Graf Spee - 16 hours fuel?

[Smiffy]

In the last few days I have read one new book about the Graf Spee (by Richard Woodman -see the Media Forum) and seen one TV documentary on the same subject, (BBC / Open University, shown on The History Channel 13 & 14 April in the UK). In reading around the subject, particularly on the Net, I keep finding references to a recently discovered "fact" that explains it all. Apparently, in 2000, it came to light that Graf Spee's fuel cleaning plant had been destroyed by a hit from HMS Exeter. The damage was irreparable and effectively made Graf Spee unseaworthy. This "fact" was kept secret for 60 years, originally to prevent the Uruguayan authorities from interning the ship as unseaworthy. The hit had left Graf Spee with only sufficient clean fuel for 16 hours steaming. She was incapable of returning to Germany.

Can anyone point me at an authoritative source of this information? Although I have found it in several articles, including two Wikipedia entries, no one gives their source.

I have 3 problems with this "fact."

1. Why can I not find its source and why was it kept secret for 60 years?

2. If a hit from Exeter caused the damage, leaving only 16 hours fuel, how did Langsdorff manage to steam his ship, at high speed, for the next 17 hours, then run some of his engines to provide electrical power during the stay in Montevideo, and still be able to raise enough power to leave the harbour again?

3. If Langsdorff was told that he only had 16 hours fuel left (presumably at high speed) after one hour in action, during which time he had reduced Exeter to a blazing ruin and halved Ajax's firepower, why did turn away then? He could have continued the action, destroyed, or driven off, the light cruisers and then made for Buenos Aires, where he would have had a better chance of making repairs, at low speed. Alternatively, he could have headed out to sea and made a rendezvous with Altmark and, or, the Tacoma. Then, if the damage truly was irreparable, he could have taken his crew off and scuttled the ship in deep water. Even if continuing the action used up too much of his remaining fuel, he could have landed his crew at Punta Del Este, before scuttling.

[djcyclone]

I just read a document on the internet called the Graf Spee Operational History, which is basically a log of everything that happened all the way from launching to the battle, and finally the scuttling. This particular page made no mention of only 16 hours of fuel left, but it did mention the damage to the oil purification and desalination plants. I would say that the whole 16 hours is made up. That is probably why you cannot find anyone who is willing to give references. As you said, it took 17 hours to get to port, and what about the additional fuel to leave port. The reason why it has not been revealed for 60 years is because it is not true.

As for your question, the sight did mention in the final damage report that the Graf Spee had used up almost all of its ammunition in the fight. This was probably due to the continuous fire at the two light cruisers which missed repeatedly until the final stages of the battle. It does not say that the damage was beyond repair, but rather that the port of Montevideo, Uruguay was pro British, and International law said that no Warship could stay in a neutral port for longer than 72 hours. The repairs would have taken longer than 72 hours to finish. The document also mentioned that the two cruisers not only followed the Graf Spee, but where within range to watch the ship be scuttled. This is probably why the Captain thought that there was an armada waiting for him.

I would say that he broke off the attack, because his ammunition was running low. The document does indicate that at the end of the battle, the Graf Spee was winning, and therefore could have easily finished off the two Light Cruisers, since the Exeter had already fled. Once he decided to break off the attack, he had to run away from the Cruisers. This might be why he went to Motevideo instead of the ports you mentioned. It is vary possible that the captain went to that port without ever intending to scuttle the ship (believing that he could repair and then leave). Things just changed once he arrived, and found out that the repairs would take too long. He could not go back to Germany, or even leave port without engaging the two cruisers and if he had little amunition, then that would explain his decision. It was not a matter of whether he could win or not, but rather the fact that he could not even fight.

[Smiffy]

In Woodman's book, he says that in his belief the aggressive behaviour of the light cruisers, even after Exeter had been knocked out of the action, led Langsdorff to believe that other British heavy units were already nearby and that is why he ran for Montevideo. Woodman also asserts that although Langsdorff wanted 14 days to repair his ship, the German diplomats refused to ask for such a long time as they did not wish to show any weakness.

If Langsdorff had believed that he was only facing 2 light cruisers, which already had a speed advantage over him, it would have made more sense for him to have slowed down and make for Buenos Aires. Running for Montevideo only makes sense if he thought something big and fast was also after him, like HMS Renown.

[djcyclone]

I can agree with that. Both of the Light Cruisers had taken significant damage, and yet they still pressed on and continued to fight. This could easily be seen by a commander, and taken as if something bigger is coming to back them up.


The thing about the diplomats makes sense also, but I still would question the 16 hour thing. Maybe the Graff Spee had 16 hours of fuel after it arrived in port, and this is why it could not run at full speed to escape from the two Light Cruisers.

[Serg]

I have 3 problems with this "fact."

1. Why can I not find its source and why was it kept secret for 60 years?

Hi,
I am uncertain about other sources, but I remember that 16 hours was mentioned at least in the German capital ships by M.Whitley.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi,
I am uncertain about other sources, but I remember that 16 hours was mentioned at least in the German capital ships by M.Whitley.


Hi Serg,

It's always the naggling little details. M.J. Whitley's "German Capital Ships in World War II" quotes the German list of 20 hits she sustained and the oil purifier was not mentioned. Whitely says the Uraguayan authorities were surprised at her lack of damage as her main engines were undamaged, she had plenty of fuel aboard, and 43% of her main gun ammo left.

I checked Grove's "The Price of Disobediance" and on page 87 says "The key auxliary boiler that supplied steam to the distilling plant for fresh water and the fuel and lubricating oil purifier was also out of action". And on page 88, "Most importantly, the vital fuel and oil purification was perhaps ireparable at sea, as were significant parts of his fighting capacity".

Both authors cite German official records in their bibliographies, but no specific citations to the oil purification plant. I'm not a diesl plant expert so I don't know how long Graf Spee could steam without some sort of diesel failure if some sort of filtration system could not be jury rigged.

Gerhard and Koop in "Pocket Battleships of the Deuschland Class" have spooty coverage of teh battle. They don't mention any mechanical problems with the engines, but say the large gash in her bows played a large part in Langsdorf's decision to scuttle.

It would be nice to see the sourcing on the internet report. This may not be so much as a "secret" as just a detail overlooked by historians all these years.

[djcyclone]

Hi Serg,

It's always the naggling little details. M.J. Whitley's "German Capital Ships in World War II" quotes the German list of 20 hits she sustained and the oil purifier was not mentioned. Whitely says the Uraguayan authorities were surprised at her lack of damage as her main engines were undamaged, she had plenty of fuel aboard, and 43% of her main gun ammo left.

I checked Grove's "The Price of Disobediance" and on page 87 says "The key auxliary boiler that supplied steam to the distilling plant for fresh water and the fuel and lubricating oil purifier was also out of action". And on page 88, "Most importantly, the vital fuel and oil purification was perhaps ireparable at sea, as were significant parts of his fighting capacity".

Both authors cite German official records in their bibliographies, but no specific citations to the oil purification plant. I'm not a diesl plant expert so I don't know how long Graf Spee could steam without some sort of diesel failure if some sort of filtration system could not be jury rigged.

Gerhard and Koop in "Pocket Battleships of the Deuschland Class" have spooty coverage of teh battle. They don't mention any mechanical problems with the engines, but say the large gash in her bows played a large part in Langsdorf's decision to scuttle.

It would be nice to see the sourcing on the internet report. This may not be so much as a "secret" as just a detail overlooked by historians all these years.



Now we are back to square one. If he had all half of his ammo then it is anyone's guess as to why he ran. Their is probably a peace of the puzzle that was lost when the captain killed himself. We shall never know. It could have been anything, because the document I read said nothing about the damage to the main hull or a gash in the bow of the ship. There are more documents out their on the incident than one can count, and who knows which ones are accurate, if any of them at all.

[old_pop2000]

Now we are back to square one. If he had all half of his ammo then it is anyone's guess as to why he ran. Their is probably a peace of the puzzle that was lost when the captain killed himself. We shall never know. It could have been anything, because the document I read said nothing about the damage to the main hull or a gash in the bow of the ship. There are more documents out their on the incident than one can count, and who knows which ones are accurate, if any of them at all.


This whole episode maybe simpler than we are making it. We know that Graf Spee had taken a hit in the bow, that would have precluded her from making the voyage back to Germany. Temporary repair in Montevideo were effected. He was low on ammunition, that is a fact that can be verified by the number of rounds expended. The British had allowed a rumor to go around that there was a fleet waiting for him when he sailed. He had no method of verifying this and had to take it on face value. He was ordered to either fight his way out or scuttle the ship.

Looking at it from his viewpoint, he had taken damage that probably had reduced the effectivenss of the ship to fight or sail, he had taken losses in the crew which would reduce also its effectiveness. There was no possible assistance from Germany. A raider's most vital assets are secrecy and mobility. Once a raider has been detected, his location fixed, his game is almost over. His only recourse is to abandon his mission and head for home, or head to another part of the ocean. Graf Spee was cornered, his mission essentially over. Langsdorf's primary responsibility at this juncture was to protect the lives of his crew. Scuttling the ship, provides the best method of protecting the secrets of the ship and the lives of the crew.

Now, the fuel issue. I have a real problem with the idea that a ship designer would place a vital piece of machinery for the operation of fuel purification in a vulnerable spot like the smokestack of a warship. One of best targets is a smokestack. Placing the power source for the fuel purification in that location has to be leaving yourself open for almost immediate problems. It would seem to me, that the designer might place the machinery in that location, but provide a method of bypassing the purification system in case of damage from enemy action or simple mechanical failure. The oil purification system probably purified the fuel oil before entering the fuel injectors. I cannot see why you would purify the oil and then return it to an empty fuel tank, it does not make sense. If the fuel purification system could be bypassed, then you could run on one diesel and put the other into a maintenance mode to clean the fuel lines and fuel injectors. Then swap engines and keep this procedure up.

As to the possible lack of fuel oil, it was usually a practice by raiders to capture a tanker, sail it with a price crew to a location awaiting the raider at some time in the future. In fact, Atlantis did this for one of the raiders like Deutschland. So, it's possible that once Langsdorf was into open ocean, he could request a tanker to rendevous or even a submarine could be provided, to give him more diesel fuel.

Just some random thoughts

[old_pop2000]

Link to the National Officers Association of Canada website with good information on the oil problem for Graf Spee.

http://www.noac-national.ca/noac/members/Starshellspring06.pdf


Apparently the pre-heated oil was stored in a day tank. Section you want to read is near the end of the PDF file. Here is a snippet:


The ‘Deutschland’ Class armoured ships, to which Admiral
Graf Spee belonged, were diesel-propelled. The diesel fuel oil
available for marine use in those days was
much “heavier,” i.e., viscous, than today’s
more highly refined product. Accordingly, it
needed to be pre-heated to achieve proper
combustion when burned in diesel engines.
About 24 hours’ supply of heated fuel oil was
therefore kept in a ‘day tank’ for immediate
supply to the engines. In the ‘Deutschland’
Class armoured ships the day tank was heated
by internal steam coils, steam being supplied
from a donkey boiler by way of an unprotected
line running along the upper deck.
This critical design flaw now manifested
itself: a 6 inch hit on Admiral Graf Spee’s upper
deck amidships had severed the steam supply
line from the donkey boiler to the day tank.
There would be no more pre-heated fuel available
for main engines once the oil in the day
tank had been exhausted. And without preheated
fuel, the engines would rapidly carbon
up and eventually stop running altogether—
especially in the cold waters of the North Atlantic
which would be encountered on the return
to Germany. Worse still, repairs to the steam pipe were beyond the capacity
of the ship’s staff to effect. Admiral Graf Spee had to
enter a port for dockyard assistance. There was no other choice.
Accordingly, at 0740 Captain Langsdorff announced to his startled
officers: “We must run into port, the ship is not now seaworthy
for the North Atlantic.”
It should be noted that discovery of the above-described
design fault was treated by both Captain Langsdorff and the
German Naval Staff as top-secret information, to be kept from
the British at all costs. The matter remained a closely-guarded
secret; it was revealed only after the war by Engineer Lieutenant-
Commander Klepp, who had been Admiral Graf Spee’s
Chief Engineer at the time of the battle.

It appears the designers did do something really stupid by putting a vital piece machinery and piping in vulnerable position. It is hard to believe. But, it wasn't a purification system, it was a fuel heating system. You could put that in a temporary tank and heat the tank. That makes much more sense.

[Smiffy]

What I find hard to take in is the idea that a simple steam line could not be repaired at sea, or repaired quickly, and easily, in harbour, but then I'm no marine engineer. Graf Spee was offered a lot of technical assistance by German commercial interests in Montevideo and surely a jury rig was not beyond the talents of her Engineer Commander

Obviously, with hindsight, Korvettenkapitan Klepp's estimate of 16 hours remaining fuel was conservative, but even 16 hours would have given Langsdorff plenty of time to finish off the light cruisers, that could not have been the reason for breaking off the action. It could be a major influence on the eventual decision to scuttle, but the breakaway had to be for some other reason. Which brings me back to Woodman's claim that the aggressive action of Ajax and Achilles led Lagsdorff to believe that something big and nasty was just over the horizon.

You have to wonder what would have happened had Graf Spee's aircraft been operational?

[Smiffy]

As to the possible lack of fuel oil, it was usually a practice by raiders to capture a tanker, sail it with a price crew to a location awaiting the raider at some time in the future. In fact, Atlantis did this for one of the raiders like Deutschland. So, it's possible that once Langsdorf was into open ocean, he could request a tanker to rendevous or even a submarine could be provided, to give him more diesel fuel.


The Altmark was still in the area and still had at least one load of diesel for Graf Spee . The Tacoma was in Montevideo and about to sail to relieve Altmark. Fuel supply was not a problem for Langsdorff.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Link to the National Officers Association of Canada website with good information on the oil problem for Graf Spee.

http://www.noac-national.ca/noac/members/Starshellspring06.pdf


Apparently the pre-heated oil was stored in a day tank. Section you want to read is near the end of the PDF file. Here is a snippet:



It appears the designers did do something really stupid by putting a vital piece machinery and piping in vulnerable position. It is hard to believe. But, it wasn't a purification system, it was a fuel heating system. You could put that in a temporary tank and heat the tank. That makes much more sense.

Hi Dennis,

Good info. As part of the 1907 Hague Agreement, the Graf Spee could only stay in port for 24 hours unless there was damage to her seaworthiness. Such repairs could be made using the ships' work force and were limited to those repairs that did not enhance the ship's combat power. After being examined by the Uruguayans and Klepp, she was granted a three day stay. The list of defects for sea worhtiness made during the inspection did not include this pre heating tank. Langsdorff did recieve some assistance from two German merchants in the bay and from nearby Buenos Aires.

With Langsdorff gone, there is much to speculate about about his mental state and the effects of the two wounds he had suffered. How much of the propaganda about British forces he believed and how much an impact it made on his decision is unkown. Seeing little chance to escape and wishing to save his crew, the decision to scuttle makes sense. We don't really know why he chose suicide for himself. Langsdorff had fought a humane war and had been scrupulous in the care of those he captured. An honorable legacy.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Now we are back to square one. If he had all half of his ammo then it is anyone's guess as to why he ran. Their is probably a peace of the puzzle that was lost when the captain killed himself. We shall never know. It could have been anything, because the document I read said nothing about the damage to the main hull or a gash in the bow of the ship. There are more documents out their on the incident than one can count, and who knows which ones are accurate, if any of them at all.

Hi Cyclone,

The hole is described is being 4 sqaure meters in area and a picture is shown in Grove's "The Price of Disobediance". It is just below the upper deck level on the port side. A temprorary cofferdam does not seem to be beyond the realm of possibility. Langsdorff told the captain of the Africa Shell the day after the battle that he believed the British ships were so aggressive as there were larger units nearby. This seems to contradict why he disobeyed his orders to engage in the first place. This contradicts what he said on his bridge when he ordered teh ship to battle saying, "I suspect a convoy". Langsdorff knew there were British cruisers in the area, the presence of "destroyers" would almost certainly mean a heavy ship nearby. So turning away made much more sense. Harwood had to conserve his seaplanes so he had not launched one for dawn patrol, so Langsdorff could have avoided detection. Langsdorff's Arado had finally gone unserviceable two days before.

[djcyclone]

Hi Cyclone,

The hole is described is being 4 sqaure meters in area and a picture is shown in Grove's "The Price of Disobediance". It is just below the upper deck level on the port side. A temprorary cofferdam does not seem to be beyond the realm of possibility. Langsdorff told the captain of the Africa Shell the day after the battle that he believed the British ships were so aggressive as there were larger units nearby. This seems to contradict why he disobeyed his orders to engage in the first place. This contradicts what he said on his bridge when he ordered teh ship to battle saying, "I suspect a convoy". Langsdorff knew there were British cruisers in the area, the presence of "destroyers" would almost certainly mean a heavy ship nearby. So turning away made much more sense. Harwood had to conserve his seaplanes so he had not launched one for dawn patrol, so Langsdorff could have avoided detection. Langsdorff's Arado had finally gone unserviceable two days before.



In the end, I can read all of these post and point to one source. It seems that everything that happened can be summarized by simply pointing the finger at the Captain. It seems that he made mistakes, one after the other, and perhaps that is why he chose to take his life afterwords.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Link to the National Officers Association of Canada website with good information on the oil problem for Graf Spee.

http://www.noac-national.ca/noac/members/Starshellspring06.pdf


Apparently the pre-heated oil was stored in a day tank. Section you want to read is near the end of the PDF file. Here is a snippet:



It appears the designers did do something really stupid by putting a vital piece machinery and piping in vulnerable position. It is hard to believe. But, it wasn't a purification system, it was a fuel heating system. You could put that in a temporary tank and heat the tank. That makes much more sense.

Dennis:

Nice research, the mystery of the fuel is solved!