months. That would be December 1941. It also meant that half of the 6.250 million tons of commercial shipping was grabbed for the military. The nation required 10 million tons of shipping for sustainment and with the war in Europe, foreign shipping was nowhere to be had in the Pacific. Historians are still trying to determine what the Japanese thought they were going to do in December 1941 without shipping, had they not gone to war. It would make one believe, that war planning was more advanced in 1938, than we have ever believed.
　

[Mike Malanaphy]

　
Hi Mike:
That is a textbook, and part of the Modern War Studies series from the UKansas. I am putting that on my B&N wish list. The information sounds excellent. It's interesting about the industry, the Miyazaki plan was designed to build the nations industry to a point where it could sustain a total war for 2 to 3 years. However, the invasion of China in 1937 began the bleeding of money to the operational area. At same time, the 1937 naval building which would finish in 1941. All of these caused the Miyazaki plan to fall by the wayside.
In 1938, the Kaigun went on full mobilization which meant that all refits, modernizations had to be completed in 18 months. That would be December 1941. It also meant that half of the 6.250 million tons of commercial shipping was grabbed for the military. The nation required 10 million tons of shipping for sustainment and with the war in Europe, foreign shipping was nowhere to be had in the Pacific. Historians are still trying to determine what the Japanese thought they were going to do in December 1941 without shipping, had they not gone to war. It would make one believe, that war planning was more advanced in 1938, than we have ever believed.
　


Hi Dennis,

I would highly recommend it. He also alludes to the loss of documentary sources as well. The two weeks between the surrender and Allied occupation saw tons of documents destroyed. That leaves a number of tantilizing holes in the story about the decisions made up to and in the Pacific war. He traces the army's sometimes brutal field behavior but has no real explanation for it. In contrast to WW II, the Army treated western prisoners in 1905 and World War I fairly well. Native populations suffered severely throughout the army's history and thousands of Okinawans died after being impressed into hastily formed militia units to oppose the American invasion. The same expectation of fighting to the death was the future for the mainland Japanese as well. Death before dishonor was a relatively new concept that appeared in the late 20s and became inculcated in the soldier's manual in the 30s. The "human bullets" at Port Arthur and 6 soldiers killed trying to breach an obstacle with the explosives packed to their bodies during the Shanghai expedition caught the public's imagination and were role models Several officers captured in China and by the Russians prior to the war were encouraged to commit suicide after being repatriated. The most celebrated was Lt Col Suga, captured after being seriously wounded at Shanghai....there were four popular movies made about his situation.

Like the Germans, Japanese POWs disappeared into the Soviet Union after the war. Drea states about 500,000 members of the Kwangtung Army are unaccounted for. In open terrain, the Soviet attack shattered the Japanese.

An interesting sidelight on how the army looked at logistics was the endemic problem of beri beri in Japan. It was learned that by mixing barley in with the white rice, beri beri incidence was greatly reduced because of the added vitamins. However, that is what Japanese prisoners were fed, so the army lived with beri beri to keep soldier morale up. Even in World War II, poor nutrition and medical care killed more Japanese soldiers than enemy action Drea states.

Drea also has a collection of essays on the army during the Pacific War I haven't started yet.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I would highly recommend it. He also alludes to the loss of documentary sources as well. The two weeks between the surrender and Allied occupation saw tons of documents destroyed. That leaves a number of tantilizing holes in the story about the decisions made up to and in the Pacific war. He traces the army's sometimes brutal field behavior but has no real explanation for it. In contrast to WW II, the Army treated western prisoners in 1905 and World War I fairly well. Native populations suffered severely throughout the army's history and thousands of Okinawans died after being impressed into hastily formed militia units to oppose the American invasion. The same expectation of fighting to the death was the future for the mainland Japanese as well. Death before dishonor was a relatively new concept that appeared in the late 20s and became inculcated in the soldier's manual in the 30s. The "human bullets" at Port Arthur and 6 soldiers killed trying to breach an obstacle with the explosives packed to their bodies during the Shanghai expedition caught the public's imagination and were role models Several officers captured in China and by the Russians prior to the war were encouraged to commit suicide after being repatriated. The most celebrated was Lt Col Suga, captured after being seriously wounded at Shanghai....there were four popular movies made about his situation.

Like the Germans, Japanese POWs disappeared into the Soviet Union after the war. Drea states about 500,000 members of the Kwangtung Army are unaccounted for. In open terrain, the Soviet attack shattered the Japanese.

An interesting sidelight on how the army looked at logistics was the endemic problem of beri beri in Japan. It was learned that by mixing barley in with the white rice, beri beri incidence was greatly reduced because of the added vitamins. However, that is what Japanese prisoners were fed, so the army lived with beri beri to keep soldier morale up. Even in World War II, poor nutrition and medical care killed more Japanese soldiers than enemy action Drea states.

Drea also has a collection of essays on the army during the Pacific War I haven't started yet.

Hi Mike:
It's interesting that we have, on this forum discussed the Pacific war in excrutiating detail and yet, the most important operational area which was a natural lead-in to the war, was the Chinese theatre and its economic and military effects. By reading and understanding its effects, the reasons for the war and its failure become clear and the different paths that could have been taken, become evident. I am attempting to get more information on the Japanese strategic bombing campaign against the supply routes from outside areas to the Nationalist Chinese government and Chungking. It was a total failure and they learned what the Germans, British and US learned about unescorted bombers and daylight raids. They eventually had to use Naval aircraft and went over to night raids.

[old_pop2000]

One of the lessons that I've learned from reading about the recent financial crises is that Wall Street drives Main Street. As it was put, credit drives business. This fact is true now, but was also true in the 1930's for Japan or any industrializing nation. If the national banking system or government did not have sufficient capital to fund major industrialization, then it had to be procured from outside sources. For Japan, with the occupation of Korea and Manchuria, any industrialization of those areas would need the credit as would the Miyazaki plan to upgrade Japanese industrial capacity to sustain it in 2 to 3 year conflict. All these were competing for a limited amount of credit available around the world. The war in China was capturing more and more of the state budget and the Kaigun mobilization in 1938 increased this. As of the 1940 budget, that figure was 75% of the state budget going to defense related needs. This pushed out any commercial funding and the Miyazaki plan was still borne. What the Japanese found out was that you cannot fight a war in China and increase domestic spending at the same time without overextending your finances. We found that out during the Vietnam war and I am certain, the Soviets found that out in Afghanistan.

Now, the Japanese Navy realized that it needed a 10:7 ratio in ships to compete in any conflict with the US. However, the Vinson Navy bill, upped the ante. To maintain the ratio, Japan would have to move beyond the 1937 Naval building plans but due to the above state budget issues, could not accomplish this. Essentially then, by December 1941, the Japanese either had to back down the mobilization and return it to a peacetime configuration to gain funding, or go to war.

In any Pacific war, the Japanese would have to build both warships and merchant ships to maintain operations. They would also have to refit, modernize and repair both. With the current level of industrialization including shipyards and repair yards, they could not do both at the same time. It seems then, that the Japanese had placed the cart before the horse. They should have increased their industrial capacity during 1920's and 1930's, maintained the status quo in China, then begin the process of increasing the strength of the navy. There was the unknown of war in Europe. This unknown factor eliminated much of foreign shipping and dried up foreign credit. This now required Japan to use her gold supply to purchase goods, and by 1941, this gold supply had been depleted.

IMO, this is the story of the Japanese initiation of the Pacific war. By December 1941, with state funding drying up, the US increasing its fleet to include a two ocean navy, no foreign credit or shipping available, and a mobilized fleet using up its reserves of fuel at a prodigious rate, and a Japanese army looking more and more to an attack on Russia after the German invasion, the Japanese took the only path it could visualize, capture the southern asian region, gather the resources and build a defensive structure to prevent the US from being able to penetrate it. They had internal documents from Britain stating that the British could not defend the Malay peninsula, France was occupied as was Holland and there was no concept that the German's could lose in Russia so the most advantageous time was December 1941.

There are volumes of facts and figures showing the economic problems but I've chosen not to use them because I am not an economist and I don't know what is relevent and what is not. I did not want to bore any of you.

Question: If the Japanese government had decided to stop mobilization and seek a peaceful solution to the war in China, is it possible that the military's hold on the government would have continued? Would the Japanese people have changed their constitution to force a more civilian run organization?

[paladin5]

Question: If the Japanese government had decided to stop mobilization and seek a peaceful solution to the war in China, is it possible that the military's hold on the government would have continued? Would the Japanese people have changed their constitution to force a more civilian run organization?

Maybe. Though it sometimes seems that the Japan of that era was really an army with a country, not a country with an army. It sort of reminds me of present day North Korea in that regard, but with marginally less insane leadership.

[old_pop2000]

Maybe. Though it sometimes seems that the Japan of that era was really an army with a country, not a country with an army. It sort of reminds me of present day North Korea in that regard, but with marginally less insane leadership.

Hi Mike:
I don't see recklessness in the Japanese strategy. They were confronted by a civil war in China with warlords controlling much of the northern area. Lack of a firm government in China is responsible for much of the problems with the Japanese. However, Manchuria, northern China and Korea were here best and most lucrative trading partners. She derived most of her foodstuffs like soy, rice from this area. Hard to back away from that. Japan actually did enter into talks with the Kwuomintang, but the Nanking incident, destruction of dams and dykes on the Yellow river and other atrocities hardened the Nationalist position. Strategic bombing did not help either. A reduction in the army committment to China, certainly would have made the Pacific war easier. It's possible that the southwest Pacific option, Australia option with Indian ocean option might have been prosecuted in a cooperative effort, but not with the committment in China. The key, in my perspective is the Japanese government. Had the government been changed and become a strong parlimentary democracy, it all might have worked out. But not with the government controlled by the Army. In my view, only after the Army and Navy were discredited by military action, would the people allow the government to change. The Navy, contrary to most views, was aggressive, especially Yamamoto. Nagano and Naval staff wanted restraint, but Yamamoto pushed for action.

[Ed Rotondaro]

On Google books, I've found a book from Forgotten books, titled a History of Japan by Hisho Saito. It is a translation and the complete book. In Chapter XVIII, he discusses Bushido which as the author states reached its zenith during the Tokugawa Shogunate. The organization of this shogunate was different, apparently from others. The feudal system in place was reformed and the existing class of warlords, titled Daimios were divided into three classes. There were over 260 of these. These were large landowners in Japan.

The first class of the Daimyios were the Shimpan, feudal princes related to the Shogun. Second class was the Fudai, feudal princes who held fiefs from the Shogun and Tozama, princes who had been subjucated by the shogun. These daimyio held power under the Shogun. The system he describes, in detail, is a feudal system where the king or emperor is not in actual control of the government, the shogun and his Daimyios were. All this fell apart in 1862, when the Daimyos and samurai gathered at Kyoto, criticizing shogunate. Reforms were enacted and the emperor began to take more control. With the eventual resignation of the shogun, the new emperor took control of the government. This was the birth of the imperial army. The industrialization and reintroduction of western ideas and products seems to have dated from this time. However, the daimyos were still in power, so large land owners still had control. This means that the feudal system was still in place with the shogun simply replaced by the emperor and his imperial army.

I've used this and a few others from the 1912-1919 time period, because the last of the 1868 principals were still alive at this time. In my way of thinking, these period books are primary documents, of sorts.

Dennis:

One thing to keep in mind is that Bushido as practiced during the Shogunate was much different then the version that Japan practiced in the after 1905. It had become a more brutal and controlling philospy used by both the Army and Navy to maintain discipline. It was more contempous of the lower classes, indeed the physical punishment that an officer or senior non-com could mete out to an enlisted man was not seen in earlier centuries.

I think Japan recoiled during the inter-war period and felt that the traditional way of life was being threatened by ideas from the West. While the Generals may have appreciated the technological progress of the West, the notions of freedom and expression were very alien to the Japanese mindset. The crushing of a more liberal minded government with the rash of assassinations of forward thinking politicians by generally junios Army officers was treated so lightly that dissent was avoided. Group think became the norm.

One thing i found interesting was the disconnect between the Emporer and his subjects. In his book "Downfall" Robert Frank makes note that Hirohito finallly announced the end of the war, many of subjects could not understand him since they had rarely heard him speak in public and he used the formalized speach of the Imperial court which was alien to the average Japanese citizen.

Considering tha Japan was an island nation, it is interesting that the Army rather the navy was the dominate influence. The navy due to its technological needs was far more able to see the big picture, but since the Army was the "senior" service it controlled the debate.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

One thing to keep in mind is that Bushido as practiced during the Shogunate was much different then the version that Japan practiced in the after 1905. It had become a more brutal and controlling philospy used by both the Army and Navy to maintain discipline. It was more contempous of the lower classes, indeed the physical punishment that an officer or senior non-com could mete out to an enlisted man was not seen in earlier centuries.

I think Japan recoiled during the inter-war period and felt that the traditional way of life was being threatened by ideas from the West. While the Generals may have appreciated the technological progress of the West, the notions of freedom and expression were very alien to the Japanese mindset. The crushing of a more liberal minded government with the rash of assassinations of forward thinking politicians by generally junios Army officers was treated so lightly that dissent was avoided. Group think became the norm.

One thing i found interesting was the disconnect between the Emporer and his subjects. In his book "Downfall" Robert Frank makes note that Hirohito finallly announced the end of the war, many of subjects could not understand him since they had rarely heard him speak in public and he used the formalized speach of the Imperial court which was alien to the average Japanese citizen.

Considering tha Japan was an island nation, it is interesting that the Army rather the navy was the dominate influence. The navy due to its technological needs was far more able to see the big picture, but since the Army was the "senior" service it controlled the debate.

Hi Ed:
I agree, to some degree, that the introduction of western ideas was a culture shock to the Japanese people. It would have begun in the 1868 Mejii restoration, how extensive, I don't know. I have a book written in 1919 on my Nook that explains all this, just haven't gotten to it. We should explore this in more depth. I may read "The Rising Sun" again.

As far as the Navy and Army, the Japanese always looked westward, not eastward, so a large, navy was never needed.

[old_pop2000]

Just some more on the Japanese and the sea. The sea has always been isolator for Japan. The civil warfare that existed for much of their existence is due to the isolating effect of the sea. It also limited their advance in technology. The first recorded naval engagement was in the thirteenth century against Pirates who invaded Kiushu. However, in the sixteenth century, in their first external conflict, they lost to the Koreans due to a lack of a navy to protect the transport of their army. They learned that lesson although the Emperor kicked Europeans out of the country soon after. In 1853, with the forced opening of the Japanese ports to trade by the US and Europeans, the Japanese had to realize that a navy was necessary. They had learned that the sea, by this time, was now an avenue for invasion opening up the whole coast of the country. By 1895, and the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese had learned that lesson and developed a reasonably good small navy. This, is a simple history of how the Japanese were affected by the sea. Remember that Japan is very mountainous and the sea was one of the best methods of transportation up and down the coast and to the other islands. So, while they weren't long distance sailors, they had a lot of experience with the sea. It did not take long-one generation- to develop the technology and ships necessary for a navy.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis:

As one author noted, Japan is a nation the size of California with the usuable land of Connecticut.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

As one author noted, Japan is a nation the size of California with the usuable land of Connecticut.

That is true, one her best cash crops was silk from silk worms. Unfortunately, the development of nylon and rayon eliminated that market and the balance of payments began to swing the other way. Korea has always been a source of food and materials for the Japanese. The Koreans, by nature are fishermen and farmers with plenty of arable land. They also have some good harbors.