Warships and battleships.. a question of versatility,

[Warship NWS]

The most versatile warships,

1) CVs -- they could attack land, sea, air, or underwater targets.
2) CVE/Ls -- as above, just not as large airwings.
3) DDs -- as above.. but without aircraft until the advent of helos.
4) CRs -- more cost effective for shore bombardments and could operate in groups for the cost of a single capital ship. In terms of modern naval warfare they would rank with DDs but not as expendable.
5) BBs/BCs.. costly and although better armored they themselves needed heavy escorting to operate in any ocean due to the inability to engage submerged threats or being non-expendable assets. Shore bombardment effectiveness was limited to the distance from the shore they could operate from due to deep drafts. In terms of AAA there were far more cheaper ships that could fill the role and operate in multi-axis positions due to greater numbers.

Overall.. the BB/BC proved in WW1 and in WW2 to be the least cost effective warships at naval warfare for the operations, losses, costs, etc.. they required to build, maintain, and operate them. The only time they proved especially effective at naval warfare is when they greatly outranged and outgunned their opponents in a surface action. At no time during WW1 or WW2 did they achieve a strategic victory that altered the course of a naval campaign or the war itself - subs and carriers however did, or could, on both counts. Example: Jutland was a blockade in force battle and waste of resources for the HSF as they had no chance to alter the course of the war. In most cases capital ships were effectively mission killed due to the simple presence of an enemy having similar warships and/or due to fear of losing them to mines, subs, aircraft, lack of fuel, cost to maintain, etc.

Personally, I feel that the age of the battleship days were numbered after the Battle of Tsushima. Prior to that time frame they could greatly effect the course of entire theaters of naval warfare which in turn could effect the strategic direction of the war on land as no one had anything to directly counter them as effectively as other "battleships".

As of WW1 battleships ended up being a show of how much money a nation could blow away on big majestic warships with very little real naval use. However, in terms of the course a war would take they mattered little in the overall scheme of history. Unless they could be used to directly interdict supply lines at sea they ended up being port tourist attractions and major maintenance funding sponges.

The most active combat ships of WW1 and WW2 were CVs, CRs, and DDs.. next were the ocean raiders and subs. BBs/BCs saw the fewest actions of all and sank the least ships of all... end result, quite often.. they were a waste of money.

Granted.. this may be a very debatable topic but those are my personal thoughts.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

I'll start by quoting something I posted in the Pearl Harbor Warning thread (for those who didn't see it there):

I have a book titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team," written by VADM Joseph Taussig (ret) that was published in 1943. In the chapter on battleships, he still considers them the main units of the fleet, and claimed that until battleships arrived in the Solomons, "we were being beaten just as we had been beaten elsewhere." He also thought that canceling the next class after the Iowas (I believe he was referring to the Montana class) was "regrettable, for the need for them is bound to come...". Of course, they were canceled because many others knew what he didn't- that the battleship's days were numbered.

Now of course we have the benefit of hindsight. But I think even by 1943 standards he should have seen the writing on the wall. Yet he still insisted that in order to win "we must build bigger and better battleships" and pictured a major naval engagement against the Japanese with the battleships slugging it out while the carriers engaged in scouting.

[djcyclone]

My personal opinion, is that Germany used its BB's and BC's for the best uses. They used them as convoy raiders in WW II, and in WW I in battles such as Jutland, they used their ships to toy with the British and tempt them into battles that they could not win. In WW II it was the sheer size of the British Armored Fleet that defeated the Germans surface war. Even when you think of the Bismark, yes it was wounded by a swordfish torpedo, but it still took two Battleships to sink it after that. What if only one had been within range. Would the battle have been the same, or would the Bismark have succeeded?

I think that if the U.S. had commited our Battleships to convoy raiding against Japan, that they would have saw far more action, but only the latest models had enough speed to be a real threat to a convoy, and you still have the cost of operating them.

Ultimatly I would agree that they where nothing but a waste of money.

[asnrobert]

My personal opinion, is that Germany used its BB's and BC's for the best uses. They used them as convoy raiders in WW II, and in WW I in battles such as Jutland, they used their ships to toy with the British and tempt them into battles that they could not win. In WW II it was the sheer size of the British Armored Fleet that defeated the Germans surface war. Even when you think of the Bismark, yes it was wounded by a swordfish torpedo, but it still took two Battleships to sink it after that. What if only one had been within range. Would the battle have been the same, or would the Bismark have succeeded?

I think that if the U.S. had commited our Battleships to convoy raiding against Japan, that they would have saw far more action, but only the latest models had enough speed to be a real threat to a convoy, and you still have the cost of operating them.

Ultimatly I would agree that they where nothing but a waste of money.

The German BBs/BCs (and even the over-hyped "pocket battleships") were not very cost-effective commerce raiders compared to the U-boats. At most, they made the British tie down resources that could have been used elsewhere. As for the Bismarck, even had only one British BB been present, she still would have been mission killed considering her damaged rudder, and even if she managed to limp home, who knows when or if she'd be able to sail again? And the British could afford to swap the Germans BB for BB (or even two for one).
As for the Pacific campaign, again, the submarine was a far more effective commerce destroyer. Until very late in the war, battleships would have had to operate far from base to reach the Japanese convoy lanes, and even the fast battleships would have been dead without a CV to provide air cover.

[Kyle Holgate]

I wonder what the direct cost of an Iowa class - fully decked out for war as compared to an Essex class - in the same readiness. For the latter you have of course the 36 or so Hellcat/Coursair fighters, 36 dive bombers and 15 Avengers. Yes, nit pick if you want - I'm not trying for exact numbers here - just general. Point is - the bird farm ain't exactly cheap either - evein IF you don't add to the costs with the need to have trained pilots. I'd argue that the pilot training is far more intensive than most crew positions on the Battleship.
The bottom line though, is that with the carrier - even if it IS more expensive after all is done - is a much more versitile war machine and is easily upgraded in versitility by nature of the weapons systems it employs (aircraft of course). You can have a very distinct improvement in a carrier just by flying on new aircraft. In contrast, the BB - you need major ship refits to get an improvement of the same sort.

I do wonder though, if a larger fleet of CVL type might serve better than a smaller fleet of larger ships. I guess it's the "more eggs in the basket" question that has been argued and debated since carriers appeared and is still debated with the advent of the monster CVN's such as the US has.

One final thing to ponder - Carriers require escorts, Destroyers do not. I don't suggest that a navy of "zillions" of DD's is the answer - just making a point!

[old_pop2000]

I wonder what the direct cost of an Iowa class - fully decked out for war as compared to an Essex class - in the same readiness. For the latter you have of course the 36 or so Hellcat/Coursair fighters, 36 dive bombers and 15 Avengers. Yes, nit pick if you want - I'm not trying for exact numbers here - just general. Point is - the bird farm ain't exactly cheap either - evein IF you don't add to the costs with the need to have trained pilots. I'd argue that the pilot training is far more intensive than most crew positions on the Battleship.
The bottom line though, is that with the carrier - even if it IS more expensive after all is done - is a much more versitile war machine and is easily upgraded in versitility by nature of the weapons systems it employs (aircraft of course). You can have a very distinct improvement in a carrier just by flying on new aircraft. In contrast, the BB - you need major ship refits to get an improvement of the same sort.

I do wonder though, if a larger fleet of CVL type might serve better than a smaller fleet of larger ships. I guess it's the "more eggs in the basket" question that has been argued and debated since carriers appeared and is still debated with the advent of the monster CVN's such as the US has.

One final thing to ponder - Carriers require escorts, Destroyers do not. I don't suggest that a navy of "zillions" of DD's is the answer - just making a point!

Initial procurement cost per unit of the F6F Hellcat was $50,000 but it dropped to $35,000 at the end of the contract.

36 X $50,000 = $1,800,000 for fighters


For a Commencement Bay class CVE at a cost of $11,000,000 per unit and an air wing that cost $1,800,000, total rough estimate is $12,800,000 per carrier.

1 Iowa class battleship cost $100,000,000.

1 Commencement Class CVE with Air Wing, built and in the water probably would be $15,000,000

So, we can roughly build 6 CVE's with over 236 first line aircraft with a range of over 300 miles per plane, for the same cost of an Iowa class battleship with a conservative striking range of 30 miles.

For the total cost of the Iowa's; $400,000,000, we build and outfit 26 Commencement Class carriers with a grand total of 936 first line aircraft.

[djcyclone]

The German BBs/BCs (and even the over-hyped "pocket battleships") were not very cost-effective commerce raiders compared to the U-boats. At most, they made the British tie down resources that could have been used elsewhere. As for the Bismarck, even had only one British BB been present, she still would have been mission killed considering her damaged rudder, and even if she managed to limp home, who knows when or if she'd be able to sail again? And the British could afford to swap the Germans BB for BB (or even two for one).
As for the Pacific campaign, again, the submarine was a far more effective commerce destroyer. Until very late in the war, battleships would have had to operate far from base to reach the Japanese convoy lanes, and even the fast battleships would have been dead without a CV to provide air cover.



I disagree. If the Bismarck had been opposed by only one Battleship, it might have stood a chance. All the commander would have had to do is position the Bismarck so that his ship could broad side the opposing BB, and then stop his engines. Yes this would have made the Bismarck a sitting duck, but it would have placed him on a level playing ground with the enemy. It then would have depended on the accuracy of both crews, and the critical hits that the two ships took.

Now to the Pacific. One thing that America can brag about, was the respect that our commanders had for the Japanese air bases. What I mean is that Nimitz was never willing to go anywhere near Rabul, until he knew that he was ready. This means that a Battleship commander would have simply had to know where he was, and stay away from the Airfields. If a Battleship did encounter a Carrier then that would have been pure chance.

To my knowlege the Japanese did not tie their Carriers down with Convoy protection. It has been mentioned earlier in the Pearl Harbor discussion, that the Japanese did not protect their convoys very well at all. This means that the average convoy would have had 3 to 4 destroyers, in hopes of scaring away submarines. 3 or 4 Destroyers are no match for a Battleship, escpecially since they would be spread out trying to protect the Convoy. The Battleship could shoot at free will, while the Destroyers tried to get organized and make an attack. The only weapon that Destroyers had, that could hurt a Battleship would have been torpedoes. This would have required them to make suicide charges at the Batttleship, in order to get within effective range. They could shoot at the Battleship with their 4",5",and in some cases maybe 6", but this would only irritate the Battleship.

I am not saying that it would have been cost effective, but only presenting an idea.

[old_pop2000]

There was a proposal and drawing to convert Iowa's to carriers during construction in 1942.

Link to Springstyles book and drawing:

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/s-file/s511-54c.htm


Someone must have done some math, and determined that carriers were more important than bigger battleships.

Opinions?

[Mike Malanaphy]

The German BBs/BCs (and even the over-hyped "pocket battleships") were not very cost-effective commerce raiders compared to the U-boats. At most, they made the British tie down resources that could have been used elsewhere. As for the Bismarck, even had only one British BB been present, she still would have been mission killed considering her damaged rudder, and even if she managed to limp home, who knows when or if she'd be able to sail again? And the British could afford to swap the Germans BB for BB (or even two for one).
As for the Pacific campaign, again, the submarine was a far more effective commerce destroyer. Until very late in the war, battleships would have had to operate far from base to reach the Japanese convoy lanes, and even the fast battleships would have been dead without a CV to provide air cover.


Hi Robert,

I might suggst that your conclusion makes sense based upon hindsight. When the ships were designed in the late 20's and thirties, commerce raiding made sense for the German Navy, Unable to match the British in numbers, cruiser warfare made sense. In pre radar, effective CV, and VLR maritime aircraft days, the ocean was a big place. A cruiser or larger ship ship carried scout planes and could use them to locate targets and avoid opponents. The German fear of damage or loss kept the pocket battleships away from fruitful concentrations. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did what the U boats could never do...stop convoys from sailing while the Britsh hustled to provide battleship escorts. The real achilles heel was the supply system which was fatally compromised in May of 1941 with the continuous read of German enigma code. Had Bismarck successfully have broken out, all but one of her supply ships had been located and sunk by mid June.

The argument is often made that so may more U boats could have put to sea had the materials and personnel used on the big ships had been diverted to them. Well, aside form the lack of building capacity and crew, it is interesting to note that of the 859 U boats that made patrols, only 321 actually sank a ship. Like fighter pilots, a small minority of skippers sank the vast majority of ships. Two percent of U boat skippers sank almost 30% of all ships lost.

[djcyclone]

Hi Robert,

I might suggst that your conclusion makes sense based upon hindsight. When the ships were designed in the late 20's and thirties, commerce raiding made sense for the German Navy, Unable to match the British in numbers, cruiser warfare made sense. In pre radar, effective CV, and VLR maritime aircraft days, the ocean was a big place. A cruiser or larger ship ship carried scout planes and could use them to locate targets and avoid opponents. The German fear of damage or loss kept the pocket battleships away from fruitful concentrations. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did what the U boats could never do...stop convoys from sailing while the Britsh hustled to provide battleship escorts. The real achilles heel was the supply system which was fatally compromised in May of 1941 with the continuous read of German enigma code. Had Bismarck successfully have broken out, all but one of her supply ships had been located and sunk by mid June.

The argument is often made that so may more U boats could have put to sea had the materials and personnel used on the big ships had been diverted to them. Well, aside form the lack of building capacity and crew, it is interesting to note that of the 859 U boats that made patrols, only 321 actually sank a ship. Like fighter pilots, a small minority of skippers sank the vast majority of ships. Two percent of U boat skippers sank almost 30% of all ships lost.



Those are some interesting numbers. I imagine that Eric Topp was among those U boat skippers that you mentioned. He suposedly was one of the best, and managed to survive through the war. He is supposed to be the one that sank the Ruben James. He also came the U.S. after the war and helped teach our Navy about Submarine strategy, and evasive manuvers.

[Warship NWS]

My personal opinion, is that Germany used its BB's and BC's for the best uses. They used them as convoy raiders in WW II, and in WW I in battles such as Jutland, they used their ships to toy with the British and tempt them into battles that they could not win. In WW II it was the sheer size of the British Armored Fleet that defeated the Germans surface war. Even when you think of the Bismark, yes it was wounded by a swordfish torpedo, but it still took two Battleships to sink it after that. What if only one had been within range. Would the battle have been the same, or would the Bismark have succeeded?

I think that if the U.S. had commited our Battleships to convoy raiding against Japan, that they would have saw far more action, but only the latest models had enough speed to be a real threat to a convoy, and you still have the cost of operating them.

Ultimatly I would agree that they where nothing but a waste of money.

The Bismarck was not going to make it home after the torpedo hit to her rudder system.. sunk or not it mattered little as she was a dead ship. Commerce raiding for capital ships was the greatest waste of resources of all - not even getting into how demoralizing it must have been to the crew to have such a big fancy ship going after unarmed merchants. We must never forget the human element. It would have made far more sense to build and man a bucket of U-boats, a handfull of merchant raiders, or a few Deutschlands which all proved FAR superior for that job then a big ordnance sponge that only achieved 5 minutes of fame and then cost the KM one of their worst prestige setbacks.

The Bismarck, like the Yamato class, was a waste of resources for navies that desperately needed those resources elsewhere.

[Warship NWS]

I disagree. If the Bismarck had been opposed by only one Battleship, it might have stood a chance. All the commander would have had to do is position the Bismarck so that his ship could broad side the opposing BB, and then stop his engines. Yes this would have made the Bismarck a sitting duck, but it would have placed him on a level playing ground with the enemy. It then would have depended on the accuracy of both crews, and the critical hits that the two ships took.

I will not agree with this. One of the greatest assets of a warship is its speed. A ship sitting still is far easier to hit then one that is moving at over 25-30 knots as it nearly halves the complexity of your gunnery calculations - for example range change of the target due to estimating its speed is eliminated. Also if you cannot maneuver the enemy can sail around to its bow or stern quadrant and blow you out of the water with near impunity. Game over.. your dead. This is not even getting into attacking cruisers and destroyers with their torpedoes.. or follow up air attacks. Another example.. when the Scharnhorst lost a few knots of speed after the hit to her boiler system by a 14" shell she was pounced on by cruisers and destroyers and sunk.

The ONLY assets a commerce raider could count on is SPEED and STEALTH. Once your location is fixed you have 2 choices.. run or be destroyed as the wolves will come a running after you.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

As to "tied up resources" when commerce raiders attacked.. lets back up and look at this for a minute. Compare the resources involved to hunt down U-boats and armed merchant raiders across WW2 in the various theaters operated in by the KM. Now compare that to the flashes in the pans called the "battleships".. that is like burping into a hurricane thinking you might achieve something in comparison. For one battleship you could man and create multiple threats that are far stealthier and harder to track thus tying down enemy assets at a geometric rate. Losing a battleship is also FAR FAR worse then losing a U-boat or some merchant with guns.. in the regards of political and morale comparisons. If we are thinking 20/20 here.. then keep the human factor of the times in mind. Battleships were the ultimate double edged swords as you have a weapon you fear too much to lose and if they sit the crews become disenchanted with mopping their decks all day.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

The argument is often made that so may more U boats could have put to sea had the materials and personnel used on the big ships had been diverted to them. Well, aside form the lack of building capacity and crew, it is interesting to note that of the 859 U boats that made patrols, only 321 actually sank a ship. Like fighter pilots, a small minority of skippers sank the vast majority of ships. Two percent of U boat skippers sank almost 30% of all ships lost.

There were single U-boats that sank by themselves more shipping then all KM warships combined. For that matter, I think there were some armed merchant raiders that also sank more then all KM warships combined... the Atlantis alone sank 144,000 tons of shipping.. 22 ships.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Another thought.. tying down resources.. hmm, yes the surface raiders did tie down some resources.. but, what else would those resources be doing otherwise? The only resources you can use against subs are planes and escorts so you do not need BBs or CRs for that job. The rest of the KM did nearly nothing except make a few high speed runs trying to avoid detection and create a few brief headlines. So what do you do with the KGVs, Hood, Repulse and Renown, etc.. go chasing around the globe after some pesky surface raiders or act as expensive mobile armored AAA barges for the CVs and convoys. Point being is this.. the resources that were used to go after the KM raiders, BBs and CRs, had nothing else they were really needed for anyways. Only the CVs got spread out kind of thin when raiders were running around until more CVEs took over the task of escorting convoys.

Thanks.

[djcyclone]

I will not agree with this. One of the greatest assets of a warship is its speed. A ship sitting still is far easier to hit then one that is moving at over 25-30 knots as it nearly halves the complexity of your gunnery calculations - for example range change of the target due to estimating its speed is eliminated. Also if you cannot maneuver the enemy can sail around to its bow or stern quadrant and blow you out of the water with near impunity. Game over.. your dead. This is not even getting into attacking cruisers and destroyers with their torpedoes.. or follow up air attacks. Another example.. when the Scharnhorst lost a few knots of speed after the hit to her boiler system by a 14" shell she was pounced on by cruisers and destroyers and sunk.

The ONLY assets a commerce raider could count on is SPEED and STEALTH. Once your location is fixed you have 2 choices.. run or be destroyed as the wolves will come a running after you.

Thanks.



I see your point, however one can still argue. You see when your moving, it requires you to take into effect the distance and the direction change of your own ship. A skilled gunner could acomidate for this, but you also have to deal with the effect that the waves are having on your ship as you are turning. I am talking about the list caused by the weight shift of a large ship, or any ship for that matter. Now the Bismarck would be free from this, because they are not moving. The only thing that effects the Bismarcks gunners, is the pitch and roll caused by the recoil of the guns.

Now if the enemy battle ship positions itself to shoot at the bow, or the stern only. The Bismarck is not dead in the water. The captain can still set the engines to full and continue the turn accordingly.

In the end you are right, because the two Destroyers that where involved in the action would have been able to launch their own attacks, but I was just hypothisizing about the probability of only one Battleship showing up to the seen at all. This is why I said that it was the sheer size of the Royal Navy that kept the Kriegsmarine bottled up. Every where that the surface fleet went, they had to run with their tails between their legs hoping they would not be spotted.

[Warship NWS]

I see your point, however one can still argue. You see when your moving, it requires you to take into effect the distance and the direction change of your own ship. A skilled gunner could acomidate for this, but you also have to deal with the effect that the waves are having on your ship as you are turning. I am talking about the list caused by the weight shift of a large ship, or any ship for that matter. Now the Bismarck would be free from this, because they are not moving. The only thing that effects the Bismarcks gunners, is the pitch and roll caused by the recoil of the guns.

Now if the enemy battle ship positions itself to shoot at the bow, or the stern only. The Bismarck is not dead in the water. The captain can still set the engines to full and continue the turn accordingly..

Two problems with your thought process,

a) Your own ship movements are FAR easier to calculate then the movements of the enemy ship which are, at best, estimates so in turn the slower and less maneuverable your target is the easier it will be to hit it vs one that is up to speed and maneuvering. Example.. you have men on your deck that know exactly what your ship is doing.. however that is not the case for the enemy ship. This becomes even more important if your primary means of target tracking are via optical methods -- radars were not that advanced yet.

b) Just switching on the "engines to full" was 1) the rudder system was damaged to a point that the Bismarck could not maneuver effectively and that caused a serious loss in speed and 2) it takes a bit of time for a ship to gain speed.. and the higher the speed your trying to achieve the longer it takes.

Contrary to popular belief by some the speed of a ship could prove VERY critical in a surface naval engagement -- there is a reason why the engineering of a ship, that which drives a ship through the water -- was considered "vital" to the survival of a ship.. they did not armor the heck out of that section of the ship without good reason. Even a few knots difference in speed could prove critical in surface combat.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

Mike:
I agree that my conclusions were based (at least partly) on hindsight. And I agree that the German navy was limited by its size in what it could do. But, if their intent was to engage in commerce raiding, they designed the wrong fleet for it. The Bismarck and Tirpitz were totally unfit for commerce raiding, given their size and power. I think if they were serious in building a commerce raiding fleet, I would have built a lot more subs and AMCs, and at most, I would have designed a ship somewhere between the Lutzows and Scharnhorst- something with enough firepower to sink merchants or the occasional threat, reasonable protection, good range and speed to get away, plus something little larger than a cruiser so that you could build a number of them (instead of just two or three) so it wasn't a calamity if you lost one. I think one of the reasons that U-boats and AMCs were so effective was that they were cheap to make, which made them expendable- if you lost one, what was one rat to the pack?- which made them more likely to be sent in harm's way, unlike the larger ships.

Chris:
When I talked about the German heavy ships tying down resources, I should have clarified it by stating they tied down resources out of proportion to their threat. Look at all the efforts the British spent in destroying the Tirpitz- midget sub, Lancasters with 6-ton bombs, etc- and they continued even after the Tirpitz was obviously mission killed and no longer a threat.

DJ:

I agree with Chris. The Bismarck was a goner once her rudder was jammed. Even had she survived and been dragged into port, it would have been months (or more) before repairs would have been complete. And, viewing the obsession the British had with destroying the Tirpitz, they would have moved heaven and earth to make sure she never sailed again. That was the reason for the Campbelltown raid to destroy the Normandie dock at St. Nazaire- to ensure that the Germans had no drydock facilities outside of Germany.

[Campy]

If Halsey had left Lee's battleships to guard San Bernadino Straits, two of the last major naval battles of the war would have been battleship vs. battleship (inc. Surigao Straits). If they had stayed with the pursuit North, they might have been used against Ise and Hyuga, another BB vs. BB possibility. The people predicting a final battleship vs battleship fight were not all that far off base.

With 12 modern fast battleships completed or on the way, we certainly did not need the Montana's, which probably would not have been completed during the war.

Frank

[bridav58]

Where the Germans made a mistake was risking the Bismarck the way they did . They should have waited till Tirpitz was ready then move them both to Norwiegion waters and make the Murmansk Run a real murderous affair.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Those are some interesting numbers. I imagine that Eric Topp was among those U boat skippers that you mentioned. He suposedly was one of the best, and managed to survive through the war. He is supposed to be the one that sank the Ruben James. He also came the U.S. after the war and helped teach our Navy about Submarine strategy, and evasive manuvers.

Hi Cyclone,

The Battle of the Atlantic can often be reduced to numbers often masks how hard a struggle it was for the men on both sides. Two other interesting stats are that 25% of all shipping losses to U Boats during the war were off the US coast in the first 7 months of 1942 and that 98% of all ships in convoy arrived safely at their destinations. Clay Blair's book is an excellent narrative that interwines the human and production aspects of the battle.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The most versatile warships,

1) CVs -- they could attack land, sea, air, or underwater targets.
2) CVE/Ls -- as above, just not as large airwings.
3) DDs -- as above.. but without aircraft until the advent of helos.
4) CRs -- more cost effective for shore bombardments and could operate in groups for the cost of a single capital ship. In terms of modern naval warfare they would rank with DDs but not as expendable.
5) BBs/BCs.. costly and although better armored they themselves needed heavy escorting to operate in any ocean due to the inability to engage submerged threats or being non-expendable assets. Shore bombardment effectiveness was limited to the distance from the shore they could operate from due to deep drafts. In terms of AAA there were far more cheaper ships that could fill the role and operate in multi-axis positions due to greater numbers.

Overall.. the BB/BC proved in WW1 and in WW2 to be the least cost effective warships at naval warfare for the operations, losses, costs, etc.. they required to build, maintain, and operate them. The only time they proved especially effective at naval warfare is when they greatly outranged and outgunned their opponents in a surface action. At no time during WW1 or WW2 did they achieve a strategic victory that altered the course of a naval campaign or the war itself - subs and carriers however did, or could, on both counts. Example: Jutland was a blockade in force battle and waste of resources for the HSF as they had no chance to alter the course of the war. In most cases capital ships were effectively mission killed due to the simple presence of an enemy having similar warships and/or due to fear of losing them to mines, subs, aircraft, lack of fuel, cost to maintain, etc.

Personally, I feel that the age of the battleship days were numbered after the Battle of Tsushima. Prior to that time frame they could greatly effect the course of entire theaters of naval warfare which in turn could effect the strategic direction of the war on land as no one had anything to directly counter them as effectively as other "battleships".

As of WW1 battleships ended up being a show of how much money a nation could blow away on big majestic warships with very little real naval use. However, in terms of the course a war would take they mattered little in the overall scheme of history. Unless they could be used to directly interdict supply lines at sea they ended up being port tourist attractions and major maintenance funding sponges.

The most active combat ships of WW1 and WW2 were CVs, CRs, and DDs.. next were the ocean raiders and subs. BBs/BCs saw the fewest actions of all and sank the least ships of all... end result, quite often.. they were a waste of money.

Granted.. this may be a very debatable topic but those are my personal thoughts.

Thanks.

Chris:

That's the contention of the book "Sacred Vessels, the Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the US Navy". By WWII I will admit BBs were obsolete, but they certainly weren't in WWI. Just because we don't lots of examples of them in action doesn't mean they were useless. The very fact that Britain possessed such a large armada of capital ships helped keep the German High Seas Fleet in port rather than at sea. Every navy seemed to be afraid to risk their battleships unless they had a clear numerical advantage. I seriously doubt that aircraft in WWI could carry large bombs or torpedoes to damage a capital ship, but by the 1920s, they could.

[Ed Rotondaro]

My personal opinion, is that Germany used its BB's and BC's for the best uses. They used them as convoy raiders in WW II, and in WW I in battles such as Jutland, they used their ships to toy with the British and tempt them into battles that they could not win. In WW II it was the sheer size of the British Armored Fleet that defeated the Germans surface war. Even when you think of the Bismark, yes it was wounded by a swordfish torpedo, but it still took two Battleships to sink it after that. What if only one had been within range. Would the battle have been the same, or would the Bismark have succeeded?

I think that if the U.S. had commited our Battleships to convoy raiding against Japan, that they would have saw far more action, but only the latest models had enough speed to be a real threat to a convoy, and you still have the cost of operating them.

Ultimatly I would agree that they where nothing but a waste of money.

DJ:

Using a battleship for convoy raiding is a waste of time and money. It could and was done far better with subs and aircraft. The only advantage a BB brings to the table is endurance compared to aircraft and speed compared to a sub. The USN had already decided on using subs for unrestricted commerce raiding. Another factor that rules out the USN using BBs for commerce raiding is the enormous distances involved. Most of Japan's merchant shipping was operating in rear areas that were under Japanese control. You would not want to risk a small task force there. You really don't have the long cross ocean commerce that you saw between Britain and the US in the Atlantic. About the farthest the IJN would be sailing to was Truk. Any merchant shipping in the South West Pacific would put US surface ships within range of extensive land based air.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I wonder what the direct cost of an Iowa class - fully decked out for war as compared to an Essex class - in the same readiness. For the latter you have of course the 36 or so Hellcat/Coursair fighters, 36 dive bombers and 15 Avengers. Yes, nit pick if you want - I'm not trying for exact numbers here - just general. Point is - the bird farm ain't exactly cheap either - evein IF you don't add to the costs with the need to have trained pilots. I'd argue that the pilot training is far more intensive than most crew positions on the Battleship.
The bottom line though, is that with the carrier - even if it IS more expensive after all is done - is a much more versitile war machine and is easily upgraded in versitility by nature of the weapons systems it employs (aircraft of course). You can have a very distinct improvement in a carrier just by flying on new aircraft. In contrast, the BB - you need major ship refits to get an improvement of the same sort.

I do wonder though, if a larger fleet of CVL type might serve better than a smaller fleet of larger ships. I guess it's the "more eggs in the basket" question that has been argued and debated since carriers appeared and is still debated with the advent of the monster CVN's such as the US has.

One final thing to ponder - Carriers require escorts, Destroyers do not. I don't suggest that a navy of "zillions" of DD's is the answer - just making a point!

Kyle:

While the CVL was a useful stop gap for the USN, it was still not the answer. It's air group was not much bigger than those on the CVEs and since the ships were conversions, they handled poorly compared to the big fleet carriers. You'll note that post war the USN stuck with large carriers and abandoned the small carrier concept, although it ocassionally resurfaces (CVX).

[Ed Rotondaro]

There was a proposal and drawing to convert Iowa's to carriers during construction in 1942.

Link to Springstyles book and drawing:

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/s-file/s511-54c.htm


Someone must have done some math, and determined that carriers were more important than bigger battleships.

Opinions?

Dennis:

That's another reason why they cancelled the Montana class. What is surprising though is that the USN still went ahead with the two additional Iowa class BBs the Illinois and the Kentucky.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There was a proposal and drawing to convert Iowa's to carriers during construction in 1942.

Link to Springstyles book and drawing:

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/s-file/s511-54c.htm


Someone must have done some math, and determined that carriers were more important than bigger battleships.

Opinions?

Dennis:

That's another reason why they cancelled the Montana class. What is surprising though is that the USN still went ahead with the two additional Iowa class BBs the Illinois and the Kentucky. The Alaska class large cruisers were meant to have six ships, but once again they cancelled the rest for similar reasons.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Another thought.. tying down resources.. hmm, yes the surface raiders did tie down some resources.. but, what else would those resources be doing otherwise? The only resources you can use against subs are planes and escorts so you do not need BBs or CRs for that job. The rest of the KM did nearly nothing except make a few high speed runs trying to avoid detection and create a few brief headlines. So what do you do with the KGVs, Hood, Repulse and Renown, etc.. go chasing around the globe after some pesky surface raiders or act as expensive mobile armored AAA barges for the CVs and convoys. Point being is this.. the resources that were used to go after the KM raiders, BBs and CRs, had nothing else they were really needed for anyways. Only the CVs got spread out kind of thin when raiders were running around until more CVEs took over the task of escorting convoys.

Thanks.

Chris:

Remember the Italian navy was still active in the time period we're talking about. You don't think Admiral Cunningham couldn't have used some of the capital ships that were forced to screen convoys, especially after HMS Barham was sunk and QE and Valiant were badly damaged by Italian frogmen? Wouldn't KGV or DOY been better deployed to the Med instead of being tied down worrying about the Scharnhorst or the Tirpitz? Considering the time and effort and resources the RN used to neutralize those two ships alone, they at least formed a mini-risk fleet. I'm not saying Churchill made the most rational decisions regarding German surface raiders, but those decisions were made and those resources were tied up.

[Ed Rotondaro]

If Halsey had left Lee's battleships to guard San Bernadino Straits, two of the last major naval battles of the war would have been battleship vs. battleship (inc. Surigao Straits). If they had stayed with the pursuit North, they might have been used against Ise and Hyuga, another BB vs. BB possibility. The people predicting a final battleship vs battleship fight were not all that far off base.

With 12 modern fast battleships completed or on the way, we certainly did not need the Montana's, which probably would not have been completed during the war.

Frank

Campy:

I agree. There were still missions for battleships even as late as 1944. Its just that the opportunities for them were becoming far and few between. Reminds me of Yamato's final death ride. At first Admiral Spruance had planned on intercepting her with six of the old slow battleships to give them one last fight. Meanwhile Admiral Mitscher was preparing a full deck load strike to do the same. He signalled his commander and asked "Shall we take them or will you"? Spruance pondered briefly and issued the shortest operational order of the entire war equal only to Halsey's "Attack repeat Attack". He replied "You take them". So for the cost of ten aircraft the IJN loses the biggest BB ever, a light cruiser and 4 DDs. So from cost effectiveness point of view there is no comparison between aircraft carriers and capital ships.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Where the Germans made a mistake was risking the Bismarck the way they did . They should have waited till Tirpitz was ready then move them both to Norwiegion waters and make the Murmansk Run a real murderous affair.

Hi:

But keep in mind the Murmansk run had not yet started. Those convoys were the result of the German invasion of Russia in June of 1941. The convoys themselves began in August of 1941. Still the entire Bismarck affair would have been far more interesting if she had been allowed to either work with Tirpitz or Scharnhorst/Gneisenau. But that also ties up lots of resources on the German side. You better have a good idea of where a large convoy is to make it worthwhile to send out that many of Germany's capital ships at one time.

[djcyclone]

A question that I have always wondered, is why did Germany waste any money on Destroyers at all? The Destroyers they had where no match for the RN, and they did not have to worry about Convoy Protection or Submarine Hunting. To my knowlege, the German Destroyers never did anything worth while, and nearlly all of them where lost at Narvik while in port if I remember right.

They could have built one or two more Cruisers, or maybe even another Bismarck Class.

[Warship NWS]

Kyle:

While the CVL was a useful stop gap for the USN, it was still not the answer. It's air group was not much bigger than those on the CVEs and since the ships were conversions, they handled poorly compared to the big fleet carriers. You'll note that post war the USN stuck with large carriers and abandoned the small carrier concept, although it ocassionally resurfaces (CVX).

Not entirely true.. the USN does operate amphibious ships capable of launching fixed wing aircraft (LHAs) and they have proven very usefull for the close support and interdiction roles and can engage enemy aircraft if the need requires it with their AV-8Bs much like the Harriers did during the Falklands, obviously not on the level of a CVN fighter group but you cannot ignore them either.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

That's the contention of the book "Sacred Vessels, the Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the US Navy". By WWII I will admit BBs were obsolete, but they certainly weren't in WWI. Just because we don't lots of examples of them in action doesn't mean they were useless. The very fact that Britain possessed such a large armada of capital ships helped keep the German High Seas Fleet in port rather than at sea. Every navy seemed to be afraid to risk their battleships unless they had a clear numerical advantage. I seriously doubt that aircraft in WWI could carry large bombs or torpedoes to damage a capital ship, but by the 1920s, they could.

Please note what I stated, they never had any effect in a strategic naval battle during WW1 or WW2. I also noted that the existence of the RN cancelled out the HSF effectively mission killing their entire fleet of major surface combatants. However, how much strategic effect could the HSF have had even if they could sail? IMHO, little if any at all as they were in no way a blue water naval force.

The RN could have scared them witless just by building a bucket of subs and then blockading them that way or with mines. As to aircraft.. yes, actually aircraft could carry torpedoes and kill ships by around 1917 or so, and/or at the least damage them with bombs - and it did happen vs a few merchants. The problem was that aircraft doctrines were still very much in their infancy and there was not nearly as effort or resources poured into developing naval attack capable aircraft as there was for developing warships - at least not until the 1930s, which were still considered the ultimate anti-ship killers - ironically, subs and mines killed far more warships then warships themselves. Flip side - ships had very poor AA defenses so if you did launch a flight of aircraft armed with air droppable torpedoes, even small ones could prove very dangerous during those times, or heavy bombers with bombs they could do damage if they hit their targets. Even the slightest of damage could force a mighty warship to stay in port for months at a time. No one however really pressed the idea though.

So IF nations had pushed the idea of naval attack aircraft more.. they could have been more of a threat. If nothing else.. recon aircraft covering warships could have been very usefull at various naval engagements possibly giving the same advantages as they did over land.

In the end however, battleships ended up being a huge drain on the nations that built them and they had no real effect on the strategic outcome of the war. After Tsushima there were far cheaper weapons that could cancel them out fairly effectively. Subs and mines proved this as naval commanders were scared to death of those silent assasins that could pop up anywhere. When aircraft started to be believed in more by the military leaders the battleship was effectively neutralized as a strategic weapon of war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A question that I have always wondered, is why did Germany waste any money on Destroyers at all? The Destroyers they had where no match for the RN, and they did not have to worry about Convoy Protection or Submarine Hunting. To my knowlege, the German Destroyers never did anything worth while, and nearlly all of them where lost at Narvik while in port if I remember right.

They could have built one or two more Cruisers, or maybe even another Bismarck Class.

DJ:

The destroyers were used for coastal convoy escort when available. The main problems with German DDs were unreliable high pressure boilers, and over armament with 5.9 guns on members of certain classes. This made them very unstable in rough seas (i.e. the North Atlantic just about all the time). I also think that the German DDs had a sense of inferiority when facing their RN counterparts. The RN stressed aggressiveness in its all its commanders, but especially its DD skippers. The Germans were just trying to avoid losing ships which was an operational doctrine that hamstrung their entire navy.

Cruiser wise I hope you are referring to their heavy cruisers, because German light cruisers were along with Japanese light cruisers very inferior designs. They lacked range, armor and firepower compared to British or American CLs. The heavy cruisers were powerful but had the same faulty high pressure boilers that kept them in port as often as they were at sea.
Vincent O'Hara's book "The German Fleet at War 1939-1945" covers every surface action that the Germans fought and you'd be surprised how many times the DDs fought. But it was more a case of lack of operational experience combined with lack of ship design experience (remember that Germany was forbade a large navy by the Treaty of Versailles) that crippled her destroyers.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Remember the Italian navy was still active in the time period we're talking about. You don't think Admiral Cunningham couldn't have used some of the capital ships that were forced to screen convoys, especially after HMS Barham was sunk and QE and Valiant were badly damaged by Italian frogmen? Wouldn't KGV or DOY been better deployed to the Med instead of being tied down worrying about the Scharnhorst or the Tirpitz? Considering the time and effort and resources the RN used to neutralize those two ships alone, they at least formed a mini-risk fleet. I'm not saying Churchill made the most rational decisions regarding German surface raiders, but those decisions were made and those resources were tied up.

The only surface ships that proved strategicaly significant in any theater of war were the CVs - even in the Med. as was proven at Toranto and during the convoy runs. The Italians had nothing to counter the CVs except land based air power, with a lot of added support from the Luftwaffe. Without the CVs the RN would have been in serious trouble in the Med. Sea. The BBs did very little in comparison to the CVs in the Atlantic or the Med theater of operations and if the BBs operated anywhere where land based air could attack them without CV coverage they were not much more then targets. At best, the BBs in both theaters used their guns in tactical skirmishes. The Swordfish by comparison did more damage to the Italian fleet in one night then the BBs did in the Med throughout the entire war.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

That's the contention of the book "Sacred Vessels, the Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the US Navy". By WWII I will admit BBs were obsolete, but they certainly weren't in WWI. Just because we don't lots of examples of them in action doesn't mean they were useless. The very fact that Britain possessed such a large armada of capital ships helped keep the German High Seas Fleet in port rather than at sea. Every navy seemed to be afraid to risk their battleships unless they had a clear numerical advantage. I seriously doubt that aircraft in WWI could carry large bombs or torpedoes to damage a capital ship, but by the 1920s, they could.

Actually, they did carry large enough torpedoes in WW1 to seriously damage battleships, problem was that the doctrines and aircraft were not applied as much as they possibly could have been. By around 1917 torpedo armed seaplanes were attacking merchant shipping but in very small numbers. Large bombers could carry bombs that could damage major warships but again they were not put to the test as much as they could have been. By WW1 the BBs was not so much obsolete as being vulnerable to far cheaper weapons such as mines and subs. In a sense they were mostly mission killed by cheaper threats - by WW2 the circle of mission killing capital ships was completed when air power finally had a chance to prove its true worth in a naval war. In the end however, they ended up being show pieces for the navies that played no real strategic role in the naval wars in any theater. In the end, could they have played a greater role? Maybe.. but again there were cheaper and far more expendable (both politically and militarily) methods of blockading ports.

[djcyclone]

Actually, they did carry large enough torpedoes in WW1 to seriously damage battleships, problem was that the doctrines and aircraft were not applied as much as they possibly could have been. By around 1917 torpedo armed seaplanes were attacking merchant shipping but in very small numbers. Large bombers could carry bombs that could damage major warships but again they were not put to the test as much as they could have been. By WW1 the BBs was not so much obsolete as being vulnerable to far cheaper weapons such as mines and subs. In a sense they were mostly mission killed by cheaper threats - by WW2 the circle of mission killing capital ships was completed when air power finally had a chance to prove its true worth in a naval war. In the end however, they ended up being show pieces for the navies that played no real strategic role in the naval wars in any theater. In the end, could they have played a greater role? Maybe.. but again there were cheaper and far more expendable (both politically and militarily) methods of blockading ports.



Here are the Numbers for Battleships sunk by Submarines in WW I



U.K.- 5 Battleships, not including those sunk by mines, which where normally laid by Submarines.

U.S.- lost our 1 and only Aurmored Cruiser to Submarine laid Mine.

French- 3

Italy- 1

It is actually amazing to see how many Battleships sunk due to internal explosions during WW I. You would think that would have cause the light bulb to light up in the Commanders minds, and get rid of the whole project.

[JMS]

Please note what I stated, they never had any effect in a strategic naval battle during WW1 or WW2. I also noted that the existence of the RN cancelled out the HSF effectively mission killing their entire fleet of major surface combatants. However, how much strategic effect could the HSF have had even if they could sail? IMHO, little if any at all as they were in no way a blue water naval force.

The RN could have scared them witless just by building a bucket of subs and then blockading them that way or with mines. As to aircraft.. yes, actually aircraft could carry torpedoes and kill ships by around 1917 or so, and/or at the least damage them with bombs - and it did happen vs a few merchants. The problem was that aircraft doctrines were still very much in their infancy and there was not nearly as effort or resources poured into developing naval attack capable aircraft as there was for developing warships - at least not until the 1930s, which were still considered the ultimate anti-ship killers - ironically, subs and mines killed far more warships then warships themselves. Flip side - ships had very poor AA defenses so if you did launch a flight of aircraft armed with air droppable torpedoes, even small ones could prove very dangerous during those times, or heavy bombers with bombs they could do damage if they hit their targets. Even the slightest of damage could force a mighty warship to stay in port for months at a time. No one however really pressed the idea though.

So IF nations had pushed the idea of naval attack aircraft more.. they could have been more of a threat. If nothing else.. recon aircraft covering warships could have been very usefull at various naval engagements possibly giving the same advantages as they did over land.

In the end however, battleships ended up being a huge drain on the nations that built them and they had no real effect on the strategic outcome of the war. After Tsushima there were far cheaper weapons that could cancel them out fairly effectively. Subs and mines proved this as naval commanders were scared to death of those silent assasins that could pop up anywhere. When aircraft started to be believed in more by the military leaders the battleship was effectively neutralized as a strategic weapon of war.

I beg to differ here. The impact of the dreadnought battleship in WW1 was quite decisive. The unwillingness of the Germans to risk them in battle ensured the triumph of the blockade strategy but the presence of the German battleships practically isolated Russia from Western help.

Goeben and the impounding of the Turkish battleships had a very strategic effect on the war, and the Black Sea fleet managed to control the Black sea and push the Turks to the brink before Russia collapsed first. That couldn't be done with anything but battleships.

Of course, it was the German naval program what pushed Britain into the war for all practical effects. A program based in submarines and destroyers couldn't have done that and would have resulted in the bottled up by close blockade and the entry into the Baltic disbarred.

[JMS]

Here are the Numbers for Battleships sunk by Submarines in WW I



U.K.- 5 Battleships, not including those sunk by mines, which where normally laid by Submarines.

U.S.- lost our 1 and only Aurmored Cruiser to Submarine laid Mine.

French- 3

Italy- 1

It is actually amazing to see how many Battleships sunk due to internal explosions during WW I. You would think that would have cause the light bulb to light up in the Commanders minds, and get rid of the whole project.


All but one pre-dreadnoughts of dubious values which would have gone to the breakers within 5 years after 1914. The loss of Audacious was a combination of poor damage control and weather, she should have been able to survive the mine hit.

[JMS]

Actually, they did carry large enough torpedoes in WW1 to seriously damage battleships, problem was that the doctrines and aircraft were not applied as much as they possibly could have been. By around 1917 torpedo armed seaplanes were attacking merchant shipping but in very small numbers. Large bombers could carry bombs that could damage major warships but again they were not put to the test as much as they could have been. By WW1 the BBs was not so much obsolete as being vulnerable to far cheaper weapons such as mines and subs. In a sense they were mostly mission killed by cheaper threats - by WW2 the circle of mission killing capital ships was completed when air power finally had a chance to prove its true worth in a naval war. In the end however, they ended up being show pieces for the navies that played no real strategic role in the naval wars in any theater. In the end, could they have played a greater role? Maybe.. but again there were cheaper and far more expendable (both politically and militarily) methods of blockading ports.

There's a very good article in Warship 2007 regarding a planned Pearl harbor type attack vs the German fleet. This kind of assault could only have any impact in port in WW1, as both the torpedos and the planes were too slow and an alerted ship could have maneuvered away.

[bridav58]

There's a very good article in Warship 2007 regarding a planned Pearl harbor type attack vs the German fleet. This kind of assault could only have any impact in port in WW1, as both the torpedos and the planes were too slow and an alerted ship could have maneuvered away.


being slow didn't stop the swordfish of the RN from hitting the fast Bismarck ,3 times at that. The Bismarck was much faster then WW1 BB's and had much better AA to boot.

[djcyclone]

being slow didn't stop the swordfish of the RN from hitting the fast Bismarck ,3 times at that. The Bismarck was much faster then WW1 BB's and had much better AA to boot.



The Bismarck did not have that good of an AAA system. From what I understand, the ship had the first system of Automated Anti Aircraft guns. The downside to all of this, was that the system could not target slow aircraft. It was designed to catch the fast spitfires. The swordfish went right through it with little to no consequence. If their system had been more of a manned unit, like just regular machine guns, then the Swordfish would have been easy pray for a human gunner.

[bridav58]

The Bismarck did not have that good of an AAA system. From what I understand, the ship had the first system of Automated Anti Aircraft guns. The downside to all of this, was that the system could not target slow aircraft. It was designed to catch the fast spitfires. The swordfish went right through it with little to no consequence. If their system had been more of a manned unit, like just regular machine guns, then the Swordfish would have been easy pray for a human gunner.


Swordfish easy prey for enemy AA? they were exposed to AA as you suggest but didn't seem especially vulnerable as compared to other aircraft. Bismarck did have much better AA then any WW1 BB though which is mainly what I'm driving at.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Not entirely true.. the USN does operate amphibious ships capable of launching fixed wing aircraft (LHAs) and they have proven very usefull for the close support and interdiction roles and can engage enemy aircraft if the need requires it with their AV-8Bs much like the Harriers did during the Falklands, obviously not on the level of a CVN fighter group but you cannot ignore them either.

Chris:

With all due respect, you can't equate an amphib ship with a few Harriers or Helos with a carrier. If we do that, then every DDG or FFG is a carrier. Please.:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

The only surface ships that proved strategicaly significant in any theater of war were the CVs - even in the Med. as was proven at Toranto and during the convoy runs. The Italians had nothing to counter the CVs except land based air power, with a lot of added support from the Luftwaffe. Without the CVs the RN would have been in serious trouble in the Med. Sea. The BBs did very little in comparison to the CVs in the Atlantic or the Med theater of operations and if the BBs operated anywhere where land based air could attack them without CV coverage they were not much more then targets. At best, the BBs in both theaters used their guns in tactical skirmishes. The Swordfish by comparison did more damage to the Italian fleet in one night then the BBs did in the Med throughout the entire war.

Chris:

How do you explain the large number of surface actions in the Med if CVs dominated? At best the Brits operated two CVs at a time and they were vulnerable to land based air. Cruisers and DDs were the primary combatants on both sides since the the Italian and British BBs were damaged for a good part of the campaign. Neither side lost a BB at sea to air attack until the Germans sank the Roma with a Fritz wire guided missile.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Actually, they did carry large enough torpedoes in WW1 to seriously damage battleships, problem was that the doctrines and aircraft were not applied as much as they possibly could have been. By around 1917 torpedo armed seaplanes were attacking merchant shipping but in very small numbers. Large bombers could carry bombs that could damage major warships but again they were not put to the test as much as they could have been. By WW1 the BBs was not so much obsolete as being vulnerable to far cheaper weapons such as mines and subs. In a sense they were mostly mission killed by cheaper threats - by WW2 the circle of mission killing capital ships was completed when air power finally had a chance to prove its true worth in a naval war. In the end however, they ended up being show pieces for the navies that played no real strategic role in the naval wars in any theater. In the end, could they have played a greater role? Maybe.. but again there were cheaper and far more expendable (both politically and militarily) methods of blockading ports.

Chris:

While a BB was costly and vulnerable to numerous threats, so were just about every other naval vessel. BBs evolved to meet those threats and to a degree succeeded. One problem with your argument about BBs not having a strategic role is that you expect them to be used constantly. Their very existence caused nations to plan how to deal with them. Nuclear weapons have fortunately only been used twice so far, but would you say they were strategically irrelevant? They certainly caused the major powers of the world to avoid going to war with each other. Nuclear deterrance was the cornerstone of Cold War strategy. All for a weapon that was costly and not used.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Here are the Numbers for Battleships sunk by Submarines in WW I



U.K.- 5 Battleships, not including those sunk by mines, which where normally laid by Submarines.

U.S.- lost our 1 and only Aurmored Cruiser to Submarine laid Mine.

French- 3

Italy- 1

It is actually amazing to see how many Battleships sunk due to internal explosions during WW I. You would think that would have cause the light bulb to light up in the Commanders minds, and get rid of the whole project.

DJ:

Ships sinking due to internal explosions does not render the concept of the ship obsolete. It tells the navy to start investigating why they explode and to improve the manufacture of gun propellant. Any ship with unstable cordite can suffer an explosion.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I beg to differ here. The impact of the dreadnought battleship in WW1 was quite decisive. The unwillingness of the Germans to risk them in battle ensured the triumph of the blockade strategy but the presence of the German battleships practically isolated Russia from Western help.

Goeben and the impounding of the Turkish battleships had a very strategic effect on the war, and the Black Sea fleet managed to control the Black sea and push the Turks to the brink before Russia collapsed first. That couldn't be done with anything but battleships.

Of course, it was the German naval program what pushed Britain into the war for all practical effects. A program based in submarines and destroyers couldn't have done that and would have resulted in the bottled up by close blockade and the entry into the Baltic disbarred.

JMS:

Yes, very solidly reasoned. Good post!

[Ed Rotondaro]

All but one pre-dreadnoughts of dubious values which would have gone to the breakers within 5 years after 1914. The loss of Audacious was a combination of poor damage control and weather, she should have been able to survive the mine hit.

JMS:

Audacious didn't even lose any crew from that mine hit. That's amazing in my opinion. And you are correct, she should have been able to be saved. Kind of reminds you of the loss of the Ark Royal in WWII to a single torpedo hit.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Swordfish easy prey for enemy AA? they were exposed to AA as you suggest but didn't seem especially vulnerable as compared to other aircraft. Bismarck did have much better AA then any WW1 BB though which is mainly what I'm driving at.

Hi:

Actually I agree with DJ on this one. The Bismarck's light AA had trouble tracking the slow moving Swordfish and the explosive shells had a tendency to go through the plane ran than explode. You will note that Britain never deployed this plane in the Pacific where it would have been dead meat. German naval AA left a lot to be desired when compared to the IJN or USN.

[JMS]

Hi:

Actually I agree with DJ on this one. The Bismarck's light AA had trouble tracking the slow moving Swordfish and the explosive shells had a tendency to go through the plane ran than explode. You will note that Britain never deployed this plane in the Pacific where it would have been dead meat. German naval AA left a lot to be desired when compared to the IJN or USN.

Moreover, she survived an air torpedo hit in a previous attack and it was dumb luck that she was hit in the rudder. Had the torpedo hit the belt, she would have slipped away to France.

[bridav58]

Hi:

Actually I agree with DJ on this one. The Bismarck's light AA had trouble tracking the slow moving Swordfish and the explosive shells had a tendency to go through the plane ran than explode. You will note that Britain never deployed this plane in the Pacific where it would have been dead meat. German naval AA left a lot to be desired when compared to the IJN or USN.


Aircraft in the late 1910's & the early 1920's could still move fast enough to damage BB's when you consider thier AA outfits at the time and thier speeds compared to Bismarck. Furthermore consider Bismarck's size/beam/TDS compared to BB's from WW1 as to wether the same torpedoes would stop them or not.

[bridav58]

Moreover, she survived an air torpedo hit in a previous attack and it was dumb luck that she was hit in the rudder. Had the torpedo hit the belt, she would have slipped away to France.

Let her get hit by a torpedo like North Carolina got hit by or the torpedoes that sank Yamato or Musashi & she if she slips home or not.

[Warship NWS]

A quick point about the Bismarck, granted it was a lucky hit that knocked out her vulnerable rudder system but even if she had reached Brest she would have likely become a bomb sponge as happened to Tirpitz. The last thing you want when your a battleship is to have your position fixed at sea or at port at a location where the enemy can hurt you. Whether the RAF, or other means, destroyed her or not would not have mattered as even slight damage would have kept her in port as captains never wanted to leave port with damage unrepaired if they could help it. End result, she would have been destroyed or mission killed in port.

As to what sank the Yamato or Musashi.. I doubt any BB would have survived such an attack and it proved conclusively that without proper aircover a BB could be destroyed by aircraft alone.. but then again, that was proven already vs the PoW and Repulse at sea much earlier in the war. The instant aircraft were used in numbers and could carry ordnance capable of sinking or heavily damaging warships the BBs days were effectively neutralized as strategic naval units.

Quick historical note, the only real reason the torpedoes that hit the Bismarck prior to the fatal hit was due to the typical mistake of the British dropping their torpedoes too shallow so in turn they would often hit belt armor. This was true throughout most of the war even with DDs -- example the Scharnhorst would not have survived so many hits if the hits scored were below the belt line.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

With all due respect, you can't equate an amphib ship with a few Harriers or Helos with a carrier. If we do that, then every DDG or FFG is a carrier. Please.:D

They are effectively a light CVs as their aircraft are capable of all of the same missions, if armed accordingly, as a CV. Now do they have the same doctrinal use or combat power of a CVN? Of course not and I did mention that point, for that matter an LHA will not go anywhere without their big brother around. To consider the LHAs as not being light carriers would be to not consider the RN CVs to be not light carriers.. they both had similiar air wing strength numbers and hitting power and could fullfill the same roles if required -- where do you think the AV-8B idea came from?

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Hi:

Actually I agree with DJ on this one. The Bismarck's light AA had trouble tracking the slow moving Swordfish and the explosive shells had a tendency to go through the plane ran than explode. You will note that Britain never deployed this plane in the Pacific where it would have been dead meat. German naval AA left a lot to be desired when compared to the IJN or USN.

Partly accurate.. the light AAA did not have trouble tracking the aircraft, the problem was that they were the SKC30 37mm semi-automatic weapons that had to be hand loaded so their ROF was terribly slow. These weapons were also on U-boats but upgraded to the far superior fully automatic M42 37mm weapons. The 105mm AA guns did have trouble tracking the Swordfish due to their fire control directors. The 20mm were too short ranged to engage enemy aircraft before they could release their ordnance and their shells could go through the fabric, as you mentioned, before detonating. They would have to hit the pilot or engine area to be effective.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

How do you explain the large number of surface actions in the Med if CVs dominated? At best the Brits operated two CVs at a time and they were vulnerable to land based air. Cruisers and DDs were the primary combatants on both sides since the the Italian and British BBs were damaged for a good part of the campaign. Neither side lost a BB at sea to air attack until the Germans sank the Roma with a Fritz wire guided missile.

At what point did the RN BBs have a decisive and strategic effect on the Med naval campaign? The majority of the surface actions involved the CRs and DDs. The BBs hardly got to fight at all. That is my point. There were thousands of surface actions during WW2 using patrol craft on up to BBs.. but the BBs had a chance to fight in a fraction of a fraction of the actions and none proved strategically decisive.

[paladin5]

I think that if the U.S. had commited our Battleships to convoy raiding against Japan, that they would have saw far more action, but only the latest models had enough speed to be a real threat to a convoy, and you still have the cost of operating them.

Ultimatly I would agree that they where nothing but a waste of money.



And how would you employ them? Singly? With a small escort force for each battleship? Also theree is the problem of exposing them to enemy air without any air cover of there own.

[JMS]

At what point did the RN BBs have a decisive and strategic effect on the Med naval campaign? The majority of the surface actions involved the CRs and DDs. The BBs hardly got to fight at all. That is my point. There were thousands of surface actions during WW2 using patrol craft on up to BBs.. but the BBs had a chance to fight in a fraction of a fraction of the actions and none proved strategically decisive.

Matapan was pretty decisive in bottling up and damaging the Italian surface fleet at a moment it could have hurt decisively the evacuation from Crete. The 2 Sirtes show the disruption the Italian fleet could have provoked in supplying Malta. Without Malta there's no interdiction of Rommel's supply lines and he gets a fair chance of arriving to the Suez Canal, etc, etc.

PQ-17 shows the battleships' value as a deterrent. Tirpitz sails, the convoy scatters and becomes easy picking for U-boats and planes, without a shot being fired.

[JMS]

And how would you employ them? Singly? With a small escort force for each battleship? Also theree is the problem of exposing them to enemy air without any air cover of there own.

The cost/benefit of that proposition doesn't work out. Japanese convoys were small, so sinking a few merchants in exchange for a battleship was a lose/lose proposition.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A quick point about the Bismarck, granted it was a lucky hit that knocked out her vulnerable rudder system but even if she had reached Brest she would have likely become a bomb sponge as happened to Tirpitz. The last thing you want when your a battleship is to have your position fixed at sea or at port at a location where the enemy can hurt you. Whether the RAF, or other means, destroyed her or not would not have mattered as even slight damage would have kept her in port as captains never wanted to leave port with damage unrepaired if they could help it. End result, she would have been destroyed or mission killed in port.



Chris:

There is also the possibility that the Bismarck could have made the channel dash with the twins and Prinz Eugen. You can't automatically assume her demise just because she is in a port that the RAF can reach. But I agree that she would have been a priority target for the RAF and the RN.

[Ed Rotondaro]

They are effectively a light CVs as their aircraft are capable of all of the same missions, if armed accordingly, as a CV. Now do they have the same doctrinal use or combat power of a CVN? Of course not and I did mention that point, for that matter an LHA will not go anywhere without their big brother around. To consider the LHAs as not being light carriers would be to not consider the RN CVs to be not light carriers.. they both had similiar air wing strength numbers and hitting power and could fullfill the same roles if required -- where do you think the AV-8B idea came from?

Thanks.

Chris:

Are the aircraft capable of ACM or fleet defense? I don't think so. They are a nice little additional club in the bag so to speak, but they are not aircraft carriers by any means. RN carriers might be small, but they pack a decent air wing.

[Ed Rotondaro]

At what point did the RN BBs have a decisive and strategic effect on the Med naval campaign? The majority of the surface actions involved the CRs and DDs. The BBs hardly got to fight at all. That is my point. There were thousands of surface actions during WW2 using patrol craft on up to BBs.. but the BBs had a chance to fight in a fraction of a fraction of the actions and none proved strategically decisive.

Chris:

My point (and I do have one) is that capital ships exerted an influence on any naval operation. You always had to take into account what large ship you might face. Sure BBs never fought that many actions, we've already covered that ground. You had to take into account their possible use and then decide if you airpower could neutralize them. Here's an observation:

The most successful use of airpower was against anchored BBs or inadequately escorted BBs. Taranto and Pearl Harbor were target shoots. POW and Repulse were so thoroughly outumbered that they had no chance. Fast forward to 1944 and Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf and you don't see air strikes sinking everything in sight. What you see is airpower convincing admirals to get the hell out of Dodge. Based on the number of planes the USN could deploy in both of these battles, there should not have been a Japanese fleet after November of 1944.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Matapan was pretty decisive in bottling up and damaging the Italian surface fleet at a moment it could have hurt decisively the evacuation from Crete. The 2 Sirtes show the disruption the Italian fleet could have provoked in supplying Malta. Without Malta there's no interdiction of Rommel's supply lines and he gets a fair chance of arriving to the Suez Canal, etc, etc.

PQ-17 shows the battleships' value as a deterrent. Tirpitz sails, the convoy scatters and becomes easy picking for U-boats and planes, without a shot being fired.

JMS:

Good post and solid analysis!

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Are the aircraft capable of ACM or fleet defense? I don't think so. They are a nice little additional club in the bag so to speak, but they are not aircraft carriers by any means. RN carriers might be small, but they pack a decent air wing.

Really?

The design requirements for the AV-8B+, and remember only the USMC uses them which are a branch of the USN;



Conduct close air support using conventional and specific weapons.
Conduct deep air support, to include armed reconnaissance and air interdiction, using conventional and specific weapons.
Conduct offensive and defensive antiair warfare. This includes combat air patrol, armed escort missions, and offensive missions against enemy ground-to-air defenses, all within the capabilities of the aircraft.
Be able to operate and deliver ordnance at night and to operate under instrument flight conditions.
Be able to deploy for extended operations employing aerial refueling.
Be able to deploy to and operate from carriers and other suitable seagoing platforms, advanced bases, expeditionary airfields, and remote tactical landing sites.


The updated weapons qualifications for the AV-8B+


Hardpoints: 7 with a capacity of 13,200 lb (STOVL) of stores, including iron bombs, cluster bombs, napalm canisters, laser-guided bombs, AGM-65 Maverick or AGM-84 Harpoon missiles, a LITENING targeting pod, up to four AIM-9 Sidewinder or similar-sized infrared-guided missiles. Radar equipped AV-8B+ variants can carry up to four AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. An ongoing upgrade program is currently fitting airframes with wiring and software to employ 1760 bus based weapons “smart weapons” (i.e.JDAM),

Why would you arm a USMC aircraft with AIM-120s and an APG-65 multi-role radar if you have no intentions of being able to shoot down enemy planes? Does this mean they would be the PRIMARY CAP if a CVN was nearby.. absolutely not.. but, you cannot ignore them if they were pressed into a CAP role if the need required it and they can surely act in the ESCORT role. The USMC AV-8B+ have, or can be modified at sea, to be just as capable as the versions used by the Italian, RN, and Spanish CVs --- and operated in similiar numbers on their flight decks.

Point being just because they are NOT used primarly for fleet defense if the LHA is the core fixing wing capable carrier of a amphibious assault group they most certainly can act as CAP or ESCORT aircraft if the need required it.

[JMS]

Well, the B+ is more capable than the Sea Harrier 2 ever was and those have been withdrawn anyway. As far as I know, Spanish and Italian B+ are the same as the USMC, and their primary role is air defence. I know they do well in exercises vs F/A-18s for example.

[Warship NWS]

Boy.. you guys get more time to post then I do.. but lets hit a few responses here;

First.. WW2,

a) Cape Matapan was decided by naval air power, not naval gunnery. If not for the Albacore attacks on the Italian fleet the battleships would not have been provided any viable targets. It was a strategic victory.. but due to the effect of naval air power dictacting who and what was engaged.

b) Rommel was in no threat of losing his convoy system.. what killed him most of all was the long supply lines from Tobruk to his forces which were very vulnerable to tactical aircraft. He did lose a good number of supply ships to the RN but not to battleship guns so much as to RN subs and aircraft.

c) The PQ17 incident was hardly a strategic event.. at most it was a tactical disaster. The battleship only had anything to do with it out of fear and severe tactical errors of judgment.. not due to physical presence. No battleships of WW2 had any strategic effect on any convoy system in any theater -- especially when compared to subs or air threats. The Tirpitz guns did not sink anything.. the subs and aircraft did and they still would have sank shipping even if the Tirpitz didn't exist, the Tirpitz just made it easier for them to do so when the RN commander of PQ17 panicked.

d) BBs did not exert a strategic influence in any theater, in the realistic sense IMHO, even PH was intended more to kill the CVs then the BBs. When the CVs were not available to attack the BBs ended up taking their place as the primary targets. Even when BBs were present within a navy the CVs were typically the first targets to be prioritized if an opposing navy operated them. The primary reason the Italian fleet at Toranto was attacked as a priority is because that was the only viable Italian naval surface threat to the RN convoy lines however BBs never proved especially effective at disrupting convoys for any sustained length of time during WW2 in any theater of war.

WW1.. this is where the real debate comes into play..

Strategic.. what this means is the ability to alter the course of a naval war when in turn alters the course of a land war in a definitive and sustained manner. In physical presence during strategic engagements BBs had some of the greatest limitations for several reasons. Cost to operate, logistics, communication requirements, not being expendable, organizational requirements, sea-keeping, etc.. What proved FAR more effective in a *continuous* role in terms of blockading enemy fleets were the submarines, mines, and patrol craft. FAR more battleships, granted mostly older BBs, were sunk by mines, subs, and torpedo armed patrol craft then by any measure of naval gunfire. For that matter, more BBs were sunk by patrol craft then by any other major warship classes. Why some of you may ask? Simple.. ASW was piss poor at best for all navies and NO enemy admiral had a clue of exactly where the subs were and subs could lay mines very close to enemy shores and mine-sweeping proved to be very dangerous and specialized jobs. Torpedos proved especially deadly to major warships and even if they did not sink them they could cause serious damage causing a big expensive ship to be laid up for months of repairs. Fearing a big battleship that might have a 2-4% chance of even hitting you, on average at Jutland as an example, is one thing and might gain the most glory or respect.. but the greatest fear came from something that could sink or heavily damage you in one hit and subs were far cheaper to operate and deploy at sea in greater sustained numbers. The only true way to consistently uphold an anti-merchant blockade, which is what forced nations to capitulate far more then any surface naval actions, was to put subs in the merchant sea lanes or mines. There was far less fear of losing a sub then losing that big glorified naval gun battery of a battleship.

IMHO, subs had a far greater strategic role then the battleships could dream of during WW1. Merchant shipping being stopped or sunk by battleships was extremely far and few between. The subs held the bulk of that job or ships smaller then battleships. Battleships assisted in keeping enemy battleships from interfering with surface ship mine laying and sweeping operations but they could do nothing about the operations of submarines that could lay mines.

Now some of you might think .. "Hey, subs were slower then almost all major warships!".. yes that is true, but NOT when the warships are trying to maintain a standing blockade, in confined waters, at fuel efficient cruising speeds, or when they are sailing near ports. Defensive mines had to be laid just to restrict various locations from unrestricted operations for subs. Mines are double edged swords however, they can kill you just as easily as the enemy so your routes tend to be more predictable when the minefields are discovered and their general locations are known. WW1 cruising speeds were also often around 10-15 knots to conserve coal/oil and you cannot just keep sailing around in a blockade near a coastline or in restricted waters.. exactly where subs could be the most lethal. The other catch is what you have to consider the more important targets.. the battleships or the merchants that supply coal, oil, parts, food, etc.. for the battleships. Subs also had no problem catching merchants.. merchants were the strategic war winners.. not the battleships, IMHO.

We need to look at HOW MUCH participation each type of warship played into the WW1 naval strategic operational theaters and their direct effect on the enemy.. not by just fear alone, but actually results on the enemy supply lines. The only reason a navy exists in any war is to disrupt the ability of the enemy to maintain a war. Only when you can stop the enemy from creating and maintaining the weapons of war can you win a war. In this sense.., IMHO, battleships participated the least. Even had the RN lost at Jutland the HSF battlefleet, the battleships, again IMHO, could have done little vs the RN supply lines except in the support roles. The most lethal weapons of the anti-merchant shipping war were subs, raiders, mines, and torpedo armed craft. I would also note that no battleship could catch most of the "cruisers" that acted as raiders during WW1, only BCs could achieve catching faster then 20 knot warships as was proved during the Falklands battle. Had the HSF utilized it's cruisers in a greater role of merchant raiding the BBs could have done little to nothing as none of them could catch them until the advent of the BBs that could achieve greater then 20 knots and it was far too logistically costly to operate BBs far from shore for extended lengths of time to chase after some pesky cruisers.

Again, these are my personal thoughts, opinions, and theories and I am more then willing to hear further discussions regarding this very interesting topic.

[Warship NWS]

Well, the B+ is more capable than the Sea Harrier 2 ever was and those have been withdrawn anyway. As far as I know, Spanish and Italian B+ are the same as the USMC, and their primary role is air defence. I know they do well in exercises vs F/A-18s for example.

That is correct on both counts. USMC pilots are fully trained in doctrinal air combat and the AV-8B has proven effective in all air combat roles with exceptional maneuverability.

[djcyclone]

Even had the RN lost at Jutland the HSF battlefleet, the battleships, again IMHO, could have done little vs the RN supply lines except in the support roles.



I am pretty sure the RN did lose at Jutland. The Germans just lost a higher percentage of their fleet, compared to the RN losses. The Germans still sent the RN home with a bloody lip after that battle.

I cannot argue with everything else that you posted, because it was very accurate. I think that when it really comes down to it, WW I and WW II where simply learning points. When you look at WW I you will see that most of the BIG WIG commanders had started their careers at the end of the age of sail. When they had started, the concept of Naval Warfare was to bring as many guns to bear as one possibly could. This is why the Battleship held so much sway. It was just the process of letting go, that proved to be to difficult for the people in that day. When many of the BIG WIG commanders that I spoke of above started, the Submarine was nothing more than a Suicide Weapon (A.K.A. the Hunley.) The Aircraft has only been invented for a decade, and is still in the stages of infancy. So you can see why they held on to the concept so diligently.

WW I was nothing but a refusal to let go of the old and grab hold of the new. This is why their was such a high death toll in the Trench Warfare. The British where still using Calvary charges at the begining of the War. By the time we reach WW II, I agree the idea should have sunk in, but it did not. The old fogies of the day still wanted to hold on to their trophies. At least we did grab hold of the concept after WW II. I have argued with people today that think the Battleship should still be in service. I spoke with a person some time back who argued with me regularly how the Battleship was our most effective and proven weapon. No matter how hard I tried, I could not convince this guy that the Battleships age was long gone. I tried telling him of the effects of the MK 48 ADCAP torpedo, and how in theory a single Torpedo could sink a Battleship. The heavier the target the more likely it will snap in half. I also mentioned how advanced modern day Missiles are, and how much of a sitting taget a Battleship would be, but everything that I said just bounced right off. I could have convinced a brick wall to move, before I cold get this guy to back off. Just be greatfull that our leaders are not still that hard headed on the concept of the Battleship.

[paladin5]

The cost/benefit of that proposition doesn't work out. Japanese convoys were small, so sinking a few merchants in exchange for a battleship was a lose/lose proposition.



I know thats what i was trying to point out with my post, guess i didn't do a very good job though.

[djcyclone]

Another thing that I want to throw out their, is the last proposal for upgrading the Iowa Class Battleships. I am quite suprised that no one brought this up in this entire discussion.

Anyway, it was about 20 years ago that this was proposed. The Navy was going to put the Iowa's through extensive refit. From what I understand, they would have replaced the engines with the latest and greatest form of Gas Turbines, which was expected to get the ships up to and possibly past 40 knots. They where also going to remove the front two turrets, and replace them with VLS missile pads. The Iowa's would have been able to carry SM2's, LAM's, SSM, and possibly ASROC's. They where going to leave the rear 18" aswell as the 20 5" guns on the side. CIWS is already onboard the Iowa's so that was not an issue. The only thing that would have been left, was the replacing of the Radar, to the most up to date version.

They where basically going to make the Iowa's modern, but in the end Congress was just to tight to ever agree on the amount of money needed. It was easier and cheaper to make them into floating Museums. Just thought I would throw that out their, and see what your opinions where.

Have fun with it. :rolleyes:

[Ed Rotondaro]

I am pretty sure the RN did lose at Jutland. The Germans just lost a higher percentage of their fleet, compared to the RN losses. The Germans still sent the RN home with a bloody lip after that battle.

I cannot argue with everything else that you posted, because it was very accurate. I think that when it really comes down to it, WW I and WW II where simply learning points. When you look at WW I you will see that most of the BIG WIG commanders had started their careers at the end of the age of sail. When they had started, the concept of Naval Warfare was to bring as many guns to bear as one possibly could. This is why the Battleship held so much sway. It was just the process of letting go, that proved to be to difficult for the people in that day. When many of the BIG WIG commanders that I spoke of above started, the Submarine was nothing more than a Suicide Weapon (A.K.A. the Hunley.) The Aircraft has only been invented for a decade, and is still in the stages of infancy. So you can see why they held on to the concept so diligently.

WW I was nothing but a refusal to let go of the old and grab hold of the new. This is why their was such a high death toll in the Trench Warfare. The British where still using Calvary charges at the begining of the War. By the time we reach WW II, I agree the idea should have sunk in, but it did not. The old fogies of the day still wanted to hold on to their trophies. At least we did grab hold of the concept after WW II. I have argued with people today that think the Battleship should still be in service. I spoke with a person some time back who argued with me regularly how the Battleship was our most effective and proven weapon. No matter how hard I tried, I could not convince this guy that the Battleships age was long gone. I tried telling him of the effects of the MK 48 ADCAP torpedo, and how in theory a single Torpedo could sink a Battleship. The heavier the target the more likely it will snap in half. I also mentioned how advanced modern day Missiles are, and how much of a sitting taget a Battleship would be, but everything that I said just bounced right off. I could have convinced a brick wall to move, before I cold get this guy to back off. Just be greatfull that our leaders are not still that hard headed on the concept of the Battleship.

DJ:

Ouch! Sorry that is just wrong totally. The British did not lose a at Jutland. At best it was a minor tactical victory for Germany versus a strategic victory for Britain. Once the battle was over, the RN had control of the seas and the Germans were back in port. With the exception of one dreadnought, the RN was able to sail again within two days while the German navy took about three months to get repaired and up to speed. The bloody lip was administered to the German Navy, not the RN. The only reason Jutland looks like a German victory was that the three British Battlecruisers that exploded lost 99% of their crews and this makes the butchers bill look like a German victory. After Jutland, the German navy was afraid to face the Royal Navy. They were outsailed and out thought and had the RN's scouting commanders been more willing to pass on information to Jellicoe, he would have trapped the German Fleet at dawn on the next day.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Another thing that I want to throw out their, is the last proposal for upgrading the Iowa Class Battleships. I am quite suprised that no one brought this up in this entire discussion.

Anyway, it was about 20 years ago that this was proposed. The Navy was going to put the Iowa's through extensive refit. From what I understand, they would have replaced the engines with the latest and greatest form of Gas Turbines, which was expected to get the ships up to and possibly past 40 knots. They where also going to remove the front two turrets, and replace them with VLS missile pads. The Iowa's would have been able to carry SM2's, LAM's, SSM, and possibly ASROC's. They where going to leave the rear 18" aswell as the 20 5" guns on the side. CIWS is already onboard the Iowa's so that was not an issue. The only thing that would have been left, was the replacing of the Radar, to the most up to date version.

They where basically going to make the Iowa's modern, but in the end Congress was just to tight to ever agree on the amount of money needed. It was easier and cheaper to make them into floating Museums. Just thought I would throw that out their, and see what your opinions where.

Have fun with it. :rolleyes:

DJ:

The USN did not field 18" guns on its battleships. The Iowa class had 16"/50 caliber guns. Also the proposals I saw featured removing the rear turret for VTOL aircraft.

[Warship NWS]

Jutland.. for all intensive purposes, was a blockade in force series of skirmishes using surface action units -- in that sense the RN accomplished their mission. The HSF however I do not believe intended to take the matter any further then attempting to damage some RN warships as they were attempting to divide up the RN force so as to cause some level of attrition using superior firepower vs smaller combat elements. Even had the RN not won the fight the HSF I do not think could have done much with a victory except improve the morale of their navy.

As to the Iowas being converted.. it would have been a huge waste of money. A CG is far cheaper to operate and built and far more versatile.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I tried telling him of the effects of the MK 48 ADCAP torpedo, and how in theory a single Torpedo could sink a Battleship. The heavier the target the more likely it will snap in half. I also mentioned how advanced modern day Missiles are, and how much of a sitting taget a Battleship would be, but everything that I said just bounced right off. I could have convinced a brick wall to move, before I cold get this guy to back off. Just be greatfull that our leaders are not still that hard headed on the concept of the Battleship.


I think your partly right on some of these points. However, a Mk48 would not likely kill a BB, or a CVN for that matter, with just one hit. They can break the back of most cruisers, destroyers, and frigates but a BB is much larger and included a double bottom hull. Would it cause severe damage? Yes. Likely though it would take 2-3+ hits to sink a battleship .. of course this would all depend on had bad the damage is from each hit. In any case the BBs had no real place in the modern naval spectrum after around the 1980s. At $10,000 an hour to operate per BB you could operate 2-4 DDGs or CGs for the same cost and they would be continuous contributors to the overall battle fleet rather then being a floating naval battery hoping to have something to shoot at every so often. A BB could only attack land targets with shells that were 2-3X more expensive then GPS bombs and not anywhere near as accurate. DDGs, SSGNs, and CGs are constant contributors to a battlefleet.. the BBs contributed nearly nothing except to be a TLAM and Harpoon launcher and crater maker. One DDG VLS set of cells could solve the missile problem and if we need guns just park some 155mm guns on a landing ship or ad hoc low draft monitor and have at it or just use air power.. heck of a lot cheaper.

Thanks.

[djcyclone]

DJ:

The USN did not field 18" guns on its battleships. The Iowa class had 16"/50 caliber guns. Also the proposals I saw featured removing the rear turret for VTOL aircraft.



Maybe the 18" was part of the proposal. Just remove the rear turret, and replace it with 18" guns. The version I heard of though called for removing the two front turets. Leaving the rear turret for a possible surface to surface engagement. The Navy did see the need to remove the majority of the big guns for a more practical Missile system, that could deal with all threats.

[djcyclone]

DJ:

Ouch! Sorry that is just wrong totally. The British did not lose a at Jutland. At best it was a minor tactical victory for Germany versus a strategic victory for Britain. Once the battle was over, the RN had control of the seas and the Germans were back in port. With the exception of one dreadnought, the RN was able to sail again within two days while the German navy took about three months to get repaired and up to speed. The bloody lip was administered to the German Navy, not the RN. The only reason Jutland looks like a German victory was that the three British Battlecruisers that exploded lost 99% of their crews and this makes the butchers bill look like a German victory. After Jutland, the German navy was afraid to face the Royal Navy. They were outsailed and out thought and had the RN's scouting commanders been more willing to pass on information to Jellicoe, he would have trapped the German Fleet at dawn on the next day.



Admiral Reinhardt von Scheer and the German Navy immediately claimed victory based on the number of ships destroyed. Whereas the British Navy (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWnavy.htm) lost 3 battlecruisers (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWbattlecruisers.htm), 3 cruisers (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWcruiser.htm) and 8 destroyers (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWdestroyer.htm) (6,100 casualties); the German Navy lost 1 battleship, 1 battlecruiser, 4 light cruisers and 3 destroyers (2,550 casualties).

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWjellicoe.htm) was criticised for being over-cautious, but he argued that it was vitally important to protect the size of his Grand Fleet. Whereas Jellicoe was able to inform the British government on 2nd June that the Grand Fleet was ready for further action, the German High Seas Fleet had to be reconstructed and was never in the position to risk another major North Sea confrontation. Jellicoe was therefore able to claim that his tactics were justified by the battle's long-term effects.

I have always read and heard that the Germans won Jutland. I guess it just depends on your point of view. The Battle was won by the Germans in numbers no doubt, but in the long run the British did win. That is why I said that the Germans lost a higher percentage of their over all fleet, as opposed to the British. You have to see that the British got their butts kicked, as they entered the Battle with more ships in the first place. That coupled with the fact the a smaller fleet was able to engage a larger fleet, and sink more ships than it lost itself. That is the clear definition of victory. The whole in the long run doesn't matter. As they say "you may have won the battle, but you lost the war."

[Mike Malanaphy]

Admiral Reinhardt von Scheer and the German Navy immediately claimed victory based on the number of ships destroyed. Whereas the British Navy (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWnavy.htm) lost 3 battlecruisers (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWbattlecruisers.htm), 3 cruisers (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWcruiser.htm) and 8 destroyers (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWdestroyer.htm) (6,100 casualties); the German Navy lost 1 battleship, 1 battlecruiser, 4 light cruisers and 3 destroyers (2,550 casualties).

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWjellicoe.htm) was criticised for being over-cautious, but he argued that it was vitally important to protect the size of his Grand Fleet. Whereas Jellicoe was able to inform the British government on 2nd June that the Grand Fleet was ready for further action, the German High Seas Fleet had to be reconstructed and was never in the position to risk another major North Sea confrontation. Jellicoe was therefore able to claim that his tactics were justified by the battle's long-term effects.

I have always read and heard that the Germans won Jutland. I guess it just depends on your point of view. The Battle was won by the Germans in numbers no doubt, but in the long run the British did win. That is why I said that the Germans lost a higher percentage of their over all fleet, as opposed to the British. You have to see that the British got their butts kicked, as they entered the Battle with more ships in the first place. That coupled with the fact the a smaller fleet was able to engage a larger fleet, and sink more ships than it lost itself. That is the clear definition of victory. The whole in the long run doesn't matter. As they say "you may have won the battle, but you lost the war."

Hi Guys,

I forget whiich British official said, "the German navy has assaulted it jailor, but it is still in jail."

[Warship NWS]

I think the bigger question is this.. what did the HSF hope to accomplish? At most I think they might have damaged or sunk a few more ships.. but the situation would have been unchanged. In the basic sense both fleets cancelled each other out - IOW, a stalemate, in terms of naval power. Neither side had the strength to completely destroy the other. Neither side was interrupting the most strategically important ships of all, the merchants, with their battleships. It was like a boxing match where the boxers mattered little except to see who could bruise the others ego more.

Now, what if the HSF had broken the blockade.. then what? What could the HSF have done with their battleships to the British in a strategic sense? If the RN won a strategic victory at Jutland.. what was so strategic about it?

I will leave that question open for all of you.

Thanks.

[djcyclone]

DJ:

Ouch! Sorry that is just wrong totally. The British did not lose a at Jutland. At best it was a minor tactical victory for Germany versus a strategic victory for Britain. Once the battle was over, the RN had control of the seas and the Germans were back in port. With the exception of one dreadnought, the RN was able to sail again within two days while the German navy took about three months to get repaired and up to speed. The bloody lip was administered to the German Navy, not the RN. The only reason Jutland looks like a German victory was that the three British Battlecruisers that exploded lost 99% of their crews and this makes the butchers bill look like a German victory. After Jutland, the German navy was afraid to face the Royal Navy. They were outsailed and out thought and had the RN's scouting commanders been more willing to pass on information to Jellicoe, he would have trapped the German Fleet at dawn on the next day.



What your saying is the equivelant of saying that the Japanese lost every naval battle during WW II simply because they lost the War. This is completly untrue, as the Japanese handed us our tails on many occasions with a note that said "would you prefer extra crispy or just well done." The British flat out got their buts kicked in the Battle of Jutland. The Germans entered the battle with a smaller fleet, and engaged a larger fleet inflicting more than twice the number of casualties (nearly 3 times more), and sinking more ships than they lost themselves.

The British where simply able to reconstitute their fleet because they had the numbers to do so. The fleet that replaced the blockaid, was nearly a completly different list of ships. The Germans simply did not have a large enough fleet to replace their losses. This does not change the fact that they busted the British up pretty bad. The bloody lip was given to the British, not to the Germans. You have to look at the Battle, not the outcome of the war.

In the end, if you look at it the way that you are, you could say that the Battle was a draw, because the Germans wher still Blocked in, and the British where still in control of the North Sea. Nothing changed, except for the ships that the British had involved in the Blockaid.

[djcyclone]

In any case the BBs had no real place in the modern naval spectrum after around the 1980s. At $10,000 an hour to operate per BB you could operate 2-4 DDGs or CGs for the same cost and they would be continuous contributors to the overall battle fleet rather then being a floating naval battery hoping to have something to shoot at every so often. A BB could only attack land targets with shells that were 2-3X more expensive then GPS bombs and not anywhere near as accurate. DDGs, SSGNs, and CGs are constant contributors to a battlefleet.. the BBs contributed nearly nothing except to be a TLAM and Harpoon launcher and crater maker. One DDG VLS set of cells could solve the missile problem and if we need guns just park some 155mm guns on a landing ship or ad hoc low draft monitor and have at it or just use air power.. heck of a lot cheaper.

Thanks.



I can agree with that, plus do not forget that when a Battleship sails, it has to have a modern DDG, or CG to escort it for missile deffence. Otherwise it is just a floating target. I wonder if your idea of putting mobile guns on a Flat Deck Ship has ever been tried? That is a good idea I think. You could have a temperary Battleship, but then again it is easier and cheaper to simply use aircraft and missiles.

[Warship NWS]

I can agree with that, plus do not forget that when a Battleship sails, it has to have a modern DDG, or CG to escort it for missile deffence. Otherwise it is just a floating target. I wonder if your idea of putting mobile guns on a Flat Deck Ship has ever been tried? That is a good idea I think. You could have a temperary Battleship, but then again it is easier and cheaper to simply use aircraft and missiles.

Why use a missile when you can use a dumb bomb (better accuracy then a shell when using ballistic computers on aircraft) or a GPS bomb? A lot cheaper then a missile.

[bridav58]

What your saying is the equivelant of saying that the Japanese lost every naval battle during WW II simply because they lost the War. This is completly untrue, as the Japanese handed us our tails on many occasions with a note that said "would you prefer extra crispy or just well done." The British flat out got their buts kicked in the Battle of Jutland. The Germans entered the battle with a smaller fleet, and engaged a larger fleet inflicting more than twice the number of casualties (nearly 3 times more), and sinking more ships than they lost themselves.

The British where simply able to reconstitute their fleet because they had the numbers to do so. The fleet that replaced the blockaid, was nearly a completly different list of ships. The Germans simply did not have a large enough fleet to replace their losses. This does not change the fact that they busted the British up pretty bad. The bloody lip was given to the British, not to the Germans. You have to look at the Battle, not the outcome of the war.

In the end, if you look at it the way that you are, you could say that the Battle was a draw, because the Germans wher still Blocked in, and the British where still in control of the North Sea. Nothing changed, except for the ships that the British had involved in the Blockaid.

The RN suffered more ships sunk but they also suffered far heavier damage to ships that weren't sunk. I think the HSF only had like 10 caoital ships fit for action after the Jutland battle.

[djcyclone]

Why use a missile when you can use a dumb bomb (better accuracy then a shell when using ballistic computers on aircraft) or a GPS bomb? A lot cheaper then a missile.



A big factor to look at when when deciding between a dumb bomb, GPS bomb, or a missile, is that the Missile cost more, but does not require a pilot to deliver it. If you choose a bomb, then their is the chance of the jet being shot down, and the possible lost of a pilot. That might be enough of a modivating factor to simply launch a missile, but I still like the idea of puting Artillary guns on a flat deck ship. That just sounds cool.

[john964]

Ah guys the USN is already going to a larger gun on ships the 6in/62 AGS for the Zumwalt class DDG's.

[djcyclone]

Ah guys the USN is already going to a larger gun on ships the 6in/62 AGS for the Zumwalt class DDG's.



I saw a web page on that. Supposedly each shell has an independant form of propulsion. Each shot will be like shooting a minature missile. I forget if the shells are guided or not, but the propulsion increases the range. That ship is wierd looking by the way. The web page that I looked at, said that Congress is only going to allow 2 or 3 to be built, since the Aegis Cruisers of today (Ticonderoga, Arleigh Burk) can maintain sea supremacy.

[Warship NWS]

Ah guys the USN is already going to a larger gun on ships the 6in/62 AGS for the Zumwalt class DDG's.

Interesting how that is the same size shell as the NATO 155mm isn't it. ;) The 155mm has proven to be a "sweet spot" shell calibre capable of a variety of shell types and powerful enough to knock out the majority of typical land targets.

[tony_glazebrook]

The RN suffered more ships sunk but they also suffered far heavier damage to ships that weren't sunk. I think the HSF only had like 10 caoital ships fit for action after the Jutland battle.

If I may add a small 2 cents worth - I think that asking a one dimensional question, such as "who won Jutland", is bound to end up in debate. The more useful question is to discriminate between the tactical, operational and strategic elements, ask - for each level - what the objectives were, could and should have been, and then do an assessment.

[Warship NWS]

The RN suffered more ships sunk but they also suffered far heavier damage to ships that weren't sunk. I think the HSF only had like 10 caoital ships fit for action after the Jutland battle.

The primary reason for this is due to the high large calibre shell failure rates for the RN. Had their shells worked better the HSF would have take far greater damage.

[Warship NWS]

A big factor to look at when when deciding between a dumb bomb, GPS bomb, or a missile, is that the Missile cost more, but does not require a pilot to deliver it. If you choose a bomb, then their is the chance of the jet being shot down, and the possible lost of a pilot. That might be enough of a modivating factor to simply launch a missile, but I still like the idea of puting Artillary guns on a flat deck ship. That just sounds cool.

A missile costs A LOT more then a GPS bomb, which is why GPS bombs are so popular.. cheap and accurate. Even the flight time of the aircraft, the bomb, and the operations to launch and land the plane are cheaper then some of the more expensive guided munitions. Now if you are dealing with a high threat environment, like attacking a foreign military power with SAMs, AAA, and possibly aircraft.. that is a different matter. In a low threat environment however bombs are the most likely choice. IIRC, over 90% of the ordnance dropped in the first Gulf War were dumb bombs.

[Warship NWS]

If I may add a small 2 cents worth - I think that asking a one dimensional question, such as "who won Jutland", is bound to end up in debate. The more useful question is to discriminate between the tactical, operational and strategic elements, ask - for each level - what the objectives were, could and should have been, and then do an assessment.

It really mattered little who won or lost.. the battle was not going to decide the outcome of the naval war in the North Sea in a way that was any different then what was already taking place. Neither side had the strength to greatly change the course of the naval war through gunfire alone - for one thing they simply did not carry enough shells on board the ships to sink very many targets in a single engagement especially when compared to the number of hits scored per shots fired. This is why I question the true strategic nature of the battleships of WW1.. if the RN BBs won.. nothing changed, if the HSF BBs won.. what could they have done with the victory rather then just inflate their propaganda? Not much IMHO.

Thanks.

[djcyclone]

I think your partly right on some of these points. However, a Mk48 would not likely kill a BB, or a CVN for that matter, with just one hit. They can break the back of most cruisers, destroyers, and frigates but a BB is much larger and included a double bottom hull. Would it cause severe damage? Yes. Likely though it would take 2-3+ hits to sink a battleship .. of course this would all depend on had bad the damage is from each hit. In any case the BBs had no real place in the modern naval spectrum after around the 1980s. At $10,000 an hour to operate per BB you could operate 2-4 DDGs or CGs for the same cost and they would be continuous contributors to the overall battle fleet rather then being a floating naval battery hoping to have something to shoot at every so often. A BB could only attack land targets with shells that were 2-3X more expensive then GPS bombs and not anywhere near as accurate. DDGs, SSGNs, and CGs are constant contributors to a battlefleet.. the BBs contributed nearly nothing except to be a TLAM and Harpoon launcher and crater maker. One DDG VLS set of cells could solve the missile problem and if we need guns just park some 155mm guns on a landing ship or ad hoc low draft monitor and have at it or just use air power.. heck of a lot cheaper.

Thanks.

I can not swear to this, but I believe that some of our older Battleships where used as targets when the MK 48 ADCAP was first put into service. At least one Battleship has been used for this purpose, and I believe it only took one hit to complete the job. Do not underestimate the MK 48 ADCAP. The Iowa's might be stronger, but I would think it would only take two at most to get the job done. The heavier the target, the more strain that is put on the bow and stern, which in turn transfers to the center breaking the back. This is only if the torpedo works as designed, but of course if it only hits below the waterline, then you could be talking about 7 or 8 torpedoes before everything is taken care of.

If you do not have a MK 48, then just get a Nuke Torpedo from the Soviets, and then see what is left of an IOWA Class. Either way the ship is just a floating target asking for someone to shoot it.

[tony_glazebrook]

It really mattered little who won or lost.. the battle was not going to decide the outcome of the naval war in the North Sea in a way that was any different then what was already taking place. Neither side had the strength to greatly change the course of the naval war through gunfire alone - for one thing they simply did not carry enough shells on board the ships to sink very many targets in a single engagement especially when compared to the number of hits scored per shots fired. This is why I question the true strategic nature of the battleships of WW1.. if the RN BBs won.. nothing changed, if the HSF BBs won.. what could they have done with the victory rather then just inflate their propaganda? Not much IMHO.

Thanks.

Chris - I agree in the sense that in my opinion the only strategic point for Germany to try to be competitive in the big ship race was economic. If they could have broken the British economy through an arms race of that kind, then there would have been a point. Otherwise, the submarine, even the submarine of WW1 era, was a much more effective weapon against British supply lines, just as in WW2. And Germany was nowhere near as reliant on freedom of the oceans for its own economic welfare. It was a lopsided contest - or should have been. I shudder to think what might have transpired in WW2 if Doenitz had been able to influence the direction of naval resources earlier than he did.

This was part of my original point - to consider the strategic side. Unless Germany in WW1 had been able to bring the British battle fleet to battle on numerous occasions, and had been tactically superior on all such occasions, gaining brilliant victories and wearing down the British fleet to a position of inferiority, there really was no point in a German surface fleet. The odds against such an outcome are so long that you would have to say that rationally the German investment in capital ships in WW1 (and WW2) was a huge waste, IMHO.

[JMS]

Chris - I agree in the sense that in my opinion the only strategic point for Germany to try to be competitive in the big ship race was economic. If they could have broken the British economy through an arms race of that kind, then there would have been a point. Otherwise, the submarine, even the submarine of WW1 era, was a much more effective weapon against British supply lines, just as in WW2. And Germany was nowhere near as reliant on freedom of the oceans for its own economic welfare. It was a lopsided contest - or should have been. I shudder to think what might have transpired in WW2 if Doenitz had been able to influence the direction of naval resources earlier than he did.

This was part of my original point - to consider the strategic side. Unless Germany in WW1 had been able to bring the British battle fleet to battle on numerous occasions, and had been tactically superior on all such occasions, gaining brilliant victories and wearing down the British fleet to a position of inferiority, there really was no point in a German surface fleet. The odds against such an outcome are so long that you would have to say that rationally the German investment in capital ships in WW1 (and WW2) was a huge waste, IMHO.

If they hadn't invested in that surface fleet, Britain most likely would have remained aloof from the war and, in the end, the Germans would have prevailed. However, if by some mischance, they would have been able to destroy a significant part of the Royal Navy, the impact would have been felt very soon.

For once, the Channel would be opened to outflank German armies in Flanders and communications with France imperiled. Submarines would have had an easier way to reach their hunting areas and may have been able to starve out Britain.

Restricting the impact of the battleship to the few actions they fought ignores the deterrent effect they had on the weaker side. There were not more actions because the Germans wouldn't go out. Jutland was fought because both sides assumed the other was still in port. A British victory at Jutland would have opened the Baltic just like the German surrender did in 1919 and that would have had a decisive impact on the war comparable to a victory on the Dardanelles.

I repeat myself, it was fear of inferiority in numbers what drove the British government to impound the Turkish battleships and drove Turkey into the war with some help from Goeben. Right there you have a strategic impact that would have been unattainable with submarines.

Mines could be double edged swords, but with sufficient numbers they could very well bottle up a submarine force in port, specially through close blockade. Submarines and destroyers could do little to avoid that, as shown by 1st Helgoland in 1914.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ah guys the USN is already going to a larger gun on ships the 6in/62 AGS for the Zumwalt class DDG's.

John:

I keep getting mixed signals on the Zumwalt class and the gun. Are they behind schedule for development? I seem to recall that the ship itself may only be built in small numbers and the guns retroffited to exsiting Arleigh Burkes.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The RN suffered more ships sunk but they also suffered far heavier damage to ships that weren't sunk. I think the HSF only had like 10 caoital ships fit for action after the Jutland battle.

DJ:

I think you have that reveresed. The bulk of the RN that was not sunk was able to return to sea in two days. Only Marlborough required serious dock time due to torpedo damage. Whereas all the German BCs were wrecks as were several of their BBs. German gunnery was good against the BCs, but lousy against the British Dreadnoughts because Jellicoe had been able to cross the T twice.

[tony_glazebrook]

If they hadn't invested in that surface fleet, Britain most likely would have remained aloof from the war and, in the end, the Germans would have prevailed. However, if by some mischance, they would have been able to destroy a significant part of the Royal Navy, the impact would have been felt very soon.

For once, the Channel would be opened to outflank German armies in Flanders and communications with France imperiled. Submarines would have had an easier way to reach their hunting areas and may have been able to starve out Britain.

Restricting the impact of the battleship to the few actions they fought ignores the deterrent effect they had on the weaker side. There were not more actions because the Germans wouldn't go out. Jutland was fought because both sides assumed the other was still in port. A British victory at Jutland would have opened the Baltic just like the German surrender did in 1919 and that would have had a decisive impact on the war comparable to a victory on the Dardanelles.

I repeat myself, it was fear of inferiority in numbers what drove the British government to impound the Turkish battleships and drove Turkey into the war with some help from Goeben. Right there you have a strategic impact that would have been unattainable with submarines.

Mines could be double edged swords, but with sufficient numbers they could very well bottle up a submarine force in port, specially through close blockade. Submarines and destroyers could do little to avoid that, as shown by 1st Helgoland in 1914.

Hmm - if you build a fleet then don't use it because of fear of losing it, that is a double waste. The impounding of Turkish battleships is undoubtedly of strategic significance but surely of the unintended kind - this would not and should not have been sufficient reason for the Germans to build battleships.

To my mind, the strategic question is whether the resources expended could have been better spent on other weapons, such as subs. Every weapon has a use and can inflict damage or wastage, even just as a threat. But some weapons are simply better than others for the kind of war that needed to be fought. That's my simple point. Perhaps I am seeing things too simplistically, but I remain sceptical of the utility of a German battlefleet in either war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hmm - if you build a fleet then don't use it because of fear of losing it, that is a double waste. The impounding of Turkish battleships is undoubtedly of strategic significance but surely of the unintended kind - this would not and should not have been sufficient reason for the Germans to build battleships.

To my mind, the strategic question is whether the resources expended could have been better spent on other weapons, such as subs. Every weapon has a use and can inflict damage or wastage, even just as a threat. But some weapons are simply better than others for the kind of war that needed to be fought. That's my simple point. Perhaps I am seeing things too simplistically, but I remain sceptical of the utility of a German battlefleet in either war.

Tony:

This topic has arisen several times in the past. Namely Germany was a land based power with little experience in exercising command at sea. I won't simplfy it by saying geography is destiny, but look at how easy it was to bottle up the Imperial German navy in WWI. This was a driving force in Germany's seizing Holland, Denmark and Norway in WWII as well as France. She now more ways to get her naval forces out to sea, but still Britain could force the Germans to sail around Scotland and down. Any chances for basing large German ships in France ended with the destruction of the drydock at St. Nazaire. Only subs and E-boats could hope to operate out of protected bases on the French coast. It was even harder for Germany to get naval forces into the Med due the choke point of Gibralta.

I don't know if you have ever had the chance to read Robert Massie's excellent book "Dreadnought, Britain Germany and the Coming of the Great War". It is a thick book but written in an easy to read style. All the players are introduced and the mindsets of the leaders and their nations are reviewed. The naval race is shown as part technological and part national. With Imperial Germany rising in power, the Kaiser felt that to be taken seriously, she must have overseas colonies and a navy to protect them, He never grasped that any large navy would be viewed by the British as a direct threat to their existence. Wilhelm thought that since Victoria was his grandmother and George was his uncle, that family ties would prevent any wars. He never realized that his own ministers didn't have that connection and were also not very skilled in the art of diplomacy. The German navy did what centuries of struggles couldn't. It made Britain and France allies.

One can speculate what would have happened if Germany had built carriers and long range raiders along with subs while ignoring battleships and cruisers in the inter war period. While the North Atlantic is not the most conducive area for carrier operations, it still would have given Germany a weapon with far greater reach than her surface ships had.

[Smiffy]

The simple existence of battleships in your enemy or potential enemy's fleet was sufficient reason to build your own. Up until late 1941 only a battleship was thought capable of destroying another battleship at sea. No one had expected the air strikes from Victorious and Ark Royal to actually sink the Bismarck, they were launched in the hope of slowing her down. The loss of Force Z changed that way of thinking and very few battleship keels were laid from then onwards.

Despite this discovery that aircraft could take out a battleship at sea, the battleship remained a serious threat. By keeping his capital ships in Northern Norway Hitler's "Fleet in Being" remained a massive threat to allied shipping in both the Atlantic and Arctic and tied down large amounts of ships and manpower that had to be held ready, just in case they came out. In terms of draining British resources Tirpitz was far more successful than Bismarck.

Between the wars there had been many who preached that aircraft would overcome the battle fleets, but until the world had seen a practical demonstration of that the battleship was the key naval unit in the minds of governments the world over. British foreign policy had for centuries been dominated by the question, "How many ships-of-the-line does my enemy have and how many more can he get?" That was why Denmark was attacked, twice, in the Napoleonic Wars, it was why Britain put an army into Portugal in 1808 and it was why Britain destroyed the French fleet in 1940.

While it is easily argued that other ships were more versatile and better value for money than a battleship, no other ship had the awesome might that held the public imagination and became a repository for national pride.

[john964]

I can not swear to this, but I believe that some of our older Battleships where used as targets when the MK 48 ADCAP was first put into service. At least one Battleship has been used for this purpose, and I believe it only took one hit to complete the job. Do not underestimate the MK 48 ADCAP. The Iowa's might be stronger, but I would think it would only take two at most to get the job done. The heavier the target, the more strain that is put on the bow and stern, which in turn transfers to the center breaking the back. This is only if the torpedo works as designed, but of course if it only hits below the waterline, then you could be talking about 7 or 8 torpedoes before everything is taken care of.

If you do not have a MK 48, then just get a Nuke Torpedo from the Soviets, and then see what is left of an IOWA Class. Either way the ship is just a floating target asking for someone to shoot it.
DJ not happening the MK48 and MK 48 ADCAP were not in service until 1972 and 1988. Last old battleship was West Virginia, she was scrapped in 1961.

[Ed Rotondaro]

DJ not happening the MK48 and MK 48 ADCAP were not in service until 1972 and 1988. Last old battleship was West Virginia, she was scrapped in 1961.

John:

Wasn't the MK 48 actually a British designed torpedo?

[Warship NWS]

The simple existence of battleships in your enemy or potential enemy's fleet was sufficient reason to build your own. Up until late 1941 only a battleship was thought capable of destroying another battleship at sea. No one had expected the air strikes from Victorious and Ark Royal to actually sink the Bismarck, they were launched in the hope of slowing her down. The loss of Force Z changed that way of thinking and very few battleship keels were laid from then onwards.

Ironic.. they expected the Swordfish to cripple, and did, the Italian fleet - the Sword fish did more damage in one night then the entire RN in the Med throughout the entire war, why not think this could happen to the Bismarck, especially since she wont sink in the mud just to be refloated? Expectations are one thing.. if they had however dropped the torpedoes deep enough to avoid hitting the belt of the ship they might well have caused severe flooding. The IJN didn't expect to knock out as many major warships either, but did so.


Despite this discovery that aircraft could take out a battleship at sea, the battleship remained a serious threat. By keeping his capital ships in Northern Norway Hitler's "Fleet in Being" remained a massive threat to allied shipping in both the Atlantic and Arctic and tied down large amounts of ships and manpower that had to be held ready, just in case they came out. In terms of draining British resources Tirpitz was far more successful than Bismarck.

"Massive" threat I think is overestimating their true capabilities as raiders. Armed merchant raiders were far more effective.. why? Much harder to detect. Stealth was the greatest attribute of a raider.. and you simply are not stealthy in a big battleship. Battleship are also not designed to operate independently.. raiders are. Atlantis proved this by sinking more merchants then ALL of the KM warships combined. Single U-boats proved many times more lethal to shipping then any BB ever built in naval history. Let's flip this.. how about the navies that did have plenty of sea power.. why didn't they use BBs for anti-merchant operations? Percieved threat is not the same as viable threat IMHO. As to "draining" resources.. in what way? The Tirpitz was nothing more then on the job training target for the RAF and probably drained more resources from the Germans to keep her afloat then the RAF assets applied to sink her.. the Bismarck lasted one sortie and died... end result, a flash in the pan that did squat except kill a 1920s battlecruiser. Compare that to the resources required to protect against hundreds of U-boats, enemy aircraft, patrol craft in the Channel, merchant raiders, and the Deustchlands.. heck the Graf Spee had almost as much naval power addressed to find and catch her as was sent after the Bismarck in comparison. Since the RN BBs had nothing much better to do how was it such a dramatic drain in on the RN to chase after a few big gunned ships every so often? Is that not what they were built for.. to shoot at something?


Between the wars there had been many who preached that aircraft would overcome the battle fleets, but until the world had seen a practical demonstration of that the battleship was the key naval unit in the minds of governments the world over. British foreign policy had for centuries been dominated by the question, "How many ships-of-the-line does my enemy have and how many more can he get?" That was why Denmark was attacked, twice, in the Napoleonic Wars, it was why Britain put an army into Portugal in 1808 and it was why Britain destroyed the French fleet in 1940.

I will note we are talking 1905 onwards, after the time of Tsushima when cheaper weapons were being developed that could cancel out the power of the battleships in a more prolific and mass produced manner.


While it is easily argued that other ships were more versatile and better value for money than a battleship, no other ship had the awesome might that held the public imagination and became a repository for national pride.

Again, now we are talking percieved threat vs actual threat. The end result is that the BBs of 1905 onwards participated little to the overall strategic effect of both WW1 and even more so WW2, IMHO. All of this still does not answer the overall question of what could the HSF had done to the British had they won at Jutland? Is there is no strategic answer to this question? If not, then why was it a strategic battle if it had no chance for the victor to alter the course of the war at sea? The RN had free reign of the world througout all of WW1.. and yet not a single battleship was used to directly interdict oceanic supply lines for any sustained length of time, at least that I can find. So again, what strategic effect did battleships have on WW1 when they deployed at sea?

[Warship NWS]

One can speculate what would have happened if Germany had built carriers and long range raiders along with subs while ignoring battleships and cruisers in the inter war period. While the North Atlantic is not the most conducive area for carrier operations, it still would have given Germany a weapon with far greater reach than her surface ships had.


What is even more ironic is that Germany knew airpower was the future dominating factor in any war yet ignored this factor for naval combat until it was too late. The designers of Blitzkrieg, where airpower was the key weapon, fumbled the ball in a huge way in that regard IMHO.

Had they started CV development at the same time as the RN and USN it might have been more interesting in the Atlantic. Instead of a BB arms race you might have had a CV arms race.

[john964]

John:

Wasn't the MK 48 actually a British designed torpedo?

No Ed, But the USN did borrow several design ellements that improved the weapon. IIRC the USN was going to use wire guidence where the wire was drawn from out of the tube but the RN was working on the same thing except that they were using wire guidence drawn from the torpedo. The Mk48 was a inproved and geneational advance of the Mk37.

[Warship NWS]

If they hadn't invested in that surface fleet, Britain most likely would have remained aloof from the war and, in the end, the Germans would have prevailed. However, if by some mischance, they would have been able to destroy a significant part of the Royal Navy, the impact would have been felt very soon.

For once, the Channel would be opened to outflank German armies in Flanders and communications with France imperiled. Submarines would have had an easier way to reach their hunting areas and may have been able to starve out Britain.

Restricting the impact of the battleship to the few actions they fought ignores the deterrent effect they had on the weaker side. There were not more actions because the Germans wouldn't go out. Jutland was fought because both sides assumed the other was still in port. A British victory at Jutland would have opened the Baltic just like the German surrender did in 1919 and that would have had a decisive impact on the war comparable to a victory on the Dardanelles.

I repeat myself, it was fear of inferiority in numbers what drove the British government to impound the Turkish battleships and drove Turkey into the war with some help from Goeben. Right there you have a strategic impact that would have been unattainable with submarines.

Mines could be double edged swords, but with sufficient numbers they could very well bottle up a submarine force in port, specially through close blockade. Submarines and destroyers could do little to avoid that, as shown by 1st Helgoland in 1914.

Interesting points.. would you care to elaborate further on how BBs themselves could have participated in exploiting any tactical successes?

Note, I started this conversation intentionally to open a larger scaled investigation into whether BBs played a strategic role in WW1 and WW2.. as mentioned as the outset WW1 is the most debatable war due to the complexities of the war due to the multiple number of nations involved. There are some answers and thoughts I have of my own that I have not posted as of yet so as to leave the topic open for debate and further discussion.

Thanks.

[Smiffy]

Ironic.. they expected the Swordfish to cripple, and did, the Italian fleet - the Sword fish did more damage in one night then the entire RN in the Med throughout the entire war, why not think this could happen to the Bismarck, especially since she wont sink in the mud just to be refloated? Expectations are one thing.. if they had however dropped the torpedoes deep enough to avoid hitting the belt of the ship they might well have caused severe flooding. The IJN didn't expect to knock out as many major warships either, but did so.



"Massive" threat I think is overestimating their true capabilities as raiders. Armed merchant raiders were far more effective.. why? Much harder to detect. Stealth was the greatest attribute of a raider.. and you simply are not stealthy in a big battleship. Battleship are also not designed to operate independently.. raiders are. Atlantis proved this by sinking more merchants then ALL of the KM warships combined. Single U-boats proved many times more lethal to shipping then any BB ever built in naval history. Let's flip this.. how about the navies that did have plenty of sea power.. why didn't they use BBs for anti-merchant operations? Percieved threat is not the same as viable threat IMHO. As to "draining" resources.. in what way? The Tirpitz was nothing more then on the job training target for the RAF and probably drained more resources from the Germans to keep her afloat then the RAF assets applied to sink her.. the Bismarck lasted one sortie and died... end result, a flash in the pan that did squat except kill a 1920s battlecruiser. Compare that to the resources required to protect against hundreds of U-boats, enemy aircraft, patrol craft in the Channel, merchant raiders, and the Deustchlands.. heck the Graf Spee had almost as much naval power addressed to find and catch her as was sent after the Bismarck in comparison. Since the RN BBs had nothing much better to do how was it such a dramatic drain in on the RN to chase after a few big gunned ships every so often? Is that not what they were built for.. to shoot at something?



I will note we are talking 1905 onwards, after the time of Tsushima when cheaper weapons were being developed that could cancel out the power of the battleships in a more prolific and mass produced manner.

Again, now we are talking percieved threat vs actual threat. The end result is that the BBs of 1905 onwards participated little to the overall strategic effect of both WW1 and even more so WW2, IMHO. All of this still does not answer the overall question of what could the HSF had done to the British had they won at Jutland? Is there is no strategic answer to this question? If not, then why was it a strategic battle if it had no chance for the victor to alter the course of the war at sea? The RN had free reign of the world througout all of WW1.. and yet not a single battleship was used to directly interdict oceanic supply lines for any sustained length of time, at least that I can find. So again, what strategic effect did battleships have on WW1 when they deployed at sea?

The Taranto raid was against stationary targets in a know location that was easy to locate. Bismarck was doing nearly 30 knots in a broken sea, and the attackers had only an estimated position for the target. The numbers of aircraft involved in the Bismarck strikes were small compared to the numbers attacking Prince of Wales and Repulse.

Without the threat of a "Fleet in Being" the RN could have manned more ASW vessels and released its carriers for more productive work. You are right in saying that the day of the battleship was over, just as long as the other guy's battleships were out of the way. The RN was already laying battleships up, giving them away to Russia and expending them as breakwaters for "Mulberry" Harbours. Yes Atlantis was more effective, but she didn't catch the public attention like a battleship. The British public saw the Atlantis as underhanded German trickery, something to be despised, while they saw Bismarck and Tirpitz as something to be feared. Maybe Bismarck did only did take out an old battlecruiser, but you have to realise that HMS Hood was the seen as the ultimate symbol of British sea power, her loss was a tremendous blow to national pride, only saved by the destruction of the Bismarck. That is why Churchill demanded her destruction at any cost.

I totally agree that the perceived threat was greater than the actual threat, but people don't think that way in war time. It was a widely held belief in Britain in both wars that loss of supremacy in the North Sea would lead to an immediate invasion of the East Coast.

British battleships did not interdict German sea transport because there wasn't much of it to interdict. Britain always had more to lose at sea than Germany, that's why British heavy units were used to defend merchant shipping rather than attack. Only in WW2, to supply North Africa, did Britain's enemies make significant use of sea transport, but in an area with good air cover, that was more suited to attacks by submarines, light surface forces and aircraft than by capital ships.

Cheaper weapons were being developed from 1905, but they didn't become effective until mid-century. It was 1940 before a warship was sunk by dive-bombing and '41 before aerial torpedoes sank a major ship, at sea. A submarine, even in WW2, needed a lot of luck to find itself in a position to attack a major warship.

In short, in a cold historical appreciation you are absolutely right, but the perception of people at the time was very different. Maybe if the Spanish Civil War had seen a major warship sunk by aircraft, building priorities would have changed earlier. Once the other methods had actually proved themselves in battle the day of the battleship was over, but they had to be seen to work first.

[Ed Rotondaro]

What is even more ironic is that Germany knew airpower was the future dominating factor in any war yet ignored this factor for naval combat until it was too late. The designers of Blitzkrieg, where airpower was the key weapon, fumbled the ball in a huge way in that regard IMHO.

Had they started CV development at the same time as the RN and USN it might have been more interesting in the Atlantic. Instead of a BB arms race you might have had a CV arms race.

Chris:

Keep in mind that Gemany was a series of feudal fiefdoms under the Nazis. Goering had his airforce, Himmler had the SS, Speer played off the others and Doenitz struggled to get what he needed for the navy. Hitler liked it that way, it made it difficult for his subordinates to overthrow him.

[tony_glazebrook]

Tony:

This topic has arisen several times in the past. Namely Germany was a land based power with little experience in exercising command at sea. I won't simplfy it by saying geography is destiny, but look at how easy it was to bottle up the Imperial German navy in WWI. This was a driving force in Germany's seizing Holland, Denmark and Norway in WWII as well as France. She now more ways to get her naval forces out to sea, but still Britain could force the Germans to sail around Scotland and down. Any chances for basing large German ships in France ended with the destruction of the drydock at St. Nazaire. Only subs and E-boats could hope to operate out of protected bases on the French coast. It was even harder for Germany to get naval forces into the Med due the choke point of Gibralta.

I don't know if you have ever had the chance to read Robert Massie's excellent book "Dreadnought, Britain Germany and the Coming of the Great War". It is a thick book but written in an easy to read style. All the players are introduced and the mindsets of the leaders and their nations are reviewed. The naval race is shown as part technological and part national. With Imperial Germany rising in power, the Kaiser felt that to be taken seriously, she must have overseas colonies and a navy to protect them, He never grasped that any large navy would be viewed by the British as a direct threat to their existence. Wilhelm thought that since Victoria was his grandmother and George was his uncle, that family ties would prevent any wars. He never realized that his own ministers didn't have that connection and were also not very skilled in the art of diplomacy. The German navy did what centuries of struggles couldn't. It made Britain and France allies.

One can speculate what would have happened if Germany had built carriers and long range raiders along with subs while ignoring battleships and cruisers in the inter war period. While the North Atlantic is not the most conducive area for carrier operations, it still would have given Germany a weapon with far greater reach than her surface ships had.

Thanks Ed, all good points. I will have to read Massie's book when I get the chance.

I'm probably going to vacate the forums now for the next 2 weeks - except for the SAS Help/testing threads - while I try to finish the beta.

Cheers my friend

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Keep in mind that Gemany was a series of feudal fiefdoms under the Nazis. Goering had his airforce, Himmler had the SS, Speer played off the others and Doenitz struggled to get what he needed for the navy. Hitler liked it that way, it made it difficult for his subordinates to overthrow him.

Like I have always said.. Hitler was an expert politician.. but a poor military strategist.

[Warship NWS]

To Smiffy,

Very well worded post.. there is one thing you left out however, mine warfare. Aircraft were used for naval attacks by WW1, the Goeben alone was attacked by 270 aircraft sorties. However, mines destroyed more major warships in WW1 then all other methods combined with a close second being submarines, which deployed mines AND used torpedoes.

To everyone else,

Now.. the flip side of this discussion. In the physical strategic sense BBs did almost nothing in both wars.. a deterrent, as JMS stated, is probably the best term in this case when it comes to any strategic significance of the BB in WW1. Could BBs in WW2 be a problem? Possibly, but for the most part - only tactically. In WW1.. they could be IF they could operate for a sustained amount of time without being countered by viable threats. Again, only if you can cut off the logistics to a nation can a navy prove to be strategically effective in the physical sense.

The problems with the "strategic" term for BBs in WW1 are as follows..

a) WW1 was a very complicated war with many nations involved with, for the most part, their own self interests at heart and in some cases being very limited as to what they could offer in terms of support for whichever allies they happened to be a part of at the time.
b) BBs were a deterrent but also a weapon that could not be lost due to political fallout so they were the ultimate catch 22 weapon.
c) the endurance, time at sea, for a BB was limited due to its poor conditions -- at port crews didn't even want to be on board them,
d) BBs, if they had any physical strategic effect at all --- was to protect or enforce mine warfare which affected all types of shipping and submarine operational choke points. The only other possible effect, if they could sustain such operations and cause enough damage, would be possible bombardment of enemy ports.

So.. was the threat perceived or real in WW1? Was it more political or military? The other problem is how do we define "strategic"?

WW1 is a huge "gray area" type of war due to its complexities. WW2 was far more defined in who was fighting who and why. This is what makes WW1 a very interesting war to consider as it was the first major war where all dimensions of warfare were involved in numbers, albeit some in their infancy like tanks and planes, but countries were starting to learn just how bloody the industrialized age would be when the industries built weapons that could kill thousands in a single day in quick succession. WW1 was the first war however where the heavy use of self propelled torpedos and mines, deployed by ships and subs, which could cripple or kill a major warship in one hit -- how much this degraded the strategic power of a BB is open to interpretation.

In the end.. BBs in military sense were of limited value in both wars, except, as deterrents. JMS I think got pretty close to the mark on that point. If we think in the time frame of WW1, as Smiffy stated, then yes.. they were a fearfully weapon much like the ICBMs of modern day. Everyone wants one but nobody wants to use it if they have any interest in self-preservation - either politically or militarily. This is very likely why old battleships were deployed far more often then the far more expensive newer battleships and as a result suffered accordingly.

I posted this entire topic not so everyone would agree.. but so we could re-examine the theories of the battleships and their strategic place in warfare between 1905 and 1945. In 40 years much had changed and the role of the capital ship was evolving with variable returns for the investments.

Very good posts everyone... please feel free to add more thoughts to this interesting topic.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

DJ:

Ouch! Sorry that is just wrong totally. The British did not lose a at Jutland. At best it was a minor tactical victory for Germany versus a strategic victory for Britain. Once the battle was over, the RN had control of the seas and the Germans were back in port. With the exception of one dreadnought, the RN was able to sail again within two days while the German navy took about three months to get repaired and up to speed. The bloody lip was administered to the German Navy, not the RN. The only reason Jutland looks like a German victory was that the three British Battlecruisers that exploded lost 99% of their crews and this makes the butchers bill look like a German victory. After Jutland, the German navy was afraid to face the Royal Navy. They were outsailed and out thought and had the RN's scouting commanders been more willing to pass on information to Jellicoe, he would have trapped the German Fleet at dawn on the next day.

I believe it was a New York paper that gave the best description of the battle of Jutland: "The prisoner left his cell to strike the jailer, then returned to his cell." The prisoner being the HSF and the jailer being the RN.

[john964]

Without the threat of a "Fleet in Being" the RN could have manned more ASW vessels and released its carriers for more productive work. You are right in saying that the day of the battleship was over, just as long as the other guy's battleships were out of the way. The RN was already laying battleships up, giving them away to Russia and expending them as breakwaters for "Mulberry" Harbours. Yes Atlantis was more effective, but she didn't catch the public attention like a battleship. The British public saw the Atlantis as underhanded German trickery, something to be despised, while they saw Bismarck and Tirpitz as something to be feared. Maybe Bismarck did only did take out an old battlecruiser, but you have to realise that HMS Hood was the seen as the ultimate symbol of British sea power, her loss was a tremendous blow to national pride, only saved by the destruction of the Bismarck. That is why Churchill demanded her destruction at any cost.

No BB's were used as breakwaters in the Mulberry Harbors, 2 D class CL's were used. They were HMS Dragon and HMS Durban IIRC they were fitted with extra AA guns. As to the RN laying up its old BB's that was not done untill the spring of 45 starting with the R class the QE's were done during the summer of 45. Also only one old BB was lend leased to Russia in 44 (Royal Soverign) it was handed back in 1949 this was to prevent russia from laying claim to several Italian BB's as reperations Note Milwaukee was also handed over at the same time for the same reason.

[asnrobert]

Thanks Ed, all good points. I will have to read Massie's book when I get the chance.

I'm probably going to vacate the forums now for the next 2 weeks - except for the SAS Help/testing threads - while I try to finish the beta.

Cheers my friend

read also Massie's sequel, "Castles of Steel" which covers WW1 at sea.

[bridav58]

DJ:

I think you have that reveresed. The bulk of the RN that was not sunk was able to return to sea in two days. Only Marlborough required serious dock time due to torpedo damage. Whereas all the German BCs were wrecks as were several of their BBs. German gunnery was good against the BCs, but lousy against the British Dreadnoughts because Jellicoe had been able to cross the T twice.


"they" as the Germans.I just didn't word it right.

[djcyclone]

Like I have always said.. Hitler was an expert politician.. but a poor military strategist.



I would not even say that he was a good politician or a good speaker. In my opinion he was just at the right place at the right time. His speaches simply touched the people becuase the hate was already their. The seed of hate had been planted when Germany lost WW I and was punished so harshly for a war that they did not even start. All Hitler had to do, was say a few fancy words that got the people wriled up. I would say if anything that he was a good conn man, but not a good politician. He basicaly swindled his way into power, with very dirty tricks to say the least.

If Hitler had been a good politician, then he would have realized the strategic value of what he had. He could have rebuilt Germany and thrown the treaty of Versi away (or however it is spelled). Anyway he then could have taken the nearby countries through alliances like Rome is best known for doing. "Join us or Die" politics, "and let us defend you politics". Once Germany was free of the treaty, and back on their feet with no war, then they easily could have built a Navy that could have put Britain on its toes. The thing that destroyed Germany was the War and nothing but. If Hitler had been a good politician, and patient then he would have seen all that he had right in front of him. Germany would have been the Middle Super Power between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

To top everything else off, they would have led the world in technological advance. The MK 48 ADCAP Torpedo comes from the Germans using magnetic fuses, and the Rockets we have today come from the V1 and V2 rockets (hence Balistic Missiles), plus jets, the tear drop design of submarines being first designed in the type 21 U-Boat. They where even working on a possible Nuke program before they lost. Hitler had no shortage of extremly smart people working for him, but again he did not see it that way. Granted, that all of those designes would have come along slower without war, but they still would have been designed. Germanys economy would have sky rocketed, and Hitler would have been at the head of it all, but he let his hate lead him, and that is why he made so many mistakes.

[Warship NWS]

Let's get back on topic .. one can take up how Hitler got into power on another thread. ;) Note, if a thread is started up political history/reference points only, not debates.

[bridav58]

I would not even say that he was a good politician or a good speaker. In my opinion he was just at the right place at the right time. His speaches simply touched the people becuase the hate was already their. The seed of hate had been planted when Germany lost WW I and was punished so harshly for a war that they did not even start. All Hitler had to do, was say a few fancy words that got the people wriled up. I would say if anything that he was a good conn man, but not a good politician. He basicaly swindled his way into power, with very dirty tricks to say the least.

If Hitler had been a good politician, then he would have realized the strategic value of what he had. He could have rebuilt Germany and thrown the treaty of Versi away (or however it is spelled). Anyway he then could have taken the nearby countries through alliances like Rome is best known for doing. "Join us or Die" politics, "and let us defend you politics". Once Germany was free of the treaty, and back on their feet with no war, then they easily could have built a Navy that could have put Britain on its toes. The thing that destroyed Germany was the War and nothing but. If Hitler had been a good politician, and patient then he would have seen all that he had right in front of him. Germany would have been the Middle Super Power between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

To top everything else off, they would have led the world in technological advance. The MK 48 ADCAP Torpedo comes from the Germans using magnetic fuses, and the Rockets we have today come from the V1 and V2 rockets (hence Balistic Missiles), plus jets, the tear drop design of submarines being first designed in the type 21 U-Boat. They where even working on a possible Nuke program before they lost. Hitler had no shortage of extremly smart people working for him, but again he did not see it that way. Granted, that all of those designes would have come along slower without war, but they still would have been designed. Germanys economy would have sky rocketed, and Hitler would have been at the head of it all, but he let his hate lead him, and that is why he made so many mistakes.

The V-1 & V-2 were developed by Germany only because of thier response to the Allied Bombing raids. Also Hitler had to go to war because of economic reasons for Germany was nearly bankrupt when they invaded Poland.

[djcyclone]

The V-1 & V-2 were developed by Germany only because of thier response to the Allied Bombing raids. Also Hitler had to go to war because of economic reasons for Germany was nearly bankrupt when they invaded Poland.



They where nearly bankrupt because they tried to grow to fast. Granted, it would have taken awile for Germany to get back on its feet, but obviously Hitler was unconcerned about The Treaty regulations, and the League of Nations was not brave enough to try and enforce the Treaty. If he had been patient, then Germany could have became the Super Power that I mentioned.

Chris is right, we need to get back on the topic of Battleships, if their is anything else to say that is. I think we have covered everything.

[Smiffy]

To Smiffy,

Very well worded post.. there is one thing you left out however, mine warfare. Aircraft were used for naval attacks by WW1, the Goeben alone was attacked by 270 aircraft sorties. However, mines destroyed more major warships in WW1 then all other methods combined with a close second being submarines, which deployed mines AND used torpedoes.



And me being an ex-minesweeper man too!:).

To illustrate your point, a submarine took out Royal Oak in Scapa Flow, so the fleet moves to Loch Ewe where a submarine deployed mine blows the bow off of Nelson putting her out of action for months. One BB destroyed and one out of action and no one saw the enemy.

[Smiffy]

No BB's were used as breakwaters in the Mulberry Harbors, 2 D class CL's were used. They were HMS Dragon and HMS Durban IIRC they were fitted with extra AA guns. As to the RN laying up its old BB's that was not done untill the spring of 45 starting with the R class the QE's were done during the summer of 45. Also only one old BB was lend leased to Russia in 44 (Royal Soverign) it was handed back in 1949 this was to prevent russia from laying claim to several Italian BB's as reperations Note Milwaukee was also handed over at the same time for the same reason.

You are right about no "R-Class" BBs being used as breakwaters, my mistake:o. However I am sure that both Revenge and Resolution were considered for this as both were non-operational by May 1944. Revenge having been stripped of her main armament, to provide spares for Warspite and some of the monitors, and Resolution became an engineers' training ship. The old battleship Centurion was expended as a breakwater (Corn Cob) at Omaha Beach. She had been made a target ship in the 1920's but spent most of WW2 pretending to be a King George V Class ship for the benefit of the Luftwaffe's and Regia Marina's photographers.

My point is, that by 1944 the RN was sure that the day of the battleship was well and truly over. The older ships were only being kept in service for shore bombardment duties, the KGVs were still useful as flagships and for covering Tirpitz. Vanguard was built as an experiment in applying new technology and to use up four available, spare 15" turrets. The Lion Class ships were cancelled as early as 1940, construction of ASW escorts already being seen as more important.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thanks Ed, all good points. I will have to read Massie's book when I get the chance.

I'm probably going to vacate the forums now for the next 2 weeks - except for the SAS Help/testing threads - while I try to finish the beta.

Cheers my friend

Tony:

Good luck on the beta and stay sane old friend!

[Ed Rotondaro]

To Smiffy,

Very well worded post.. there is one thing you left out however, mine warfare. Aircraft were used for naval attacks by WW1, the Goeben alone was attacked by 270 aircraft sorties. However, mines destroyed more major warships in WW1 then all other methods combined with a close second being submarines, which deployed mines AND used torpedoes.

To everyone else,

Now.. the flip side of this discussion. In the physical strategic sense BBs did almost nothing in both wars.. a deterrent, as JMS stated, is probably the best term in this case when it comes to any strategic significance of the BB in WW1. Could BBs in WW2 be a problem? Possibly, but for the most part - only tactically. In WW1.. they could be IF they could operate for a sustained amount of time without being countered by viable threats. Again, only if you can cut off the logistics to a nation can a navy prove to be strategically effective in the physical sense.

The problems with the "strategic" term for BBs in WW1 are as follows..

a) WW1 was a very complicated war with many nations involved with, for the most part, their own self interests at heart and in some cases being very limited as to what they could offer in terms of support for whichever allies they happened to be a part of at the time.
b) BBs were a deterrent but also a weapon that could not be lost due to political fallout so they were the ultimate catch 22 weapon.
c) the endurance, time at sea, for a BB was limited due to its poor conditions -- at port crews didn't even want to be on board them,
d) BBs, if they had any physical strategic effect at all --- was to protect or enforce mine warfare which affected all types of shipping and submarine operational choke points. The only other possible effect, if they could sustain such operations and cause enough damage, would be possible bombardment of enemy ports.

So.. was the threat perceived or real in WW1? Was it more political or military? The other problem is how do we define "strategic"?

WW1 is a huge "gray area" type of war due to its complexities. WW2 was far more defined in who was fighting who and why. This is what makes WW1 a very interesting war to consider as it was the first major war where all dimensions of warfare were involved in numbers, albeit some in their infancy like tanks and planes, but countries were starting to learn just how bloody the industrialized age would be when the industries built weapons that could kill thousands in a single day in quick succession. WW1 was the first war however where the heavy use of self propelled torpedos and mines, deployed by ships and subs, which could cripple or kill a major warship in one hit -- how much this degraded the strategic power of a BB is open to interpretation.

In the end.. BBs in military sense were of limited value in both wars, except, as deterrents. JMS I think got pretty close to the mark on that point. If we think in the time frame of WW1, as Smiffy stated, then yes.. they were a fearfully weapon much like the ICBMs of modern day. Everyone wants one but nobody wants to use it if they have any interest in self-preservation - either politically or militarily. This is very likely why old battleships were deployed far more often then the far more expensive newer battleships and as a result suffered accordingly.

I posted this entire topic not so everyone would agree.. but so we could re-examine the theories of the battleships and their strategic place in warfare between 1905 and 1945. In 40 years much had changed and the role of the capital ship was evolving with variable returns for the investments.

Very good posts everyone... please feel free to add more thoughts to this interesting topic.

Thanks.

Chris:

The use of strategic and deterrence is good way to examine the role of the BB in the 20th century. They were the naval weapon of last resort, the ultimate ability to project power over distance. They were somewhat analagous to nuclear weapons. Everybody wants them, but nobody wants to use them if they don't have enough. We see examples of nations like Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey coveting them which mirrors India, Pakistan and perhaps North Korea striving to develop a nuclear capability. In case of the latter, its mainly to keep hostile neighbors honest. Having a large number of BBs made your navy a force to be taken seriously. Now if you are facing multiple threats in widely separated theaters, the BB fleet makes sense.

Prior to WWII, naval aviation, while holding forth promise, was still not mature enough to be recognized as the premier threat. The development of aircraft in general and military aircraft in particular underwent an explosive growth in the 1930s as engines got more powerful, speeds went up, ranges increased and weapons carried grew. Just about every nation was caught to a degree in the bind of not having adequate AA defenses on land or at sea.

Mines are primarily a defensive weapon that can keep your opponent at a respectable distance. The number of small unit operations fought in both wars to sweep, or plant mines kept navies busy. Submarines in WWI showed their worth, but generally against merchants or slow moving warships. As one poster mentioned there was still a good deal of luck involved in attacking large ships with submarines as the Germans found out at Jutland. They had a line of subs on station, but since they were unable to stay on station long enough, they missed the British fleet. By WWII with subs of greater endurance, carrying more torpedoes and aided by signals intel and radar, the interception of capital ships could be attempted. But generally a submerged sub had a hard time keeping up with a surface warship unless it had detected it at long range and could manuever to attack it.

Strategically the possession of a large fleet of battleships in the WWI era meant that you could detach armored cruisers or battlecruisers to hunt down commerce raiders while keeping your opponent's BBs in port. Expensive? Yes, but defeat is more costly and the other forms of naval warfare were at that time not fully developed.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I believe it was a New York paper that gave the best description of the battle of Jutland: "The prisoner left his cell to strike the jailer, then returned to his cell." The prisoner being the HSF and the jailer being the RN.

Robert:

Exactly Robert, well quoted sir.

[Ed Rotondaro]

read also Massie's sequel, "Castles of Steel" which covers WW1 at sea.

Robert:

I agree completely. The chapters on Jutland alone may be the best popular account of that battle with Campbell and Gordon's books being more super detailed accounts of the battle.

[Ed Rotondaro]

"they" as the Germans.I just didn't word it right.

DJ:

No problem, sometimes we type faster than we proof.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I would not even say that he was a good politician or a good speaker. In my opinion he was just at the right place at the right time. His speaches simply touched the people becuase the hate was already their. The seed of hate had been planted when Germany lost WW I and was punished so harshly for a war that they did not even start. All Hitler had to do, was say a few fancy words that got the people wriled up. I would say if anything that he was a good conn man, but not a good politician. He basicaly swindled his way into power, with very dirty tricks to say the least.

If Hitler had been a good politician, then he would have realized the strategic value of what he had. He could have rebuilt Germany and thrown the treaty of Versi away (or however it is spelled). Anyway he then could have taken the nearby countries through alliances like Rome is best known for doing. "Join us or Die" politics, "and let us defend you politics". Once Germany was free of the treaty, and back on their feet with no war, then they easily could have built a Navy that could have put Britain on its toes. The thing that destroyed Germany was the War and nothing but. If Hitler had been a good politician, and patient then he would have seen all that he had right in front of him. Germany would have been the Middle Super Power between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

To top everything else off, they would have led the world in technological advance. The MK 48 ADCAP Torpedo comes from the Germans using magnetic fuses, and the Rockets we have today come from the V1 and V2 rockets (hence Balistic Missiles), plus jets, the tear drop design of submarines being first designed in the type 21 U-Boat. They where even working on a possible Nuke program before they lost. Hitler had no shortage of extremly smart people working for him, but again he did not see it that way. Granted, that all of those designes would have come along slower without war, but they still would have been designed. Germanys economy would have sky rocketed, and Hitler would have been at the head of it all, but he let his hate lead him, and that is why he made so many mistakes.

DJ:

The question of course becomes, would Germany have developed all these weapons is she was not at war, or planning to go to war?

[Kyle Holgate]

Let's think a bit about the alternative - NOT having any battleships. If England had not decided to build Dreadnought and kept up with the smaller "old" BB's would there have been any real difference? What if Germany had simply not responded to Dreadnought, and continued to build "OBB" type ships?
In some circles, it is viewed that the very build of of the German Dreadnought fleet directly lead to WW1. I submit that if this is true, then at least in WW1 the Dreadnought had a very, very strategic impact on the entire planet - just by existing, even if not really used to any effect once the war started. Similarly Hydrogen bombs are a great mover and shaker in the international community - though none have ever been used.
Dreadnoughts (and to be clear, talking WW1 only here) were hugely expensive to build and operate - but could a country that wanted to be a world power afford NOT to build them?

[djcyclone]

DJ:

The question of course becomes, would Germany have developed all these weapons is she was not at war, or planning to go to war?




I believe they would have. It would have been a lot slower, but I think that Germany would have been driven by a desire to be seen as a seriouse Nation. The bigger the weapons, and better the weapons the more likely other Nations will leave you alone. The experts where their, and I think they would have built the things that we see today. Plus you must consider that other Nations like the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. would be advancing slowly aswell. WW II was what caused technology to explode like it did. Without that war everyone would have gone slower in building technology, but still would have built it.

[Warship NWS]

Again, lets keep the "Hitler" topic for another thread.

A quick note here.. a monkey wrench into the mix time .. BBs might have been the deterrent force.. but subs were the counter deterrent, and did, for a time keep all RN major warship classes in port. All navies might have put the focus of glory on the BBs that made the big headlines but the subs had a far greater effect of fear as they were the combat units actually being used in combat and that the big battleship admirals feared the most.

Let me explain.. at the outset of the war the RN was sending out patrols into the North Sea but after the 3 ACs were sunk in formation by the U-9 in a single hour the Admiral Fischer ordered that all RN patrols be stopped as there was NO counter to the U-boat threat in the North Sea. The only way that the RN did NOT have to constantly patrol the North Sea, thus putting their ships in constant jeopardy due to U-boats/Mines, was the fact that they gained access to the HSF codes. At that point they only had to deploy warships as needed and the ships could use higher transit speeds to get to where they needed to go, fight, and then get back to port. While on patrol they could not sustain higher speeds and typically did not zig zag or were properly escorted by DDs due to their limited range or being used for convoy duties.

One thing we need to remember is that WW2 warships were AS fast as the subs on the surface at cruising speed.. 20 knots, which is what made it hard for them to intercept warships, plus they would often use zig-zag courses to help counter the sub threats. Warships were also often heavily escorted by a ring of destroyers making such attacks very dangerous. WW1.. this was not the case at all. DDs were of little use against subs except to ram or gun them down until underwater weapons and sensors started to be developed around 1916 and they did not operate in a ASW ring as much as operating in torpedo attack flotillas. Subs were also capable of around 15 knots on the surface, the ocean going types, which was fast enough to get into position against slower battleships, especially older battleships which suffered the worst, if they were traveling at typical cruising speeds of around 10-15 knots to conserve fuel/coal.

Battleships might have been the "mindset" deterrent of WW1.. but the submarine forces were by far the most strategic weapons of the war and the submarines had more effect on enemy shipping losses, the merchants, then all other factors combined. Single submarines were sinking large numbers of merchants either through mines, torpedoes, and especially deck guns.

So my opinion at this point stands.. the submarines were the true war winners as the bulk of the surface forces had little effect on the outcome of the war due to the fear of sub attacks and mines. While the battleship gained the headlines the submarines took the war to the enemy and caused the greatest strategic effect of all naval combatants. Had the U-boats not been countered by 1917 Britain may well have lost the war and there is no greater strategic effect then that. RN submarines contributed far more to the naval blockade of Germany then the surface combatants that spent more time in port then at sea.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Let's think a bit about the alternative - NOT having any battleships. If England had not decided to build Dreadnought and kept up with the smaller "old" BB's would there have been any real difference? What if Germany had simply not responded to Dreadnought, and continued to build "OBB" type ships?
In some circles, it is viewed that the very build of of the German Dreadnought fleet directly lead to WW1. I submit that if this is true, then at least in WW1 the Dreadnought had a very, very strategic impact on the entire planet - just by existing, even if not really used to any effect once the war started. Similarly Hydrogen bombs are a great mover and shaker in the international community - though none have ever been used.
Dreadnoughts (and to be clear, talking WW1 only here) were hugely expensive to build and operate - but could a country that wanted to be a world power afford NOT to build them?

Was all of this due to the fact that the submarine had not proven itself yet? If the BB was instrumental to causing a war by its existence then why was everyone out to "grab lands" during WW1? I do not believe Germany attacked various nations that they were connected to due to the fact they had BBs of their own -- if they had any at all. To me, WW1 was more about settling old scores, grabbing lands, or an effort to reduce the world population more then about "hey.. you have more BBs then we do!". Just my opinion anyway..;)

[john964]

To top everything else off, they would have led the world in technological advance. The MK 48 ADCAP Torpedo comes from the Germans using magnetic fuses, and the Rockets we have today come from the V1 and V2 rockets (hence Balistic Missiles), plus jets, the tear drop design of submarines being first designed in the type 21 U-Boat. They where even working on a possible Nuke program before they lost. Hitler had no shortage of extremly smart people working for him, but again he did not see it that way. Granted, that all of those designes would have come along slower without war, but they still would have been designed. Germanys economy would have sky rocketed, and Hitler would have been at the head of it all, but he let his hate lead him, and that is why he made so many mistakes.
DJ The Type XX! was not a Tear Drop design it was a for runner but not a tear drop design. The V-2 started development in the mid-1930's not as a result of allied bombing, also the rocket was not a all german effort. When Von Braun was debriefed at the end of the war, he was asked were he got his ideas at the begining he said one word 'Goddard'. Goddard had tried to intrest the US military in rockets as far back as 1929-30 but the US Military thought he was a crackpot. IIRC Goddard had asked for $ 2 million over 5 years to continue further reasearch, he was thrown physicaly from the office.

[Warship NWS]

Guys.. keep the Hitler stuff for another thread.. thanks.

[Smiffy]

To me, WW1 was more about settling old scores, grabbing lands, or an effort to reduce the world population more then about "hey.. you have more BBs then we do!". Just my opinion anyway..;)

But not the Kaiser's opinion.:D

WW1 would still have happened without BBs or it don't rain in Indianapolis.

However the warship building race ensured that Britain was involved. Amongst the many reasons for WW1, was British and German colonial rivalry. For three decades the Germany had been undermining British colonial authority and was beginning to project her power around the world, by means of a big fleet. To British eyes at least, you only need a fleet that big if you are going to attack Britain.

The British had never seen large continental armies as a threat. "I do not say they cannot come. I only say that they cannot come by sea" (Lord St.Vincent, First Sea Lord 1803). Now someone was building a big fleet that, perhaps, could enable landings, of a very big army, on the east coast, Britain suddenly needed friends, preferably with large continental armies. So Britain enters into an alliance that commits her to fight a European War.

[asnrobert]

But not the Kaiser's opinion.:D

WW1 would still have happened without BBs or it don't rain in Indianapolis.

However the warship building race ensured that Britain was involved. Amongst the many reasons for WW1, was British and German colonial rivalry. For three decades the Germany had been undermining British colonial authority and was beginning to project her power around the world, by means of a big fleet. To British eyes at least, you only need a fleet that big if you are going to attack Britain.

The British had never seen large continental armies as a threat. "I do not say they cannot come. I only say that they cannot come by sea" (Lord St.Vincent, First Sea Lord 1803). Now someone was building a big fleet that, perhaps, could enable landings, of a very big army, on the east coast, Britain suddenly needed friends, preferably with large continental armies. So Britain enters into an alliance that commits her to fight a European War.

Britain was also afraid that if Germany defeated France again, it would have to face Germany all alone. Which is why they became friends with their longstanding enemy, France.

[Smiffy]

Britain was also afraid that if Germany defeated France again, it would have to face Germany all alone. Which is why they became friends with their longstanding enemy, France.

Chris is right in his analysis that BBs were a waste of money, but you have to understand the mentality of people at that time. It took something as emotive as battleships, "Castles of Steel", to bring about the greatest change in British foreign policy in a thousand years. Britain had long seen the German states as friends and a good source of mercenaries. Strong royal family ties should have reinforced this but the unified Germany was quickly seen as a threat, especially when they started to build such large numbers of capital ships.

Thinking of WW1 alone, most of the BBs had been built or laid down before the war started. Battleships were a proven weapon and dreadnoughts were just a refinement of the technology. Submarines were unproven, aircraft were unproven, mines had only been used close to shore. Not only that but this unseen underwater stuff was dammed underhand and very Un-British. Until the war started almost everyone thought that the battleships would be the deciding factor. There could be no question of building anything else.

As for old battleships against dreadnoughts (and super dreadnoughts), it comes down to how many guns can you train on the enemy at your maximum range.

[Warship NWS]

In many ways the big steel warships of WW1 were just a simple evolution of "I have more guns then you do!" mentality. The future of warfare and the counters to big expensive ships however were already started before WW1 but not in enough deployable and effective numbers as of yet.. example, the rapid deployable mine and self propelled torpedo. Submarines before WW1 were also fairly ineffective for blue water warfare. WW1.. changed all of this, whether the blue water admirals wanted to wake up to it or not was another matter. Fortunately before WW2 spanked everyone just as hard with a new dose of reality with the latest battleship killer, the airplane, there were at least some admirals that have enough vision, and lack of sheer arrogance, to know that airpower would be the future of naval warfare. WW2 proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the nation who controlled the skies dictated the strategy of warfare.



As for old battleships against dreadnoughts (and super dreadnoughts), it comes down to how many guns can you train on the enemy at your maximum range.


Guns only matter if they hit something.. the side who hits first the hardest usually won. OBBs however.. were too damned slow and could not dictate the battle range and had inferior FCDs compared to the newer BBs/BCs of WW1. Several generations of FCDs and ship designs were brought into service during the war.. example, the BCs evolved through 3-4 generations alone between 1914 and 1918 with improvements to protection, firepower, and speed. OBBs suffered the worst during WW1 compared to other major capital ships as they were the least expendable big gunned ships.. especially in the eye of public opinion.

[Warship NWS]

To JMS,

I would agree with you about the effects of the Goeben, and Ottoman Empire vs Russia, being a strategic effect in WW1 except for the fact that neither empire greatly effected the direction of the war - the Ottoman Empire was effectively disintigrated by the war and the Russian Empire fell into revolution shortly after Germany aided Austria-Hungary in pushing back the Eastern Front. The only two nations that could alter the course of the war to any great degree was Britain and Germany - until the USA got involved militarily on the Western Front after aiding both nations prior to 1918.

Germany almost knocked Britain out of the war by 1916 through the use of the U-boat of which the big RN fleet could do squat about and they were far more effective then any bribing of nations to join their cause - of which none of the bribed nations were ever able to contribute enough to alter the course of the war in terms of military accomplishments. If not for the emergency work on anti-sub tactics and weapons the British would have been in serious trouble. Germany was damaged more by subs, especially the E-class of submarines which proved very effective, then by anything the RN ever achieved with surface combatants. The way to end the war was to cut off supplies coming into the nations at war.. only subs made that possible due to being expendable, extremely cost effective, and very hard to detect. They could lay offensive and defensive minefields and kill any ship afloat with extreme efficiency and low cost of operations in both fuel, manpower, and expense. One example is Kapt. Periere who alone sank 194 ships (454,000 tons) using only his deck gun and 4 torpedoes. Another example is the E.11 which sank 122 ships in the Sea of Marmara during the Turkish naval campaigns.

End result, IMHO, submarines were the true strategic naval warfare weapons of WW1, far more so then any classes of surface combatants which in many ways, if not entirely so, were degraded to nothing more then tactical weapons of naval warfare due to their inability to counter the submarine threat.

[JMS]

Ts, ts, please allow me to nitpick a bit ;)


To JMS,

I would agree with you about the effects of the Goeben, and Ottoman Empire vs Russia, being a strategic effect in WW1 except for the fact that neither empire greatly effected the direction of the war - the Ottoman Empire was effectively disintigrated by the war and the Russian Empire fell into revolution shortly after Germany aided Austria-Hungary in pushing back the Eastern Front. The only two nations that could alter the course of the war to any great degree was Britain and Germany - until the USA got involved militarily on the Western Front after aiding both nations prior to 1918.


The entry of Turkey into the war not only impacted WWI, it's impact is still being felt today. See Iraq and Israel, under Turkey's rule, Iraq was a backwater that wasn't a unified country while Israel wouldn't even exist.

Without a isolated Russia being knocked out of the war, Communism wouldn't have gotten hold and there wouldn't have been a Cold War, Eastern Europe wouldn't have been an industrial wasteland and Europe would still be a bunch of different countries rather than moving to a unified entity. With Russia in the war and kicking, Austria would have gone down the drain much sooner, and Germany would have been defeated by about 1917, in better condition to avoid the turmoil of the 20s and therefore avoiding the rise of Nazism.

World history would have been much, much more different and IMO more sedate if Turkey remained neutral and/or the Baltic would have been opened to traffic into Russia. As a by side, the great flu epidemic of 1918/1919 would most likely been avoided and 50 million deaths averted worlwide since there wouldn't have been a substantial movement of men to and from the US into a weakened Europe and from there to elsewhere.




Germany almost knocked Britain out of the war by 1916 through the use of the U-boat of which the big RN fleet could do squat about and they were far more effective then any bribing of nations to join their cause - of which none of the bribed nations were ever able to contribute enough to alter the course of the war in terms of military accomplishments. If not for the emergency work on anti-sub tactics and weapons the British would have been in serious trouble. Germany was damaged more by subs, especially the E-class of submarines which proved very effective, then by anything the RN ever achieved with surface combatants. The way to end the war was to cut off supplies coming into the nations at war.. only subs made that possible due to being expendable, extremely cost effective, and very hard to detect. They could lay offensive and defensive minefields and kill any ship afloat with extreme efficiency and low cost of operations in both fuel, manpower, and expense. One example is Kapt. Periere who alone sank 194 ships (454,000 tons) using only his deck gun and 4 torpedoes. Another example is the E.11 which sank 122 ships in the Sea of Marmara during the Turkish naval campaigns.

End result, IMHO, submarines were the true strategic naval warfare weapons of WW1, far more so then any classes of surface combatants which in many ways, if not entirely so, were degraded to nothing more then tactical weapons of naval warfare due to their inability to counter the submarine threat.

It should be noted though that most, if not just about all, the damage caused by U boats on British trade was self-inflicted by not implementing sooner a convoy system, when such system was already in place for trade with the Scandinavian peninsula and France.

There's no discussion that the cost effectiveness of the U-boat was disproportionate to their size and their impact was huge, but the boats ability to sail depended on keeping the enemy away from the friendly coast and that was dependent on the battlefleet being in existence. With no battleships around, there was nothing to keep the RN from pounding the harbours and defences and mining in the boats or try a Zeebrugge type raid on the German harbours until they succeeded. That was their tradition since Napoleon.

But then, without battleships, Britain mey have ended up allied to Germany against the traditional enemies, France and Russia.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Let's think a bit about the alternative - NOT having any battleships. If England had not decided to build Dreadnought and kept up with the smaller "old" BB's would there have been any real difference? What if Germany had simply not responded to Dreadnought, and continued to build "OBB" type ships?
In some circles, it is viewed that the very build of of the German Dreadnought fleet directly lead to WW1. I submit that if this is true, then at least in WW1 the Dreadnought had a very, very strategic impact on the entire planet - just by existing, even if not really used to any effect once the war started. Similarly Hydrogen bombs are a great mover and shaker in the international community - though none have ever been used.
Dreadnoughts (and to be clear, talking WW1 only here) were hugely expensive to build and operate - but could a country that wanted to be a world power afford NOT to build them?

Kyle:

In his book entitled "Dreadnought, Britain and Germany and the coming of WWI", historian Robert Massie shows that even without the dreadnought, the tensions underlying the late Victorian era and the Edwardian era would have eventually erupted. Also if Britain hadn't launched the Dreadnought, the USN was definitely building an all big gun battleship and Japan had plans to do so as well.

[JMS]

Kyle:

In his book entitled "Dreadnought, Britain and Germany and the coming of WWI", historian Robert Massie shows that even without the dreadnought, the tensions underlying the late Victorian era and the Edwardian era would have eventually erupted. Also if Britain hadn't launched the Dreadnought, the USN was definitely building an all big gun battleship and Japan had plans to do so as well.


But also that those tensions were a consequence of the German navy laws approved under William II. When under the Bismarckian aegis, Germany had been able to neutralise Russia through the reassurance treaty and was only left with France as enemy, a situation that was quite manageable for Germany and left her to be the arbiter of European affairs.

[Kyle Holgate]

From most accounts the rivalry between Germany and England was largely caused by the build-up of the German fleet. Prior to that Germany and England were on pretty good terms in general, even though Germany's merchant fleet and international trade was starting to compete. If Germany had decided to forgoe Dreadnought building, and built up a fleet of cruisers and u-boats and what not while expressing their desire simply to enable them to protect their worldwide trade - would the friction between England and Germany have built to the point of war between them?
Imagine a different 1914 where the alliances between France, Russia and England aren't there but perhaps instead Germany and England are still on friendly terms. Just one possibility I agree, but some of the alliances and support treaties drew countries into WW1 where they may not have become involved otherwise. Again, pure guesswork on that part, but not pure guesswork in that German battle fleet was a direct contributor to the sour relations between Germany and England! (been reading Dreadnought...).

War in Europe seemed to be coming regardless - but the scope of the war, and whether or not it would have been more limited or a world war I still question - if the Dreadnought arms race hadn't happened.


Did nations "need" Dreadnouhts? Seems to me the battleships they had were sufficient, though a bit too slow. Certainly the Dreadnought was a match for a single BB - but was it a match for 2? I wonder!

[Warship NWS]

As I like to say about WW1.. it was the great "gray area" war as all nations had their own self-interests in mind. That is why I called the entire "strategic battleship" theory a debatable topic. The reason it is so debatable is because the war could have been instigated for many reasons as the participants in many ways were just looking for a reason to get involved in the war, or supply those that were taking part, and even if battleships were not part of the political equations other methods of tempting countries to fight, or not, most likely would have put to use.

So where do we draw the line on "strategic"? Political? Perceived threat? Combat effectiveness? Take your pick. The fallout of WW1 was going to be dramatic had battleships been a part of the war or not so the political effects could be anyones guess. Perceived threat? More probable as everyone wanted them if they could afford them and then they had to afford to maintain them. Actually combat effectiveness? This all depends who fights who and when - overall however, they contributed the least to the war effort in terms of naval effectiveness due to their very limited use. Even the naval blockades were mostly handled by smaller warships, politics, subs, and mines as no one wanted to lose an almighty modern battleship to silly torpedo or mine. In the end run.. the battleships may have been the greatest perceived threat but ended up being the least used threat.

So what was the end result? Is it based on theory, political, or actual fact? How do we put a fine point on the gray area of human nature, politics, and perception?

It is interesting to note however that battleships sank the least shipping (warships or merchants) of all military weapons available to all nations. How much naval power did they effectively "mission kill"? Well, that question will likely be debated until the end of time. I will let all of you post your thoughts on this one as there are no real right or wrong answers, only historical interpretations, opinions, and perceptions. ;)

Thanks JMS, and to everyone else, for your posts on this thread. My main directive behind this thread was to bring about some good debating about one of the controversial weapons of naval history and its effects in the strategic realm of world wars. Enjoy the conversation. :)

[Smiffy]

In the light of this fascinating and enjoyable debate, is it not especially ironic that HMS Dreadnought's only kill was the U-29. In fact she was the only BB ever to destroy a submarine by herself.

Of course, HMS Warspite's aircraft destroyed a submarine in the Second Battle of Narvik, a battle that must have been the most aggressive use of a battleship ever.

[john964]

In the light of this fascinating and enjoyable debate, is it not especially ironic that HMS Dreadnought's only kill was the U-29. In fact she was the only BB ever to destroy a submarine by herself.

Of course, HMS Warspite's aircraft destroyed a submarine in the Second Battle of Narvik, a battle that must have been the most aggressive use of a battleship ever.

I don't know about that, How about Second Gualdalcanal or Surigou Strait.

[Ed Rotondaro]

As I like to say about WW1.. it was the great "gray area" war as all nations had their own self-interests in mind. That is why I called the entire "strategic battleship" theory a debatable topic. The reason it is so debatable is because the war could have been instigated for many reasons as the participants in many ways were just looking for a reason to get involved in the war, or supply those that were taking part, and even if battleships were not part of the political equations other methods of tempting countries to fight, or not, most likely would have put to use.

So where do we draw the line on "strategic"? Political? Perceived threat? Combat effectiveness? Take your pick. The fallout of WW1 was going to be dramatic had battleships been a part of the war or not so the political effects could be anyones guess. Perceived threat? More probable as everyone wanted them if they could afford them and then they had to afford to maintain them. Actually combat effectiveness? This all depends who fights who and when - overall however, they contributed the least to the war effort in terms of naval effectiveness due to their very limited use. Even the naval blockades were mostly handled by smaller warships, politics, subs, and mines as no one wanted to lose an almighty modern battleship to silly torpedo or mine. In the end run.. the battleships may have been the greatest perceived threat but ended up being the least used threat.

So what was the end result? Is it based on theory, political, or actual fact? How do we put a fine point on the gray area of human nature, politics, and perception?

It is interesting to note however that battleships sank the least shipping (warships or merchants) of all military weapons available to all nations. How much naval power did they effectively "mission kill"? Well, that question will likely be debated until the end of time. I will let all of you post your thoughts on this one as there are no real right or wrong answers, only historical interpretations, opinions, and perceptions. ;)

Thanks JMS, and to everyone else, for your posts on this thread. My main directive behind this thread was to bring about some good debating about one of the controversial weapons of naval history and its effects in the strategic realm of world wars. Enjoy the conversation. :)

Chris:

If we consider the battleship as the logical evolution of ships-of-line to ironclads to pre-dreadnoughts, then it is hard to fault naval planners for emphasising them as the premier weapon. In recent memory, there is the example of Tsushima which made navies draw the lesson that the big gun was the final arbiter of naval combat. Now once WWI begins, the perceived and demonstrated threat of the mine and the torpedo make all combatants proceed cautiously. They become believers now that the threats are demonstrated. Jellicoe even expected the HSF to draw his fleet in pursuit into an ambush of mines and torpedoes. So the navies were aware of the dangers and during the inter-war period they worked out means to counter them, be it torpedo bulges, and double bottom hulls as well as developing better ASW weapons and tactics. They recognized to a degree the threat posed by aircraft, but if you examine the AA measures at the start of the war, they were not adequate since they were meant to counter slow moving bi-planes. I mean look how many ships in the USN still carried .50cal MGs as part of their AA weaponry? If you look at the most successful navies in WWII, they the ones that understood the potential for airpower to dominate naval combat. One has to admire the RN managing to overcome the mismanagement of its naval aviation due to the RAF controlling it until just before the outbreak of the war. This explains the lack of good naval aircraft in the RN.

[Smiffy]

I don't know about that, How about Second Gualdalcanal or Surigou Strait.

We could argue this one for ever, they are all pretty impressive, but I think steaming a battleship into a fjord full of destroyers, with all the problems of lack of sighting distance and lack of room to manoeuvre just about takes it. However I'm not going to labour the point, but it is an example of putting a major unit well and truly into harm's way.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I don't know about that, How about Second Gualdalcanal or Surigou Strait.

John:

I think Smiffy's point was bringing the Warpsite into the confined waters of a fjord against targets armed with torpedoes that could have conceivably sunk her at short range. No one would have faulted Admiral Whitworth if he had stayed back as distant cover and let his 9 destroyers finish off the German DDs. I wouldn't consider Surigao Strait an aggressive use of the battleship, it was more like target practice against an enemy that couldn't respond effectively. Second Guadalcanal can certainly be considered aggressive, but Lee also tempered his manuevers with the realization that he faced a lot of torpedoes. It was a good mix of aggressive and realistic.

[Kyle Holgate]

We could argue this one for ever, they are all pretty impressive, but I think steaming a battleship into a fjord full of destroyers, with all the problems of lack of sighting distance and lack of room to manoeuvre just about takes it. However I'm not going to labour the point, but it is an example of putting a major unit well and truly into harm's way.


I'm with you on this one - it took some "big brass ones" (and I don't mean bells) to sail a major ship like Warspite into confined waters to chase down destroyers. At Guadalcanal the BB's were used to good effect once, then their repeat tries (talking of the Japanese here) were all intercepted. I don't see them as looking at this as a gamble to he same extent Warspite's fjord visit was. Suragaio was more of a fools gambit, hoping against hope for a miracle IMO.

[bridav58]

One must remember that even if Dreadnought wasn't built the USN already had the South Carolina & Michigan design work finished in fact they even preceded the Dreadnought. The question is if the USN went on ahead and built them would other navy's follow suit?

[Smiffy]

I'm with you on this one - it took some "big brass ones" (and I don't mean bells) to sail a major ship like Warspite into confined waters to chase down destroyers. At Guadalcanal the BB's were used to good effect once, then their repeat tries (talking of the Japanese here) were all intercepted. I don't see them as looking at this as a gamble to he same extent Warspite's fjord visit was. Suragaio was more of a fools gambit, hoping against hope for a miracle IMO.

According to my father, who held a very junior position (RAF Liaison Officer's clerk) on the staff of C-in-C Home Fleet at that time, Admiral Whitworth was told by the C-in-C, after First Narvik, "You let the buggers in. You can get the buggers out!"

[Kyle Holgate]

One must remember that even if Dreadnought wasn't built the USN already had the South Carolina & Michigan design work finished in fact they even preceded the Dreadnought. The question is if the USN went on ahead and built them would other navy's follow suit?

Totally right. Even if Dreadnought were not built other nations would have put to sea their own versions of the "all big gun" battleship. Japan was leaning that way, as you mention the US was and the Italians certainly were. My question though, was the Dreadnought (or contemporaries) all that special? If modern turbine technology and new learning's about protection and gunnery were added to new "old style" BB's instead of to a comparatively huge ship - wouldn't things have been pretty much the same?
It might be like a bunch of ants attacking a beetle but enough guns on the small ships and even a Dreadnought type is going to be in trouble.

[asnrobert]

We could argue this one for ever, they are all pretty impressive, but I think steaming a battleship into a fjord full of destroyers, with all the problems of lack of sighting distance and lack of room to manoeuvre just about takes it. However I'm not going to labour the point, but it is an example of putting a major unit well and truly into harm's way.

I agree. If the German torpedoes had been functioning better, things might have turned out differently.

[john964]

John:

I think Smiffy's point was bringing the Warpsite into the confined waters of a fjord against targets armed with torpedoes that could have conceivably sunk her at short range. No one would have faulted Admiral Whitworth if he had stayed back as distant cover and let his 9 destroyers finish off the German DDs. I wouldn't consider Surigao Strait an aggressive use of the battleship, it was more like target practice against an enemy that couldn't respond effectively. Second Guadalcanal can certainly be considered aggressive, but Lee also tempered his manuevers with the realization that he faced a lot of torpedoes. It was a good mix of aggressive and realistic.
Ed, I was thinking from the IJN's perspective of sailing into a layerd defence and being restricted in the ability to manuver effectively.

[Warship NWS]

To JMS,



If we consider the battleship as the logical evolution of ships-of-line to ironclads to
pre-dreadnoughts, then it is hard to fault naval planners for emphasising them as the premier weapon.


Another consideration is a simple matter of naval tradition. Naval tradition plagued the various navies throughout their histories.. sometimes for the good, sometimes not. Even though tradition can promote professional lineage it can also foster lack of vision and innovativeness - example.. don't rock the battleship, pun intended.

Thanks.

[Smiffy]

To JMS,



Another consideration is a simple matter of naval tradition. Naval tradition plagued the various navies throughout their histories.. sometimes for the good, sometimes not. Even though tradition can promote professional lineage it can also foster lack of vision and innovativeness - example.. don't rock the battleship, pun intended.

Thanks.

There ain't no captains' billets in submarines and when did an admiral ever fly his flag in a sub.

[djcyclone]

There ain't no captains' billets in submarines and when did an admiral ever fly his flag in a sub.



Was it Admiral Hart that tucked tail an ran in the begining of WW II? I will admit that I am rusty in this area, but I believe that he was in Command of the Houston at Java, and took a bit of the blame for lossing. He then transfered his flag to a Submarine shortly before being relieved of all of his responsabilities in the Pacific Theater.

[JMS]

... If Germany had decided to forgoe Dreadnought building, and built up a fleet of cruisers and u-boats and what not while expressing their desire simply to enable them to protect their worldwide trade - would the friction between England and Germany have built to the point of war between them?
...

To answer this point, war may have been averted but Britain would still see cruisers as a menace. Veeery slooowly I am writing an article on the history of the armored cruiser, and for every foreign class that would outrun or outgun their cruisers, Britain laid down an equivalent, so for the Russian Rurik and the French Dupuy de Lôme, they built the Powerfuls and for Jeanne d'Arc they built the Drakes. German cruisers only became a menace with the Scharnhorsts which were countered by the Minotaurs.

Commerce protection was one of the big worries of the RN from the 1880s until WW1.

[JMS]

As I like to say about WW1.. it was the great "gray area" war as all nations had their own self-interests in mind. That is why I called the entire "strategic battleship" theory a debatable topic. The reason it is so debatable is because the war could have been instigated for many reasons as the participants in many ways were just looking for a reason to get involved in the war, or supply those that were taking part, and even if battleships were not part of the political equations other methods of tempting countries to fight, or not, most likely would have put to use.


I don’t see it that way, World war 1 became a world war because Britain was involved and that involvement led directly to the involvement of other powers, such as Turkey and the US, as well as Japan. Absent Britain, the 1914 was would have been another European scuffle such as the 1866, 1870 or the Balkan wars. The consequences would have been a readjustment of borders, mainly in the East and the Balkans, but the national structures would remain in place. Britain getting involved in a European war for the first time since the Napoleonic times (since the Crimea war was of very limited aims and did not menace Russia’s integrity) changed the face of the war and the worries over the margin the Grand Fleet had over the High Seas Fleet drove Churchill to step on Turkey’s toes and widened the war to Southwest Asia.

Now, would the Admiralty have been so worried or public at large so concerned had the Germans stuck to cruisers and submarines? Certainly not, the French had a fleet designed for commerce raiding and Britain contented itself with matching the French designs and the submarine couldn’t create such a concern when they were, for all practical effects, experimental boats in 1914. Only battleships could so worry the British.



So where do we draw the line on "strategic"? Political? Perceived threat? Combat effectiveness? Take your pick. The fallout of WW1 was going to be dramatic had battleships been a part of the war or not so the political effects could be anyones guess. Perceived threat? More probable as everyone wanted them if they could afford them and then they had to afford to maintain them. Actually combat effectiveness? This all depends who fights who and when - overall however, they contributed the least to the war effort in terms of naval effectiveness due to their very limited use. Even the naval blockades were mostly handled by smaller warships, politics, subs, and mines as no one wanted to lose an almighty modern battleship to silly torpedo or mine. In the end run.. the battleships may have been the greatest perceived threat but ended up being the least used threat.

So what was the end result? Is it based on theory, political, or actual fact? How do we put a fine point on the gray area of human nature, politics, and perception?

It is interesting to note however that battleships sank the least shipping (warships or merchants) of all military weapons available to all nations. How much naval power did they effectively "mission kill"? Well, that question will likely be debated until the end of time. I will let all of you post your thoughts on this one as there are no real right or wrong answers, only historical interpretations, opinions, and perceptions. ;)

Thanks JMS, and to everyone else, for your posts on this thread. My main directive behind this thread was to bring about some good debating about one of the controversial weapons of naval history and its effects in the strategic realm of world wars. Enjoy the conversation. :)

The fallout need not be dramatic, since continental wars had happened before and the European aims of the warring powers in 1914 were very limited. France wanted Alsace and Lorraine, Germany didn’t know what they wanted, but would probably content themselves with slices of Poland, Austria wanted Serbia taken out and Russia wanted to remain influential in the Balkans. Britain just wanted a return to the status quo ante of 1900

As for the effectiveness of the battleships vs other weapons, yes, in the event they were underused, because for the owner of the bigger fleet around they represented the margin of security needed to send an Army to the continent, so the Grand Fleet couldn’t be risked haphazardly, for the second best, they became a trump card to hold in the post-war negotiations. For lesser powers like France or Italy the were a waste of resources while for third rank powers like Russia, Austria-Hungary or Turkey, they were a valuable addition to their armies in providing a third dimension to the fronts that had coasts. Russia in particular, couldn’t do without them as that would leave their coasts vulnerable to amphibious assault, including their capital and they acted as deterrent enough for the Germans not to risk their smaller (vis the RN) fleet to additional losses.

[JMS]

There ain't no captains' billets in submarines and when did an admiral ever fly his flag in a sub.

Not in WW2 but aren't SSBNs commanded by Captains? they would be the equivalent of the battleship of WW1, big, expensive and basically unusable.

[Mart]

Totally right. Even if Dreadnought were not built other nations would have put to sea their own versions of the "all big gun" battleship. Japan was leaning that way, as you mention the US was and the Italians certainly were. My question though, was the Dreadnought (or contemporaries) all that special? If modern turbine technology and new learning's about protection and gunnery were added to new "old style" BB's instead of to a comparatively huge ship - wouldn't things have been pretty much the same?
It might be like a bunch of ants attacking a beetle but enough guns on the small ships and even a Dreadnought type is going to be in trouble.

Hi Kyle, In a discussion on the previous board, which was, I believe about battleships and research, I pretty tongue-in-cheek suggested something to the effect that if all the effort that had gone into perfecting battleships, had gone into research instead, by the time that WWII came about, one country or another may have had some handy pieces of kit, such as better radar and targeting computers, or even missiles. It's not so far fetched. German use of rockets, developed pretty quickly, within a decade, into missile systems. OK, it sounds far-fetched, but you don't need anything as sophisticated as a Harrier, or an Exocet, to destroy some other country's fancy dreadnought.

As I understand it, the big advantage of dreadnoughts was clear targeting with one large gun type. Well, there are many ways to skin a cat, as submarines, mines and torpedoes showed, probably as quite a surprise when they were first deployed with effect.

"Nice big ship. Very impressive. Very pretty. Looks at it's best when it's vertical!"

Sorry to sound naive.

Martin

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, I was thinking from the IJN's perspective of sailing into a layerd defence and being restricted in the ability to manuver effectively.

John:

I see Surigao as the classic example of the courage of despair that Bushido instilled into its followers. Any IJN sailor with a brain knew that was a suicide mission, a surface version of the kamikaze. But that's just my opinion.

[Smiffy]

Not in WW2 but aren't SSBNs commanded by Captains? they would be the equivalent of the battleship of WW1, big, expensive and basically unusable.

I think you are right as far as the USN goes, the RN's SSBNs are a commander's command (RN can't have a full captain commanding a boat can it? Even if that boat is one of the most powerful weapons ever to put to sea.) Don't know how the French do it, but whoever commands will have lots of gold braid.

However, my real point was that back in the early 20th Century the senior officers and their staffs, who decided what ship to build next, would have though about things in the light of their own careers, ambitions and experience. So they would naturally think, "Big Ship".

[JMS]

With Jacky Fisher's exception, of course... :cool:

Don't underestimate the senior officer's ability to innovate. Most of the profession will remain a "traditionalist" but once in a while, one of the admirals will step forward and sponsor new ideas and foster a breed of officers bred in the innovation. Examples of this would be Fisher, Rickover, Nelson...

[john964]

I think you are right as far as the USN goes, the RN's SSBNs are a commander's command (RN can't have a full captain commanding a boat can it? Even if that boat is one of the most powerful weapons ever to put to sea.) Don't know how the French do it, but whoever commands will have lots of gold braid.

However, my real point was that back in the early 20th Century the senior officers and their staffs, who decided what ship to build next, would have though about things in the light of their own careers, ambitions and experience. So they would naturally think, "Big Ship".

From what I have read and studied in the submarine service of the Royal Navy SSK's are commanded by Lt Commanders, SSN's Commanders, SSBN Captains. And after they finish there commands in submarines they get to start hunting them as commanding officers of Frigates, this is if they don't get command of a submarine squadron or some such.

[Smiffy]

From what I have read and studied in the submarine service of the Royal Navy SSK's are commanded by Lt Commanders, SSN's Commanders, SSBN Captains. And after they finish there commands in submarines they get to start hunting them as commanding officers of Frigates, this is if they don't get command of a submarine squadron or some such.
British SSNNs are a Commander's command. You can check it out on http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk (http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/)

[Warship NWS]

With Jacky Fisher's exception, of course... :cool:

Don't underestimate the senior officer's ability to innovate. Most of the profession will remain a "traditionalist" but once in a while, one of the admirals will step forward and sponsor new ideas and foster a breed of officers bred in the innovation. Examples of this would be Fisher, Rickover, Nelson...

The RN, USN, and IJN were fortunate enough to have visionaries that could see that the aircraft carriers were the future of naval combat as one example. The battleships admirals however were fairly stuck in their ways for a while on the tactical and strategic level and it cost many lives to learn through the "tradition" mistakes.

[Kyle Holgate]

The RN, USN, and IJN were fortunate enough to have visionaries that could see that the aircraft carriers were the future of naval combat as one example. The battleships admirals however were fairly stuck in their ways for a while on the tactical and strategic level and it cost many lives to learn through the "tradition" mistakes.

One phrase we often said in the Navy: "200 years of tradition on fettered by common sense".

It's very easy to stick with something that works (which with BB's is debatable by itself) - trying to look at it through the eyes of people of the time it does seem like it would be hard to sink a BB with airplanes, which generally speaking ended up to be true. It took a LOT of planes to sink a BB which is what they seemed to be most worried about. They didn't seem to consider that it took only one good hit to mission kill a BB - forcing it to head to port for lengthy repairs at the very least.

[Warship NWS]

One phrase we often said in the Navy: "200 years of tradition on fettered by common sense".

It's very easy to stick with something that works (which with BB's is debatable by itself) - trying to look at it through the eyes of people of the time it does seem like it would be hard to sink a BB with airplanes, which generally speaking ended up to be true. It took a LOT of planes to sink a BB which is what they seemed to be most worried about. They didn't seem to consider that it took only one good hit to mission kill a BB - forcing it to head to port for lengthy repairs at the very least.

It took a lot of planes in WW1, not WW2, depending on the attack and the results per hit. However, you are quite correct about the part regarding mission kills.. doesn't matter how big and fancy your ship is if it can't fight - regardless of why it cannot fight.

[Kyle Holgate]

It took a lot of planes in WW1, not WW2, depending on the attack and the results per hit. However, you are quite correct about the part regarding mission kills.. doesn't matter how big and fancy your ship is if it can't fight - regardless of why it cannot fight.

In WW2 battleships at sea in fighting condition were sunk by aircraft only in instances where aircraft were in large numbers. To be clear, I mean sunk only - not as in Bismarck for example mission killed. POW and Repulse - dozens of attackers. Musashi, Dozens of attacking planes. Yamato, same thing. It took time and a while to sink them, and if there were only 20 or so attackers in each case it's quite possible the BB's would have made it out "alive".
I think only in the instance of the Roma's sinking did one single aircraft destroy a battleship at sea. This does prove it could be done - and I certainly don't argue that it's impossible in other circumstances, history just does not show it as happening (that I can think of at least!).

[Warship NWS]

In WW2 battleships at sea in fighting condition were sunk by aircraft only in instances where aircraft were in large numbers. To be clear, I mean sunk only - not as in Bismarck for example mission killed. POW and Repulse - dozens of attackers. Musashi, Dozens of attacking planes. Yamato, same thing. It took time and a while to sink them, and if there were only 20 or so attackers in each case it's quite possible the BB's would have made it out "alive".
I think only in the instance of the Roma's sinking did one single aircraft destroy a battleship at sea. This does prove it could be done - and I certainly don't argue that it's impossible in other circumstances, history just does not show it as happening (that I can think of at least!).

Note, not all planes involved in the attacks actually hit their targets or actually always found their targets or could attack (mechanical or navigational errors for example or full attack patterns).

When you tally the number of hits to sink a ship vs the amount of ordnance required for surface ships to gain the same results.. that changes the perspective considerably. It took less torpedoes to sink the Yamato with aircraft torpedoes then the Scharnhorst with ship torpedoes... they hit the Yamato on all one side and the torpedoes were set to hit below or outside the belt line (bow and stern) as one example.

Aircraft could also attack ships at locations the surface combatants or subs could not reach such as protect harbors or restricted waters.

Not really debating mind you.. just pointing out that "large" numbers of aircraft might be giving too generalized a statement when you consider that on average it only took 10-20 actuall attacking aircraft in most cases per primary target to at least put a battleship out of action.. and possibly even sink it. It just all depended on how many actually scored hits and the damage inflicted per hits scored. How well the target is protected by escorting ships, total AA capable of engaging, and any air cover is also a consideration.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

Not in WW2 but aren't SSBNs commanded by Captains? they would be the equivalent of the battleship of WW1, big, expensive and basically unusable.

When I was on the USS Georgia (an Ohio class sub), we had Captains as commanding officers.
On the older missile subs, Commanders were the COs.

[Rick]

When you tally the number of hits to sink a ship vs the amount of ordnance required for surface ships to gain the same results.. that changes the perspective considerably. It took less torpedoes to sink the Yamato with aircraft torpedoes then the Scharnhorst with ship torpedoes... they hit the Yamato on all one side and the torpedoes were set to hit below or outside the belt line (bow and stern) as one example.




I dunno thats kinda thin. According to Morrison there were 98 torpedo bombers total in the strikes that sank Yamato, and they made 10 hits. Acccording to what I could find on Scharnhorst, the RN DD's fired 55 torpedos for 11 hits. NOt all that big a difference, even considering the Aerial torpedos probably had smaller warheads. Not sure the US flyers could have done anything to deliberately hit Yamato under her belt, shoot they wouldn't have even known how deep her belt was.

[Kyle Holgate]

Note, not all planes involved in the attacks actually hit their targets or actually always found their targets or could attack (mechanical or navigational errors for example or full attack patterns).

When you tally the number of hits to sink a ship vs the amount of ordnance required for surface ships to gain the same results.. that changes the perspective considerably. It took less torpedoes to sink the Yamato with aircraft torpedoes then the Scharnhorst with ship torpedoes... they hit the Yamato on all one side and the torpedoes were set to hit below or outside the belt line (bow and stern) as one example.

Aircraft could also attack ships at locations the surface combatants or subs could not reach such as protect harbors or restricted waters.

Not really debating mind you.. just pointing out that "large" numbers of aircraft might be giving too generalized a statement when you consider that on average it only took 10-20 actuall attacking aircraft in most cases per primary target to at least put a battleship out of action.. and possibly even sink it. It just all depended on how many actually scored hits and the damage inflicted per hits scored. How well the target is protected by escorting ships, total AA capable of engaging, and any air cover is also a consideration.

Thanks.

I totally agree, if you add ports and confined waters and what not then the sinkings go up - Toranto, Pearl Harbor, the Tirpitz, a couple Japanese BB's, etc. My only point is that a BB at sea typically took a lot of planes to take down and it only happened in situations historically where the attacking aircraft had absolute air superiority. Not to suggest planes don't trump BB's in general - both in their ability to damage/sink or more improtantly to do anything a BB can do better and cheaper. In my opinion the latter reason is more important than the former. It's not so much a direct fight between the two that matters as much as the Airplane simply made the BB obsolete in that it was as capable (and more) for a LOT less cost.

[Warship NWS]

I dunno thats kinda thin. According to Morrison there were 98 torpedo bombers total in the strikes that sank Yamato, and they made 10 hits. Acccording to what I could find on Scharnhorst, the RN DD's fired 55 torpedos for 11 hits. NOt all that big a difference, even considering the Aerial torpedos probably had smaller warheads. Not sure the US flyers could have done anything to deliberately hit Yamato under her belt, shoot they wouldn't have even known how deep her belt was.

Did Yamato need 9+ hits to sink if they all hit on the same side? After the first three she already developed a serious list. Scharnhorst, according to which account you read, was hit by 10-14 torpedoes, many hits were scored after she was slowed down by the 14" shell hit, problem was that the British tended to launch their torpedoes too shallow so as to hit the belt line, same happened vs the Bismarck when the Swordfish attacked until the hit to the stern. The preferred method to hit battleships was below the belt line, thus the reason for battleships being built with bulges. No battleship afloat had their main belt thickness more then so many few feet below the waterline and torpedoes would not penetrate thick armor belts very well. Torpedoes could be set with deep or shallow depth settings depending on the ship they were attacking - DDs, CRs, or capital ships.

Thanks.

[JMS]

I totally agree, if you add ports and confined waters and what not then the sinkings go up - Toranto, Pearl Harbor, the Tirpitz, a couple Japanese BB's, etc. My only point is that a BB at sea typically took a lot of planes to take down and it only happened in situations historically where the attacking aircraft had absolute air superiority. Not to suggest planes don't trump BB's in general - both in their ability to damage/sink or more improtantly to do anything a BB can do better and cheaper. In my opinion the latter reason is more important than the former. It's not so much a direct fight between the two that matters as much as the Airplane simply made the BB obsolete in that it was as capable (and more) for a LOT less cost.

And it should be noted that by the time Mushasi and Yamato were sunk the battleship was already recognised as an obsolete weapon, so it would be akin to the pre-dreadnoughts and armored cruisers in Jutland.

Now, going back to WW1, the capability of the first torpedo bombers clearly was insufficient to sink a battleship, and not only that, but the carriers available had an aircraft capacity that was also insufficient to create the mass needed to sink a maneouvring battleship.

[Warship NWS]

Short Admiralty, Short Folders, and Cuckoos could carry 14" (Shorts) and 18" (Cuckoos) torpedoes starting at 1917 to 1918. This was too little too late to make any real difference in the North Sea campaign but had the idea been pursued as persistantly as the developments of aircraft fighting over the Western Front it could have been possible for successful attacks on warships to take place before the end of the war, note the ships of the time frame had poor AA defenses at the time and many major warships were still quite slow and not very maneuverable - especially the older pre-dreadnoughts and some of the older cruisers. Even a single hit could lay up a ship in the docks for months or sink ships that had poor flooding protection. Point being, aircraft just missed their chance to make an impression. Had the war lasted 2-3 more years I think aircraft would have had more of a tactical role to play in the naval theaters. Now it was not until the 1920s, and especially the 1930s, that you started to see coordinated naval aircraft doctrines, full fleet carrier concepts, etc.

Thanks.

[JMS]

Short Admiralty, Short Folders, and Cuckoos could carry 14" (Shorts) and 18" (Cuckoos) torpedoes starting at 1917 to 1918. This was too little too late to make any real difference in the North Sea campaign but had the idea been pursued as persistantly as the developments of aircraft fighting over the Western Front it could have been possible for successful attacks on warships to take place before the end of the war, note the ships of the time frame had poor AA defenses at the time and many major warships were still quite slow and not very maneuverable - especially the older pre-dreadnoughts and some of the older cruisers. Even a single hit could lay up a ship in the docks for months or sink ships that had poor flooding protection. Point being, aircraft just missed their chance to make an impression. Had the war lasted 2-3 more years I think aircraft would have had more of a tactical role to play in the naval theaters. Now it was not until the 1920s, and especially the 1930s, that you started to see coordinated naval aircraft doctrines, full fleet carrier concepts, etc.

Thanks.

Older cruisers and pre-dreadnought were on the way out as totally obsolete by 1918 and many were laid up unmanned by then, so sinking them will not change the equation a bit. Newer ships capable of 21 to 25 knots had a better than fair chance of evading air torpedoes as, for example, the top speed of the cuckoo was only 92 knots (i.e. if the battleship run away the overtake speed would at most be 71 knots but that would be with the aircraft unloaded). Contrast that with the 240 knots of the Avenger vs the 27 knot Yamato.

Now, the 18 inc Mk VIII torpedo had a speed of 35 knots for 2.300 m. (2.500 yards) so the speed differential vs a full speed battleships would only be 10-14 knots, so the torpedoes need to be dropped from very close range to have any chance of hit.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I dunno thats kinda thin. According to Morrison there were 98 torpedo bombers total in the strikes that sank Yamato, and they made 10 hits. Acccording to what I could find on Scharnhorst, the RN DD's fired 55 torpedos for 11 hits. NOt all that big a difference, even considering the Aerial torpedos probably had smaller warheads. Not sure the US flyers could have done anything to deliberately hit Yamato under her belt, shoot they wouldn't have even known how deep her belt was.

Hi Rick:

That tracks with what I have read, and there are questions as to whether Yamato took 11 or 13 torpedo hits. Also Scharnhort's hits were difficult to determine due to the issues of visibility caused by weather and smoke.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Did Yamato need 9+ hits to sink if they all hit on the same side? After the first three she already developed a serious list. Scharnhorst, according to which account you read, was hit by 10-14 torpedoes, many hits were scored after she was slowed down by the 14" shell hit, problem was that the British tended to launch their torpedoes too shallow so as to hit the belt line, same happened vs the Bismarck when the Swordfish attacked until the hit to the stern. The preferred method to hit battleships was below the belt line, thus the reason for battleships being built with bulges. No battleship afloat had their main belt thickness more then so many few feet below the waterline and torpedoes would not penetrate thick armor belts very well. Torpedoes could be set with deep or shallow depth settings depending on the ship they were attacking - DDs, CRs, or capital ships.

Thanks.

Chris:

Considering Japanese dmage control methods, you may be right in terms of the number of hits needed. Apparently the USN wasn't taking chances if you get my drift.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Short Admiralty, Short Folders, and Cuckoos could carry 14" (Shorts) and 18" (Cuckoos) torpedoes starting at 1917 to 1918. This was too little too late to make any real difference in the North Sea campaign but had the idea been pursued as persistantly as the developments of aircraft fighting over the Western Front it could have been possible for successful attacks on warships to take place before the end of the war, note the ships of the time frame had poor AA defenses at the time and many major warships were still quite slow and not very maneuverable - especially the older pre-dreadnoughts and some of the older cruisers. Even a single hit could lay up a ship in the docks for months or sink ships that had poor flooding protection. Point being, aircraft just missed their chance to make an impression. Had the war lasted 2-3 more years I think aircraft would have had more of a tactical role to play in the naval theaters. Now it was not until the 1920s, and especially the 1930s, that you started to see coordinated naval aircraft doctrines, full fleet carrier concepts, etc.

Thanks.

Chris:

I agree, traditionally navies are moer conservative than armies and this is definitely true when you compare the development of land based air to naval air in WWI. It would be interesting to see if more use of naval avaition in WWI would have had an effect on fighting submarines.

[Kyle Holgate]

Trying hard not to use 20/20 hindsight here...
If you look at aircraft circa 1918 it sure looks like a battleship could take care of itself fairly well though it will need lots of smaller AA guns than previous ships which had perhaps secondary and a very few smaller guns for AA or close in torpedo boat defense.
Indeed it's true to some effect, that part of defeating the BB is to overwhelm her AA defense. Would Yamato have been hit by all those torpedoes (or any) if she'd not had dozens of attackers at once, overwhelming her defenses? If it'd been only one CV with 15 Avengers and 36 Helldivers - I'm not so sure that she'd have been sunk. Same for Musashi and POW/Repulse (of course limiting G3M and G4M's there).
Aircraft trumped battleships because they were cheap and one could build hundreds for the cost of a BB - and the carrier too. Still, one carrier alone isn't necessarily a match for one BB alone, though there is virtually nothing the BB can do in retaliation for an air attack. Sooner or later the carrier would force the BB back to port or possibly sink her.

Anyway from around 1918 even into the 1930's I can certainly understand why some wouldn't think that BB's are in great danger of being trumped, if escorted with destroyers and cruisers and what not and perhaps even having CV's along for air defense. It turned out the CV's were better at offense than any BB.

From the CV side: "Anything you can do I can do better, I can do anything better than you".
IMO the real reason for the twighlight of the BB...

[Ed Rotondaro]

Now, the 18 inc Mk VIII torpedo had a speed of 35 knots for 2.300 m. (2.500 yards) so the speed differential vs a full speed battleships would only be 10-14 knots, so the torpedoes need to be dropped from very close range to have any chance of hit.

JMS:

Which helps explain why the machine gun was considered a viable AA weapon in WWI, along with the 3" AA. The planes were slower and flew at much lower altitudes. There was no dive bombing yet.

[Kyle Holgate]

Chris:

I agree, traditionally navies are moer conservative than armies and this is definitely true when you compare the development of land based air to naval air in WWI. It would be interesting to see if more use of naval avaition in WWI would have had an effect on fighting submarines.

More use of naval aviation certainly would have impacted submarine operations. In WW2 it was shown that just having a plane buzzing about was all that was neede to reduce the effectiveness of subs. The subs often spotted the plane first and then dove - and since WW1 and 2 subs are so slow under water - their effectiveness is hugely reduced unless they're already in a position to attack - and even then they have to worry about the airplane spotting them.
One thing as far as submarine development that strikes me as odd - why didn't the sub designers think of increasing battery power and hull streamlining sooner? They could have thought of it in 1914 but it appears to have taken until 1944 to be actually done.

[Ed Rotondaro]

More use of naval aviation certainly would have impacted submarine operations. In WW2 it was shown that just having a plane buzzing about was all that was neede to reduce the effectiveness of subs. The subs often spotted the plane first and then dove - and since WW1 and 2 subs are so slow under water - their effectiveness is hugely reduced unless they're already in a position to attack - and even then they have to worry about the airplane spotting them.
One thing as far as submarine development that strikes me as odd - why didn't the sub designers think of increasing battery power and hull streamlining sooner? They could have thought of it in 1914 but it appears to have taken until 1944 to be actually done.

Kyle:

With subs, a lot of the actions occurred in coastal waters. British boats certainly were not meant for long range patrols. Only the US, Japan and Germany really planned for that, and even then, the Germans still fielded a considerable number of coastal subs and the IJN never really tried to interdict US merchant shipping and ended up staying closer to where their fleet was.

[Warship NWS]

Older cruisers and pre-dreadnought were on the way out as totally obsolete by 1918 and many were laid up unmanned by then, so sinking them will not change the equation a bit. Newer ships capable of 21 to 25 knots had a better than fair chance of evading air torpedoes as, for example, the top speed of the cuckoo was only 92 knots (i.e. if the battleship run away the overtake speed would at most be 71 knots but that would be with the aircraft unloaded). Contrast that with the 240 knots of the Avenger vs the 27 knot Yamato.

Now, the 18 inc Mk VIII torpedo had a speed of 35 knots for 2.300 m. (2.500 yards) so the speed differential vs a full speed battleships would only be 10-14 knots, so the torpedoes need to be dropped from very close range to have any chance of hit.

I will be quick to note that many aerial dropped torpedoes of WW2 were around the same speed, or only just slightly faster in some cases. The difference was that they were dropped in patterns to help improve the chances of a hit and WW2 aircraft had more effective flight ranges. Torpedoes of WW2 were also dropped at only around 800-1000 yards from the target on average. Like I said, successful attacks during WW1 could have happened had the idea been pushed harder, I never said it would have made a major impact as torpedo capable aircraft were not in enough numbers as of yet.. the idea was moving forward however. Had the war lasted slightly longer, if more aircraft had been built for the role, then some warships may have been attacked successfuly by air dropped torpedoes.

[Warship NWS]

To Kyle, it would be good to remember that 4 DDs and 1 CR were also sunk during the raid on the Yamato and many aircraft could not even attack at all due to so many planes being in the attack patterns, it was serious overkill.

I will also be quick to note that your 1 CV vs 1 BB is a bit too simplistic. BBs never went anywhere without being escorted, unless they were operating as raiders, so you have to figure in not just the AAA of the primary target but also the escorts. Very often during raids some aircraft did not attack due to navagational errors or mechanical issues so it is fair to think that extra aircraft were used to help ensure something found the target, made it through the defenses, the weapon and plane fucntioned properly, and then the pilot hits the target.

A single CV at sea launching a full deck vs 1 unescorted BB at a range of 100nm.. I think you could be pretty certain that the BB would not be going home either due to being crippled or just flat out sunk - even a full deck from a CVL/E could cause problems depending on the types of ordnance used. Undisrupted air attacks were much more lethal then those being disrupted by heavy flak and CAP. The very first few hits on POW and Repulse by torpedoes, the ones that caused serious flooding ensured they would never sail again, and towing a battleship at sea was questionable at best, the rest just made sure they sank a lot faster. Much depended on where the ordnance hit the target ship. One critical hit slowing down a BB could make it an easier target for further hits and the speed of a target, thus effecting its maneuverability, is a very important factor for calculating if aerial ordnance hits a moving ship or not.

Location, location, location.. there is nothing certain until the hit is scored, but once the hit is scored in a dangerous spot your ship could be in very serious trouble.

[Warship NWS]

Kyle:

With subs, a lot of the actions occurred in coastal waters. British boats certainly were not meant for long range patrols. Only the US, Japan and Germany really planned for that, and even then, the Germans still fielded a considerable number of coastal subs and the IJN never really tried to interdict US merchant shipping and ended up staying closer to where their fleet was.

Not entirely accurate. The RN E class, one of their most successfull classes of subs, heavily patrolled the North Sea and also operated in the Med theater. This class of sub was capable of 3000nm at 10 knots and had a top surface speed of 15 knots. The ocean going subs of WW1 caused a lot of havoc in all naval theaters whereas the coastals acted in the defensive or minelaying roles but in turn they were built in greater numbers due to their cheaper cost.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Not entirely accurate. The RN E class, one of their most successfull classes of subs, heavily patrolled the North Sea and also operated in the Med theater. This class of sub was capable of 3000nm at 10 knots and had a top surface speed of 15 knots. The ocean going subs of WW1 caused a lot of havoc in all naval theaters whereas the coastals acted in the defensive or minelaying roles but in turn they were built in greater numbers due to their cheaper cost.

Chris:

When I say long range, I mean capable of operating in the Pacific or South Atlantic. The British T class subs did a good job in the Med in WWII, but they certainly were not capable of operating much further from home without extensive support in the form of mid-ocean refueling. Also British subs didn't carry a large torpedo load and as a result tended to rely on their deck guns against unarmed targets.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

When I say long range, I mean capable of operating in the Pacific or South Atlantic. The British T class subs did a good job in the Med in WWII, but they certainly were not capable of operating much further from home without extensive support in the form of mid-ocean refueling. Also British subs didn't carry a large torpedo load and as a result tended to rely on their deck guns against unarmed targets.

For all instensive purposes.. the RN subs did not need to operate in the South Atlantic or the Pacific, they could bottle Germany just fine in the North Sea, North Atlantic, and Baltic theaters, and effect other Central powers in the Med. They did a lot of damage to their commerce shipping in those theaters. As to lack of torpedoes.. the vast majority, for all naval sub forces in all nations, of merchant shipping were sunk in WW1 with gunfire alone - the greatest U-boat commander only used 4 torpedos vs 194 merchants. Why use a torpedo if you do not have to especially if you have to surface and warn the enemy anyways prior to "unrestricted submarine warfare"? This is what caused the involvement of Q ships or arming of merchant raiders and using DDs as escorts.. someone needed to shoot back at the subs, after that more torpedoes were used while staying submerged. The other benefit of the deck gun was the sub could use higher speeds on the surface for interception if needed.

[Kyle Holgate]

To Kyle, it would be good to remember that 4 DDs and 1 CR were also sunk during the raid on the Yamato and many aircraft could not even attack at all due to so many planes being in the attack patterns, it was serious overkill.

I will also be quick to note that your 1 CV vs 1 BB is a bit too simplistic. BBs never went anywhere without being escorted, unless they were operating as raiders, so you have to figure in not just the AAA of the primary target but also the escorts. Very often during raids some aircraft did not attack due to navagational errors or mechanical issues so it is fair to think that extra aircraft were used to help ensure something found the target, made it through the defenses, the weapon and plane fucntioned properly, and then the pilot hits the target.

A single CV at sea launching a full deck vs 1 unescorted BB at a range of 100nm.. I think you could be pretty certain that the BB would not be going home either due to being crippled or just flat out sunk - even a full deck from a CVL/E could cause problems depending on the types of ordnance used. Undisrupted air attacks were much more lethal then those being disrupted by heavy flak and CAP. The very first few hits on POW and Repulse by torpedoes, the ones that caused serious flooding ensured they would never sail again, and towing a battleship at sea was questionable at best, the rest just made sure they sank a lot faster. Much depended on where the ordnance hit the target ship. One critical hit slowing down a BB could make it an easier target for further hits and the speed of a target, thus effecting its maneuverability, is a very important factor for calculating if aerial ordnance hits a moving ship or not.

Location, location, location.. there is nothing certain until the hit is scored, but once the hit is scored in a dangerous spot your ship could be in very serious trouble.

I was unclear in my post the single vs single was talking about the main ships, I would expect both to have reasonable escorts.
Let's look at WW2 - the Santa Cruz battle IIRC - South Dakota shot down a crap load of planes. A single BB with a reasonable escort 'could' fight a single carrier to a standstill. THe main issue of course is that from 100 miles away the Carrier is quite safe and only the BB is under fire. If the BB shoots enough planes down so the carrier has to retire though, it's a mission kill.
Now that being said - a single CV full of planes - fighters, dive bombers and torpedo craft - if they attack all at once is probably going to overwhelm most any BB's defenses, though the escorts will of course help. Once again though the main risk is to the BB with little to none to the carrier which has all the initiative. Not a good spot to be in for a BB to be sure!
To try to be clear as to what I'm saying exactly - It generally appears to take quite a few aircraft to defeat a BB with escorts at sea in fighting condition. Historically in most instances where BB's were sunk at sea - it was by very large numbers of planes. We don't see instances where only a few planes actually sink a BB at sea - except as previously mentioned Roma with the guided bomb.
Mission killing the BB is of course much easier - as happened with the Bismarck torpedo hit, one on Vittorio Veneto (IIRC) in the Med, and some single hits on BB's in the Pacific (I think Pennsylvania was badly damaged by a single torpedo hit in 1944 for example).
Guess my point is - BB's are not easy targets by any means for aircraft, they have to work at it!

[john964]

I was unclear in my post the single vs single was talking about the main ships, I would expect both to have reasonable escorts.
Let's look at WW2 - the Santa Cruz battle IIRC - South Dakota shot down a crap load of planes. A single BB with a reasonable escort 'could' fight a single carrier to a standstill. THe main issue of course is that from 100 miles away the Carrier is quite safe and only the BB is under fire. If the BB shoots enough planes down so the carrier has to retire though, it's a mission kill.
Now that being said - a single CV full of planes - fighters, dive bombers and torpedo craft - if they attack all at once is probably going to overwhelm most any BB's defenses, though the escorts will of course help. Once again though the main risk is to the BB with little to none to the carrier which has all the initiative. Not a good spot to be in for a BB to be sure!
To try to be clear as to what I'm saying exactly - It generally appears to take quite a few aircraft to defeat a BB with escorts at sea in fighting condition. Historically in most instances where BB's were sunk at sea - it was by very large numbers of planes. We don't see instances where only a few planes actually sink a BB at sea - except as previously mentioned Roma with the guided bomb.
Mission killing the BB is of course much easier - as happened with the Bismarck torpedo hit, one on Vittorio Veneto (IIRC) in the Med, and some single hits on BB's in the Pacific (I think Pennsylvania was badly damaged by a single torpedo hit in 1944 for example).
Guess my point is - BB's are not easy targets by any means for aircraft, they have to work at it!
Penn was hit while bombarding Wake Is in the summer of 45. Due to the age of the ship and nearness of the end of the war the ship was not adequitly repaired. IIRC the hit damaged her steering grear.

[Warship NWS]

To Kyle,

I think the part you need to define is how many aircraft are really needed per threat to score enough hits to mission kill or sink a ship. Obviously this varies a lot depending on the time frame, the AAA defenses, range to target (mechanical and navigational attrition), weather conditions, etc.. its not a simple "ok, they always needed buckets of planes per threat" until you define specifics. Also, what time frame? You talk of the South Dakota after it had VT fuzing and radar.. how many ships were that capable? What about the quality of the pilots? Are more torpedo bombers attacking or dive bombers? Dive bombers proved far harder to kill then torpedo bombers and bombs could cause underwater damage due to near misses but then again it depends on the size of the bomb the dive bomber carried.. thus the reason why the SBD and Stuka proved more lethal then the underarmed Val as they could carry 2x the payload.

As we have discussed after WW2 sinking ships became less and less of a requirement due to lack of available time to repair major damage to ships. Even in WW2 this often proved critical in many theaters due to lack of available dry docks for certain nationalities or time restrained time frames for major naval campaigns.

You are correct in your statement of "mission kill" vs sinking, but numbers of aircraft required to sink a battleship is just too variable a concept to simply state "it took lots of planes" IMHO. Just because lots of planes were used does not mean it would take lots of planes to kill the ship.. sometimes it was just a matter of compensating for other contingencies or battle dynamics.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

To Kyle,

I think the part you need to define is how many aircraft are really needed per threat to score enough hits to mission kill or sink a ship. Obviously this varies a lot depending on the time frame, the AAA defenses, range to target (mechanical and navigational attrition), weather conditions, etc.. its not a simple "ok, they always needed buckets of planes per threat" until you define specifics. Also, what time frame? You talk of the South Dakota after it had VT fuzing and radar.. how many ships were that capable? What about the quality of the pilots? Are more torpedo bombers attacking or dive bombers? Dive bombers proved far harder to kill then torpedo bombers and bombs could cause underwater damage due to near misses but then again it depends on the size of the bomb the dive bomber carried.. thus the reason why the SBD and Stuka proved more lethal then the underarmed Val as they could carry 2x the payload.

As we have discussed after WW2 sinking ships became less and less of a requirement due to lack of available time to repair major damage to ships. Even in WW2 this often proved critical in many theaters due to lack of available dry docks for certain nationalities or time restrained time frames for major naval campaigns.

You are correct in your statement of "mission kill" vs sinking, but numbers of aircraft required to sink a battleship is just too variable a concept to simply state "it took lots of planes" IMHO. Just because lots of planes were used does not mean it would take lots of planes to kill the ship.. sometimes it was just a matter of compensating for other contingencies or battle dynamics.

Thanks.

Historically it took lots of planes. Did SoDak have VT in late 1942? I thought they didn't come into play until later.
I agree in any case, there are plenty of factors involved with attacking any surface ship. I think a BB is the hardest to kill however due to armor and their ability to have lots of AA on their horizontal surfaces.
My main point though is the "anything you can do I can do better" comment earlier. There is little doubt that an escorted battleship with fighter cover would be quite dangerous even in 1945. Ditch the battleship though and have the carrier use the fighters as escorts for her own strikes and she's more capable of everything except perhaps shore bombardment.

[Campy]

Did SoDak have VT in late 1942?

I don't think so. What she did have is more 40 and 20mm in lieu of the two extra 5" turrets carried by her sisters. This probably helped in close in work.

Frank

[Smiffy]

More use of naval aviation certainly would have impacted submarine operations. In WW2 it was shown that just having a plane buzzing about was all that was neede to reduce the effectiveness of subs. The subs often spotted the plane first and then dove - and since WW1 and 2 subs are so slow under water - their effectiveness is hugely reduced unless they're already in a position to attack - and even then they have to worry about the airplane spotting them.
One thing as far as submarine development that strikes me as odd - why didn't the sub designers think of increasing battery power and hull streamlining sooner? They could have thought of it in 1914 but it appears to have taken until 1944 to be actually done.

The British R-Class submarines of 1918 were the first hunter-killers. A hull shape similar to the much later Los Angeles boats, with lots of battery, streamlined tower and no deck gun. 9 knots on the surface and 14 knots submerged. Too late to prove themselves in WW1, they were used for ASW training in the '20s. Fastest underwater speed in the world, until the Guppy conversions arrived.

Why the concept wasn't taken any further, I don't know.

[Warship NWS]

Historically it took lots of planes. Did SoDak have VT in late 1942? I thought they didn't come into play until later.
I agree in any case, there are plenty of factors involved with attacking any surface ship. I think a BB is the hardest to kill however due to armor and their ability to have lots of AA on their horizontal surfaces.
My main point though is the "anything you can do I can do better" comment earlier. There is little doubt that an escorted battleship with fighter cover would be quite dangerous even in 1945. Ditch the battleship though and have the carrier use the fighters as escorts for her own strikes and she's more capable of everything except perhaps shore bombardment.

Campy replied already.. however, by 10/42 she had 4 quad 40mm, 5 quad 28mm, 34 20mm, and 16 5in. It was not until 1943 that the rest of the 28mm were replaced with 40mm. She was credited with 26 enemy aircraft shot down.. but, remember, they were not all concentrated on her and North Carolina claimed 14 during the Eastern Solomons battle. VT fuzing I think did not start being used until mid-1943 in any significant numbers. I'm short on time right now so I will let all of you continue.

[Rick]

Did Yamato need 9+ hits to sink if they all hit on the same side?

Since thats what actually happened....uhh yeah

[Mike Malanaphy]

Campy replied already.. however, by 10/42 she had 4 quad 40mm, 5 quad 28mm, 34 20mm, and 16 5in. It was not until 1943 that the rest of the 28mm were replaced with 40mm. She was credited with 26 enemy aircraft shot down.. but, remember, they were not all concentrated on her and North Carolina claimed 14 during the Eastern Solomons battle. VT fuzing I think did not start being used until mid-1943 in any significant numbers. I'm short on time right now so I will let all of you continue.

Hi folks,

In a "Radar History of World War II", Louis Brown says the first shipments of VT fuzed 5" shells were shipped to Pearl Harbor in Mid November, 1942. First combat use was by USS Helena on 5 January, 1943 to shoot down a Japanese plane. The shooting acceptance trials were conducted aboard the USS Cleveland on 12 August, 1942 in Chesapeake Bay. Despite extreme secrecy, there were enough rumors of it's existence to appear in after action reports from teh Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

[Warship NWS]

Since thats what actually happened....uhh yeah

Really? It is interesting that Yamato was reported, from various accounts over the years, that she took anywhere from 9 to 17 torpedo hits. So what was the magic number? After the first 3 hits she was already listing, after the first wave of attacks she was down to 10 knots and was within minutes of sinking and if they had not sacrificed hundreds of their own crew to desperately flood the starboard engine rooms and boilers she would have sank within a few minutes. This only bought the Yamato ~30 more minutes however and I would say it was safe to assume that at that point she was never returning home as her damage control systems for counterflooding were also destroyed earlier by a bomb hit. So tell me Rick where is your verifiable evidence that it took precisely, and at least, nine hits to sink Yamato? Example, what if she was hit with 4-5 Torpex Mk13 armed torpedoes all up at the forward port quarter or rear quarter? (BTW, this is what they were aiming for in follow up attacks so as to avoid any chances of hitting the main belt armor and also to reduce her chances of maneuvering, which they succeeded in doing) Do you think she would have survived such hits considering that her TPS could only absorb ~700lbs of TNT and she was being hit by over 900lb+ of TNT equivelant Torpex? I sincerely doubt it.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I don't think so. What she did have is more 40 and 20mm in lieu of the two extra 5" turrets carried by her sisters. This probably helped in close in work.

Frank

Campy:

VT first started showing up in mid-1943. The first known kill was by the CL Helena. Not to nitpit, but Massachussetts shipped more quad 40mm mounts than SD (18 versus 17), but you are correct in that Indiana and Alabama carried less than SD (12 quads each). The 20mm mountings were continually expanded on all these ships, so its hard to get an accurate count at a given time. Also it's not really the lack of the two 5" twin turrets that gave her more light AA, but rather the realization that more AA was needed. Her sister ship Massachussets hadno problem carrying a large AA suite while still retaining the full ten 5" DP mounts. SD was intended to be a fleet flagship, and as such had a larger conning tower that needed reinforcement. Hence the landing of two 5" mounts. Oddly enough she never served as a flagship, although late in her career, Admiral Lee shifted his flag briefly from Washington to SD (much to the dismay of the Washington's crew who despised the SD. I won't mention their nickname for her, but use your imagination).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Campy replied already.. however, by 10/42 she had 4 quad 40mm, 5 quad 28mm, 34 20mm, and 16 5in. It was not until 1943 that the rest of the 28mm were replaced with 40mm. She was credited with 26 enemy aircraft shot down.. but, remember, they were not all concentrated on her and North Carolina claimed 14 during the Eastern Solomons battle. VT fuzing I think did not start being used until mid-1943 in any significant numbers. I'm short on time right now so I will let all of you continue.

Chris et al:

That total of 26 aircraft has been discredited by various sources. What happened was that 26 kills were claimed by the task force and somehow they were all attributed to the South Dakota. Perhaps it was a way of pumping up the value of the battleship as an AA platform? Or just a poorly worded report?

[Kyle Holgate]

Chris et al:

That total of 26 aircraft has been discredited by various sources. What happened was that 26 kills were claimed by the task force and somehow they were all attributed to the South Dakota. Perhaps it was a way of pumping up the value of the battleship as an AA platform? Or just a poorly worded report?

I have always strongly suspected the claim of South Dakota of 26 aircraft. Sure, they may have been shooting at that many and saw that many go down, but was anyone else shooting at the same aircraft? How do you know for sure it was one ship not another when hundreds of weapons are firing at the same time at multiple planes.
Regardless, the Japanese air groups were certainly badly hurt - though they did their job too.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I have always strongly suspected the claim of South Dakota of 26 aircraft. Sure, they may have been shooting at that many and saw that many go down, but was anyone else shooting at the same aircraft? How do you know for sure it was one ship not another when hundreds of weapons are firing at the same time at multiple planes.
Regardless, the Japanese air groups were certainly badly hurt - though they did their job too.


Hi guys,

I suppose it's possible. The other ships in the screeen were relatively weak AA platfrms and the Sodak's 40mm may have come as a rude sirprise to Japanese pilots acustomed to relavely weak USN fire power. Kyle's point is a good one, but I don't think the volume of fire was near as great later in war where most ships carried 40mm in profusion. Compared the the handfull of 20mm and .50cals still in use on escorts, theouth Dakota's performance must have been awe inspiriring and made fast battleships a desireable sailing companion

[Kyle Holgate]

Hi guys,

I suppose it's possible. The other ships in the screeen were relatively weak AA platfrms and the Sodak's 40mm may have come as a rude sirprise to Japanese pilots acustomed to relavely weak USN fire power. Kyle's point is a good one, but I don't think the volume of fire was near as great later in war where most ships carried 40mm in profusion. Compared the the handfull of 20mm and .50cals still in use on escorts, theouth Dakota's performance must have been awe inspiriring and made fast battleships a desireable sailing companion

I wonder how good the FC directors were for 5"/38 vs aircraft. Prior to the VT you either had to use barrage fire or have a really quick way of setting the fuzes. Even before VT I believe it was the Japanese that dubbed the '38' the 5 inch machine gun.

The Japanese really could have used a 40mm AA weapon. They captured some in 1941 and could have produced them. They wouldn't have been as useful against the tougher US planes as the USN's were against flimsier Japanese aircraft, but it they would have been a great improvement over 25mm AAA.

[djcyclone]

The British R-Class submarines of 1918 were the first hunter-killers. A hull shape similar to the much later Los Angeles boats, with lots of battery, streamlined tower and no deck gun. 9 knots on the surface and 14 knots submerged. Too late to prove themselves in WW1, they were used for ASW training in the '20s. Fastest underwater speed in the world, until the Guppy conversions arrived.

Why the concept wasn't taken any further, I don't know.



The R class was nothing but a coastal patrol boat. It was designed with the concept of hunting other submarines, by simply shooting a lot of torpedoes in the direction of the enemy sub, and hoping you hit (Like they did in the movie U-571.) It only had a crew of 20 and it was capable of 10 knots on the surface and 15 knots submerged.

I do not know why you said it looked like the later Los Angeles boats, because the only picture I have looks like a regular U-boat of that day. Anyway some of them did have 3 inch and 4 inch deck guns, but some went without them. The ship was nothing but an experiment, because torpedoes did not have the technology to find a sub on their own yet. This left success to complete chance, and experts do not like such things.

I think the R class was designed as nothing more than a sub designed to travel along the enterance to a harbor, and try to catch submarines that where acting as a blockade. In the end it was nothing but an experiment, that was later used for ASW training.

(All Info Above Taken From JANE'S COMBAT SHIPS OF THE WORLD WW I ISSUE)

[john964]

I wonder how good the FC directors were for 5"/38 vs aircraft. Prior to the VT you either had to use barrage fire or have a really quick way of setting the fuzes. Even before VT I believe it was the Japanese that dubbed the '38' the 5 inch machine gun.

The Japanese really could have used a 40mm AA weapon. They captured some in 1941 and could have produced them. They wouldn't have been as useful against the tougher US planes as the USN's were against flimsier Japanese aircraft, but it they would have been a great improvement over 25mm AAA.Kyle where did the japanese capture 40mm AA guns. I dont think they were captured from the US IIRC both Wake and Guam did not have them. The Phillippines may have had them but I doubt this because according to my information they had not been sent to Hawaii yet. And the Asiatic fleet and Far East Army was about dead last in the pecking order for new equipment.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Kyle where did the japanese capture 40mm AA guns. I dont think they were captured from the US IIRC both Wake and Guam did not have them. The Phillippines may have had them but I doubt this because according to my information they had not been sent to Hawaii yet. And the Asiatic fleet and Far East Army was about dead last in the pecking order for new equipment.

Hi guys,

If not from the British in Hong Kong or Singapore, I'm sure the Dutch had them in Java. The 40mm being in Dutch service prior to the war. The Japanese also captured the latest Brtish Army gun laying radar at Singapore along with a set of hand written notes by an operator.

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle where did the japanese capture 40mm AA guns. I dont think they were captured from the US IIRC both Wake and Guam did not have them. The Phillippines may have had them but I doubt this because according to my information they had not been sent to Hawaii yet. And the Asiatic fleet and Far East Army was about dead last in the pecking order for new equipment.

As Mike said, they got versions from the RN from Singapore and got actual 40mm Boffers from the Dutch - same weapon the US went to later in the war when it was found that the 50 cal and 20mm cannons didn't have enough hitting power.

Another instance - I know the Japanese were smart, but sometimes it seems like they were really short sighted and/or stupid. Note, I don't mean that as a racial comment, just a comment on their war operations.

[Smiffy]

The R class was nothing but a coastal patrol boat. It was designed with the concept of hunting other submarines, by simply shooting a lot of torpedoes in the direction of the enemy sub, and hoping you hit (Like they did in the movie U-571.) It only had a crew of 20 and it was capable of 10 knots on the surface and 15 knots submerged.

I do not know why you said it looked like the later Los Angeles boats, because the only picture I have looks like a regular U-boat of that day. Anyway some of them did have 3 inch and 4 inch deck guns, but some went without them. The ship was nothing but an experiment, because torpedoes did not have the technology to find a sub on their own yet. This left success to complete chance, and experts do not like such things.

I think the R class was designed as nothing more than a sub designed to travel along the enterance to a harbor, and try to catch submarines that where acting as a blockade. In the end it was nothing but an experiment, that was later used for ASW training.

(All Info Above Taken From JANE'S COMBAT SHIPS OF THE WORLD WW I ISSUE)

The hull was a circular cross section with a bulbous bow narrowing towards the stern, their hull form was designed with underwater speed in mind. Originally they were to carry a larger crew and more stores, making for longer range, but it was decided to increase the torpedo capacity at the expense of crew accommodation. I don't believe the idea was to attack underwater targets, the idea being to use their high underwater speed to get into a firing position. No submarine hit another submerged submarine until 1945, I doubt anyone was going to attempt it in 1918, but it may have been worth a try. I would have assumed that they would have been useful off the German U-boat bases, but, for some reason, they were all stationed in Southern Ireland.

However, the point of the post was that someone had thought about higher underwater speeds before WW2.

[Kyle Holgate]

The hull was a circular cross section with a bulbous bow narrowing towards the stern, their hull form was designed with underwater speed in mind. Originally they were to carry a larger crew and more stores, making for longer range, but it was decided to increase the torpedo capacity at the expense of crew accommodation. I don't believe the idea was to attack underwater targets, the idea being to use their high underwater speed to get into a firing position. No submarine hit another submerged submarine until 1945, I doubt anyone was going to attempt it in 1918, but it may have been worth a try. I would have assumed that they would have been useful off the German U-boat bases, but, for some reason, they were all stationed in Southern Ireland.

However, the point of the post was that someone had thought about higher underwater speeds before WW2.

But didn't DO it on a wide scale. The technology was there long before 1944 - that's the point I was trying to make. Seems pretty obvious now, but then again so do a lot of things that weren't known back then! :)

[Smiffy]

But didn't DO it on a wide scale. The technology was there long before 1944 - that's the point I was trying to make. Seems pretty obvious now, but then again so do a lot of things that weren't known back then! :)

Yes, true. Obviously they were problems with it at the time as the concept was abandoned, maybe it was before its time. I expect battery technology wasn't up to it until the 1940s. Of course the next attempt at high underwater speeds involved closed-cycle engines and not batteries.

[djcyclone]

The hull was a circular cross section with a bulbous bow narrowing towards the stern, their hull form was designed with underwater speed in mind. Originally they were to carry a larger crew and more stores, making for longer range, but it was decided to increase the torpedo capacity at the expense of crew accommodation. I don't believe the idea was to attack underwater targets, the idea being to use their high underwater speed to get into a firing position. No submarine hit another submerged submarine until 1945, I doubt anyone was going to attempt it in 1918, but it may have been worth a try. I would have assumed that they would have been useful off the German U-boat bases, but, for some reason, they were all stationed in Southern Ireland.

However, the point of the post was that someone had thought about higher underwater speeds before WW2.



The book specificaly says they where designed as a submarine destroyer of submarines. They supposedly had advanced hydrophone's for finding enemy submarines. They had 4 forward tubes, and the idea was to locate a submarine an fire a complete salvo in hope of accidently hitting the submarine.

They are specifically characterized as coastal boats, and in truth the where the first attack submarines. The size of the boat, along with the large rudder, and other features made them extremly manuverable. They where designed to do circles around other submarines. They could dive faster than any other submarine due to larger than normal dive planes, and extra equipment disigned to flood ballast tanks quicker.

The book specifically says that they where designed to chase hostile submarines from harbor, and the hydrophone equipment allowed them to hunt hostile submarines. Someone was way ahead of the times, but that was the idea. As I said earlier, the idea of success was based on complete chance, since torpedoes did not have the ability to track other submarines yet. The plan was to get a fix on the submarine without them knowing, then launch a salvo of 4 torpedoes. Hopefully you hit before they know what's going on and try to move.

That is why they where not used very much. The experts of the day did not like putting money into chance, and so they where just used as training boats. According to the book, only 12 where built before the plan was canceled. My guess is they where just an experiment, and only 12 where built before the big wigs learned about what was going on, and pulled the plug.

[Smiffy]

The book specificaly says they where designed as a submarine destroyer of submarines. They supposedly had advanced hydrophone's for finding enemy submarines. They had 4 forward tubes, and the idea was to locate a submarine an fire a complete salvo in hope of accidently hitting the submarine.

They are specifically characterized as coastal boats, and in truth the where the first attack submarines. The size of the boat, along with the large rudder, and other features made them extremly manuverable. They where designed to do circles around other submarines. They could dive faster than any other submarine due to larger than normal dive planes, and extra equipment disigned to flood ballast tanks quicker.

The book specifically says that they where designed to chase hostile submarines from harbor, and the hydrophone equipment allowed them to hunt hostile submarines. Someone was way ahead of the times, but that was the idea. As I said earlier, the idea of success was based on complete chance, since torpedoes did not have the ability to track other submarines yet. The plan was to get a fix on the submarine without them knowing, then launch a salvo of 4 torpedoes. Hopefully you hit before they know what's going on and try to move.

That is why they where not used very much. The experts of the day did not like putting money into chance, and so they where just used as training boats. According to the book, only 12 where built before the plan was canceled. My guess is they where just an experiment, and only 12 where built before the big wigs learned about what was going on, and pulled the plug.

My main source on this is "Le Fleming's Warships of WW1", which I have, but I also recall reading about them in another book, maybe one of Bill Gunson's. Anyway Le Fleming says 6 tubes and 12 reloads. The original order was for 14 boats but only 12 were built, but even 12 is a lot for an experiment. I think they were cancelled because the war was ending.

I fully take your point about them being coastal vessels, but I do not think that they were built for harbour defence. Back in 1914, and before, that had been seen as a major role for the submarine, but by 1917/18 things had moved on. I may be wrong, but I don't think any major British harbour was penetrated by a submarine in WW1. By 1917/18, aircraft were making coastal operations very difficult for U-boats. I am somewhat mystified by the fact that the "R" boats were stationed in Southern Ireland, it may have been a shipping choke point, but it was heavily patrolled by ships and aircraft and no longer an attractive station for a U-boat. I would have thought that, if they were to be used off the coast, it would have been the enemy coast.

As I said before, I am highly doubtful that they were intended to attack submerged targets. I can find no reference to any trials of this. Although modern submarines have demonstrated such a capability for many years now, there has only ever been one underwater to underwater kill ever made and that was in February 1945.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I wonder how good the FC directors were for 5"/38 vs aircraft. Prior to the VT you either had to use barrage fire or have a really quick way of setting the fuzes. Even before VT I believe it was the Japanese that dubbed the '38' the 5 inch machine gun.

The Japanese really could have used a 40mm AA weapon. They captured some in 1941 and could have produced them. They wouldn't have been as useful against the tougher US planes as the USN's were against flimsier Japanese aircraft, but it they would have been a great improvement over 25mm AAA.

Hi Guys,

For the battle TF 16 was composed of the following ships:

CV Enterprise with 8-5", 22-40mm, and 38, 20mm

BB South Dakota with 16-5", 16-40mm, 20-1.1", 35-20mm, and 16 .50 cals.

CA Portland with 8-5", 16-1.1", and a smattering of 20mm

CLAA San Juan with 16-5", 12-1.1", and 8 20mm

DD Mahan with 5-5", 4 .50 cals

DD Cushing with 5-5", 4 .50 cals

DD Preston with 5-5", 4 .50 cals

DD Smith with 5-5", 4 .50 cals

DD Maury with 4-5", 4-1.1", 4 .50 cals

DD Conyngham with 5-5", 4 .50 cals

DD Shaw with 5-5", 4. 50 cals

The DD's might have had a couple of scrounged 20mm. The 11 40mm mounts had the advantage of not only being longer ranged and harder hitting, but benefitted from an individual director with a gyro sight. South Dakota and Enterprise had the majority of the medium AA fire power which was just as well as the ships maneuvered independently. Morison says that South Dakota originally claimed 32 planes shot down, but was officially credited with 26.

There is an extract form North Carolina's AA report in Reilly's "Operational Experience of Fasr battleships; World War II, Korea, Vietnam". Though not equipped with 40 mm and only carried 16 1-1", she had 40-20mm and 26 .50 cal and made quite an impression. The only negative note was that even at 27 klnots, she ended up 4,000 yards behind Enterprise and not able to cover her with gunfire.

[djcyclone]

My main source on this is "Le Fleming's Warships of WW1", which I have, but I also recall reading about them in another book, maybe one of Bill Gunson's. Anyway Le Fleming says 6 tubes and 12 reloads. The original order was for 14 boats but only 12 were built, but even 12 is a lot for an experiment. I think they were cancelled because the war was ending.

I fully take your point about them being coastal vessels, but I do not think that they were built for harbour defence. Back in 1914, and before, that had been seen as a major role for the submarine, but by 1917/18 things had moved on. I may be wrong, but I don't think any major British harbour was penetrated by a submarine in WW1. By 1917/18, aircraft were making coastal operations very difficult for U-boats. I am somewhat mystified by the fact that the "R" boats were stationed in Southern Ireland, it may have been a shipping choke point, but it was heavily patrolled by ships and aircraft and no longer an attractive station for a U-boat. I would have thought that, if they were to be used off the coast, it would have been the enemy coast.

As I said before, I am highly doubtful that they were intended to attack submerged targets. I can find no reference to any trials of this. Although modern submarines have demonstrated such a capability for many years now, there has only ever been one underwater to underwater kill ever made and that was in February 1945.



I do not believe that any submarines ever entered British ports before the Scapa Flow incident in WW II, however the "R" type boats where designed to protect the harbor. I think they stayed in Ireland simply because the technology did not exsist yet to make them capable of what they had been built for.

Whoever designed them was most definitely a visionary. Unfortanetely, torpedoes where not capable of performing the requirments of this design. The chance of hitting a submerged target simply was not good enough to make these ships anything other than training boats. As to why no trials on this idea where ever done, the only reason I can think of, is again because of torpedoes.

They would have to hunt a friendly submarine with their advanced hydrophone, and that is easy, but then you have to actually shoot torpedoes at the target and see if the idea works. Even if the torpedoes are duds, they will still damage the target when they hit. We play war games today with smart dud torpedoes. The torpedoes turn away and come to a stop to signify a hit. Back then torpedoes where not smart, they simply go in the direction that you told them to go. The idea of poking holes in a friendly submarine is simply not a good idea, especially when the submarine is already submerged. Try finding volunteers for that.

These boats where simply built before their time. They had the idea, but the technology was not their. I would say that is why no other boats where built to travel fast under water, until the type 21 U-boat. Good thing it was the Germans who designed the wake homing torpedoes. Could you imagine an "R" type submarine with wake homing torpedoes. This would eliminate the odds, because now all you have to do is get behind the sub and fire. The sub will most likely hear the torpedo and then attemp to run sealing their own fate. If this scenario had taken place, their would have been a lot more sub to sub kills in WW II.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi guys,

I suppose it's possible. The other ships in the screeen were relatively weak AA platfrms and the Sodak's 40mm may have come as a rude sirprise to Japanese pilots acustomed to relavely weak USN fire power. Kyle's point is a good one, but I don't think the volume of fire was near as great later in war where most ships carried 40mm in profusion. Compared the the handfull of 20mm and .50cals still in use on escorts, theouth Dakota's performance must have been awe inspiriring and made fast battleships a desireable sailing companion

Mike:

I agree. Midway was the first battle where the 40mm was beginning to appear in numbers on US ships. Many older cruisers and DDs still carried the 1.1" gun until 1943. Generally the policy was if a ship went in for its scheduled refit, it got updated radar and usually swapped out the 1.1" for some version of th 40mm (twin, quad or even single mounts). And as the war went on, additional light AA were added to all ships.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I wonder how good the FC directors were for 5"/38 vs aircraft. Prior to the VT you either had to use barrage fire or have a really quick way of setting the fuzes. Even before VT I believe it was the Japanese that dubbed the '38' the 5 inch machine gun.

The Japanese really could have used a 40mm AA weapon. They captured some in 1941 and could have produced them. They wouldn't have been as useful against the tougher US planes as the USN's were against flimsier Japanese aircraft, but it they would have been a great improvement over 25mm AAA.

Kyle:

Remember that the 5" guns were controlled by the MK 37 FC director, considered one of the single best of the war, especially when coupled with radar which was increasingly common was 1942 went on.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

I agree. Midway was the first battle where the 40mm was beginning to appear in numbers on US ships. Many older cruisers and DDs still carried the 1.1" gun until 1943. Generally the policy was if a ship went in for its scheduled refit, it got updated radar and usually swapped out the 1.1" for some version of th 40mm (twin, quad or even single mounts). And as the war went on, additional light AA were added to all ships.

Hi Ed,

In addition to a dearth of weapons intitally, many of the prewar cruisers and destroyers had insufficient stability to absorb the tremendous top weight of new guns, ammo, and the crews to man them. The Atlanta's had to surrender their torpedo tubes and most of the pre war destroyers had to surrender a 5" mount to carry just a pair io twin 40mms.

Since most escorts lacked a medium range AA gun to provide cover for ships other than themselves, individual maneuvering makes sense in hthese earlybattles especially as teh carrier itself woulfd be the most powerfully armed and stable platform.

Hodges/Friedman's "Destroyer Weapons" particularly covers the transformation of US AA destroyer armaments through the war from initial design, the 1941 King Board recommendations, to the ultimate Kamikaze fits at the end of the war.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

In addition to a dearth of weapons intitally, many of the prewar cruisers and destroyers had insufficient stability to absorb the tremendous top weight of new guns, ammo, and the crews to man them. The Atlanta's had to surrender their torpedo tubes and most of the pre war destroyers had to surrender a 5" mount to carry just a pair io twin 40mms.

Since most escorts lacked a medium range AA gun to provide cover for ships other than themselves, individual maneuvering makes sense in hthese earlybattles especially as teh carrier itself woulfd be the most powerfully armed and stable platform.

Hodges/Friedman's "Destroyer Weapons" particularly covers the transformation of US AA destroyer armaments through the war from initial design, the 1941 King Board recommendations, to the ultimate Kamikaze fits at the end of the war.

Mike:

That's a very good point about stability, especially for the smaller ships. You'll note that the older treaty cruisers never had the 5"/38 refitted to replace their 5"/25s. I'm not sure they could have managed it. I think the Fletcher class DDs were the first that could accept the 40mm guns without losing a 5" gun. Topheaviness was a major issue for the Cleveland class CLs as additional light AA was added. I'm not sure if this was a problem with the Baltimore class CAs, they did have their design modified with extra beam based on the experiences of the Wichita class CA (all one of them LOL). Until the advent of the kamikaze, the 5" gun and 40mm guns were about equal in downing aircraft.

[Kyle Holgate]

Mike:

That's a very good point about stability, especially for the smaller ships. You'll note that the older treaty cruisers never had the 5"/38 refitted to replace their 5"/25s. I'm not sure they could have managed it. I think the Fletcher class DDs were the first that could accept the 40mm guns without losing a 5" gun. Topheaviness was a major issue for the Cleveland class CLs as additional light AA was added. I'm not sure if this was a problem with the Baltimore class CAs, they did have their design modified with extra beam based on the experiences of the Wichita class CA (all one of them LOL). Until the advent of the kamikaze, the 5" gun and 40mm guns were about equal in downing aircraft.

5 inch about equal to 40mm: is that 5" + VT or 5" without VT? I would think with, but dunno which is why I am asking! :D

[Ed Rotondaro]

5 inch about equal to 40mm: is that 5" + VT or 5" without VT? I would think with, but dunno which is why I am asking! :D

Kyle:

5" without VT. Once CT was available, the 5" became the primary killer and the only thing that could reliable break up a kamikaze.

[john964]

Mike:

That's a very good point about stability, especially for the smaller ships. You'll note that the older treaty cruisers never had the 5"/38 refitted to replace their 5"/25s. I'm not sure they could have managed it. I think the Fletcher class DDs were the first that could accept the 40mm guns without losing a 5" gun. Topheaviness was a major issue for the Cleveland class CLs as additional light AA was added. I'm not sure if this was a problem with the Baltimore class CAs, they did have their design modified with extra beam based on the experiences of the Wichita class CA (all one of them LOL). Until the advent of the kamikaze, the 5" gun and 40mm guns were about equal in downing aircraft.
As topheaviness became a factor with the addition of more and more AA guns most of the Treaty cruisers landed a catapult. The only classes that did not do this were the Brooklyn's and Baltimore

[Mike Malanaphy]

My main source on this is "Le Fleming's Warships of WW1", which I have, but I also recall reading about them in another book, maybe one of Bill Gunson's. Anyway Le Fleming says 6 tubes and 12 reloads. The original order was for 14 boats but only 12 were built, but even 12 is a lot for an experiment. I think they were cancelled because the war was ending.

I fully take your point about them being coastal vessels, but I do not think that they were built for harbour defence. Back in 1914, and before, that had been seen as a major role for the submarine, but by 1917/18 things had moved on. I may be wrong, but I don't think any major British harbour was penetrated by a submarine in WW1. By 1917/18, aircraft were making coastal operations very difficult for U-boats. I am somewhat mystified by the fact that the "R" boats were stationed in Southern Ireland, it may have been a shipping choke point, but it was heavily patrolled by ships and aircraft and no longer an attractive station for a U-boat. I would have thought that, if they were to be used off the coast, it would have been the enemy coast.

As I said before, I am highly doubtful that they were intended to attack submerged targets. I can find no reference to any trials of this. Although modern submarines have demonstrated such a capability for many years now, there has only ever been one underwater to underwater kill ever made and that was in February 1945.

Hi Guys,

I finally found some additoinal info on these submarines and this is from D.K. Brown's "The Grand Fleet".

The Director of Naval Construction submitted a design for a small submarine with high underwater speed in March, 1917. The 12 boats were ordered in October, 1917. THey had a designed speed of 9.5 knots on the surface and 15 submerged. The picture shows a bulbous bow whith a reduced streamlined hull starting just before the conning tower.

They could maintain the 15 knots for an hour before draining the battery and had an operation speed undewater of 12.5 knots for 1.8 hours. Brown mnetions control problems as at high speed they could pass their 250 foot safe depth in 20 seconds at 30 degree down angle. The large bow had two ballast tanks to help control slamming on the surface and he says that trim could change quickly under water. Five hydrophones were carried on teh bow, but the two mid body were never installed. Six 18" bow tubes, plus 5 reloads carried at the "expense of considerable crew comfort". The use of tube loaded torpedoes indicates a small number of attacks capacity thereby operating close to home.

He mentions the one attack carried out by the R Class failed, but there are no details of it or how the submarine was doctrinally used. Trials showed the loss of one knot of underwater speed if the perscope was up. Possibly indicating attacks on submarines on the surface, detected via hydrophone, and then visually acquired.

Though new, the subs were scrapped shortly after the war. Brown opines they had control problems underwater ( a combination of high speed and large control surfaces), but were more like seen as redundant with the appearance of ASDIC.

[old_pop2000]

Some information about the blockade of WWI by the British. Legally, it was not a blockade, and I know, I am splitting hairs. A legal blockade was not instituted with notification of said blockade to neutrals until the early portion of 1915 when the British and French did so against German East Africa and Austria-Hungary instituted one against Montenegro. In fact, Germany's blockade was in name only, as they never really submitted lists of contraband material and rules to neutrals.


The blockade of Germany by France and England was commenced, legally, seven months after the initiation of hostilities. This was announced by England on March 1, 1915. This imposition actually initiated the German blockade by submarine some time later.

As to the German Navy, it had two areas of sea frontier to guard, which required naval vessels- the North Sea and the Baltic. The latter against the Russian Fleet. Although the Russian fleet was not thought to pose much of a problem, it had to be masked, to prevent landings on the north coast to outflank Germany. This problem for the Germans did cause a loss of ships to that task. German planning had always assumed she would face no sizeable fleet at the beginning of the war, but British planning and execution of their revised naval strategy to recall and congregate their fleet at Scapa Flow and Southern England coupled with the Japanese fleet in the Far East, and the neutrality of Italy caused a plethora of unsolvable problems for the German HSF.

As to the execution of the blockade, it's main tenor was always blockade from a distance to control sea communications. In fact, there never was a close blockade from the south, as German ships could put to sea at any time, except for mines. This was the military blockade of Germany.

There was also a commercial blockade of Germany, at the same time. The two should not be confused. One of the issues was that a complete and effective commerce blockade would have reduced or eliminated neutral trading with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Holland. Interestingly, cotton was not initially placed on the contraband list, which is interesting. It was finally placed on the list on August 22,1915.

The fleet that can be considered the commercial blockade fleet and reserve for the Grand Fleet was the Reserve Squadron of 10 of the oldest battleships accompanied by two big cruisers and two smaller ones. The second fleet was the channel fleet which interfaced with the Mediterranean fleet. It consisted of eight battleships and four cruisers. None of the major units were fully manned at the beginning of the war.

The issue of a military and commercial blockade is a complicated but important one. The latter was not effective without the former. That was not in place immediately and British merchant men actually paid the price.

I will continue my research on the specific details of the blockade as to ship types and procedures.

[Spook046]

SD was intended to be a fleet flagship, and as such had a larger conning tower that needed reinforcement. Hence the landing of two 5" mounts. Oddly enough she never served as a flagship, although late in her career, Admiral Lee shifted his flag briefly from Washington to SD (much to the dismay of the Washington's crew who despised the SD. I won't mention their nickname for her, but use your imagination).

I vaguely recall that South Dakota was used by Adm Nimitz for the trip to Tokyo for the final surrender ceremony in Sept 45. That's not quite the same as being a flag command ship during a combat tour, but seems to make sense to use a ship with "VIP" accomodations for a high-ranking officer and staff.

And I assume, Ed, that you are referring from Musicant's "Battleship at War" regarding the nickname bestowed by Washington's crew for the SD. The basis of that acrimony was over the 14-15 November '42 naval battle where each crew felt the other BB left their own ship in a lurch during the fighting. What compounded the feud, however, was that in 1943, SD's Captain Gatch basically claimed while stateside that his ship was the "Battleship X" (media label) which took on and sank the Kirishima while facing down the rest of the IJN force, contrary to the actual course of events. Needless to say, that didn't sit well with the crew of "Rusty W".

And the nickname? "Sh-tty Dick". Yep, that was a vulgar tag to give to another ship, though I believe in reality it was the tip of the iceberg regarding nasty nicknames which certain crews gave to other ships within all navies through the whole of WWII.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I vaguely recall that South Dakota was used by Adm Nimitz for the trip to Tokyo for the final surrender ceremony in Sept 45. That's not quite the same as being a flag command ship during a combat tour, but seems to make sense to use a ship with "VIP" accomodations for a high-ranking officer and staff.

And I assume, Ed, that you are referring from Musicant's "Battleship at War" regarding the nickname bestowed by Washington's crew for the SD. The basis of that acrimony was over the 14-15 November '42 naval battle where each crew felt the other BB left their own ship in a lurch during the fighting. What compounded the feud, however, was that in 1943, SD's Captain Gatch basically claimed while stateside that his ship was the "Battleship X" (media label) which took on and sank the Kirishima while facing down the rest of the IJN force, contrary to the actual course of events. Needless to say, that didn't sit well with the crew of "Rusty W".

And the nickname? "Sh-tty Dick". Yep, that was a vulgar tag to give to another ship, though I believe in reality it was the tip of the iceberg regarding nasty nicknames which certain crews gave to other ships within all navies through the whole of WWII.

Hi Ed:

Bingo, you are obviously well read on this. I really enjoyed the book for its insights into the day to day life on board a battleship and how the crew became tight. Interesting to note how many of her officers attained flag rank. Rusty W was a good training ground for naval officers.

[Kyle Holgate]

And the nickname? "Sh-tty Dick". Yep, that was a vulgar tag to give to another ship, though I believe in reality it was the tip of the iceberg regarding nasty nicknames which certain crews gave to other ships within all navies through the whole of WWII.

Heh heh, it didn't stop with the end of WW2 either. Not a vulgar name but the sailor on USS Nimitz call the name an accronym for: Never Imagined Myself In This Zoo.
That's actually a nice one (though not a nickname, I did find it amusing) - I've heard far worse... Forrestall (forrestfire) being a fairly mild one that comes to mind. Anyway I'm hijcacking the threat so I'll quit now!

[Saffron]

One of my favorites is USS Canopus (AS-34) being USS Can-Of-P*ss. ;)

[asnrobert]

One of my favorites is USS Canopus (AS-34) being USS Can-Of-P*ss. ;)

I heard that one when I did a couple patrols on the Casimir Pulaski- we refitted from her.

[Ed Rotondaro]

One of my favorites is USS Canopus (AS-34) being USS Can-Of-P*ss. ;)


Saffy:

You ever wonder how picks out the names? Like what did this person do to get assigned that duty? I wonder if it is easier these days since the navy no longer uses the naming systems that it did during WWII (except for DDs and FFGs, they still get named after famous sailors or marines).

[john964]

Saffy:

You ever wonder how picks out the names? Like what did this person do to get assigned that duty? I wonder if it is easier these days since the navy no longer uses the naming systems that it did during WWII (except for DDs and FFGs, they still get named after famous sailors or marines).The only provision is that the Sailor or Marine be of Flag rank or have been decorated with a Silver Star or higher. Most names now come from "recomondations" in Congress. Try guessing this ship The Litter Box?

[Ed Rotondaro]

The only provision is that the Sailor or Marine be of Flag rank or have been decorated with a Silver Star or higher. Most names now come from "recomondations" in Congress. Try guessing this ship The Litter Box?

John:

I'm guessing the ship's real name must have something to do with felines? Is it a currently serving ship?

[john964]

John:

I'm guessing the ship's real name must have something to do with felines? Is it a currently serving ship?
Not sure she may be or about to be DECOMed.

[Smiffy]

Saffy:

You ever wonder how picks out the names? Like what did this person do to get assigned that duty? I wonder if it is easier these days since the navy no longer uses the naming systems that it did during WWII (except for DDs and FFGs, they still get named after famous sailors or marines).


The only provision is that the Sailor or Marine be of Flag rank or have been decorated with a Silver Star or higher. Most names now come from "recomondations" in Congress. Try guessing this ship The Litter Box?

So did Winston Churchill hold honorary rank in the USN or did he get one named after himself thanks to Congress?

Back in the 1950s someone screwed up over the naming of the Blackwood Class frigates for the RN. They were named after famous frigate captains of the Napoleonic Wars, but whoever picked the names didn't realise that Pellew and Exmouth were both named after the same man. Captain Sir Edward Pellew was became Captain Lord Exmouth when he was raised to the peerage. So one guy had two ships named after him in commission at the same time.

[djcyclone]

The ship I was stationed on is the U.S.S. McFaul. Senior Chief McFaul was a Navy Seal and was on Seal Team Four. When the Panama incident happened he was sent in with his team. When the battle got out of hand, they attempted to retreat, but on the way out one of his team mates was shot and fell down. Chief McFaul turned around and ran to retrieve him. On the way to him he was shot multiple times by machine gun fire. With his last breath he layed his body down over his teamate and used himself as a shield. His teamate did survive, but McFaul obviously did not.

My point is, you have to do quite a bit in order to get a ship named after you. The Frigate Underwood is named after the famouse Submarine Captain who sunk that Japanese Super Carrier on its way out of port (I forget the name of the ship). He also had more kills than any other Submarine Captain in the Pacific. Again, no small deeds exepted.

[JMS]

The ship I was stationed on is the U.S.S. McFaul. Senior Chief McFaul was a Navy Seal and was on Seal Team Four. When the Panama incident happened he was sent in with his team. When the battle got out of hand, they attempted to retreat, but on the way out one of his team mates was shot and fell down. Chief McFaul turned around and ran to retrieve him. On the way to him he was shot multiple times by machine gun fire. With his last breath he layed his body down over his teamate and used himself as a shield. His teamate did survive, but McFaul obviously did not.

My point is, you have to do quite a bit in order to get a ship named after you. The Frigate Underwood is named after the famouse Submarine Captain who sunk that Japanese Super Carrier on its way out of port (I forget the name of the ship). He also had more kills than any other Submarine Captain in the Pacific. Again, no small deeds exepted.

The supercarrier was Shinano and the sub commander was Joe Enright :p so obviously Underwood's namesake was not that one. It was this one:

Captain Gordon Waite Underwood was born in New York on 3 June 1910, and at an early age moved with his family to Portland, Oregon from where he was appointed to the US Naval Academy in the class of 1932. At the Naval Academy he proved to be an outstanding student and superb athlete. He earned letters and starred in football and track. He was awarded the coveted "Academy Sword" for athletic excellence.

Following his graduation from the Academy, Captain Underwood served in USS OKLAHOMA. This tour was followed by training at the US Submarine School in New London, Connecticut. After his graduation he served in the Submarine School S-21, USS MISSISSIPPI, and USS VEGA. In 1941, he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology and earned a Masters Degree in Marine Engineering. Upon his return to sea duty he was assigned to the Staff of Commander Submarine Squadron TEN as Squadron Engineer supporting submarines on war patrol. In January 1944, he was assigned as Commanding Officer of USS SPADEFISH (SS-411). On this ship during three war patrols he was credited with destruction of seventy-six thousand tons of enemy shipping including one aircraft carrier, the HIJMS SHINYO. For each of his war patrols he was awarded a Navy Cross and in recognition of the great successes of the first two patrols SPADEFISH was awarded the President Unit Citation. His record of success in his war patrols remains one of the most notable in the history of the US Navy Submarine Service.

Captain Underwood, following his retirement from the Navy in 1962 after 30 years service with distinction, became associated with Spelin Inc., Mountain View California, in which he was Vice President. He was also Vice President of Filter-Aire Company of Hollister, California until his retirement. He died January 15, 1978 at the age of 67.

The top ace of the Pacific was Dick O'Kane who has DDG-77 named after him,

http://www.o-kane.navy.mil/default.aspx

Rear Admiral Richard H. O'Kane
Richard H. O'Kane was born on February 2, 1911. He attended Phillips Academy, Andover, and the University of New Hampshire before entering the United States Naval Academy in 1930. Upon graduation in 1934, O'Kane was commissioned as an Ensign and served on USS CHESTER and USS PRUITT before reporting for instruction in submarines at the Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, in January 1938. After completing his training, O'Kane served on the submarine USS ARGONAUT until 1942, when he reported for duty as Executive Officer of USS WAHOO. For outstanding service on WAHOO, O'Kane was awarded the Silver Star Medal with two Gold Stars, and a Letter of Commendation from the Secretary of the Navy.

In August 1943, O'Kane returned to the Mare Island Navy Yard where he assumed command of USS TANG upon her commissioning on October 15, 1943. After intensive training exercises in the San Diego area, TANG left for the Pacific, arriving in Pearl Harbor on January 8, 1944. Under Commander O'Kane, TANG went on five war patrols, sinking a total of 31 ships, totaling more than 227,000 tons, and damaging two other ships, a record unsurpassed by any American submarine.

During its fifth and final war patrol, which began on September 24 and ended on October 25, 1944, TANG sank 13 enemy ships. In what was to be her final battle, the TANG encountered a heavily escorted enemy convoy. Engaged in a fierce surface battle, Commander O'Kane directed TANG to fire her last two torpedoes at a crippled transport ship. The first torpedo went straight and true and struck its target. The second torpedo was faulty and turned around almost immediately, heading directly for TANG. Ordering emergency speed, TANG tried to pull out of its path, but it struck the submarine in the stern, causing a violent explosion. Of the entire crew, only nine were able to escape the sinking submarine. They swam through the night until they were picked up by a Japanese destroyer escort eight hours later.

Commander O'Kane and the others from TANG were imprisoned on Formosa. He was later transferred to a secret prison camp near Tokyo where he was not registered and was therefore listed as "missing in action" until the camp's liberation two weeks after V-J Day. During his imprisonment, he and the other prisoners survived on a diet of less than 300 calories a day, eating mostly rice or barley, without fruit, vegetables or protein. Upon his release, O'Kane was suffering from scurvy and beriberi. He was evacuated by air to Pearl Harbor and, after a short hospitalization there, was transferred to the Naval Hospital in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

After his recovery, O'Kane's commands included USS PELIAS and USS SPERRY, as well as the Submarine School in New London, Connecticut, Submarine Division THIRTY-TWO and Submarine Squadron SEVEN. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his exemplary service on TANG on March 27, 1947. Rear Admiral O'Kanes other military decoration include the Navy Cross with two Gold Stars, the Legion of Merit with Combat "V", the Purple Heart and the Prisoner of War Medal. He also wrote two books based on his experiences in World War II, Clear the Bridge and WAHOO.

Rear Admiral O'Kane passed away in February 1994.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The ship I was stationed on is the U.S.S. McFaul. Senior Chief McFaul was a Navy Seal and was on Seal Team Four. When the Panama incident happened he was sent in with his team. When the battle got out of hand, they attempted to retreat, but on the way out one of his team mates was shot and fell down. Chief McFaul turned around and ran to retrieve him. On the way to him he was shot multiple times by machine gun fire. With his last breath he layed his body down over his teamate and used himself as a shield. His teamate did survive, but McFaul obviously did not.

My point is, you have to do quite a bit in order to get a ship named after you. The Frigate Underwood is named after the famouse Submarine Captain who sunk that Japanese Super Carrier on its way out of port (I forget the name of the ship). He also had more kills than any other Submarine Captain in the Pacific. Again, no small deeds exepted.

DJ:

Shinano, the sister ship to the Yamato and Musashi which was converted to a carrier.

[john964]

The supercarrier was Shinano and the sub commander was Joe Enright :p so obviously Underwood's namesake was not that one. It was this one:

Captain Gordon Waite Underwood was born in New York on 3 June 1910, and at an early age moved with his family to Portland, Oregon from where he was appointed to the US Naval Academy in the class of 1932. At the Naval Academy he proved to be an outstanding student and superb athlete. He earned letters and starred in football and track. He was awarded the coveted "Academy Sword" for athletic excellence.

Following his graduation from the Academy, Captain Underwood served in USS OKLAHOMA. This tour was followed by training at the US Submarine School in New London, Connecticut. After his graduation he served in the Submarine School S-21, USS MISSISSIPPI, and USS VEGA. In 1941, he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology and earned a Masters Degree in Marine Engineering. Upon his return to sea duty he was assigned to the Staff of Commander Submarine Squadron TEN as Squadron Engineer supporting submarines on war patrol. In January 1944, he was assigned as Commanding Officer of USS SPADEFISH (SS-411). On this ship during three war patrols he was credited with destruction of seventy-six thousand tons of enemy shipping including one aircraft carrier, the HIJMS SHINYO. For each of his war patrols he was awarded a Navy Cross and in recognition of the great successes of the first two patrols SPADEFISH was awarded the President Unit Citation. His record of success in his war patrols remains one of the most notable in the history of the US Navy Submarine Service.

Captain Underwood, following his retirement from the Navy in 1962 after 30 years service with distinction, became associated with Spelin Inc., Mountain View California, in which he was Vice President. He was also Vice President of Filter-Aire Company of Hollister, California until his retirement. He died January 15, 1978 at the age of 67.

The top ace of the Pacific was Dick O'Kane who has DDG-77 named after him,

http://www.o-kane.navy.mil/default.aspx

Rear Admiral Richard H. O'Kane
Richard H. O'Kane was born on February 2, 1911. He attended Phillips Academy, Andover, and the University of New Hampshire before entering the United States Naval Academy in 1930. Upon graduation in 1934, O'Kane was commissioned as an Ensign and served on USS CHESTER and USS PRUITT before reporting for instruction in submarines at the Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, in January 1938. After completing his training, O'Kane served on the submarine USS ARGONAUT until 1942, when he reported for duty as Executive Officer of USS WAHOO. For outstanding service on WAHOO, O'Kane was awarded the Silver Star Medal with two Gold Stars, and a Letter of Commendation from the Secretary of the Navy.

In August 1943, O'Kane returned to the Mare Island Navy Yard where he assumed command of USS TANG upon her commissioning on October 15, 1943. After intensive training exercises in the San Diego area, TANG left for the Pacific, arriving in Pearl Harbor on January 8, 1944. Under Commander O'Kane, TANG went on five war patrols, sinking a total of 31 ships, totaling more than 227,000 tons, and damaging two other ships, a record unsurpassed by any American submarine.

During its fifth and final war patrol, which began on September 24 and ended on October 25, 1944, TANG sank 13 enemy ships. In what was to be her final battle, the TANG encountered a heavily escorted enemy convoy. Engaged in a fierce surface battle, Commander O'Kane directed TANG to fire her last two torpedoes at a crippled transport ship. The first torpedo went straight and true and struck its target. The second torpedo was faulty and turned around almost immediately, heading directly for TANG. Ordering emergency speed, TANG tried to pull out of its path, but it struck the submarine in the stern, causing a violent explosion. Of the entire crew, only nine were able to escape the sinking submarine. They swam through the night until they were picked up by a Japanese destroyer escort eight hours later.

Commander O'Kane and the others from TANG were imprisoned on Formosa. He was later transferred to a secret prison camp near Tokyo where he was not registered and was therefore listed as "missing in action" until the camp's liberation two weeks after V-J Day. During his imprisonment, he and the other prisoners survived on a diet of less than 300 calories a day, eating mostly rice or barley, without fruit, vegetables or protein. Upon his release, O'Kane was suffering from scurvy and beriberi. He was evacuated by air to Pearl Harbor and, after a short hospitalization there, was transferred to the Naval Hospital in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

After his recovery, O'Kane's commands included USS PELIAS and USS SPERRY, as well as the Submarine School in New London, Connecticut, Submarine Division THIRTY-TWO and Submarine Squadron SEVEN. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his exemplary service on TANG on March 27, 1947. Rear Admiral O'Kanes other military decoration include the Navy Cross with two Gold Stars, the Legion of Merit with Combat "V", the Purple Heart and the Prisoner of War Medal. He also wrote two books based on his experiences in World War II, Clear the Bridge and WAHOO.

Rear Admiral O'Kane passed away in February 1994.
On TANG's third war patrol she sank no enemey ships it was conciderd a sucsessful patrol as she had rescued 22 aviators during Lifegaurd duty during Operation HAILSTONE(?) the neutralazation of Truk.