Suragaio Strait

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi folks,

Just got Anthony Tully's new book on Suragaio Strait. Good write ups, hope to spend some time with it this weekend. Had some intersting unpublished pictures. Don't anybody tell me how it ends. : )

[old_pop2000]

Hi folks,

Just got Anthony Tully's new book on Suragaio Strait. Good write ups, hope to spend some time with it this weekend. Had some intersting unpublished pictures. Don't anybody tell me how it ends. : )

I wonder how much more can be said. Give us a good report. BTW, I just got Niall Fergurson's book " The Pity of War: Explaining WWI". It should have some good insights into the effect of the war.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I wonder how much more can be said. Give us a good report. BTW, I just got Niall Fergurson's book " The Pity of War: Explaining WWI". It should have some good insights into the effect of the war.

Hi Dennis,

He has laudatory jacket notes from Barrett Tillman (Clash of the Carriers), W.D. Dickenson (Battle of the Phillipine Sea), Malcolm Muir (Iowa Class battleships), and James D. Hornfischer (Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors).

I have few books specifically on a single naval battle with the exception of Jutland, mainly general series like Morison, Roskill, and some later ones. He breaks the overall battle into four smaller ones; Samar, Sibuyan, Engano, and Surigao. So it will be interesting to read the details. What new info he has may just be limited to research done since 2000 about the location and conditons of wrecks found on the bottom.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

He has laudatory jacket notes from Barrett Tillman (Clash of the Carriers), W.D. Dickenson (Battle of the Phillipine Sea), Malcolm Muir (Iowa Class battleships), and James D. Hornfischer (Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors).

I have few books specifically on a single naval battle with the exception of Jutland, mainly general series like Morison, Roskill, and some later ones. He breaks the overall battle into four smaller ones; Samar, Sibuyan, Engano, and Surigao. So it will be interesting to read the details. What new info he has may just be limited to research done since 2000 about the location and conditons of wrecks found on the bottom.

Hi Mike:
Those are good recommendations. The problem, as you said, is how much new data could there be. As the saying goes, "they came on in the same old way, and we knocked them down in same old way". What more about Surigao can you say? Three battleships did most of the shooting, and only Yamashiro was still moving, IIRC. Fuso was dead in the water, sinking. With the Mark 8 fire control, it was essentially target practice.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Dennis,

He has laudatory jacket notes from Barrett Tillman (Clash of the Carriers), W.D. Dickenson (Battle of the Phillipine Sea), Malcolm Muir (Iowa Class battleships), and James D. Hornfischer (Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors).

I have few books specifically on a single naval battle with the exception of Jutland, mainly general series like Morison, Roskill, and some later ones. He breaks the overall battle into four smaller ones; Samar, Sibuyan, Engano, and Surigao. So it will be interesting to read the details. What new info he has may just be limited to research done since 2000 about the location and conditons of wrecks found on the bottom.

Mike and Dennis:

He got some mixed reviews for the book from what I've read on-line. A little too dramatic at times, but I've seen that occur with other writers as well. I'm reading Edwin Hoyt's book "The Lonely Ships, The Life and Death of the US Asiatic Fleet" and he frequently falls into that trap, but I believe it was because he was more of a writer than an actual historian.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike and Dennis:

He got some mixed reviews for the book from what I've read on-line. A little too dramatic at times, but I've seen that occur with other writers as well. I'm reading Edwin Hoyt's book "The Lonely Ships, The Life and Death of the US Asiatic Fleet" and he frequently falls into that trap, but I believe it was because he was more of a writer than an actual historian.


Hi Ed,

I've gotten about 30 pages in. He does a good job setting up the background situation and Japanese plans, the command structure being quite convoluted. Nice character sketches of the principles, Nishimura (Especially Nishimura's hard luck record at sea) and Shima. I read a couple of Hoyt's books in the 80s, but got the same impression. A.A. Hoeling was another author in a similar vein. "Salvo" by Bernard Edwards is a classic example of that genre, especially the breathless description of the pregnant light house keeper's wife at Port Stanley riding her horse into town to warn Sturdee of Spee's approach. Makes you wonder about the other content in the book.

That style may just be a sign of the times, must be difficult as a writer to compete against TV, movies, and excellent documentaries like Dogfights where your visual senses are engaged. I can remember how seeing Victory At Sea as a kid fired my imagination for warships and started my book passion. I can stand a little drama as long as the information is good and learn something new (though that doesn't take much with me).

[old_pop2000]

Mike and Dennis:

He got some mixed reviews for the book from what I've read on-line. A little too dramatic at times, but I've seen that occur with other writers as well. I'm reading Edwin Hoyt's book "The Lonely Ships, The Life and Death of the US Asiatic Fleet" and he frequently falls into that trap, but I believe it was because he was more of a writer than an actual historian.

I am currently reading a book on Google titled "Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement from Diane Press. One article is written by Jon Sumida. The articles are aimed at discussing the changes in naval historical writing since the 1980's. It talks about the deficiencies of what they call the core naval histories like Morisons. It states that those core histories could not delve into the personnel conflicts or the black box of production. That new histories are getting into such issues as how production decisions affected the wars, how high level decisions have also. It's interesting. Diane press books appear to be on Google Books completely.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I am currently reading a book on Google titled "Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement from Diane Press. One article is written by Jon Sumida. The articles are aimed at discussing the changes in naval historical writing since the 1980's. It talks about the deficiencies of what they call the core naval histories like Morisons. It states that those core histories could not delve into the personnel conflicts or the black box of production. That new histories are getting into such issues as how production decisions affected the wars, how high level decisions have also. It's interesting. Diane press books appear to be on Google Books completely.


Hi Dennis,

Yes, one only has to look at the struggle the RN had in publishing an official history of Jutland to see the pitfalls. The official histories provide an excellent base of data to delve farther. Crticism is often muted as they are written closely after the event and the particpants still on active duty. Roskill was well aware of Ultra's impact, but couldn't write about it. They also generally delve into less "sexy" topics such as logistics as well. Roskill is particularly well written and I wonder how he could cover the RN in four volumes versus Morison's 15. Both are extremely useful references.

The revelation for me was reading Blair's "Silent Victory" in the mid 70s. Having read Roscoe's book in the 60s, I was frankly stunned by the problems with training and doctrine, the poor skippers in the first years, and the torpedo scandal. There was no coherent strategy between the two commands to throttle Japanese shipping until 1944. Lots of time lost chasing high value "Ultra" targets and special missioins to support guerilla warfare. Despite the long endurance of fleet subs, only a handful of actual training patrols to Empirem waters had been done to test the boats and crews prior to the war. Unrealistic peace time training leading to the use of the submerged sound attack as the preferred method.

[Kyle Holgate]

History books are sometimes hard to read even for one such as I that are very interested in the subject. Sometimes they can be very dry and I can only read a bit before I have to put them down and go find something more entertaining to do. They're like a boring professor who is providing a lot of good info, but not doing it so that he's holding attention very well. Then there's the other side where you get a good read, but it's factually deficient or misleading in some way.
It must be difficult to produce a book that is entertaining enough but also well researched and factual. They need a bit of both or they turn into textbooks or (nearly) fiction novels.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Yes, one only has to look at the struggle the RN had in publishing an official history of Jutland to see the pitfalls. The official histories provide an excellent base of data to delve farther. Crticism is often muted as they are written closely after the event and the particpants still on active duty. Roskill was well aware of Ultra's impact, but couldn't write about it. They also generally delve into less "sexy" topics such as logistics as well. Roskill is particularly well written and I wonder how he could cover the RN in four volumes versus Morison's 15. Both are extremely useful references.

The revelation for me was reading Blair's "Silent Victory" in the mid 70s. Having read Roscoe's book in the 60s, I was frankly stunned by the problems with training and doctrine, the poor skippers in the first years, and the torpedo scandal. There was no coherent strategy between the two commands to throttle Japanese shipping until 1944. Lots of time lost chasing high value "Ultra" targets and special missioins to support guerilla warfare. Despite the long endurance of fleet subs, only a handful of actual training patrols to Empirem waters had been done to test the boats and crews prior to the war. Unrealistic peace time training leading to the use of the submerged sound attack as the preferred method.

Hi Mike:
Shattered Sword is another good example of what we can learn, when we delve into the documents. Official histories, written soon after the event are usually hampered by the lack of documents which haven't been released. This is the advantage after the 1970's and especially the 1980's, the availability of documents is really helping to provide a look at how production management and other factors were played out.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

I've gotten about 30 pages in. He does a good job setting up the background situation and Japanese plans, the command structure being quite convoluted. Nice character sketches of the principles, Nishimura (Especially Nishimura's hard luck record at sea) and Shima. I read a couple of Hoyt's books in the 80s, but got the same impression. A.A. Hoeling was another author in a similar vein. "Salvo" by Bernard Edwards is a classic example of that genre, especially the breathless description of the pregnant light house keeper's wife at Port Stanley riding her horse into town to warn Sturdee of Spee's approach. Makes you wonder about the other content in the book.

That style may just be a sign of the times, must be difficult as a writer to compete against TV, movies, and excellent documentaries like Dogfights where your visual senses are engaged. I can remember how seeing Victory At Sea as a kid fired my imagination for warships and started my book passion. I can stand a little drama as long as the information is good and learn something new (though that doesn't take much with me).

Mike:

Captain Alan Zimm who is highly regarded in both wargaming (he programmed the long gone Action Stations) and in defense matters recommends the book for new insights, but was also the one tasking Mr. Tully's style. Interesting in that Tully was the co-author of Shattered Sword which I highly regard and I didn't see any of that kind of writing in there. I guess his co-author John Parshall reined him in?;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

I am currently reading a book on Google titled "Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement from Diane Press. One article is written by Jon Sumida. The articles are aimed at discussing the changes in naval historical writing since the 1980's. It talks about the deficiencies of what they call the core naval histories like Morisons. It states that those core histories could not delve into the personnel conflicts or the black box of production. That new histories are getting into such issues as how production decisions affected the wars, how high level decisions have also. It's interesting. Diane press books appear to be on Google Books completely.

Dennis:

There seems to be several generations of military history since WWII. First are the immediate books written by the victors often without consulting official records many of which were still classified. Morison falls into this vortex although he generally avoids the most jingoistic phrases (Try reading his contemporary Woodward's account of Leyte Gulf for a comparison).

The next generation was written by either the generals or admirals and can at times be self-serving, i.e. defending their actions. Even more suspect is the books written by the defeated. Does anyone really think that any high ranking surviving German general wasn't aware of the Holocaust and to some degree facilitated it? Yet we read about Guderian or Von Manstein and think of them as brilliant generals serving a bad cause. Too many of the fawning allied interrogators didn't ask the hard questions. Switch over to Japan and we see even more whitewash in the form of Allied censorship during the time period when the books were initially written. Add in the fact the Japanese don't like to remember defeat or the past or anything that could embarrass them and you get books were the authors were telling their English speaking collaborators pretty much they wanted to hear. Add in the atmosphere of the Cold War and Western writers wanted to hold up the Allied struggle against aggression as a metaphor for the Soviet and Western tension.

The next generation of historians had the Viet Nam War to color their judgement. It was OK to be anti-establishment and question the "official history". We start seeing more critical examinations of the what had been the conventional wisdom on any given military subject. Historical icons get criticised (justly and at time injustly). The worse problem here is the lure of historical revisionism. In these instances, the historian/writer begins their research with their opinions already made up generally due to an economic/political mindset. They ignore that which refutes their thesis. I have always felt it is the duty of a historian to revisit the past to gain a clearer picture of what happened, but not to revise due to a pre-existing agenda.

The next generation of military history really begins in the late 1980s and continues on to this day. With the great distance of time and the de-classification of archives, historians can look on their subjects with a more objective eye and a willingness to state the uncomfortable at times. It's only now that we are really getting better insights into Viet Nam. We are still too close to either Gulf War to do more than report current events. The real deal changer has been the Internet and the spread of available information. No longer can assertions and mistakes go unchallenged. Those with a desire to know more about what happened are demanding higher standards. Much more specialized publishing houses are producing detailed books on subjects that would have never been more than a chapter at best in previous decades (does anyone honestly think without the Naval Institute Press and the on-line historical forums that Norman Friedman's book on firecontrol would have ever seen the light of day?).

The point that historians like Sumida is making is that to understand the battles, wars and weapons, we need to see the much bigger picture which includes economics, technology and politics. And I think that we lovers of history are fortunate to be living and reading in a time where this is becoming more of the new model for historical writing. One can always hope. End of my long essay.;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Dennis,

Yes, one only has to look at the struggle the RN had in publishing an official history of Jutland to see the pitfalls. The official histories provide an excellent base of data to delve farther. Crticism is often muted as they are written closely after the event and the particpants still on active duty. Roskill was well aware of Ultra's impact, but couldn't write about it. They also generally delve into less "sexy" topics such as logistics as well. Roskill is particularly well written and I wonder how he could cover the RN in four volumes versus Morison's 15. Both are extremely useful references.

The revelation for me was reading Blair's "Silent Victory" in the mid 70s. Having read Roscoe's book in the 60s, I was frankly stunned by the problems with training and doctrine, the poor skippers in the first years, and the torpedo scandal. There was no coherent strategy between the two commands to throttle Japanese shipping until 1944. Lots of time lost chasing high value "Ultra" targets and special missioins to support guerilla warfare. Despite the long endurance of fleet subs, only a handful of actual training patrols to Empirem waters had been done to test the boats and crews prior to the war. Unrealistic peace time training leading to the use of the submerged sound attack as the preferred method.

Mike:

Blair is a perfect example of the way good history evolved and continues to. He has dispelled many a myth about submarine warfare in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Mike:
Shattered Sword is another good example of what we can learn, when we delve into the documents. Official histories, written soon after the event are usually hampered by the lack of documents which haven't been released. This is the advantage after the 1970's and especially the 1980's, the availability of documents is really helping to provide a look at how production management and other factors were played out.

Dennis:

Then factor in the language problems, at least when dealing with Japanese, and it becomes very difficult to mine the facts from the original documents. Parshall and Tully both allude to it in Shattered Sword and give get credit to their translators who helped decipher the subtle nuances.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

Blair is a perfect example of the way good history evolved and continues to. He has dispelled many a myth about submarine warfare in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Hi Ed,

Couldn't agree more. He passed a few years back. His volume on Korea, "The Forgotten War" is one of the greatest history books I have ever read. Beautifully written, enthralling, a page turner. The war covered from Harry Truman and post war collapse of the US Army to the final battles. The descriptions of the premature committments of US troops in June and July brings tears of pride and anger at the same time. Halberstam's volume came out a few years ago, but I didn't look at it. Blair's book is definitive. "Silvent Victory" and "Hitler's U Boat War" will be classics 100 years from now, but "The Forgotten War" is my favorite of his.

[Vince O'Hara]

There seems to be several generations of military history since WWII. First are the immediate books written by the victors often without consulting official records many of which were still classified.

The next generation was written by either the generals or admirals and can at times be self-serving,

The next generation of historians had the Viet Nam War to color their judgement. It was OK to be anti-establishment and question the "official history".

The next generation of military history really begins in the late 1980s and continues on to this day. With the great distance of time and the de-classification of archives, historians can look on their subjects with a more objective eye and a willingness to state the uncomfortable at times.

The point that historians like Sumida is making is that to understand the battles, wars and weapons, we need to see the much bigger picture which includes economics, technology and politics. And I think that we lovers of history are fortunate to be living and reading in a time where this is becoming more of the new model for historical writing. One can always hope. End of my long essay.;)

This is a subject of interest to me and I think Ed makes a good analysis (At least, I think along the same lines). The historiography of WWII does fall into "waves" and I think his descriptions are valid. I would add another wave that started in the late 70s with the revelation of ULTRA etc. There was a tendency to regard all the prior history as invalid and in need of rewrite in light of these new revelations. Also, more lately it has been a trend to revisit "received" conclusions in light of fresh and more inclusive perspectives. The way Shattered Sword challenges the traditional view of the Battle of Midway is a good example.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

This is a subject of interest to me and I think Ed makes a good analysis (At least, I think along the same lines). The historiography of WWII does fall into "waves" and I think his descriptions are valid. I would add another wave that started in the late 70s with the revelation of ULTRA etc. There was a tendency to regard all the prior history as invalid and in need of rewrite in light of these new revelations. Also, more lately it has been a trend to revisit "received" conclusions in light of fresh and more inclusive perspectives. The way Shattered Sword challenges the traditional view of the Battle of Midway is a good example.

Vince

Hi Vince:
I believe that what you are seeing since the '80s parallels what is occuring in the military. We see more top down research, more operational arts, more operational analysis. We see in historians, more opening up of the black box of production and government operations during wars to understand how priorities were set and production allocated. Operations during the war are now examined using threat analysis and assessment.

My pet peeve with Shattered Sword is the emphasis on Japanese carrier deck operation timing. They seem(I might be wrong)to assign too much of the blame for the disaster on that issue and not enough to the fact that Midway was a decoy and that good threat analysis and assessment would have recognized that, saving the second strike until a further aerial assessment could be accomplished. Tomonaga could not be certain as to how many of the land based defenses were disabled or destroyed, nor could he ascertain the exact number of aircraft destroy. The aircraft were the big threat from Midway. In modern warfare, threat assessment would be a priority before committing a second strike.

[Vince O'Hara]

My pet peeve with Shattered Sword is the emphasis on Japanese carrier deck operation timing. .

How are you doing Dennis?

I wasn't making any comment on SS's merits or demerits but it is representative of a new wave in WWII historiography. The authors are incorporating more information from the other side and discounting some of the information previously out there from Japanese sources. It's revisionistic in that sense.

Another wave that has become popular lately is what I think of as "Greatest Generation" literature. The veterans are disappearing and there seems to be a rush to produce books constructed around their memories.

As for Doing Naval History, I read that book not long ago and found it fascinating. One conclulsion one of the authors reached is that no one can be proficient in all the disciplines and languages required to produce useful naval history. You can take that for what it's worth.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

How are you doing Dennis?

I wasn't making any comment on SS's merits or demerits but it is representative of a new wave in WWII historiography. The authors are incorporating more information from the other side and discounting some of the information previously out there from Japanese sources. It's revisionistic in that sense.

Another wave that has become popular lately is what I think of as "Greatest Generation" literature. The veterans are disappearing and there seems to be a rush to produce books constructed around their memories.

As for Doing Naval History, I read that book not long ago and found it fascinating. One conclulsion one of the authors reached is that no one can be proficient in all the disciplines and languages required to produce useful naval history. You can take that for what it's worth.

Vince

Hi Vince:

Doin' great, and you?

I agree about SS, it discounts Fuchida and some others, going on squadron records that were rewritten, I believe, years later. It does do a good job of laying out the details of the deck operations and the timeline. I am not certain that I agree about the revisionist idea, this much detail about the operations and decisions on that morning has never really been explained in such thoroughness.

I have enjoyed "Doing Naval History", I have enjoyed their approach and their ideas. I am not entirely certain I agree with them all, but they do give you another pattern of thought about the subject of the naval history. I agree with the comment.

I can understand about the "disappearing veterans". I never really had a chance to discuss the war with my dad. By the time he wanted and I could, he was very sick and couldn't really remember because he was on morphine for pain. I believe that we should get as much as possible but remember that the memory can play tricks after sixty years.

Nice to hear from you, maybe we can discuss Midway in more detail. That would be fun. Just kidding.