Did the Italians need a carrier for their Navy?

[old_pop2000]

On the Military History Media forum, we've had discussion about the Italians and war in the Mediterranean. That discussion made wonder about this question. Did the Italians need a carrier or carriers to accompany their surface fleet? Would it have been a cost effective weapons system for them. Many critics and historians have stated that this was a failure, but I am not so certain. We know or should have some realistic idea of the total cost of ownership for such a system; the cost of building the ship, outfitting and maintaining maintenance; aircraft design and construction along with pilot training. These are just some of the costs associated with such a weapon. We know about the geostrategic conditions prevalent in the Mediterranean in regards to the Italian position. We also understand that they did not have a robust economy and were very dependent on shipping for raw materials. Couple these factors with the location of air bases in North Africa, the Dodecanese, Albania, Sicily, Sardinia and southern Italy, you wonder if the carrier was really necessary.

Anyway, maybe this will initiate a good discussion.

[paladin5]

If they'd have had a carrier, or even several of them I think the British would have pulled out all the stops to take those ship(s) out of action. Though if had them, and if they were competently operated. They would have made life very hard for the Allies until they were taken out of action.

It is always fun when you have that many "if's" in such a short post.

[old_pop2000]

If they'd have had a carrier, or even several of them I think the British would have pulled out all the stops to take those ship(s) out of action. Though if had them, and if they were competently operated. They would have made life very hard for the Allies until they were taken out of action.

It is always fun when you have that many "if's" in such a short post.

Hi Mike:
There are many ifs or what ifs. Not only the "if they could build the ships", but "if they could maintain and use them". These ships, once their air wings are launched, can be vulnerable as we and the Japanese found out. In an inland sea, they are especially vulnerable as Illustrious and Ark Royal found out. Without adequate fighter protection, AA support and radar, those carriers are even more vulnerable than the other surface ships. This is why I asked the question, should they have really built them.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Dennis,

I think an Italian carrier would have been a tremendous asset for the battle fleet. A major complaint by Supermarina was a lack of Air Force cooperation, especially for reconnaissance. The Aquila had an air group of 50 planes, but only 36 assembled. Still, a heavier complement than the RN with the exception of Ark Royal. The presence of an aircraft carrier would also deter the RN from convoys without it becoming a major operation. The Reggiane 2001 fighter would outclass her RN opponents. Aquila would provide excellent fighter cover and a comprehensive search capability for the Italian battle fleet. Her fighters would be especially useful in protecting convoys on the North Africa route where fighter protection was Bf110s or Ju 88s. As a one of however, I wonder if the italians woudl have risked her in that area where British subamrines were ever present. Another possibility would fighter suppression over Malta, though an other risky area for her to spend time.

The problem of course was manifest with Italy's weak industrial base and the political ability of Marshall Balbo, the Italian Air Force commander, to deny those ships to the navy. The liner Roma and her sister ship were identified for conversion as early as 1935. But Balbo's insistence that Italy's interior position and network of land airbases were sufficient to convince Mussolini. Mussolini would only relent after Matapan in March, 1941. By then it was too late. Aquila was about 80% complete by the Armistice.

Her airgroup would consist of only Reggiane 2001 fighters which could be armed with 250lb bombs, so her ship killing ability was minimal and no real capability for independent missions. According to Polmar in "Aircraft Carriers", she would have made 31 knots after conversion and the Germans shared arrester gear and other equipment to speed her conversion once it was decided to go ahead. Her conversion shouldn't have been much more expensive than updating the older battleships and a much more useful unit for the fleet overall.

I'll have to check my Complete Carrers at War as I should be able to build her in the scenario editor for the Med.

Peeking at Wikipedia, the author has a slighty different airgroup size and the Re 2001 was modified to carry 1,400 lbs of bombs. One was tested to carry a torpedo. If so, a substantial ship stiking ability.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I think an Italian carrier would have been a tremendous asset for the battle fleet. A major complaint by Supermarina was a lack of Air Force cooperation, especially for reconnaissance. The Aquila had an air group of 50 planes, but only 36 assembled. Still, a heavier complement than the RN with the exception of Ark Royal. The presence of an aircraft carrier would also deter the RN from convoys without it becoming a major operation. The Reggiane 2001 fighter would outclass her RN opponents. Aquila would provide excellent fighter cover and a comprehensive search capability for the Italian battle fleet. Her fighters would be especially useful in protecting convoys on the North Africa route where fighter protection was Bf110s or Ju 88s. As a one of however, I wonder if the italians woudl have risked her in that area where British subamrines were ever present. Another possibility would fighter suppression over Malta, though an other risky area for her to spend time.

The problem of course was manifest with Italy's weak industrial base and the political ability of Marshall Balbo, the Italian Air Force commander, to deny those ships to the navy. The liner Roma and her sister ship were identified for conversion as early as 1935. But Balbo's insistence that Italy's interior position and network of land airbases were sufficient to convince Mussolini. Mussolini would only relent after Matapan in March, 1941. By then it was too late. Aquila was about 80% complete by the Armistice.

Her airgroup would consist of only Reggiane 2001 fighters which could be armed with 250lb bombs, so her ship killing ability was minimal and no real capability for independent missions. According to Polmar in "Aircraft Carriers", she would have made 31 knots after conversion and the Germans shared arrester gear and other equipment to speed her conversion once it was decided to go ahead. Her conversion shouldn't have been much more expensive than updating the older battleships and a much more useful unit for the fleet overall.,,,,,



Hi Mike:
I am not certain I can subscribe to the idea that it would have been of tremendous value. Yes, the British were able to accomplish the attack on Taranto but that was a one time raid, not really repeatable. Besides the issues of production and economics, the Italians did not have the naval infrastructure to really develop the doctrine and the equipment requirements that would result from that doctrine. The nations that developed carrier aviation began the process either during WWI or soon after and continued the development of doctrine and the equipment resulting from continued testing. Italians had problems like poor engine performance and no high octane fuels. This limited the speed of their aircraft and load capacity. They had no radar, as such and poor ASW. It seems to me that the solution, besides better industrial production and better production management to gain economies of scale would have been to develop, like the Japanese a land based Naval air force trained to operate from aerodromes with armor piercing bombs on dive bombers, and single engined torpedo bombers with long range fighters. Range translates into time on target and heavier armament. They also need better AA support on those fields with their excellent 90 MM AA gun which had the similar characteristics of the German 88 mm guns. They needed the lighter 20 and 40 mm guns. I believe that the money that would have been spent on the carriers could have been channeled into this kind of naval air force, whose doctrine would be integrated into the Royal Italian Navy. The narrow enclosed sea and their central position could have worked to their advantage. I don't believe the expenditure on carriers would have realized any real benefits, especially against a naval power that had had the carrier since WWI.

BTW, I like the looks and specs on the Savoia-Marchetti SM91. It used the DB601 engine, had the load capacity for a 1100 lb bomb and was fast. This might have been a good airplane to start the war with.

[Kyle Holgate]

I'm not sure that an Italian carrier wouldn't be better as a defensive asset - to protect itself and accompanying ships than as an offensive attacking platform. The Reggiane 2001 should make short work of Swordfish though light armament may be inadequate against British carrier fighters. Lack of radar would have caused coordination problems, but still - fill it with a boatload (literally) of fighters.

Coordination with land-based aircraft would be very tricky, but imagine the fighters forming up with long-range land based torpedo bombers and escorting them? Given the history of how any inter-service cooperation worked (or still works) I don't think this would have happened.

[old_pop2000]

I'm not sure that an Italian carrier wouldn't be better as a defensive asset - to protect itself and accompanying ships than as an offensive attacking platform. The Reggiane 2001 should make short work of Swordfish though light armament may be inadequate against British carrier fighters. Lack of radar would have caused coordination problems, but still - fill it with a boatload (literally) of fighters.

Coordination with land-based aircraft would be very tricky, but imagine the fighters forming up with long-range land based torpedo bombers and escorting them? Given the history of how any inter-service cooperation worked (or still works) I don't think this would have happened.

Kyle:
Ok, let's assume they managed to get the Aquila in the water, with 51 non-folding wing Reggiane Re 2001 fighters on board. 41 stowed in the hanger, 10 in a deck park. With a full load, she could manage 29.5 knots, respectable but not outstanding. First situation is the lack of radar, which means that the carrier has to provide its own scouting function to be effective at protecting the fleet. Do they rely on the seaplanes and flying boats from shore? That would seem to be a good idea. They have to provide adequate long range scouting patrols, not to mention inner and outer patrols. The inner patrols are designed to search for submarines. Single seaters are not real good scouts, two seaters are better. So, for scouting purposes, the Italian battleships along with the Aquila will have to send out at least fifteen scouts, at 10 degree sectors to cover the fleet and detect enemy forces. How far out? Well, the Reggiane 2001 had a range of 646 miles. I think you could manage 150 miles out and back with a 50 mile dog leg. You need 10% for warm up, launch, time to climb and circling in the pattern and trap.

You now need at least four aircraft on outer patrols, flying just outside the destroyer screen, with another four on inner patrols looking for submarines. You will need four aircraft as a second launch group if an incoming raid is spotted, and a replacement group for the inner patrols. You need another group for outer patrols. So, 4 for outer, 4 for inner, 4 on ready alert, 10 for the first scouting group and 10 for the second. let's see, that's 32 aircraft either scouting, or patrolling. So, you have, out of 51 aircraft, possibly nineteen ready for immediate launch, but there are four on outer to intercept and 4 on inner that can be used, along with 4 on ready alert. All this is adequate and within reason except. You only have one carrier. As we all know, we shuttled our carriers in and out of Pearl Harbor. Remember that normal flight ops will slowly attrit the air wing depending on how long it is a sea, so you might start with 51 aircraft but quickly will be reduced by 10 due to accidents, or some other non-operational loss. Airgroups get reduced very quickly just doing normal ops and not including combat operations. I have serious doubts, the Aquila would have a full complement of aircraft when she met the British due to these factors. This neglects any bomb or torpedo damage which might be difficult to repair with the lack of infrastructure in the Italy.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
I am not certain I can subscribe to the idea that it would have been of tremendous value. Yes, the British were able to accomplish the attack on Taranto but that was a one time raid, not really repeatable. Besides the issues of production and economics, the Italians did not have the naval infrastructure to really develop the doctrine and the equipment requirements that would result from that doctrine. The nations that developed carrier aviation began the process either during WWI or soon after and continued the development of doctrine and the equipment resulting from continued testing. Italians had problems like poor engine performance and no high octane fuels. This limited the speed of their aircraft and load capacity. They had no radar, as such and poor ASW. It seems to me that the solution, besides better industrial production and better production management to gain economies of scale would have been to develop, like the Japanese a land based Naval air force trained to operate from aerodromes with armor piercing bombs on dive bombers, and single engined torpedo bombers with long range fighters. Range translates into time on target and heavier armament. They also need better AA support on those fields with their excellent 90 MM AA gun which had the similar characteristics of the German 88 mm guns. They needed the lighter 20 and 40 mm guns. I believe that the money that would have been spent on the carriers could have been channeled into this kind of naval air force, whose doctrine would be integrated into the Royal Italian Navy. The narrow enclosed sea and their central position could have worked to their advantage. I don't believe the expenditure on carriers would have realized any real benefits, especially against a naval power that had had the carrier since WWI.

BTW, I like the looks and specs on the Savoia-Marchetti SM91. It used the DB601 engine, had the load capacity for a 1100 lb bomb and was fast. This might have been a good airplane to start the war with.

Hi Dennis.

I would agree with you on your assessment about the lack of Italian industry to support a major aviation program, but a one of ship, like the Aquila, I think could have been brought to fruition. The parts were all there, not the desire or drive to make it a reality. On of the pre war concepts to support her was the "breakout" fleet, a scenario where the Italian battlefleet would operate outside the Mediterranean. I will have to look a little bit deeper, perhaps Vince looked into this idea. It would be hard to see how the short legged Italian ships could venture very far into the Atlantic and what they could do once they got there. From the pre war Italian perspective, she does seem a luxury considering their central positon and limited production resources, Once war started, the failure of the Italian air force to support the battlefleet with reconnaissance and unable on it's own to control the central became evident. But by then it was too late. Then Italian state was a victim of a surprise "come as you are" war. No coherent strategy for attack or defense, a gamble they couldn't afford to lose. So weak was Italian industry that less than 10,000 combat aircraft were produced before the Armistice. To have sailed, Aquila would have neeeded to been built pre war.

Some of the equipment you mention such as radar and better AA guns woudl benefit the entire fleet, just not the Aquila.

I would disagree with you about another Taranto. I believe another carrier borne attack against an Italian anchorage was possible there being no real improvement in Italian defenses. The attacking force would enjoy surprise, radar and fight cover. I wonder why it wasn't repeated unless net defenses were the biggest inhibitor to success.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis.

I would agree with you on your assessment about the lack of Italian industry to support a major aviation program, but a one of ship, like the Aquila, I think could have been brought to fruition. The parts were all there, not the desire or drive to make it a reality. On of the pre war concepts to support her was the "breakout" fleet, a scenario where the Italian battlefleet would operate outside the Mediterranean. I will have to look a little bit deeper, perhaps Vince looked into this idea. It would be hard to see how the short legged Italian ships could venture very far into the Atlantic and what they could do once they got there. From the pre war Italian perspective, she does seem a luxury considering their central positon and limited production resources, Once war started, the failure of the Italian air force to support the battlefleet with reconnaissance and unable on it's own to control the central became evident. But by then it was too late. Then Italian state was a victim of a surprise "come as you are" war. No coherent strategy for attack or defense, a gamble they couldn't afford to lose. So weak was Italian industry that less than 10,000 combat aircraft were produced before the Armistice. To have sailed, Aquila would have neeeded to been built pre war.

Some of the equipment you mention such as radar and better AA guns woudl benefit the entire fleet, just not the Aquila.

I would disagree with you about another Taranto. I believe another carrier borne attack against an Italian anchorage was possible there being no real improvement in Italian defenses. The attacking force would enjoy surprise, radar and fight cover. I wonder why it wasn't repeated unless net defenses were the biggest inhibitor to success.

Hi Mike:
let's say
that they managed to get Aquila built, outfitted and sailing with the fleet, at great cost. How long will she last? Well, the British are going to track her progress in the pre-war period for certain. Once she is ready for sea, based on the Italian navy's idea of maintaining the fleet close to British supply lines, she will be sitting in Taranto Harbor with the rest of the fleet. Just like Yamamoto at Pearl Harbor, the carrier will be the prime target along with the battleships. This means that she will last until 11-12 Novemeber 1941. Something to consider in the design. This was a transatlantic ocean liner, not a purpose built carrier. This means that her compartimentation was not up to the standards of a real warship. I don't know of her below decks construction but I'll bet should would be vulnerable below the waterline. Most conversion were, especially the ocean liner conversion like Junyo and Hiyo. Hiyo only took one torpedo and two 500 lb bombs to sink.

Now, she will be valuable in the area of long range reconnaissance and the prevention of British scout aircraft from detecting the fleet. However, the snag in that is that as soon as one of those scouts reports the presence of a Reggiane 2001 in that position, then the British will know that it could only have come from a carrier. Specifically the Aquila, since that is the only one they have. Now what happens? The British have the Italians outnumbered in carriers at least three to one with about 150 aircraft against the Aquila's 51-53. Non-operational losses and operational losses will slowly attrit those numbers, reducing her effective air group strength, so we don't know how many aircraft she will have for an effective airgroup. The British will now hunt her down with every ship they have. When she returns with the fleet, she now is sitting in Taranto harbor. Remember that the Taranto action was actually conceived by Admiral Lyster before the war, IIRC. This was not a sudden brainstorm, it had been discussed and plans developed as early as the Abyssinian crises of 1935. Even during WWI, the Italian fleet had always been based at Taranto and action against that base was in their plans. With the only Italian aircraft carrier in that port, the attack might have come off quite a bit sooner. My point here is that this is not 20/20 hindsight. The British were well aware of the capabilities of aircraft carriers and that carrier would have been number one on their hit parade both sitting in Taranto or at sea. With the poor Italian ASW, I would be surprised if a British sub wouldn't get a shot at her, before any action at Taranto, possibly leaving Taranto harbor. So, can the Italians protect the lone carrier. Would they even want to risk her at sea?

As to the possibility of another Taranto, IIRC, the Italians moved the remaining fleet ships to Naples to protect them. There would have been no reason to hit the base again.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Dennis,

All of those outcomes are a possibility. Cunningham took Furious into battle at the tail end fo his battle line at Calabria and Matapan. Aquila had cement added to the inside of her hull to stop slinters, but would be vulnerable to damage. I suspect another feature of Italian inexperience would be firefighting, a key skill in carrier combat.

Had Aquila been ready at war's start, she would have had the advantage of force parity and an RN carrier force stretched very thinly. Skilll and a little luck would make all the difference in that case. Not until Pedestal in August, 1942, did three British carriers approach that amount of aircraft with 108. Eagle was torpedoed and lost and Indomitable bombed and out of action. The fleet with fighters only shot down 30 enemy aircraft.

I wonder how much impact her presence would have on British carrier doctrine? Even had a shift been made from support of the battlefleet to an independent strike capability, there was no time or resources to do so pre war. I suspect both side's carriers would support the battlefleet with scouting and CAP. With Cunningham's abiding desire to get the Italian battleships, she might not be that high on the target list. An intriguing what if, but as we have discussed, Italy did not have the industrial or doctrinal base to field her effectively. However, she made more sense than Graf Zepplin in terms of a place to operate usefully.

I knew British carriers did yeoman's work ferrying aircraft to Malta, but an appendix in Polmar's book "Aircraft Carriers" shows that in 25 operations, 694 fighters plus 24 Swordfish/Albacores were ferried to Malta in 25 operations. Wasp was responsible for over 75 of them. Perhaps the decisive edge.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

All of those outcomes are a possibility. Cunningham took Furious into battle at the tail end fo his battle line at Calabria and Matapan. Aquila had cement added to the inside of her hull to stop slinters, but would be vulnerable to damage. I suspect another feature of Italian inexperience would be firefighting, a key skill in carrier combat.

Had Aquila been ready at war's start, she would have had the advantage of force parity and an RN carrier force stretched very thinly. Skilll and a little luck would make all the difference in that case. Not until Pedestal in August, 1942, did three British carriers approach that amount of aircraft with 108. Eagle was torpedoed and lost and Indomitable bombed and out of action. The fleet with fighters only shot down 30 enemy aircraft.

I wonder how much impact her presence would have on British carrier doctrine? Even had a shift been made from support of the battlefleet to an independent strike capability, there was no time or resources to do so pre war. I suspect both side's carriers would support the battlefleet with scouting and CAP. With Cunningham's abiding desire to get the Italian battleships, she might not be that high on the target list. An intriguing what if, but as we have discussed, Italy did not have the industrial or doctrinal base to field her effectively. However, she made more sense than Graf Zepplin in terms of a place to operate usefully.

I knew British carriers did yeoman's work ferrying aircraft to Malta, but an appendix in Polmar's book "Aircraft Carriers" shows that in 25 operations, 694 fighters plus 24 Swordfish/Albacores were ferried to Malta in 25 operations. Wasp was responsible for over 75 of them. Perhaps the decisive edge.

Hi Mike:
Based on different sources, as of January 1941, Force H had Ark Royal and the Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria had Illustrious and Eagle. Eagle had a complement of 21 aircraft, Ark Royal had a complement of 60 as did Illustrious. So, as of the first full year of the war, the British would have had three carriers and 150 aircraft arrayed against Aquila with 55 at best. Even in July, 1940 at the Action off Calabria, Cunningham had Eagle and force H had Ark Royal although not engaged, that's at least 30 aircraft on the British side, with another 60 available, versus Aquila had she been present at the action. I don't see any reason she wouldn't be. Later, Illustrious did join up at Alexandria, so Aquila's parity was fleeting at best. If the British had information that Aquila was present, even the airfield on Sardinia notwithstanding, he would have insisted that Force H sortie to prove assistance. However, I agree that in that early action, I believe she might have played a part in the area of fleet defense and scouting, how much is debatable. The Italians might not be so ready to risk their only aircraft carrier.

My point is that one carrier with 55 aircraft of limited endurance might have some tactical advantage but it does not provide any real improvements in the operational strategy of the Italian fleet. The Italian problems went far deeper than the lack of a carrier. They had the central position in the Mediterranean but poor operational control and lack of coordination hampered effective action. Even with bases around the eastern Mediterranean, the lack of fuel, range and bomb load limited the Royal Italian Air forces capability to provide the kind of air cover required. One small, converted ocean liner is going to redress those deficiencies. It could only divert valuable resources and probably be the prime target for the British.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Dennis,

I'd have to look at overall availabilty during that period, by David Brown's "Carrier Operations in World War II" Vol 1, lists for that period:

Ark Royal: 54 total, 12 Skuas, 12 Fulmars, 30 Swordfish

Illustrious: 39 total, 15 Fulmars, 24 Swordfish

Eagle: 24 total, 2 Sea Gladiators, 2 Skuas, 2 Fulmars, and 18 Swordfish.

Wear and tear was such that export brewster Buffaloes were considered as fighter replacements except Cunningham declined them. Circumstances did not allow them to work together and there is a big difference between a carrier group and a group of carriers. At times in this period, all supplied Swordfish squadrons for land based use in the Western Desert.

Prior to mid 1942 there were very few multiple carrier operations by the RN due to availability. Force H also had committments to the Atlantic, so coordinating strikes would be difficult. By this date, Flieger Corps X is soming into play in the air as well.

Both sides carriers face the same set of risks at this date, mine, submarine, air, and harbor attack. Aquila could operate with the Italian battlefleet under land air cover with some hope of success. But very dicey.

You have me intrigued about the types of operations during this period...time to take some notes.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I'd have to look at overall availabilty during that period, by David Brown's "Carrier Operations in World War II" Vol 1, lists for that period:

Ark Royal: 54 total, 12 Skuas, 12 Fulmars, 30 Swordfish

Illustrious: 39 total, 15 Fulmars, 24 Swordfish

Eagle: 24 total, 2 Sea Gladiators, 2 Skuas, 2 Fulmars, and 18 Swordfish.

Wear and tear was such that export brewster Buffaloes were considered as fighter replacements except Cunningham declined them. Circumstances did not allow them to work together and there is a big difference between a carrier group and a group of carriers. At times in this period, all supplied Swordfish squadrons for land based use in the Western Desert.

Prior to mid 1942 there were very few multiple carrier operations by the RN due to availability. Force H also had committments to the Atlantic, so coordinating strikes would be difficult. By this date, Flieger Corps X is soming into play in the air as well.

Both sides carriers face the same set of risks at this date, mine, submarine, air, and harbor attack. Aquila could operate with the Italian battlefleet under land air cover with some hope of success. But very dicey.

You have me intrigued about the types of operations during this period...time to take some notes.
Mike:
If we take the action off Calabria as an example, Aquila's aircraft could have provided good air cover against the slow moving biplanes, when during the battle, Eagle launched Swordfish aircaft. Malta launched Sunderlands and it's possible Aquila's air cover might have been able to shoot those scouts down. She could have kept the prying eyes of the Sunderlands and Swordfish off of the Italian fleet and its movements. This is a valuable function for any carrier. But again, it puts her at risk. Aquila, without dive bombers or torpedo bombers is really not much of an offensive weapon. We know the effectiveness of FliegerKorps X and its stukas. This had to be a component of Aquila's air wing. The land based bombers flying at 12,000 feet flew over 435 sorties against Cunningham as Campioni retreated to Augusta, but never hit anything. This is typical of level bombing of maneuving naval ships.
BTW, during this action, Force H did sortie to draw the attention of the Italians with Somerville planning an attack on an Italian base but he decided that his destroyers did not have the range, so he returned. This was mean to be a coordinated operation. Cunningham after the action, did recommend an armored deck carrier and an AA cruiser. He received Illustrious.

[JMS]

And of course, the presence of fighters means that British air strikes need to be escorted reducing the available fighters for CAP.

[old_pop2000]

And of course, the presence of fighters means that British air strikes need to be escorted reducing the available fighters for CAP.

Quite possibly, if they are available. If Aquila was nearby and British knew about her, they would have to send escorts along with the Swordfish, if enough were available. In this action, that might have been four aircraft at best; Fulmars and Skuas. The Sea Gladiators would have to provide air cover as would the swordfish that remained. I believe that Cunningham, had he prior knowledge of Aquila's sailing, might have waited until Somerville with Force H had passed near Sardinia and struck Cagliari and Elmas first to draw the Italian fleet or parts to that area. They would have to pass close to Cape Spartavento and Cape Teulada.

[old_pop2000]

I've been attempting to derive or find an order of battle for the Italian Air Force and aerodromes. For Sardinia and Sicily, here is the best I have.

2nd Air Region - Palermo, Sicily

3rd Bomber Division at Catania
11th Bomb Wing at Comiso
41st Bomb Wing at Gela
24th Bomb Wing at Catania
11th Bomber Brigade at Castelvetrano
96th Independent Bomber Squadron at Reggio Calabria
30th Bomber Wing at Sciacca
1st Fighter Wing at Palermo - Named Aquila - Equpped with CR 42
6th Independent Fighter Squadron at Comiso
30th Recon at Palermo

Sardinia Air Command at Cagliari
10th Bomber Brigade Cagliari
3rd Independent Fighter Squadron at Monserrato
19th Indep. Ground Attack squadron at Alghero equipped with Ba 88s
124 Recon Flight at Cagliari-Elmas
8th Bomb Wing at Villacidro
31st Bomber Wing at Cagliari-Elmas
32nd Bomb Wing at Decimonomannu.

There was also the Libyan Air Command in Tripoli; The Aegean Air Command in Rhodes, with units in the Libyan Air Command in Benghazi.

Air Force units for the Navy also had Cant Z501 seaplanes at Taranto, Brindisi and La Spezia to name a few.

There were many many more. Just wanted to give you the flavor of Italian aerodromes and their locations.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:
If we take the action off Calabria as an example, Aquila's aircraft could have provided good air cover against the slow moving biplanes, when during the battle, Eagle launched Swordfish aircaft. Malta launched Sunderlands and it's possible Aquila's air cover might have been able to shoot those scouts down. She could have kept the prying eyes of the Sunderlands and Swordfish off of the Italian fleet and its movements. This is a valuable function for any carrier. But again, it puts her at risk. Aquila, without dive bombers or torpedo bombers is really not much of an offensive weapon. We know the effectiveness of FliegerKorps X and its stukas. This had to be a component of Aquila's air wing. The land based bombers flying at 12,000 feet flew over 435 sorties against Cunningham as Campioni retreated to Augusta, but never hit anything. This is typical of level bombing of maneuving naval ships.
BTW, during this action, Force H did sortie to draw the attention of the Italians with Somerville planning an attack on an Italian base but he decided that his destroyers did not have the range, so he returned. This was mean to be a coordinated operation. Cunningham after the action, did recommend an armored deck carrier and an AA cruiser. He received Illustrious.


Hi Dennis,

I think that is a good scenario for Aquila and I believe she could have been viable to 1943. The RN carrier force was at a very low ebb at this period. With the loss of Glorious and Courageous, only Ark Royal and Furious could qualify as useful fleet carriers. Argus, Eagle, and Hermes were old and slow. Illustrious did not commision until May of 1940 and did not go into action until September. The slow building rate of her sisters condemned the RN to be unable to field a serious carrier component until mid 1943. At the same time, these ships were supporting raider hunting groups, air ops off Norway, in the Mediterranean, and the attack on Madagascar.

The Italian Air Force also bombed Campioni as he withdrew from the battle. I believe that Gloucester took a bomb hit on her bridge during this battle killing her captain. Cunningham speaks of breathlessly watching bomb pillars rise around his ships. but none were seriously damaged. Like most other air forces, the Italians learned high level bombing against maneuvering ships at sea was a difficult task. Only the Japanese seemed to have much success with it though the RAF wrecked Gneisenau and the USAAF had some success in the Mediterranean against anchored ships.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Mike:
Based on what I've read, the Italian Command understood that its fleet needed air protection. On many occasions, Admiral Iachino was told, as were others, to stay within range of land based aircraft, specifically Sardinian airfield during the Spartevento action and others. They realized they needed air cover. However, they also needed better aircraft, better coordination, better weapons. The whole country needed to be on a war footing, not a peacetime footing. They needed better equipment for night fighting, not just radar, but low light range finders etc. Better night fighting training, more training exercises between the air force and navy. The list goes on and on. The battle for the Med did not go against the British until the Germans put Fliegerkorp 10 in the Med and later FliegerKorp II in the Dodecanese, Crete area. The idea that the carrier was going to solve all their problems is ludicrous. According to what I've been able to determine, if the Re 2001s were launched, the Aquila could not trap them, they had to fly to a land base. I haven't confirmed this with sources I feel are firm, but it might be true. If it is, what good is the ship?

Look at the carriers that the British lost to the German forces. Illustrious badly damaged, Ark Royal sunk, Eagle sunk, Formidable damaged. Two sunk and two damaged doesn't sound like much, but with the other loses around the world and with Rommel taking the Cyrenaican airfields and some of the fields around Sidi Barrani, Bardia etc. This just added to the woes. The Mediterranean was a dangerous area to sail in for both sides. The British withdrew their larger, older subs for the smaller class because of the shallow waters in the Med. The Italians moved the fleet from Taranto to Naples, they had to move it again because of the bomber attacks from Malta. The Aquila wasn't the cure all for the Italian problems, it would have been just another black hole for funds, that they would either have had to keep in port because they were afraid to lose it, or would send out and some British sub commander would have gotten a good prize. The carrier is not the cure all for every ailment that a navy has, its just an expensive tool. They are vulnerable especially for a side that has poor ASW capability. It would have been just another target. As my old submariner buddy used to say; there are only two kinds of ships in the navy; submarines and targets.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Mike:
I've read some articles about this issue of the Italian fleet and the Med, books and it appears that the standard answer by historians is that the Italians needed carriers and a fleet air arm. However, carrier technology and a naval air arm do not just develop overnight and especially because of the idea that "Gee, everyone else has one". Carriers developed in the US because of the immense distances and few real good bases in the Pacific ocean area. They were an outgrowth of War Plan Orange and our understanding that the Japanese were going to be a possible foe in the Pacific. WPO had been around, before 1914. Our carrier development started about the early 1920's because of a strategic reason to develop them. The same holds for the Japanese and the British. Both had good strategic reasons for developing carrier aviation and a fleet air arm. The British because of their world-wide commitments and the Japanese for basically the same reason as the US.

But what was the Italian strategic reason? Who was their foe? It certainly wasn't the French or the British up until 1935-1936. It was the Germans. Of course, good strategic planning requires the development of a series operational plans for different possible foes. All nations develop those kinds of plans, or should. However, you will concentrate your efforts against the primary nation you consider to be your primary threat. You would build a fleet air arm to protect your surface force if you had a threat from the air, at sea. Where was that threat until 1935? The German's did not have a fleet to speak of, and it was based in the Baltic, not the Med. The only possible threat was from the British but they weren't a threat until 1935. That's four years before the war started and five before they entered it against the British and French. Just because the Italians were a seafaring nation, dependent on shipping and had a sizeable navy, does not mean that it follows that they needed a carrier force. The Med is not the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean. They did not have a credible naval threat up until 1935 that had a carrier. Four years is a very short time to develop a carrier doctrine, develop requirements and then build the carriers along with development of carrier based aircraft and training for pilots. No nation, until the war started and carrier aviation was used in action, had any real knowledge except in exercises how the carrier would affect naval warfare. It was probably a surprise to even the nations that had them. Almost all nations believed that the battleship would always be supreme and that the carrier would provide reconnnaissance and air defense. It seems to me, that the Italians had no reason to be any more skeptical of carrier aviation than any other nation, even the ones that had carriers. They also had more reasons not to build them.

Just some thoughts

[JMS]

Dennis, once you have worked in Italy with italians you understand that their effort was total war footing despite appearances... :)

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, once you have worked in Italy with italians you understand that their effort was total war footing despite appearances... :)

Hi JMS:
It is entirely possible that most italians thought they were on a war footing, but when comparisons are made with WWI, you get an entirely different story. Subjectiveness is fine and important to the story, but hard facts really tell the story. It has been reported that Kesselring, upon taking command of the forces in Italy found huge stockpiles of raw materials the Italian industrialists had been saving for the period after the war, so they could be the first to initiate consumer production. The Germans discovered vast stores of unused war material. I suspect much of this was for the future defense of Italy and could not be sent to NA. In September and October of 1943, the German sent 68,200 tons of raw materials back to Germany. In that same September, it has been reported that the Germans seized three times as much steel as was available in 1940. A look at the figures comparing the ratio of consumption and investment between 1915 and 1940 shows that in WWI, it was -7.8 whereas in 1940 it was +5.7. Consumption went to negative, finally in 1943; to a -1.2. In 1918, that figure was a -30.9. So, subjectively, the Italians might have felt they were on a war footing, but their industrialists and Mussolini knew better. So did the Germans in 1943, after the armistice.

[JMS]

Hi JMS:
It is entirely possible that most italians thought they were on a war footing, but when comparisons are made with WWI, you get an entirely different story. Subjectiveness is fine and important to the story, but hard facts really tell the story. It has been reported that Kesselring, upon taking command of the forces in Italy found huge stockpiles of raw materials the Italian industrialists had been saving for the period after the war, so they could be the first to initiate consumer production. The Germans discovered vast stores of unused war material. I suspect much of this was for the future defense of Italy and could not be sent to NA. In September and October of 1943, the German sent 68,200 tons of raw materials back to Germany. In that same September, it has been reported that the Germans seized three times as much steel as was available in 1940. A look at the figures comparing the ratio of consumption and investment between 1915 and 1940 shows that in WWI, it was -7.8 whereas in 1940 it was +5.7. Consumption went to negative, finally in 1943; to a -1.2. In 1918, that figure was a -30.9. So, subjectively, the Italians might have felt they were on a war footing, but their industrialists and Mussolini knew better. So did the Germans in 1943, after the armistice.

Not my point, my point is that, that is the Italian way, come war or peace. Appearance is more important than substance, sometimes it works great (Ferrari), sometimes it falls flatfooted (WW2).

BTW, interesting figures, where do you get them? I remember hearing that the fuel crisis shouldn't have happended and that the Italians still haf fuel stashed somewhere, but never a firm reference.

[old_pop2000]

Not my point, my point is that, that is the Italian way, come war or peace. Appearance is more important than substance, sometimes it works great (Ferrari), sometimes it falls flatfooted (WW2).

BTW, interesting figures, where do you get them? I remember hearing that the fuel crisis shouldn't have happended and that the Italians still haf fuel stashed somewhere, but never a firm reference.

Hi JMS:
Ok, I understand what you were saying, and BTW, my mother is full blooded italian. Her family hails from Bari and Palermo. I am aware of their traits.

As far as the figures, they come from different sources. I found a piece that had original Italian and German documents as primary sources. Some of the figures came from that. I am trying to find more sources with more information. I've read about the Pedestal convoy, which was decimated. The Italian navy used the excuse that the fleet was short on fuel, so they couldn't sortie from Naples and Messina. The attacks were conducted by MTBs, German and italian aircraft and subs. This happened a few times against UK convoys moving from Gibraltar and Alexandria toward Malta. I would like to find a book that ties all this together, but I have doubts. It is an interesting subject. The Germans sent Italian skilled labor to Germany in 1943, after the armistice. They also used the same skilled labor in Italy along with resources. The Italians lost ships, after the armistice working for the Allies including the Roma.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi JMS:
It is entirely possible that most italians thought they were on a war footing, but when comparisons are made with WWI, you get an entirely different story. Subjectiveness is fine and important to the story, but hard facts really tell the story. It has been reported that Kesselring, upon taking command of the forces in Italy found huge stockpiles of raw materials the Italian industrialists had been saving for the period after the war, so they could be the first to initiate consumer production. The Germans discovered vast stores of unused war material. I suspect much of this was for the future defense of Italy and could not be sent to NA. In September and October of 1943, the German sent 68,200 tons of raw materials back to Germany. In that same September, it has been reported that the Germans seized three times as much steel as was available in 1940. A look at the figures comparing the ratio of consumption and investment between 1915 and 1940 shows that in WWI, it was -7.8 whereas in 1940 it was +5.7. Consumption went to negative, finally in 1943; to a -1.2. In 1918, that figure was a -30.9. So, subjectively, the Italians might have felt they were on a war footing, but their industrialists and Mussolini knew better. So did the Germans in 1943, after the armistice.

Hi Dennis,

Perhaps so. Sadkovich describes the sad state of Italian industry. Antiquated factories, a lack of raw materials including coal for power. Almost every aspect of modern warfare in 1939 was beyond Italian industry. Though prototype sonar and radar had been developed, none were delivered before 1942 and the ubiquitous German DB601 engine was adapted for the best Italian fighter because of her own inablility to produce higher horsepower engines. Italian industry produced just over 10,000 aircraft prior to the Armistice. Italy's GDP was only 25% of Britain's in 1939 as was her production of steel. There was a faction of the Italian navy that sought a role in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean to attack Britain. It was rejected by Mussolini because it's cost was prohibitive. Aquila was a victim of those lmitations. Certainly, there was every reason to be confident that Italian seapower supported by land based air should be able to hold the Central Mediterranean. There were plans to attack Malta and Alexandria in case of war, but Mussolini hoped that the war would be over by fall 1941. Ooops. Much like Hitler, he had told his military no war before 1942. Nevertheless, I believe Aquila would have been a useful asset to the Italian fleet.

The pre war dynamics are interesting. France and Italy had drawn closer together, but the Italian attack on Abyssinia and Albania forced France to choose between Britain and Italy, she chose Italy while Italy turned to the Axis. During the Abyssinian crisis, the Italians were reading British coded traffic from the embassy in Rome. They read the RNs dismal assessment about being unable to support a military option against Italy and knew they had little to fear.

[JMS]

Well, during the Pedestal, the italians did sortie with light cruisers, HMS/M Urge putting 2 out of order North of Sicily in one attack. I believe there were constrains regarding fuel that hampered RM ops after the first year, more so in light of German problems in Russia and Germany was gobbling up most of the Romanian oil, but then...

[old_pop2000]

Well, during the Pedestal, the italians did sortie with light cruisers, HMS/M Urge putting 2 out of order North of Sicily in one attack. I believe there were constrains regarding fuel that hampered RM ops after the first year, more so in light of German problems in Russia and Germany was gobbling up most of the Romanian oil, but then...

The Italians sortied the 18th, 2nd and 20th MAS to intercept the convoy along with the German 3rd division. All MTBs. They sortied the 7th division from Cagliari with two light cruisers but these were spotted by a Beaufighter. The Cruisers were in company with the Maestrale, Oriani and Gioberti. They were to rendevous with the Attendolo. The Trieste sortied from Genoa to meet the Fuciliere and the MTB Ardito. They also had the 3rd division with two heavy cruisers escorted by six destroyers. The Bolzano and the Gorizia were both struck by torpedoes as was the Attendolo. All from a British submarine. All these ships had received a recall order because Supermarina did not want a night action off of Pantelleria. To my knowledge, this was all the action for the Italian navy except for the submarines and MTBs.

There had been a meeting at Comando Supremo between the Italians and Kesselring and it was suggested that the battlefleet sortie. However, Kesselring and the Italians agreed that there would be little or no air support and that it was too risky to sortie the main portion of the fleet. Admiral Riccardi also added that the navy was in crisis "due to the lack of oil" The main attack plan was to use aircraft of the Italian AF and the II Fliegerkorp, MTBs and submarines but to use the the cruisers of the 3rd and 7th divisions against the already weakened convoy. In "Struggle for the Middle Sea", it is related that in fact, the recall to Admiral Parona of the 3rd division was because a battleship and cruiser had been spotted joining the escort. It eventually turned out to be the light cruiser Charybdis and the destroyers Eskimo and Somali. This illustrates a problem of ship recognition in later hours.


Source: The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 Chapter Operation Pedestal

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Perhaps so. Sadkovich describes the sad state of Italian industry. Antiquated factories, a lack of raw materials including coal for power. Almost every aspect of modern warfare in 1939 was beyond Italian industry. Though prototype sonar and radar had been developed, none were delivered before 1942 and the ubiquitous German DB601 engine was adapted for the best Italian fighter because of her own inablility to produce higher horsepower engines. Italian industry produced just over 10,000 aircraft prior to the Armistice. Italy's GDP was only 25% of Britain's in 1939 as was her production of steel. There was a faction of the Italian navy that sought a role in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean to attack Britain. It was rejected by Mussolini because it's cost was prohibitive. Aquila was a victim of those lmitations. Certainly, there was every reason to be confident that Italian seapower supported by land based air should be able to hold the Central Mediterranean. There were plans to attack Malta and Alexandria in case of war, but Mussolini hoped that the war would be over by fall 1941. Ooops. Much like Hitler, he had told his military no war before 1942. Nevertheless, I believe Aquila would have been a useful asset to the Italian fleet.

The pre war dynamics are interesting. France and Italy had drawn closer together, but the Italian attack on Abyssinia and Albania forced France to choose between Britain and Italy, she chose Italy while Italy turned to the Axis. During the Abyssinian crisis, the Italians were reading British coded traffic from the embassy in Rome. They read the RNs dismal assessment about being unable to support a military option against Italy and knew they had little to fear.

Hi Mike:
I did read that the Re 2001 was handmade and its production was slow. That's why they emphasised the MC 202 which did use a DB 601 and could be mass produced. Hitler was never enthusiastic about the possible invasion of Malta. I suspect it might have been because he did not want the Italians to abandon the German troops. But also, he was focused more on Russia which he felt was where the war would be won.

As far as codes, both the British and Italians were reading codes although Ultra was doing a far better job. The spy in Gibraltar seems to have done a good job reporting the goings and comings of the convoys and Force H(Gibraltar Forces). Our Colonel Fellers in Cairo wasn't helping the situation, since they were reading his information being sent back to the states in the completely compromised "Black Code".

As far as the Aquila, as I have stated, it could have been useful but without protection and offensive aircraft, it was not really worth the effort. With Italian ASW so poor, it would have been a short-lived asset. With poor radios, poor serviceability and machine guns that jammed, I have doubts about the value of the Re 2001 aircraft. Now, place some Italian Stukas on the ships with a better fighter, and maybe you would have had something.

[old_pop2000]

Basis for the Aquila would be the SS Roma - Displacement -23,900 std tons, 28,200 full load, Spd 30 kts, rng 5500 nm, aircraft complement 30 -CR-42 Biplane fighters, 12 IMAM Ro. 37 Two Seat Recon biplanes adapted for naval use, 9 CR-42Bis Naval attack version with 2 x 220 lb bombs and possibly four 12.7 mm Breda-SAFAT MGs.

Assessment: Good speed and deck armour. Arresting gear problems are solved and she can trap returning aircraft( Not true in reality, I gave the Italians that one since they are doing this in peacetime) She will have no radar capability.
Completed and launched in 1939. Sister ship in construction; Sparviero. Available in 1941.

CR-42 Falco - Excellent maneuverability, low engine power, poor range of 420 nm, and poor armament. No armour but equipped with radios and homing devices. Max range with engine warmup, takeoff and climb along with recovery, 350 Nm.

Primary mission - fleet air protection and reconnaissance - minimal attack capability and night fighter operation. Based at Taranto, in outer harbor along with the battlefleet.

Note: Military funding being what it is, someone in the military will have to sacrifice something to buy and equip these two carriers. Possibly the Regia Marina will give up a couple of heavy cruisers, MAS boats or submarines. We don't get something for nothing, even in this alternate history.

As of the start of the war, British intelligence, The Royal Navy and Cairo are aware of the successful conclusion of the working up exercises conducted by the Aquila and the battle fleet. The fight for the Mediterranean is now one to one in carriers.... at least for the time being.


Just a reminder. The addition of a carrier has not changed the problems for the Italian military. The same deficiencies in training, coordination etc still plague the services. The Italian economy has still not been put on a complete war footing, but so what, neither have the Germans. We haven't changed everything.


Anyone care to take a stab at the first moves. Cunningham is aggressive, especially now that the Italians have an operational carrier with more aircraft. The Italians, well, they have to establish and maintain sea control over the central and eastern Med.

[JMS]

But Cunningham is, and remained, a battlehip admiral, so a carrier is not going to tip any balance in his mind, and probably won't change the mindset of the Italians either. The pilots are going to be Regia aeronautica anyway so they would be a bunch of pariahs and being named captain of Aquila could be perceived as a career killing move. I see no change in either side, although now the Italians are less vulnerable to torpedo attack.

[john964]

But Cunningham is, and remained, a battlehip admiral, so a carrier is not going to tip any balance in his mind, and probably won't change the mindset of the Italians either. The pilots are going to be Regia aeronautica anyway so they would be a bunch of pariahs and being named captain of Aquila could be perceived as a career killing move. I see no change in either side, although now the Italians are less vulnerable to torpedo attack.
Most admiral of the time were battleship admirals. IIRC when Halsey went to Pensacola for flight training he had to have an eyeglass perscription put into his flying gogles in secret.

[old_pop2000]

But Cunningham is, and remained, a battlehip admiral, so a carrier is not going to tip any balance in his mind, and probably won't change the mindset of the Italians either. The pilots are going to be Regia aeronautica anyway so they would be a bunch of pariahs and being named captain of Aquila could be perceived as a career killing move. I see no change in either side, although now the Italians are less vulnerable to torpedo attack.

JMS:
I am not certain that moniker really describes how Cunningham will react to the Italian carrier and its presence. He knows what capabilities the presence of a carrier brings to the table. He will execute the pre-war Taranto attack using Illustrious, he will use Eagle to launch torpedo attacks and defend the fleet during Calabria. He has enough experience in peacetime exercises to know that the carrier adds another dimension to any plan he develops. what he doesn't know is how much the Italians know about the use of the carrier. Remember, in this alternate history, they have just finished working up exercises in the Adriatic. They will have little or no experience with carriers and their uses. On paper they do, but not in a real combat situation. We had had carriers participating in fleet exercises since the introduction of the Langley, then Lex and Sara. So had the British. They had time to develop doctrine and carrier tactics. The Italians have none of that. Do they know that fighters are important, more so than attack aircraft. All three nations with carriers immediately learned that lesson, and increased fighter protection on their ships. Do they know about fuel vapors spreading throughout the ships and the possibility of explosions from unwanted sparks. We learned that lesson at Coral Sea with Lexington. Will they be as successful without radar? The Japanese did not do badly, without radar, Midway excepted. But to conduct good fleet protection requires good command and control of combat air patrols. This means not only radar, but radios and radio detection equipment. These are techniques that have to be learned and developed in peacetime, to a great extent. It's too late in the war.

All these factors must be accounted for, not just the presence of the carrier itself. Cunningham will know about these elements, the Admiral's of the Regia Marina might not. He will have the advantage in that aspect. Remember also, that while Eagle doesn't have the air wing that Aquila has, her pilots are more experienced and better trained. Training, both in war and peacetime with carriers, may be the difference. One more item to remember. All three nations with extensive carrier fleets, fought WWII with pre-war carrier designs. Even the Essex class, was laid down prior to the war. Those designs were based on pre-war testing and evaluations of fleet exercises and engineering. Many changes were made to the carriers based on wartime experience, but not enough to really change the basic designs. How much do the Italians really know? Design features?

Length to beam ratios -

Aquila - 7.15, Illustrious - 7.4, Eagle - 7.09, Yorktown - 8.8

LtoB equals less hull drag which means less engine power for a given speed. Aquila, Illustrious and Eagle were 30 knt ships. Yorktown was a 33 knt ship. She has, based on rought outlines, four props and two rudders widely spaced which should make her maneuverable even with engines. However, there is no armor on the rudder areas, so she is vulnerable to the golden BB. She also, based on my information, no side armor but does have a torpedo blister for what ever good those do. Her two hanger lifts are close together near the island. One good bomb hit on that unarmored deck, and both might become temporarily or permanently unserviceable. Her island and stack are large making her distinctive and easy to recognize especially with radar. So, any surface search set should get good returns from that area. She will be vulnerable to high angle bomb hits, like most carriers of that period, but possibly more so without armor on the deck. As to seakeeping, that is more difficult to assess based on the sketchy information, she might be similar to the British Illustrious class. Pitching, heaving and rolling are more pronounced when a carrier turns into the wind which means she is also catching waves. These can upset or even prevent air operations. The Med is probably the least affected by these problems but they do get some nasty storms and with the shallow areas, the waves can be problematic. One consolation for Aquila is that if she is having problems, so are the British carriers.

On the cost issue, building her and her sister ship will eliminate the upgrades to the Cavour class battleships and probably delay the building of the Littorio. The BB admirals should like that. This probably means that there will be no Littorio at Taranto at the beginning of the war.

[JMS]

This needs more elaboration than I have time for, unfortunately, but look closely at ABC's career, a successful destroyer sailor into the 30s, he then moved to battlecruisers and finally to the Med fleet. He always favored gun action over air attack - a bias largely hidden by the feebleness of RN air groups. When he became First Sea Lord (1943) he stopped work on AA cruisers to refocus on classic gun cruisers (which were made obsolete by carrier air power) and pushed for completion of battleships over aircraft carriers.

Don't forget Taranto was not his brainchild, but Lyster's and the use of airpower in Matapan clearly shows the aim was to bring ballistic contact. Lack of understanding of airpower is also shown in the forays around Crete, as mentioned by Vince, but further example is provided, in April 1944, by his prodding Fraser to hang around to strike Tirpitz when it was obvious that no results could be obtained over what was done and losses were going to be heavy.

He was aggressive and lucky, given the circumstances, but not particularly forward thinking.

[old_pop2000]

This needs more elaboration than I have time for, unfortunately, but look closely at ABC's career, a successful destroyer sailor into the 30s, he then moved to battlecruisers and finally to the Med fleet. He always favored gun action over air attack - a bias largely hidden by the feebleness of RN air groups. When he became First Sea Lord (1943) he stopped work on AA cruisers to refocus on classic gun cruisers (which were made obsolete by carrier air power) and pushed for completion of battleships over aircraft carriers.

Don't forget Taranto was not his brainchild, but Lyster's and the use of airpower in Matapan clearly shows the aim was to bring ballistic contact. Lack of understanding of airpower is also shown in the forays around Crete, as mentioned by Vince, but further example is provided, in April 1944, by his prodding Fraser to hang around to strike Tirpitz when it was obvious that no results could be obtained over what was done and losses were going to be heavy.

He was aggressive and lucky, given the circumstances, but not particularly forward thinking.

Hi JMS:
Thanks for taking time to make a comment. Your comments are applicable to most admirals, in all the navies of the world. Even in the USN, most admirals were gunnery officers, not pilots. Halsey was an anachronism. Spruance was just so smart, it didn't matter. So, while it might be true, it probably didn't matter in the Med. In this narrow, middle sea, air protection was vital for a surface force including convoys, against effective land based air power. Note the adjective "effective". The Regia Aeronautica was certainly not that effective, the X and II Fliegerkorp certainly were, as Cunningham and others found out. Cunningham was knowledgeable enough to realize after Calabria that he needed a carrier with an armoured deck and more aircraft. Eagle was just not adequate. He would have been savy enough to realized that with sea borne air protection, the Regia Marina would be freed from staying close to the coastal aerodromes and allow her to roam the eastern and western Mediterranean in search of British convoys. It also meant attacks on the coastal regions of NA to assist Rommel. It would also mean that Malta would be under even more pressure. It didn't require a pilots license to understand the strategic consequences of an Italian Carrier.

One of the reasons that I introduced this subject, is to move our discussions... what few we now have... to a region that is more germaine to modern naval combat. The Med is where naval history was born. The Pacific war, while interesting, was an aberration. The action in the Med is now being restudied because it is more applicable to the future. It is more complicated, requiring more variables and factors that affected combat in this region.

Anyway, thanks for your comments

[JMS]

You are welcome, with more time now, I can elaborate. A navy did not need pilots to have a carrier mentality, just common sense and the willingness to part with tradition, this last more than the first. The RN did not develop an understanding of the change carriers brought until very late in WW2. Remember they practically threw away 2 (and nearly Ark Royal too) fleet carriers in operations they knew where secondary (Courageous in ASW sweeps that didn't brought any result in WW1, Glorious "rescuing" an squadron of Hurricanes) while trying to bring German battlecruisers to gun action. The same attitude saw carriers repeatedly attached to heavy ships in the Bismarck chase and the Med, rather than giving them freedom to maneuver in order to chase down the Germans/Italians.

Of course, their opponents fared much worse, Germans and Italians being deprived of the naval aviation and insuring zero cooperation between the ideological air farces and the traditionalist navies - which is why the RN shines somewhat.

Moving over to modern times, the problem, as always, is one of first locating the enemy, be it the Med or elsewhere. This has bedeviled admirals from Nelson to ABC! typical opponents usually lack recon assets to exploit the theoretical capabilities of their weapon systems.

[old_pop2000]

You are welcome, with more time now, I can elaborate. A navy did not need pilots to have a carrier mentality, just common sense and the willingness to part with tradition, this last more than the first. The RN did not develop an understanding of the change carriers brought until very late in WW2. Remember they practically threw away 2 (and nearly Ark Royal too) fleet carriers in operations they knew where secondary (Courageous in ASW sweeps that didn't brought any result in WW1, Glorious "rescuing" an squadron of Hurricanes) while trying to bring German battlecruisers to gun action. The same attitude saw carriers repeatedly attached to heavy ships in the Bismarck chase and the Med, rather than giving them freedom to maneuver in order to chase down the Germans/Italians.

Of course, their opponents fared much worse, Germans and Italians being deprived of the naval aviation and insuring zero cooperation between the ideological air farces and the traditionalist navies - which is why the RN shines somewhat.

Moving over to modern times, the problem, as always, is one of first locating the enemy, be it the Med or elsewhere. This has bedeviled admirals from Nelson to ABC! typical opponents usually lack recon assets to exploit the theoretical capabilities of their weapon systems.

Hi JMS:

You really did need to have pilot training to understand the problems in the development of carriers and carrier aviation. Two of the most influential men in USN carrier aviation became pilots first, then became involved in naval aviation. These would be Admiral Moffett and Admiral Reeves; the latter is the father of Naval aviation. Naval aviation really begins with seaplane tenders and evolved from there. Almost all of the early pioneers were men who had been associated with seaplanes. It was in fact a requirement in our navy that to command air units, that you be a pilot.

As to the British and their conduct. Their carrier doctrine and requirements were based on the North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea theatres. Fleet protection includes not only aircraft but subsurface threats, reconnaissance along with a modest naval attack compliment. I can't really criticize them for their actions with Glorious and Courageous although the captains can be faulted for poor judgement, their missions were sound. They just didn't work. As they found out in the Med, carriers operating near land are very vulnerable. The Pacific was no different.

Now, as to the Germans and Italians, neither actually had good geostrategic reasons for having carriers. However, there was good cooperation between the luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine especially in the use of the FW200 Condors and the fleet of flying boats. However, the Germans were a continental power and did not actually have real requirement and the Italians had plenty of land bases on both sides of the Med including the Dodecanese from which to launch aircraft. Their problem wasn't with their choice not to build a carrier, it was the fact that they did not develop a good air force with naval attack capability in the prewar era. They also needed better cooperation between the services and better strategies. The decision not be build a carrier considering their economic problems was sound, but they failed to fulfill the alternative solution adequately.

On your point about locating the enemy; that has always been the primary element in any operation. In WWII, as Capt. Wayne Hughes shows, the side that discovered the opponent first and launched his attack, won the battles 9 times out of ten. Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons were all victories because we discovered and launched first. At Santa Cruz, it was a tie, but we still managed to gain a victory, strategically. This element was the driving force behind seaplanes on large warships and the evolution of the aircraft carrier. Its primary mission was scouting. Fleet defense and attack came later, as aircraft improved to a point where they could carry weapons large enough to do damage. But that scouting mission never diminished. This was the reason that our carriers began the war with an 18 plane scout bomber squadron. The SBDs in those squadron were specifically trained for that mission but they still carried a bomb. That mission was vital to the fleet until the advent of long range surface search radar. Even then, the TBFs replaced the SBD but still performed the same mission. That mission was always vital and the key to our successes. Land based bombers and seaplanes also were necessary. The German BV-238 and HA-139, Japanese Emily, the PBY, The Sunderland all performed that same mission; scouting and reconnaissance. That mission has not changed, just the toys did.

In that same vain, I wonder how influential the twelve reconnaissance aircraft might have been on Aquila? The two Cant seaplanes that were used to shadow British formations were partially effective, but carrier-borne air reconnaissance to augment the catapult aircraft could be vital. One major issue in all the battles for the italians was the lack of good, up-to-date information.

[old_pop2000]

As I have said, in my alternate history, Aquila will be home ported in Taranto to keep her close to the battlefleet, which she is to protect. Now, discounting 20/20 hindsight, this places her in a very convenient position astride British sea lanes from Alexandria to Malta and to Greece. However, where she is located in Taranto harbor is important.

The harbor is well protected from high waves by breakwaters and an island. It consists of two harbor areas; Port Piccolo and Port Grande. Grande is the outer harbor bordering the sea and Piccolo is the inner harbor. The two are connected today, by a channel, 75 feet wide and 39 feet deep. I don't know if that was the dimensions in 1940 or not, but it probably doesn't matter. The wisest choice that would allow Aquila to sortie the fastest, is Port Grande. It would not be wise to put her in the smaller port, although torpedo run ins are almost non-existent in that location, because if an attack does come, that channel could be blocked by debris or a ship, after the attack. If I were the British, that channel would be a prime target if Aquila was in there.

So, Aquila should be located in the outer harbor with torpedo nets to protect her. However, a carrier is especially vulnerable to bomb attacks. More so than BBs,BCs or heavy cruisers. Heavy AA support and balloons are the only method of ameliorating this problem, however, Aquila's deck is vulnerable, when stationary to high level bombing attacks by British twin engined bombers. This must be reckoned with.

The alternative is to home port her at Naples for safety. But, this has disadvantages in terms of availability and fuel consumption. To join the battlefleet, she must sail from Naples through the straits of Messina past Calabria and join up somewhere south of the toe. This puts her in danger from Malta based aircraft and submarines.

Anyone got ideas?

[JMS]

The harbor is well protected from high waves by breakwaters and an island. It consists of two harbor areas; Port Piccolo and Port Grande. Grande is the outer harbor bordering the sea and Piccolo is the inner harbor. The two are connected today, by a channel, 75 feet wide and 39 feet deep.

Me thinks you are mixing feet with meters there... ;) otherwise it's academic how Aquila (30m wide) could fit in a 22m wide channel. Wiki sez channel is 73m (243 feet) wide.

I don't think the Italians would play around that, they will anchor her on the Mar Grande like the battleships, in order to have her ready to sail, just like the battleships, and she will remain in company with the heavy ships in any fleet action. IMO.

[old_pop2000]

JMS:
My information comes from the official Naval Severe Weather Handbook dtd 1991 for Taranto issued to U.S. Navy ship captains. It states that the inner harbor is accessed via a navigation channel 23m or 75 feet wide, depth of 12m or 39 feet deep with a drawbridge over it that can be raised to accommodate vessels taller than 20m or 65 feet.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi JMS:

You really did need to have pilot training to understand the problems in the development of carriers and carrier aviation. Two of the most influential men in USN carrier aviation became pilots first, then became involved in naval aviation. These would be Admiral Moffett and Admiral Reeves; the latter is the father of Naval aviation. Naval aviation really begins with seaplane tenders and evolved from there. Almost all of the early pioneers were men who had been associated with seaplanes. It was in fact a requirement in our navy that to command air units, that you be a pilot.

As to the British and their conduct. Their carrier doctrine and requirements were based on the North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea theatres. Fleet protection includes not only aircraft but subsurface threats, reconnaissance along with a modest naval attack compliment. I can't really criticize them for their actions with Glorious and Courageous although the captains can be faulted for poor judgement, their missions were sound. They just didn't work. As they found out in the Med, carriers operating near land are very vulnerable. The Pacific was no different.

Now, as to the Germans and Italians, neither actually had good geostrategic reasons for having carriers. However, there was good cooperation between the luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine especially in the use of the FW200 Condors and the fleet of flying boats. However, the Germans were a continental power and did not actually have real requirement and the Italians had plenty of land bases on both sides of the Med including the Dodecanese from which to launch aircraft. Their problem wasn't with their choice not to build a carrier, it was the fact that they did not develop a good air force with naval attack capability in the prewar era. They also needed better cooperation between the services and better strategies. The decision not be build a carrier considering their economic problems was sound, but they failed to fulfill the alternative solution adequately.

On your point about locating the enemy; that has always been the primary element in any operation. In WWII, as Capt. Wayne Hughes shows, the side that discovered the opponent first and launched his attack, won the battles 9 times out of ten. Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons were all victories because we discovered and launched first. At Santa Cruz, it was a tie, but we still managed to gain a victory, strategically. This element was the driving force behind seaplanes on large warships and the evolution of the aircraft carrier. Its primary mission was scouting. Fleet defense and attack came later, as aircraft improved to a point where they could carry weapons large enough to do damage. But that scouting mission never diminished. This was the reason that our carriers began the war with an 18 plane scout bomber squadron. The SBDs in those squadron were specifically trained for that mission but they still carried a bomb. That mission was vital to the fleet until the advent of long range surface search radar. Even then, the TBFs replaced the SBD but still performed the same mission. That mission was always vital and the key to our successes. Land based bombers and seaplanes also were necessary. The German BV-238 and HA-139, Japanese Emily, the PBY, The Sunderland all performed that same mission; scouting and reconnaissance. That mission has not changed, just the toys did.

In that same vain, I wonder how influential the twelve reconnaissance aircraft might have been on Aquila? The two Cant seaplanes that were used to shadow British formations were partially effective, but carrier-borne air reconnaissance to augment the catapult aircraft could be vital. One major issue in all the battles for the italians was the lack of good, up-to-date information.

Hi Dennis,

That's a good point about float planes, I remember reading little about their employment by either side in the surface battles. The presence of Aquila would not require the use of fighting ships to carry, launch and recover their planes in combat. Her presence to scout would have been particularly handy at Punta Stilo and Spativento in 1940. In both cases while capital ship strength was essentially the same, the Italians had a large advantage in heavy cruisers. In both cases, the disarray of British forces would have been apparent and Sommerville could have been defeated in detail. Her aircraft were faster than the Cant flying boats and could avoid Fulmars to continue to scout. The disasterous attempt to sweep north of Crete with two light cruisers resulting in the loss of one at Cape Spada would have be much more effective by a heavy cruiser divison and Aquila much akin to the light carrier/cruiser sweep in the Indian Ocean supporting Nagumo. Her presence would make smoke screens less effective in hiding British strength and dispositons in the convoy skirmishes with Vian as well.

While Aquila certainly had her failings as a conversion, in your alternative history, she could hold her own in the relative force vacuum of the first three years of the war.

[JMS]

JMS:
My information comes from the official Naval Severe Weather Handbook dtd 1991 for Taranto issued to U.S. Navy ship captains. It states that the inner harbor is accessed via a navigation channel 23m or 75 feet wide, depth of 12m or 39 feet deep with a drawbridge over it that can be raised to accommodate vessels taller than 20m or 65 feet.

That settles it pretty nicely.

[JMS]

Problem with plane scouting is that usually the planes have no clue where are they exactly.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

That's a good point about float planes, I remember reading little about their employment by either side in the surface battles. The presence of Aquila would not require the use of fighting ships to carry, launch and recover their planes in combat. Her presence to scout would have been particularly handy at Punta Stilo and Spativento in 1940. In both cases while capital ship strength was essentially the same, the Italians had a large advantage in heavy cruisers. In both cases, the disarray of British forces would have been apparent and Sommerville could have been defeated in detail. Her aircraft were faster than the Cant flying boats and could avoid Fulmars to continue to scout. The disasterous attempt to sweep north of Crete with two light cruisers resulting in the loss of one at Cape Spada would have be much more effective by a heavy cruiser divison and Aquila much akin to the light carrier/cruiser sweep in the Indian Ocean supporting Nagumo. Her presence would make smoke screens less effective in hiding British strength and dispositons in the convoy skirmishes with Vian as well.

While Aquila certainly had her failings as a conversion, in your alternative history, she could hold her own in the relative force vacuum of the first three years of the war.

Hi Mike:
Aquila's greatest contribution could have been twofold:

1. keeping Malta based Sunderlands and Eagle based Swordfish from scouting and shadowing both Campioni and Paladini. That fact alone could have assisted Campioni in springing the trap on Cunningham. Without the Sunderland shadowing on the morning of the 9th, there might not have been a swordfish attack by Eagle's aircraft.

2. Fleet reconnaissance - detecting and shadowing Cunningham's force, to allow Regia Aeronautica to find Cunningham immediately and attack him along with allowing Campioni a change to move into position with his force and Paladini cruiser force.

In either case, whether it be depriving the opponent of intelligence or gathering it yourself, the Italians might have had a better chance in the coming sea battle. Now, Aquila doesn't belong anywhere near this particular phase, but she could have facilitated it.

Again, this is what carriers were primarily designed for and used in the early portions of the war. This was a valuable function along with fleet air defense. But, carriers are fragile. One or two well placed bombs and now she is just a target.

[old_pop2000]

Problem with plane scouting is that usually the planes have no clue where are they exactly.

HI JMS:
Sometimes that is true and many times their ship recognition is poor. OTOH, from a height of 10,000-15,000 feet, ship recognition is problematic. My dad told me that even his ship, the Sara, looked like a speck on the water from 20,000 feet. He told me that to do ship recognition, you have to drop down and then the fighters get you and the medium to high altitude AA guns. As to the navigation, most scout pilots and crews are trained heavily in navigation, for obvious reason. All navy pilots and crews were given extensive over water navigation. This is why naval aircraft had Zed Baker homing equipment to find their way back to the ship when getting near. I think Dad said it only had a range of about 20-30 miles, but sometimes that was enough.

[JMS]

No doubt, the RN was heavily into that to the point og having 2 place fighters, but the record for independent air forces (LW/RA) is poorer, I can recall the case of a convoy missed by wolfpacks because the Condor position was wrong. Of course, the Med is smaller and maybe easier to navigate, but I don't recall many instances of the Italians using the shipboard floatplanes in combat, maybe Vince can illuminate us?

[old_pop2000]

No doubt, the RN was heavily into that to the point og having 2 place fighters, but the record for independent air forces (LW/RA) is poorer, I can recall the case of a convoy missed by wolfpacks because the Condor position was wrong. Of course, the Med is smaller and maybe easier to navigate, but I don't recall many instances of the Italians using the shipboard floatplanes in combat, maybe Vince can illuminate us?

JMS:
Greene relates that at 1510 hrs on July 8th, Campioni launched an Ro-43 floatplane from the cruiser Abruzzi for aerial reconnaissance but land based Cant flying boats had already detected and pinpointed Cunninghams position. On the 9th, three Ro-43 were launched from Da Barbiano, Di Giussano, Duca Degli Abruzzi for the same purposes, and later three more were launched from Eugenio di Savoia, Garibaldi and Cadorna. They reported the British position, 30 miles closer than supposed by earlier reports. All three aircraft were recovered, although one had to fly to Messina. It was damaged by friendly fire. Just a note. The Ro-43 floatplane reconnaissance aircraft was a derivative of the Ro-37 land based two seat reconnaissance aircraft. That is the aircraft that I place twelve of on Aquila at the start of the war.

[JMS]

Matapan? would have been helpful there. At the 2 Sirtes the weather would have prevented useful recon probably.

[old_pop2000]

Matapan? would have been helpful there. At the 2 Sirtes the weather would have prevented useful recon probably.

JMS:
I believe we can say, without reservation, that accurate, up-to-date intelligence is vital. Whether it's source is aerial reconnaissance, signal intelligence or human intelligence does not matter. Together they provide a picture in real time of the enemy actions and intentions. As to the weather in the two Sirte actions, Littorio launched an Ro-43 in the afternoon, on the 18th of July, so the weather wasn't that bad. Low ceilings are not that restrictive. You can do adequate scouting from 5000 feet. However, on the second battle of Sirte, the conditions were near gale or hurricane like, according to Vince. That would rule out any launch by Aquila, if in fact she was available and it was felt that the risk was necessary. I doubt it, I would not have risk my only carrier for that operation.

[Vince O'Hara]

I'm probably missing something here, but the question "did the Italians need a carrier for their navy" could just as easily have been "did the Italians need a navy." The answer to both, I would submit, is yes.

There were a lot of carrier designs and conversions bouncing around in the mid 1930s, which was the latest any ships could have been laid down to be available by 1940. A 14,000 ton design based loosely upon USS Ranger came close to realization. It would have carried the Ca.165 bi-plane fighter and an upgraded Z.1012 torpedo bomber. Air force opposition and the budget were always the big problems. But any nation that could lay down four modern battleships and rebuild four battleships in the 1930s could have built or at least converted several hulls into carriers if it was a priority. Although the navy was keen to acquire a torpedo bomber, I think in practice any Italian carrier would have provided reconnaissance and fighter coverage.

As for float planes, the Italians deployed them in most of their operations. This is just off the top of my head, but Calabria, Matapan (which is how Iachino found the British cruisers), Second Sirte (which is how they found the convoy) Pantelleria (one was shot down and the radio broke on the other). Vigorous. In the July 1940 operation into the Aegean, the cruisers didn’t launch because the sea was too rough. The Italian navy trusted reports from their float planes much more than from air force aircraft. (In 1940 the head of the air force complained to Mussolini about his aircraft being required to undertake maritime patrols. They wore out engines and tired his men.). The float planes always had spotty communications with the fleet. That was a recurrent problem. I can’t think of any examples off the top of my head where they provided effective gunnery spotting. For that matter, I can’t think of many examples in any navy where planes provided effective gunnery spotting. (I don’t thing River Plate qualifies.)

The fact that the Regia Marina really, really missed a ship bourn fighter component is shown by the way they stuck fighters on the battleships toward the end of the war. The big problem that took a long time to solve was air to ship communications and direction.

The question whether a carrier would have survived is not relevant to the discussion, I think. However, the reason naval staff rejected several relatively quick and easy conversions in the 1935-36 period was because they would have had insufficient underwater protection.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

I'm probably missing something here, but the question "did the Italians need a carrier for their navy" could just as easily have been "did the Italians need a navy." The answer to both, I would submit, is yes.

There were a lot of carrier designs and conversions bouncing around in the mid 1930s, which was the latest any ships could have been laid down to be available by 1940. A 14,000 ton design based loosely upon USS Ranger came close to realization. It would have carried the Ca.165 bi-plane fighter and an upgraded Z.1012 torpedo bomber. Air force opposition and the budget were always the big problems. But any nation that could lay down four modern battleships and rebuild four battleships in the 1930s could have built or at least converted several hulls into carriers if it was a priority. Although the navy was keen to acquire a torpedo bomber, I think in practice any Italian carrier would have provided reconnaissance and fighter coverage.

As for float planes, the Italians deployed them in most of their operations. This is just off the top of my head, but Calabria, Matapan (which is how Iachino found the British cruisers), Second Sirte (which is how they found the convoy) Pantelleria (one was shot down and the radio broke on the other). Vigorous. In the July 1940 operation into the Aegean, the cruisers didn’t launch because the sea was too rough. The Italian navy trusted reports from their float planes much more than from air force aircraft. (In 1940 the head of the air force complained to Mussolini about his aircraft being required to undertake maritime patrols. They wore out engines and tired his men.). The float planes always had spotty communications with the fleet. That was a recurrent problem. I can’t think of any examples off the top of my head where they provided effective gunnery spotting. For that matter, I can’t think of many examples in any navy where planes provided effective gunnery spotting. (I don’t thing River Plate qualifies.)

The fact that the Regia Marina really, really missed a ship bourn fighter component is shown by the way they stuck fighters on the battleships toward the end of the war. The big problem that took a long time to solve was air to ship communications and direction.

The question whether a carrier would have survived is not relevant to the discussion, I think. However, the reason naval staff rejected several relatively quick and easy conversions in the 1935-36 period was because they would have had insufficient underwater protection.

Vince

Hi Vince:
Thanks for joining the ever shrinking group of alternative historians. LOL

First, the kind of carrier developed isn't really that important. Conversions can be beneficial to at least get some kind of training platform built to develop your naval air arm, and carrier doctrine. Later, once your requirements are defined by the doctrine, then specifications can be drawn and purpose built carriers designed and built. Unfortunately for the Italians they had neither the time nor the funding to perform such a task. Yes they could build battleships but that is a technology they were familiar with, but carrier technology and doctrine is a whole lot more complicated as are the logistics in supporting those carriers. My alternative historical scenario is based on the least effect principle. Those two liner conversion were the easiest and best method of putting a fleet protection force into service in minimal time. We can elaborate and develop more complicated scenarios, if we retrograde into the 1920's after WWI. To develop a full fledged carrier force with purpose built carriers and outfit them with a complete airwing would have required, minimum, ten years. So, they would have had to start around 1930 or earlier. I don't know the economic, industrial conditions at that time in Italy nor the political and military atmosphere that would have been needed. I can say that there would have had to have been a strategic requirement for such a policy to be put into effect. I don't see that in 1930, but you know more about that than I do.

As to the issue of survivability, it is absolutely important that that factor be considered, especially if you only have the funds to build two such ships. Torpedo protection systems are of minimal value and haven't really saved most carriers. We have evidence of that in almost every carrier lost. Carriers are fragile weapons systems. They have large quantities of very volatile materials on board including Avgas, ordnance, flares, pure oxygen generation plants, and such. . You don't have to sink a carrier to eliminate it from action, a mission kill is just as important. Witness the issue with the Sara. Torpedoed twice in one year, both times eliminated from the theatre. The second time, COMSOUTHWEST got desperate and ordered the air wing and the squadron personnel to off load at Efate and move to Guadalcanal, because that air wing was so vital. We can discuss the magnetic pistols on British torpedoes also, as they defeated the TPS and nets at Taranto. However, bomb laden swordfish could have mission killed Aquila just as easily had she been present.

I believe strongly, that survivability was an important consideration in the construction, deployment and use of carriers especially in a narrow shallow sea like the Med.

[Vince O'Hara]

Hi Dennis.

There are carriers and there are carriers. I can’t imagine the Italians deploying a force in the same neighborhood as the Japanese carriers strike force but we’re not talking about that. We’re talking about the concept of a carrier as a force multiplier, the way the British used their carriers up through 1942. A vessel that cruises with the battlefleet and augments its recon capabilities and provides fighter support. This is not a simple thing, but it requires much less technology and a simpler doctrine than operating fleets of carriers with high capacity planes. Like I said, the navy wanted a torpedo strike capability, but that was probably pushing the envelope of what they could have done.

As for survivability, I think we’re taking at cross purposes. I was just responding (and not very clearly) to some of the earlier discussion that seemed to imply there was no reason for the Italians to build a carrier because the British were going to sink it anyway. The Italians were very sensitive to survivability and I imagine they would have been tender with any carrier they put into service, probably more than some Allied admirals I can think of.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis.

There are carriers and there are carriers. I can’t imagine the Italians deploying a force in the same neighborhood as the Japanese carriers strike force but we’re not talking about that. We’re talking about the concept of a carrier as a force multiplier, the way the British used their carriers up through 1942. A vessel that cruises with the battlefleet and augments its recon capabilities and provides fighter support. This is not a simple thing, but it requires much less technology and a simpler doctrine than operating fleets of carriers with high capacity planes. Like I said, the navy wanted a torpedo strike capability, but that was probably pushing the envelope of what they could have done.

As for survivability, I think we’re taking at cross purposes. I was just responding (and not very clearly) to some of the earlier discussion that seemed to imply there was no reason for the Italians to build a carrier because the British were going to sink it anyway. The Italians were very sensitive to survivability and I imagine they would have been tender with any carrier they put into service, probably more than some Allied admirals I can think of.

Vince

Hi Vince:
Well there are different classes of carriers; Fleet, light and escort are just some of them. But they all have the same basic requirements to perform any mission, be it reconnaissance and fleet defense or attack. They need a hanger and that needs to be partitioned for damage control, foam lines and generating plant, ammunition elevators, aircraft elevators and maintenance areas equipped with tools, pneumantic and hydraulic equipment for engine removals, wings and control services. They need shops for repairs and replacements, and a host of other things. All aircraft have the same basic needs whether just recon or torpedo or just fighters. Maybe one type of carrier's requirements are reduced due to air wing size, but the requirements still need to be met and provided. Read the stories of the 1930's and the support necessary for the biplane fighters, dive bombers and torpedoes in our fleet, the requirements were the same, just the numbers were different.

As to the survivability, my belief is that the Italians had an alternative to a carrier air wing and that was a land based naval air arm built like the Japanese with long range fighters and bombers with reconnaissance assets that were attached to a shore command but when operational, were under the command of the fleet commander. The system was not without its flaws, but was viable and a good alternative to building a carrier and maintaining them especially in a narrow sea like the Med. I can assure you, that had Somerville and Cunningham been aware of Aquila, they would have moved heaven and earth to remove her from the scene as fast as possible. She would have been priority one at Taranto or even at Naples, had she been ported there. If she moved, the British and Ultra would have known about it. Does this mean they shouldn't have built a carrier? No, but they should have started long before the war. If they could not afford it before the war, I have serious doubts whether wartime conditions would have improved that ability. I don't believe one small carrier would have been of any value to them, in their geostrategic position. Yes, it improve some of the actions during the war, but they had far greater problems that were not solvable. At least not with the regime in power.

[Vince O'Hara]

If the Italians had pushed their 1934/35 carrier project forward, they could have dummied out the technical and operational requirements by 1940 to the point where the vessel would have been an asset to the navy. This would have been a warship, not a mercantile conversion and would have been as “survivable” as any its contemporaries. If they had gone the mercantile conversion route in the late thirties all things would have been the same, except the ship would have been more vulnerable to damage. Check out the article Enrico Cernuschi and I wrote in Warship 2007 for more details.

If by some freak of circumstance Aquila had come into service in 1943 her usefulness would have been very limited, assuming there was any fuel oil for her to put to sea in the first place. (There were no secret reserves.) If the war had developed the way Hitler and Mussolini thought it was going to in 1941 when Aquila’s conversion commenced it would have been a different matter, but to speculate about that is to enter the land of fantasy.

I disagree with your comment “the Italians had an alternative to a carrier air wing and that was a land based naval air arm.” They didn’t have a naval air arm and the political conditions were such that they were not going to have one (that didn’t happen until very recently and still doesn’t include a land based air striking force, at least to my knowledge. Moreover, the Italian air force is till trying to take the navy’s limited aviation back). Your alternative could only happen in a perfect world and in that situation there wouldn’t have been a war in the first place.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

If the Italians had pushed their 1934/35 carrier project forward, they could have dummied out the technical and operational requirements by 1940 to the point where the vessel would have been an asset to the navy. This would have been a warship, not a mercantile conversion and would have been as “survivable” as any its contemporaries. If they had gone the mercantile conversion route in the late thirties all things would have been the same, except the ship would have been more vulnerable to damage. Check out the article Enrico Cernuschi and I wrote in Warship 2007 for more details.

If by some freak of circumstance Aquila had come into service in 1943 her usefulness would have been very limited, assuming there was any fuel oil for her to put to sea in the first place. (There were no secret reserves.) If the war had developed the way Hitler and Mussolini thought it was going to in 1941 when Aquila’s conversion commenced it would have been a different matter, but to speculate about that is to enter the land of fantasy.

I disagree with your comment “the Italians had an alternative to a carrier air wing and that was a land based naval air arm.” They didn’t have a naval air arm and the political conditions were such that they were not going to have one (that didn’t happen until very recently and still doesn’t include a land based air striking force, at least to my knowledge. Moreover, the Italian air force is till trying to take the navy’s limited aviation back). Your alternative could only happen in a perfect world and in that situation there wouldn’t have been a war in the first place.

Vince

Hi Vince:
Can you provide a link or a search parameter to find that article? I would like to read it. I believe that the Italians would have had to make a choice in the mid-thirties as to how they were going to develop carrier aviation, if the naval staff and government could agree. The only impetous for such a push in 1934/35 would have been the Abyssinian crisis and their recognition that the British were now their main opponent in the Mediterranean and they had carriers and could move along the NA coast into Cyrenaica. Even in alternate historical scenarios, we cannot dismiss economic and strategic goals that might have generated the changes. So the questions are posed; Why do the Italians decide to build a carrier force? How large a carrier force? What is the economic impact of that decision upon other military spending including the building of other ships. What kind of carriers? Conversions or purpose built or both? These are all valid questions to ask and they are important. What if scenarios and analysis has been used by many disciplines for years including economist. It helps to clarify why decisions were made, due to the research necessary to understand those decisions.

As far as the alternative to carrier air wings, I believe that the land based naval air arm was an alternative however remote. It should be considered and explored as to how it would have affected the Mediterranean theatre and I don't believe a perfect world was necessary, just some different decisions by Mussolini and the Comando Supremo. However, maybe the historical accounts prove that such considerations were out of the question. Maybe, but what drove those historical decisions? Was there anywhere in the timeline and decision-making process where a minor change could have resulted in the carriers or a land based naval air arm.

Just some of my thoughts. BTW I am not a devotee of wild and crazy alternate historical scenarios, but I do appreciate the value of them when they maintain some basis in historical fact and timing. I've found that kind of thinking useful in my career many times. It seems the military does also.

[Swordfish]

An aircraft carrier would have made perfect sense for Italy, especially with regards to the vast sea areas that surround it.
In WWII, these sea areas were even vaster, as Libya was controlled by Italy, too.
The Regia Aeronautica could have never been a substitute for a carrier, because the production capacities of the italian airforce industry wouldn't have been sufficient for that.

[old_pop2000]

An aircraft carrier would have made perfect sense for Italy, especially with regards to the vast sea areas that surround it.
In WWII, these sea areas were even vaster, as Libya was controlled by Italy, too.
The Regia Aeronautica could have never been a substitute for a carrier, because the production capacities of the italian airforce industry wouldn't have been sufficient for that.

Hi Sword:
The areas surrounding the Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Malta and Crete are not so vast and much of it is shallow water. Remember how effective the two German Fliegerkorps, X and II, were at stopping British convoys and damaging two of her newest armored deck carriers. With better ordnance, torpedo and dive bombers and better coordination, the Regia Aeronautica could have been much more effective. A carrier might have been useful, but they would have to have two and much better ASW protection with escorts. A carrier is a very fragile weapons system. The Italians had done preparation work in the the post WWI era with seaplanes and tenders so they probably had the necessary expertise to develop a series of small, usefull escort type carriers. Remember the British carriers had to be versatile enough to operate in the Far East, North Atlantic, Pacific and the Med. All entirely different geographic environments against some well equipped opponents. So, you aren't wrong, but there are other factors to consider.

[Vince O'Hara]

A couple of comments.

Regarding the effectiveness of X and II Fliegerkorps, I think of the remark made by Captain A. J. Pugsley who skippered a British destroyer during a Malta convoy operation in June 1942. Perhaps we should [have been] grateful that it was the Italians and the Germans with their equal lack of understanding of how to operate naval air power that we faced in those waters and not the Japanese. The British had three armored carriers damaged by German aircraft, but there was a span of nineteen months between the first (Jan 41) and the last (Aug 42). I’m suggesting that the Germans and Italians really weren’t that good, at least compared to the Japanese and Americans, and that the British would never have gotten away with sailing convoys and carriers within a hundred miles of Japanese bases that held equal numbers of naval aircraft the way they repeatedly did in the Mediterranean. I'm amazed at how many mass German and Italian air attacks were completely ineffective. Something to think about.

As for Italian naval air power. If the Italian navy had controlled its own specially trained land-based naval strike/recon/fighter forces and if Italy had developed torpedo bombers and dive bombers before 1940 and if there was a flexible and direct command link between the naval air units and the naval units afloat, and if there was a robust doctrine for their use, then perhaps the Italians wouldn’t have needed any carriers. Problem is, I had to say “if” so many times.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

A couple of comments.

Regarding the effectiveness of X and II Fliegerkorps, I think of the remark made by Captain A. J. Pugsley who skippered a British destroyer during a Malta convoy operation in June 1942. Perhaps we should [have been] grateful that it was the Italians and the Germans with their equal lack of understanding of how to operate naval air power that we faced in those waters and not the Japanese. The British had three armored carriers damaged by German aircraft, but there was a span of nineteen months between the first (Jan 41) and the last (Aug 42). I’m suggesting that the Germans and Italians really weren’t that good, at least compared to the Japanese and Americans, and that the British would never have gotten away with sailing convoys and carriers within a hundred miles of Japanese bases that held equal numbers of naval aircraft the way they repeatedly did in the Mediterranean. I'm amazed at how many mass German and Italian air attacks were completely ineffective. Something to think about.

As for Italian naval air power. If the Italian navy had controlled its own specially trained land-based naval strike/recon/fighter forces and if Italy had developed torpedo bombers and dive bombers before 1940 and if there was a flexible and direct command link between the naval air units and the naval units afloat, and if there was a robust doctrine for their use, then perhaps the Italians wouldn’t have needed any carriers. Problem is, I had to say “if” so many times.

Vince

Vince:
I am not certain the facts support that conclusion. The Luftwaffe was a land based tactical air force whose doctrine revolved around land operations, not naval targets. The X Fliegerkorps had been trained to fly coastal operations in Norway against convoys and that's why they were moved to Sicily in January 1941. You fight like you train. I would like to see some facts about sortie rates, ordnance expended, targets attacked, targets hit and targets sunk before I question Fliegerkorp X's abilities. At Calabria, Eagle launched two 9 plane raids against the Italian battlefleet, and never hit anything with fully trained, experienced naval pilots flying slow biplane torpedo bombers. Does that mean FAA pilots were no good? No, just means on this occasion, they missed. At Midway, two US torpedo bomber squadrons attacked the Japanese fleet and never got one hit. These were not land based pilots, they were naval pilots. None survived. The two dive bomber squadrons dropped almost 36 bombs and scored only about 8 hits, sinking three carriers. Had they not been lucky in timing, its possible those carriers would have survived, again conjecture. All experienced naval dive bomber pilots. If we examine the record, the Japanese naval pilots were not any better. It is true they were facing air opposition and AA fire, but they had been trained to fly under these conditions and the dive bombers had fighter escort. At Coral Sea, the Yorktown air group expended 22 x 1000 lb bombs and 9 torpedoes. Results: One carrier damaged but still sailing, one missed completely. This does not include the expended ordnance of the Lexington air group on that same mission. They at least were able to sink Shoho on another occasion.

As to the last comment, I agree. The might if's accumulate. There is nothing to say that even with carriers and a fleet air arm, they would be any better than the Regia Aeronautica. Without proper escorts with ASW, a carrier is in danger. Unprotected, they are dead meat once the air wing is launched. We cannot assume that just because we build carriers, that the pilots and planes would improve.

Dennis

[Vince O'Hara]

Vince:
I am not certain the facts support that conclusion. I would like to see some facts about sortie rates, ordnance expended, targets attacked, targets hit and targets sunk before I question Fliegerkorp X's abilities.
Dennis

Another fascinating question about the Mediterranean war waiting to be answered.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Another fascinating question about the Mediterranean war waiting to be answered.

Vince

So true, so true. It's one of many about that theatre of war.

[JMS]

A couple of comments.

Regarding the effectiveness of X and II Fliegerkorps, I think of the remark made by Captain A. J. Pugsley who skippered a British destroyer during a Malta convoy operation in June 1942. Perhaps we should [have been] grateful that it was the Italians and the Germans with their equal lack of understanding of how to operate naval air power that we faced in those waters and not the Japanese. The British had three armored carriers damaged by German aircraft, but there was a span of nineteen months between the first (Jan 41) and the last (Aug 42). I’m suggesting that the Germans and Italians really weren’t that good, at least compared to the Japanese and Americans, and that the British would never have gotten away with sailing convoys and carriers within a hundred miles of Japanese bases that held equal numbers of naval aircraft the way they repeatedly did in the Mediterranean. I'm amazed at how many mass German and Italian air attacks were completely ineffective. Something to think about.

As for Italian naval air power. If the Italian navy had controlled its own specially trained land-based naval strike/recon/fighter forces and if Italy had developed torpedo bombers and dive bombers before 1940 and if there was a flexible and direct command link between the naval air units and the naval units afloat, and if there was a robust doctrine for their use, then perhaps the Italians wouldn’t have needed any carriers. Problem is, I had to say “if” so many times.

Vince

I agree completely, it should be noted that by their own measurement, the Japanese "won" the war by early 1943 since they had destroyed/damaged the enemy pre-war fleets. Too bad the US didn't play fair and built a new fleet or 2 or 3... :(

Contrast the attack on PoW vs any attack on the Med.

[old_pop2000]

.....

Contrast the attack on PoW vs any attack on the Med.

Ok, lets get some numbers on the POW attack. The Japanese launched three waves of bombers, 34 of them had torpedoes. They achieved, at best eight hits. Divers only confirmed six. they also achieved two bomb hits. Repulse had not been overhauled like Renown so she did not have a torpedo blister and her internals had not been compartimentized against such hits. POW was new. So, the torpedo bombers achieved a 23% hit rate. There were 51 level bombers and they achieved two hits, even worse.

This was to be the most efficient attack by the Japanese and they were specifically trained land based bomber units, not carrier based pilots. There was no air opposition, as experienced in the Med. Now, are there any records of similar attacks by Italian and German aircraft on two capital ships, without air cover and few escorts to make a comparison? We do have the attack by Fliegerkorp X on Illustrious. They achieved five bomb hits with an attack by 18 He-111s and 43 Ju-87 escorted by 10 Me-110s. However, only 30 stuka's actually attacked Illustrious. Besides the five hits, there was a near miss which damaged her steering gear and caused flooding. So, six hits by thirty stukas is 20% hit rate. Almost the same for those specifically trained Japanese torpedo bomber pilots. However, let's recognize that dive bombing is far more accurate than torpedo bombing. This was the best available information that I could find, but I think it illustrates the point I am attempting to make. We can examine the bombing records of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz among others and compare them to known Fliegerkorp ten attacks to really put numbers on the claim. I am not disagreeing, but asking for numbers for air attacks on warship by German/Italian units versus Japanese units. I suspect we will find that Fliegerkorp X probably did nearly as well, under the circumstances.

[JMS]

23% and 2 hits against manoeuvering and alerted warships is pretty good compared to similar attacks on the Med. For the LW I found this extract for the early part of the war:

"Luftwaffe Torpedo Operations 1936-40.

The first operation use of airborne torpedoes by the Luftwaffe was in the Spanish Civil War. From mid 1936 a small number of Heinkel He 59 seaplanes served with the Seeflieger Gruppe AS/88 of the Condor Legion, operating from the island of Majorca. This unit was operational until the spring of 1939, and during this time launched a number of airborne torpedoes in combat. However due to problems with the LT F5 torpedo only one was successful. An attack on the British merchant ship Thropeness (4,700 GRT) which on the night of 21st July 1938 was entering the Spanish port of Valencia loaded with grain. At the time it was claimed by the Spanish Nationalists that this ship had been sunk by a mine.

By the start of WW2, the Seeflieger possessed 30 operational He 59s in four Staffeln. At this time the He 115 was starting to come into service, but due to the fragility of the LT F5 torpedo it couldn’t be carried, as the He 115 couldn’t fly slow enough, without stalling, to release the LT F5 torpedo successfully.
From October 1939 the few He 59s flew a limited number of torpedo operations against Allied shipping, but the only success recorded by He 59s using torpedoes in WW2 was the sinking of the British fishing steamer, Active (185 GRT) on the 18 December 1939.

In March 1940 with technical improvements to the LT F5 torpedo (including a new rudder) the He 115 was made operational with this torpedo, replacing the He 59 in the role, though the torpedo was still far from satisfactory, as it still required the He 115 to fly as slow and low as it possibly could, and even then failures were common.
Over the next few months due to limited available supplies of the torpedo (135 in March) few operations were undertaken.
In July 1940 the only operational airborne torpedo Staffel ready for action was 3/Ku.Fl.Gr 506 based at Stavanger, to be followed by 1./Ku.Fl.Gr 106 from mid August based at Norderney

From August as other He 115 torpedo attack units became operational, combat sorties increased though the limited number of torpedoes available was always a problem ( in September the figure was down to 38 at one point)
The first successes of the He 115 units may have been the sinking of Llanishen (5,035 GRT) and the Makalla (6,680 GRT) of Convoy CA 203 in the Moray Firth on the 23 August 1940, but some sources put their loss down to bombs not torpedoes.
The first confirmed success of He 115 torpedo bombers was the sinking of the Remuera (11,445 GRT) by Ku.Fl.Gr 506 on the 26 August 1940.

Over the next 4 months until the end of the year the Luftwaffe used about 160 airborne torpedoes in operations against British shipping in Northern waters, Luftwaffe claims were high (one unit alone, 3./Ku.Fl.Gr 506 was credited with sinking 124,000 GRT) but when checked against British losses, Luftwaffe torpedo bombers probably sank a total of 7 or 8 Allied merchant ships of around 50-60,000 GRT in 1940.


During this period there were attempts to use both the He 111 and Ju 88 in the torpedo bomber role, but due to problems with inter service rivalry, and the LT F5 torpedo, none became operational in 1940, though the He 111 did become operational as a torpedo bomber in early 1941.

Source for the facts and figures used in this article
Luftwaffe Aerial Torpedo Aircraft and Operations in World War II, by Harold Thiele"

Note the use vs merchants, certainly PoW and Repulse were tougher opponents.

Some more stats:

"On 11 January 1941, HMS Southampton, accompanied by HMS Gloucester at position some 220 miles east of the Sicilian coast came under attack of the II/St.G. 2 with 35 Ju-87s. Southampton received two direct 500 kg bomb hits: the first detonated in the wardroom and the second in the officer's mess. Huge fires broke out and isolated some of the control for flooding the magazines, rendering the situation immediately critical. After 4 hours of fruitless efforts to bring the conflagration under control, HMS Southampton was abandoned at 19.00 H. "(that's 6% hits)

"During the first ten days of the Normandy operation with hundreds of targets, only five vessels were sunk. Norwegian air strength was supplemented by the Ju 188, but during a four-day attack where 200 torpedoes were launched, all failed to hit."

"Of the 860 sorties flown by Stumpff's Luftflotte V aircraft against PQs 16, 17, and 18, over 340 were made by torpedo bombers. German assessments of these operations confirmed that the torpedo bomber was the most efficient mean of destroying enemy merchant ship. The calculations undertaken by Luftwaffe's 8th Abteilung have proved that while only one vessel was sunk for every 19 bombing sorties undertaken, torpedo missions sank an Allied vessel on every 8 sorties, that is, they were on average twice as effective as high-level or dive-bombing attacks, and one-quarter of all the torpedoes launched struck their targets."

PQ-16 lost 6 ships to air attack
PQ-17 lost 13 (only 3 while in convoy, the rest when dispersed)
PQ-18 lost 10 at a price of 40 a/c lost.

29/860 - 3% success rate

There's truth, falseness and statistics...

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?4537-German-Torpedo-Bombers-What-Were-they&

[old_pop2000]

23% and 2 hits against manoeuvering and alerted warships is pretty good compared to similar attacks on the Med. For the LW I found this extract for the early part of the war:

"Luftwaffe Torpedo Operations 1936-40.

The first operation use of airborne torpedoes by the Luftwaffe was in the Spanish Civil War. From mid 1936 a small number of Heinkel He 59 seaplanes served with the Seeflieger Gruppe AS/88 of the Condor Legion, operating from the island of Majorca. This unit was operational until the spring of 1939, and during this time launched a number of airborne torpedoes in combat. However due to problems with the LT F5 torpedo only one was successful. An attack on the British merchant ship Thropeness (4,700 GRT) which on the night of 21st July 1938 was entering the Spanish port of Valencia loaded with grain. At the time it was claimed by the Spanish Nationalists that this ship had been sunk by a mine.

By the start of WW2, the Seeflieger possessed 30 operational He 59s in four Staffeln. At this time the He 115 was starting to come into service, but due to the fragility of the LT F5 torpedo it couldn’t be carried, as the He 115 couldn’t fly slow enough, without stalling, to release the LT F5 torpedo successfully.
From October 1939 the few He 59s flew a limited number of torpedo operations against Allied shipping, but the only success recorded by He 59s using torpedoes in WW2 was the sinking of the British fishing steamer, Active (185 GRT) on the 18 December 1939.

In March 1940 with technical improvements to the LT F5 torpedo (including a new rudder) the He 115 was made operational with this torpedo, replacing the He 59 in the role, though the torpedo was still far from satisfactory, as it still required the He 115 to fly as slow and low as it possibly could, and even then failures were common.
Over the next few months due to limited available supplies of the torpedo (135 in March) few operations were undertaken.
In July 1940 the only operational airborne torpedo Staffel ready for action was 3/Ku.Fl.Gr 506 based at Stavanger, to be followed by 1./Ku.Fl.Gr 106 from mid August based at Norderney

From August as other He 115 torpedo attack units became operational, combat sorties increased though the limited number of torpedoes available was always a problem ( in September the figure was down to 38 at one point)
The first successes of the He 115 units may have been the sinking of Llanishen (5,035 GRT) and the Makalla (6,680 GRT) of Convoy CA 203 in the Moray Firth on the 23 August 1940, but some sources put their loss down to bombs not torpedoes.
The first confirmed success of He 115 torpedo bombers was the sinking of the Remuera (11,445 GRT) by Ku.Fl.Gr 506 on the 26 August 1940.

Over the next 4 months until the end of the year the Luftwaffe used about 160 airborne torpedoes in operations against British shipping in Northern waters, Luftwaffe claims were high (one unit alone, 3./Ku.Fl.Gr 506 was credited with sinking 124,000 GRT) but when checked against British losses, Luftwaffe torpedo bombers probably sank a total of 7 or 8 Allied merchant ships of around 50-60,000 GRT in 1940.


During this period there were attempts to use both the He 111 and Ju 88 in the torpedo bomber role, but due to problems with inter service rivalry, and the LT F5 torpedo, none became operational in 1940, though the He 111 did become operational as a torpedo bomber in early 1941.

Source for the facts and figures used in this article
Luftwaffe Aerial Torpedo Aircraft and Operations in World War II, by Harold Thiele"

Note the use vs merchants, certainly PoW and Repulse were tougher opponents.

Some more stats:

"On 11 January 1941, HMS Southampton, accompanied by HMS Gloucester at position some 220 miles east of the Sicilian coast came under attack of the II/St.G. 2 with 35 Ju-87s. Southampton received two direct 500 kg bomb hits: the first detonated in the wardroom and the second in the officer's mess. Huge fires broke out and isolated some of the control for flooding the magazines, rendering the situation immediately critical. After 4 hours of fruitless efforts to bring the conflagration under control, HMS Southampton was abandoned at 19.00 H. "(that's 6% hits)

"During the first ten days of the Normandy operation with hundreds of targets, only five vessels were sunk. Norwegian air strength was supplemented by the Ju 188, but during a four-day attack where 200 torpedoes were launched, all failed to hit."

"Of the 860 sorties flown by Stumpff's Luftflotte V aircraft against PQs 16, 17, and 18, over 340 were made by torpedo bombers. German assessments of these operations confirmed that the torpedo bomber was the most efficient mean of destroying enemy merchant ship. The calculations undertaken by Luftwaffe's 8th Abteilung have proved that while only one vessel was sunk for every 19 bombing sorties undertaken, torpedo missions sank an Allied vessel on every 8 sorties, that is, they were on average twice as effective as high-level or dive-bombing attacks, and one-quarter of all the torpedoes launched struck their targets."

PQ-16 lost 6 ships to air attack
PQ-17 lost 13 (only 3 while in convoy, the rest when dispersed)
PQ-18 lost 10 at a price of 40 a/c lost.

29/860 - 3% success rate

There's truth, falseness and statistics...

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?4537-German-Torpedo-Bombers-What-Were-they&

Hi JMS:
Thanks for the research. Slow moving merchants are much better targets. But statistics are all we have at this point in history. As to the results, I believe that Japanese results against merchants would be similiar. But I don't believe we have any data that proves the Japanese pilots were any better than the Luftwaffe pilots. They all had difficulties with maneuvering targets in flak conditions and air opposition. This was the primary reason for the move to glide bomb attacks and decrease in torpedo attacks by aircraft. They were dangerous and produced few results against maneuving warships. Many of these situations are unique and difficult to extract meaningful stats. Again, I haven't seen anything in my numbers or yours that confirms that the German luftwaffe was any better or worse than the Japanese.

I would say that everything I've read, points to the fact that the addition of Fliegerkorp X did change the complexion of the war in the Mediterranean. Whether they were more or less accurate, remains to be proven. But they did have an effect on Malta's operations and the operations of the British fleets in the eastern and western Mediterranean. However, there were other events around the world that can and did affect this area.

[JMS]

I think the comparison cannot be made fairly, a lot depends on the training of the pilots. LW statistics before the setting up of the Grosseto school were unremarkable, Japanese statistics after the ravaging of their air groups ended up being poor too.
There were also hardware issues (Mk-13 torpedo early in the Pacific war...), different attack profiles, difference between opponents... The Japanese in 1941 were very good, but losses for the Bettys would likely be higher in the Med vs He-111 or Ju-88 or SM.79 because they were sturdier.

[old_pop2000]

I think the comparison cannot be made fairly, a lot depends on the training of the pilots. LW statistics before the setting up of the Grosseto school were unremarkable, Japanese statistics after the ravaging of their air groups ended up being poor too.
There were also hardware issues (Mk-13 torpedo early in the Pacific war...), different attack profiles, difference between opponents... The Japanese in 1941 were very good, but losses for the Bettys would likely be higher in the Med vs He-111 or Ju-88 or SM.79 because they were sturdier.

Hi JMS:
There are a lot of reasons why Japanese carrier aircraft took heavy losses in the first four carrier battles of the war. Our radar and fighter control system were effective, even when it was new at Coral Sea. Our aircraft and pilots were skilled and well trained. The Japanese aircraft were not well protected and with the air wings having few available fighters, the attackers went in alone. There are many factors for both operational theatres that were different. Both were effective in their theatres, for short period of time. The question then is was either side effective over the balance of time and answer is no. Neither side maintained their control and in fact, the Japanese never gained it. Their air wings only gained a draw at Santa Cruz but their air wings were decimated. They even lost Murata, their best and most experienced torpedo bomber pilot. They never recovered from the losses. But they never gained control of the sea lanes and at Guadalcanal their land based air wings were decimated in the whole six months campaign. We must judge by results. In this case, the Italian-German Mediterranean air force, once the NA coast was in Allied hands, they lost air control over the Med. especially with the movement of US air forces and ships into the area. So, you be the judge.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi JMS:
Thanks for the research. Slow moving merchants are much better targets. But statistics are all we have at this point in history. As to the results, I believe that Japanese results against merchants would be similiar. But I don't believe we have any data that proves the Japanese pilots were any better than the Luftwaffe pilots. They all had difficulties with maneuvering targets in flak conditions and air opposition. This was the primary reason for the move to glide bomb attacks and decrease in torpedo attacks by aircraft. They were dangerous and produced few results against maneuving warships. Many of these situations are unique and difficult to extract meaningful stats. Again, I haven't seen anything in my numbers or yours that confirms that the German luftwaffe was any better or worse than the Japanese.

I would say that everything I've read, points to the fact that the addition of Fliegerkorp X did change the complexion of the war in the Mediterranean. Whether they were more or less accurate, remains to be proven. But they did have an effect on Malta's operations and the operations of the British fleets in the eastern and western Mediterranean. However, there were other events around the world that can and did affect this area.

Hi Dennis,

Just back from vacation. I think it is very hard to compare the effectivness of the Luftwaffe vs the RAI vs the Japanese naval airforce. The closest apple to apple comparison I could think of is the Luftwaffe versus Fiji and Gloucester and Nagumo's Vals versus Cornwall and Dorsetshire. Egusa's Vals sank them, the Hermes, 3 oilers, a corvette, and a destroyer for the loss of one Val. Planes from Ryujo sank 10 merchant ships during the same operation in the Indian Ocean. All were dangerous opponents. I think the IJN enjoyed the intial advantage of a finely honed, cohesive force untouched by war while the Luftwaffe and RAI were learning antiship work on the job. Accounts of German and Italian attacks show them to be less coordinated and conducted necessarily by fewer planes.

The Luftwaffe's best performance was the intial attack by 40 torpedo planes on PQ18 in September, 1942. 8 merchant ships were sunk with 5 planes lost. There were four more torpedo attacks over the next few days which sank two more ships, but cost 28 torpedo planes. By the last attack, only 12 aircraft were serviceable. 6 divebombers were lost, but only made two hits on a ship already sinking. Most of the German aircraft shot down were by Sea Hurricanes from the escort carrier Avenger.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Just back from vacation. I think it is very hard to compare the effectivness of the Luftwaffe vs the RAI vs the Japanese naval airforce. The closest apple to apple comparison I could think of is the Luftwaffe versus Fiji and Gloucester and Nagumo's Vals versus Cornwall and Dorsetshire. Egusa's Vals sank them, the Hermes, 3 oilers, a corvette, and a destroyer for the loss of one Val. Planes from Ryujo sank 10 merchant ships during the same operation in the Indian Ocean. All were dangerous opponents. I think the IJN enjoyed the intial advantage of a finely honed, cohesive force untouched by war while the Luftwaffe and RAI were learning antiship work on the job. Accounts of German and Italian attacks show them to be less coordinated and conducted necessarily by fewer planes.

The Luftwaffe's best performance was the intial attack by 40 torpedo planes on PQ18 in September, 1942. 8 merchant ships were sunk with 5 planes lost. There were four more torpedo attacks over the next few days which sank two more ships, but cost 28 torpedo planes. By the last attack, only 12 aircraft were serviceable. 6 divebombers were lost, but only made two hits on a ship already sinking. Most of the German aircraft shot down were by Sea Hurricanes from the escort carrier Avenger.

Hi Mike:
While all that is true, and I don't disagree, I would like to see more of the details of how Fliegerkorps X operated. Did they use their own B dienst intelligence sources or were the Italians providing the intel. Who was coordinating the attacks? The answer is in the details. Now, having said that, I am certain that the IJN pilots were much better trained for naval attack missions than the Luftwaffe. But when I do rudimentary analysis on percentages of hits in selected important missions, the average for both sides is .23 or 23% hits. Neither side is really that accurate. On the German side, there is a clear lack of historical analysis by authors on the subject of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterrranean. It makes a valid comparison very difficult.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
While all that is true, and I don't disagree, I would like to see more of the details of how Fliegerkorps X operated. Did they use their own B dienst intelligence sources or were the Italians providing the intel. Who was coordinating the attacks? The answer is in the details. Now, having said that, I am certain that the IJN pilots were much better trained for naval attack missions than the Luftwaffe. But when I do rudimentary analysis on percentages of hits in selected important missions, the average for both sides is .23 or 23% hits. Neither side is really that accurate. On the German side, there is a clear lack of historical analysis by authors on the subject of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterrranean. It makes a valid comparison very difficult.

Hi Dennis,

You ask a lot of good questions. I remember being skeptical about the claims of the number of hits on Hermes and Dorsetshire, upwards of 20 a piece, by Egusa's pilots. There are good pictures of both ships sinking post attack which do not show the massive kind of damage you would expect to see after 20 or so 500 lb bomb hits per ship. Hermes flight deck looks virtually intact. The AA ability of those ships was virtually nil against such pilots with excellent weather conditions. However, later efforts under fire were not as spectacular. The Luftwaffe attacks against the arctic convoys were under much toughter conditions.

On the other side of the coin, I don't want to discount that such attacks were difficult to coordintate because of limited information and relative primitive communications abilities. The range advantage of Betty's and Nell's allowed the Japanese to launch search and strike attacks looking for P of W and Replulse.

I think it's possible to do an apples to apples comparison between the effectiveness of the RAI and Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean. Sadkovich mentions in his book that the RAI suffered from the Germans not supplying more JU 87s and torpedoes for the Aerosiluranti units. The Italians did have a satisfactory aerial torpedo and several version of the motobomba self propelled mine (dropped ahead of the target), but not the ablity to produce them in significant enough numbers. The Italians did hhave some successes with torpedo bombers, but the Luftwaffe torpedo bomber units sank the bulk of ships with about the same overall numbers of aircraft.

[Vince O'Hara]

Hi Mike:
But when I do rudimentary analysis on percentages of hits in selected important missions, the average for both sides is .23 or 23% hits. Neither side is really that accurate. On the German side, there is a clear lack of historical analysis by authors on the subject of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterrranean. It makes a valid comparison very difficult.

Dennis, 23%!!!! What attacks are you looking at and how are you calculating your percentages of hits? I just did a very rough and quick ratio of sorties to hits for June 14 and June 15 1942 on the Harpoon convoy only and came up with 158 aircraft sorties for the Italians and four hits (resulting in two sinkings) and seventy-five sorties for the Germans resulting in two, maybe three hits (three sinkings but I think one of the sinkings is misattributed.) These are hit rates on the order of 2.6 percent for the Italians and 2.7 to 4% for the Germans. Plus, I know my totals for sorties are understated. These attacks were conducted in favorable weather conditions. Their escorts outnumbered combat air patrol, generally and many of the German attacks were made after the escort had been weakened or was engaged in fighting Italian surface units. The Italian attacks included torpedo bombers (about half) high level bombers and dive bombers. The Germans were all dive or glide bombing attacks. I'm not counting attacks made on friendly units of which there were at least twenty (no hits).

On June 14 and 15 the Germans conducted even more sorties against the Vigorous convoy (I'm too lazy right now to try to tally the exact number) and achieved even fewer successes. They did not, for the most part, face fighter oppostion.

Vince

[Vince O'Hara]

I think it's possible to do an apples to apples comparisons between the effectiveness of the RAI and Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean. Sadkovich mentions in his book that the RAI suffered from the Germans not supplying more JU 87s and torpedoes for the Aerosiluranti units. The Italians did have a satisfactory aerial torpedo and several version of the motobomba self propelled mine (dropped ahead of the target), but not the ablity to produce them in significant enough numbers. The Italians did hhave some successes with torpedo bombers, but the Luftwaffe torpedo bomber units sank the bulk of ships with about the same overall numbers of aircraft.

Hi Mike. I agree that useful comparisons are possible -- to a point. The greater the universe being compared, the better. For for some of the other comments, the motobomba didn't come on line until August 1942. It wasn't the fault of the Germans that the Italians couldn't produce a good dive-bomber (they tried). The Italians exported aerial torpedoes to the Germans because the Germans couldn't make one as good. Italian torpedo bombers sank 21 and damgaed 19 Allied ships up through July 1943 flying death traps (the S.79 and S.84) German torpedo bombers (He.111s and adapted Ju.88s) damaged seven and sank six Allied ships through the end of 1942. This is from the excellent article by Pierre Hervieux, "Le operazioni degli aerosiluranti italiani e tedeschi in Mediterraneo." I'm going to post a link on a website. See the media section sometime today.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, 23%!!!! What attacks are you looking at and how are you calculating your percentages of hits? I just did a very rough and quick ratio of sorties to hits for June 14 and June 15 1942 on the Harpoon convoy only and came up with 158 aircraft sorties for the Italians and four hits (resulting in two sinkings) and seventy-five sorties for the Germans resulting in two, maybe three hits (three sinkings but I think one of the sinkings is misattributed.) These are hit rates on the order of 2.6 percent for the Italians and 2.7 to 4% for the Germans. Plus, I know my totals for sorties are understated. These attacks were conducted in favorable weather conditions. Their escorts outnumbered combat air patrol, generally and many of the German attacks were made after the escort had been weakened or was engaged in fighting Italian surface units. The Italian attacks included torpedo bombers (about half) high level bombers and dive bombers. The Germans were all dive or glide bombing attacks. I'm not counting attacks made on friendly units of which there were at least twenty (no hits).

On June 14 and 15 the Germans conducted even more sorties against the Vigorous convoy (I'm too lazy right now to try to tally the exact number) and achieved even fewer successes. They did not, for the most part, face fighter oppostion.

Vince

Vince:
You have far more data at hand than I do. I have stated, in another post, that I would like to see a valid assessment of how well Fliegerkorps X and others actually performed overall, based on the amount of ordnance expended versus the number of hits. Not the number sorties, which is one airplane on one mission. Did every plane drop its ordnance, we assume it did? I would not assume that and if they did not, then it does not hold water. Did every plane that took off, even find the target? We need to know how many bombs or torpedoes were expended versus the number of hits. For the Japanese, against Hermes, it was 80 250lb bombs dropped, 40 hits. I know of no better way to determine the capabilities of either side than that. In the case of Hermes, she had limited AA guns, no fighter support and was moving at about 22-23 knots. A sitting duck, if you will. On the surface, it appears that the japanese had the advantage because of their training in naval attack and it showed in many instances. However, overall, they rarely had more than a 20-25% hit rate. Ours was no better. Dropping a 500 lb bomb on a maneuvering ship, from 2000 feet is not easy as most of the pilots I've talked to, have stated.

[old_pop2000]

I want to point out some problems when attempting to analyze data about bombings and accuracy. What matters is how man bombs or torpedoes were expended on the target and how many hits were obtained. Example: At Midway, Hornet launched on her first attack 10 fighters, 35 dive bombers and 15 torpedo bombers. So, sixty sorties were launched and hit the target, correct. No hits were recorded. Wrong. None of the dive bombers ever encountered the Japanese fleet and neither did the fighters, to my knowledge. So, the actual expended ordnance is about 15 torpedoes. But wait, not all the torpedo bombers made it to the target and launched a weapon, some were shot down before hand trying to dive into position. So, the number is far less.

Same problem for the actual attack by the Enterprise dive bombers. We know that 30 dive bombers from Enterprise dived on Kaga and Akagi, but only 12 dropped bombs. and six missed. What happened to the other eighteen? The efficiency of the Enterprise dive bombers is, in effect, 50%. 12 bombs expended, six hits. But even that isn't correct. Kaga was attacked by 25 dive bombers but only nine bombs were dropped near her. So, using sorties and hits does not work. You must know how many aircraft reached the target and actually dived on the target and hit the target to make a real determination of accuracy. If you read the Action Report from Enterprise, they expended in three days, 57 x 1000 lb, 67 x 500 lb, 22 x 100 lb bombs for the VSB and VB squadrons and obtained probably no more than 10 hits. Hiryu was struck by four bombs from 13 dive bombers from Enterprise. That's 144 pieces of ordnance expended and 10 hits. That's 6.9%, if my calculator isn't lying to me. That also does not include the torpedoes expended on the first day by the eighteen TBD's. If we assume all launched, then its an additional 18. Now its 6.1%, big change.

This type of discussion about how many planes departed, reached the target, attacked the target, expended ordnance and hit the target gets complicated and contentious. Historians are still arguing over Midway, Coral Sea and all the carrier battles as to who did what to whom.

[old_pop2000]

According to Greene and Massignani (The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, Pg 134) the attack on the Illustrious on 10 January was initiated by 30 Stukas from Fliegerkorps X. They had been a part of a group of 18 He-111s and 43 Stukas escorted by 10 Me-110s. Four Fulmars launched an attempted to climb up to attack. The Stuka dived from 12,000 feet and released at 2000 feet. She was hit five times, with one failing to explode and one near miss which damaged her steering gear and caused flooding. It appears that later at 1600 hrs, 6 Italian Stukas attacked and managed one bomb hit and two near misses.

14 Stukas later attacked without success Valiant and Janus. 14 He-111s attacked and no hits obtained

Now, it appears that a total of 36 Stukas, both Italian and Germans attacked Illustrious, managing 6 hits, one near miss with damage, and 2 near misses, damage unknown. Discounting the latter, that is 36 bombs released, for 7 hits. Did I miss anything there. they managed a 19.4% hit rate. Discounting the Italians, it would be 30 bombs expended and 6 direct hits and 1 damaging near miss for a hit rate of 20%.

Total attacks was 64 bombs expended for a hit rate of about 11%. Total FliegerKorps X aircraft sortied was 71 aircraft along with 6 Italian.

Just trying to be fair and honest, as always.

[Vince O'Hara]

My perception is that when one piles on the variables then you’re right, it is impossible to make useful comparisons because, ultimately, every situation is unique. For this reason, I like to back away a little and look at the larger picture. In the example I cited the numbers of sorties includes only aircraft that arrived over the target and participated in the attack. Nearly all dropped their ordinance (some were forced to abort by enemy defenses). Looking at as much of the universe as possible, I think useful conclusions and comparisons can be made and reasonable baseline expectations can be assigned as to the relative power of a nation’s air assets. Within those baselines, there are very many variables that can affect the final result, but that is a different type of analysis. My example doesn't set a baseline . . . you'd need much more data, but I think it does suggest what that baseline might look like.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

My perception is that when one piles on the variables then you’re right, it is impossible to make useful comparisons because, ultimately, every situation is unique. For this reason, I like to back away a little and look at the larger picture. In the example I cited the numbers of sorties includes only aircraft that arrived over the target and participated in the attack. Nearly all dropped their ordinance (some were forced to abort by enemy defenses). Looking at as much of the universe as possible, I think useful conclusions and comparisons can be made and reasonable baseline expectations can be assigned as to the relative power of a nation’s air assets. Within those baselines, there are very many variables that can affect the final result, but that is a different type of analysis. My example doesn't set a baseline . . . you'd need much more data, but I think it does suggest what that baseline might look like.

Vince

I am not certain that the comparisons have any real value. The real question is; did Fliegerkorps X, when in action, succeed in protecting Axis convoys and choking off British convoys to Malta? Sea control does not require me to sink everything, just to control the flow and in many cases turn it off. So, did they provide control over the eastern Mediterranean and help the Axis armies in North Africa advance towards Egypt. I believe the answer is yes. Were they as good as the Japanese in sinking ships? It doesn't matter. Two different operational areas, each with their own unique conditions.

So, I will agree that based on the sparse data that we can gather, Fliegerkorp X was not as good at sinking ships as the Japanese. But, did they accomplish their mission, while in theatre?

[old_pop2000]

Here is a rough comparison of Japanese pilots against Enterprise at Santa Cruz. Enterprise Action Report states that 24 dive bombers attacked, with 7 shot down before dropping ordnance. Three bomb hits were reported. That equals 17.6% bombing efficiency.

She reported 15 torpedo bombers, one shot down about five miles from the ship, leaving 14 for the attack. Nine torpedoes launched, no hits.

All total, 32 attacks where ordnance launched, 3 actual hits. That is a hit rate of 9.3%

For Hornet, the attack was led by Lcdr. Murata, with 21 Vals and 20 kates. 21 attack aircraft were lost either getting in or during attacks. It is unknown whether they were shot down before or after the expenditure of ordnance. We know they were in the battle area and attacking. From my gleaning of the records from three sources, 6 bomb hits and 2 torpedo hits were confirmed. So, we can estimate that 41 attacks and expenditures are accounted for, with 8 hits. That's 19.5%. Caveat: remember we are counting some of the downed aircraft as having expended ordnance. BTW, in my sources, the Vals were carrying one 350kg and two 100 kg. All were salvoed at one time. So, its three times 21 or 63 pieces of ordnance expended added to the 20 torpedoes for a total of 83 pieces of ordnance expended and 8 hits. That lowers the hit rate to 9.6%. The same holds true for Enterprise. So, we can add that to her totals. Unfortunately, we don't know if the smaller bombs struck at the same time as the larger.

In total, there were 73 known attacks on two carriers with 11 hits. That is a combined hit rate of 15%. This is the last known coordinated, full scale successful attack by the IJN carrier air wings in the war. They were led by the best torpedo pilot available and they managed only 15% hits. Much of it due to heavy AA fire and well over 40 defending fighters.

[JMS]

I see problems with any statistic, be it spent ordnance (it would include bombs jettisoned by planes who don't find the target), number of sorties (caveats exposed above) or counting hits (how many missed, how many were close enough to do damage,...)

[old_pop2000]

I see problems with any statistic, be it spent ordnance (it would include bombs jettisoned by planes who don't find the target), number of sorties (caveats exposed above) or counting hits (how many missed, how many were close enough to do damage,...)

Hi JMS:
The eternal skeptic, and that is not bad. I am not a stats nut, but sometimes its important to convey an idea as long as everyone understands that the data is raw and untested.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I am not certain that the comparisons have any real value. The real question is; did Fliegerkorps X, when in action, succeed in protecting Axis convoys and choking off British convoys to Malta? Sea control does not require me to sink everything, just to control the flow and in many cases turn it off. So, did they provide control over the eastern Mediterranean and help the Axis armies in North Africa advance towards Egypt. I believe the answer is yes. Were they as good as the Japanese in sinking ships? It doesn't matter. Two different operational areas, each with their own unique conditions.

So, I will agree that based on the sparse data that we can gather, Fliegerkorp X was not as good at sinking ships as the Japanese. But, did they accomplish their mission, while in theatre?

Hi Dennis,

I think you can argue no. While severly damaging Cunningham's fleet and pushing it almost to the breaking point, they were unable deny the British the use of the Mediterranean. The RN were able to evacuate troops from Greece and Crete and obstruct the land component of the Crete operation. Had they been left in place for another three months, a much different story.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I think you can argue no. While severly damaging Cunningham's fleet and pushing it almost to the breaking point, they were unable deny the British the use of the Mediterranean. The RN were able to evacuate troops from Greece and Crete and obstruct the land component of the Crete operation. Had they been left in place for another three months, a much different story.

I am not certain I can agree with that. We know that the British lost Illustrious to damage and Southhampton to sinking. Cunningham, in his report to the Admiralty of 19 March 1941 states that " ... it is a potent new factor in the Mediterranean war and will undoubtedly deny us that free access to the waters immediately surrounding Malta and Sicily which we have previously enjoyed until our own air forces have been built-up to a scale to meet it." He goes on to say that dive bombing attacks by German aircraft were most efficiently performed and came as an unpleasant surprise...." I think this means that Fliegerkorps X was having its effect almost immediately and to continue to move supplies to Malta was going to be difficult. This is sea control, in my view.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I am not certain I can agree with that. We know that the British lost Illustrious to damage and Southhampton to sinking. Cunningham, in his report to the Admiralty of 19 March 1941 states that " ... it is a potent new factor in the Mediterranean war and will undoubtedly deny us that free access to the waters immediately surrounding Malta and Sicily which we have previously enjoyed until our own air forces have been built-up to a scale to meet it." He goes on to say that dive bombing attacks by German aircraft were most efficiently performed and came as an unpleasant surprise...." I think this means that Fliegerkorps X was having its effect almost immediately and to continue to move supplies to Malta was going to be difficult. This is sea control, in my view.

Hi Dennis,

I don't know what the Luftwaffe's mission wording was, but in terms of denying the use of the Mediterranean to the RN, they failed. Malta remained supplied, Cunningham transported troops to Greece and Crete by sea and removed them as neccessary under the shadow of Fliegerkorps X. He was able to win to seek out teh Italian fleet and win at Matapan. By the end of March, Cunningham was on the ropes after Crete. The withdrawal of Fliegerkorps X gave him a breathing space to be reinforced and station Force K at Malta over the summer and fall of 1941. Leaving Fliegerkorps X's 300 or so aircraft in place might have yielded decisive dividends in the Mediterranean.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I don't know what the Luftwaffe's mission wording was, but in terms of denying the use of the Mediterranean to the RN, they failed. Malta remained supplied, Cunningham transported troops to Greece and Crete by sea and removed them as neccessary under the shadow of Fliegerkorps X. He was able to win to seek out teh Italian fleet and win at Matapan. By the end of March, Cunningham was on the ropes after Crete. The withdrawal of Fliegerkorps X gave him a breathing space to be reinforced and station Force K at Malta over the summer and fall of 1941. Leaving Fliegerkorps X's 300 or so aircraft in place might have yielded decisive dividends in the Mediterranean.

Fliegerkorps X was transferred, or at least many of the main units were transferred to NA and therefore were not in a position to continue the attacks on Malta convoys or Malta itself. I believe that was a mistake, but Rommel did need some air support. So, they were not actually withdrawn, just rearranged. BTW, the short range of Stuka was a disadvantage to air operations.

[old_pop2000]

This thread and the other, revolve around the concept of sea control and whether sea control was accomplished by any side in the 1940-1943 battle of the Mediterranean. Sea control is either permanent or temporary. One term that I recently came across in reading over my books is the idea of contested sea control. This term was applied to the period in discussion; 1940-1943 in the Mediterranean. It occurs between two strong opponents and many times in the initial phases of the war. Command cannot be maintained by any side for long. It can be contested even by the weaker side, in both the open ocean or coastal regions. In coastal areas, land based air can be a major factor. As pointed out, Axis submarines did contest Allied control throughout both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. Each side had local control in the area transited by convoys, but only temporarily. The term used is "moving zone". Quite appropos. The best forces for this kind of contested control were the lighter forces along with submarines and carriers. This whole idea of contested control appears to identify perfectly what we see in the Mediterranean in the first three years of the war. Another factor is that control of the land surrounding a narrow sea is important for the maintenance of this control. Sicily, Cyrenaica in North Africa, Crete, Dodencanese. all of these areas including Malta and Sardinia were important to the maintenance of control. However, as we have discussed, even with the addition of the two Fliegerkorps from the Luftwaffe, control was contested. With the movement of many squadrons to Cyrenaica, control over the Maltese skys was lost for periods of time and exploited by the British convoys.

One other issue is the decision by the British to defend and contest the Mediterranean. The British always placed a priority on the North Atlantic and secondarily, Singpore. However, the concept was to place the best ships in Alexandria to facilitate the movement to the Far East and to basically act as a "fleet-in-being" to the Japanese. However, according to H.P. Willmott, in the 1920's with the economic problems after the war and the Naval Limitation Treaty, the British just could not afford to base large warships at that location. They began to inform the Allies like NZ and Australia, of a time frame for when ships would be available. This situation was layed out in a War plan. The time period for the movement of ships began to slip and in 1939, it was six months. I bring this up, because the collapse of the French armed forces and disarming of their fleet plus the entrance of the Italian's into the war, was a direct cause of the failure to provide more ships along with other military equipment to the Far East. This is one effect of the action in the Mediterranean and cannot be underestimated.

[Mike Malanaphy]

This thread and the other, revolve around the concept of sea control and whether sea control was accomplished by any side in the 1940-1943 battle of the Mediterranean. Sea control is either permanent or temporary. One term that I recently came across in reading over my books is the idea of contested sea control. This term was applied to the period in discussion; 1940-1943 in the Mediterranean. It occurs between two strong opponents and many times in the initial phases of the war. Command cannot be maintained by any side for long. It can be contested even by the weaker side, in both the open ocean or coastal regions. In coastal areas, land based air can be a major factor. As pointed out, Axis submarines did contest Allied control throughout both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. Each side had local control in the area transited by convoys, but only temporarily. The term used is "moving zone". Quite appropos. The best forces for this kind of contested control were the lighter forces along with submarines and carriers. This whole idea of contested control appears to identify perfectly what we see in the Mediterranean in the first three years of the war. Another factor is that control of the land surrounding a narrow sea is important for the maintenance of this control. Sicily, Cyrenaica in North Africa, Crete, Dodencanese. all of these areas including Malta and Sardinia were important to the maintenance of control. However, as we have discussed, even with the addition of the two Fliegerkorps from the Luftwaffe, control was contested. With the movement of many squadrons to Cyrenaica, control over the Maltese skys was lost for periods of time and exploited by the British convoys.

One other issue is the decision by the British to defend and contest the Mediterranean. The British always placed a priority on the North Atlantic and secondarily, Singpore. However, the concept was to place the best ships in Alexandria to facilitate the movement to the Far East and to basically act as a "fleet-in-being" to the Japanese. However, according to H.P. Willmott, in the 1920's with the economic problems after the war and the Naval Limitation Treaty, the British just could not afford to base large warships at that location. They began to inform the Allies like NZ and Australia, of a time frame for when ships would be available. This situation was layed out in a War plan. The time period for the movement of ships began to slip and in 1939, it was six months. I bring this up, because the collapse of the French armed forces and disarming of their fleet plus the entrance of the Italian's into the war, was a direct cause of the failure to provide more ships along with other military equipment to the Far East. This is one effect of the action in the Mediterranean and cannot be underestimated.

Hi Dennis,

A pretty accurate description of the tactical situation. Neither side could amass sufficient mass to maintain permanent control and deny access to the other navy. Economic reality after WWI forced the RN to replace the two power standard for fleet size dating from 1889 for a one power standard. This and naval limitations only allowed the British 15 captial ships, three BCs and 12 battleships. With one battle squadron each for the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets. The Mediterranean loomed large in strategy because of Suez and it's link to the east. The loss of the French fleet as a counter balance to Italy threw a major monkey wrench into pre war planning assumptions which allowed for only one war and enough warning for the fleet to transfer east to Singapore to confront the Japanese. The Australian and New Zealand governments were concerned that the bulk of their forces were fighting in North Africa and with the RN. Churchill had to bend to their calls for assistance against the looming Japanese threat. Resources available were militarily insignificant, but a gesture had to be made. Churchill believed Force Z could be a deterrent and in time of war, hide amongst the islands to raid Japanese forces until reinforced....OOPS. A similar miscalculation of Japanese determination/desperation was made by Roosevelt in sending the fleet to Pearl Harbor.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

A pretty accurate description of the tactical situation. Neither side could amass sufficient mass to maintain permanent control and deny access to the other navy. Economic reality after WWI forced the RN to replace the two power standard for fleet size dating from 1889 for a one power standard. This and naval limitations only allowed the British 15 captial ships, three BCs and 12 battleships. With one battle squadron each for the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets. The Mediterranean loomed large in strategy because of Suez and it's link to the east. The loss of the French fleet as a counter balance to Italy threw a major monkey wrench into pre war planning assumptions which allowed for only one war and enough warning for the fleet to transfer east to Singapore to confront the Japanese. The Australian and New Zealand governments were concerned that the bulk of their forces were fighting in North Africa and with the RN. Churchill had to bend to their calls for assistance against the looming Japanese threat. Resources available were militarily insignificant, but a gesture had to be made. Churchill believed Force Z could be a deterrent and in time of war, hide amongst the islands to raid Japanese forces until reinforced....OOPS. A similar miscalculation of Japanese determination/desperation was made by Roosevelt in sending the fleet to Pearl Harbor.

Hi Mike:
I am not certain how much value Suez would have, once the Italians had effectively controlled the Sicilian straits to traffic. Once the German's mine the canal, that pretty much ended travel through it. The British had to make some choices and the loss of the French fleet and the entrance into the war of Italy, seems to have helped them make the choices.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
I am not certain how much value Suez would have, once the Italians had effectively controlled the Sicilian straits to traffic. Once the German's mine the canal, that pretty much ended travel through it. The British had to make some choices and the loss of the French fleet and the entrance into the war of Italy, seems to have helped them make the choices.

Hi Dennis,

I would argue they didn't really see a choice. British policy saw Suez the linch pin of the Empire and it occupied a similar postion of strategic importance as the Panama Canal did for the United States. The British occupied Egypt in 1882 to specifically protect the Canal. The presence of a British Fleet in the Mediterranean was primarily for protection of the Canal. Once Italy entered the war, the British moved quickly to eliminate Italian air and sea power in her colonies on the Red Sea at the south end of the Canal and clear Cyrenaica of Italian forces as well. Even as late as 1956, England and France were willing to use military force to prevent any Egyptian restrictions on the Canal from being imposed. A large proportion of RN losses occured in the Mediterranean, especially in 1941, and the large convoy efforts of 1942 required the transfer of ships from the Home Fleet and Arctic to cover those operations. Interesting to speculate had the USN been willing to commit Ranger and Wasp during those critical months. With effective radar, good AA escorts, and Wildcats, either was arguably a more potent air power platform than anything in the RN could field.

The Luftwaffe flew a number of mining sorties against the canal, but were unable to sustain it to outstrip British mine sweeping efforts. Your questions about the finer points of RAI and Luftwaffe operations are important. On the surface, the RAI and Luftwafe should have been able to dominate the Narrows with little problem. The close range allowed planes to fly multiple sorties and the air defense mounted by the RN was woeful compared to what the IJN faced against Americans even early in the war. Attacks were generally not coordinated effectively and flown in small numbers. Coordination with naval forces was poor as well. Reconnaissance seemed to be a particular problem for both air forces even in an a relatively small geographical area. The aircraft were capable, crews relatively well trained, and generally had pretty decent flying conditions. While there was a shortage of torpedoes and torpedo bombers, both the RAI and Luftwaffe had found fighter bombers to be effective against ships. So somewhere underneath the hood, something wasn't right.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I would argue they didn't really see a choice. British policy saw Suez the linch pin of the Empire and it occupied a similar postion of strategic importance as the Panama Canal did for the United States. The British occupied Egypt in 1882 to specifically protect the Canal. The presence of a British Fleet in the Mediterranean was primarily for protection of the Canal. Once Italy entered the war, the British moved quickly to eliminate Italian air and sea power in her colonies on the Red Sea at the south end of the Canal and clear Cyrenaica of Italian forces as well. Even as late as 1956, England and France were willing to use military force to prevent any Egyptian restrictions on the Canal from being imposed. A large proportion of RN losses occured in the Mediterranean, especially in 1941, and the large convoy efforts of 1942 required the transfer of ships from the Home Fleet and Arctic to cover those operations. Interesting to speculate had the USN been willing to commit Ranger and Wasp during those critical months. With effective radar, good AA escorts, and Wildcats, either was arguably a more potent air power platform than anything in the RN could field.

The Luftwaffe flew a number of mining sorties against the canal, but were unable to sustain it to outstrip British mine sweeping efforts. Your questions about the finer points of RAI and Luftwaffe operations are important. On the surface, the RAI and Luftwafe should have been able to dominate the Narrows with little problem. The close range allowed planes to fly multiple sorties and the air defense mounted by the RN was woeful compared to what the IJN faced against Americans even early in the war. Attacks were generally not coordinated effectively and flown in small numbers. Coordination with naval forces was poor as well. Reconnaissance seemed to be a particular problem for both air forces even in an a relatively small geographical area. The aircraft were capable, crews relatively well trained, and generally had pretty decent flying conditions. While there was a shortage of torpedoes and torpedo bombers, both the RAI and Luftwaffe had found fighter bombers to be effective against ships. So somewhere underneath the hood, something wasn't right.

Hi Mike:
While all that is true, the real value of the Suez and Alexandria was their connection to the sea lanes through the Med. Once those sea lanes were effectively blocked, there really wasn't much value in the canal except to provide a passage for supplies. Interesting but the operations in Italian Eritrea meant that they actually had a small naval force in the Red sea. This complicated operations for the British.

I am not a revisionist, I believe that the decisions to protect Suez and Malta, were the correct decisions. At some point, one has to fight and for a sea power, attrition warfare is usually the pattern. I think that most historians have got it right about the Med and the British decision to defend the area. There are always alternatives.

[Vince O'Hara]

Suez's major value was as a short cut between Europe and the Indian Ocean; it lopped 4,500 miles off the trip from England to India. No vessels used Suez to travel from England to India from May 1940 to July or August 1943 plainly reducing its value. The canal was still handy to stage vessels into the Mediterranean from the Red Sea. Several Malta convoys were loaded in England, sailed around Africa and up the Red Sea and through Suez to Malta.

As for Dennis' remark that Great Britain's decision to protect Malta and Suez was correct, this might well be true. Someone (maybe it was H.P. Wilmott) observed that wars can only be won by fighting. This was something Churchill seemed to appreciate better than the Italian military. But I don't think it should be accepted as an article of faith that the decision to fight for Malta was the best decision or the only decision that could have been made at that time. In fact, it seems to me that so much was invested in defending Malta (we'll leave Suez out of this for the time being) that it's wrong not to ask the question what did that particular fight gain and what was sacrificed in the effort.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

...

As for Dennis' remark that Great Britain's decision to protect Malta and Suez was correct, this might well be true. Someone (maybe it was H.P. Wilmott) observed that wars can only be won by fighting. This was something Churchill seemed to appreciate better than the Italian military. But I don't think it should be accepted as an article of faith that the decision to fight for Malta was the best decision or the only decision that could have been made at that time. In fact, it seems to me that so much was invested in defending Malta (we'll leave Suez out of this for the time being) that it's wrong not to ask the question what did that particular fight gain and what was sacrificed in the effort.

Vince

Vince:
That is a counterfactual argument. You are saying essentially, what would have happened if they hadn't defended Malta. Ok, let's explore that counterfactual argument. You surrender the island, the German's invade Crete and now the Axis have an even stronger hold on that 4500 mile shortcut. They can now move that Fliegerkorp to the Cyrenaican airfields permanently and use them to attack the British supply lines on the road from Alexandria. It probably also opens the door for even more supplies getting to Benghazi and Tobruk, although both of those are really too small to support any sort of large force in North Africa. We can continue this thought experiment but I believe the simple answer is that it forced the Italians and Germans to defend their convoys and utilize resources on Malta that could have been used to advance Rommel. This is attrition warfare and almost all sea powers have used it in time of war. Why was Guadalcanal important? Because of the airfield and the fact that it gave us a way to attack their main base at Rabaul. It also forced the Japanese navy to expend naval forces to fight for it. Again, attrition warfare and that was one of the driving forces behind Watchtower. Attrition warfare is a nasty, expensive way to fight, but when you can't get at the enemy in the initial stages of a conflict, sometimes it is the best. Was the operation to maintain Malta expensive? Absolutely, and I am certain the Admiralty understood that. So did Churchill, but it served the purpose. The operation in the Med and NA was a drain on the German resources, especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia. They had to provide not only raw materials to Italy for her industry and oil, but planes and troops. Again, it was attrition warfare.

[Vince O'Hara]

Vince:
That is a counterfactual argument. You are saying essentially, what would have happened if they hadn't defended Malta. .

Dennis . . . that's a straw man. I said that the decision to defend Malta should be analyzed and not automatically accepted as the only or even the best option available at the time it was made. It was made hoping for certain results (the collapse of Italian morale) that did not occur. The string of events you listed as consequences if the British had assigned different priorities and adopted a defensive posture in Egypt and the Middle East are hypothetical. What is fact is that Great Britain lost Malaya and, in the process, (in my opinion) its Empire. Did the decision to defend Malta and the year-long effort to make it a base for offensive operations contribute to this result? I think it did. What do you think?

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Dennis . . . that's a straw man. I said that the decision to defend Malta should be analyzed and not automatically accepted as the only or even the best option available at the time it was made. It was made hoping for certain results (the collapse of Italian morale) that did not occur. The string of events you listed as consequences if the British had assigned different priorities and adopted a defensive posture in Egypt and the Middle East are hypothetical. What is fact is that Great Britain lost Malaya and, in the process, (in my opinion) its Empire. Did the decision to defend Malta and the year-long effort to make it a base for offensive operations contribute to this result? I think it did. What do you think?

Vince

Vince:
One of the characteristics of free societies, is the fact that the civilians run the war and decide on grand strategy. This is vital. I believe that Malta and the decision to defend it was a wise military decision and political decision. At some point, a government has to consider what its dominions and Allies think of its performance and whether they will stand with them and fight. If you sacrifice Malta because you are afraid to lose a few ships, then what happens to Egypt? If you abandon Egypt, then what do the South Africans, Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders etc. and the Indians begin to believe about you? They will believe that at some point, you will cut and run when the cost is too high. We may not like that, but it is a fact, that many decisions are forced on a government by Allies and dominions.

As far as militarily, without Malta, then what does the Eastern Mediterranean fleet do? Sit in the harbor at Alexandria? Why not just move it to Colombo and defend the Indian ocean. It certainly isn't going to do any good sitting in those harbors. The German's and Italians will go after them. The decision to preserve Malta and defend it was not a perfect decision. It was expensive but I believe militarily and politically, it was vital and necessary.

[Warship NWS]

IMHO,

Anything beyond the Suez was in effect beyond the effective scope of the RN while the Italians and Germans could still operate naval units in the Med and the Atlantic. The RN CVs were simply not powerful enough, and definitely not worth risking, anywhere within effective reach of IJN/IJA threats until the USN could assist in the Pacific in strength - as the Eagle, POW, and Repulse were sacrificed finding that out the hard way. The USN could not even do much, with the exception of subs, in the SW Pacific until 1942+ - much less the RN. The RN CVs were enough to get the job done against navies that had no CVs of their own and just barely adequate for CAP in the Med. Until the naval contest of the Med and Atlantic could be handled effectively I do not think there was any real reason to push beyond the Suez in strength just to overstretch the RN/RAF into an unsupportable arena vs an enemy that could seriously threaten their survival.

The Malta debate; if nothing else Malta (especially after the loss of Crete) was pain in the ass in the Med for the Italians and Germans to deal with - they could not ignore it entirely and they could not easily capture it without seriously risking their own naval units. The island also attracted attention at times that could have been used to support the Afrika Korps (AK) and often created a potential, or direct, threat to the AK supply lines.

I think that Malta was not only key for the British to defend if at all possible but also acted as a strategic thorn in the side for the Axis forces during the Med./Africa campaign and, at times, acted like an unsinkable CV/naval outpost that augmented the British air groups and assisted naval units operating in that region.

Thanks.