Bismarck, another book review

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi:

Here is another book review of a title I’ve recently read. It is “Bismarck; The Final Days of Germany’s Greatest Battleship” by Niklas Zetterling and Michael Tamelander (Casemate Books 2009).
Well I believe we can all say the Bismarck may be one of history’s most famous warships. Her reputation until recently was that of an almost invincible behemoth who’s destruction was the result of incredible British courage and skill. More recent scholarship has given us a better understanding of this ship and its brief career.
The authors are experienced, but suffer from the fact that English is a second language so the book is stilted at times and could use better editing. Also it is primarily based on secondary sources, the bulk of which is badly footnoted. The primary account of what happened on Bismarck derives from Baron Burkhardt von Mullenheim-Rechberg’s account of the only voyage of the Bismarck. Ted Briggs, the famous survivor of the Hood gives the British perspective. According to the dust jacket, the book gives a detailed account of naval developments up to the era of the big gun battleship (not!).
It does give a decent overview of the plan for Cruiser warfare that the Kreigsmarine had decided upon. What becomes interesting is that the plan was even able to achieve any success at all considering that Britain had broken the German naval codes. The Kriegsmarine rarely achieved any surprise, it was only the difficulty of locating a warship at sea that allowed them to escape detection for so long. It is also amazing that German tankers were able to stay at sea without being intercepted. When Britain finally began hunting these vital ships down, Cruiser warfare was doomed.
As the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen make their breakout, the German commander Lutjens was pessimistic about the chances for success. He felt British airpower would spot his raiding force and direct surface forces to trap him. He also felt that British radar was superior to German equipment since Bismarck seemed to be constantly shadowed by British cruisers despite the bad weather. In this he was partly correct. The heavy cruiser HMS Suffolk had the latest equipment whereas the Norfolk had an older less efficient set.
One strength of this book is that it has numerous maps and charts of the task forces that were searching for Bismarck. The authors also settle into an hourly account of the chase and battles that gives a sense of urgency to the story. The description of the Hood’s destruction is one of the best I’ve ever read. The explosion was much more prolonged than we are used to believing. It spread through the ship almost like a tornado, smashing its way through every compartment since it was contained by the ship’s hull. From Briggs’ account most of the crew was killed by the blast effects rather than drowning. It’s interesting to note that Briggs and the other two survivors were afloat for a least three hours, but appear to have been on life rafts since there is no way they could have survived the icy cold waters of the North Atlantic. Even still, the exposure to the elements must have been horrible.
The authors make the point that the torpedo hit on Bismarck’s rudder that doomed her was a one in a hundred thousand chance. She had already taken a hit amidships and had barely lost speed. Had the second torpedo hit her anywhere else than her rudder there was a good chance she could have least made it to port. Also the British task forces were running short of fuel and were beginning to disengage.
The final battle is based primarily on Mullenheim’s account. It appears that most of the crew died in the unrelenting hail of large caliber shells that pummeled Bismarck. Many were trapped in turrets twisted by the 14” and 16” shells of the British battleships. At least one turret was blown apart by gunfire. The British navy very quickly silenced any chance that Bismarck had of going down fighting.
The authors come to the conclusion that cruiser warfare was an unrealistic strategic plan. The German admirals were counting on what US airforce generals termed “system collapse”. The concept that a few well placed blows could disrupt their opponent. In practice this sort of warfare proved difficult to achieve. It would take the British a few more years of thorough statistical analysis to realize that even with the U-boats, Germany was simply not able to do enough damage to prevent Britain from staying in the war.
In conclusion, this book is not a thorough study of the Bismarck’s one and only battle, but it does offer some insights into the story. If you have already studied the battle and want another look it is worth a read.

[old_pop2000]

Hi:

Here is another book review of a title I’ve recently read. It is “Bismarck; The Final Days of Germany’s Greatest Battleship” by Niklas Zetterling and Michael Tamelander (Casemate Books 2009).
Well I believe we can all say the Bismarck may be one of history’s most famous warships. Her reputation until recently was that of an almost invincible behemoth who’s destruction was the result of incredible British courage and skill. More recent scholarship has given us a better understanding of this ship and its brief career.
The authors are experienced, but suffer from the fact that English is a second language so the book is stilted at times and could use better editing. Also it is primarily based on secondary sources, the bulk of which is badly footnoted. The primary account of what happened on Bismarck derives from Baron Burkhardt von Mullenheim-Rechberg’s account of the only voyage of the Bismarck. Ted Briggs, the famous survivor of the Hood gives the British perspective. According to the dust jacket, the book gives a detailed account of naval developments up to the era of the big gun battleship (not!).
It does give a decent overview of the plan for Cruiser warfare that the Kreigsmarine had decided upon. What becomes interesting is that the plan was even able to achieve any success at all considering that Britain had broken the German naval codes. The Kriegsmarine rarely achieved any surprise, it was only the difficulty of locating a warship at sea that allowed them to escape detection for so long. It is also amazing that German tankers were able to stay at sea without being intercepted. When Britain finally began hunting these vital ships down, Cruiser warfare was doomed.
As the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen make their breakout, the German commander Lutjens was pessimistic about the chances for success. He felt British airpower would spot his raiding force and direct surface forces to trap him. He also felt that British radar was superior to German equipment since Bismarck seemed to be constantly shadowed by British cruisers despite the bad weather. In this he was partly correct. The heavy cruiser HMS Suffolk had the latest equipment whereas the Norfolk had an older less efficient set.
One strength of this book is that it has numerous maps and charts of the task forces that were searching for Bismarck. The authors also settle into an hourly account of the chase and battles that gives a sense of urgency to the story. The description of the Hood’s destruction is one of the best I’ve ever read. The explosion was much more prolonged than we are used to believing. It spread through the ship almost like a tornado, smashing its way through every compartment since it was contained by the ship’s hull. From Briggs’ account most of the crew was killed by the blast effects rather than drowning. It’s interesting to note that Briggs and the other two survivors were afloat for a least three hours, but appear to have been on life rafts since there is no way they could have survived the icy cold waters of the North Atlantic. Even still, the exposure to the elements must have been horrible.
The authors make the point that the torpedo hit on Bismarck’s rudder that doomed her was a one in a hundred thousand chance. She had already taken a hit amidships and had barely lost speed. Had the second torpedo hit her anywhere else than her rudder there was a good chance she could have least made it to port. Also the British task forces were running short of fuel and were beginning to disengage.
The final battle is based primarily on Mullenheim’s account. It appears that most of the crew died in the unrelenting hail of large caliber shells that pummeled Bismarck. Many were trapped in turrets twisted by the 14” and 16” shells of the British battleships. At least one turret was blown apart by gunfire. The British navy very quickly silenced any chance that Bismarck had of going down fighting.
The authors come to the conclusion that cruiser warfare was an unrealistic strategic plan. The German admirals were counting on what US airforce generals termed “system collapse”. The concept that a few well placed blows could disrupt their opponent. In practice this sort of warfare proved difficult to achieve. It would take the British a few more years of thorough statistical analysis to realize that even with the U-boats, Germany was simply not able to do enough damage to prevent Britain from staying in the war.
In conclusion, this book is not a thorough study of the Bismarck’s one and only battle, but it does offer some insights into the story. If you have already studied the battle and want another look it is worth a read.

Hi Ed:
Thanks for the good review, you have saved me some money. I can get most of what I need from the internet, so I'll pass on this book.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi:

Here is another book review of a title I’ve recently read. It is “Bismarck; The Final Days of Germany’s Greatest Battleship” by Niklas Zetterling and Michael Tamelander (Casemate Books 2009).
Well I believe we can all say the Bismarck may be one of history’s most famous warships. Her reputation until recently was that of an almost invincible behemoth who’s destruction was the result of incredible British courage and skill. More recent scholarship has given us a better understanding of this ship and its brief career.
The authors are experienced, but suffer from the fact that English is a second language so the book is stilted at times and could use better editing. Also it is primarily based on secondary sources, the bulk of which is badly footnoted. The primary account of what happened on Bismarck derives from Baron Burkhardt von Mullenheim-Rechberg’s account of the only voyage of the Bismarck. Ted Briggs, the famous survivor of the Hood gives the British perspective. According to the dust jacket, the book gives a detailed account of naval developments up to the era of the big gun battleship (not!).
It does give a decent overview of the plan for Cruiser warfare that the Kreigsmarine had decided upon. What becomes interesting is that the plan was even able to achieve any success at all considering that Britain had broken the German naval codes. The Kriegsmarine rarely achieved any surprise, it was only the difficulty of locating a warship at sea that allowed them to escape detection for so long. It is also amazing that German tankers were able to stay at sea without being intercepted. When Britain finally began hunting these vital ships down, Cruiser warfare was doomed.
As the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen make their breakout, the German commander Lutjens was pessimistic about the chances for success. He felt British airpower would spot his raiding force and direct surface forces to trap him. He also felt that British radar was superior to German equipment since Bismarck seemed to be constantly shadowed by British cruisers despite the bad weather. In this he was partly correct. The heavy cruiser HMS Suffolk had the latest equipment whereas the Norfolk had an older less efficient set.
One strength of this book is that it has numerous maps and charts of the task forces that were searching for Bismarck. The authors also settle into an hourly account of the chase and battles that gives a sense of urgency to the story. The description of the Hood’s destruction is one of the best I’ve ever read. The explosion was much more prolonged than we are used to believing. It spread through the ship almost like a tornado, smashing its way through every compartment since it was contained by the ship’s hull. From Briggs’ account most of the crew was killed by the blast effects rather than drowning. It’s interesting to note that Briggs and the other two survivors were afloat for a least three hours, but appear to have been on life rafts since there is no way they could have survived the icy cold waters of the North Atlantic. Even still, the exposure to the elements must have been horrible.
The authors make the point that the torpedo hit on Bismarck’s rudder that doomed her was a one in a hundred thousand chance. She had already taken a hit amidships and had barely lost speed. Had the second torpedo hit her anywhere else than her rudder there was a good chance she could have least made it to port. Also the British task forces were running short of fuel and were beginning to disengage.
The final battle is based primarily on Mullenheim’s account. It appears that most of the crew died in the unrelenting hail of large caliber shells that pummeled Bismarck. Many were trapped in turrets twisted by the 14” and 16” shells of the British battleships. At least one turret was blown apart by gunfire. The British navy very quickly silenced any chance that Bismarck had of going down fighting.
The authors come to the conclusion that cruiser warfare was an unrealistic strategic plan. The German admirals were counting on what US airforce generals termed “system collapse”. The concept that a few well placed blows could disrupt their opponent. In practice this sort of warfare proved difficult to achieve. It would take the British a few more years of thorough statistical analysis to realize that even with the U-boats, Germany was simply not able to do enough damage to prevent Britain from staying in the war.
In conclusion, this book is not a thorough study of the Bismarck’s one and only battle, but it does offer some insights into the story. If you have already studied the battle and want another look it is worth a read.

Hi Ed,

Nice report. Your comment about Lutjen's pessimism is interesting as he had just completed a two month cruise in the North Atlantic and never came close to being in danger. He had successfully avoided cruiser shadowing on that sortie as well. From what I have read, the first real Axis inkling of British naval radar was from an the Battle of Cape Matapan in March where Italian intelligence intercepted a British contact report at night from which they deduced was made by radar. German research was for gunnery ranging as was Suffolk's Type 284 radar which did yeoman's work in this case as opposed to a surface search set. Perhaps it was Bomber and Coastal Command's air campaign against the Twins in Brest that prevented their particiaption in the operation that shaded his opinion

[old_pop2000]

Hi Ed,

Nice report. Your comment about Lutjen's pessimism is interesting as he had just completed a two month cruise in the North Atlantic and never came close to being in danger. He had successfully avoided cruiser shadowing on that sortie as well. From what I have read, the first real Axis inkling of British naval radar was from an the Battle of Cape Matapan in March where Italian intelligence intercepted a British contact report at night from which they deduced was made by radar. German research was for gunnery ranging as was Suffolk's Type 284 radar which did yeoman's work in this case as opposed to a surface search set. Perhaps it was Bomber and Coastal Command's air campaign against the Twins in Brest that prevented their particiaption in the operation that shaded his opinion

Hi Mike:
We need to take a longer view of Operation Rhine. Raeder is the one who forced Lutjens to execute the operation, against his recommendations. Raeder's view was that he had to do something to gain Hitler's favor in building more battleships to contest control of the North Sea. Raeder was attempting to coordinate the Crete operation with Operation Rhine to draw British resources from the Med to cope with Bismarck. Raeder realized that the operation should have been delayed until more forces were available, but time was running out. I don't think Lutjen's realized that fact or understood strategy. He had only been an admiral since 1937 so his view was limited to small unit tactics. Much of the failure in the operation was Lutjens failure to assess his threats and take the appropriate action. Lutjens consistently overestimated the British and his pessimism after each action caused him to make poor decisions such as failing to understand that once he was shadowed by British cruisers, all surprise was lost. This surprise was a main element of the operation. This essentially means that his other option, to retreat back to Norway was probably the best option for him but he stuck to the original plan although he was given plenty of maneuver room in his orders.

Raeder always expected that his capital ships would continue to fight until sunk. Basically, he would keep his ships engaged until out of action or sunk. He was not going to repeat the mistakes of WWI where most of the HSF just surrendered and then scuttled itself. Raeder always like small unit forces because they were more maneuverable and easier to hide, forcing the British to race around looking for them. Keep in mind, one battleship had eight British BB/BC, two Aircraft carriers and fourteen cruisers hunting it. I'd say his idea was working.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed:
Thanks for the good review, you have saved me some money. I can get most of what I need from the internet, so I'll pass on this book.

Dennis:

Yes there are so many books to read ans so little time that it behooves one to chose wisely. I got this by mistake due to belonging to a book club that I have since quit.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

Nice report. Your comment about Lutjen's pessimism is interesting as he had just completed a two month cruise in the North Atlantic and never came close to being in danger. He had successfully avoided cruiser shadowing on that sortie as well. From what I have read, the first real Axis inkling of British naval radar was from an the Battle of Cape Matapan in March where Italian intelligence intercepted a British contact report at night from which they deduced was made by radar. German research was for gunnery ranging as was Suffolk's Type 284 radar which did yeoman's work in this case as opposed to a surface search set. Perhaps it was Bomber and Coastal Command's air campaign against the Twins in Brest that prevented their particiaption in the operation that shaded his opinion

Mike:

Your point about the twins is very sound. The German experience in that they hoped would be the standard for cruiser warfare operations led them to have misgivings about the strategy. The Kriegsmarine was crippled by lack of ships, poor powerplant reliability and a doctrine that didn't stress agressiveness enough. Only the U-boats and schellboots seemed to have the proper piratical mindset.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Mike:
We need to take a longer view of Operation Rhine. Raeder is the one who forced Lutjens to execute the operation, against his recommendations. Raeder's view was that he had to do something to gain Hitler's favor in building more battleships to contest control of the North Sea. Raeder was attempting to coordinate the Crete operation with Operation Rhine to draw British resources from the Med to cope with Bismarck. Raeder realized that the operation should have been delayed until more forces were available, but time was running out. I don't think Lutjen's realized that fact or understood strategy. He had only been an admiral since 1937 so his view was limited to small unit tactics. Much of the failure in the operation was Lutjens failure to assess his threats and take the appropriate action. Lutjens consistently overestimated the British and his pessimism after each action caused him to make poor decisions such as failing to understand that once he was shadowed by British cruisers, all surprise was lost. This surprise was a main element of the operation. This essentially means that his other option, to retreat back to Norway was probably the best option for him but he stuck to the original plan although he was given plenty of maneuver room in his orders.

Raeder always expected that his capital ships would continue to fight until sunk. Basically, he would keep his ships engaged until out of action or sunk. He was not going to repeat the mistakes of WWI where most of the HSF just surrendered and then scuttled itself. Raeder always like small unit forces because they were more maneuverable and easier to hide, forcing the British to race around looking for them. Keep in mind, one battleship had eight British BB/BC, two Aircraft carriers and fourteen cruisers hunting it. I'd say his idea was working.

Dennis:

I think that once Hood was sunk and Bismarck was losing oil, returning home would have been far smarter. The KM had already accomplished a proganda victory that would have made Churchill squander resources better used elsewhere.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I think that once Hood was sunk and Bismarck was losing oil, returning home would have been far smarter. The KM had already accomplished a proganda victory that would have made Churchill squander resources better used elsewhere.

I think it might have been too late. As soon as he detected the presence of British radar and the cruisers, he should have turned around and headed back to Germany and wait for another opportunity. Bismarck sighted Norfolk and Suffolk at 1922 hrs on the 23 of May at a distance of seven miles. It was at that time, that they could have turned 180 and head back through the straits and home. The contact with Hood and PoW was at 0500 on the 24th of May.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I think it might have been too late. As soon as he detected the presence of British radar and the cruisers, he should have turned around and headed back to Germany and wait for another opportunity. Bismarck sighted Norfolk and Suffolk at 1922 hrs on the 23 of May at a distance of seven miles. It was at that time, that they could have turned 180 and head back through the straits and home. The contact with Hood and PoW was at 0500 on the 24th of May.


Hi Dennis,

That is what Lutjens did on his previous sortie and hid an the Arctic for a week before trying the patrol line again successfully. That's why the question of what he knew or was advised about British naval radar was significant. He evidently assumed they were still tracking him even though he had successfully detached Eugen and transmitted the 30 minute message that got him found again.

My point being, if he was of that mindset that he couldn't escape the radar, then he couldn't lose them once contacted so continuing into the Atlantic rather than back towards Scapa Flow makes sense. He could count on being able to outrun the Home Fleet and eventually losing the cruisers due their endurance or engaging them. Unfortunately, Tovey had anticipated the breakout and position battlecruiser/battleship pairs to back up the westernmost patrol lines.

Balancing the risks and your threat assessment shades your willingness to push your luck. Lutjens was very concious of the value of his ships and how easy it would be to see them damaged or sunk. His contact with Renown off Norway and his unwillingness to take Hoffman's suggestion to split the twins as to draw off the old battleship convoy escorts are good signs of what risks he was willing to take. Lutjens was just not the right personality to have in charge of this operation. His orders to preserve his force removed the freedom of operation that U boats and merchant raiders had. On the other hand, Langsdorff pushed his luck with Graf Spee and lost his gamble. There are no guarantees, but seizing the initiative is generally the only way an inferior force can change the status quo.

I agree with Ed, that going home after sinking the Hood was the best moment, but Lutjens had no idea what other RN forces might be in the area since he had been surprised by Holland. My impulse would have been to follow up and sink P of W and then retire because the loss of two capital ships only makes your next sortie much easier. That would leave only KG V and Repulse and Renown fast enough to catch you while you have Bismarck, Tirpitz and the twins. The next KGV wasn't commissioned until January 1943. But that's why I ain't commanding a battleship. : )

The real Achilles heel was the compromise of Enigma which allowed the British to roll up the necessary supply ship for an extended sortie....but if theyy had adopted the 4 rotor Enigma earlier. Oh well, fun to speculate about.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

That is what Lutjens did on his previous sortie and hid an the Arctic for a week before trying the patrol line again successfully. That's why the question of what he knew or was advised about British naval radar was significant. He evidently assumed they were still tracking him even though he had successfully detached Eugen and transmitted the 30 minute message that got him found again.

My point being, if he was of that mindset that he couldn't escape the radar, then he couldn't lose them once contacted so continuing into the Atlantic rather than back towards Scapa Flow makes sense. He could count on being able to outrun the Home Fleet and eventually losing the cruisers due their endurance or engaging them. Unfortunately, Tovey had anticipated the breakout and position battlecruiser/battleship pairs to back up the westernmost patrol lines.

Balancing the risks and your threat assessment shades your willingness to push your luck. Lutjens was very concious of the value of his ships and how easy it would be to see them damaged or sunk. His contact with Renown off Norway and his unwillingness to take Hoffman's suggestion to split the twins as to draw off the old battleship convoy escorts are good signs of what risks he was willing to take. Lutjens was just not the right personality to have in charge of this operation. His orders to preserve his force removed the freedom of operation that U boats and merchant raiders had. On the other hand, Langsdorff pushed his luck with Graf Spee and lost his gamble. There are no guarantees, but seizing the initiative is generally the only way an inferior force can change the status quo.

I agree with Ed, that going home after sinking the Hood was the best moment, but Lutjens had no idea what other RN forces might be in the area since he had been surprised by Holland. My impulse would have been to follow up and sink P of W and then retire because the loss of two capital ships only makes your next sortie much easier. That would leave only KG V and Repulse and Renown fast enough to catch you while you have Bismarck, Tirpitz and the twins. The next KGV wasn't commissioned until January 1943. But that's why I ain't commanding a battleship. : )

The real Achilles heel was the compromise of Enigma which allowed the British to roll up the necessary supply ship for an extended sortie....but if theyy had adopted the 4 rotor Enigma earlier. Oh well, fun to speculate about.


Hi Mike:

You know that maintenance of the objective is the most important precept that a commander must follow. His objective was to breakout and attack the convoys. At 1933 Hours when he contacted Suffolk, the game was up. He had been told by German intelligence before sailing, that the Home Fleet was in Scapa Flow. In fact, if you read the reconstructed Bismarck log, you see messages from Group West, concerning air reconnaissance information on ice and the forces occupying Scapa Flow. Even after Norfolk and Suffolk are confirmed by Group West, they are telling Lutjens that his breakout is successful. However, once he saw the two RN heavy cruisers, it should have been apparent that the intelligence was wrong and surprise was gone. Surprise was a prime prerequisite for this type of operation, and the contact at 1933 hours obviated that.

I agree, that once action was joined, he should have pursued PoW and destroyed her. IMO, he took the middle road in execution of his orders. Instead of turning around ten hours earlier when discovered, he continued on until being forced to fight Hood. Then at this propitious moment, when he could have dealt a real blow to the RN, he now decides to follow the spirit of the orders and avoid further contact. He should have either avoided any further contact by heading home to wait for the two sisters, or pursue a beaten enemy to destruction and then turned for Brest for fuel and repairs. Swapping a battleship for an old battlecruiser doesn't win wars.

Again, the prime prerequisite for success in this kind of operation was surprise. Raeder's decision was based on his intelligence that told him he would have surprise. The encounter at 1933 hrs. eliminated that. Sorry, he should have turned back for home, 10 hrs before engaging the Hood.

[JMS]

Hi Mike:

You know that maintenance of the objective is the most important precept that a commander must follow. His objective was to breakout and attack the convoys. At 1933 Hours when he contacted Suffolk, the game was up. He had been told by German intelligence before sailing, that the Home Fleet was in Scapa Flow. In fact, if you read the reconstructed Bismarck log, you see messages from Group West, concerning air reconnaissance information on ice and the forces occupying Scapa Flow. Even after Norfolk and Suffolk are confirmed by Group West, they are telling Lutjens that his breakout is successful. However, once he saw the two RN heavy cruisers, it should have been apparent that the intelligence was wrong and surprise was gone. Surprise was a prime prerequisite for this type of operation, and the contact at 1933 hours obviated that.

I agree, that once action was joined, he should have pursued PoW and destroyed her. IMO, he took the middle road in execution of his orders. Instead of turning around ten hours earlier when discovered, he continued on until being forced to fight Hood. Then at this propitious moment, when he could have dealt a real blow to the RN, he now decides to follow the spirit of the orders and avoid further contact. He should have either avoided any further contact by heading home to wait for the two sisters, or pursue a beaten enemy to destruction and then turned for Brest for fuel and repairs. Swapping a battleship for an old battlecruiser doesn't win wars.

Again, the prime prerequisite for success in this kind of operation was surprise. Raeder's decision was based on his intelligence that told him he would have surprise. The encounter at 1933 hrs. eliminated that. Sorry, he should have turned back for home, 10 hrs before engaging the Hood.

This thread sprung up while I was on holidays and I missed it. Lütjens did not really have the option of turning back, when detected by cruisers he went on in order to break in the Atlantic and then loose them (which he eventually did). After the Denmark straits battle, the Home Fleet was in better position to intercept him if he returned to Norway than if he continued to the Atlantic.

Loss of fuel eventually forced Lütjens to cancel the raid for Bismarck and go for France, Prinz Eugen failure being due to mechanical defects, a reasonable decision, although the paranoia about being followed eventually proved his undoing. Also, although the torpedo hit was lucky, the Bismarck was also fortunate that the previous hit did not cause more damage. Eventually, the FAA was bound to conect.

The KM did not really have an alternative to cruiser warfare, although the uncoordinated approach to isolating the British isles doomed the effort from the start.

[old_pop2000]

This thread sprung up while I was on holidays and I missed it. Lütjens did not really have the option of turning back, when detected by cruisers he went on in order to break in the Atlantic and then loose them (which he eventually did). After the Denmark straits battle, the Home Fleet was in better position to intercept him if he returned to Norway than if he continued to the Atlantic.

Loss of fuel eventually forced Lütjens to cancel the raid for Bismarck and go for France, Prinz Eugen failure being due to mechanical defects, a reasonable decision, although the paranoia about being followed eventually proved his undoing. Also, although the torpedo hit was lucky, the Bismarck was also fortunate that the previous hit did not cause more damage. Eventually, the FAA was bound to conect.

The KM did not really have an alternative to cruiser warfare, although the uncoordinated approach to isolating the British isles doomed the effort from the start.

Hi JMS:
Raeder and Lutjens both understood that this operation was doomed without surprise. Lutjens was against making the voyage. He, Lutjens understood that once he was detected by the cruisers, surprise was lost. Surprise was the only factor that could ensure success. So, what to do? He was receiving consistent reports from B-Dienst and KM headquarters as to the whereabouts and actions of the RN. Lutjens had no easy decision path. Either course of action, was dangerous. Either could have resulted in destruction or excessive damage. However, returning to Bergen was the least dangerous. He would be heading back into KM destroyers and U-boats along with Luftwaffe long range aircraft. He would also have the benefit of the terrible weather in the area to hide in. However, this is only evident with the benefit and clarity of hindsight. At sea, with Lutjens its a different story. However, we have reports from senior officers on board and within KM, that it was recommended that after the Battle of the Denmark Straits, Bismarck should have been ordered to return. I think this is too late and not possible. After being detected by the cruisers would have been the better time, he was still in the Iceland-Greenland passage and could have turned around, in the fog and mist. The surprise factor to the British, might have given him an edge.

However, in reality, there was no way to predict that a lucky torpedo would have damaged her steering and prevented her return. Had that lucky event, or golden BB not occurred, she might have made it to Brest and been moved to the Normandie dock for repairs. However, there she would have been even easier to track and bomb, probably having to return to Germany like the sisters for major repairs. So, in the end, what's the difference. Even if she had made to Bergen, with no repair ships or docks capable of repairing a ship of her size, she would still have had to slip back to Wilhelmshaven and been bombed like Gneisenau. Take your pick. Like Raeder knew, it was just a matter of his capital ships finding a fitting place to die. Amazing how many golden BBs decided the fate of ships.

On the whole, I agree that the KM had no real alternative considering their geostrategic position in Europe and the size of the force. With so many British ships at sea, hunting her, it was almost inevitable without assistance, that she would make it to France without sustaining more damage. More damage means more time in the dock and France was not setup to repair German ships, everthing had to be brought from Germany. Again, all conjecture. Possibly Lutjens knew the alternatives and just figured he would go down in a blaze of glory. The problem with that is he took many, German sailors with him. But that is the burden of command.

[Mike Malanaphy]

This thread sprung up while I was on holidays and I missed it. Lütjens did not really have the option of turning back, when detected by cruisers he went on in order to break in the Atlantic and then loose them (which he eventually did). After the Denmark straits battle, the Home Fleet was in better position to intercept him if he returned to Norway than if he continued to the Atlantic.

Loss of fuel eventually forced Lütjens to cancel the raid for Bismarck and go for France, Prinz Eugen failure being due to mechanical defects, a reasonable decision, although the paranoia about being followed eventually proved his undoing. Also, although the torpedo hit was lucky, the Bismarck was also fortunate that the previous hit did not cause more damage. Eventually, the FAA was bound to conect.

The KM did not really have an alternative to cruiser warfare, although the uncoordinated approach to isolating the British isles doomed the effort from the start.

Hi JMS,

Hope you had a good time on holiday. I tend to disagree with you on this point. Primarily on two points. First, Lutjens prior success with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau three months ealier and second, German lack of underatnding about British radar.

On his first attemp to break out, Lutjens encoutered a cruiser patrol and hid in the Arctic for several days and refuelled before heading into the Atlantic. Once free, he remained basicaaly invisible except when he attacked. He was able to return to Brest unnolested. The situation on Rheinubung was little different. No British planes spotted him at sea outbound or attacked him. While encountering the cruisers was a problem, damaging or sinking them seemed a much better option than hiding. There was little risjk in that course of action and he couild always break back into the Arctic if he did not do so. Mobility was his main advantage. Lutjens experience would have told him that his chances of success were high. No matter how well you plan, the odd submarine, mine, or golden BB is a threat to any operation.

Unaware of the capabilities about British radar lead him to believe he couldn't escape them, though Prinz Eugen certainly did when he detached her. This is not his fault as only an inkling had been gleaned by an Italian intercept of a British spotting report at Cape Matapan in March revealed the British ability to detect byond visual range at night.

Tovey had placed the Home Fleet to block his approaches to the Atlantic. There was nothing else available at Scapa Flow to block his return to Bergen or Germany unless Tovey was quick footed enough to redeploy and risk the wrath of the Luftwaffe.

Discounting Enigma, which could be counted with signal security, I believe that German warships could have cruised the sea lanes at moderate risk well into 1942. No VLR aircraft with good radar until January, 1943. With the loss of Hood, Prince of Wales, and Repulse, only KG V could catch and duel with her until early in 1942 when Anson commissioned. The Fleet Air Arm was still a pretty weak reed to lean on while Coastal and Bomber Command proved unavle to stop the Channel Dash nearly a year later. The Atlantic was still a pretty big place. You can argue that the big ships sunk little tonnage to justify the risk, but I would argue you have to count the ships that would not have sailed as well. Lutjens sorite into the Atlantic with the Twins was the only time the Atlantic convoy cycle was halted until the Britsh could provide battleship escorts. Something the U Boats were never able to do.

Churchill commented that the U Boat threat was the only thing he really feared during the war, but it is clear that the risk of these ships sailing weighed heavily on the RN and USN until 1944 when you look at the resources devoted to containing and eventually sinking them.

[JMS]

Hi JMS,

Hope you had a good time on holiday. I tend to disagree with you on this point. Primarily on two points. First, Lutjens prior success with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau three months ealier and second, German lack of understanding about British radar.


Hi Ed, thanks.

The big caveat of Operation Berlin was that it was undertaken in winter, with long nights and bad weather that negated for practical purposes the use of aircraft, Rhine, on the other hand, happened in spring, when days were becoming longer, and of course, in Northern latitude there was going to be no night to hide while weather was improving. The opportunity window for big ship ops was closing fast.



While encountering the cruisers was a problem, damaging or sinking them seemed a much better option than hiding. There was little risjk in that course of action and he couild always break back into the Arctic if he did not do so. Mobility was his main advantage. Lutjens experience would have told him that his chances of success were high. No matter how well you plan, the odd submarine, mine, or golden BB is a threat to any operation.


True, but that option went out of the window after the Battle of the Denmark strait. The contest now was 2 cruisers and a battleship vs his cruiser and battleships, odds good enough since he didn't know he was up against PoW rather than KGV.



Unaware of the capabilities about British radar lead him to believe he couldn't escape them, though Prinz Eugen certainly did when he detached her.


I think at this point in the war, admirals considered radar a thing of magic or disregarded it, for lack of understanding. Lütjens reflects this.



Tovey had placed the Home Fleet to block his approaches to the Atlantic. There was nothing else available at Scapa Flow to block his return to Bergen or Germany unless Tovey was quick footed enough to redeploy and risk the wrath of the Luftwaffe.


At the time of Denmark strait, Tovey with KGV and Repulse was east enough that he blocked the direct route to Germany/Norway and would be able to catch up with Bismarck if he returned through Denmark strait, the contest being uneven at KGV+PoW+Repulse reinforced by Victorious. His best option was going to France - and he nearly made it!



Discounting Enigma, which could be counted with signal security, I believe that German warships could have cruised the sea lanes at moderate risk well into 1942.


Can't do that, because what ended up big ship raiding for sure was the rolling up of the supply ship chain, enabled by Enigma decripts, so, although big ships could break out from France, there would be no resupply of fuel available, leaving just the Middle East convoys within reach.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi JMS,

Good points. My suggestion would have been for Lutjens to engage the cruisers when contacted. Sinking or damaging both may have allowed him to elude Hood and Prince of Wales. Good practice for those convoy escorts that might be encountered. I don't think the weather or length of day would help the British much. Save for the Swedish spot report, Lutjens would have never been seen. Coastal Command's ability to attack ships at sea was vitually non existent and Bomber Command had been stung attacking them in port. Tovey had an opportunity, but was little stronger than Holland. KG V's balky guns and Repulse's thin armor were an issue. Victorius's squadron was brand new and her hit on Bismarck caused the ship no damage. Lutjens also had the advantage of shoosiing his time as well and land based air reconnaissance to guide him.

In terms of Ultra detecting supply ships, that is an interesting dilema for the RN. Solutions at this point depended on break ins obtained from captures of code materials from German ships, not a reliable source. Pound directed only some of the Bismarck's 8 supply ships be sunk to protect the source of the nformation, but serendipity lead to 7 of them being lost. Continued use to sink supply ships was risky. In addition, good signal security could have helped a great deal. The enigma net used by the big ships was never broken. Bismarck heading for Brest was confirmed by a Luftwaffe enigma intercept sent to an officer in Athens that had a son on board her.

The RN was stretched extremely thinly during this period and suffered grevous losses in the Med and Pacific by the end of the year. Patrol aircraft were few and far between and until VLR Liberators were finally made available in late 1942, you had a handful of Ansons. Sunderlands, and other assorted short range aircraft with Coastal Command to cover the entire Atlantic.

Interesting to specualte about, I'm sure the German naval staff had simliar discussions. : )

[JMS]

Hi JMS,

Good points. My suggestion would have been for Lutjens to engage the cruisers when contacted. Sinking or damaging both may have allowed him to elude Hood and Prince of Wales. Good practice for those convoy escorts that might be encountered. I don't think the weather or length of day would help the British much. Save for the Swedish spot report, Lutjens would have never been seen. Coastal Command's ability to attack ships at sea was vitually non existent and Bomber Command had been stung attacking them in port. Tovey had an opportunity, but was little stronger than Holland. KG V's balky guns and Repulse's thin armor were an issue. Victorius's squadron was brand new and her hit on Bismarck caused the ship no damage. Lutjens also had the advantage of shoosiing his time as well and land based air reconnaissance to guide him.


Hi Mike, indeed but one thing you cannot blame the RN for is overestimating their weakness, British admirals time and again sailed in the face of danger and bigger forces to try to achieve something, from Cunningham at Crete to Phillips off Malaysia. I doubt Tovey would have shrunk from going after Bismarck



In terms of Ultra detecting supply ships, that is an interesting dilema for the RN. Solutions at this point depended on break ins obtained from captures of code materials from German ships, not a reliable source. Pound directed only some of the Bismarck's 8 supply ships be sunk to protect the source of the nformation, but serendipity lead to 7 of them being lost. Continued use to sink supply ships was risky. In addition, good signal security could have helped a great deal. The enigma net used by the big ships was never broken. Bismarck heading for Brest was confirmed by a Luftwaffe enigma intercept sent to an officer in Athens that had a son on board her.

The RN was stretched extremely thinly during this period and suffered grevous losses in the Med and Pacific by the end of the year. Patrol aircraft were few and far between and until VLR Liberators were finally made available in late 1942, you had a handful of Ansons. Sunderlands, and other assorted short range aircraft with Coastal Command to cover the entire Atlantic.

Interesting to specualte about, I'm sure the German naval staff had simliar discussions. : )

But it should be noted that the short supply of VLR aircraft was caused by the sutbbornness of Bomber Command in keeping bombing fields in Germany - If the big ships really became a threat, that would end in short order.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike, indeed but one thing you cannot blame the RN for is overestimating their weakness, British admirals time and again sailed in the face of danger and bigger forces to try to achieve something, from Cunningham at Crete to Phillips off Malaysia. I doubt Tovey would have shrunk from going after Bismarck



But it should be noted that the short supply of VLR aircraft was caused by the sutbbornness of Bomber Command in keeping bombing fields in Germany - If the big ships really became a threat, that would end in short order.

Hi JMS,

I have no doubt Tovey would have steered to intercept Lutjens fully supported by Churchill. That's an interesting point about VLR aircraft. Both the US and Britain prioritized four engine bomber production for the CBO. Be interesting if the threat of German battleships at sea would be able to overcome the desire to strike at Germany via bombers. A relative handfull of Liberators could have made a great impact in the North Atlantic against raiders and U Boats in 1942.

[old_pop2000]

Just a note:
The three models of VLR Liberators; Lib I, IIIA and V all had rear armor removed and a range of about 2300 nm at 4000 feet. The MkI using full wing tanks, MKIIIA using full tanks plus two full bomb cell aux tanks and no bombs, same for the MKV. Now hitting a 20 knot battleship or BC at 4000 feet in a level bomber is problematic or damn near impossible. Remember that Uboats on the surface can barely make 12 knots if it wanted to attain its 11,000 NM range and have little AA gun support. The basic premise was to interrupt their recharge and force them down. For the surface ships, simply shadowing is probably about the best you could do.

Now, the PBY-5A late model had a range of 2550 miles and could land in the water if trouble arose. The -5 late had a range of over 2800 miles.

However, against a BB or BC, I can't see either one doing anything other than annoying it. It can forewarn a convoy and it can reroute, but a surface ship of this size can carry a larger, longer range surface search set set on a mast of over 180 feet giving it a far greater range. It might even carry a B-dienst signal intercept unit which could detect the aircrafts signals. I have doubts whether, in concert with a wolf pack, a fast, well armed surface ship is going to be out run by a slow moving convoy.

The Uboat's greatest weapon is its stealth, except when UBoat command gets talkative and someone is reading their mail. The U-boats problems were; Lack of an up-to-date design giving more underwater speed and endurance; Ultra; numbers. There just weren't enough U-boats to accomplish the mission.

As to the surface raiders like Scharnhorst, it's difficult to destroy them but also difficult to hide them. They also have a limited endurance and need a rather large shipyard for repairs and maintenance.

So, I don't see a VLR Liberator or a PBY-5 or 5A doing anything but detecting and identifying, possibly shadowing one of these ships, so a carrier/BB group can destroy it. If the raider is smart and stays in the mist and North Atlantic, it can use the weather conditions to hide for a while and then strike. But both types of commerce raiders need easy access to protected bases and numbers to do the job correctly. History teaches us that.

I am of the opinion, that the Admiralty should have spent less resources hunting the sisters and more going after the U-boats, as should have RAF Bomber command have spent less resources on Germany. They should have spent more assets bombing the four U-boat bases with their heavy concrete and steel pens being built. They might have delayed those pens substantially. England could only lose the war at sea, not in Germany.

[JMS]

So, I don't see a VLR Liberator or a PBY-5 or 5A doing anything but detecting and identifying, possibly shadowing one of these ships, so a carrier/BB group can destroy it. If the raider is smart and stays in the mist and North Atlantic, it can use the weather conditions to hide for a while and then strike. But both types of commerce raiders need easy access to protected bases and numbers to do the job correctly. History teaches us that.

I am of the opinion, that the Admiralty should have spent less resources hunting the sisters and more going after the U-boats, as should have RAF Bomber command have spent less resources on Germany. They should have spent more assets bombing the four U-boat bases with their heavy concrete and steel pens being built. They might have delayed those pens substantially. England could only lose the war at sea, not in Germany.

There's also another effect that is quite significant, an airplane forces a submarine to go under, reducing their field of view and ability to detect convoys, depriving it of mobility (down to 7 knots max or so for the Type VII), allowing unhindered passage to a convoy, this more than anything else is what could have been achieved in 1941.

[old_pop2000]

There's also another effect that is quite significant, an airplane forces a submarine to go under, reducing their field of view and ability to detect convoys, depriving it of mobility (down to 7 knots max or so for the Type VII), allowing unhindered passage to a convoy, this more than anything else is what could have been achieved in 1941.

Absolutely. Submarines of that era were more surface ships with underwater capability than anything.