Ed Rotondaro
06-17-2010, 04:43 PM
Hi all:
In light of the recent thread about D-Day, I present a book review for your consideration. Entitled “D-Day; The Battle for Normandy” by Antony Beevor (Penguin Books 2009). Beevor is a well published historian with seven previous titles to his credit. His style is clear and compelling and he’s not afraid to ruffle a few feathers.
At first glance one would say ‘What another book on D-Day?” Yet Beevor manages to snag a few new insights and points that were either lightly alluded to in previous works or else just not addressed.
Let’s start out by saying what this book is not. It doesn’t give you the detail of the planning and run up to Normandy. Rely on Max Hastings “Overlord” or Cornelius Ryan’s “The Longest Day” for that. Beevor concentrates on the human side of things, especially the long neglected French casualties. He makes a compelling point that more civilians were killed in the bombings leading up to and throughout the campaign than during the Battle of Britain.
Beevor finally explains a lot about the lack of offensive progress of the British ground forces in France in 1944. It wasn’t lack of courage or skill. It was basically bad doctrine coupled with tiredness. The British army has been described by other authors as “tribal” due to its regimental system. Whereas an American formation would have infantry and at least artillery and usually armor, the Brits preferred the separate units combined perhaps at the divisional level. For the Brits, there was an intentional decision not to copy the organization of German panzer grenadiers, much to the cost of the soldier on the ground. Poor communication and attitude went a long way towards nullifying the basic fighting skills of the Royal army. This was coupled with a very WWI like attitude of what constituted a successful advance. A couple of miles made a British colonel very happy. Stopping to brew up tea in the midst of a mobile battle made the US cast scorn on their allies. Beevor along with other recent historians has re-cast Bernard Montgomery, the field marshal of the British forces as basically a WWI general with a bare understanding of mobile warfare. Also Beevor shows that Monty was not as well liked as his publicists made him out to be. The veteran troops he commanded were sick and tired of the war and had little desire to die when the struggle seemed over. His lack of patience with the Canadian forces under his command reflects his inability to understand their lack of experience and their distrust of Great Britain after Dieppe.
Beevor shows that while allied airpower was crucial, it was more in the denial of movement than the actual destruction of targets. The brutal facts emerge that of the vehicles claimed as destroyed both by the USAAF and the RAF, the total was about half and most were abandoned, not killed by bombs and rockets as the airpower advocates would have us believe. What allied air superiority did was prevent the Luftwaffe from disrupting movement and supply while making it difficult for German reinforcements to reach the front. Many German mechanized units took up to 13 days to reach the battle whereas in 1940 they could have made the journey in less than two days.
Beevor rightly points out the lack of true understanding as to what the British army and Bradley’s army were meant to accomplish, especially at Falaise gap. Bradley certainly should have been more assertive in light of the slow progress of his allies.
One of the more telling facts that comes out after the invasion is the amazing ability of French civilians to be part of the resistance and to take it out on others who they felt were collaborators. Once a city was liberated, vengeful citizens sought out anyone they thought may have even been polite to the Germans and considered them collaborators. Most of the women who suffered the humiliation of being shaved had done little more than sleep with a German mainly for food. In some instances, Free French soldiers and Resistance fighters stopped what they saw as petty payback by these late to the colors patriots against those who had also suffered under occupation.
Beevor does a good job of explaining the crippling German command structure that was guaranteed to confuse any attempt at effective resistance to the invasion. The channels of command were so complex that you could not hope to move needed formations to battle in time. Add in the interdiction effect of allied airpower and it is a wonder that the Germans were able to hold on as long as they did.
The Hitler assassination attempt gets a chapter and we learn that Rommel knew a hell of a lot more than most historians acknowledged. He repeated stressed that for any separate peace to occur, the current leadership could not be intact. In essence he was tacitly agreeing to killing Hitler and even Himmler and Goering. One can realize that the failure of the attempt to kill Hitler was a victory for the allies. It meant that Hitler would no longer trust his generals and worst yet would assume total command and make as many blunders as possible.
Beevor does a fine job of detailing both the military and political aspects of liberating Paris and the rivalry as various factions of the Free French and Resistance determined who would form the new government. Interesting how politics trumps common sense in wartime.
Overall, Beevor’s account offers some new insight into the Normandy campaign, especially at the human level and certainly belongs on your bookshelf if you are interested in this pivotal campaign. Definitely worth a read.
In light of the recent thread about D-Day, I present a book review for your consideration. Entitled “D-Day; The Battle for Normandy” by Antony Beevor (Penguin Books 2009). Beevor is a well published historian with seven previous titles to his credit. His style is clear and compelling and he’s not afraid to ruffle a few feathers.
At first glance one would say ‘What another book on D-Day?” Yet Beevor manages to snag a few new insights and points that were either lightly alluded to in previous works or else just not addressed.
Let’s start out by saying what this book is not. It doesn’t give you the detail of the planning and run up to Normandy. Rely on Max Hastings “Overlord” or Cornelius Ryan’s “The Longest Day” for that. Beevor concentrates on the human side of things, especially the long neglected French casualties. He makes a compelling point that more civilians were killed in the bombings leading up to and throughout the campaign than during the Battle of Britain.
Beevor finally explains a lot about the lack of offensive progress of the British ground forces in France in 1944. It wasn’t lack of courage or skill. It was basically bad doctrine coupled with tiredness. The British army has been described by other authors as “tribal” due to its regimental system. Whereas an American formation would have infantry and at least artillery and usually armor, the Brits preferred the separate units combined perhaps at the divisional level. For the Brits, there was an intentional decision not to copy the organization of German panzer grenadiers, much to the cost of the soldier on the ground. Poor communication and attitude went a long way towards nullifying the basic fighting skills of the Royal army. This was coupled with a very WWI like attitude of what constituted a successful advance. A couple of miles made a British colonel very happy. Stopping to brew up tea in the midst of a mobile battle made the US cast scorn on their allies. Beevor along with other recent historians has re-cast Bernard Montgomery, the field marshal of the British forces as basically a WWI general with a bare understanding of mobile warfare. Also Beevor shows that Monty was not as well liked as his publicists made him out to be. The veteran troops he commanded were sick and tired of the war and had little desire to die when the struggle seemed over. His lack of patience with the Canadian forces under his command reflects his inability to understand their lack of experience and their distrust of Great Britain after Dieppe.
Beevor shows that while allied airpower was crucial, it was more in the denial of movement than the actual destruction of targets. The brutal facts emerge that of the vehicles claimed as destroyed both by the USAAF and the RAF, the total was about half and most were abandoned, not killed by bombs and rockets as the airpower advocates would have us believe. What allied air superiority did was prevent the Luftwaffe from disrupting movement and supply while making it difficult for German reinforcements to reach the front. Many German mechanized units took up to 13 days to reach the battle whereas in 1940 they could have made the journey in less than two days.
Beevor rightly points out the lack of true understanding as to what the British army and Bradley’s army were meant to accomplish, especially at Falaise gap. Bradley certainly should have been more assertive in light of the slow progress of his allies.
One of the more telling facts that comes out after the invasion is the amazing ability of French civilians to be part of the resistance and to take it out on others who they felt were collaborators. Once a city was liberated, vengeful citizens sought out anyone they thought may have even been polite to the Germans and considered them collaborators. Most of the women who suffered the humiliation of being shaved had done little more than sleep with a German mainly for food. In some instances, Free French soldiers and Resistance fighters stopped what they saw as petty payback by these late to the colors patriots against those who had also suffered under occupation.
Beevor does a good job of explaining the crippling German command structure that was guaranteed to confuse any attempt at effective resistance to the invasion. The channels of command were so complex that you could not hope to move needed formations to battle in time. Add in the interdiction effect of allied airpower and it is a wonder that the Germans were able to hold on as long as they did.
The Hitler assassination attempt gets a chapter and we learn that Rommel knew a hell of a lot more than most historians acknowledged. He repeated stressed that for any separate peace to occur, the current leadership could not be intact. In essence he was tacitly agreeing to killing Hitler and even Himmler and Goering. One can realize that the failure of the attempt to kill Hitler was a victory for the allies. It meant that Hitler would no longer trust his generals and worst yet would assume total command and make as many blunders as possible.
Beevor does a fine job of detailing both the military and political aspects of liberating Paris and the rivalry as various factions of the Free French and Resistance determined who would form the new government. Interesting how politics trumps common sense in wartime.
Overall, Beevor’s account offers some new insight into the Normandy campaign, especially at the human level and certainly belongs on your bookshelf if you are interested in this pivotal campaign. Definitely worth a read.