Flawed Victory, a book review

[Ed Rotondaro]

“Flawed Victory; Jutland 1916” by Keith Yates, Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Hi:

Along with the battle of Midway and perhaps Trafalgar, Jutland is the most written about naval battle in history. It remains the largest clash between battleships ever. It had all the elements of high drama, the long hoped for showdown between the two most powerful navies at the time. And it played out totally unlike anything the protagonists had planned.

Professor Yates has ambitious intentions in this book. He tries to offer a fresh look at this battle and do so in a shorter format than most contemporary histories do. I don’t wish to diminish his effort, but this book comes off at times as the “Cliff’s Notes” of several other books. This work is primarily based on secondary sources and if one reads the bibliography I’ll bet that most of us have several of the books cited in our own libraries.

Professor Yates attempts to lay out the political background for the First World War and the naval build up that preceded it. In this case he duplicates the efforts of Robert Massie in his book “Dreadnought” (highly recommended reading). The issues regarding empire building and the resultant tensions between Germany and Great Britain are summarized as are the reasons for building the all big gun capital ship. Other technical issues including armor piercing shell performance, propellant safety and fire control are addressed again in brief almost sound bite fashion.

The author perhaps misses his stride by trying to recoup the history of the naval war at sea in WWI leading up to Jutland. Now there is reason for doing so since the early skirmishes colored how each side would approach the battle of Jutland. Britain learned early on that the German navy had excellent gunnery and very tough ships. Crew courage was never in doubt. Germany learned that Britain could still exert naval power to any corner of the globe and that its seamanship was still second to none. The battlecruisers seemed to be all that they were advertised with their successes at the Falklands and Heligoland Bight.

The various personalities both political (Kaiser Wilhelm, Winston Churchill) and naval (Jackie Fisher, Jellicoe, Beatty, Hipper and Scheer) are given their quick overview. Once again the need to cram as much detail into a moderately sized volume means that Yates covers things like the lack of gunnery practice by the British battlecruiser fleet and Jellicoe’s fears of torpedoes and mines in brief.

Yates comes into his own when discussing the battle proper. He details the absolute failure of British naval intelligence which equipped with the ability to know when the German fleet was at sea failed to use information properly. Imagine if you will that you have knowledge of your opponent’s operational plan? The advantage this gives you is immense. But if not used properly, it becomes worthless. Remember that in the American Civil War, the Union General McClelland had delivered to him a detailed copy of the orders that Lee had sent to his subordinates. Still without decisive action and a willingness to fight, this priceless intelligence was wasted and the result was Antietam, at best a minor tactical victory.

The British intelligence unit known as Room 40 had the information on the German plans to sortie, but this information was sadly enough allowed to sit on a table because the officer in command had a low opinion of intelligence in general and Room 40 in particular. Had Jellicoe been given the information in a timely manner, he could have sailed earlier and brought the Germans to action with far more daylight and to perhaps a more decisive conclusion.

The basic course of Jutland is known to those who have an interest in naval history, but Yates nails some salient points. He demonstrates how both Beatty and Scheer used their forces to screen the main fleets from each other. Beatty has been rightly criticized for not sending the sort of detailed scouting reports that Jellicoe needed, but he did draw Scheer right into the guns of the British fleet. Scheer’s slow pre-dreadnoughts (deemed five minute ships by the German navy) performed a similar service.

Yates does a good job of describing the actual firing, especially that of Evan-Thomas’ fast battleship squadron. Despite Beatty’s convenient loss of memory, it was the British battleships that did the bulk of the damage rather than his battlecruisers. Yates has several appendixes that detail fleet organization, casualties per ship, and hits achieved.

The British failures at signaling and taking decisive action are displayed in detail. One is left wondering if Jutland had been fought in better weather would the Germans have been crushed? It also leaved you wondering if the Royal Navy had fought with the same doctrine in WWII, could they have ever caught either the Bismarck or the Scharnhorst?

The final part of the book details the question of who won the battle. A lot of what is presented has been raised in earlier works and Yates distills it down and lets the reader draw his or her own conclusion. Beatty really comes off as self serving and desperate to cover up his mistakes while treading on Jellicoe’s reputation. Jellicoe comes off as a true gentleman who only responded when need be. In many respects I wish I had read this book before reading Massie’s book “Castles of Steel” since the conclusions he offers have obviously been influenced by Yates book especially regarding which admiral had the best performance at Jutland. The basic fact is that the Royal Navy was not well served by the creation of two camps with their own point of view (either Pro-Jellicoe or pro-Beatty). The Royal Navy in WWII seems to have learned its lessons and avoided this kind of internal squabbling.

In conclusion ( I’m sure you are all grateful I’ve stopped), Professor Yates book is perhaps best described as the best straightforward introduction to the battle of Jutland. For those who want more on the political background there is always Massie’s “Dreadnought”. For detailed analysis of battle damage John Campbell’s “Jutland an Analysis of the fighting” or V.E. Tarrant’s “Jutland, the German Perspective” are recommended. Andrew Gordon’s “The Rules of the Game” may be the actual best account of Jutland, but it is wrapped around a detailed analysis of the social history of the Royal Navy from Trafalgar to Jutland and the mindset that made the RN act the way it did. In summary, “Flawed Victory” is a good account of Jutland and can save one buying many more expensive and lengthy books.

[Mike Malanaphy]

“Flawed Victory; Jutland 1916” by Keith Yates, Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Hi:

Along with the battle of Midway and perhaps Trafalgar, Jutland is the most written about naval battle in history. It remains the largest clash between battleships ever. It had all the elements of high drama, the long hoped for showdown between the two most powerful navies at the time. And it played out totally unlike anything the protagonists had planned.

Professor Yates has ambitious intentions in this book. He tries to offer a fresh look at this battle and do so in a shorter format than most contemporary histories do. I don’t wish to diminish his effort, but this book comes off at times as the “Cliff’s Notes” of several other books. This work is primarily based on secondary sources and if one reads the bibliography I’ll bet that most of us have several of the books cited in our own libraries.

Professor Yates attempts to lay out the political background for the First World War and the naval build up that preceded it. In this case he duplicates the efforts of Robert Massie in his book “Dreadnought” (highly recommended reading). The issues regarding empire building and the resultant tensions between Germany and Great Britain are summarized as are the reasons for building the all big gun capital ship. Other technical issues including armor piercing shell performance, propellant safety and fire control are addressed again in brief almost sound bite fashion.

The author perhaps misses his stride by trying to recoup the history of the naval war at sea in WWI leading up to Jutland. Now there is reason for doing so since the early skirmishes colored how each side would approach the battle of Jutland. Britain learned early on that the German navy had excellent gunnery and very tough ships. Crew courage was never in doubt. Germany learned that Britain could still exert naval power to any corner of the globe and that its seamanship was still second to none. The battlecruisers seemed to be all that they were advertised with their successes at the Falklands and Heligoland Bight.

The various personalities both political (Kaiser Wilhelm, Winston Churchill) and naval (Jackie Fisher, Jellicoe, Beatty, Hipper and Scheer) are given their quick overview. Once again the need to cram as much detail into a moderately sized volume means that Yates covers things like the lack of gunnery practice by the British battlecruiser fleet and Jellicoe’s fears of torpedoes and mines in brief.

Yates comes into his own when discussing the battle proper. He details the absolute failure of British naval intelligence which equipped with the ability to know when the German fleet was at sea failed to use information properly. Imagine if you will that you have knowledge of your opponent’s operational plan? The advantage this gives you is immense. But if not used properly, it becomes worthless. Remember that in the American Civil War, the Union General McClelland had delivered to him a detailed copy of the orders that Lee had sent to his subordinates. Still without decisive action and a willingness to fight, this priceless intelligence was wasted and the result was Antietam, at best a minor tactical victory.

The British intelligence unit known as Room 40 had the information on the German plans to sortie, but this information was sadly enough allowed to sit on a table because the officer in command had a low opinion of intelligence in general and Room 40 in particular. Had Jellicoe been given the information in a timely manner, he could have sailed earlier and brought the Germans to action with far more daylight and to perhaps a more decisive conclusion.

The basic course of Jutland is known to those who have an interest in naval history, but Yates nails some salient points. He demonstrates how both Beatty and Scheer used their forces to screen the main fleets from each other. Beatty has been rightly criticized for not sending the sort of detailed scouting reports that Jellicoe needed, but he did draw Scheer right into the guns of the British fleet. Scheer’s slow pre-dreadnoughts (deemed five minute ships by the German navy) performed a similar service.

Yates does a good job of describing the actual firing, especially that of Evan-Thomas’ fast battleship squadron. Despite Beatty’s convenient loss of memory, it was the British battleships that did the bulk of the damage rather than his battlecruisers. Yates has several appendixes that detail fleet organization, casualties per ship, and hits achieved.

The British failures at signaling and taking decisive action are displayed in detail. One is left wondering if Jutland had been fought in better weather would the Germans have been crushed? It also leaved you wondering if the Royal Navy had fought with the same doctrine in WWII, could they have ever caught either the Bismarck or the Scharnhorst?

The final part of the book details the question of who won the battle. A lot of what is presented has been raised in earlier works and Yates distills it down and lets the reader draw his or her own conclusion. Beatty really comes off as self serving and desperate to cover up his mistakes while treading on Jellicoe’s reputation. Jellicoe comes off as a true gentleman who only responded when need be. In many respects I wish I had read this book before reading Massie’s book “Castles of Steel” since the conclusions he offers have obviously been influenced by Yates book especially regarding which admiral had the best performance at Jutland. The basic fact is that the Royal Navy was not well served by the creation of two camps with their own point of view (either Pro-Jellicoe or pro-Beatty). The Royal Navy in WWII seems to have learned its lessons and avoided this kind of internal squabbling.

In conclusion ( I’m sure you are all grateful I’ve stopped), Professor Yates book is perhaps best described as the best straightforward introduction to the battle of Jutland. For those who want more on the political background there is always Massie’s “Dreadnought”. For detailed analysis of battle damage John Campbell’s “Jutland an Analysis of the fighting” or V.E. Tarrant’s “Jutland, the German Perspective” are recommended. Andrew Gordon’s “The Rules of the Game” may be the actual best account of Jutland, but it is wrapped around a detailed analysis of the social history of the Royal Navy from Trafalgar to Jutland and the mindset that made the RN act the way it did. In summary, “Flawed Victory” is a good account of Jutland and can save one buying many more expensive and lengthy books.

Hi Ed,

Interesting book report. Jutland will be one of those classic battles of history that will be continue to spark debate for centuries. The Room 40 snafu was a classic of how to throw away valuable information. Scheer used the call sign DK when in port and the Friederich Der Grosse's at sea. Admiral Jackson asked Room 40 where call sign DK was and was correctly told it was still in port when Scheer had already sailed. Jackson's lack of knowledge to ask the right question and the analysts' lack of understanding about the tactical situation to tell the Admiral that the HSF had sailed lost a critical opportunity for Jellocoe to use his tactical advantage. It undercut Jellicoe's faith in Room 40 so he ignored the later message they had intecepted in which Scheer gave his route home that night. Jellicoe could have cut him off the next morning to settle the issue.

There are a number of great books on Jutland, but Gordon's and Campbell's would be a perfect pair in your library. Both are still available as trade paperbacks.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Ed,

Interesting book report. Jutland will be one of those classic battles of history that will be continue to spark debate for centuries. The Room 40 snafu was a classic of how to throw away valuable information. Scheer used the call sign DK when in port and the Friederich Der Grosse's at sea. Admiral Jackson asked Room 40 where call sign DK was and was correctly told it was still in port when Scheer had already sailed. Jackson's lack of knowledge to ask the right question and the analysts' lack of understanding about the tactical situation to tell the Admiral that the HSF had sailed lost a critical opportunity for Jellocoe to use his tactical advantage. It undercut Jellicoe's faith in Room 40 so he ignored the later message they had intecepted in which Scheer gave his route home that night. Jellicoe could have cut him off the next morning to settle the issue.

There are a number of great books on Jutland, but Gordon's and Campbell's would be a perfect pair in your library. Both are still available as trade paperbacks.

Interesting, that this battle served no purpose, accomplished nothing and strategically changed nothing. Even tactically, it was not really significant. Yet, so much has been written about it. It did not prove or disprove the theory of the decisive battle. It only confirmed what everyone had expected about battleship action. I sense the British have always felt that this was their last gasp as a sea power. Interesting.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Interesting, that this battle served no purpose, accomplished nothing and strategically changed nothing. Even tactically, it was not really significant. Yet, so much has been written about it. It did not prove or disprove the theory of the decisive battle. It only confirmed what everyone had expected about battleship action. I sense the British have always felt that this was their last gasp as a sea power. Interesting.

Actually, I´m not sure it could prove anything. WW1 was a land war; how could a sea battle be decisive in that?

[old_pop2000]

Actually, I´m not sure it could prove anything. WW1 was a land war; how could a sea battle be decisive in that?

Hi Christian:
That is almost an absolute fact, that Germany could not affect the outcome of the war, on the sea except with a guerre de course using submarines and surface raiders. The HSF's greatest contribution was as a fleet-in-being, no more and no less. But it would never be decisive in the war, only the army could be decisive. All Jellicoe had to do, was maintain the integrity of his fleet. He didn't have to win the battle. It has been true throughout history that a sea power usually cannot act decisively against a land power. It has to use its army and get at the opponent's army, and be decisive in that venue. Keep in mind that Trafalgar occurred ten years before Waterloo. Trafalgar might have ended Napoleon's dream of developing France into a sea power, but it did not end the war or stop him. It took a land battle to finally remove him from power. Notice that even the Allies in WWII, with absolute control of the seas, still had to invade Europe, to finish the war. Even against the Japanese, it was going to take either an invasion or something even more extraordinary to end the conflict.

Jutland was an interesting naval battle, probably because it was the last great sea battle that did not involve the airplane, which would become the decisive arm in the future. That maybe it's greatest claim to fame and why its popular.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Hi Christian:
That is almost an absolute fact, that Germany could not affect the outcome of the war, on the sea except with a guerre de course using submarines and surface raiders.The HSF's greatest contribution was as a fleet-in-being, no more and no less. But it would never be decisive in the war, only the army could be decisive. All Jellicoe had to do, was maintain the integrity of his fleet. He didn't have to win the battle.

I think the point is this: the HSF could, at best, tie up a force that had absolutely no bearing on the outcome of the war, while consuming a lot of resources - all those battleships can´t be cheap.

[old_pop2000]

I think the point is this: the HSF could, at best, tie up a force that had absolutely no bearing on the outcome of the war, while consuming a lot of resources - all those battleships can´t be cheap.

That's it, it was simply unnecessary for Germany and as you say, consumed a lot of resources.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

Interesting book report. Jutland will be one of those classic battles of history that will be continue to spark debate for centuries. The Room 40 snafu was a classic of how to throw away valuable information. Scheer used the call sign DK when in port and the Friederich Der Grosse's at sea. Admiral Jackson asked Room 40 where call sign DK was and was correctly told it was still in port when Scheer had already sailed. Jackson's lack of knowledge to ask the right question and the analysts' lack of understanding about the tactical situation to tell the Admiral that the HSF had sailed lost a critical opportunity for Jellocoe to use his tactical advantage. It undercut Jellicoe's faith in Room 40 so he ignored the later message they had intecepted in which Scheer gave his route home that night. Jellicoe could have cut him off the next morning to settle the issue.

There are a number of great books on Jutland, but Gordon's and Campbell's would be a perfect pair in your library. Both are still available as trade paperbacks.

Hi Mike:

I agree. The British certainly improved how they used signals intel by WWII and relied on it to win the battle of the Atlantic. I have Gordon's book and Campbell's book in my library and rate them highly.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Actually, I´m not sure it could prove anything. WW1 was a land war; how could a sea battle be decisive in that?

Christian and Dennis:

I would suppose it depends on who wins a decisive battle at sea? Let's postulate two outcomes:

1. Jellicoe traps the High Seas Fleet and finishes most of it off on June 1st. Nothing chagnes for Germany other than the loss of men and ships and prestige. Germany goes to unrestricted submarine warfare a year earlier. Does this force Britain to its knees or bring the US into the war earlier?

2. Scheer manages to defeat the British piecemeal and gains a numeric advantage in capital ships. He can now interdict the re-supply of the British army in France. The possible threat of invasion might cause Britain to retain badly needed troops at home rather than send them to France. While the war still has to be won on the ground, a decisive German victory might have influenced France and Britain to consider an armistice.

Just some things to ponder.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Christian and Dennis:

I would suppose it depends on who wins a decisive battle at sea? Let's postulate two outcomes:

1. Jellicoe traps the High Seas Fleet and finishes most of it off on June 1st. Nothing chagnes for Germany other than the loss of men and ships and prestige. Germany goes to unrestricted submarine warfare a year earlier. Does this force Britain to its knees or bring the US into the war earlier?

The latter, if anything.


2. Scheer manages to defeat the British piecemeal and gains a numeric advantage in capital ships. He can now interdict the re-supply of the British army in France. The possible threat of invasion might cause Britain to retain badly needed troops at home rather than send them to France. While the war still has to be won on the ground, a decisive German victory might have influenced France and Britain to consider an armistice.

And you don´t think the French navy might have anything to say about that?

What was the battle line strength of the French Navy at the time? And how many ships would the HSF retain in battleworthy condition, or be able to repair before the French navy gathered and sailed against them?

I think even in the best scenario for the Germans, the French navy and the remnants of the RN would be enough of a fleet-in-being to deter any move of the HSF against Britain or the flow of supplies to France.

[old_pop2000]

....
2. Scheer manages to defeat the British piecemeal and gains a numeric advantage in capital ships. He can now interdict the re-supply of the British army in France. The possible threat of invasion might cause Britain to retain badly needed troops at home rather than send them to France. While the war still has to be won on the ground, a decisive German victory might have influenced France and Britain to consider an armistice.



HI Ed:
Even Scheer realized that a victory at Jutland, was not going to guarantee a victory for Germany and he stated that to the Kaiser. The geographical problems still exist for the Germans. The blockade at a distance was still viable, even with a reduced fleet.

The French fleet had, including submarines about 202 ships with 56 being added during the war. In the Med, they had six old battleships, eleven pre-dreadnought, two dreadnoughts, 11 armoured cruisers, four protected cruisers and about half of the 86 destroyers and 34 submarines.

At Jutland, the British had over 150 ships to the German's 99. The combined Anglo-French fleet was more than capable of continuing the fight against the Germans, even with a British defeat at Jutland. Remember also, that the US fleet could be used to augment the British fleet because it is in our best interest to assist in maintaining the sea lines of communication. The German's are facing a coalition of nations. The balance of power at sea, does not change appreciably and the German's probably will take some losses, that they can't afford.

It would seem, that even a victory, doesn't change the landscape much, although it might give the German's notable victory at this stage of the war. It might also have a terrible effect on British morale, the result of which is difficult to calculate.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Christian:
That is almost an absolute fact, that Germany could not affect the outcome of the war, on the sea except with a guerre de course using submarines and surface raiders. The HSF's greatest contribution was as a fleet-in-being, no more and no less. But it would never be decisive in the war, only the army could be decisive. All Jellicoe had to do, was maintain the integrity of his fleet. He didn't have to win the battle. It has been true throughout history that a sea power usually cannot act decisively against a land power. It has to use its army and get at the opponent's army, and be decisive in that venue. Keep in mind that Trafalgar occurred ten years before Waterloo. Trafalgar might have ended Napoleon's dream of developing France into a sea power, but it did not end the war or stop him. It took a land battle to finally remove him from power. Notice that even the Allies in WWII, with absolute control of the seas, still had to invade Europe, to finish the war. Even against the Japanese, it was going to take either an invasion or something even more extraordinary to end the conflict.

Jutland was an interesting naval battle, probably because it was the last great sea battle that did not involve the airplane, which would become the decisive arm in the future. That maybe it's greatest claim to fame and why its popular.

Hi Dennis,

An option for the HSF that they didn't turn to until near the end of the war was striking at the blockade. The 10th Cruiser Squadron was tasked with covering the northern route into the North Sea. Originally AMCs then older armored cruisers, attack by the HSF battlecruisers makes more sense than shelling English coastal towns. These ships were on patrol in bad weather charged with stopping, searching, and sending ships with contraband to British ports for inspection or confiscation. All would have been meat on the table for prowling German battlecruisers. Another sensitive spot was convoy traffic between England and Norway.

The attacks on the English towns forced Jellicoe to move Beatty to Rosyth to be closer to intervene. Pressure in the other direction forces Jellicoe to redeploy or worse, split the BCF to cover both areas. The November 1917 battlecruiser skirmish was an opportunity for teh germans to defeat a Brtiish force in detail.

To be viable, the fleet in being has to pose a threat. As you mentioned, Jellicoe could control the sea without leaving port. It was up to the Germans to change the balance. The risk averse HSF was also a major bargaining chip for the Germans at any future peace conference.

[JMS]

There are other nutty alternatives to ponder, like convoying a Corps to Britain (defended by a single division) in 1914, sure, the HSF gets trounced but the Germans march on London!

[Christian Schwietzke]

There are other nutty alternatives to ponder, like convoying a Corps to Britain (defended by a single division) in 1914, sure, the HSF gets trounced but the Germans march on London!

Yeah, nutty is just the right word for that...

[Mike Malanaphy]

Yeah, nutty is just the right word for that...

Hi Christian,

Before the war, the German Foreign Minister was asked what would happen if the British would land an army on the Pomeranian coast (ala Fischer's Baltic plan), he replied, "We would send the police to arrest them."

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

An option for the HSF that they didn't turn to until near the end of the war was striking at the blockade. The 10th Cruiser Squadron was tasked with covering the northern route into the North Sea. Originally AMCs then older armored cruisers, attack by the HSF battlecruisers makes more sense than shelling English coastal towns. These ships were on patrol in bad weather charged with stopping, searching, and sending ships with contraband to British ports for inspection or confiscation. All would have been meat on the table for prowling German battlecruisers. Another sensitive spot was convoy traffic between England and Norway.

The attacks on the English towns forced Jellicoe to move Beatty to Rosyth to be closer to intervene. Pressure in the other direction forces Jellicoe to redeploy or worse, split the BCF to cover both areas. The November 1917 battlecruiser skirmish was an opportunity for teh germans to defeat a Brtiish force in detail.

To be viable, the fleet in being has to pose a threat. As you mentioned, Jellicoe could control the sea without leaving port. It was up to the Germans to change the balance. The risk averse HSF was also a major bargaining chip for the Germans at any future peace conference.

Hi Mike:
I don't see attacking the blockade, as you describe as being an adequate solution. All the British have to do is move their forces back and the German's are still blockaded from a distance. Their only alternative was the guerre de course using submarines. That option should have been executed much earlier, say around 1914 or 1915.

Remember that the Allies best chance of victory was through attrition. This required them to maintain their trade lines throughout the world to South America, North America, India and Asia. As long as they maintained those sea lanes, they could outlast the Central powers, especially Turkey and AH. Once those two weaker partners were eliminated, Germany had a major problem. The Allies could not defeat Germany at sea, however, without maintaining those sea lanes, they could lose.

After the failure of the first offensive, the German's were reduced in the number of options left to them, for defeating the Allies. They tried three more times with offensive action on land, and failed. The fifth attempt at victory was in early 1917 when they commenced the five month submarine campaign designed to defeat Britain by sinking, hopefully, 600000 tons of shipping. With Britain out of the war, it was felt that the rest would follow like dominoes. This action failed and the last attempt was the Michael offensive using Stosstruppen. This was unleashed on March 21, 1918. It had been calculated that with the imposition of a war economy, in 1916 I believe, that they had two years to defeat the Allies before the German economy collapsed.

Many of the scholarly works state that Britain could not defeat the Germans at sea, but could lose in day. I don't subscribe to that idea. The British had at least 2.5-3:1 advantage over the Germans in ships plus a better geostrategic position outside the European peninsula. They could strike from all directions and maintain their blockade which was decisive against the Central powers. The German's could never match the British in ship building and repair. Even had they won the battle of Jutland, the losses and damages to their ships would have taken time to repair. The British could rebuild and replace much faster. They didn't need dreadnoughts to impose a blockade at a distance. Just some cruisers, destroyers, submarines and mines. Simple tools.

England had to maintain command of the seas. The Royal Navy's first task was that, not defeating the HSF. In fact, throughout the reign of the British Royal Navy, accepting battle to eliminate a naval threat has generally been their last resort. Blockade is usually the British method of countering any threat to their command of the sea. The HSF had to prod the British into making tactical mistakes at sea, to win command of the seas, something the experienced British admiralty would never allow to happen.

Was the HSF superior to the British Grand Fleet. Possibly in fire control, shell penetration and night fighting and ship construction. However, that is a tactical advantage, not a strategic one. The superiority of the British RN was in the massed firepower of its fleet, centralized handling by its leaders but more importantly, its deployment of resources around the world and its superior naval strategic doctrine. That was always its advantages, gained through the years as a sea power. Something Germany could never match.

IMO, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe never contemplated coming to grips with Scheer and annihilating the HSF. He was not on a Nelsonian mission. In point of fact, most senior admirals both English and German believe that he performed in an almost faultless manner. Many of his problems had nothing to do with the handling of the ships, they were technical issues that were rectified after the battle.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
I don't see attacking the blockade, as you describe as being an adequate solution. All the British have to do is move their forces back and the German's are still blockaded from a distance. Their only alternative was the guerre de course using submarines. That option should have been executed much earlier, say around 1914 or 1915.

Remember that the Allies best chance of victory was through attrition. This required them to maintain their trade lines throughout the world to South America, North America, India and Asia. As long as they maintained those sea lanes, they could outlast the Central powers, especially Turkey and AH. Once those two weaker partners were eliminated, Germany had a major problem. The Allies could not defeat Germany at sea, however, without maintaining those sea lanes, they could lose.

After the failure of the first offensive, the German's were reduced in the number of options left to them, for defeating the Allies. They tried three more times with offensive action on land, and failed. The fifth attempt at victory was in early 1917 when they commenced the five month submarine campaign designed to defeat Britain by sinking, hopefully, 600000 tons of shipping. With Britain out of the war, it was felt that the rest would follow like dominoes. This action failed and the last attempt was the Michael offensive using Stosstruppen. This was unleashed on March 21, 1918. It had been calculated that with the imposition of a war economy, in 1916 I believe, that they had two years to defeat the Allies before the German economy collapsed.

Many of the scholarly works state that Britain could not defeat the Germans at sea, but could lose in day. I don't subscribe to that idea. The British had at least 2.5-3:1 advantage over the Germans in ships plus a better geostrategic position outside the European peninsula. They could strike from all directions and maintain their blockade which was decisive against the Central powers. The German's could never match the British in ship building and repair. Even had they won the battle of Jutland, the losses and damages to their ships would have taken time to repair. The British could rebuild and replace much faster. They didn't need dreadnoughts to impose a blockade at a distance. Just some cruisers, destroyers, submarines and mines. Simple tools.

England had to maintain command of the seas. The Royal Navy's first task was that, not defeating the HSF. In fact, throughout the reign of the British Royal Navy, accepting battle to eliminate a naval threat has generally been their last resort. Blockade is usually the British method of countering any threat to their command of the sea. The HSF had to prod the British into making tactical mistakes at sea, to win command of the seas, something the experienced British admiralty would never allow to happen.

Was the HSF superior to the British Grand Fleet. Possibly in fire control, shell penetration and night fighting and ship construction. However, that is a tactical advantage, not a strategic one. The superiority of the British RN was in the massed firepower of its fleet, centralized handling by its leaders but more importantly, its deployment of resources around the world and its superior naval strategic doctrine. That was always its advantages, gained through the years as a sea power. Something Germany could never match.

IMO, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe never contemplated coming to grips with Scheer and annihilating the HSF. He was not on a Nelsonian mission. In point of fact, most senior admirals both English and German believe that he performed in an almost faultless manner. Many of his problems had nothing to do with the handling of the ships, they were technical issues that were rectified after the battle.

Hi Dennis,

I pretty much agree with most of that. The concept of a close blockade of Germany was replaced with an "observational blockade" in 1912. In addition to the risks from submarines and mines, steam fleets were just not able to perform as sailing ships had in similar situations. Fuel costs and mechanical wear and tear on the ships was excessive. Fisher had suggested that the fleet should retire at least 170 miles from any German destroyer base at night, but destroyers only had a 2-3 day endurance envelope, requiring three shifts of them to cover the fleet for a close blockade. So the close blockade was unsustainable on the part of the RN.

On November 5, 1914, the Admiralty declared the North Sea a war zone and imposed a blockade. The blockade area covered from the Shetlands to Norway and from the NW side of the Hebrides to Iceland. Initially, 14 old armored cruisers of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were tasked to do the job, but by the end of November, it was clear the old cruisers could not handle the weather and seas. The 10th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted to use nominally 24 Armed Merchant Cruisers.

During the war, they intercepted 12,979 ships and lost 679. 7 AMCs were sunk by submarines, 1 by a German raider, and two foundered. After the war, Admiral deChair, one of the squadron's commanders said, "Providentially, the Germans were afraid to risk a first class ship on such a venture although it would have paid them well to do so". Providing they stayed off the radio, it seems that German armored cruisers or battle cruisers could have made sorties against the AMCs with relative impunity.

Though risky, it puts Jellicoe in much the same situation faced by the Home Fleet in WW II in guarding against break outs. Strikes against the blockade would almost force Jellicoe to move some BCs to the North to guard against such attacks, weakening his scouting force and the ability to protect the east coast of England from raids. No other ships could do the job.

[old_pop2000]

...Providing they stayed off the radio, it seems that German armored cruisers or battle cruisers could have made sorties against the AMCs with relative impunity.

Though risky, it puts Jellicoe in much the same situation faced by the Home Fleet in WW II in guarding against break outs. Strikes against the blockade would almost force Jellicoe to move some BCs to the North to guard against such attacks, weakening his scouting force and the ability to protect the east coast of England from raids. No other ships could do the job.

Hi Mike:
I agree that there were options, but not good ones. The RN could always have moved one or two BC's from the Med along with some armoured cruisers to bolster the North Sea area. As far as scouting, there were other ships that could perform the scouting mission, possibly even better than the battle cruisers. I am not entirely in agreement with most sources that BC's were great scouting ships. IMO, the light cruisers with torpedoes were far better scouts than the BC's. The only advantage of a BC is its ability to fight through a screening force to gather the necessary information but it is a very expensive solution and is not likely to be risked if at all possible. She is also more capable of preventing opponent scouts from succeeding, but again its the cost per performance of the ship. Most scouting involves speed and extended range, but to acheive that along with heavy firepower means sacrifices and extra costs. I am not certain that the BC's were ever the best solution to the scouting problem. A problem eventually taken over by submarines but more importantly, aircraft. IMO, BC's were better used on the wings of the battle fleet, to be used like the heavy cavalry of old, to swing around the flanks and catch the opponent in a crossfire situation.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
I agree that there were options, but not good ones. The RN could always have moved one or two BC's from the Med along with some armoured cruisers to bolster the North Sea area. As far as scouting, there were other ships that could perform the scouting mission, possibly even better than the battle cruisers. I am not entirely in agreement with most sources that BC's were great scouting ships.

Hi Dennis,

As you have pointed out, the Germans held the end of a very short stick in terms of dealing with the RN at sea. Unrestricted submarine warfare was the only real tool to defeat England, but it was politcally unpopular and carried big risks unless it could be decisively used. The only other option available to an inferior power is to use initiative to keep the enemy off balance. Beatty formed the heavy scouting force for Jellicoe for good or ill. His effective fighting strength was little better than Hipper's on a good day and the detachment of the 2nd or 3rd BC squadrons to guard the AMCs only weaknes him. Not to mention that British 12" BCs were meat on the table for Lutzow and company if caught alone.

Be fun to wargame out. : )

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

As you have pointed out, the Germans held the end of a very short stick in terms of dealing with the RN at sea. Unrestricted submarine warfare was the only real tool to defeat England, but it was politcally unpopular and carried big risks unless it could be decisively used. The only other option available to an inferior power is to use initiative to keep the enemy off balance. Beatty formed the heavy scouting force for Jellicoe for good or ill. His effective fighting strength was little better than Hipper's on a good day and the detachment of the 2nd or 3rd BC squadrons to guard the AMCs only weaknes him. Not to mention that British 12" BCs were meat on the table for Lutzow and company if caught alone.

Be fun to wargame out. : )

Hi Mike:
The German's certainly did have a short stick, as you call it. They built a fleet, with little or no idea, how to use it. They certainly must have appreciated the bad geographical position they were in and that the most powerful fleet and sea power in the world, had unfettered access to the only exit points from the North Sea. If they understood anything about the British use of sea power, they would have realized that the British were not going to sail out to the middle of the arena and say "let's have a big naval battle". The German's best strategy was " sporatic warfare". Pick and choose the time of battle and use attrition to catch small groups of ships alone and pick them off. Now, we see that kind of strategy in the early years, but of course, the Magdeburg coup certainly did not help them. With the British reading their mail, surprise was going to be difficult to achieve.

IMO, the British were fairly lucky that they were matched against a foe that really did not understand their advantages and disadvantages in naval warfare.

[old_pop2000]

I've been rereading my copy of Admiral Scheer's memoirs from 1920. He states categorically, that " we had never regarded it as possible that the English Fleet would be held back from battle and, as a fleet-in-being, be restricted solely to blockading us from a distance, thereby running no risk." Well, there it is, in black and white. Somehow, the German Navy had failed to read English history and the history of the British navy in war. He states later that the protection of transports headed to France was the primary job of the English fleet but that if the HSF attempted to interfere, a decisive naval battle would occur. He doubts that they could seriously interrupt the flow.

The war orders for the fleet were to attack the blockading forces, mine the British ports and use submarines. If equality was finally achieved by these methods, then under favorable circumstances, they would seek battle. It appears that the German strategy was much more concerned with ensuring that the English Fleet did not attempt to interfere with the Baltic operations and that this is why the HSF was stationed and operated in the North Sea. However, at the beginning of the war, the German fleet fully expected the English fleet to sail out and give battle in the North Sea.

Simplistically, the German's had adopted a purely defensive strategy, due to lack of numbers. Their one good strategy could and should have been to interdict the transports headed toward the continent to stop the flow of supplies and men. This strategy would have required the English fleet to come out and fight to protect those ships. The English, on the other hand, adopted the same defensive strategy as she had used in previous wars; the close or distant blockade. The English fleet accepted battle only on favorable terms of position and numbers. However, here's an interesting conumdrum, both sides built expensive navies... too expensive, apparently, to risk in battle. So they both adopted a defensive strategy, leaving it to the armies to decide the outcome of the war.

Naval strategy must be part of the overall national strategy. It fell to the Navy to protect the army's flank and interdict the English transports supporting the Entente armies on the continent. However, the Navy was overruled by the Army who claimed they could dispose of the Entente forces easier and the precious ships would not have to be risked. I would point out that this is a key mistake in German military and overall national strategy. The Navy had to be equal to the Army and use its forces to execute its mission. This, to me, is the smoking gun.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I've been rereading my copy of Admiral Scheer's memoirs from 1920. He states categorically, that " we had never regarded it as possible that the English Fleet would be held back from battle and, as a fleet-in-being, be restricted solely to blockading us from a distance, thereby running no risk." Well, there it is, in black and white. Somehow, the German Navy had failed to read English history and the history of the British navy in war. He states later that the protection of transports headed to France was the primary job of the English fleet but that if the HSF attempted to interfere, a decisive naval battle would occur. He doubts that they could seriously interrupt the flow.

The war orders for the fleet were to attack the blockading forces, mine the British ports and use submarines. If equality was finally achieved by these methods, then under favorable circumstances, they would seek battle. It appears that the German strategy was much more concerned with ensuring that the English Fleet did not attempt to interfere with the Baltic operations and that this is why the HSF was stationed and operated in the North Sea. However, at the beginning of the war, the German fleet fully expected the English fleet to sail out and give battle in the North Sea.

Simplistically, the German's had adopted a purely defensive strategy, due to lack of numbers. Their one good strategy could and should have been to interdict the transports headed toward the continent to stop the flow of supplies and men. This strategy would have required the English fleet to come out and fight to protect those ships. The English, on the other hand, adopted the same defensive strategy as she had used in previous wars; the close or distant blockade. The English fleet accepted battle only on favorable terms of position and numbers. However, here's an interesting conumdrum, both sides built expensive navies... too expensive, apparently, to risk in battle. So they both adopted a defensive strategy, leaving it to the armies to decide the outcome of the war.

Naval strategy must be part of the overall national strategy. It fell to the Navy to protect the army's flank and interdict the English transports supporting the Entente armies on the continent. However, the Navy was overruled by the Army who claimed they could dispose of the Entente forces easier and the precious ships would not have to be risked. I would point out that this is a key mistake in German military and overall national strategy. The Navy had to be equal to the Army and use its forces to execute its mission. This, to me, is the smoking gun.


Hi Dennis,

I was rereading the first part of Halpern's "A Naval History fo World War I" and he argues that the German Navy effectively had no real strategy upon entering the war. They had planned a number of operations to attack close blockade British forces, extensively exercising it in 1913. Of course, the close blockade did not materailize and the Germans were loath to venture far into the North Sea away from their bases in case a ship was damaged as the Kaiser had prohibited the fleet from leaving German waters.. The U Boat fleet was too small and short ranged to effectively wage an unrestricted submarine war even had it been policy from the start of the war. What was left was the "klienkrieg" or small war of mining and submarine patrols against British patrols.

After Jutland, the Germans hoped to supplement U boats in enforcing the "sperrgebeit" or prohibited area around the British Isles with surface actions. However, there were severe restrictions on it's employment requiring submarine and air reconnaissance to prevent it from being surrpised. The target chosen were the convoys that ran between England and Scandanavia.

The first happened on 17 Oct 1917 when the light cruisers Brummer and Bremse attacked a convoy 50 miles off the coast of England. In a brisk action, they sank both destroyer escorts and 9 merchant ships.

On 12 December 1917, 8 German destroyers sortied to attack those convoys. A division of 4 found convoy just off the coast of Norway and sank 1 destroer, four A/S trawlers, and 6 merchant ships with no losses to themselves. The other division swept off the English coast. Bad weather caused them to miss the convoy, but they sank an independent merchant ship.

Stung by the defeat, Beatty reluctantly had to provide a battle squadron or battlecruiser squadron to provide an escort to these convoys. A retaliatory raid into the Bight led to the last clash between dreadnoughts, Courageous and Glorious against Kaiser and Kaiserin.

On April 23, 1918, Hipper sortied the whole fleet minus the pre dreadnought to attempt to trap one of Beatty's detached divisions. Bad weather again hampered his information and he missed the convoy by a day and it's escort of the 3rd BCS. Had he sailed a week earlier, the close escort would have been the USN's 6th battle squadron.

Despite Beatty's desire not to dilute his strength, he was forced to respond to these convoy operations offensively and defensively. A little more boldness might have paid dividends for the Germans.

[old_pop2000]

I was rereading the first part of Halpern's "A Naval History fo World War I" and he argues that the German Navy effectively had no real strategy upon entering the war. They had planned a number of operations to attack close blockade British forces, extensively excersining it in 1913. Of course, the close blockade did not materailize and the Germans were loath to venture far into the North Sea away from their bases in case a ship was damaged. The U Boat fleet was too small and short ranged to effectively wage an unrestricted submarine war even had it been policy from the start of the war. What was left was teh "klienkrieg" or small war of mining and subamrine patrols against British patrols.

.....

Hi Mike:
The German naval strategy was predicated on the British being neutral in the war. The HSF would sail though the Shetland's gap and around the British Isles to engage and destroy the smaller French fleet. This would allow them to cut off the French ports to trade, forcing the French to either capitulate or reduce their ability to continue the war. The other part of the strategy was to control skaggerak and the Kattegat choke points into the Baltic with the point of controlling the Baltic against the Russians. However, when England entered the war, that whole strategy was bankrupt. The HSF was smaller than the British fleet and the British fleet had changed its plans prior to the war, using the distant blockade instead of a close blockade. The Germans still had to guard the two entry points to the Baltic to prevent the British from assisting the Russians. So, the only other alternative action for the HSF was to either interdict the movement of transports and material to the continent from England or to operate between the Helgoland Bight and the North/South Frisian Islands with attacks by smaller forces on the southern English ports. I would say that they had a strategy, but no alternative if the conditions at the time, did not materialize. As Halpern explains, the building of the HSF probably did exactly the opposite by forcing the British to commit to a continental involvement strategy, which was not in Germany's best interest. The signing of the entente cordial immediately put the German strategy in trouble. While Tirpitz might have felt he had a strong position to deal with the British fleet, I don't think he counted on them building more and more ships and recalling the others. Seems that the German's probably hadn't explored all possible British actions carefully enough. Again, planning for what the opponent will do, instead of what is possible for him to do.

Any action after Jutland by the HSF was meaningless as the Grand Fleet had learned its lessons and improved all aspects of their performance. The Grand Fleet of 1917 was a far more formidable force than the one that the HSF had faced previously.