Russo-Japanese War; Prelude to defeat?

[old_pop2000]

Reportedly, prior to signalling "Tor Tor Tor" to Nagumo before commencing the attack on PH, Mitsuo Fuchida said to himself "Have these Americans never hear of Port Arthur?". The reference, of course, referring to the Japanese sneak attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur at 2230 hrs, 8 February 1904 when two flotillas of destroyers evaded patrolling Russian destroyers to launch a torpedo attack on the Russian 1st Pacific squadron. Of the sixteen torpedoes fired, only three found their mark and those ships were not sunk. Even after the next days action, effectively nothing was accomplished except to prolong the war. Had the Japanese simply waited until the Russian ships sortied, then engaged them in a Naval battle, they might have ended the war much faster before the Baltic Fleet was dispatched. Point being, the sneak attack only warned the Russians of Japanese capabilities. They were able to improve the fleet anchorage defenses with more mines, block ships and destroyers. Eventually, Port Arthur fell but only to Japanese land forces after they captured the important Hill 203.

The second important battle that has been the cornerstone of Japanese naval history and doctrine was Tsu-Shima or the Donkey Ears. In this battle, the Russian Baltic fleet renamed the 2nd Pacific Squadron was completely destroyed as it passed through the Straits of Korea by the IJN fleet under Admiral Togo. It was probably the most decisive sea battle ever fought with over 36 Russian ships destroyed. This one battle seemed to confirm Mahan's theories about sea power and the decisive battle. The problem was that there were extenuating circumstances which diminished this battles lessons learned. First, many of the Russian ships were obsolete and should have been in the wreckers yards instead in the fleet. Except for the four Borodino class battleships and some of the cruisers, it was entirely unusable as a fleet. Second, after the two arms of the fleet had rejoined at Madagascar, the Russian czar was more worried about keeping his throne than fighting the Japanese. This fleet had or was almost considered lost, before reaching the straits. Third, The second in command has died on the voyage, but the fleet admiral had not told anyone. Fourth, there was no battle plan, just a sailing order to reach, Vladivostok, since Port Arthur had fallen when this force reached Madagascar, originally this force was supposed to reinforce the 1st Pacific squadron, but it no longer existed. Fifth, the ships were so overloaded with coal, that their armor belts were below the surface and the lower gunports could not be fired. As one Russian reporter stated, it was more of a mob than a fleet.

It was upon these two operations and the results from the Sino-Japanese war, that much of the Japanese naval strategy and doctrine was based. Their night doctrine was based on the poor effects of the night actions during the RJW especially the results from torpedo attacks. The attacks by the Russian squadron at Vladivostok against Japanese shipping until finally destroyed caused great consternation in Japan and even calls for escorts. As one writer put it, "possibly Fuchida should have been more concerned that Japan remember Port Arthur and its effects, not the US".

I hope we can use this information to discuss Japanese strategy and battle doctrine and how it affected the Pacific war operations. Let's not focus entirely on the nuts and bolts, but how generally, the Japanese weapons evolved based on the results of that war.

[old_pop2000]

I am currently surveying a book written in 1924 about Japanese war expenditures from the Restoration of Meiji to that year. One interesting point that they make is that the victories by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy at Mukden and Tsu-Shima made possible the loans from foreign markets on advantageous terms and the willingness to bear the burdens of increased taxation and subscriptions to bonds by the Japanese people. It states that those victories made the financial measures possible.

I wonder if the Japanese remembered that point at Pearl Harbor and later.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Reportedly, prior to signalling "Tor Tor Tor" to Nagumo before commencing the attack on PH, Mitsuo Fuchida said to himself "Have these Americans never hear of Port Arthur?". The reference, of course, referring to the Japanese sneak attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur at 2230 hrs, 8 February 1904 when two flotillas of destroyers evaded patrolling Russian destroyers to launch a torpedo attack on the Russian 1st Pacific squadron. Of the sixteen torpedoes fired, only three found their mark and those ships were not sunk. Even after the next days action, effectively nothing was accomplished except to prolong the war. Had the Japanese simply waited until the Russian ships sortied, then engaged them in a Naval battle, they might have ended the war much faster before the Baltic Fleet was dispatched. Point being, the sneak attack only warned the Russians of Japanese capabilities. They were able to improve the fleet anchorage defenses with more mines, block ships and destroyers. Eventually, Port Arthur fell but only to Japanese land forces after they captured the important Hill 203.

The second important battle that has been the cornerstone of Japanese naval history and doctrine was Tsu-Shima or the Donkey Ears. In this battle, the Russian Baltic fleet renamed the 2nd Pacific Squadron was completely destroyed as it passed through the Straits of Korea by the IJN fleet under Admiral Togo. It was probably the most decisive sea battle ever fought with over 36 Russian ships destroyed. This one battle seemed to confirm Mahan's theories about sea power and the decisive battle. The problem was that there were extenuating circumstances which diminished this battles lessons learned. First, many of the Russian ships were obsolete and should have been in the wreckers yards instead in the fleet. Except for the four Borodino class battleships and some of the cruisers, it was entirely unusable as a fleet. Second, after the two arms of the fleet had rejoined at Madagascar, the Russian czar was more worried about keeping his throne than fighting the Japanese. This fleet had or was almost considered lost, before reaching the straits. Third, The second in command has died on the voyage, but the fleet admiral had not told anyone. Fourth, there was no battle plan, just a sailing order to reach, Vladivostok, since Port Arthur had fallen when this force reached Madagascar, originally this force was supposed to reinforce the 1st Pacific squadron, but it no longer existed. Fifth, the ships were so overloaded with coal, that their armor belts were below the surface and the lower gunports could not be fired. As one Russian reporter stated, it was more of a mob than a fleet.

It was upon these two operations and the results from the Sino-Japanese war, that much of the Japanese naval strategy and doctrine was based. Their night doctrine was based on the poor effects of the night actions during the RJW especially the results from torpedo attacks. The attacks by the Russian squadron at Vladivostok against Japanese shipping until finally destroyed caused great consternation in Japan and even calls for escorts. As one writer put it, "possibly Fuchida should have been more concerned that Japan remember Port Arthur and its effects, not the US".

I hope we can use this information to discuss Japanese strategy and battle doctrine and how it affected the Pacific war operations. Let's not focus entirely on the nuts and bolts, but how generally, the Japanese weapons evolved based on the results of that war.

Dennis:

The points you put forth are supported in the recent Osprey book Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship by Robert Forzck in the Duel series. He demonstrates that the IJN's main advantage was better training and leadership, not tactics or technology. Also until Tsushima, the battles were not lopsided.

I have maintained in previous threads that the Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War and its easy gains as Britain's ally in WWI may have been the foundation of its belief that it could challenge Western powers particularly the US in the Pacific and win. As you state, had the Czar not been dealing with unrest at home, he would have undoubtably continued the war at least on the ground and Japan's losses to her army were becoming critical.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

The points you put forth are supported in the recent Osprey book Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship by Robert Forzck in the Duel series. He demonstrates that the IJN's main advantage was better training and leadership, not tactics or technology. Also until Tsushima, the battles were not lopsided.

I have maintained in previous threads that the Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War and its easy gains as Britain's ally in WWI may have been the foundation of its belief that it could challenge Western powers particularly the US in the Pacific and win. As you state, had the Czar not been dealing with unrest at home, he would have undoubtably continued the war at least on the ground and Japan's losses to her army were becoming critical.

Hi Ed:

It's interesting that the Japanese Pacific war strategy, developed over the interwar period was based on the Port Arthur blockade strategy of Saneyuki Akiyama, the father of Japanese naval strategy. It was essentially, a battle strategy, expanded to a Pacific war strategy. His strategy at Port Arthur was based on his experiences with Admiral Sampson at Santiago Bay in the Spanish-American War. The strategy used at Port Arthur, was a failure. Akiyama was a devotee of Admiral Mahan, in fact, he tried to hire him to teach at the Naval War College. Akiyama was aboard Mikasa at Togo side at Tsu-shima, it was his strategy that Togo used. Akiyama however, after the war, realized that Mahan's ideas needed to be tailored to the vast expanses of the Pacific. Unfortunately, he died of perotinitis in 1918. One wonders how the IJN Pacific strategy would have developed, had Akiyama continued on at Eta Jima.

Akiyama's plan was titled " The Seven Stage Plan of Attrition". It included torpedoes and night attacks. The first two stages would involve torpedo attacks by destroyers and torpedo boats south of the straits of Korea, or Tsu-Shima. The third phase was the main action. The next two phases were night torpedo attacks with the sixth a resumption of the main attack and the final phase pursuit of the beaten force to Vladivostok and the driving of the Russian ships into the newly lain minefields. Unfortunately, the Russian's evaded detection until well into the Straits, but according to Willmott, everything else went according to plan. Willmott states that while this plan was a disaster for the Russian Baltic fleet, in point of fact, its success was a disaster for the "Japanese National and service interests." As Moltke said, no plan survives the first shot and Akiyama's didn't either.

My study of the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, Russo-Japanese, and WWI is beginning to open up new views of the Japanese Pacific strategy. It was a bankrupt strategy and Nagano knew it. Ships and strategy had been developed for the attrition strategy and it was useless to them. We were not going to come marching across at the beginning of the war. They had based their strategy on misinterpretations of the victory at Tsu-Shima and the successes in the Battle of the Yellow Sea and Port Arthur.

However, the tactics along with the ships were still useable, but they had no Pacific strategy developed to deal with the new realities, they just used the old ideas of the decisive battle. There is a vast difference between a battle strategy and an operational strategy designed to win a war over vast distances. Interestingly, the Japanese experienced heavy shipping losses due to the Russian naval forces at Vladivostok and seemingly forgot that experience in the interwar period.

I wish we could get more of the forum members interested in this area, but it does explain much of what is witnessed in the Pacific war. We have to get beyond the sneak attack syndrome, there was far more to the Pacific War from the Sino and Russo Japanese wars along with others in that era.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed:

It's interesting that the Japanese Pacific war strategy, developed over the interwar period was based on the Port Arthur blockade strategy of Saneyuki Akiyama, the father of Japanese naval strategy. It was essentially, a battle strategy, expanded to a Pacific war strategy. His strategy at Port Arthur was based on his experiences with Admiral Sampson at Santiago Bay in the Spanish-American War. The strategy used at Port Arthur, was a failure. Akiyama was a devotee of Admiral Mahan, in fact, he tried to hire him to teach at the Naval War College. Akiyama was aboard Mikasa at Togo side at Tsu-shima, it was his strategy that Togo used. Akiyama however, after the war, realized that Mahan's ideas needed to be tailored to the vast expanses of the Pacific. Unfortunately, he died of perotinitis in 1918. One wonders how the IJN Pacific strategy would have developed, had Akiyama continued on at Eta Jima.

Akiyama's plan was titled " The Seven Stage Plan of Attrition". It included torpedoes and night attacks. The first two stages would involve torpedo attacks by destroyers and torpedo boats south of the straits of Korea, or Tsu-Shima. The third phase was the main action. The next two phases were night torpedo attacks with the sixth a resumption of the main attack and the final phase pursuit of the beaten force to Vladivostok and the driving of the Russian ships into the newly lain minefields. Unfortunately, the Russian's evaded detection until well into the Straits, but according to Willmott, everything else went according to plan. Willmott states that while this plan was a disaster for the Russian Baltic fleet, in point of fact, its success was a disaster for the "Japanese National and service interests." As Moltke said, no plan survives the first shot and Akiyama's didn't either.

My study of the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, Russo-Japanese, and WWI is beginning to open up new views of the Japanese Pacific strategy. It was a bankrupt strategy and Nagano knew it. Ships and strategy had been developed for the attrition strategy and it was useless to them. We were not going to come marching across at the beginning of the war. They had based their strategy on misinterpretations of the victory at Tsu-Shima and the successes in the Battle of the Yellow Sea and Port Arthur.

However, the tactics along with the ships were still useable, but they had no Pacific strategy developed to deal with the new realities, they just used the old ideas of the decisive battle. There is a vast difference between a battle strategy and an operational strategy designed to win a war over vast distances. Interestingly, the Japanese experienced heavy shipping losses due to the Russian naval forces at Vladivostok and seemingly forgot that experience in the interwar period.

I wish we could get more of the forum members interested in this area, but it does explain much of what is witnessed in the Pacific war. We have to get beyond the sneak attack syndrome, there was far more to the Pacific War from the Sino and Russo Japanese wars along with others in that era.

Dennis:

I think the Japanese strategy for the war with Russia was based on two things:

They knew they would be outnumbered (even if many of the Russian ships were obsolete)
They were operating close to home

As you say they attempted to translate their success in the Russo-Japanese war to a potential war with the US but:

The vast distances meant you needed bases and a good logistical system to keep the fleet supplied. And Japan never realized until it was too late just how vulnerable her merchant fleet was to submarines.

Also an attritional war against the US was totally unwinnable. The Japanese would have needed to sink just about the entire US navy in the first six months of the war. Even then the bulk of the US shipyards were on the east coast and not vulnerable to attack by Japan. Plus the USN was expanding already. One author (it may have been Wilmott) stated that the USN essentially fought WWII with two navies. The older existing fleet and the one built during the war which was unrestrained by any treaty limitations.

[keschofield]

I don't have a lot of time right now, but one of my biggest contentions for many years has been that, at best, Japan was a 2nd rate power. She lost sight of that fact after her easy victories in China, the Russo-Japanese War, and WW1. Her almost surprising gains in 1941 and early '42 were due more to the US focus on Europe than on Japan's prowess. The Japanese didn't see it that way at the time and they over-extended themselves.

I'd love to see a serious analysis of what would have happened in 1941, if the US did not have her gaze elsewhere. My guess is that Japan would have been stopped earlier than she was and the rollback wouldn't have taken as long.

[old_pop2000]

.......

I'd love to see a serious analysis of what would have happened in 1941, if the US did not have her gaze elsewhere. My guess is that Japan would have been stopped earlier than she was and the rollback wouldn't have taken as long.

Hi Kurt:
I don't see a real difference. The US Navy War Plan Orange had evolved from an immediate offensive strategy to one of waiting for a year or so, till the two ocean navy was a reality, then proceed across the Central Pacific and through the Solomons. There would be frequent raiding in the Gilberts, Solomons, Carolina's etc. but nothing like an offensive. By the late 1930's, the Philippines were a write off, the Navy wasn't going to risk its ships to save that area. I believe that they expected more from the European powers especially the British. The British plan was to reinforce the Far Eastern fleet but that did not manifest itself due to the fall of France. The counteroffensive against the Japanese always had to wait for the assets to be available. Even with no focus on the European operations, you had to maintain the Atlantic fleet at an acceptable level to protect the sea communication lanes to Europe and to South America. Sea control was a paramount issue with the US Navy.

[keschofield]

Hi Kurt:
I don't see a real difference. The US Navy War Plan Orange had evolved from an immediate offensive strategy to one of waiting for a year or so, till the two ocean navy was a reality, then proceed across the Central Pacific and through the Solomons. There would be frequent raiding in the Gilberts, Solomons, Carolina's etc. but nothing like an offensive. By the late 1930's, the Philippines were a write off, the Navy wasn't going to risk its ships to save that area. I believe that they expected more from the European powers especially the British. The British plan was to reinforce the Far Eastern fleet but that did not manifest itself due to the fall of France. The counteroffensive against the Japanese always had to wait for the assets to be available. Even with no focus on the European operations, you had to maintain the Atlantic fleet at an acceptable level to protect the sea communication lanes to Europe and to South America. Sea control was a paramount issue with the US Navy.

Dennis,

Of course, you're probably right. Nothing exists in a vacuum. However, I believe manpower could have been built up and applied to the Pacific much more quickly than historically. I also believe that with the Pacific getting first priority for resources, the fleet would have expanded more quickly as would have airpower.

When you consider that historically the Battle of Midway was less than a month after Corregidor surrendered, it makes one wonder how impossible defending the Phillipines really was. Imagine if Dugout Doug hadn't squandered his men and supplies by trying to defend everywhere. If he had pulled everything including supplies back to Bataan from the outset and not ignored the news of the Pearl Harbor attack, things might not have been so easy for the Japanese. Even better, imagine if the Phillipines had a competent commander and not his majesty King Doug!

Obviously, I am not a fan of Douglas "By God" MacArthur. During WWII he was at best competant later in the war, at worst guilty of deriliction of duty in 1941. In 1951/2 in Korea his behavior was at best guilty of gross insubordination, at worst treason.:mad:

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

Of course, you're probably right. Nothing exists in a vacuum. However, I believe manpower could have been built up and applied to the Pacific much more quickly than historically. I also believe that with the Pacific getting first priority for resources, the fleet would have expanded more quickly as would have airpower.

When you consider that historically the Battle of Midway was less than a month after Corregidor surrendered, it makes one wonder how impossible defending the Phillipines really was. Imagine if Dugout Doug hadn't squandered his men and supplies by trying to defend everywhere. If he had pulled everything including supplies back to Bataan from the outset and not ignored the news of the Pearl Harbor attack, things might not have been so easy for the Japanese. Even better, imagine if the Phillipines had a competent commander and not his majesty King Doug!

Obviously, I am not a fan of Douglas "By God" MacArthur. During WWII he was at best competant later in the war, at worst guilty of deriliction of duty in 1941. In 1951/2 in Korea his behavior was at best guilty of gross insubordination, at worst treason.:mad:

Hi Kurt:
The Philippines were not supportable for more than one reason, the least of which was that we had not base of supply nearby. Australia was in the works, but not quite there yet. Once the Japanese had taken Malaya, occupied Indochina and Borneo, the position at the Philippines was unteneable. The failure by the Japanese to finish the job was less our abilities and more their incompetence. More troops means more logistics and there was no real system in place as yet.The extra troops might have been used to occupy Johnson Island, Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia not to mention, move in on Guadalcanal and Florida island. But, you must have naval and air support to maintain yourself. We did not have that. So, its a moot point.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I think the Japanese strategy for the war with Russia was based on two things:

They knew they would be outnumbered (even if many of the Russian ships were obsolete)

They were operating close to home

Hi Ed:
The Japanese strategic problem was that the Russian Far Eastern Fleet was separated into two areas. The primary area was Port Arthur, an ice free port. However, there was the independent cruiser squadron based at Vladivostok but iced in. The Japanese focused on two main areas; Port Arthur and Dalny. They separated their destroyer flotillas into two equal forces and attacked both areas. Dalny was a waste of time, there were no Russian naval forces in that area. This reduced the effort at Port Arthur and it only hit three out of sixteen torpedoes. The second failure and the most pronounced was the lack of a follow up attack that night on the disorganized Russian Fleet. Togo waited until 1200 hrs the next day to move his main fleet close to the harbor only to meet with his own surprise. The Russian fleet had gathered its wits and sortied in line abreast firing their guns, then reversing their formation to return, in column formation. At that moment one of the ship headed toward the Togo's fleet and launched a torpedo attack forcing Togo to move away and head back to protect the landing area. This failure, and Akiyama says it was a failure, cost the Japanese another year, attempting to capture Port Arthur and destroying the Far Eastern Fleet. It left that fleet as a fleet-in-being. It was only finally accomplished by land based operations, not naval operations. Another year of combat operations nearly bankrupted the Japanese government. After that action, mining operations later sank three Japanese battleships or one third of Togo's available battleships. It was a costly mistake for Togo, not to mention the failure mask the Independent force at Vladivostok which caused problems later.

The Japanese became so focused on Port Arthur, that they neglected to maintain a vigil on Vladivostok, so the Russian independent cruiser force was able to sail when the ice breaker was available, and begin to attack Japanese supply ships heading for Korea.

Look at some of the failures in 1904 and look at the parallels with the Pacific War. At PH, they failed to follow up the attack with a third wave or stay near to attack and destroy the real threat, the carriers. In operation MO and MI, a lack of concentration of effort. Finally, their neglect to take commerce raiding seriously. They missed those lessons entirely. But focused on their one success.... Tsu-Shima. But then, failed to read that success properly. All similar failures to the 1904 actions.

However, let us not forget that while tactically at Port Arthur and Yellow Sea, the actions were a failure, Togo and the commanders learned and did close with the enemy and pursued him till the end at Tsu-shima. Togo's strategic goal of sea control in and around Korea was successful. However, the japanese had never had to be concerned about protection of sea lanes or the idea that an opponent might not oblige them by coming out and fighting a decisive battle. They never considered an alternative strategy if the next opponent did not.... which they didn't.

What do you think?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis,

Of course, you're probably right. Nothing exists in a vacuum. However, I believe manpower could have been built up and applied to the Pacific much more quickly than historically. I also believe that with the Pacific getting first priority for resources, the fleet would have expanded more quickly as would have airpower.

When you consider that historically the Battle of Midway was less than a month after Corregidor surrendered, it makes one wonder how impossible defending the Phillipines really was. Imagine if Dugout Doug hadn't squandered his men and supplies by trying to defend everywhere. If he had pulled everything including supplies back to Bataan from the outset and not ignored the news of the Pearl Harbor attack, things might not have been so easy for the Japanese. Even better, imagine if the Phillipines had a competent commander and not his majesty King Doug!

Obviously, I am not a fan of Douglas "By God" MacArthur. During WWII he was at best competant later in the war, at worst guilty of deriliction of duty in 1941. In 1951/2 in Korea his behavior was at best guilty of gross insubordination, at worst treason.:mad:

Kurt:

MacArthur was the most overrated American general of the war. He ranks with Montgomery for arrogance and lack of real war fighting skills. The overall command in the Pacific should have been Admiral Nimitz.

[keschofield]

Kurt:

MacArthur was the most overrated American general of the war. He ranks with Montgomery for arrogance and lack of real war fighting skills. The overall command in the Pacific should have been Admiral Nimitz.

Hi Ed.

Not to hijack the thead, but Mac would have to come up a whole bunch of pegs to equal Monty. Yes they were both arrogant and vain, but Monty was never incompetent and treasonous.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Ed.

Not to hijack the thead, but Mac would have to come up a whole bunch of pegs to equal Monty. Yes they were both arrogant and vain, but Monty was never incompetent and treasonous.


Hi Kurt:
The British armoured units in Normandy around Caen, might have a strong case against that argument that he was never incompetent. But let's not hijack this thread. Also, neither Mac nor Monty were ever treasonous, both tried to do the best job they could, incompetent or not. I believe that it is disrespectful of them.;)

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Ed:

It's interesting that the Japanese Pacific war strategy, developed over the interwar period was based on the Port Arthur blockade strategy of Saneyuki Akiyama, the father of Japanese naval strategy. It was essentially, a battle strategy, expanded to a Pacific war strategy. His strategy at Port Arthur was based on his experiences with Admiral Sampson at Santiago Bay in the Spanish-American War. The strategy used at Port Arthur, was a failure. Akiyama was a devotee of Admiral Mahan, in fact, he tried to hire him to teach at the Naval War College. Akiyama was aboard Mikasa at Togo side at Tsu-shima, it was his strategy that Togo used. Akiyama however, after the war, realized that Mahan's ideas needed to be tailored to the vast expanses of the Pacific. Unfortunately, he died of perotinitis in 1918. One wonders how the IJN Pacific strategy would have developed, had Akiyama continued on at Eta Jima.

Akiyama's plan was titled " The Seven Stage Plan of Attrition". It included torpedoes and night attacks. The first two stages would involve torpedo attacks by destroyers and torpedo boats south of the straits of Korea, or Tsu-Shima. The third phase was the main action. The next two phases were night torpedo attacks with the sixth a resumption of the main attack and the final phase pursuit of the beaten force to Vladivostok and the driving of the Russian ships into the newly lain minefields. Unfortunately, the Russian's evaded detection until well into the Straits, but according to Willmott, everything else went according to plan. Willmott states that while this plan was a disaster for the Russian Baltic fleet, in point of fact, its success was a disaster for the "Japanese National and service interests." As Moltke said, no plan survives the first shot and Akiyama's didn't either.

My study of the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, Russo-Japanese, and WWI is beginning to open up new views of the Japanese Pacific strategy. It was a bankrupt strategy and Nagano knew it. Ships and strategy had been developed for the attrition strategy and it was useless to them. We were not going to come marching across at the beginning of the war. They had based their strategy on misinterpretations of the victory at Tsu-Shima and the successes in the Battle of the Yellow Sea and Port Arthur.

However, the tactics along with the ships were still useable, but they had no Pacific strategy developed to deal with the new realities, they just used the old ideas of the decisive battle. There is a vast difference between a battle strategy and an operational strategy designed to win a war over vast distances. Interestingly, the Japanese experienced heavy shipping losses due to the Russian naval forces at Vladivostok and seemingly forgot that experience in the interwar period.

I wish we could get more of the forum members interested in this area, but it does explain much of what is witnessed in the Pacific war. We have to get beyond the sneak attack syndrome, there was far more to the Pacific War from the Sino and Russo Japanese wars along with others in that era.

Hi Dennis,

The Japanese experience with torpeodes in the conflict was not a happy one. Technology limited attacks to a range of 800 yards or less.

Japanese destroyer attacks on Port Arthur were:

9 February: 18 torpedoes fired for 3 hits.
14 February: 11 destroyers with no hits.
24 February: 5th Destroyer Division leads night block ship operation. No hits, all five block ships sunk.
22 March: 8 destroyers atttack, no hits.
27 March: Another blocking ship operation, all five block ships sunk.
2 May: Another blocking ship operation, 13 blockships sunk.
23 June: Togo caught a Russian squadron at sea and chased it back to Port Arthur. That night, he attacked with 44 destroyers and torpedo boats which obtained no hits.

Mines had a considerable effect on both sides. The Russian fleet was energetic under Makarov who was killed on April 13 when the Petropavlosk was sunk by a mine. On May 15, Hatuse and Yashima both were sunk by mines, reducing Togo's battleship strength to 4, encouraging the sending of Baltic squadron in hopes of salvaging the situation.

Yessen's Vladivostock squadron was able to exploit Togo having to concentrate on Port Arthur. In several sorties, he sank or captured 18 Japanese and neutral ships, most importantly the Hitachi Maru which was carrying 18 11" seige howitzers. One British steamer carrying Japanese troops to Korea was sunk after the troops on board refused to surrender and fired back. With the Anglo-Japanese treaty, this was risky business.

Kamimura caught Yessen on 14 Augst as he had sailed to meet Vitegeft's August 10 break out. Kamimura had 6 to 3, but only sunk one, reminiscent of Dogger Bank a decade later. Foreshadowing how gunnery had outstripped fire control, Kamimura fought at 5,000-9,000 yards claiming 6% hits.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

The Japanese experience with torpeodes in the conflict was not a happy one. Technology limited attacks to a range of 800 yards or less.

Japanese destroyer attacks on Port Arthur were:

9 February: 18 torpedoes fired for 3 hits.
14 February: 11 destroyers with no hits.
24 February: 5th Destroyer Division leads night block ship operation. No hits, all five block ships sunk.
22 March: 8 destroyers atttack, no hits.
27 March: Another blocking ship operation, all five block ships sunk.
2 May: Another blocking ship operation, 13 blockships sunk.
23 June: Togo caught a Russian squadron at sea and chased it back to Port Arthur. That night, he attacked with 44 destroyers and torpedo boats which obtained no hits.

Mines had a considerable effect on both sides. The Russian fleet was energetic under Makarov who was killed on April 13 when the Petropavlosk was sunk by a mine. On May 15, Hatuse and Yashima both were sunk by mines, reducing Togo's battleship strength to 4, encouraging the sending of Baltic squadron in hopes of salvaging the situation.

Yessen's Vladivostock squadron was able to exploit Togo having to concentrate on Port Arthur. In several sorties, he sank or captured 18 Japanese and neutral ships, most importantly the Hitachi Maru which was carrying 18 11" seige howitzers. One British steamer carrying Japanese troops to Korea was sunk after the troops on board refused to surrender and fired back. With the Anglo-Japanese treaty, this was risky business.

Kamimura caught Yessen on 14 Augst as he had sailed to meet Vitegeft's August 10 break out. Kamimura had 6 to 3, but only sunk one, reminiscent of Dogger Bank a decade later. Foreshadowing how gunnery had outstripped fire control, Kamimura fought at 5,000-9,000 yards claiming 6% hits.

Hi Mike:
Torpedoes certainly let them down in most of their operations, being mechanically unreliable. However, mines cost both sides. But, it was mostly the poor strategy and lack of follow up that cost them most.