Carrier Operations in 1939-1943 [Archive] - NWS ONLINE GAMING STORE / NAVAL WARFARE SIMULATIONS FORUMS

old_pop2000

11-16-2009, 06:36 PM

Over on the torpedo discussion - the Shoho was brought up. Question - did she have any business being there? How small can a carrier and its airgroups be before it's a sitting duck? Granted the Japanese had no idea that the Shoho would be encountering 2 USN Carriers, but the questions remain.

Shoho was providing air cover for Admiral Goto's transports in the occupation force against subs, air raids, it was defensive, not offensive. As far as Yamamoto was concerned, Enterprise and Hornet were west of Tokyo and Saratoga was undergoing repairs. This left Yorktown and Lexington to guard the west coast and Hawaii. Of course, they did not reckon on Nimitz and King sending the two to the SW Pacific area for operations against Rabaul and the protection of Port Moresby after Negat and Hypo both gathered sufficient signint about Operation MO.

Japanese planning was poor in this operation.

1. Operation MI and MO were planned too close together to provide sufficient assets for both to be completed.

2. Strategic objectives in Operation MO were too widely separated which prevented either force from providing mutual aid.

3. One of the primary requisites for MO was air supremacy over Port Moresby which the Japanese forces on Rabaul never were able to achieve, thereby requiring Takagi and Hara to move north into the Solomon's sea to provide the necessary air power. Inoue should have scrapped the operation when air supremacy had failed to materialize.

4. The supplementary operation to send 9 Zero's to Rabaul should have been scrapped. The delay cost Inoue the operation.

5. Poor reconnaissance by Japanese Mavis and Emily flying boats and recognition of enemy ships. Lack of proper analysis of this information and skepticism by Japanese officers

6. Primary failure to plan for what the enemy can do, not what he will do.

These errors are almost exactly the same as the ones made at Midway.

BTW: Below is a link to a picture of Shoho under attack. Look closely off to the right of a splash in the water. That is a TBD in a hard right turn, possibly that splash is her torpedo hitting the water. Second photo, notice the TBD at the bottom.

http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=1854

http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=2355

Kyle Holgate

11-16-2009, 07:45 PM

old_pop2000

11-16-2009, 08:07 PM

What about the light/medium carriers in general. Were ships like Shoho, Zuiho, Junyo and such worth while? Of course the US had the Independence class which provided significant numbers of aircraft. Then again, there were significant numbers of the light carriers too. If I remember right they were largely fighter carriers - with around 24 fighters and 9 Avengers. No dive bombers.
This too I find interesting - why did the USN decide to go with torpedo aircraft instead of dive bombers? Midway's experience would tend to lead one to believe that the bombers were the more effective of the two weapons. I agree with the torpedo planes over the bombers, but it would be interesting to know the decision process.

Hi Kyle:

A couple of good questions. Let me see if I can answer them.

First, Ryujo, while having an inefficient hanger, was a handy carrier as she had the speed to stay with the fleet carriers and could carry about 38 aircraft. She would be handy for providing ASW and scouting patrols along with supplimenting the CAP. Hiyo and Junyo were converted ocean liners with poor engines and slow. Their best capabiliity was escorting convoys, troop ships and delivering aircraft to island bases like Truk, Rabaul and Andaman Islands. Taiyo class were slow, same as above. Shoho was the lead ship in her class, carrying 30 aircraft with a speed of around 28 knots. Similar problems except her good speed allowed her to perform escort operations for operations like Tulagi. However, in the presence of fleet carriers, she was just a good target.

Now, as to our use of TBM's on the CVL and other smaller carriers. The TBM's were generally used for scouting missions, ASW patrols, and for glide bombing attacks. This relieved the fleet carriers from the responsibility of providing inner and intermediate patrols and gave the TG a supplementary platform for combat air patrols over the fleet. There were also night fighters like the F6F-5N and Photorecon aircraft like the F6F-5P.

If you examing the organization of TF 58, you will see the TG supplemented by one CVL. TG 58.1 had the Cabot, 58.3 had the Monterey and Cowpens, 58.4 had the Princeton and Langley. Air wing for these ships was 3 F6F-3s, 24 F6F-5s, 1 F6F-5P(photorecon), 9 TBM-1C.

Hope that was complete enough

old_pop2000

11-16-2009, 11:14 PM

Kyle:
I erred when I stated that Shoho was assigned to Admiral Shima. It did not hit me until I examined the location of her sinking on Google Earth. She was sunk north of what was then called Desboyne Island in the Louisiades, near the Jomard Straits. In that location, she had to be escorting the transports, not escorting Shima's Tulagi invasion force. To verify I read the interrogation of Masatake Okumiya, who was apparently the comm officer for the 6th Cruiser Squadron. He confirmed my suspicions. This would actually make more sense. I believe she left Rabaul with the invasion force on 4 May and headed into the Solomon Sea. Her course would have been SSE, then she headed more SE then S for short period. At that point, they must have been advised of the presence of Crace's cruiser force then headed WSW to a point near Deboyne Island. This would have been the 7th of May. That was the day she was sunk.

Apologies for the mistake. Hate it when I do that.:(

I went back, originally and edited the error, but decided to just post the proper information.

Mike Malanaphy

11-17-2009, 02:41 PM

Shoho was providing air cover for Admiral Goto's transports in the occupation force against subs, air raids, it was defensive, not offensive. As far as Yamamoto was concerned, Enterprise and Hornet were west of Tokyo and Saratoga was undergoing repairs. This left Yorktown and Lexington to guard the west coast and Hawaii. Of course, they did not reckon on Nimitz and King sending the two to the SW Pacific area for operations against Rabaul and the protection of Port Moresby after Negat and Hypo both gathered sufficient signint about Operation MO.

Japanese planning was poor in this operation.

1. Operation MI and MO were planned too close together to provide sufficient assets for both to be completed.

2. Strategic objectives in Operation MO were too widely separated which prevented either force from providing mutual aid.

3. One of the primary requisites for MO was air supremacy over Port Moresby which the Japanese forces on Rabaul never were able to achieve, thereby requiring Takagi and Hara to move north into the Solomon's sea to provide the necessary air power. Inoue should have scrapped the operation when air supremacy had failed to materialize.

4. The supplementary operation to send 9 Zero's to Rabaul should have been scrapped. The delay cost Inoue the operation.

5. Poor reconnaissance by Japanese Mavis and Emily flying boats and recognition of enemy ships. Lack of proper analysis of this information and skepticism by Japanese officers

6. Primary failure to plan for what the enemy can do, not what he will do.

These errors are almost exactly the same as the ones made at Midway.

BTW: Below is a link to a picture of Shoho under attack. Look closely off to the right of a splash in the water. That is a TBD in a hard right turn, possibly that splash is her torpedo hitting the water. Second photo, notice the TBD at the bottom.

http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=1854

http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=2355

Hi Dennis,

Certainly seems logical though it appears to be quite a splash. If you look just above the splash, you can see two more in the distance perhaps from attacks on her port bow. Pretty good timing.

old_pop2000

11-17-2009, 02:49 PM

Hi Dennis,

Certainly seems logical though it appears to be quite a splash. If you look just above the splash, you can see two more in the distance perhaps from attacks on her port bow. Pretty good timing.

Dropping the torpedo from less than 100 feet, the torpedo did not dive into the water, it dropped flat, so the spash makes sense. Immediately, the TBD would pull a climbing turn to the right away from the carrier and out of the path of the next TBD. As I said in another post, the coordination on this attack was textbook. That's why I put the pictures up, to get a sense of what a real attack looks like.

Mike Malanaphy

11-17-2009, 02:57 PM

Here is a link to, what appears to be good information on this tragedy. As they say, it should never have happened. Some of you have been alluding to this engagement on the other thread, so lets discuss this issue. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the information. If you have any information that contradicts this site, then by all means bring it up.

http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharnjuno.html

Hi Dennis,

The facts for both sites are pretty accurate. Clearly, Glorious was incompetently handled. Hughes had a reputation as a martinet and bully and obviously unwilling to listen to his specialist staff. Even though there is only inferential evidence on the matter, Hughes wanting to get back to court martial is waiting air group commander makes perfect, if tragic sense. The top not being manned, no air operations to protect the ship, his poor reaction to the appearance of the Germans, and marginal escort, brand him as an incompetent in the classic British sense. The crews of three ships paid a terrible price for his being in command. Glorious was much too valuable of a ship to be released early or not used to protect the other convoys.

Radio silence was a double edged sword here. The Germans were still reading the primary RN code and any chattiness would have only helped the Geramns to up their score including the King of Norway being evacuated on a British cruiser.

Kyle Holgate

11-17-2009, 04:24 PM

old_pop2000

11-17-2009, 04:59 PM

What about carrier deck and refueling/rearming operations. The USN and Japan did things differently. Not sure from memory how the RN did things, but I think they rearmed and refueled in the hanger deck as opposed to on the flight deck.

US Carriers had open, single level hangers. We used the deck park to rearm and refuel. Aircraft were usually brought down to the hanger during weather conditions but usually for repairs and such. We used CO2 in our fuel lines to purge after use. The deck park allowed our carriers to allocate more aircraft to the air wing, and the higher ceilings for the hangers allowed for aircraft and large sections of them to be stored aloft for easier access.

The Japanese had multilevel inclosed hangers after the British style. Top two layers were for the operational aircraft, if a third deck was available it was used for spares. During Operation MI, the third level on many carriers was used for the Midway Air Group. All aircraft had to be lowered into the hanger for rearm and refuel. No engine testing could be accomplished in the hangers. In our hangers, due to the open sides, we could run engine tests within the hanger. Our flight decks, until the Midway class, were superstructure not part of the hull as in Japanese and British. Our decks were not armored, but theirs were. Stowage of aircraft was angled to get all the aircraft in the hanger.

Overall, our carrier operations were faster than the Japanese. We could recover and launch faster. The Japanese could rearm the Val dive bombers on the deck but usually didn't. They brought everything down, rearmed and refueled, then brought all aircraft up, then proceeded to launch. Zero's were stowed on the first level, forward. Kates were stowed aft in the first level. Val's were stowed forward in the second level, with the remaining Kates after in the third level. One elevator serviced the forward section, one elevator serviced the after section of the first and second levels.

There is quite a bit more in the NAVJAPREP's on aircraft stowage, with diagrams plus refueling. Japanese fire fighting hoses were stowed along the side of the hanger. When the carriers ignited at Midway, it prevented the fire fighting crews from access these hoses. I believe that ours were stowed differently and we had doors to close off sections of the hanger. I don't believe the japanese had doors, just a curtain, which were destroyed quickly by internal hanger explosions. Our open hangers also facilitated fire fighting from ships moving along side. It also allowed us to move aircraft over the side to prevent further explosions. Once a japanese carriers elevator was hit, it was in serious trouble.

Hope that is complete enough, I am doing this quickly from memory. Hope I don't make too many mistakes. Shattered Sword is a good resource but you're at work.

john964

11-17-2009, 08:29 PM

US Carriers had open, single level hangers. We used the deck park to rearm and refuel. Aircraft were usually brought down to the hanger during weather conditions but usually for repairs and such. We used CO2 in our fuel lines to purge after use. The deck park allowed our carriers to allocate more aircraft to the air wing, and the higher ceilings for the hangers allowed for aircraft and large sections of them to be stored aloft for easier access.

The Japanese had multilevel inclosed hangers after the British style. Top two layers were for the operational aircraft, if a third deck was available it was used for spares. During Operation MI, the third level on many carriers was used for the Midway Air Group. All aircraft had to be lowered into the hanger for rearm and refuel. No engine testing could be accomplished in the hangers. In our hangers, due to the open sides, we could run engine tests within the hanger. Our flight decks, until the Midway class, were superstructure not part of the hull as in Japanese and British. Our decks were not armored, but theirs were. Stowage of aircraft was angled to get all the aircraft in the hanger.

Overall, our carrier operations were faster than the Japanese. We could recover and launch faster. The Japanese could rearm the Val dive bombers on the deck but usually didn't. They brought everything down, rearmed and refueled, then brought all aircraft up, then proceeded to launch. Zero's were stowed on the first level, forward. Kates were stowed aft in the first level. Val's were stowed forward in the second level, with the remaining Kates after in the third level. One elevator serviced the forward section, one elevator serviced the after section of the first and second levels.

There is quite a bit more in the NAVJAPREP's on aircraft stowage, with diagrams plus refueling. Japanese fire fighting hoses were stowed along the side of the hanger. When the carriers ignited at Midway, it prevented the fire fighting crews from access these hoses. I believe that ours were stowed differently and we had doors to close off sections of the hanger. I don't believe the japanese had doors, just a curtain, which were destroyed quickly by internal hanger explosions. Our open hangers also facilitated fire fighting from ships moving along side. It also allowed us to move aircraft over the side to prevent further explosions. Once a japanese carriers elevator was hit, it was in serious trouble.

Hope that is complete enough, I am doing this quickly from memory. Hope I don't make too many mistakes. Shattered Sword is a good resource but you're at work.Dont forget the Japanese CV's had continuious fire mains with no isolation valves, they were also made of cast iorn with no dampners and shock absorbers. When the bombs went of not only were they perferated by shrapnel but the blast shock shattered the pipes.

Christian Schwietzke

11-17-2009, 09:06 PM

old_pop2000

11-17-2009, 09:13 PM

Wouldn´t an open hangar deck, ceteris paribus, be somewhat less affected by the blast of a bomb or anything else that went off in the hangar, since the blast can "escape" through the open part, rather than being contained by the walls of an enclosed deck and probably being "funnelled" through whatever happens to be the weakest spot? I know I´m not expressing myself very technically here but surely you can tell what I´m trying to say.

Absolutely, an enclosed hanger will allow pressure from the explosion to build up, something you would prefer to dissipate. We had an opening forward and one aft, pluse the bow was open. It would dissipate the blast but also eliminate the build up of fumes in the hanger. Unfortunately, this did not help the Lex much.

Kyle Holgate

11-18-2009, 01:05 AM

old_pop2000

11-18-2009, 01:32 AM

USN CV's were not subjected to 1000 lb bombs (I think). I don't have my weapons books here (stuck at work still 1.5 hours after I should be home :(). How would US CV's stand up to US dive bombers? The Japanese considered the torpedo to be the ship killing weapon - and generally they were probably right. Midway was a bit of a fluke in that the targets were somewhat more vulnerable than might have been the case had they been more prepared for attack (ammo stowed, fuel lines purged/flooded with CO2, etc).

I suspect it would depend on the altitude the bomb was dropped from. The original proposal for the Yorktown's was to have a 2.5 deck to keep out 1000 lb bombs dropped from 5000 feet. The 1000 lb bombs would penetrate the flight deck but not the hanger deck. However, with our open hangers and better fire control on the fueling system, there would be terrific damage but the ship might be salvagable. The Val could not carry such a weapon so we were lucky. If our carriers were in a similar state of preparation, we might have suffered the same fate, but our carrier deck operations were much faster and with the deck load principle, the chances of such catastrophic explosions was minimized but still possible. It all depends on the timing. Timing is everything. We can look at Shokaku at Coral Sea, a new ship with better preparations, and she lived to fight another day.

Mike Malanaphy

11-18-2009, 02:39 PM

I suspect it would depend on the altitude the bomb was dropped from. The original proposal for the Yorktown's was to have a 2.5 deck to keep out 1000 lb bombs dropped from 5000 feet. The 1000 lb bombs would penetrate the flight deck but not the hanger deck. However, with our open hangers and better fire control on the fueling system, there would be terrific damage but the ship might be salvagable. The Val could not carry such a weapon so we were lucky. If our carriers were in a similar state of preparation, we might have suffered the same fate, but our carrier deck operations were much faster and with the deck load principle, the chances of such catastrophic explosions was minimized but still possible. It all depends on the timing. Timing is everything. We can look at Shokaku at Coral Sea, a new ship with better preparations, and she lived to fight another day.

Hi Dennis,

I re read the chapter in "Sunburst" about carrier design. The use of hangars certainly slowed the flight cycle in Japanese carriers. With no combat experience to guide them, the impact was lost on operational tempo was lost to them. Perhaps had the First Air Fleet had another year or two together prior to the start of the war, changing doctrine might have produced a different outlook. The Japanese never made damage control a priority in ship training and I would imagine the power of fuel or fuel vapor fires was totally underestimated. The British design for their armored carriers was to treat the hangar as a magazine with protection from aerial and surface attack because early 30s conventional wisdom lead them to believe they would always be under land based air attack. With no radar and inferior fighters, the RN believed it was safer to stow planes in the hangar and depend on AA fire and armor to protect the ship. The RAF assured them that no dive bomber would be capable of delivering any bomb heavier than 500lbs in the forseeable future. OOPs. The 1100 lb bombs carried by Stukas could defeat that deck protection.

It would be interesting to know more about the design history of Taiho. Laid down in April, 1941, it would be interesting to know what impact damage at Coral Sea and Midway had on her design and construction, if any or the thought of armor protection was a natural out growth of being able to build larger carriers that could carry the weight without the sacrifices made by the RN.

old_pop2000

11-18-2009, 03:19 PM

....It would be interesting to know more about the design history of Taiho. Laid down in April, 1941, it would be interesting to know what impact damage at Coral Sea and Midway had on her design and construction, if any or the thought of armor protection was a natural out growth of being able to build larger carriers that could carry the weight without the sacrifices made by the RN.

Taiho had a displacement of 34,200 tons with sophisticated fire fighting equipment and additional AA guns. She was a little bigger than Shokaku and had a reduced air wing. To maintain a low center of gravity, she had a shallow freeboard and one less deck than Shokaku, she had a fully enclosed hurricane bow with the hull extended upward and faired into the flight deck. She had an armoured flight deck and over the magazine/engine room areas. She had only two elevators but they were much heavier for protection. Her hangers were separated into five compartments by firewalls and the lower hanger separated into four compartments. The upper hanger roof and main hull girders were reinforced with special armored plates.

She would carry 63 operational aircraft and 15 reserve aircraft. She had a bulbous bow and two rudders. Engine Rooms and avgas tanks were designed with protection against 1700 lb bombs dropped from 2600 ft. level flight. AA and bomb magazines were safe against 2000 lb bombs. Vertical armor protection was designed against 203mm shell and the engine room and avgas areas were safe against destroyer guns. She had five protective layers with a triple bottom beneath all bomb magazines and avgas storage areas.

BTW, her loss near the Philippines from one torpedo was directly attributable to her enclosed hanger. Her damage control parties were unable to release the gasoline fumes in sufficient quantities to prevent the catastrophic explosion that occurred. Their only recourse was to open up all the hatches which only allowed the fumes to spread to other parts of the ship. Open hangers possibly would have alleviated that problem along with higher capacity blowers.

There is much more, but space and time only permits this information.

john964

11-18-2009, 04:06 PM

old_pop2000

11-18-2009, 05:26 PM

The USN was and still is fanatical about Damage Control. Look at the amount of damage some of our carriers took before going down.

Yorktown 3-4 bombs 2 airborn torpedos 2-3 sub torpedo. This on top of unreapaired damage from Coral Sea
Hornet 2 crashed planes 3 bombs 2 airborn torpedos

Others survived horrific damage or multiple incedents
Intrepid
Franklin
Enterprise
Saratoga

Yes, but they did forget some lessons during the Oriskany fire about thin walled WWII bombs, removing the safety pins on Zuni rockets and putting ground power next to Zuni's. Also, training all crew members to fight fires. Hard lessons but worked well in the Enterprise fire.

old_pop2000

11-18-2009, 05:55 PM

.... The use of hangars certainly slowed the flight cycle in Japanese carriers. With no combat experience to guide them, the impact was lost on operational tempo was lost to them. Perhaps had the First Air Fleet had another year or two together prior to the start of the war, changing doctrine might have produced a different outlook. The Japanese never made damage control a priority in ship training and I would imagine the power of fuel or fuel vapor fires was totally underestimated. The British design for their armored carriers was to treat the hangar as a magazine with protection from aerial and surface attack because early 30s conventional wisdom lead them to believe they would always be under land based air attack. With no radar and inferior fighters, the RN believed it was safer to stow planes in the hangar and depend on AA fire and armor to protect the ship. The RAF assured them that no dive bomber would be capable of delivering any bomb heavier than 500lbs in the forseeable future. OOPs. The 1100 lb bombs carried by Stukas could defeat that deck protection.

.

All the prewar carriers were spec'd at a particular size bomb dropped from an altitude around 5000 feet in level flight. They were not spec'd for a dive bomber, diving from 15,000 feet releasing at 2000 feet. Kinetic energy of the latter is much greater. A dive bomber diving at 400 MPH, is moving at 586.667 feet per second. I could be wrong, but maybe one of the math people can prove or disprove.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 02:43 AM

Found some interesting info - source: Victory at Sea. Ammunition allocation of USS Essex Dec. 31 1942.

100lb HE bombs = 500
100lb incendiary bombs = 300
500lb HE bombs = 300
1,000lb General Purpose bomb = 400
1,600lb AP bombs = 20
2,000 GP bombs = 20
Aerial Torpedoes = 36
Depth Charges = 300

36 torpedoes? Seems a bit light to me. Would be interesting to see a Japanese carrier ammo inventory. Only 20 actual AP bombs - guess they weren't planning on attacking battleships.

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 03:59 AM

Would be interesting to see a Japanese carrier ammo inventory. Only 20 actual AP bombs - guess they weren't planning on attacking battleships.

Ordnance load for the Shokaku class carriers was:

45 torpedoes
90 800 kg bombs
306 250 kg bombs
540 60 kg boms
fuel storage for 496 ton of avgas

Only 9 torpedoes could be handled simultaneously on the torpedo-arming platform

Unryu could carry 36 torpedoes and she was a Soryu class repeat so Soryu and Hiryu could only carry 36 also. Same for Akagi and Kaga. Parshall and Tully stated they carried ordnance for 1-1.5 strikes. However, other sources state 3 full strike loads. The problem is whether that means antiship or land attacks or both.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 04:47 AM

From Victory at sea again...
Essex had 91 aircraft - carried 240,000 gallons of Avgas (!). Average out each sortie to 300 gal per aircraft it comes out to 8.7 sorties each before the ship's out of gas.
For comparing - Shokaku = 72 aircraft, 187k gallons, also 8.7 sorties per plane.

The displacement in tons per aircraft is also a bit interesting. Consider that the purpose of the carriers is to carry aircraft (and ordinance).
Shinano - 70 aircraft, 71.9K tons, tons of ship per aircraft = 1.03
Other end of the spectrum
Ranger - 76 aircraft, 17.6k displacement, .23 tons per aircraft.

Yorktown - .27, Soryu - .31, Essex - .38, Shokaku .45, Indomitable - .66

Hmm. More to a carrier than just carrying of course, they have to have engines, range, damage control capability, AA guns and other stuff. Ranger was certainly not the best carrier even if she had the best ability to actually carry.

Christian Schwietzke

11-24-2009, 10:50 AM

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 02:31 PM

...

Hmm. More to a carrier than just carrying of course, they have to have engines, range, damage control capability, AA guns and other stuff. Ranger was certainly not the best carrier even if she had the best ability to actually carry.

The Shokaku class could carry 12 reserve aircraft. Now these were not spares, but fully assembled, operational aircraft that could be launched if necessary. This was still lower than Akagi at 91 and Kaga at 90. Hiryu and Soryu were smaller, carrying about 61 aircraft. Keep in mind, the Shokaku's were not hindered by treaty considerations.

Pre-war carrier construction was a hit and miss proposition. New ideas and combat experience changed carriers along with the mix of aircraft they were to carry. By the time of Eastern Solomons, we had two 18 plane fighter squadrons on board. Our carriers also had an overhead sprinkler system. Water isn't the best solution of gas fires, but it can reduce the heat around ordnance and keep them from exploding and it can extinguish some fires. It creates a mist more than a deluge which can reduce the possibility of explosion. Some other important factors. We had open hangers which means that exhaust fans were not as important. In early Japanese carriers prior to Shokaku, they had intake on the port side and exhaust on the starboard side. The problem with this is that it mixed the fuel vapors with fresh air. Later exhaust systems simply removed the air and fresh air was drawn in by leaving the elevators in the lower position during refueling operations. This procedure left the fuel vapors on the hanger deck. Fuel vapors tend to hug the deck, not rise into the upper areas. With the blanket of fuel vapor on the deck, it was easier to use the foam hoses along the side of the hanger walls to blanket the fuel vapors. Unfortunately for the four carriers at Midway, they were caught just after refueling and rearming, so the hangers were just disasters waiting to happen. Had we been caught in the same position, the same event would have occurred. We actually could have been, except our use of radar forewarned Spruance and Fletcher, who were able to empty out the fuel lines and fill them with CO2 and then push a fuel bowser over the side. These and other precautions helped prevent disaster for Yorktown.

But the key to the carrier was always the number of aircraft and the speed of recovery, rearm and launch. For about one hour to one and a half hours, a carrier can be a very vulnerable ship until the recovery is completed, and rearm and refueling are completed.

This maybe the one key factor at Midway. The failure to understand how time critical their actions were. In some cases, a ten to fifteen minute delay in making a decision, might have cost them three carriers. The lack of good intelligence about TF 16 cost them Hiryu. After the disaster of the early morning, had Yamaguchi simply turned to the west and headed away from the US forces, he would have spared Hiryu. Once the operation was cancelled, Hiryu and the 5th Carrier force along with the addition of Ryujo could have helped to rebuild the Japanese carrier force around those four ships. With these four ships available at Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz, in fact the whole Solomons campaign could have been different.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 03:36 PM

Surely you mean 1,030 tons per aircraft for Shinano rather than 1.03, don´t you? And similarly for the other carriers.
Yes- shoud have been clear it's talking about Kilotons (1000 tons).

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 03:42 PM

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 04:37 PM

Some of the Japanese carriers remind me a bit of their Zero fighter. Offensive to a fault, in that they were really not very capable of taking damage. Hiryu and Soryu were both fairly capable carriers - light displacement with good air wings. Their ability to take damage and survive is suspect. To be fair, we have only very limited evidence so perhaps with different bomb hits and different circumstances they could have lived to fight another day.
Kaga and Akagi however 'should' be fairly survivable. I won't say lucky hits killed them necessarily. The idea in ship survival is to reduce the impact of luck with good design and damage control. Luck is always going to be a factor, and some hits are going to be decisive no matter what. It appears that the damage control training and systems of Akagi and Kaga left them open for "lucky" hits.

I am not certain we can judge their carrier designs by the events at Midway. We can say that enclosed hangers and procedures that required the aircraft to be brought down into the hanger for refuel and rearm contributed to the disaster. We can say that because the flight deck was part of hull and not the superstructure, like ours, might have been a contributing factor but in all likelyhood, if our carriers had been hit in such a condition, they might have been lost also. Shokaku survived her hits at Coral Sea, which seems to indicate that without the conditions like Midway, their carriers were just as well protected as ours, maybe even better. However, there are some contributing factors that are outside the realm of carrier design and deck procedures. Poor reconnaissance considering they did not have radar. Insufficient combat air patrols and communications with those CAPs. Once the CAP was airborne, they were on their own and not guided by any fighter director, whether using radar or not. This essentially meant an uncoordinated combat air patrol action that failed to get the Zero's back up stairs. Failure of someone to count the number of torpedo planes attacking the ships. Had they counted the squadrons, they would have realized that they were facing three torpedo squadrons from three carriers. While they did not have scouting reports on three, just one, there had to be three carriers. There were too many torpedo planes and dive bombers attacking, for two carriers. This led to the destruction of Hiryu, she headed east to launch the few remaining aircraft, and was caught by the TF 16 attack aircraft. This was unnecessary.

The Japanese did learn from this disaster and the events at Coral Sea. They installed more fighters and changed procedures for damage control. This is exactly what we did. We changed the damage control procedures, added more fighters and revamped the FDO procedures. Even we had radio problems and radar problems. The FDO's could not talk to the CAPs because they were on the same channel during the action. The pilots were not shutting up. They had two CXAM radars operating at the same time, which caused interference. Everyone learned from the two actions, we just were a little faster in our procedures due to our practice before the war. It was always realized in US Navy that the side that scouted and found the target first, and launched first, would win the battle. It worked just that way.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 04:53 PM

I am not certain we can judge their carrier designs by the events at Midway. We can say that enclosed hangers and procedures that required the aircraft to be brought down into the hanger for refuel and rearm contributed to the disaster. We can say that because the flight deck was part of hull and not the superstructure, like ours, might have been a contributing factor but in all likelyhood, if our carriers had been hit in such a condition, they might have been lost also. Shokaku survived her hits at Coral Sea, which seems to indicate that without the conditions like Midway, their carriers were just as well protected as ours, maybe even better. However, there are some contributing factors that are outside the realm of carrier design and deck procedures. Poor reconnaissance considering they did not have radar. Insufficient combat air patrols and communications with those CAPs. Once the CAP was airborne, they were on their own and not guided by any fighter director, whether using radar or not. This essentially meant an uncoordinated combat air patrol action that failed to get the Zero's back up stairs. Failure of someone to count the number of torpedo planes attacking the ships. Had they counted the squadrons, they would have realized that they were facing three torpedo squadrons from three carriers. While they did not have scouting reports on three, just one, there had to be three carriers. There were too many torpedo planes and dive bombers attacking, for two carriers. This led to the destruction of Hiryu, she headed east to launch the few remaining aircraft, and was caught by the TF 16 attack aircraft. This was unnecessary.

The Japanese did learn from this disaster and the events at Coral Sea. They installed more fighters and changed procedures for damage control. This is exactly what we did. We changed the damage control procedures, added more fighters and revamped the FDO procedures. Even we had radio problems and radar problems. The FDO's could not talk to the CAPs because they were on the same channel during the action. The pilots were not shutting up. They had two CXAM radars operating at the same time, which caused interference. Everyone learned from the two actions, we just were a little faster in our procedures due to our practice before the war. It was always realized in US Navy that the side that scouted and found the target first, and launched first, would win the battle. It worked just that way.

If you re-read my post - I do suggest that using the single battle damage of Midway to judge the survivability of Hiryu and Soryu may not be a fair judgement.

In my case - I'm trying to focus on just the damage and how it was handled - and the resulting fires, taking external factors about CAP and searching out of the equation as these have been discussed many times.
My main focus is on the question of whether Hiryu and Soryu were too small and fragile.
Was their loss due to the damage at Midway due to : 1) "lucky" hits by the bombs 2) bad damage control 3) bad damage control design 4) bad situation (planes armed and fueled and such) or 5) bad hanger practices - not stowing ordinance properly for example.
It appears that a combination of these factors was involved.

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 05:18 PM

....
In my case - I'm trying to focus on just the damage and how it was handled - and the resulting fires, taking external factors about CAP and searching out of the equation as these have been discussed many times.
My main focus is on the question of whether Hiryu and Soryu were too small and fragile.
Was their loss due to the damage at Midway due to : 1) "lucky" hits by the bombs 2) bad damage control 3) bad damage control design 4) bad situation (planes armed and fueled and such) or 5) bad hanger practices - not stowing ordinance properly for example.
It appears that a combination of these factors was involved.

Hi Kyle:
You did say that, sorry. I tend to believe that you cannot leave the protection of carriers to ship design and damage control procedures. I believe that all the carriers were lost due to one factor which controlled all of the actions they took. Poor time management. Parshall and Tully do an excellent job of explaining this. Were the hits lucky? No, aircraft carriers are vulnerable to bomb hits. Even when zigzaging and prepared for the attack. Both of which they weren't. They were getting ready to launch the next strike, so they would be moving in a straight line. We can also point to carrier group alignment with the BBs and the cruiser positions. I don't have the information at hand, but it was a contributing factor. Was the damage control poor? No, not with the extent of the damage which wiped out the crews and destroyed the fire fighting system in the hanger. I am certain that the time factor seems to have caused the ordnance crews to forget proper procedure. However, remember that the ordnance elevators had to bring up the torpedoes, while the crews removed the bombs and installed the torpedo racks. The bombs either had to be sent down the elevator first, then the torpedoes brought up, or the reverse. If it were the reverse then the bombs have to go somewhere. That somewhere was the ordnance racks next to the elevators. Remember also that all the aircraft were refueled. Now were the hoses removed and stowed, after being purged? I don't know, have to see if Parshall mentions that.

I would agree that it was just a combination of factors but the poor time management by Nagumo and Kusaka was the key. They waisted 10-15 minutes minimum, deciding what to do. Yamaguchi, while impetuous, probably had some it correct. He said launch as is, with the dive bombers loaded and ready. The Kates could be launched later with the CAP. It might not have been pretty or procedural, but it would have cleared those hangers somewhat.

So, we are left with the following:

1. Poor reconnaissance and insufficient scouting aircraft

2. Poor time management

3. Poor strike organization for the first strike

4. Poor CAP procedures caused by poor radios and lack of radar

5. Insufficient fighters for the CAP.

6. Poor analysis of US actions during the morning and afternoon

7. Poor rearming and refueling procedures in light of the fact that they had already been attack by aircraft from Midway. This should have awakened someone to the fact that we had more aircraft on that island than they were led to believe and that we must have had prior knowledge of their operation.

This last one is important. When your intel is telling one thing and the action has indicated something different, its time to reevaluate the situation. Information in Yamamoto's hands about the failure of Operation K and the submarine cordon was never passed to Nagumo. He was making decisions based on the original time sequence and that sequence had already been shown to be faulty. I know you want to focus on designs, no problem. I don't think that the size of Soryu and Hiryu was a problem, they were the last of the treaty carrriers and were fast enough and built well enough to be a fleet carrier. The Shokaku's were better but under the same conditions, who knows.

An interesting idea would be to model the bomb hits on Shokaku with the same situation on the decks and in the hangers to see how it would have affect their operation. I suspect it probably did not matter.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 06:27 PM

It's your thread Dennis - you c'n talk about what you want to!
I'm just thinking that the Midway battle has been analyzed to death over the years - and much of the faulty information that has been thought to be true has been called into question by Shattered Sword. I think we have a pretty good idea of what happened and why from a planning, search & attack stand point.
I'm curious about the designs of the ships themselves, and how much of what happened was due to that - as opposed to having potentially good designs, but dropping the ball on damage control and/or ordinance disposal.

I am very hesitant to use some historical events as a point of judgement about any ship. The Bismarck rudders - often considered to be faulty, but if she'd not been hit there? Doubt anyone would suggest that. Hood's deck or Belt, Prince of Wales, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu.. the list goes on.
One has to look into the events a bit to determine if the KO blow was a lucky fluke - or if DC or a design factors were such that they allowed damage that otherwise would not have happened.
On the flip side we look at Iowa as an example of a superb ship design.. that was never tested by battle damage. Wonder if her torpedo defense would have proved as faulty as Yamato but we'll never know 'cause she was never torpedoed.
Anyhow - blathered on long enough!

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 07:25 PM

...I'm just thinking that the Midway battle has been analyzed to death over the years - and much of the faulty information that has been thought to be true has been called into question by Shattered Sword. I think we have a pretty good idea of what happened and why from a planning, search & attack stand point.
I'm curious about the designs of the ships themselves, and how much of what happened was due to that - as opposed to having potentially good designs, but dropping the ball on damage control and/or ordinance disposal.

I am very hesitant to use some historical events as a point of judgement about any ship. The Bismarck rudders - often considered to be faulty, but if she'd not been hit there? Doubt anyone would suggest that. Hood's deck or Belt, Prince of Wales, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu.. the list goes on.
One has to look into the events a bit to determine if the KO blow was a lucky fluke - or if DC or a design factors were such that they allowed damage that otherwise would not have happened.
On the flip side we look at Iowa as an example of a superb ship design.. that was never tested by battle damage. Wonder if her torpedo defense would have proved as faulty as Yamato but we'll never know 'cause she was never torpedoed.
Anyhow - blathered on long enough!

You do bring up good points about the ships or any ship. Until the ships are tested in battle, we don't really know how well the designs will hold up. We can compare the Essex short and long hulled carriers to the Yorktown class for reference. We can compare Taiho and the four lost at Midway. But until a ship is tested, it's really hard to know. We know that our Essex class ships were hit hard by kamikaze attacks and survived. We could use this as a yardstick of what was learned from the Yorktowns and first four battles of the war. However, Tailho and the rest of the Japanese carriers were not really exposed to the same kinds of attacks as the predecessors.

Now, if we examine design, what factors might prove valuable in preventing the loss of the ship? Hull design and compartimentation, armor and TDS, hanger configuration and flight deck. Do you have any ideas? This is an open thread, you cannot discuss carrier operations without discussing the carrier design. OK? I don't own this thread.;)

Christian Schwietzke

11-24-2009, 07:41 PM

On the flip side we look at Iowa as an example of a superb ship design.. that was never tested by battle damage. Wonder if her torpedo defense would have proved as faulty as Yamato but we'll never know 'cause she was never torpedoed.

But some of the older new BBs (North Carolina, for sure) were torpedoed, weren´t they? We can compare their torpedo defense to Iowa´s to get an idea of how Iowa would have coped. Less than ideal for a comparison, but better than pure theory.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 08:40 PM

But some of the older new BBs (North Carolina, for sure) were torpedoed, weren´t they? We can compare their torpedo defense to Iowa´s to get an idea of how Iowa would have coped. Less than ideal for a comparison, but better than pure theory.

North Carolina was certainly tested - got back underway and wasn't crippled or in danger of sinking. Her TPS design was somewhat different than that of Iowa or South Dakota. These last two ships were considered to have inferior TPS due at least in part to having the armor belt extending down to the ship bottom. Rigid armor isn't so good against torpedo hits even if it's not a bad idea against diving shells.

Information on the underwater protection of carriers is harder to come by than it is for battleships. Battleships are just much more sexy than silly bird farms I guess - big guns. Probably something Freud would say about that!:rolleyes:

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 08:47 PM

Mike Malanaphy

11-24-2009, 09:12 PM

But some of the older new BBs (North Carolina, for sure) were torpedoed, weren´t they? We can compare their torpedo defense to Iowa´s to get an idea of how Iowa would have coped. Less than ideal for a comparison, but better than pure theory.

Hi Christian,

I'm certain you can within limits, especially today when we have computers and a much better knowledge of the physics of explosions. You almost have to because valid statistical instances of similar damage would be difficult to find. In your case, the North Carolina was torpedoed, but her side protection system was different from the follow on South Dakotas and Iowas. To save weight and protect against diving shells, the inclined side belt of the South Dakotas was extended down to the ship's bottom to double both as a torpedo bulkhead and shell protection. This sytem was extended to the Iowas where the extra 10,000 tons of displacement was used to gain 6 knots of speed instead of more protection. The class A armor used was less ductile than than steel used in the North Carolina's and would not deform as well in an explosion. As we know, torpedo protection systems do not work like armor to keep a shell or explosion out, they deform with the force of the explosion to absorb it's force and keep it outside of the ship's vitals. The system would consist of multiple layers of liquids and voids and bulkheads to contain/deflect the gas bubble generated and any fragments the explosion produced. Friedman comments that tests showed this was cause the South Dakota to perform less effectively than the North Carolina system. Like other defense systems, side protective system designs had to be balanced against weight and space limitations within the design versus likely warhead sizes. As the war progressed, the explosive force of warheads increased beyond what most systems were designed to handle.

In looking at the Iowa design, her hull shape optimzed for speed constricted the space available for a side protection system from Turret II forward, definitely a vulnerable point for torpedo damage. Iowa's sytem was welded thereby avoiding one of the prime failures of Yamato's sytem which was compromised by it's rivetted construction.

D.K. Brown comments regarding the Job 74 tests the RN used to design the side protective system for the KGVs that though tests showed the system was effective, the actual number of tests was not statistically valid to cover all the possible effects of the explosion. Her system should have withstood the warheads used against her.

I'm going to have to learn to type faster to keep up with Kyle. : )

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 09:16 PM

http://books.google.com/books?id=-UT7MDTeKj8C&pg=PA235&lpg=PA235&dq=Torpedo+protection+system+Essex&source=bl&ots=HTclYTEFRg&sig=r2doKsOe4Tq20_8vk8v_x7-OSH8&hl=en&ei=TlMMS-2bGJPqsQOyxOWfAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Torpedo%20protection%20system%20Essex&f=false

Found this...

Hi Kyle:
I use Google books all the time. I even use it to search the books on my shelf. It's much faster. I have that book. Good work.

Mike Malanaphy

11-24-2009, 09:33 PM

Hi Kyle:
I use Google books all the time. I even use it to search the books on my shelf. It's much faster. I have that book. Good work.

Hi Dennis,

I looked at what Friedman had available in google books. Battleship Design and Development 1906-1945 was not one of them. : ( How does the page work as only part of Friedman's Submarine design volume was available to view.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 09:38 PM

Here is a link to a paper on TPS systems in WW2. Lots of interesting stuff on the Navweps site...

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-047.htm

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 09:53 PM

Here is a link to a paper on TPS systems in WW2. Lots of interesting stuff on the Navweps site...

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-047.htm

Totally agree, I have that bookmarked on my links across the top of IE.

Mike Malanaphy

11-24-2009, 09:55 PM

Hi Kyle:
You did say that, sorry. I tend to believe that you cannot leave the protection of carriers to ship design and damage control procedures. I believe that all the carriers were lost due to one factor which controlled all of the actions they took. Poor time management. Parshall and Tully do an excellent job of explaining this. Were the hits lucky? No, aircraft carriers are vulnerable to bomb hits. Even when zigzaging and prepared for the attack. Both of which they weren't. They were getting ready to launch the next strike, so they would be moving in a straight line. We can also point to carrier group alignment with the BBs and the cruiser positions. I don't have the information at hand, but it was a contributing factor. Was the damage control poor? No, not with the extent of the damage which wiped out the crews and destroyed the fire fighting system in the hanger. I am certain that the time factor seems to have caused the ordnance crews to forget proper procedure. However, remember that the ordnance elevators had to bring up the torpedoes, while the crews removed the bombs and installed the torpedo racks. The bombs either had to be sent down the elevator first, then the torpedoes brought up, or the reverse. If it were the reverse then the bombs have to go somewhere. That somewhere was the ordnance racks next to the elevators. Remember also that all the aircraft were refueled. Now were the hoses removed and stowed, after being purged? I don't know, have to see if Parshall mentions that.

I would agree that it was just a combination of factors but the poor time management by Nagumo and Kusaka was the key. They waisted 10-15 minutes minimum, deciding what to do. Yamaguchi, while impetuous, probably had some it correct. He said launch as is, with the dive bombers loaded and ready. The Kates could be launched later with the CAP. It might not have been pretty or procedural, but it would have cleared those hangers somewhat.

So, we are left with the following:

1. Poor reconnaissance and insufficient scouting aircraft

2. Poor time management

3. Poor strike organization for the first strike

4. Poor CAP procedures caused by poor radios and lack of radar

5. Insufficient fighters for the CAP.

6. Poor analysis of US actions during the morning and afternoon

7. Poor rearming and refueling procedures in light of the fact that they had already been attack by aircraft from Midway. This should have awakened someone to the fact that we had more aircraft on that island than they were led to believe and that we must have had prior knowledge of their operation.

This last one is important. When your intel is telling one thing and the action has indicated something different, its time to reevaluate the situation. Information in Yamamoto's hands about the failure of Operation K and the submarine cordon was never passed to Nagumo. He was making decisions based on the original time sequence and that sequence had already been shown to be faulty. I know you want to focus on designs, no problem. I don't think that the size of Soryu and Hiryu was a problem, they were the last of the treaty carrriers and were fast enough and built well enough to be a fleet carrier. The Shokaku's were better but under the same conditions, who knows.

An interesting idea would be to model the bomb hits on Shokaku with the same situation on the decks and in the hangers to see how it would have affect their operation. I suspect it probably did not matter.

Hi Dennis,

I would totally agree. Good intell gains you time to make those good descisions. Even without information from the K Operation or the submarine line, Nagumo was sailing deep into enemy waters and could reasonably expect to encounter USN units other than carrier task forces that could warn Midway ala Halsey's approach to Japan. Be it whistling in the dark or believing that the Americans would follow their script, Nagumo and his air staff could have done a much better job of searching the area around the task force their approach. Operation K and the scouting line were pretty thin reeds upon which to base your operational assumptions. Tone and Chikuma were specifically designed for such reconnaissance tasks and could have preceeded Nagumo on either flank to prevent surpise and to provide early warning. The margin here was close as Nagumo had only a short period between the detection of the Americans and the launching of their strikes to get his own planes in the air. Another case of how Nagumo was a poor choice to hold Japan's samurai sword at sea.

Nagumo had difficult orders to strike Midway and watch for the American carriers at the same time and counted on the USN following the script to maxmize the number of strike aircraft. The success of small numbers of Japanese naval aircraft at Coral Sea and Midway are a glimpse of how effective two deck loads could have been.

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 10:20 PM

Hi Dennis,

I would totally agree. Good intell gains you time to make those good descisions. Even without information from the K Operation or the submarine line, Nagumo was sailing deep into enemy waters and could reasonably expect to encounter USN units other than carrier task forces that could warn Midway ala Halsey's approach to Japan. Be it whistling in the dark or believing that the Americans would follow their script, Nagumo and his air staff could have done a much better job of searching the area around the task force their approach. Operation K and the scouting line were pretty thin reeds upon which to base your operational assumptions. Tone and Chikuma were specifically designed for such reconnaissance tasks and could have preceeded Nagumo on either flank to prevent surpise and to provide early warning. The margin here was close as Nagumo had only a short period between the detection of the Americans and the launching of their strikes to get his own planes in the air. Another case of how Nagumo was a poor choice to hold Japan's samurai sword at sea.

Nagumo had difficult orders to strike Midway and watch for the American carriers at the same time and counted on the USN following the script to maxmize the number of strike aircraft. The success of small numbers of Japanese naval aircraft at Coral Sea and Midway are a glimpse of how effective two deck loads could have been.

Hi Mike:
When Nagumo received the report of the cruisers and destroyers from Tone 4, didn't anyone question why US cruisers and destroyers were NW of Midway island? Maybe Tone 4 did not see the carriers for awhile but would't it be safe to assume that a carrier was laying close by. No one seems to have even brought up that possibiliy.

Nagumo had specific orders from Yamamoto to maintain one half of his force armed for antiship. He violated that order. If he had followed it, and waited until Tomonaga had landed, then bring them down, bring up the antiship aircraft, wouldn't that have been better and he would have followed his orders. After the destruction of all those Midway aircraft and the bases, Midway must have been of little threat to him, at this point. Why waste valuable time. Time he did not have, after the US were detected.

Another problem is that Nagumo was denied very important information about Operation K. As a combat leader, your plan estimates that the enemy has no information about your forthcoming operation. Then why were there seaplane tenders in the island up to Midway. Why so many aircraft? To me, Yamamoto was derelict. That information that he had was vital to Nagumo and he failed to provide that information to him and let him decide how to use it.

john964

11-24-2009, 10:37 PM

old_pop2000

11-24-2009, 10:53 PM

Kyle General purpose bombs are usally HE. These might also be SAP Semi-Armor Piercing bombs.

The 1000 lb GPs might have been the MK33 introduced in October 1942. It could defeat 5.8 in of class B and penetrate a 5 inch deck from 10000 feet. It was widely used.

john964

11-24-2009, 11:03 PM

1) "lucky" hits by the bombs
2) bad damage control
3) bad damage control design
4) bad situation (planes armed and fueled and such) or
5) bad hanger practices - not stowing ordinance properly for example.
It appears that a combination of these factors was involved.

#1 IMO The only IJN carrier at Midway that could be consider as killed by a lucky hit is Akagi with one bomb hitting near the mid-ships elevator and 1 near miss possibly taking out the rudder. The others all took multiple hits IIRC Kaga 4-6 bomb hits, with 3-5 hitting all along the flight deck and 1 possably hitting the island. Soyru 3 bomb hits all near the elevators. Hiryu 4 bombs all forward of midships.

#2 Yes, All IJN ships suffered from this, most IJN sailors were not adequately trained in DC, very few officers trained in DC prior to Midway, with little improvement afterwards.

#3 The ships all had major design flaws with regard to DC. eg Single loop fire main with few if any isolation valves, poorly placed fire stations, auxiliary DC gear poorly placed or hard to reach, low number of fire stations.

#4 and 5 IMO is a give in under the circumstance

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 11:04 PM

Kyle General purpose bombs are usally HE. These might also be SAP Semi-Armor Piercing bombs.

Totally agree. A battleship though may need actual AP to get through the main armored deck. GP bombs are probably just fine for carriers and lighter ships.

Kyle Holgate

11-24-2009, 11:12 PM

So - just for discussion purposes - Let's say Nagumo had 2 Lexingtons and 2 Wasps with Japanese crews and aircraft. Given the situation with the hits and improperly stowed ordinance and what not - would those ships have likely survived? Obviously the crews would be familiar with specific firefighting on board, but hopefully you get the point of the question.

One thing that the German army had was a flexibility in command at the front. This is one thing the Japanese lacked across the military spectrum. They were not trained to be innovative and take initiative. The US wasn't supposed to be there, so Nagumo just about ignored them until the carrier was spotted.
If Yamaguchi had his way they would have launched whatever they had right away. Some of the Aichis and Nakajimas would be heading out without the best bombs or without torpedoes, but given the skill of the pilots - they'd have hurt.
In addition if an immediate strike was sent with whatever was available - fewer aircraft may have been armed and fueled and maybe fuel lines would be drained.

Mike Malanaphy

11-24-2009, 11:29 PM

Hi Mike:
When Nagumo received the report of the cruisers and destroyers from Tone 4, didn't anyone question why US cruisers and destroyers were NW of Midway island? Maybe Tone 4 did not see the carriers for awhile but would't it be safe to assume that a carrier was laying close by. No one seems to have even brought up that possibiliy.

Nagumo had specific orders from Yamamoto to maintain one half of his force armed for antiship. He violated that order. If he had followed it, and waited until Tomonaga had landed, then bring them down, bring up the antiship aircraft, wouldn't that have been better and he would have followed his orders. After the destruction of all those Midway aircraft and the bases, Midway must have been of little threat to him, at this point. Why waste valuable time. Time he did not have, after the US were detected.

Another problem is that Nagumo was denied very important information about Operation K. As a combat leader, your plan estimates that the enemy has no information about your forthcoming operation. Then why were there seaplane tenders in the island up to Midway. Why so many aircraft? To me, Yamamoto was derelict. That information that he had was vital to Nagumo and he failed to provide that information to him and let him decide how to use it.

Hi Dennis,

Your certainly right about Yamamoto. It was his operational concept from top to bottom and was responsible for it's execution. I'm not so sure Operation K would have told Nagumo much of anything. A night time recon of Pearl Harbor seems iffy at best in terms of determining if US carriers are in port. If the carriers are not in port, it would reinforce the assumption that they are enroute to the Aleutians not Midway. Japanese information about the actual number of carriers available to Nimitz was highly speculative. Even had a couple of carriers been see in port, it doesn't really relieve Nagumo of his responsibility to tactically secure his operating area as others might have moved to the Pacific.

The spotting of USN cruisers/destroyers should have been a red flag to Nagumo. Not necessarily meaning the presence of a US carrier as there was a USN/Australian surface task group wandering around at the Coral Sea, but this is not in the script and should have borne further scouting. It offered the option of Nagumo delaying his strike on Midway while he checked the area for naval ressistance and eliminating it. The appearance of the USN was vital as the primary goal of the operation was it's destruction. Carriers still require screening vessels, so sinking them in numbers is almost as good as sinking the carrier.

When planning an operation, a combat leader makes assumptions based upon the best information he has available, there is no other reasonable course. The better your information, the less uncertainty there is in your assumptions. When there is uncertainty, you have to take matters into your own hands to protect the integrity of your force. I don't believe Nagumo had an impossible task, but surprise is the perhaps the biggest combat multiplier there is. The Japanese certainly were counting on it. There had been discussions and planning regarding the security of Nagumo's force enroute to Pearl harbor, the Japanese were certainly aware they could be discovered.

Early detection of the US carriers allowed Nagumo to strike first or fall back onto Yamamoto if he believed he needed additional support. The presence of the combined japanese force would have forced the USN to keep it's distance even had the Japanese invaded the island.

old_pop2000

11-25-2009, 02:18 PM

......
The spotting of USN cruisers/destroyers should have been a red flag to Nagumo. Not necessarily meaning the presence of a US carrier as there was a USN/Australian surface task group wandering around at the Coral Sea, but this is not in the script and should have borne further scouting. It offered the option of Nagumo delaying his strike on Midway while he checked the area for naval ressistance and eliminating it. The appearance of the USN was vital as the primary goal of the operation was it's destruction. Carriers still require screening vessels, so sinking them in numbers is almost as good as sinking the carrier.

When planning an operation, a combat leader makes assumptions based upon the best information he has available, there is no other reasonable course. The better your information, the less uncertainty there is in your assumptions. When there is uncertainty, you have to take matters into your own hands to protect the integrity of your force. I don't believe Nagumo had an impossible task, but surprise is the perhaps the biggest combat multiplier there is. The Japanese certainly were counting on it. There had been discussions and planning regarding the security of Nagumo's force enroute to Pearl harbor, the Japanese were certainly aware they could be discovered.

Early detection of the US carriers allowed Nagumo to strike first or fall back onto Yamamoto if he believed he needed additional support. The presence of the combined japanese force would have forced the USN to keep it's distance even had the Japanese invaded the island.

Hi Mike:
The chain of events prior to Nagumo arriving at a point NW of Midway is interesting. I-168 was watching Midway and reported US patrol planes leaving at 0400 hrs in the morning. This means they were searching out to 600-700 miles, much farther than the Japanese had assumed. They were also searching to the NW, the direction that Nagumo would be moving in from. why? In March, the same observations had been taken and there were few if any long range patrols. What changed? I-123 and I-128 both visited French Frigate Shoals and laysan Island. Both islands had seaplane tenders that were conducting long range searches. Again, why? What had changed in three months, since March.

Next problem is Akagi radio aerials had been reduced due to flight operations. So, Nagumo was not intercepting messages from these subs which Yamamoto must have assumed. Now, this information talks to the first four carrier battles. In all four, land based scouting by B-17s and PBYs found the opposing fleet for the US carriers. Did this not register with someone on board Yamato, that the US Patwings were operating out at a long range.

Ugaki writes on May 29th that radio interception indicates that enemy planes and subs in the Aleutians, Hawaiian Island and the Mid-Pacific are engaged in brisk activities. He goes on to comment; Exchanges of urgent messaes are at a very unusual rate. Certain indications make me suspect that they are taking countermeasures against our suspected movement rather than engaging in operations based on their own initiative. So, Yamamoto's COS has questioned, five days prior to the action, that the US may be on to the scheme. A plan that requires surprise and secrecy. The Japanese also intercepted radio traffic of a high order that told them that the carriers were at sea, not in Pearl. However, they assumed that the submarine cordon would detect them. That cordon was not in place yet and the US forces were already deployed. However they could have seen Yorktown because she departed later than TF 16. How much more information contrary to your planning assumptions do you need to realize, the opponent may not be surprised.

On the June 2nd entry he states that out of 180 radio exchanges observed in the Hawaii area, 72 were tagged 'urgent' . WE believe that the enemy are preparing to me us after having strongly suspected our movement. It has become especially almost certain that they have deployed subs in the vicinity of six hundred miles bearing SW of Midway and have intensified their guard together with planes. Notice the "WE". It isn't Ugaki anymore, its 'WE'. It appears, and maybe I am grasping at straws, that the Japanese were now convinced that their surprise was gone and that we were waiting for them. Did anyone bother to inform Nagumo? He is the point of the spear, sitting out there with few reconnnaissance assets. Would an assessment of what had been intercepted and the staff's ideas of what it means to Nagumo be something to transmit to Nagumo? Was it not something to convey to Nagumo before he arrives close enough to be detected?

I agree that you plan using the best available information. However, when information is arriving that contradicts most of your planning assumptions, or at least brings them into question, then it is time to analyze them and see what they could mean to your operation. I haven't seen anyting that says that they did that.

Mike Malanaphy

11-25-2009, 04:41 PM

Hi Mike:
The chain of events prior to Nagumo arriving at a point NW of Midway is interesting. I-168 was watching Midway and reported US patrol planes leaving at 0400 hrs in the morning. This means they were searching out to 600-700 miles, much farther than the Japanese had assumed. They were also searching to the NW, the direction that Nagumo would be moving in from. why? In March, the same observations had been taken and there were few if any long range patrols. What changed? I-123 and I-128 both visited French Frigate Shoals and laysan Island. Both islands had seaplane tenders that were conducting long range searches. Again, why? What had changed in three months, since March.

Next problem is Akagi radio aerials had been reduced due to flight operations. So, Nagumo was not intercepting messages from these subs which Yamamoto must have assumed. Now, this information talks to the first four carrier battles. In all four, land based scouting by B-17s and PBYs found the opposing fleet for the US carriers. Did this not register with someone on board Yamato, that the US Patwings were operating out at a long range.

Ugaki writes on May 29th that radio interception indicates that enemy planes and subs in the Aleutians, Hawaiian Island and the Mid-Pacific are engaged in brisk activities. He goes on to comment; Exchanges of urgent messaes are at a very unusual rate. Certain indications make me suspect that they are taking countermeasures against our suspected movement rather than engaging in operations based on their own initiative. So, Yamamoto's COS has questioned, five days prior to the action, that the US may be on to the scheme. A plan that requires surprise and secrecy. The Japanese also intercepted radio traffic of a high order that told them that the carriers were at sea, not in Pearl. However, they assumed that the submarine cordon would detect them. That cordon was not in place yet and the US forces were already deployed. However they could have seen Yorktown because she departed later than TF 16. How much more information contrary to your planning assumptions do you need to realize, the opponent may not be surprised.

On the June 2nd entry he states that out of 180 radio exchanges observed in the Hawaii area, 72 were tagged 'urgent' . WE believe that the enemy are preparing to me us after having strongly suspected our movement. It has become especially almost certain that they have deployed subs in the vicinity of six hundred miles bearing SW of Midway and have intensified their guard together with planes. Notice the "WE". It isn't Ugaki anymore, its 'WE'. It appears, and maybe I am grasping at straws, that the Japanese were now convinced that their surprise was gone and that we were waiting for them. Did anyone bother to inform Nagumo? He is the point of the spear, sitting out there with few reconnaissance assets. Would an assessment of what had been intercepted and the staff's ideas of what it means to Nagumo be something to transmit to Nagumo? Was it not something to convey to Nagumo before he arrives close enough to be detected?

I agree that you plan using the best available information. However, when information is arriving that contradicts most of your planning assumptions, or at least brings them into question, then it is time to analyze them and see what they could mean to your operation. I haven't seen anyting that says that they did that.

Hi Dennis.

Yes, very interesting set of circumstances. The Japanese were unable to decode the messages, but were well versed in traffic analysis. The problem is they had a very comprehensive and effective radio deception plan for the Hawaii operation. Without any other means of corroborating the origin of the signals, the information was of little use in painting the complete picture for the US. You have the same issue here making air reconnaissance even more critical to your security, if your Nagumo to reduce that bubble of uncertainty around your force. The presence of those signals tells Yamamoto little really in terms of whether to move forward or not. Not only were his forces not mutally supporting, they were unable to communicate with each other prior to enemy contact. A fatal issue. Had they been closer, you could have at least communicated by messenger plane. Slow, but at least it worked.

old_pop2000

11-25-2009, 04:43 PM

　
Admiral Ugaki on the June 5th entry, does a summation of what transpired and the problems with Operation MI. This is interesting since it is before the narrative about the events. In fact, the authors send you to the following pages, then send you back. Anyway, here is what the COS for Admiral Yamamoto states in his diary of June 5th. It starts on page 138. I will only present the first sentence of each.

1. There are question as to whether the enemy knew our plan, apart from its extent. [He does indicate that the activity in the area of Midway endorse that conclusion]

2. Our reconnaissance of the enemy was insufficient. [In point of fact, their reconnaissance in all the actions before and after were deficient. This is one poor area for the IJN.]

3. An unexpectedly large enemy force attacked our task force at its most vulnerable moment [He does state that a carrier force is vulnerable when it is attacking another target and has insufficient defensive forces like interceptors to deal with the situation.]

4. To the enemy's advantage, they attacked our force while ouir carriers were concentrated in one group, offering many eggs in one basket.[ This was a doctrinal different with the US forces. We had two separated, task forces. You find one but you might miss the other.]

5. The front area of our invasion plan was expanded too widely. [ Basically he saying that the forces were not in a mutually supporting position. This was true of the operations prior and after Midway. Again, Japanese carrier doctrine was faulty]

As one can see, Ugaki seems to have hit the nail on the head. What is even more interesting, is that during the table top exercises, these problems were brought out and Ugaki was the one that reduced the hits on Kaga and revived her to the consternation of most of the staff.

Maybe we can now discuss some of these in light of the carrier operations during the first years of the war.
　

Kyle Holgate

11-25-2009, 05:38 PM

old_pop2000

11-25-2009, 06:28 PM

The Japanese command structure always strikes me as very odd. On one hand you can have subordinates arguing with their superiors. On the other hand, once the orders are out - they were typically very rigid and not innovative. Taking initiative from the front lines and changing with the flow of events wasn't something they were particularly good at.
I'm not sure that Nagumo even had a clear idea of what the aim of the Midway invasion was. Did he know that the destruction of the US fleet was the priority and Midway was almost irrelevant?

Well, let the Japanese tell us what the objective was.

5 May 1942
1. Object of the Operation: By means of the capture of Midway, we will check enemy task force attacks against our homeland from the Hawaii area. At the same time, we will destroy the enemy fleet which will appear when our operation is underway.

Nagumo states that after attacking Midway by air and destroying the enemy's shore based air strength to facilitate our landing operations, we would still be able to destroy any enemy task force which may choose to counter attack.

So, what was the priority? To Nagumo, taking the island was the priority until the US fleet showed up to defend. The problem is, he was not finished with destroying Midway, in his estimate of situation. Based on intelligence estimates of the aircraft located on Midway, the attacks by those aircraft had been decimated and the base bombed to such an extent that it no longer posed a threat to him or the invasion force. So, had he simply followed orders to maintain one half of his aircraft strength armed for antiship operations, he would have been ok.
　
　

old_pop2000

11-25-2009, 06:51 PM

Kyle Holgate

11-25-2009, 06:57 PM

First priority of any commander is the integrity of his force. Of course you have to take risk to get a job done, but keeping his carrier force intact was vital to doing anything - be it taking Midway or defeating the Americans when they show up.
The US fleet was not supposed to be there, so when they did show up it did "not compute". I tend to agree with Yamaguchi.
We've spotted American ships. Launch whatever you have as fast as you can. If they have GP bombs instead of AP or torpedoes - oh well.

Mike Malanaphy

11-25-2009, 07:38 PM

Well, let the Japanese tell us what the objective was.

5 May 1942
1. Object of the Operation: By means of the capture of Midway, we will check enemy task force attacks against our homeland from the Hawaii area. At the same time, we will destroy the enemy fleet which will appear when our operation is underway.

Nagumo states that after attacking Midway by air and destroying the enemy's shore based air strength to facilitate our landing operations, we would still be able to destroy any enemy task force which may choose to counter attack.

So, what was the priority? To Nagumo, taking the island was the priority until the US fleet showed up to defend. The problem is, he was not finished with destroying Midway, in his estimate of situation. Based on intelligence estimates of the aircraft located on Midway, the attacks by those aircraft had been decimated and the base bombed to such an extent that it no longer posed a threat to him or the invasion force. So, had he simply followed orders to maintain one half of his aircraft strength armed for antiship operations, he would have been ok.
　
　

Hi Dennis,

It shows how locked into their planning assumption they were; that the USN won't show up until it was supposed too. No need to worry about extra air search taking B5Ns away from your strike because the US can't be there yet. My Christmas list has a book on Japanese intell in the Pacific war, perhaps there will be more on what information they actually had.

On the one hand, it's hard to fathom the amount of blind faith that went into this operation by experienced military professionals, but on the other hand, it makes the Pearl Harbor seem much clearer.

Kyle Holgate

11-25-2009, 07:57 PM

Mike Malanaphy

11-25-2009, 11:00 PM

Did the Japanese ever use their B5N's for recon'? I know they used a lot of float planes for that purpose. At Midway I believe there were 3 D4Y Suisei or B6N Tenzan (I forget which) on Kaga for recon'. I can't think of any time at least before 1944 that actual carrier aircraft were used for that purpose.

Hi Kyle,

I was reading Parshall and Tully today. They have a diagram of Japanese air search for the morning of the 4th. There were 7 aircraft launched. Two "Jake" float planes a piece from Tone and Chikuma, a "Dave" float plane from Haruna, and a B5N a piece from Akagi and Kaga. The "Jakes" had a range of over 1200 miles while the "Daves" only 485. A B5N could fly 1,025 miles. Soryu carried 2 experimental D4Y1 scout planes. They had a range of only 850 miles, but were twice as fast as the "Jake" or Type 97. There is a notation that one may have been lost in an accident before the battle.

The Japanese preferred to use float planes as scouts to preserve the size of their strike groups. Tone and Chikuma were specifically designed as scout cruisers and could carry up to 8 float planes. At Midway, they carried 5 planes a piece; three "Daves" and two "Jakes". The Jakes being the only useful long range scout plane. The battleships all carried "Daves".
I wonder if the lack of "Jakes" caused the single rather than double phase search plan.

I can't remember if Tone and Chikuma were present at the other carrier battle in the Solomons.

old_pop2000

11-25-2009, 11:25 PM

Hi Kyle,

I was reading Parshall and Tully today. They have a diagram of Japanese air search for the morning of the 4th. There were 7 aircraft launched. Two "Jake" float planes a piece from Tone and Chikuma, a "Dave" float plane from Haruna, and a B5N a piece from Akagi and Kaga. The "Jakes" had a range of over 1200 miles while the "Daves" only 485. A B5N could fly 1,025 miles. Soryu carried 2 experimental D4Y1 scout planes. They had a range of only 850 miles, but were twice as fast as the "Jake" or Type 97. There is a notation that one may have been lost in an accident before the battle.

The Japanese preferred to use float planes as scouts to preserve the size of their strike groups. Tone and Chikuma were specifically designed as scout cruisers and could carry up to 8 float planes. At Midway, they carried 5 planes a piece; three "Daves" and two "Jakes". The Jakes being the only useful long range scout plane. The battleships all carried "Daves".
I wonder if the lack of "Jakes" caused the single rather than double phase search plan.

I can't remember if Tone and Chikuma were present at the other carrier battle in the Solomons.

Both Tone and Chikuma were present at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. They were not present at Coral Sea. Probably would have been useful, had they been assigned.

old_pop2000

11-25-2009, 11:28 PM

Hi Kyle,

I was reading Parshall and Tully today. They have a diagram of Japanese air search for the morning of the 4th. There were 7 aircraft launched. Two "Jake" float planes a piece from Tone and Chikuma, a "Dave" float plane from Haruna, and a B5N a piece from Akagi and Kaga. The "Jakes" had a range of over 1200 miles while the "Daves" only 485. A B5N could fly 1,025 miles. Soryu carried 2 experimental D4Y1 scout planes. They had a range of only 850 miles, but were twice as fast as the "Jake" or Type 97. There is a notation that one may have been lost in an accident before the battle.

The Japanese preferred to use float planes as scouts to preserve the size of their strike groups. Tone and Chikuma were specifically designed as scout cruisers and could carry up to 8 float planes. At Midway, they carried 5 planes a piece; three "Daves" and two "Jakes". The Jakes being the only useful long range scout plane. The battleships all carried "Daves".
I wonder if the lack of "Jakes" caused the single rather than double phase search plan.

I can't remember if Tone and Chikuma were present at the other carrier battle in the Solomons.

A two phased search would have required fourteen aircraft minimum. There were two new Judy scouts and they were used as scouts. But there was never enough scouts without using Kates from the carriers. This is why moving Ryujo and Junyo into the 1st Striking fleet would have been a better idea. More interceptors and more Kates for reconnaaissance.

BTW, the Japanese installed search radar on board Ise and Hyuga prior to the operation. However, these two ships were both located in the Aleutian screening force. Fat lot of good that radar did anyone in the icy Northern Pacific while Nagumo was getting hammered by our ships. Which had radar, so did Midway. Range on those radars was about 60-100 km.

old_pop2000

11-26-2009, 12:05 AM

Instead of placing the radar on the two old battleships which were too slow to accompany the carriers, why not put that radar on the Kongo's. They were fast enough to accompany the carriers and that radar could have been invaluable from 0700-1035 on June 4th 1942. Besides not giving Nagumo adequate reconnaissance assets, they did not even give him radar which was available. The captain of the Akagi after the war stated to interrogators that none of the ships in the Midway force had radar. He also stated that at Kure, before they left he saw grid antennas on the Ise and Hyuga. According to NAVJAPREP JM-200-B E-01 chart, it was an anti-air radar warning set, Type 2, Model 2 Mark 1. It was installed on Ise. I also have corroborating data from Louis Brown's book "Technical and Military Imperatives: A radar history of World War II". So, Ise had anti-air search radar and possibly so did Hyuga, but they were relegated to Operation AL. You talk about screwing the pooch.

Kyle Holgate

11-26-2009, 12:58 AM

The Type 21 radar was fitted to Ise in April 1942 - Range from the Kaigun site is: Air group at 100 km, single aircraft at 70 km, surface ship (large) 20 km.
Cerainly would have been useful!

old_pop2000

11-26-2009, 12:59 AM

The Type 21 radar was fitted to Ise in April 1942 - Range from the Kaigun site is: Air group at 100 km, single aircraft at 70 km, surface ship (large) 20 km.
Cerainly would have been useful!

Yup, it certainly would have made the situation better. I wonder if SAS will allow someone to add air search to a ship and see how Midway would have worked out.

Mike Malanaphy

11-26-2009, 04:06 AM

Both Tone and Chikuma were present at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. They were not present at Coral Sea. Probably would have been useful, had they been assigned.

Hi Dennis,

They're large radius of action (12,000 miles at 14 knots) and seaplane complement made them excellent escorts for the carrier divisons. Originally designed as 6" gun cruisers, they were upgraded to 8" after Japan's withdrawal from the Washington Treaty. The grouping of turrets forward not only allowed a concentration of protection that made them the best protected of the 8" cruisers, but allowed comparatively spacious crew spaces in the after portion of the ship. Originally designed to carry 6 floatplanes, they were modified to carry 8 prewar, but never carried more than 5 during their careers.

They did not serve with the carriers until November, 1941 when assigned to Nagumo for the Hawaii Operation. They remained with Nagumo through the Indian Ocean operation where they did the bulk of air scouting. Both ships were in dry dock for the Coral Sea.

After Midway, both participated in teh Battle of Santa Cruz where Chokai was hit by three bombs and was severaly damaged requiring four months of repairs. Fortunately, her captain jettisoned her torpedoes before one the mounts took a direct hit. Chikuma was scuttled by torpedoes after being crippled off Leyte and Tone was damaged by bombs in the Sibyan Sea. Repaired she was sunk by dive bombers on July 24, 1945 in Home waters.

Tone's career was tainted by an incident in March 1944, when as part of an Indian Ocean raiding force, she sank the British steamship Behar. She took aboard 108 survivors. The divsion commander ordered the prisoners to be "disposed of", but Tone's captain refused that order. After dropping off 32 survivors at Batavia, she returned to Singapore. During that leg, the admiral ordered that the prisoners be beheaded and this time her captain complied. All 72 were killed.

old_pop2000

11-26-2009, 01:41 PM

....
They're large radius of action (12,000 miles at 14 knots) and seaplane complement made them excellent escorts for the carrier divisons. Originally designed as 6" gun cruisers, they were upgraded to 8" after Japan's withdrawal from the Washington Treaty. The grouping of turrets forward not only allowed a concentration of protection that made them the best protected of the 8" cruisers, but allowed comparatively spacious crew spaces in the after portion of the ship. Originally designed to carry 6 floatplanes, they were modified to carry 8 prewar, but never carried more than 5 during their careers.

They did not serve with the carriers until November, 1941 when assigned to Nagumo for the Hawaii Operation. They remained with Nagumo through the Indian Ocean operation where they did the bulk of air scouting. Both ships were in dry dock for the Coral Sea.

After Midway, both participated in teh Battle of Santa Cruz where Chokai was hit by three bombs and was severaly damaged requiring four months of repairs. Fortunately, her captain jettisoned her torpedoes before one the mounts took a direct hit. Chikuma was scuttled by torpedoes after being crippled off Leyte and Tone was damaged by bombs in the Sibyan Sea. Repaired she was sunk by dive bombers on July 24, 1945 in Home waters.

Tone's career was tainted by an incident in March 1944, when as part of an Indian Ocean raiding force, she sank the British steamship Behar. She took aboard 108 survivors. The divsion commander ordered the prisoners to be "disposed of", but Tone's captain refused that order. After dropping off 32 survivors at Batavia, she returned to Singapore. During that leg, the admiral ordered that the prisoners be beheaded and this time her captain complied. All 72 were killed.

Interesting information. I found that they only carried six aircraft with only two launchers, so that was slow. I don't think that those ships were anyway comparable to our eighteen SBD's in a scout bomber squadron. The SBD was faster and more maneuverable plus could carry a 500 lb bomb along with two smaller bombs under each wing.

As to incident with the survivors. People wonder why ol' Harry didn't have any qualms about nuking about 400,000 of them at Hiroshima or Nagasaki. There were many incidents in the war such as that one.

BTW, Vice Admiral Sakonji was later hung by the war crimes commission and the captain was given seven years. Only 72 were randomly selected for the beheadings on the quarterdeck. MacArthur's HQ tried to suppress and destroy evidence of such incidents, but a survivor kept the secret documents until his death in 1995 when they were released. This is another time when politics got in the way of justice. There were many other incidents that were never pursued due to our desire for the Japanese to become a democracy and help us against Communism in the Far East.

old_pop2000

11-26-2009, 04:11 PM

On June 10th, 1942, the cruiser Nagara finally met the Yamato steaming for home. Kusaka and others of the staff of the First Air Fleet came aboard to give their assessment and apologies for the failure. Here are some of what Kusaka gave as the problems. These are not in the order he gave them and I am paraphrasing.

1. The primary failure was conceit[victory disease]. Kusaka states that past successes and lack of studies of the means and steps to be taken, should an enemy air force appear on the disengaged flank while an attack was in progress, was a failure. Even after the table top exercises had, in fact, pointed to such an occurrance, they took no notice of it nor prepared for it. [This is possibly where the lessons from Coral Sea and Admiral Hara might have been useful. The strict timetable of the operation prevented any real assessment or analysis of his report on the Coral Sea action and lessons learned. Ugaki states that the operation should have been delayed and replanned based on some of Hara's information ]

2. The rendevous with tankers did not go well and a long wave radio transmission of fleets position necessary to accomplish the meeting. This was thought to have been picked up by the US. [It wasn't and had no effect on the operation]

3. Each carrier prepared a first wave and second wave.... the first for attacks on the enemy base and the second for antiship. This caused great confusion in the replacement of fighters and recovering of returning aircraft. The lesson drawn from this was that each group of two carriers should have been mission oriented. One group assigned to the attack on the enemy base and the other to the antiship mission. He goes on the state that a fifth carrier carrying interceptors would be advantageous[ Many analyst have stated that Ryujo or possibly Zuikaku should have been present to provide CAP and reconnaissance aircraft.]

4. Searches to the flanks should be made as soon as possible while reequipping of weapons should not be done prematurely until the nonexistance of an enemy force is confirmed[ This observation should have been simple. Follow orders and maintain one half of your aircraft ready for antiship. Had they done this and had adequate scouting, the problems of 4 June would never have occurred.]

5. Once an enemy force has been detected, whether adequate escorts are available or not, launch the attack against the enemy force. At a time when we will beat or be beaten, no time should be lost in indecision. A quick decision is all the more needed when there is danger that our damage would be doubled having so many planes on board.[Again, had the lessons of Coral Sea been absorbed, they would have understood this because Shokaku survived because she had no airwing on board and was prepared for the incoming attack. However, we see in this lesson, a recognition of the importance of time management. ]

As one can see, both Ugaki and Kusaka seem to have assessed the failures of the campaign fairly accurately. There were some basic flaws in this operation. One of which was observed; lack of concentration of forces to provide mutual support. But that would have required an observation that something could go wrong. There was never any observation like that at the top of the CinC staff. Ugaki is the one who changed the results from the table top exercise and therefore eliminated any assessment of the need to plan for a possible appearance, suddenly of an enemy force. He also the one who approved the sending of a signal to facilitate the rendevous with the tankers.

Many books and article point to the dual objectives of the operation as being a souce of the problem. I would disagree. Nagumo had two objectives, but they were capable of being discharged. He had effectively silenced Midway. A quick reconnaissance overflight of the island probably would have shown this. Why not send a reconnaissance aircraft to assess the need for a second strike. While this is happening, land Tomonaga, rearm and refuel these aircraft. Surface ships bombarding the island could have easily finished the landing preparation. The Midway air group was now depleted. It appears that Midway always posed more of a threat to the Japanese, in their minds, than did our carriers. Possibly because their land based naval air groups were so successful, they assumed that ours would be, which they weren't.

We should now turn to the later battles like Eastern Solomons. Also begin to assess US carrier procedures and how they could improve and what failures were present.
　

Kyle Holgate

11-26-2009, 04:59 PM

Many books and article point to the dual objectives of the operation as being a source of the problem. I would disagree. Nagumo had two objectives, but they were capable of being discharged. He had effectively silenced Midway. A quick reconnaissance overflight of the island probably would have shown this. Why not send a reconnaissance aircraft to assess the need for a second strike. While this is happening, land Tomonaga, rearm and refuel these aircraft. Surface ships bombarding the island could have easily finished the landing preparation. The Midway air group was now depleted. It appears that Midway always posed more of a threat to the Japanese, in their minds, than did our carriers. Possibly because their land based naval air groups were so successful, they assumed that ours would be, which they weren't.
　

I'm not sure I agree with some of this last statement...
Lt Joichi Tomonaga radioed back the need for a 2nd strike to Nagumo. So then does Nagumo ignore the advice of the man that was on scene and wait for a recon' flight? Midway is the only KNOWN threat in the area and at the time there was no reason to think that it could not be dealt with. There are many mistakes Nagumo made, but I'm not sure this was one of them. Planes from Midway attacked after the radio message from Tomonaga... clearly Midway was still dangerous.
Sure he should have discovered other threats and made better searches and kept a 2nd anti-ship strike and all. With the information on hand though, Midway was his only threat barring submarines. Neutralize it, then when the Americans come sailing to their doom - neutralize them. Sounds easy enough.

old_pop2000

11-26-2009, 05:42 PM

I'm not sure I agree with some of this last statement...
Lt Joichi Tomonaga radioed back the need for a 2nd strike to Nagumo. So then does Nagumo ignore the advice of the man that was on scene and wait for a recon' flight? Midway is the only KNOWN threat in the area and at the time there was no reason to think that it could not be dealt with. There are many mistakes Nagumo made, but I'm not sure this was one of them. Planes from Midway attacked after the radio message from Tomonaga... clearly Midway was still dangerous.
Sure he should have discovered other threats and made better searches and kept a 2nd anti-ship strike and all. With the information on hand though, Midway was his only threat barring submarines. Neutralize it, then when the Americans come sailing to their doom - neutralize them. Sounds easy enough.

Hi Kyle:
Possibly he should have disregarded it or simply waited until the first strike landed to get a full report on what was hit and what was missed. Tomonaga missed the airfields however, there were no planes on that field. They had left to attack Nagumo and been shot out of the skys. As an air threat, Midway poses no threat to Nagumo. Tomonaga knows that he hit the fuel dumps and that they are burning. The hangers and grounded aircraft were struck along with many of the AA batteries. Nagumo has another, more pressing threat that Tomonaga is not aware of and that is the US carrier force. Tomonaga is concentrating on Midway, but Nagumo has two threats to watch for; Midway and the US carriers. He now knows that he has effectively destroyed the estimated Midway air group and that Tomonaga has done considerable damage to the aerodrome facilities. It is now time to reduce the priority from Midway first, to US carriers first.

If he waits for Tomonaga to return, land and give a full report, he and his staff can best assess whether Midway is still a threat. He can then send a scout over the island to assess how many aircraft are still available, while reloading and rearming Tomonaga's first strike group. While this seems slower, it actually improves time management for the First Air Fleet. They can assess alternatives while waiting for Tomonaga to return and wait to see what the scouts locate, if anything, during their missions. If they find nothing, they strike Midway again, if they find the US carriers are present to their disengaged side, then launch the second wave configured for antiship with adequate escorts. Nagumo has time, if he uses it wisely.

This is not 20/20 hindsight, it is using all the data that was available to Nagumo at the time. It isn't a lack of data, it is how the data was processed and the conclusions arrived at that were a problem. The continued focus on Midway, distracted Nagumo from the other threat, that actually was more important. His decision making paradigm was faulty and placed him in a poor timing condition.

You idea is not incorrect, most analyst seem to favor that. But then they try to explain away the timing issue by stating Japanese carrier deck procedures were the problem. They wouldn't have been, had the proper decisions been made initially by maintaining the second strike with antiship ordnance and waiting for Tomonaga to land and give a full report. Especially after the multiple airstrikes by Midway aircraft, which Tomonoga is not aware of. Tomonaga has a reduced view of this mission, but Nagumo has a wider view, he has seen the attacks by the Midway air group fail and now knows that most of islands facilities have been struck although not completely. How much more of a threat is Midway? Tomonaga has no way of knowing that, but Nagumo does. He has both sides of the equation now. He is in command, not Tomonaga. Nagumo has more than just Midway to concern himself with and land based facilities are useless without aircraft, most of which were destroyed in the attacks on the First Air fleet.

Kyle Holgate

11-26-2009, 07:28 PM

old_pop2000

11-26-2009, 08:34 PM

At 0700 when Nagumo got his report from Tomonaga about Midway needing a 2nd strike Nagumo had no information (yet) on US ships being around. His choices were to ignore the recommendation, wait for confirmation and debriefing of the strike, or strike. To strike he had further decisions - to re-arm the anti-ship aircraft or land, refuel and rearm the returning Midway strike aircraft.

In my mind Midway was a known threat. The US fleet shouldn't be around (there was no reason for them to be). You have to get Midway 100% out of the way so you can concentrate on the US fleet when it arrives. The Midway bombardment force and landing force can take care of Midway once the airfield is neutralized. Nagumo did not have a check list of all aircraft on Midway nor a list of fuel dumps that can be crossed off as they are destroyed. He doesn't know if Midway is a threat just like he doesn't know US carriers are nearby. He trusts his Midway strike leader, and acts on the information.
If Midway needs a 2nd strike, faster and sooner is better than waiting. You allow time for Midway aircraft to land, runways to be repaired, etc.
Hit em hard, hit em fast. No time to regroup.
Now - if my time line is right - at 0740 he gets the report that enemy ships are nearby. It is THEN that Nagumo has quick and serious decisions to make. Here is where I am in agreement with Yamaguchi to launch whatever you have ready regardless of anti-ship or anti-Midway ordinance at the US fleet.

I am not going to play the 20:20 hindsight card - we all try very hard not to be influenced by what we know. I think our main disagreement is whether to trust our team or not. Tomonaga is supposed to be the "expert". I'd trust him.
Happy Thanksgiving by the way. About time for me to go do the usual stuff myself routine. No cooking, no cleaning up. I like it! :)

Hi Kyle:

Have a good and bountiful Thanksgiving Day. We've already eaten and my wife cleaned up.

Something to consider. At the time Tomonaga was recommending a second strike, Nagumo is being attacked by six TBFs and four B-26s. Later he is attacked, while Tomonaga is returning by 16 SBD-2s and 11 SB2Us. Finally, 15 B-17s attacked with the same results; no hits. All that was left of the Midway air group were the B-17s, six SBD-2s and five SB2U-3s. Tomonaga has no knowledge of this.

Remember Kyle, Nagumo had one objective; establish and maintain air supremacy over Midway before the invasion. However, he had two threats to that objective. By 0800, or thereabouts, one of those threats had been reduced to a minor if non-existent threat. The facilities don't drop bombs, only the aircraft and they need fuel. The surface ships could have dealt with the remaining problems on the island. Nagumo now needs to turn his attention to the next threat; the US carriers. While they haven't shown up, he still has to search for them and find them if they are. He has to move to the NE of Midway and allow the invasion fleet with its support ships to move in. The key is not that he doesn't trust his team, it is that the team, namely Tomonaga does not have the entire picture in front of him, like Nagumo. Nagumo has command and he still has another threat to be careful of. Tomonaga has the luxury of making a recommendation without considering that other threat, but Nagumo can't do that. He must consider that other threat.

Kyle Holgate

11-26-2009, 10:03 PM

Hi Kyle:

Have a good and bountiful Thanksgiving Day. We've already eaten and my wife cleaned up.

Something to consider. At the time Tomonaga was recommending a second strike, Nagumo is being attacked by six TBFs and four B-26s. Later he is attacked, while Tomonaga is returning by 16 SBD-2s and 11 SB2Us. Finally, 15 B-17s attacked with the same results; no hits. All that was left of the Midway air group were the B-17s, six SBD-2s and five SB2U-3s. Tomonaga has no knowledge of this.

Remember Kyle, Nagumo had one objective; establish and maintain air supremacy over Midway before the invasion. However, he had two threats to that objective. By 0800, or thereabouts, one of those threats had been reduced to a minor if non-existent threat. The facilities don't drop bombs, only the aircraft and they need fuel. The surface ships could have dealt with the remaining problems on the island. Nagumo now needs to turn his attention to the next threat; the US carriers. While they haven't shown up, he still has to search for them and find them if they are. He has to move to the NE of Midway and allow the invasion fleet with its support ships to move in. The key is not that he doesn't trust his team, it is that the team, namely Tomonaga does not have the entire picture in front of him, like Nagumo. Nagumo has command and he still has another threat to be careful of. Tomonaga has the luxury of making a recommendation without considering that other threat, but Nagumo can't do that. He must consider that other threat.

My main issue is that Nagumo doesn't have an exact count of what was on the island, and what has been destroyed. As you point out, just as the 2nd strike is being recommended Nagumo is under air attack from Midway. To me (and him, I would bet) that means Midway remains a threat.
You would have him assume Midway can be ignored at his point? What if there are no USN ships (which is probable based on what he knows) and the next strike from Midway hits something important?

I can see we are not going to agree here. I would want to make contingencies for USN ships were I Nagumo, but it's fairly unlikely they're out there yet. Best to be sure Midway's not a problem while I can so I can give my full attention to the US fleet.

old_pop2000

11-26-2009, 11:21 PM

My main issue is that Nagumo doesn't have an exact count of what was on the island, and what has been destroyed. As you point out, just as the 2nd strike is being recommended Nagumo is under air attack from Midway. To me (and him, I would bet) that means Midway remains a threat.
You would have him assume Midway can be ignored at his point? What if there are no USN ships (which is probable based on what he knows) and the next strike from Midway hits something important?

I can see we are not going to agree here. I would want to make contingencies for USN ships were I Nagumo, but it's fairly unlikely they're out there yet. Best to be sure Midway's not a problem while I can so I can give my full attention to the US fleet.

Hi Kyle:

Here are the actual estimates by the Japanese for Midway island:
Flying boats 2 squadrons
Army Bombers 1 Squadron
Fighters 1 Squadron

Now PBY's were not a real attack threat to Nagumo so we can discount those. The attacks on Nagumo consisted of 27 dive bombers, 4 B-26s and 6 TBFs along with 15 B-17s. Thats a total of 42 attack aircraft. We also know that Tomonaga and the escorts recorded a number of kill against the defending fighters. It appears, that the Japanese had actually accounted for all the aircraft that were estimated to be on that island. Even if Nagumo and his staff, discount the kills by 50%, the Midway threat has been neutralized.

As the officer in command, Nagumo has to evaluate reports and perform a threat assessment. There might be a subset of X number of original targets on Midway, left undamaged, but the real threat to air supremacy was gone. Buildings, runways are not threats. Shore batteries and AA guns will certainly be a threat, however, these can be attacked with gunfire from surface ships. If in doubt, verify.

Nagumo's failure was a poor threat assessment. He had all the necessary information in his hands to make a proper assessment of Midway's remaining threat. If not, send a scout over the island and reverify. Also, get a detailed report from Tomonaga after he lands. While this is transpiring, stay alert for the other threat; the US carriers. Send out more scouts, rearm, refuel and repair all the first strike aircraft. Nagumo had one objective and two threats. He had neutralized one threat, now it was time to deal with the possibility of the second. His time management problem never would have occurred, had he assessed the Midway threat properly.

old_pop2000

11-27-2009, 03:37 PM

For a contrast to what Kusaka and Ugaki stated as lessons learned. Here is the list of important points from Spruance's AAR to Nimitz. I provide it for comparison and discussion purposes.

(a) Losses in attacking planes are due primarily to enemy VF and not to A.A. fire.

(b) Ships unsupported by VF are easy prey for CV air attack.

(c) In duel between CVs side which is able to strike first blow without being itself hit wins.

(d) CVs are most vulnerable to damage from fire. This is especially true when they are caught with planes on deck.

(e) Carrier air groups should be complete units which have been highly trained while operating from a shore base before they go on board carrier.

(f) A carrier air group which has been in action and has suffered heavy losses should go ashore to receive its replacements and to train these until the squadrons and the group are again ready for combat duty. This means that replacement air groups must be ready.

(g) A.P. bombs suitable for our present dive bombers are required. With present 500 and 1000 lb. bombs attack against armored ships does not disable until ship has been knocked to pieces by many more hits than should be necessary.

(h) Strafing attack against DDs by VFs temporarily stops their A.A. fire by driving exposed personnel to cover

(i) Dive bombing attacks on DDs are not profitable because of the difficulty of obtaining hits on such a small and highly maneuverable target. Such attacks should not be made if a larger and more valuable target is available.

(j) Early and accurate information of movements of an enemy force to be attacked is essential for successful carrier operations. This should be obtained, whenever possible, by other than CV aircraft, both to retain maximum CV striking power and to avoid disclosing the fact that any CVs are in the area.

(k) The performance of our F4F-4 is reported as greatly inferior to the Jap "Zero" fighter. The ammunition supply for 6 guns of our VFs in inadequate. For use against the unprotected "Zero," 4 machine guns instead of six in our F4F-4's, with the weight saved used for additional ammunition, merits consideration. A new VF with greater range and maneuverability is required.

(l) The new TBF should be substituted for the TBD as soon as possible

(m) The advantages of operating at least two carriers together were manifest. The fact that the Enterprise and Hornet were in the vicinity of the Yorktown permitted many of her planes to go to these vessels after she was crippled and to continue to operate from them throughout the action. This both saved the Yorktown planes and made up for Enterprise and Hornet losses incurred in the first attack.

Note: Examine point J, does this indicate that he agrees with the way the Japanese handled reconnaissance? Use resources outside the fleet carrier wings to handle scouting. Assets such as land based Patrol planes or dedicated carriers to handle such tasks.

Mike Malanaphy

11-27-2009, 06:07 PM

Hi Kyle:

Here are the actual estimates by the Japanese for Midway island:
Flying boats 2 squadrons
Army Bombers 1 Squadron
Fighters 1 Squadron

Now PBY's were not a real attack threat to Nagumo so we can discount those. The attacks on Nagumo consisted of 27 dive bombers, 4 B-26s and 6 TBFs along with 15 B-17s. Thats a total of 42 attack aircraft. We also know that Tomonaga and the escorts recorded a number of kill against the defending fighters. It appears, that the Japanese had actually accounted for all the aircraft that were estimated to be on that island. Even if Nagumo and his staff, discount the kills by 50%, the Midway threat has been neutralized.

As the officer in command, Nagumo has to evaluate reports and perform a threat assessment. There might be a subset of X number of original targets on Midway, left undamaged, but the real threat to air supremacy was gone. Buildings, runways are not threats. Shore batteries and AA guns will certainly be a threat, however, these can be attacked with gunfire from surface ships. If in doubt, verify.

Nagumo's failure was a poor threat assessment. He had all the necessary information in his hands to make a proper assessment of Midway's remaining threat. If not, send a scout over the island and reverify. Also, get a detailed report from Tomonaga after he lands. While this is transpiring, stay alert for the other threat; the US carriers. Send out more scouts, rearm, refuel and repair all the first strike aircraft. Nagumo had one objective and two threats. He had neutralized one threat, now it was time to deal with the possibility of the second. His time management problem never would have occurred, had he assessed the Midway threat properly.

Hi Dennis and Kyle,

Nagumo did have a dilema, but the solution was underneath him. While searching for USN carriers with his strike groups ready, he can still do fighter sweeps over Midway to keep remaining American planes on the ground. Keeping a CAP over the island allows the ability to have photos takens to study Midway's defenses. There might even be time to fly them to the invasion for for their perusal. Parschall points out the numerical inferiorty of the SNLF landing force for Midway. Such information might have forestalled the attack or allowed those BBs in the main force to add their weight to a bombardment.

Kyle Holgate

11-27-2009, 06:10 PM

Hi Kyle:

Here are the actual estimates by the Japanese for Midway island:
Flying boats 2 squadrons
Army Bombers 1 Squadron
Fighters 1 Squadron

Now PBY's were not a real attack threat to Nagumo so we can discount those. The attacks on Nagumo consisted of 27 dive bombers, 4 B-26s and 6 TBFs along with 15 B-17s. Thats a total of 42 attack aircraft. We also know that Tomonaga and the escorts recorded a number of kill against the defending fighters. It appears, that the Japanese had actually accounted for all the aircraft that were estimated to be on that island. Even if Nagumo and his staff, discount the kills by 50%, the Midway threat has been neutralized.

As the officer in command, Nagumo has to evaluate reports and perform a threat assessment. There might be a subset of X number of original targets on Midway, left undamaged, but the real threat to air supremacy was gone. Buildings, runways are not threats. Shore batteries and AA guns will certainly be a threat, however, these can be attacked with gunfire from surface ships. If in doubt, verify.

Nagumo's failure was a poor threat assessment. He had all the necessary information in his hands to make a proper assessment of Midway's remaining threat. If not, send a scout over the island and reverify. Also, get a detailed report from Tomonaga after he lands. While this is transpiring, stay alert for the other threat; the US carriers. Send out more scouts, rearm, refuel and repair all the first strike aircraft. Nagumo had one objective and two threats. He had neutralized one threat, now it was time to deal with the possibility of the second. His time management problem never would have occurred, had he assessed the Midway threat properly.

You have just found a rattlesnake and whacked it once. It is still alive. Now you turn away from it and look for other rattlesnakes that may or may not be in the grass. Very good recipe to be bit.
Search for other snakes - but take care of the one you know first.

old_pop2000

11-27-2009, 06:48 PM

Hi Dennis and Kyle,

Nagumo did have a dilema, but the solution was underneath him. While searching for USN carriers with his strike groups ready, he can still do fighter sweeps over Midway to keep remaining American planes on the ground. Keeping a CAP over the island allows the ability to have photos takens to study Midway's defenses. There might even be time to fly them to the invasion for for their perusal. Parschall points out the numerical inferiorty of the SNLF landing force for Midway. Such information might have forestalled the attack or allowed those BBs in the main force to add their weight to a bombardment.

Hi Mike:
Fighters, fighters, fighters. Where does Nagumo get the necessary fighters for those fighter sweeps? He only has 18 fighters in a squadron times four carriers or seventy two fighters. Those seventy two fighters have already been reduced by combat losses and non-operational losses. They have to provide primary and secondary combat air patrols to protect the fleet and provide escort for the strike groups. Kusaka makes the comment that a fifth carrier for interceptors was advantageous.

The morning strike on Midway consumed 36 fighters from that 72. This leaves another 36 for the antiship strike, if it becomes necessary and combat air patrols. The best way to monitor Midway is to simply send a Jake on a recon mission over the island and see if any fighters rise to meet it. If not then examine the airfields to see how many aircraft are remaining.

Remember Mike, only 11 fighters were sent up prior to the early morning launch of the air strike. That's pretty skimpy for a four carrier task force so another 11 were being readied after the strike left. All in all, that's 22. With the 36 already sent, that's 58 fighters leaving 14 left to escort any air strike on the US carriers, if it shows. Where do I get the fighter sweep planes from? Tomonaga's strike? They won't be arriving back until 0830 at the earliest. If they all land by 0900, It will take me time to rearm and refuel, bring them up on the deck and launch; at least 30 minutes minimum. So, the earliest I can have fighters over Midway is 1030 hrs. Also, during the air attacks by the Midway air group, I really can't launch or recover aircraft. That will delay me.

old_pop2000

11-27-2009, 06:51 PM

You have just found a rattlesnake and whacked it once. It is still alive. Now you turn away from it and look for other rattlesnakes that may or may not be in the grass. Very good recipe to be bit.
Search for other snakes - but take care of the one you know first.

You certainly do need to monitor the rattlesnake, but you can do this with one Jake on a recon mission while you are rearming, refueling and repairing the first strike group. You don't forget about Midway, but don't waste your dwindling assets on a weakened opponent. Verify Verify, then hit him again. You have more than one threat. One has been reduced considerably. After Tomonaga lands, he can be questioned about the number of aircraft that rose to meet him and how many were on the island when they attacked. The rest went after the carriers. Add the two up and now you see that you have defanged that snake. Send a Jake and reverify. Be careful, there is probably another snake lurking about, beware of him.

john964

11-27-2009, 07:41 PM

Interesting information. I found that they only carried six aircraft with only two launchers, so that was slow. I don't think that those ships were anyway comparable to our eighteen SBD's in a scout bomber squadron. The SBD was faster and more maneuverable plus could carry a 500 lb bomb along with two smaller bombs under each wing.

As to incident with the survivors. People wonder why ol' Harry didn't have any qualms about nuking about 400,000 of them at Hiroshima or Nagasaki. There were many incidents in the war such as that one.

BTW, Vice Admiral Sakonji was later hung by the war crimes commission and the captain was given seven years. Only 72 were randomly selected for the beheadings on the quarterdeck. MacArthur's HQ tried to suppress and destroy evidence of such incidents, but a survivor kept the secret documents until his death in 1995 when they were released. This is another time when politics got in the way of justice. There were many other incidents that were never pursued due to our desire for the Japanese to become a democracy and help us against Communism in the Far East.By some estamets as many as 90% of Pacific warcrimes were never prosicuted. Only the most blatent and notorious were. Even some of the notorious ones weren't prosicuted like the Bio/Chem war testing.

Mike Malanaphy

11-27-2009, 08:37 PM

Hi Mike:
Fighters, fighters, fighters. Where does Nagumo get the necessary fighters for those fighter sweeps? He only has 18 fighters in a squadron times four carriers or seventy two fighters. Those seventy two fighters have already been reduced by combat losses and non-operational losses. They have to provide primary and secondary combat air patrols to protect the fleet and provide escort for the strike groups. Kusaka makes the comment that a fifth carrier for interceptors was advantageous.

The morning strike on Midway consumed 36 fighters from that 72. This leaves another 36 for the antiship strike, if it becomes necessary and combat air patrols. The best way to monitor Midway is to simply send a Jake on a recon mission over the island and see if any fighters rise to meet it. If not then examine the airfields to see how many aircraft are remaining.

Remember Mike, only 11 fighters were sent up prior to the early morning launch of the air strike. That's pretty skimpy for a four carrier task force so another 11 were being readied after the strike left. All in all, that's 22. With the 36 already sent, that's 58 fighters leaving 14 left to escort any air strike on the US carriers, if it shows. Where do I get the fighter sweep planes from? Tomonaga's strike? They won't be arriving back until 0830 at the earliest. If they all land by 0900, It will take me time to rearm and refuel, bring them up on the deck and launch; at least 30 minutes minimum. So, the earliest I can have fighters over Midway is 1030 hrs. Also, during the air attacks by the Midway air group, I really can't launch or recover aircraft. That will delay me.

Hi Dennis,

I'm anticipating a time frame of Nagumo lingering in the area for a day or two. With a fighter sweep of 9 to 12 planes the following day to suppress attacks from Midway. He has limited fighters, but fewer Jakes. Perfect mission for that lone D4Y1 : ). He is able retain the bulk of his fighters for fleet defense and have his anti shipping planes ready. In an emergency, he can send the strikes unescorted and saturate the small CAPs of US carriers.

old_pop2000

11-27-2009, 10:04 PM

Hi Dennis,

I'm anticipating a time frame of Nagumo lingering in the area for a day or two. With a fighter sweep of 9 to 12 planes the following day to suppress attacks from Midway. He has limited fighters, but fewer Jakes. Perfect mission for that lone D4Y1 : ). He is able retain the bulk of his fighters for fleet defense and have his anti shipping planes ready. In an emergency, he can send the strikes unescorted and saturate the small CAPs of US carriers.

Hi Mike:
But that is what Zuiho is in the Midway Invasion Force is for, to provide top cover using A5M4 fighters over the battle area during the invasion. Zuiho has 12 type 96 fighters and 12 B5N1 Kates. There is also CVS Chitose with 7 x F1M2 and E8N2 seaplanes along with the Kamikawa Maru. Remember the invasion is set for 5 June 1942, very short schedule in this operation. Nothing wrong with the idea though, if the US carriers don't make an appearance, Nagumo can move to the NE and station his force to the disengaged side of the battle area to protect against an unexpected appearance by the US Carriers.

Mike Malanaphy

11-28-2009, 04:52 AM

Hi Mike:
But that is what Zuiho is in the Midway Invasion Force is for, to provide top cover using A5M4 fighters over the battle area during the invasion. Zuiho has 12 type 96 fighters and 12 B5N1 Kates. There is also CVS Chitose with 7 x F1M2 and E8N2 seaplanes along with the Kamikawa Maru. Remember the invasion is set for 5 June 1942, very short schedule in this operation. Nothing wrong with the idea though, if the US carriers don't make an appearance, Nagumo can move to the NE and station his force to the disengaged side of the battle area to protect against an unexpected appearance by the US Carriers.

Hi Dennis,

The invasioin force had already been hot by a PBY torpedo attack so approaching the island while it's airfield is still acive is pretty risky. Nagumo is going to stay north of Midway anyhow to shield it from US carriers, the likely avenue of approach. So diverting some fighterts to a fighter sweep only helps the issue. A bombardment group of a destroyer division and a cruiser divsion could suppress the island as well to free up Nagumo. A quick victory would make flying down some H6K or H8K long range flying boats for real long range searches nice also.

old_pop2000

11-28-2009, 03:05 PM

Hi Dennis,

The invasioin force had already been hot by a PBY torpedo attack so approaching the island while it's airfield is still acive is pretty risky. Nagumo is going to stay north of Midway anyhow to shield it from US carriers, the likely avenue of approach. So diverting some fighterts to a fighter sweep only helps the issue. A bombardment group of a destroyer division and a cruiser divsion could suppress the island as well to free up Nagumo. A quick victory would make flying down some H6K or H8K long range flying boats for real long range searches nice also.

Hi Mike:
I would agree with that idea if it weren't for the fact that most of the fighters were shot down. The airfield is still repairable, but there is almost nothing to fly off of it and most of the fuel on Eastern island went up in smoke to an accident and to the bombing. Fuel has to manhandled from Sand Island now. Tomonaga knows he hit the fuel tanks. I would not recommend another attack on the island until I have verified the remaining aircraft and the state of the island's defenses. I can send in the 4th and 5th Cruiser division along with the 3rd Battleship division to bombard the island during the night and early morning to finish off the aircraft. As to the H6K long range flying boats, the nearest base is Wake island and that is 1447 miles one way. The Mavis had a range of around 2230 miles, so this is beyond her range. It might not be beyond the Emily with its 4210 mile range. However, that is a very vulnerable aircraft.

My theory is based on the idea that Nagumo has a limited number of aircraft and carriers. He does not have all six fleet carriers and their air wings. In fact, the hangers that would have carried spare aircraft now carries the Midway Air Wing. So he does not enough spares. He has only dealt with one threat and has reduced that threat. But he has another threat, that is unknown in size and strength at this time. It might be two US carriers or three. If it is three then he is outnumbered in aircraft. He does not know if they will put in an appearance immediately, but he must be wary. This is an unknown but powerful threat. I can't be distracted by a threat that may no longer exist, I have to verify the condition and level of that threat, then focus on the other. I have limited aircraft and can't afford to waste my efforts.

old_pop2000

11-28-2009, 06:19 PM

According to a strategic and tactical analysis accomplished by Admiral Richard Bates for the Naval War College, Nagumo estimated that the US air strength on Midway was two Patwing, one squadron of Army bombers and one squadron of fighters. In fact, that was an excellent estimate. There were two and half squadrons of PBY's, one Marine fighter squadron of 28 planes, one Marine dive bomber squadron of 34 planes and 21 Army bombers consisting of 4 B-26s and 17 B-17s and six Navy TBFs. Nagumo, based on what Tomonaga had encountered and destroyed, along with what his First Air Fleet had encountered, had disposed off almost all of the US air forces on Midway. That threat was now eliminated.

IMO, this was a staff failure, specifically Kusaka's. It was their responsibility to collect the necessary data and provide recommendations to Nagumo based on those facts. One such recommendation should have been to verify the remaining US air forces on the island before sending another strike. I

Admiral Bates in his lessons area of this analysis states the following:

Vice Admiral Nagumo's greatest errors were errors in judgment brought on by over confidence and improper analysis procedure. His over confidence and his thinking because of it, led him to make the most vital decision in the action after a perfunctory analysis. This decision to break the spot and rearm for land targets his air striking group which he had had staning by to attack any enemy surface forces dicovered by his search planes. He did this before his search planes had completed their planned search.

The accuracy of a pilot's observations when engaged in combat appears to vary inversely with the intensity of the defense. That is, the stronger the defense the less accurate the observations are likely to be. If follows that every pilot's observations, particularly those of positions strongly defended should be supported by photos taken during and fter the attack as actual proof of damage. The importance of such actual proof of damage inflicted on the enemy cannot be stressed too greatly as it may have considerable effect on succeeding tactical decisions. Whenever pratciable the pilot's observations should also be supplemented by those of a trained observer not required to engage in combat

I've only found this document today, but it does have some interesting lessons that are drawn. The last speaks to what I have been saying that Tomonaga's radio message was a recommendation by a man in combat. Nagumoa and his staff should have taken the time to assess the real damage and verify whether a break in the original plan was necessary. Those types of decisions can be ruinous to a combat operation if they are made too quickly without proper assessment of their possible consequences.

Something else to consider. Tomonaga is flying at about 9000 feet over Midway. He has just bombed the island, there is a tremendous fuel fire on Eastern island, smoke from that fire and burning aircraft, burning buildings, sand kicked up into the air etc. See some of the film John Ford took on the island during and after the attack, he was there. How does Tomonaga get an accurate assessment of the damage his has or hasn't done. About all he can see is tarmac airfields with holes in them. Trust me, dive bomber pilots I have talked with say that above 5000 feet, you can't see anything, no matter how clear it is. Do you base a decision to break a deck spot, on the observations of one flight leader under these conditions, despite his best intentions and capabilities?

Think of Midway as a decoy, which very accurately decoyed Japanese air strength to it, consuming it, leaving the Japanese vulnerable to attack by our carriers, carriers which should have been detected had the Japanese launched their search planes first, instead of after the morning strike on Midway. Accurate threat assessment would have revealed that Midway was no longer a threat, but a decoy. The real threat, while not immediately known, was still lurking to the NE.

old_pop2000

11-29-2009, 04:13 PM

As most of us know, long range, land based search by two and four engined flying boats and Army bombers played a key role in the first four carrier battles of the war. In fact, the Japanese capture of Tulagi during Operation MO was designed to establish a seaplane reconnaissance base at Florida Island to monitor the SW Pacific area specifically the Coral Sea and passage between San Cristobal Island and New Caledonia.

In Operation MI, one of the deficiencies noted by analyst is the lack of such assets for the Japanese side. Their Operation K was a bust and this did affect their ability to detect our carrier force. Submarines are used for this purpose, however, they sit too low in the water so their horizon is very short. An aircraft flying even at 5000 Ft. has a horizon at 86.62 miles, at 10000 feet its 122 miles. Remember this is a radius, so you do the math about the total area an aircraft flying at 10000 feet can cover.

The question then becomes, the coordination of such assets and the forwarding of the intelligence gathered to all combat elements that require that information.

We know from Guadalcanal, that even though SW Pacific had flying boats and the Aussies had twin engine recon planes out, Mikawa's force managed to remain undetected probably due to the failure of the coordination of the information.

So, How much effect did this kind of scouting have, and how do you coordinate the gathering, analysis and forwarding of the intelligence gleaned, to the necessary combat units?

Kyle Holgate

11-29-2009, 05:39 PM

old_pop2000

11-29-2009, 05:53 PM

Mikawa's force was in fact detected at 10:30 in the morning by an Australian search plane flying out of Milne bay, heading south from Rabaul. Instead of breaking radio silence to report this, the crew waited until they returned to base in the afternoon. The report reached the forces at Guadalcanal around 7PM that evening.

During a meeting between Admirals Turner and Crutchley with General Vandegrift the message arrived about the ships. Turner had already received 2 warnings from Nimitz's headquarters that Mikawa's force was at sea. Further CINCPAC intelligence had intercepted a message from Mikawa stating his intention to rendezvous with his force near Bougainville and proceed to Guadalcanal for operations against the enemy convoy. This last was not decrypted til Aug. 23rd.

As with Midway's Japanese debacle - a comedy of errors lead to a major defeat, this time for the US forces.

Hi Kyle:
He was, in fact, sighted three times, mate. A USAAF B-17 spotted his force south of New Ireland at 1800 on the 7th of August. A US submarine sighted him at 2000 hrs east of New Britain. Because of the proximity to his base, these sightings were discounted. The third sighting was at 1026 on the 8th August by an Australian Hudson east of Bougainville, he reported two Seaplanes accompanying the force and again, the force was assumed to be escorting these ships to establish a forward seaplane base. Remember that threat analysis should always begin with the concept of assessing the enemies capabilities, not intentions.

So, while they were sighted, threat analysis was faulty, again. This time by Allied forces specifically Admiral Turner. Now, to his credit, Admiral Turner did request another reconnaissance flight by McCain's SW forces. It is possible this force would have detected Mikawa in a position that might have triggered the proper analysis with the proper conclusion.

This is the point of the question. How do you coordinate search activities and perform an accurate threat assessment based on that information. I believe this is vital especially when your air cover is gone or unavailable at night and your forces are vulnerable. Threat analysis and assessment is critical in today's high threat environment but as we can see, it was also important in the Pacific or anywhere for that matter. Mikawa's force, based on what we know, was undetected when he arrived at Savo Island. We could use the term 'unperceived' threat if you wish.

Kyle Holgate

11-29-2009, 09:23 PM

old_pop2000

11-29-2009, 11:17 PM

Dennis you said originally: "Mikawa's force managed to remain undetected" - which is what I was responding to. And since were were talking Aussies - that is the contact report I was focusing on, not the sum total of how many times Mikawa was spotted or trying to get into a 'one up' here on our historical knowledge (or ability to research). :)

Intentions is the biggest part of deciding what to do. You've spotted ships - so? What are they gonna do? You can try to think of what you'd do in their place and using what knowledge you have of their speeds figure out how far they can go in various time blocks. Beyond that though, it really is only (hopefully educated) guesswork.
Kurita at Leyte comes to mind...

Kyle:
Mikawa's force was undetected when it arrived at Savo Island. It was never in visual contact with Allied reconnaissance after the 1100 sighting.

Intentions are a large part of threat assessment. One has to decide the type of threat, likely composition, abilities to strike, direction and possible consequences of the threat. Aerial reconnaissance information must be reported in a timely manner to the on-scene commander to allow his staff to accurately compare their threat analysis with the raw sighting data. If they require more data, then they can order more reconnaissance flight to maintain contact. You always assess on the basis of capabilities not intentions. Did the Japanese have a force capable of moving down the slot and attacking the transports? Do they have good night combat capability? Do they know the area like the slot? What alternative methods of attack do they have? How long would it take a force, detected east of Bougainville at 15 knots to arrive at the sound? Remember that the first 24 hrs of any invasion is the most critical. The Japanese should know this as well as anyone. There shouldn't be any real guesswork in threat assessment. The assessment should be based on prior knowledge of your enemies capabilities and tendencies, along with the forces he has available in the area.

Mike Malanaphy

11-30-2009, 01:50 AM

Kyle:
Mikawa's force was undetected when it arrived at Savo Island. It was never in visual contact with Allied reconnaissance after the 1100 sighting.

Intentions are a large part of threat assessment. One has to decide the type of threat, likely composition, abilities to strike, direction and possible consequences of the threat. Aerial reconnaissance information must be reported in a timely manner to the on-scene commander to allow his staff to accurately compare their threat analysis with the raw sighting data. If they require more data, then they can order more reconnaissance flight to maintain contact. You always assess on the basis of capabilities not intentions. Did the Japanese have a force capable of moving down the slot and attacking the transports? Do they have good night combat capability? Do they know the area like the slot? What alternative methods of attack do they have? How long would it take a force, detected east of Bougainville at 15 knots to arrive at the sound? Remember that the first 24 hrs of any invasion is the most critical. The Japanese should know this as well as anyone. There shouldn't be any real guesswork in threat assessment. The assessment should be based on prior knowledge of your enemies capabilities and tendencies, along with the forces he has available in the area.

Hi Dennis and Kyle,

The dissemination of intelligence is a key factor in it being combat multiplier. Over the course of the war, the USN put together a huge organization to do so. Harshly, but rightly, the commander is responsible for those decisions, sometimes based upon little or no information. Just as Nagumo should have searched, Turner was responsible for anticipating that a surface attack was a likely threat. In fairness, he did, but a number of pernicious factors delivered his force into the hands of Mikawa. The surface forces had no experience in combat, so the normal combat rigors that weeded bad skippers out of the sub force and honed combat attitudes had not happened.

In retrospect, Turner's tactics seemed faulty, but he divided his forces to provide 360 coverage to the transport area and put out radar pickets for early warning on the two most likely approaches. The Northern and Southern forces individually were almost a match for Mikawa not counting his torpedoes. In the end, his tactics prevented the Japanese from getting to the transports, but at a terrible price. The USN surfaces forces equivalent of Kasserine Pass.

old_pop2000

11-30-2009, 02:06 AM

Hi Dennis and Kyle,

The dissemination of intelligence is a key factor in it being combat multiplier. Over the course of the war, the USN put together a huge organization to do so. Harshly, but rightly, the commander is responsible for those decisions, sometimes based upon little or no information. Just as Nagumo should have searched, Turner was responsible for anticipating that a surface attack was a likely threat. In fairness, he did, but a number of pernicious factors delivered his force into the hands of Mikawa. The surface forces had no experience in combat, so the normal combat rigors that weeded bad skippers out of the sub force and honed combat attitudes had not happened.

In retrospect, Turner's tactics seemed faulty, but he divided his forces to provide 360 coverage to the transport area and put out radar pickets for early warning on the two most likely approaches. The Northern and Southern forces individually were almost a match for Mikawa not counting his torpedoes. In the end, his tactics prevented the Japanese from getting to the transports, but at a terrible price. The USN surfaces forces equivalent of Kasserine Pass.

Hi Mike:
My comment is that, Mikawa did not get to the transports mainly because of Mikawa, not because of the US forces. Had he continue dead ahead into the sound instead of rounding the island, he was in perfect position to destroy the transports. The northern force was not in a position to stop him.

The key is, the dissemination of vital information is important. That is my question about this action. Poor threat assessment and even poorer information flow prevented any sort of awareness on the part of Crutchley and his forces, of the Mikawa threat. The first three sightings were important, however, further reconnaissance to verify the direction those ships were heading, was vital. Again, this points to poor threat assessment.

Kyle Holgate

11-30-2009, 03:14 AM

old_pop2000

11-30-2009, 03:41 AM

Mikawa too had failures in intelligence support. He did not know that Fletcher had retreated from the area and that there was little danger of air attack on his forces. Had he known that he may well have regrouped after the battle and mauled the transports badly. H6K and H8K search planes could have provided better support.

Hi Kyle:
I agree that Rabaul did fail Mikawa in not making him aware of the continued presence of the US Carriers, which only departed after dark. However, he did have integral air support from his own cruiser reconnaissance and spotting aircraft. Could he have launched them and sent them to look for the US carriers?

Kyle Holgate

11-30-2009, 03:34 PM

Hi Kyle:
I agree that Rabaul did fail Mikawa in not making him aware of the continued presence of the US Carriers, which only departed after dark. However, he did have integral air support from his own cruiser reconnaissance and spotting aircraft. Could he have launched them and sent them to look for the US carriers?

Tricky choice. Look for Carriers or run continuous recon' of the area you are intending to attack? The problem with carriers is that just because you don't find any doesn't mean there are none there. Careful searching though could reveal the presence of carrier aircraft (as in AHHHH, bounced by Wildcats!). It could be one of the situations where he assumed there were probably carriers around as that's what HE'D do in that situation.

Campy

11-30-2009, 03:50 PM

Kyle Holgate

11-30-2009, 04:14 PM

Mikawa had perhaps 7-8 planes? As at Midway, not nearly enough to search long range for carriers in an unknown location. And if he does so, he has no information on his real target.

As for charging in and leaving enemy forces in his rear, what sensible commander really does that? If and when he finds the transports, and IF he can wipe them out, he is then out of ammo and wiped out by the Americans. The only real Japanese surface threat in the area is no more.

We often chide the Japanese for their suicidal behavior. Now we chide them for not being suicidal.

Frank

In my view, he should have expected to encounter enemy forces guarding the transports and screening the openings between Savo and Guadalcanal. He got luckier than he had any sense to expect but still ended up departing. What did he think was going to happen? Did he expect to sneak all the way in to the transports without being spotted? If not - then he should have considered whether to go at all - as surface combat was almost certain, and IF the transports were the target, going for them in spite of surface combat should have been done.
I don't think that going after the transports was suicidal. It was certainly risky though. Again, why go at all if you're not going to go for the transports after your encounter with USN surface forces? He accomplished a lot tactially, strategically though he missed a golden opportunity.

old_pop2000

11-30-2009, 04:22 PM

Mikawa had perhaps 7-8 planes? As at Midway, not nearly enough to search long range for carriers in an unknown location. And if he does so, he has no information on his real target.

As for charging in and leaving enemy forces in his rear, what sensible commander really does that? If and when he finds the transports, and IF he can wipe them out, he is then out of ammo and wiped out by the Americans. The only real Japanese surface threat in the area is no more.

We often chide the Japanese for their suicidal behavior. Now we chide them for not being suicidal.

Frank

Hi Frank:

Fletcher's carriers are already in a known position or thereabouts, all he has to do is send out scouts and verify they are still in the general area. The daylight action between Fletcher's air wings and the attacking bomber/fighter groups from Rabaul was such that Fletcher could only be SW of Guadalcanal. Scouts just need to verify he is within striking range.

As to the idea of leaving enemy forces behind him, Mikawa has to balance loss of forces against attacking the transports, if he can create confusion in the US screening forces, then proceed into the sound, then turn and launch a barrage of torpedoes at the unloading transports, he has a good possibility of hitting something. This is similar to the night attack on Port Arthur in 1905. The Japanese managed an 18% hit rate during that attack. He has seven heavy and light cruisers, with four torpedoes available. He can fire 28 torpedoes in one salvo, from the cruisers alone. That equates to five hits, minimum. The transports were in a circle of 6000 yards radius, with one transport already on fire. Had he sailed into the sound and turn to port when firing, the distance was less than 5 miles or less against stationary targets. Look what he did to our southern and northern force during the actual battle of Savo Island and those ships were moving. Believe me, it would have been over very quickly, Frank

Campy

11-30-2009, 04:38 PM

In attacking Canberra and Chicago, only three torpedo hits were obtained. We can presume some more against the transports, but only presume. Still probably not enough to wipe the force out. Even against non maneuvering targets, few torpedoes hit their target.

Frank

Kyle Holgate

11-30-2009, 04:53 PM

Conceivably Mikawa's ships would have time to reload their torpedoes prior to attacking the transports. I agree with him that gathering his forces are regaining a semblance of orderly formations was correct.
I believe Mikawa had a good idea of what forces he was up against - so he should have been resonably aware of what was left after the battle (or battles, 2 parts of the same?).
I'm not sure what sort of guns the transports may have - certainly some light AA and possibly deck guns. Not a serious threat, but these would keep Mikawa's ships from moving in too closely. That being said though, many of the transports would be toast even without Mikawa firing a torpedo at any, as gunfire directed by searchlight from nearly point blank range would suffice. He doesn't have to destroy all of them and it would not take long to damage or destroy a good number.

Campy

11-30-2009, 05:10 PM

old_pop2000

11-30-2009, 06:16 PM

If he turns his searchlights on, then he illuminates himself for the four heavy, two light cruisers, and numerous destroyers in the area. Remember the Hiei, and the destroyer that turned on their searchlights at second Guadalcanal ended up as scrap metal. Again, I believe Mikawa had in mind the survival of his command, as the only credible Japanese force in the area.

Remember, he was also responsible for the New Guinea operation. At the time, this was the primary Japanese objective. The loss of his command could have seriously jeopardized that operation. Beside that, did he know how few transports we had for replacements? I believe the original Japanese assesment of the force landed was quite low.

Frank

Frank:
If he fires a salvo at the southern force, disrupts and hits several ships, he can continue up into the channel and deal with the transports. He doesn't even have to turn, he can continue out skylark channel then circle around Florida island and head back up the eastern side of the Solomons. His original battle plan called for the heavy cruisers to deal with the US forces off of Guadacanal while his light cruisers dealt with the transports. That plan seems more than possible if he has already dealt with the US southern force.

I would like to return to basic subject of this thread---- carrier operations in 1939-1943

In that vain, seems the loss of four carriers at Midway and one carrier at Coral Sea is now having an effect. Both Shokaku and Zuikaku are being retained in the home waters for training and to protect the area from US carrier attacks. This leaves just Ryujo and Hiyo, Zuiho and Junyo for any other operations. We know that the 5th carrier division and Ryujo were used in Eastern Solomons, so why not deploy carriers to provide air support for the Mikawa force?

john964

11-30-2009, 07:31 PM

old_pop2000

11-30-2009, 08:04 PM

A little note on the use of searchlights. Rough range of searchlights depends on size, but the largest mounted on BB's have a max illumination range of 10-11,000yds but are visible to the enemy at 2-3x that distance.
Ranges on shipboard mounted searchlights
24in searchlight 10,000yds typical for battleships
18in searchlight 8,000yds typical for heavy and light cruisers
12in searchlight 5,000yds typical for distroyers

Hey John:
One of the transports is burning, do I really need a searchlight? If I've just torpedoed part of the southern force, don't you think they already know I am here? Who cares, at this point, about the enemy detecting me, I am silhouetted against the burning ships. Speed, surprise and confusion are my best allies at this point. They know I am here and can get some visuals on me, but with my 8 and 6 inch guns firing, those destroyers and minesweepers guarding the transport are going to be no match my cruisers.

Kyle Holgate

11-30-2009, 10:48 PM

old_pop2000

11-30-2009, 11:07 PM

According to what I can find - Zuikaku and Shokaku were in Japan on 9 Aug. Junyo arrived at Truk in October. Hiyo was just commissioned in July - didn't get to Truk until October either. Ryujo was at Kure. Zuikaku and Shokaku were at Hashirajima in the inland sea.
There was no carrier to support Mikawa. I wonder - if there were carriers at Truk, would they even have been sent? Probably.

Hi Kyle:
That is correct, there were no carriers to be sent. So, the only air support has to come from Rabaul. Now, the day's air activity depleted the fighter support at Rabaul. Keep in mind that the A6M3 Model 32s that were sent to the region, had new engines that used more fuel. The range for that aircraft was only about 1125 miles. That is about a 20% decrease over the Model 21. They could not reach Guadalcanal until the airstrip on Bougainville was completed in Late September. Authorized strength of the Tainan AG on July 1942 was 20 Zero 21s in the No. 1 unit, 8 type 32 in the No. 3 and 12 Zero 21 fighters in the 6th Air Attack force along with 12 Zero 32s in the C unitof the later. So, there were only 32 Model 21 Zeros available approx. on the morning of 7/8 August for the air attacks on the transport. I don't have the figures for losses on the 7th of August at hand, but they did lose a considerable amount of men and planes. So, there was no air cover available and that is why Mikawa opted for a night attack, along with some other reasons.

john964

11-30-2009, 11:53 PM

Hey John:
One of the transports is burning, do I really need a searchlight? If I've just torpedoed part of the southern force, don't you think they already know I am here? Who cares, at this point, about the enemy detecting me, I am silhouetted against the burning ships. Speed, surprise and confusion are my best allies at this point. They know I am here and can get some visuals on me, but with my 8 and 6 inch guns firing, those destroyers and minesweepers guarding the transport are going to be no match my cruisers.
Dennis, The transport George F Elloit was well away from the other transports. From my information she was about 10-12nm SE of Tulagi and 20-25nm NE of Lunga Point. She was not much of a factor as far as illumination is concerned from were all the fighting was done during Savo Is.

old_pop2000

12-01-2009, 12:29 AM

Dennis, The transport George F Elloit was well away from the other transports. From my information she was about 10-12nm SE of Tulagi and 20-25nm NE of Lunga Point. She was not much of a factor as far as illumination is concerned from were all the fighting was done during Savo Is.

George F. Elliot was about 10 SE of the Tulagi transports and screens about 17 miles NNE of the Guadalcanal transports and screens. The Marine Corp monograph concerning the first three days states "Before U.S. torpedoes administered the coup de grace, the burning Elliott silhouetted other U.S. men of war for the Savo Island disaster".

Campy

12-01-2009, 02:51 PM

old_pop2000

12-01-2009, 04:29 PM

Found an interesting article. According to this, Mikawa headed for the transports with the Chokai, but had to turn around when Goto took his cruisers after the northern screen. Can anyone confirm/comment on this?

http://www.ww2pacific.com/savo.html

Frank

Frank:
Chokai was leading and turned into the rain squalls then fired her torpodoes. Everyone else followed. All Mikawa had to do was maintain course. Once he made the turn, he was committed to circling the island. This automatically put him in contact with the Northern force. Goto was not leading, he was in Aoba following Chokai. Aoba turned next and fired her torpedoes. At 0144 hrs, Mikawa turned to the north, on a course of 50 deg. That course either took him in contact with the Northern force or the transports in the Tulagi anchorage. However, he engaged the Northern force and therefore lost the strategic opportunity which he himself had assigned to his operation..... to destroy the transports. Transport area Xray was within his sights.

Mike Malanaphy

12-01-2009, 04:52 PM

Hi Mike:
My comment is that, Mikawa did not get to the transports mainly because of Mikawa, not because of the US forces. Had he continue dead ahead into the sound instead of rounding the island, he was in perfect position to destroy the transports. The northern force was not in a position to stop him.

The key is, the dissemination of vital information is important. That is my question about this action. Poor threat assessment and even poorer information flow prevented any sort of awareness on the part of Crutchley and his forces, of the Mikawa threat. The first three sightings were important, however, further reconnaissance to verify the direction those ships were heading, was vital. Again, this points to poor threat assessment.

Hi Dennis,

I'm not sure what more Turner could have done except cancel the night time meeting that took Crutchley and Australia away at the time of battle. He has to cover both entrances to Ironbottom Sound and be able to physically block forces attacking Japanese. Savo channelizes Mikawa and reduces the sea area that he has to cover. Had he deployed forward to the other side of Savo Island he risks meeting Mikawa in open water where the IJN's better night training and torpedoes would give him an advantage. In addition with poor radar and the mist, Mikawa could have sailed by him and into the anchorage.

Mikawa's lacked a reconnaissance unit such as a pair of destroyers or a divison to search ahead of his cruiser column. His column split during the turn from the engagement with the Southern Force and he had to regroup before being able to continue. It's hard to scout with a heavy cruiser and the need to be on his way before daylight to avoid carrier attacks.

old_pop2000

12-01-2009, 07:37 PM

Hi Dennis,

I'm not sure what more Turner could have done except cancel the night time meeting that took Crutchley and Australia away at the time of battle. He has to cover both entrances to Ironbottom Sound and be able to physically block forces attacking Japanese. Savo channelizes Mikawa and reduces the sea area that he has to cover. Had he deployed forward to the other side of Savo Island he risks meeting Mikawa in open water where the IJN's better night training and torpedoes would give him an advantage. In addition with poor radar and the mist, Mikawa could have sailed by him and into the anchorage.

Mikawa's lacked a reconnaissance unit such as a pair of destroyers or a divison to search ahead of his cruiser column. His column split during the turn from the engagement with the Southern Force and he had to regroup before being able to continue. It's hard to scout with a heavy cruiser and the need to be on his way before daylight to avoid carrier attacks.

Hi Mike:
I believe that the northern and southern forces should have been concentrated farther back from Savo to be mutually supporting, Admiral Bates in his assessment for the Naval War College states the same thing. There were options for that cruiser group. The picket ships should have been farther up the channel, away from Savo so it did not hinder the radar detection of targets.

The most prevalent and damning error was in the command structure. Ghormley should have been with Turner or Fletcher to make on scene decisions. McCain worked for him, not Fletcher who was in overall command about 100 miles away. When he left, he left Turner essentially on his own, with no authority to get anything done except expedite the unloading and decide to move the transports in the morning. The command and control in the initial stages of this operation were an example of how not to organize such a venture.

But, the reconnaissance effort was poorly executed and the limited information was not forwarded to the required command in an appropriate and timely manner. The issue was that Mikawa's base was in the South Pacific area while the Watchtower operation was in the SW Pacific area. CinCPac had informed SW Pacific and Fletcher that Aoba and Furutaka had joined Mikawa. This gave him a sizeable cruiser/destroyer force. Once he was spotted east of Bougainville, but not in the slot, he should have been watched continuously. This was the job of the South Pacific area reconnaissance effort. Once Mikawa was in the slot, then Turner would have know that his only threat, the threat his cruiser/destroyer screening force was in place to protect against, should be alerted and appropriate formation and search areas defined. This never happened. Again, I reiterate, poor threat analysis and assessment caused the failure.

However, I really want to focus on the carrier operations in and around Guadalcanal. Savo is interesting but not pertinent except for the air cover situation. I don't know how much more Fletcher could have done for the operations success. He had to protect the carriers. The Marines were landed and had a secure position. They had sufficient food and ammunition. The failure to unload the transports was Turner's issue.
So, the question becomes whether Fletcher should have taken the chance and kept closer, instead of leaving. I believe the eventual destruction of Wasp and torpedoing of the BB NC points up a possible problem that Fletcher was aware of. In this case, he did do a threat assessment and with his fighters depleted and fuel running low on the escorts, he decided to move. I believe it was a safe decision but not the bold one.

Campy

12-01-2009, 09:06 PM

Kyle Holgate

12-01-2009, 09:50 PM

However, I really want to focus on the carrier operations in and around Guadalcanal. Savo is interesting but not pertinent except for the air cover situation. I don't know how much more Fletcher could have done for the operations success. He had to protect the carriers. The Marines were landed and had a secure position. They had sufficient food and ammunition. The failure to unload the transports was Turner's issue.
So, the question becomes whether Fletcher should have taken the chance and kept closer, instead of leaving. I believe the eventual destruction of Wasp and torpedoing of the BB NC points up a possible problem that Fletcher was aware of. In this case, he did do a threat assessment and with his fighters depleted and fuel running low on the escorts, he decided to move. I believe it was a safe decision but not the bold one.

For a submarine to find a task force in open water is fairly difficult. Even if you make some assumptions as to where to look - such as that the carriers would be outside G4M range of Rabaul and within a couple hundred miles of Guadalcanal, that's a lot of water to cover.
How did the sub find Wasp and NC? They were not sailing through a choke point though they were along a fairly direct path between Esperito Santo and Guadalcanal. A carrier force in open water should not be particularly vulnerable to subs. I would think that leaving and entering port would be the most likely danger spot.

old_pop2000

12-01-2009, 10:36 PM

For a submarine to find a task force in open water is fairly difficult. Even if you make some assumptions as to where to look - such as that the carriers would be outside G4M range of Rabaul and within a couple hundred miles of Guadalcanal, that's a lot of water to cover.
How did the sub find Wasp and NC? They were not sailing through a choke point though they were along a fairly direct path between Esperito Santo and Guadalcanal. A carrier force in open water should not be particularly vulnerable to subs. I would think that leaving and entering port would be the most likely danger spot.

I dunno Kyle, we lost Wasp and had Saratoga torpedoed a second time. NC was hit. The Japanese lost Kako to S-44 in open waters. In operational planning, submarines were considered the greatest threat. Yorktown was eventually lost due to a submarine torpedo.

old_pop2000

12-01-2009, 10:39 PM

Reminder, the whole operation was thrown together in less than two months. I think the results were a reflection of that. Wasn't time to do a comprehensive analysis ahead of time. In the end, we won. As Napoleon implied, luck is sometimes more important than skill.

Frank

While that is true, if we are assessing the failures and successes of the operation, then maybe that has to be put at the top of the list. When men's lives are at stake, maybe we need to take a little more time and think the command and control through carefully plus do a better threat assessment. It would also help ensure any area relationships are established correctly and that all necessary information is passed quickly.

Kyle Holgate

12-01-2009, 11:15 PM

I dunno Kyle, we lost Wasp and had Saratoga torpedoed a second time. NC was hit. The Japanese lost Kako to S-44 in open waters. In operational planning, submarines were considered the greatest threat. Yorktown was eventually lost due to a submarine torpedo.

You see my point though? What was it that let the Japanese subs find Wasp? Did the USN use common routes? If not it's just really bad (or good if you're Japan) luck. Yorktown was a different matter in that the Japanese sub knew where to go to find the ship. I wonder if the Japanese were putting out lines of subs across likely routes to and from Guadalcanal? Will have to look into it. There seems to be little information on actual tactics used by the Japanese subs as far as searching.

old_pop2000

12-01-2009, 11:22 PM

You see my point though? What was it that let the Japanese subs find Wasp? Did the USN use common routes? If not it's just really bad (or good if you're Japan) luck. Yorktown was a different matter in that the Japanese sub knew where to go to find the ship. I wonder if the Japanese were putting out lines of subs across likely routes to and from Guadalcanal? Will have to look into it. There seems to be little information on actual tactics used by the Japanese subs as far as searching.

Yea, I get your point. I know that Wasp and her carrier group were sighted on the afternoon of 13 September 200 miles SE of the SE tip of San Cristobal Island There were nine submarines deployed in a picket line between Santa Cruz and San Cristobal Island. They were alerted to the carrier groups sighting. Wasp was hit by I-19 in the center of the picket line about 140 miles SE of the E side of San Cristobal. I-19 picked up screw noises and about fifty minutes later sighted a carrier, cruiser and escorting destroyers 8 miles away. At 1345 I-19 fired six torpedoes at a range of about 1000 yards. It appears that the region was a normal picket area for Japanese subs. I believe that Saratoga was hit in the same region.

john964

12-02-2009, 12:02 AM

Yea, I get your point. I know that Wasp and her carrier group were sighted on the afternoon of 13 September 200 miles SE of the SE tip of San Cristobal Island There were nine submarines deployed in a picket line between Santa Cruz and San Cristobal Island. They were alerted to the carrier groups sighting. Wasp was hit by I-19 in the center of the picket line about 140 miles SE of the E side of San Cristobal. I-19 picked up screw noises and about fifty minutes later sighted a carrier, cruiser and escorting destroyers 8 miles away. At 1345 I-19 fired six torpedoes at a range of about 1000 yards. It appears that the region was a normal picket area for Japanese subs. I believe that Saratoga was hit in the same region.The area running from New Calidonia to Espritos Santos to Guadalcanal was nicknamed Torpedo Junction for a reason.

Also Fletchers carriers operated in a box between Rennel Is and Guadalcanal.

john964

12-02-2009, 12:07 AM

old_pop2000

12-02-2009, 02:38 AM

Also Fletchers carriers operated in a box between Rennel Is and Guadalcanal.

On the morning of the 7th, Fletcher with Sara in the lead, was 30 miles west of the canal. He headed SE reached a point about 90 miles from his morning position. He then headed west over the Hammondsport Seamount, probably 50 miles SSE of his original morning position. He had been headed SE most of the day to put some distance between himself and incoming Japanese aircraft. On the morning of the 8th of August, TF61.1 was 20 miles S of Cape Henslow. That is the southern most cape on Guadalcanal. They were generally between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal but much closer to the canal. Rennell Island is WSW of Cape Henslow, 123 miles approx.

Mike Malanaphy

12-02-2009, 03:25 AM

While that is true, if we are assessing the failures and successes of the operation, then maybe that has to be put at the top of the list. When men's lives are at stake, maybe we need to take a little more time and think the command and control through carefully plus do a better threat assessment. It would also help ensure any area relationships are established correctly and that all necessary information is passed quickly.

Hi Dennis,

Part of the original planing process would have been a detailing of enemy forces in the area that could respond. it must have been such that the cruiser and destroyer force assigned to eh invasion was adequate to protect the island and transports.

Mike Malanaphy

12-02-2009, 03:55 AM

Hi Mike:
I believe that the northern and southern forces should have been concentrated farther back from Savo to be mutually supporting, Admiral Bates in his assessment for the Naval War College states the same thing. There were options for that cruiser group. The picket ships should have been farther up the channel, away from Savo so it did not hinder the radar detection of targets.

The most prevalent and damning error was in the command structure. Ghormley should have been with Turner or Fletcher to make on scene decisions. McCain worked for him, not Fletcher who was in overall command about 100 miles away. When he left, he left Turner essentially on his own, with no authority to get anything done except expedite the unloading and decide to move the transports in the morning. The command and control in the initial stages of this operation were an example of how not to organize such a venture.

But, the reconnaissance effort was poorly executed and the limited information was not forwarded to the required command in an appropriate and timely manner. The issue was that Mikawa's base was in the South Pacific area while the Watchtower operation was in the SW Pacific area. CinCPac had informed SW Pacific and Fletcher that Aoba and Furutaka had joined Mikawa. This gave him a sizeable cruiser/destroyer force. Once he was spotted east of Bougainville, but not in the slot, he should have been watched continuously. This was the job of the South Pacific area reconnaissance effort. Once Mikawa was in the slot, then Turner would have know that his only threat, the threat his cruiser/destroyer screening force was in place to protect against, should be alerted and appropriate formation and search areas defined. This never happened. Again, I reiterate, poor threat analysis and assessment caused the failure.

However, I really want to focus on the carrier operations in and around Guadalcanal. Savo is interesting but not pertinent except for the air cover situation. I don't know how much more Fletcher could have done for the operations success. He had to protect the carriers. The Marines were landed and had a secure position. They had sufficient food and ammunition. The failure to unload the transports was Turner's issue.
So, the question becomes whether Fletcher should have taken the chance and kept closer, instead of leaving. I believe the eventual destruction of Wasp and torpedoing of the BB NC points up a possible problem that Fletcher was aware of. In this case, he did do a threat assessment and with his fighters depleted and fuel running low on the escorts, he decided to move. I believe it was a safe decision but not the bold one.

Hi Dennis,

Morrison quotes those objections in his analysis of the battle. A couple of things.

The War College felt the pickets should have been farther out to provide more warning. Had they been, they had more open sea area to cover and why would their radar or lookouts be more effective than where they were? The only early warning they could have given was gunfire, but Mikawa held his fire at Blue as he steamed in. Since the Northern Force didn't percieve the gunfire directed at the Southern Force as a threat, the same question as the pickets, why would their reaction be different if positioned different? They recommended that the two cruiser forces be closer together for mutual support and that a single line could have crossed Mikawa's T and evaded torpedoes. The two seperate cruiser forces could have done the same, but they didn't. Also, a single cruiser line would have protected less area than two seperate ones, again driven by the need to cover two seperate channels in poor visibility. Mikawa was simply better prepared and his ships better trained. Mikawa saw the Allies first, and fired first, and surprised the Northern Force as he did the Southern. I suspect a single cruiser battleline would have been caught just as flatfooted and would have been a bigger torpedo target. Tassafaronga in August instead of November. That night, everything went the Japanese way.

If you look at the map, the battle area is only about 12 miles from the Lunga Point transport area so Turner did not have a lot of sea room to give up.

As far as Ghormley being there, might have helped. But Halsey was able to direct operations by radio from Noumea, Ghormley could have ordered Fletcher to stay the same way. Fletcher had stated on July 26, he would only cover for two days and Turner had said it would take a minimum of four days to unload the transports, plenty of time for Ghormley to make a decision.

Mikawa decided to retire at 0200 because he feared attack by aircraft at daybreak (0400) and sought to get beyond their range. His column became split after Chokai turned north to avoid a collison with Furutaka at 0144. Furutaka followed by Tenryu paralled Chokai to port and neatly boxed the Northern Force between them. Three cruisers launched float planes that helped illuminate the battle, but there is no mention of if they were looking for transports.

old_pop2000

12-02-2009, 02:13 PM

Hi Dennis,

Part of the original planing process would have been a detailing of enemy forces in the area that could respond. it must have been such that the cruiser and destroyer force assigned to eh invasion was adequate to protect the island and transports.

The cruiser screening force was adequate, had they been positioned to be self supporting. The Naval forces assigned to the operation were always minimal, due to circumstances at the time. The list of mistakes that led to this disaster were long and varied.

old_pop2000

12-02-2009, 02:58 PM

Hi Dennis,

Morrison quotes those objections in his analysis of the battle. A couple of things.

The War College felt the pickets should have been farther out to provide more warning. Had they been, they had more open sea area to cover and why would their radar or lookouts be more effective than where they were? The only early warning they could have given was gunfire, but Mikawa held his fire at Blue as he steamed in. Since the Northern Force didn't percieve the gunfire directed at the Southern Force as a threat, the same question as the pickets, why would their reaction be different if positioned different? They recommended that the two cruiser forces be closer together for mutual support and that a single line could have crossed Mikawa's T and evaded torpedoes. The two seperate cruiser forces could have done the same, but they didn't. Also, a single cruiser line would have protected less area than two seperate ones, again driven by the need to cover two seperate channels in poor visibility. Mikawa was simply better prepared and his ships better trained. Mikawa saw the Allies first, and fired first, and surprised the Northern Force as he did the Southern. I suspect a single cruiser battleline would have been caught just as flatfooted and would have been a bigger torpedo target. Tassafaronga in August instead of November. That night, everything went the Japanese way.

If you look at the map, the battle area is only about 12 miles from the Lunga Point transport area so Turner did not have a lot of sea room to give up.

As far as Ghormley being there, might have helped. But Halsey was able to direct operations by radio from Noumea, Ghormley could have ordered Fletcher to stay the same way. Fletcher had stated on July 26, he would only cover for two days and Turner had said it would take a minimum of four days to unload the transports, plenty of time for Ghormley to make a decision.

Mikawa decided to retire at 0200 because he feared attack by aircraft at daybreak (0400) and sought to get beyond their range. His column became split after Chokai turned north to avoid a collison with Furutaka at 0144. Furutaka followed by Tenryu paralled Chokai to port and neatly boxed the Northern Force between them. Three cruisers launched float planes that helped illuminate the battle, but there is no mention of if they were looking for transports.

I still contend that adequate and timely reconnaissance with prompt transmission to the necessary on-scene commanders with an accurate threat assessment would have provided the cruiser-destroyer screening force some advanced knowledge. However, without adequate training together and proper dispositions, the situation was a setup for disaster.

Mike Malanaphy

12-02-2009, 03:23 PM

Here is a question to consider. Could the Midway strike group organization have played a part in the failure. Remember that aircraft from all four carriers were involved. Was the alternative of two carriers maintaining the airwing ready for antiship operations, while the other two conducted land based operations have been a better and more effective method. This is using 20/20 hindsight, but with an evaluation could they have learned something.

Hi Dennis,

I got intrigued by our discussion and began re reading "Shattered Sword". There is a lot of good stuff in their book. I hope he goes nto furhter detail later, but he talks about Japanese carrier doctrine of launching "deck strikes" rather than full air groups as the Americans did. Typically, a Japanese carrier launched half her air group in a strike, retaining the other half aboard. I'm assuming that because the Japanese stored, fueled, and armed aircraft (except dive bombers) in the hangar as opposed to on deck ala American carriers, time constraints and deck spotting drove this preventing having half of the air group orbiting overhead wasting fuel while the other half is spotted. Parshall and Tully comment the system had worked so far.

Your comment about dividing tasks by carrier is cogent. Parshall and Tully mention that the Japanese were better at managing and coordinating multi carrier strikes because of their previous experience in China and early operations. The next logical step would be to dedicate tasks to specific carriers, but the doctrine of "deck strikes" prevented a single carrier from effectively using her entire air group in a single strike.

We've talked about the Japanese ill preparedness for an extended conflict, but they discuss the shortage of naval aircraft. Nakajima and Aichi had halted their production lines to retool for new models and produced only 56 carrier attack aircraft in all of 1942! Even though combat losses had been low, operatioin losses ate into carrier air groups. Japanese carriers usually carried 9 spare aircraft aboard, but by Midway, there were no spares. At Pearl harbor, Akagi carried 63 aircraft, at Midway 54, Kaga 63/54, Hiryu 63/54, and Soryu 63/54. With the 5th carreir division missing, Nagumo had only 60% of the aircraft he had at Pearl. Zuikaku returned with 57 aircraft after Coral Sea and could have sailed with Nagumo. Despite being a mixed group, they were all Pearl harbor vets and represent a striking comparison to the herculean American efforts to get Yorktown ready. The aircraft shortage hampered the smaller carriers as Zuhio carried A5M Claudes rather than Zeros.

Also they cite Akagi's air group report which has information derived from intell reports about increased enemy air and submarine activity after they sailed. Though the Japanese carriers suffered from poor aerial arrangements, the battleships and cruisers did not, so they infer Nagumo recieved most of intell broadcast from Japan. They ascribe the "myth" of Nagumo being in the dark because Yammomoto did not rebroadcast radio reports to maintain security to Fuchida's disingenous book that has colored Western accounts of the battle.

old_pop2000

12-02-2009, 03:53 PM

Hi Dennis,

I got intrigued by our discussion and began re reading "Shattered Sword". There is a lot of good stuff in their book. I hope he goes nto furhter detail later, but he talks about Japanese carrier doctrine of launching "deck strikes" rather than full air groups as the Americans did. Typically, a Japanese carrier launched half her air group in a strike, retaining the other half aboard. I'm assuming that because the Japanese stored, fueled, and armed aircraft (except dive bombers) in the hangar as opposed to on deck ala American carriers, time constraints and deck spotting drove this preventing having half of the air group orbiting overhead wasting fuel while the other half is spotted. Parshall and Tully comment the system had worked so far.

Your comment about dividing tasks by carrier is cogent. Parshall and Tully mention that the Japanese were better at managing and coordinating multi carrier strikes because of their previous experience in China and early operations. The next logical step would be to dedicate tasks to specific carriers, but the doctrine of "deck strikes" prevented a single carrier from effectively using her entire air group in a single strike.

We've talked about the Japanese ill preparedness for an extended conflict, but they discuss the shortage of naval aircraft. Nakajima and Aichi had halted their production lines to retool for new models and produced only 56 carrier attack aircraft in all of 1942! Even though combat losses had been low, operatioin losses ate into carrier air groups. Japanese carriers usually carried 9 spare aircraft aboard, but by Midway, there were no spares. At Pearl harbor, Akagi carried 63 aircraft, at Midway 54, Kaga 63/54, Hiryu 63/54, and Soryu 63/54. With the 5th carreir division missing, Nagumo had only 60% of the aircraft he had at Pearl. Zuikaku returned with 57 aircraft after Coral Sea and could have sailed with Nagumo. Despite being a mixed group, they were all Pearl harbor vets and represent a striking comparison to the herculean American efforts to get Yorktown ready. The aircraft shortage hampered the smaller carriers as Zuhio carried A5M Claudes rather than Zeros.

Also they cite Akagi's air group report which has information derived from intell reports about increased enemy air and submarine activity after they sailed. Though the Japanese carriers suffered from poor aerial arrangements, the battleships and cruisers did not, so they infer Nagumo recieved most of intell broadcast from Japan. They ascribe the "myth" of Nagumo being in the dark because Yammomoto did not rebroadcast radio reports to maintain security to Fuchida's disingenous book that has colored Western accounts of the battle.

The enclosed hangers and deck procedures as a result, did set the Japanese up for the disaster. However, the failure to do adequate threat assessment and respotting the deck is, as I have said, the main issue. The problems with strike assemblage would never have been a problem if it hadn't been for the poor assessment. However, the lack of adequate air cover for the fleet and scouting was definitely a problem.

I agree about Zuikaku, which is why I started the thread. She could have been ready by the 10th. She did have minor damage. Her air group could have provided the necessary fighter interceptors and B5N's with fuel tanks to do the scouting and intermediate patrols.

As far as Fuchida, I believe he was correct since Kusaka's assessment was essentially the same. Fuchida was definitely appalled at the single plane search despite it being doctrine, he felt that under these circumstances the two phase was better. He states that at Coral Sea they had learned that lesson.

The messages were important and I believe that Yamamoto's staff should have provided Nagumo with some assessments as to whether he might be in danger from US carriers. Again, the distance between himself and Nagumo was much too far. This was the same situation with Fletcher, Turner and Ghormley sitting in New Caledonia instead of being on scene.

Mike Malanaphy

12-02-2009, 05:56 PM

The enclosed hangers and deck procedures as a result, did set the Japanese up for the disaster. However, the failure to do adequate threat assessment and respotting the deck is, as I have said, the main issue. The problems with strike assemblage would never have been a problem if it hadn't been for the poor assessment. However, the lack of adequate air cover for the fleet and scouting was definitely a problem.

I agree about Zuikaku, which is why I started the thread. She could have been ready by the 10th. She did have minor damage. Her air group could have provided the necessary fighter interceptors and B5N's with fuel tanks to do the scouting and intermediate patrols.

As far as Fuchida, I believe he was correct since Kusaka's assessment was essentially the same. Fuchida was definitely appalled at the single plane search despite it being doctrine, he felt that under these circumstances the two phase was better. He states that at Coral Sea they had learned that lesson.

The messages were important and I believe that Yamamoto's staff should have provided Nagumo with some assessments as to whether he might be in danger from US carriers. Again, the distance between himself and Nagumo was much too far. This was the same situation with Fletcher, Turner and Ghormley sitting in New Caledonia instead of being on scene.

Hi Dennis,

In the chapter on Midway "myths", Parshall and Tully question the accuracy of Fuchida's account which has been the cornerstone of western historiography on the battle. He was a close source for Gordon Prange in the 70s.

When his book was published in Japan in 1951, it was in an era where the Japanese military was not held in high esteem and his book was an attempt to cover errors with other circumstances such as the dramatic dive bomber attack at 1020. Ala the intervention of fate. His book was the first published and translated into english by Roger Pineau in 1953. Few American scholars dealt with Japanese language sources and missed other narratives and the Japanese official history published in the late 70s which called his account into question. They observe that Fuchida remained the main Japanese source in the west long after he had been discredited. With little or no knowledge of Japanese carrier operations in the west, there was no way to check the accuracy of Fuchida's account.

The major misrepresentations in his account are:

Communications: Fuchida said that Nagumo was denied critical information about Operation K and enemy activity as Yamamoto witheld it through radio silence. Their research shows info in the Akagi air group's report of intell received after sailng that contradicts that thesis and attributes the source of the information to radio intelligence. All info was broadcast by the 6th Communications unit in Japan. Notes on enemy activity in the Akagi report for May 29 and 31 match the same entries in Ugaki's diary confirming Nagumo was receiveing radio traffic just fine on those days.

Two phased search: Fuchida faults Genda's for not using a two phased search which would have alerted Nagumo sooner. However, the single phase search was doctrine and the two phased search was a recommendation of the committee that evaluated the loss and was not doctrine till 1943.

Planes on deck: Fuchida's account recounts the Japanese carriers planes on deck ready to launch at 1020, victory snatched away at the last moment by the American SBDs. Author John Lundstrom noted a B-17 photo of Akagi at 0800 which showed her deck as clear. Lundstrom them figured launches and recoveries which showed the strike could not have been ready and on deck at 1020. First hand accounts by pilots generally mentioned few if any planes on the carrier decks when they dived. The authors have appendicies which track launches and recoveries as well in the book. Again, Fuchida's account contradicted by other Japanese participants and the official history.

old_pop2000

12-02-2009, 07:06 PM

...

Communications: Fuchida said that Nagumo was denied critical information about Operation K and enemy activity as Yamamoto witheld it through radio silence. Their research shows info in the Akagi air group's report of intell received after sailng that contradicts that thesis and attributes the source of the information to radio intelligence. All info was broadcast by the 6th Communications unit in Japan. Notes on enemy activity in the Akagi report for May 29 and 31 match the same entries in Ugaki's diary confirming Nagumo was receiveing radio traffic just fine on those days.

Two phased search: Fuchida faults Genda's for not using a two phased search which would have alerted Nagumo sooner. However, the single phase search was doctrine and the two phased search was a recommendation of the committee that evaluated the loss and was not doctrine till 1943.

Planes on deck: Fuchida's account recounts the Japanese carriers planes on deck ready to launch at 1020, victory snatched away at the last moment by the American SBDs. Author John Lundstrom noted a B-17 photo of Akagi at 0800 which showed her deck as clear. Lundstrom them figured launches and recoveries which showed the strike could not have been ready and on deck at 1020. First hand accounts by pilots generally mentioned few if any planes on the carrier decks when they dived. The authors have appendicies which track launches and recoveries as well in the book. Again, Fuchida's account contradicted by other Japanese participants and the official history.

First, Fuchida makes the statement that had the single phase search been launched before sunrise, it might have been effective. I believe that Parshall and Tully agreed with that. Fuchida also makes the claim in another book and in comments at conferences that the single phase search was found to be deficient in the Indian Ocean operation and that the search planes often got lost and had to be radioed their position. This alerted the enemy and the carriers were attacked. Sounds familiar. These are much the same lessons that Kusaka relayed to Ugaki on board the Yamato.

As far as communications, Ugaki reports radio intercepts did show that there was activity in the Aleutians, Hawaii and Midway but that information was never conveyed to Nagumo because it was assumed he had received the same information.

I don't agree that aircraft were probably not on the deck, Dick Best reported that he only saw Zero's taking off which would have been the interceptors. This does contradict what Fuchida states, that all aircraft had been hoisted up onto the deck and Nagumo had issued orders to launch when ready. So, we are left in a situation of believing information that was determined using incomplete data and US pilot reports or do we believe Fuchida who was on the bridge. The question then seems to be, why does Minoru Genda lie? What does he gain? Nagumo is dead as well as others, does it relieve his guilt? No.

My belief is that there were planes aft, ready for launch. Those would have been the Kates and Vals. They would have been hoisted on the number 2 and 3 elevators and readied aft. The Zero's were stored up on the first hanger, forward using the forward hanger to be hoisted. So, it is possible that the deck was full aft and that CAP aircraft were being launched. Dick Best did not see aft, there was smoke and gunfire coming up at him, plus his head was focused on the bombsight. Fuchida and Parshall might both be correct.

john964

12-02-2009, 07:12 PM

My belief is that there were planes aft, ready for launch. Those would have been the Kates and Vals. They would have been hoisted on the number 2 and 3 elevators and readied aft. The Zero's were stored up on the first hanger, forward using the forward hanger to be hoisted. So, it is possible that the deck was full aft and that CAP aircraft were being launched. Dick Best did not see aft, there was smoke and gunfire coming up at him, plus his head was focused on the bombsight. Fuchida and Parshall might both be correct.Dennis, They both may be correct. Fuchida may have either mis-spoke or mis-heard and Best may have had tunnel vision in focusing on his target.

old_pop2000

12-02-2009, 10:14 PM

Dennis, They both may be correct. Fuchida may have either mis-spoke or mis-heard and Best may have had tunnel vision in focusing on his target.

That is entirely possible, John. Remember that the deck and ship logs used by Parshall and Tully were recreated by the original clerks, in the 1960's for Senshi Sosho, the official war history. That's a long time, in my estimation. I believe that this was the sequence, no times.

The air boss notifies Nagumo that the second strike is ready for launch. This means they were fueled, rearmed and repaired. He then orders the air boss to launch, when ready. Remember Japanese aircraft could not be warmed up in the hanger, so they have to be hoisted on deck, spotted, then pilots will man the planes, engine start, warm up and then the signal to launch. Remember also, that the Zero's just need to be refueled and rearmed then brought up the forward elevator. I suspect this was taking place when the dive bombers arrived. It is entirely possible that the aft portion had aircraft on it, ready for launch. Parshall states that that was impossible due to the requirement to land and launch the CAP. However, there was a time gap. Plus, he is working with incomplete data and is guessing based on personal views. If he believes some personal views, but not Fuchida, then I am surprised. I will have to reread that section, I am doing this from memory. However, it is entirely possible that the some of the second wave aircraft were on deck getting ready for launch and the Zero's were launching up forward. This is consistent with what most pilots saw and what Fuchida stated.

old_pop2000

12-02-2009, 10:41 PM

During an interrogation on 6 October 1945, Captain Amagi, IJN Naval Aviator and Air Officer on Kaga during the Battle of Midway.

Q. Were planes on board when the ship was hit?

A. Yes, about 30 planes in hangar loaded and fueled, remainder on deck, six VF in air.

Seems this man agrees with Fuchida. He states that Kaga had aircraft on deck. This is only three years after the incident and his man is also a naval aviator.

john964

12-02-2009, 11:32 PM

That is entirely possible, John. Remember that the deck and ship logs used by Parshall and Tully were recreated by the original clerks, in the 1960's for Senshi Sosho, the official war history. That's a long time, in my estimation. I believe that this was the sequence, no times.

The air boss notifies Nagumo that the second strike is ready for launch. This means they were fueled, rearmed and repaired. He then orders the air boss to launch, when ready. Remember Japanese aircraft could not be warmed up in the hanger, so they have to be hoisted on deck, spotted, then pilots will man the planes, engine start, warm up and then the signal to launch. Remember also, that the Zero's just need to be refueled and rearmed then brought up the forward elevator. I suspect this was taking place when the dive bombers arrived. It is entirely possible that the aft portion had aircraft on it, ready for launch. Parshall states that that was impossible due to the requirement to land and launch the CAP. However, there was a time gap. Plus, he is working with incomplete data and is guessing based on personal views. If he believes some personal views, but not Fuchida, then I am surprised. I will have to reread that section, I am doing this from memory. However, it is entirely possible that the some of the second wave aircraft were on deck getting ready for launch and the Zero's were launching up forward. This is consistent with what most pilots saw and what Fuchida stated.
It also might be as simple as someone changing one word either mistranslating or misshearing in translation ie the planes were ready on the deck or the planes were readyin the hanger. Japenese like most Oreintal langauges has the same sounding word that can have multiple meanings by changing the placment in a sentance or the inflection.

I read this in Readers Digest years ago about the trouble Coca Cola had in itroducing Coke into China. IIRC Coca Cola in a strait phonetic translation means 'Go bite the wax tadpole' needless to say sales were disapointing. So Coca Cola went searching and found differant sybols in the Chinese alphabet that were phoneticly simler to Coca Cola but translated to 'Open the mouth and rejoice'.

old_pop2000

12-03-2009, 02:40 AM

It also might be as simple as someone changing one word either mistranslating or misshearing in translation ie the planes were ready on the deck or the planes were readyin the hanger. Japenese like most Oreintal langauges has the same sounding word that can have multiple meanings by changing the placment in a sentance or the inflection.

Hi John:
The interesting point of all this is that Parshall and Tully spent much of the book, Shattered Sword, explaining the timing sequence from the first launch to the destruction of the carriers to make the point that the second strike could not have been up on the deck. It had to be in the hanger. This flies in the face of Fuchida, and other pilots who stated that they believe that their aircraft were on the flight deck. But, in point of fact, it doesn't really matter.

Whether those dive bombers and torpedo bombers were on the deck or in the hanger, as long as they were fuelled, armed and ready to launch, that carrier was vulnerable to an air strike. As long as ordnance was not stowed properly in the magazines, but put aside in racks to be lowered later. Those carriers were a ticking timebomb.

What I haven't seen by anyone, is a focus on the threat analysis and assessment that had to be performed after Tomonaga radioed his suggestion of a second strike. We know what the strategic errors were in planning this operation, but the failure to assess the remaining threat posed by Midway, was a tactical error, that would lead to a failure to manage time. Time is what sank those ships. The Japanese lost the race to launch an air strike against the US carriers. They lost time when they failed to launch the single phase search in the predawn hours, they lost time deciding whether to respot the second strike for land targets and they lost time attempting to assemble a perfect strike against the US carriers. This poor time management put them in the position with fully loaded decks or hangers, when the US dive bombers arrived.

It is my amateurs opinion, that had Nagumo and his staff stuck to the plan of leaving the second strike armed for ship attack, but either rearmed and refueled the first strike aircraft or sent a reconnaissance aircraft to assess the real threat that the Midway aircraft and facilities actually posed to the landings, the timing issue would never have occurred and the slow deck operations would never have been a factor.

As I said, just an amateurs opinion:p

old_pop2000

12-03-2009, 04:02 PM

I've been reviewing the ONI published Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway, released in May 1947. This was on the fifth anniversary of the battle.

Times are from the original based on Tokyo time.

At 0400, Tomonaga radioed to Akagi 'There is a necessity for carrying out a second attack'

At 0500 Tone's #4 scout report ' sighted what appears to be the enemy composed of 10 ships, bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway, on course 150 degrees, speed 20 knots'

At around 0455, he was told ' Advise ship type'

At 0530, Tone's scout reported ' The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier in a position to the rear of the others'.

With that sighting, the greatest threat to Nagumo had appeared, the US carriers. I am certain it was a surprise. However, from 0400 to 0500, one hour, his scouts had still not reached the farthest point of their flights especially Tone's #4. It was 30 minutes behind, minimum. For the purposes of threat asssessment, Midway was still the most prominent, but now unknown threat. While Nagumo's fleet had destroyed well over 30 aircraft, he had no definitive report from the returning first strike. All he has is the curt, 'there is a need for a second strike'. There are no details. Respotting the deck for a change in armament is a one hour process minimum. He still has no information from his scouts who are reaching their maximum ranges on their missions.

So, why not ask Hiryu's lead pilot to explain. Ask him for more details as to the numbers and types of aircraft remaining on Midway, facilities still intact or wait until he lands. Get the facts or immediately at 0400, send out another scout plane to overfly Midway to ascertain the extent of damages and the numbers and state of the aircraft on the island. Those are the threats.

The 1st strike group launched at 0130 hrs. It took about fifteen minutes to launch, form up and proceed. Hiryu attack leader radioed his attack group to form a penetration formation at 0336 hrs. So, it took 2 hrs to reach the target. However, this was with heavily laden torpedo bombers, I suspect, that a scout plane could make the journey much faster. In the hour and half, that he was waiting for the scout to provide more detailed information on the state of defenses and the air field, he could have received more data from Tomonaga. Now, he might have enough good information to make a proper threat assessment of Midway and its aircraft. In the meantime, his scouts will have reached the maximum range of the missions and determined if there is any threat lurking out there.

I believe that had this type of plan or something similar been followed, Nagumo might have had a better change in the battle and the time management issue would not have been as important and neither would the issue of carrier deck operations, which I feel was always unimportant in the scheme of things.

Kyle Holgate

12-03-2009, 06:19 PM

We have a few issues involved here.

1st is that Nagumo assumed that there would be no enemy carriers in the area. I can understand this as there really was no reason for them to be there yet barring some breach in security (which in fact existed).

2nd - as discussed previously - The search that was made was insufficient. Was it a 'token' search that wasn't taken particularly seriously as enemy ships were not 'supposed' to be out there yet? If Nagumo had actually thought that the presence of enemy ships was more likely, would he have insisted on a better search?

3rd - Tomonaga's report - second strike needed. If Nagumo believes the operation was a secret until the first strike on Midway then he should have plenty of time. There is a consideration when attacking targets that a second strike (if needed) be done as soon as possible. The longer you wait the more prepared and repaired from the previous strike the target will be. I believe this is Nagumo's thinking.
In other words he's thinking: 'Enemy ships should not be around, I should hurry and remove Midway as a threat so I can be fully prepared for the USN when it arrives' (but in Japanese of course ;)).

Now - we all know IF he assumed enemy ships were not in the area, he was totally wrong. I believe that this factor is key in the decisions. Had he been more wary, I think that a delay in sending the 2nd Midway strike out may be prudent. Still - he had a known threat that could be neutralized VS a potential and increasing threat that should increase as time goes on (in other words as the US fleet gets word of the attack and sails for Midway). I think HE's thinking that a delay in dealing with Midway puts his forces at risk of having both Midway AND the US fleet to deal with later. Best to remove Midway now while there is time.

To Dennis - I am just going over Nagumo's possible thought process' here - not trying to push any view. I understand your views on doing recon' or delaying the strike. I don't think you're wrong - but neither do I think Nagumo is necessarily wrong based on what he knew and the likelihood of US forces being in the area.
All bets were off with the Intelligence SNAFU regarding the code breaking and message intercept. What happened was exactly what the US needed to happen.

old_pop2000

12-03-2009, 09:02 PM

1st is that Nagumo assumed that there would be no enemy carriers in the area. I can understand this as there really was no reason for them to be there yet barring some breach in security (which in fact existed).

2nd - as discussed previously - The search that was made was insufficient. Was it a 'token' search that wasn't taken particularly seriously as enemy ships were not 'supposed' to be out there yet? If Nagumo had actually thought that the presence of enemy ships was more likely, would he have insisted on a better search?

3rd - Tomonaga's report - second strike needed. If Nagumo believes the operation was a secret until the first strike on Midway then he should have plenty of time. There is a consideration when attacking targets that a second strike (if needed) be done as soon as possible. The longer you wait the more prepared and repaired from the previous strike the target will be. I believe this is Nagumo's thinking.
In other words he's thinking: 'Enemy ships should not be around, I should hurry and remove Midway as a threat so I can be fully prepared for the USN when it arrives' (but in Japanese of course ;)).

Now - we all know IF he assumed enemy ships were not in the area, he was totally wrong. I believe that this factor is key in the decisions. Had he been more wary, I think that a delay in sending the 2nd Midway strike out may be prudent. Still - he had a known threat that could be neutralized VS a potential and increasing threat that should increase as time goes on (in other words as the US fleet gets word of the attack and sails for Midway). I think HE's thinking that a delay in dealing with Midway puts his forces at risk of having both Midway AND the US fleet to deal with later. Best to remove Midway now while there is time.

To Dennis - I am just going over Nagumo's possible thought process' here - not trying to push any view. I understand your views on doing recon' or delaying the strike. I don't think you're wrong - but neither do I think Nagumo is necessarily wrong based on what he knew and the likelihood of US forces being in the area.
All bets were off with the Intelligence SNAFU regarding the code breaking and message intercept. What happened was exactly what the US needed to happen.

Here is a quote from a post by Mike:

Communications: Fuchida said that Nagumo was denied critical information about Operation K and enemy activity as Yamamoto witheld it through radio silence. Their research shows info in the Akagi air group's report of intell received after sailng that contradicts that thesis and attributes the source of the information to radio intelligence. All info was broadcast by the 6th Communications unit in Japan. Notes on enemy activity in the Akagi report for May 29 and 31 match the same entries in Ugaki's diary confirming Nagumo was receiveing radio traffic just fine on those days.

Based on that information, that Nagumo was privy to information gleaned from radio intelligence and we have Ugaki stating in his diary that he believes that the US was aware of their movements, then why does Nagumo still believe there might not be any carriers in the area? Wouldn't a good, thorough threat assessment, with this information, now throw the original threat analysis right out the window. Wouldn't a prudent commander now raise the probability that the US might have carrier forces in the area, to a higher level? If he was receiving all the transmissions from Tokyo as everyone claims, then he should have known that Operation K was a failure and that the submarine cordon was late. This would mean that he has no confirmation as to where the US carriers are currently located and an adequate threat analysis and assessment would have raised doubts about Nagumo's assumptions.

The communication issue also throws doubt on the idea that if he had known or suspected, he would have put out his single phase search earlier. He had, if we believe the new ideas, all the information that was required to be suspicious and put that search out hours earlier.

As to Tomonaga's report, same issue has arisen. If he has all the communications and intercept information, then his second and worse threat is a real possibility and unless Tomonaga can provide detailed information on the strike and results, Nagumo must accept the fact that we might know he is coming and we are prepared, with carriers nearby. It does not matter how we know, he just can't take the chance. If he has the information that everyone claims.

We can't have this both ways. If he has the radio intercept information and the messages concerning Operation K and the submarine cordon, then he has to change his assessment of the possibility of the US carriers being nearby. In that case, he has to wait for the scouts to reach their max range and for Tomonaga to provide a more detailed strike report before breaking the spot and rearming the second strike.

The problem I have is that if Fuchida and others are correct, then the decisions and mistakes made are perfectly understandable and logical. He made errors in judgment based on a lack of up-to-data information which was available. If he did have all that information, then his mistakes are those of poor threat analysis and assessment due to possibly conceit or just poor command and control. It is also possible and probable that the rigid Japanese command system and doctrine was at fault here.

But the communication issue is vital. It provides the data that can change his attitude from one of complete disregard for the second threat to one of wariness that the second threat is now more likely than originally thought possible.

Kyle Holgate

12-03-2009, 09:50 PM

old_pop2000

12-03-2009, 10:13 PM

"Communications: Fuchida said that Nagumo was denied critical information about Operation K and enemy activity as Yamamoto witheld it through radio silence. Their research shows info in the Akagi air group's report of intell received after sailng that contradicts that thesis and attributes the source of the information to radio intelligence. All info was broadcast by the 6th Communications unit in Japan. Notes on enemy activity in the Akagi report for May 29 and 31 match the same entries in Ugaki's diary confirming Nagumo was receiveing radio traffic just fine on those days. "

Nagumo's behavior is indicative of someone that believes that the US fleet is most likely not around. Based on what he did - what does it LOOK like he's aware of? Either he's really single minded about Midway (which is possible), he's not a very good carrier Admiral (which is possible) or he doesn't have any intel leading him to think the US may be lurking nearby (which is possible). Why would he ignore information about the possibility of the US being aware of something going on at Midway? I don't think he would.

Nagumo does not act like he's aware of the fleet reports.

One thing that has always bugged me. The Japanese should have known that the US fleet operates and does maneuvers in their back yard (meaning Hawaii/Midway area). I doubt Nagumo knew it, but during the PH strike one of the USN Carriers was near Midway just by happenstance. Even if there is no intel leading otherwise, it seems that making as sure as possible that no one is home before robbing the place is a good idea!!!

I agree, he does act like someone who isn't aware of the reports on the activity on our radio networks that were high priority messages and the greater ranges and numbers of our long range search aircraft. Why would he or his staff ignore reports that would bring into question, the initial planning assumptions about US activity. Either victory disease was stronger than suspected, they were stupid or they actually did not know about all this information, as Fuchida has stated. Why would Fuchida lie, to save a dead man's reputation. It certainly wasn't his responsibility, so its no sweat off his nose, he loses nothing. It certainly doesn't hurt Yamamoto and Ugaki, they are both dead. He seems to be telling the facts, as he knows them.

Kyle Holgate

12-04-2009, 12:34 AM

I agree, he does act like someone who isn't aware of the reports on the activity on our radio networks that were high priority messages and the greater ranges and numbers of our long range search aircraft. Why would he or his staff ignore reports that would bring into question, the initial planning assumptions about US activity. Either victory disease was stronger than suspected, they were stupid or they actually did not know about all this information, as Fuchida has stated. Why would Fuchida lie, to save a dead man's reputation. It certainly wasn't his responsibility, so its no sweat off his nose, he loses nothing. It certainly doesn't hurt Yamamoto and Ugaki, they are both dead. He seems to be telling the facts, as he knows them.

It's going to remain an unknown probably unless somehow new information comes out. I try to give the people on scene some benefit of the doubt, both because I'm an amateur looking back over 68 odd years and because in theory - they should know what they're doing to some extent.
Fuchida would have no reason to lie as such, but he could be in error. I know when I try to remember events some time ago my recollection can be off - particularly if someone else has told the story. Memory is a funny thing.
Everything points to Nagumo acting like he's on the original plan - neutralize midway then wait for the USN.
Tis a mistery...

old_pop2000

12-04-2009, 01:07 AM

It's going to remain an unknown probably unless somehow new information comes out. I try to give the people on scene some benefit of the doubt, both because I'm an amateur looking back over 68 odd years and because in theory - they should know what they're doing to some extent.
Fuchida would have no reason to lie as such, but he could be in error. I know when I try to remember events some time ago my recollection can be off - particularly if someone else has told the story. Memory is a funny thing.
Everything points to Nagumo acting like he's on the original plan - neutralize midway then wait for the USN.
Tis a mistery...

As we know, first hand accounts can be in error. Memories can play tricks. I agree that the facts seem to indicate that Fuchida is telling the truth, that Nagumo did not have the intelligence information that would have given him a different perspective on the presence of US Naval forces.

keschofield

12-04-2009, 02:25 PM

As we know, first hand accounts can be in error. Memories can play tricks. I agree that the facts seem to indicate that Fuchida is telling the truth, that Nagumo did not have the intelligence information that would have given him a different perspective on the presence of US Naval forces.

However, as we have found out with the German generals, first hand accounts written AFTER the fact can be rife with errors. Much self-serving and a$& kissing can be occurring.

old_pop2000

12-04-2009, 03:40 PM

However, as we have found out with the German generals, first hand accounts written AFTER the fact can be rife with errors. Much self-serving and a$& kissing can be occurring.

There is also the possibility that Fuchida, having been sick most of the way across, was not privy to the fact that radio intercept information and Operation K results had, in fact been received and digested by the First Striking Fleet staff. By the time, Fuchida came up to the bridge, that might have been forgotten. In point of fact, to the best of his knowledge, they might not have received those messages. He just wasn't on the bridge when received and possibly discounted. Fuchida is telling the story based upon his knowledge, even though he was not on that bridge all the time.

Kyle Holgate

12-04-2009, 04:30 PM

There is also the possibility that Fuchida, having been sick most of the way across, was not privy to the fact that radio intercept information and Operation K results had, in fact been received and digested by the First Striking Fleet staff. By the time, Fuchida came up to the bridge, that might have been forgotten. In point of fact, to the best of his knowledge, they might not have received those messages. He just wasn't on the bridge when received and possibly discounted. Fuchida is telling the story based upon his knowledge, even though he was not on that bridge all the time.

If we assume for now that Nagumo WAS aware of the US fleet activity how do we explain his actions?
As far as I can tell, there was no specific information about what the US fleet may be up to - only that there was increased radio traffic and something was going on.
Did Nagumo assume that the USN had gotten wind of SOME Japanese operation in progress, but that it would not be able expect where at? If the US is at alert it doesn't necessarily change the Midway plans. Maybe it wasn't conceivable that the US could actually be aware of the Midway operation specifically. I can understand this - without any reason otherwise he'd expect the codes to be secure so his attack location should be a surprise until the first Midway strike. Even if the USN is all stirred up and aware the Japanese were up to no good - they could not know where the Japanese were going to strike, after all.

Mike Malanaphy

12-04-2009, 06:23 PM

There is also the possibility that Fuchida, having been sick most of the way across, was not privy to the fact that radio intercept information and Operation K results had, in fact been received and digested by the First Striking Fleet staff. By the time, Fuchida came up to the bridge, that might have been forgotten. In point of fact, to the best of his knowledge, they might not have received those messages. He just wasn't on the bridge when received and possibly discounted. Fuchida is telling the story based upon his knowledge, even though he was not on that bridge all the time.

Hi Dennis,

Parshall and Tully relate that Fuchida was part of after battle committee to learn lessons. Fuchida said that ther were 6 copies of that report none of which survived the war. He lalter claimed to have found a draft of thhat report after the war and that was basis for his narrative. They suspect he used a copy of Nagumo's after action as there are no factual differeneces or maps between them.

They describe Dull's explanation of part of the Japanese character where mistakes are often attributed to "what other men do", the intervention of fate. They believe that was part of the reasoning behind the misstatements in his account.

Fuchida was up around for the launch, but obviously unable to lead the attack in his plane.

old_pop2000

12-04-2009, 09:47 PM

Hi Dennis,

Parshall and Tully relate that Fuchida was part of after battle committee to learn lessons. Fuchida said that ther were 6 copies of that report none of which survived the war. He lalter claimed to have found a draft of thhat report after the war and that was basis for his narrative. They suspect he used a copy of Nagumo's after action as there are no factual differeneces or maps between them.

They describe Dull's explanation of part of the Japanese character where mistakes are often attributed to "what other men do", the intervention of fate. They believe that was part of the reasoning behind the misstatements in his account.

Fuchida was up around for the launch, but obviously unable to lead the attack in his plane.

That's about what I read. It seems that everyone had to do the best they could after the war to recreate the records. The editors of Senshi Sosho place caveats in their combined logs stating the not to use the times in precise timelines, I think this is how they put it. The times were guesses, not precise. I believe that it is disingenuous to claim that Fuchida was attempting to cover up or tell the world what he expected that they wanted to hear. If mistakes were made, I don't know that anyone has records to disprove what he states.

old_pop2000

12-04-2009, 11:50 PM

We always assume that Tomonaga's meaning in his 0400 radio message was that a second strike was necessary to finish off the targets remaining. However, his strike was actually designed to destroy the aircraft along with the facilities. The aircraft were the real threat. As he reaches Midway and assesses the situation, he must have realized that the aircraft were missing. So, he proceeds with the attack and according to many of the surviving pilots, they actually destroyed almost everything of value. Now, was Tomonaga's message actually aimed at the facilities or was he actually requesting a second strike to come back and catch those aircraft after they landed? He must have realized the US aircraft had had warning and left the area. The PBYs would simply move out and orbit until the attack was over, but the bombers would head to the carriers for an attack. Eventually they would have to return. If they did, and the Japanese launched a second strike, then they probably would catch them on the ground.

From Nagumo's AAR -

After attacking Midway by air and destroying the enemy's shore based air strength to facilitate our landing operations, we would still be able to destroy any enemy task force which may choose to counter attack.

So, the first strike was designed to catch our shore based air strength on the ground to destroy it. However, when the first strike arrives, the planes are gone. Nagumo knows they attacked him and he destroyed most of them. Why strike the island again?

Kyle Holgate

12-05-2009, 06:27 AM

old_pop2000

12-05-2009, 08:17 PM

Shattered Sword - on Pg 149 the authors say: "The strike leaders message was blunt enough: "There is need for a second attack wave". Further on it's suggested that this was no surprise, the 70 or so bombers sent was insufficient to put Midway out of business.

On pg 152 an attack by a B-26 which narrowly missed ramming into Akagi. From Shattered sword again "If Tomonaga's message from fifteen minutes earlier hadn't already decided matters for Nagumo, the determined self-sacrifice of this particular Marauder may well have done so. Nagumo's blood was up. Enough was enough. It was clear that Midway was full of fight, and until the island was neutralized it would be a threat."

Remember that the objective was the destruction of the aircraft on the island and facilities. With no aircraft on that island when Tomonaga arrived, there is no way to know where they went although he probably guessed they went after the carriers. Now, after the attack, he is aware of how many aircraft were destroyed. However, Nagumo is aware of how many planes they destroyed. Had the two bits of information been assessed together, it would have been apparent that the threat from Midway was almost nil except for the facilities. With no planes, and no time to fly more to the island, Midway was no longer a threat. However, as Parshall states, Nagumo's blood was up. How does he know that? That is an authors licensed comment. He has no proof or evidence that Nagumo was hot to get to Midway. Had they waited for Tomonaga to land and then reassessed the threat based on what Tomonaga had seen and destroyed along with the aircraft destroyed during the attacks, it would have been readily apparent the need for the second strike was not imperative.

I remind you that on Page 153, Parshall states: 'Was he simply to let Tomonaga's men go back out later in the day to finish the job? Nagumo, after all, had absolutely no detailed information regarding the state of the island after Tomonaga's attack. All he knew was that his flight leader had thought a second strike necessary'. I call your attention to the boldy highlighted statement. Nagumo, did, in fact have detailed information. Information that Tomonaga did not. That over 50 aircraft that could only have come from Midway, had attacked the fleet and most were shot down. If he had listened to the post strike briefing by Tomonaga, then he would have realized that over 30 plus fighters were downed by the escorting Zero's. With both of these numbers together, then the estimated air wing size on Midway excludingthe PBYs was eliminated.

I submit that Yamamoto's order to retain half of the air wings for antiship strikes was a order of a prudent commander who had planned according to the opponents capabilities, not his intentions. While Yamamoto probably did not believe that the US carriers were in the area, a prudent commander would be wary and develop a plan for that possibility. Had detailed threat assessement been performed, most of this information would have been developed and it would have been realized that Midway was no longer an immediate threat. Now, the second possible threat could be dealt with, if it made an appearance. Tomonaga's aircraft could have been rearmed, refuel and repaired for a second strike in the afternoon, there was plenty of daylight. The best and most experienced pilots would be needed for an antiship strike, so why not leave them on the carriers. I don't want to waste my dwindling supply of these expert pilots against a target like Midway. Nagumo's staff seems to have performed poorly. A staff job is not a line function, it has no or shouldn't have any authority. It's job is too assemble all available information and develop alternative plans to the original, based on new information. This appears to have broken down.

I believe that there are different viewpoints on the failure at Midway. Mr. Parshall's work was excellent, his research appears to be the same. But, his conclusions are not entirely founded on the facts. They are his opinion. So be it. I have mine and I am attempting to use the same information that he used. I just wish I could get to Senshi Sosho and the squadron records. But alas I have to use his research. He has far more credibility than I, so that is the way it is.

Kyle Holgate

12-06-2009, 12:50 AM

old_pop2000

12-06-2009, 01:40 AM

That Nagumo's blood was up may well be something researched - not just Parshall's opinion. We don't know. Nagumo's forces were just attacked and indeed he himself was put in serious danger. It would be fairly easy at this point to be thinking more irrationally as adrenalin would probably be coursing and the ol' fight or flight reflex in high gear. I would guess that Nagumo wasn't completely calm and collected. Just about anyone at that point would be thinking of bombing Midway back to the stone age.
I would find that sort of reaction quite understandable.
The thing is the disaster wasn't caused by this alleged mistake or misjudgment It is one piece of the pie - so to speak. If not for the stacking of the American deck done by the code breaking this small event would be blip in the history books.

My opinion remains that under normal circumstances Nagumo did the right thing by ordering a follow up attack. His timing is questionable but not unfathomable.
In war you punch hard, if that doesn't do the trick you hit again - Fast. Don't give your opponent time to regroup or recover. This is a re-curring theme throughout military history. It probably worked in most situations even if it did not in this particular situation under quite unusual circumstances.

Something to consider. At 0407 hrs, the air officer of the Kaga reported to Mobile Force "Sand Island bombed and great results obtained". This report is seven minutes after the first strike group leader sent the code words that were preplanned requesting a second strike. Nagumo's order to reequip the second wave with land bombs was issued at 0415. Nagumo now has two conflicting reports. One requesting a second strike, another stating great results obtained from an attack on Sand Island.

BTW, as I perused through the Ugaki Diaries, he states that prior to the start of the operation he had brought up the point about an enemy force appearing on the flanks of the First Striking fleet and how it would be handled. The First Striking Fleet reviewed the matter and made the decision to leave half of the strike force armed with antiship weapons. If this is true, then it was the First Striking Fleet that decided, on its own, to follow that plan. If Yamamoto ordered it, it was to ensure that this plan was followed. Seems that the First Striking Fleet broke its own preplanning rule.

Mike Malanaphy

12-06-2009, 03:00 PM

Remember that the objective was the destruction of the aircraft on the island and facilities. With no aircraft on that island when Tomonaga arrived, there is no way to know where they went although he probably guessed they went after the carriers. Now, after the attack, he is aware of how many aircraft were destroyed. However, Nagumo is aware of how many planes they destroyed. Had the two bits of information been assessed together, it would have been apparent that the threat from Midway was almost nil except for the facilities. With no planes, and no time to fly more to the island, Midway was no longer a threat. However, as Parshall states, Nagumo's blood was up. How does he know that? That is an authors licensed comment. He has no proof or evidence that Nagumo was hot to get to Midway. Had they waited for Tomonaga to land and then reassessed the threat based on what Tomonaga had seen and destroyed along with the aircraft destroyed during the attacks, it would have been readily apparent the need for the second strike was not imperative.

I remind you that on Page 153, Parshall states: 'Was he simply to let Tomonaga's men go back out later in the day to finish the job? Nagumo, after all, had absolutely no detailed information regarding the state of the island after Tomonaga's attack. All he knew was that his flight leader had thought a second strike necessary'. I call your attention to the boldy highlighted statement. Nagumo, did, in fact have detailed information. Information that Tomonaga did not. That over 50 aircraft that could only have come from Midway, had attacked the fleet and most were shot down. If he had listened to the post strike briefing by Tomonaga, then he would have realized that over 30 plus fighters were downed by the escorting Zero's. With both of these numbers together, then the estimated air wing size on Midway excludingthe PBYs was eliminated.

I submit that Yamamoto's order to retain half of the air wings for antiship strikes was a order of a prudent commander who had planned according to the opponents capabilities, not his intentions. While Yamamoto probably did not believe that the US carriers were in the area, a prudent commander would be wary and develop a plan for that possibility. Had detailed threat assessement been performed, most of this information would have been developed and it would have been realized that Midway was no longer an immediate threat. Now, the second possible threat could be dealt with, if it made an appearance. Tomonaga's aircraft could have been rearmed, refuel and repaired for a second strike in the afternoon, there was plenty of daylight. The best and most experienced pilots would be needed for an antiship strike, so why not leave them on the carriers. I don't want to waste my dwindling supply of these expert pilots against a target like Midway. Nagumo's staff seems to have performed poorly. A staff job is not a line function, it has no or shouldn't have any authority. It's job is too assemble all available information and develop alternative plans to the original, based on new information. This appears to have broken down.

I believe that there are different viewpoints on the failure at Midway. Mr. Parshall's work was excellent, his research appears to be the same. But, his conclusions are not entirely founded on the facts. They are his opinion. So be it. I have mine and I am attempting to use the same information that he used. I just wish I could get to Senshi Sosho and the squadron records. But alas I have to use his research. He has far more credibility than I, so that is the way it is.

Hi Dennis,

That's an excellent insight about Nagumo. He had little idea about the state of the battle. Parshall mentions the cramped facilities of Akagi's flag bridge, but obviously there was no plot tracking such vital information like results, reports, plane status, etc that would allow him to make those determiniations or for his staff to make meaningful recommendations. He didn't know the CAP had shot down 50 planes or that Tomononga had shot down 30 over Midway. Like Jellicoe at Jutland, his knowledge extended little beyond what he could see and no one on his staff was putting it together for him. He was clearly in flux as at 0930, he radioed that he expected to engage the 10 American ships spotted by the scout in a surface action.

Parshall and Tully lay out Nagumo's dilema. He only had about 15 minutes to decide whether to launch a strike prior to Tomonaga's return. They argue that the strike would be a powerful one and had the added advantage of getting the fueled planes off the ships. During that critical time, Nagumo had an incomplete picture and was under constant air attack. Spotting and launching a strike under fire and helm would be extremely difficult and maybe more than any commander would do in that situation.

old_pop2000

12-06-2009, 03:29 PM

Hi Dennis,

That's an excellent insight about Nagumo. He had little idea about the state of the battle. Parshall mentions the cramped facilities of Akagi's flag bridge, but obviously there was no plot tracking such vital information like results, reports, plane status, etc that would allow him to make those determiniations or for his staff to make meaningful recommendations. He didn't know the CAP had shot down 50 planes or that Tomononga had shot down 30 over Midway. Like Jellicoe at Jutland, his knowledge extended little beyond what he could see and no one on his staff was putting it together for him. He was clearly in flux as at 0930, he radioed that he expected to engage the 10 American ships spotted by the scout in a surface action.

Parshall and Tully lay out Nagumo's dilema. He only had about 15 minutes to decide whether to launch a strike prior to Tomonaga's return. They argue that the strike would be a powerful one and had the added advantage of getting the fueled planes off the ships. During that critical time, Nagumo had an incomplete picture and was under constant air attack. Spotting and launching a strike under fire and helm would be extremely difficult and maybe more than any commander would do in that situation.

Hi Mike:
Here is something else to consider about Nagumo and his staff. At Coral Sea, the Japanese Mobile operations doctrine underwent its first trial by fire. It was the first time that the carrier force or any Japanese carrier force had been up against an opposing carrier force and the first time, it underwent an air attack. In that operation, Japanese air defense and reconnaissance by the mobile force was found to be wanting. However, the lessons were learned, not by Nagumo and his staff, but Hara. Due to the fact that Hara arrived back at Kure so near the departure date of the First Striking Fleet, there was no time to assimilate those lessons from Admiral Hara and use them to modify the plan for Operation MI. So, this is the first time, Nagumo and his staff have engaged US carriers and only the second time they have been attacked by aircraft. Both times by a land based threat. Even in the Indian Ocean operation, their reconnaissance was found wanting and their deployment of the air wings was poor. Fuchida mentions the problems encountered by a surprise land attack on the carriers. I believe this might have had some effect, possibly this made the land attack more important after the IO incident than it actually was.

I suspect the failure to assimilate the information from Admiral Hara and the incident in the IO played a significant part in the First Strikng Fleets rapid and in my opinion, faulty threat analysis and assessment of the threat Midway island posed.

Kyle Holgate

12-06-2009, 07:40 PM

It's jumping ahead across several carrier battles - but it makes an interesting contrast..

Halsey at Leyte...
Admiral Halsey's chief of staff Mick Carney was continually updating Halsey and providing analysis for him of possible Japanese intentions & actions. Halsey (and Carney) made mistakes there due to faulty recon' reports about Kurita's center force. In contrast to Midway, in this case there WAS a need for more attacks.

One quote from Carney: "No operation plan can ever include the enemy's reactions. We must always be ready to make instant decisions on changes in the situation resulting from unpredictable enemy reactions".
This is just more words saying - no plan lasts past the first contact with the enemy, but it remains quite true.
What the man in charge is and isn't aware of and how information is provided is vital. Playing wargames we always have access to information well laid out and clear. Even ones trying to provide some Fog Of War (FOW) are always providing much more, and clearly defined information than an actual commander/admiral. It's easy to forget how confusing Nagumo's place (or Halsey's) could be.

Mike Malanaphy

12-06-2009, 08:03 PM

Hi Mike:
Here is something else to consider about Nagumo and his staff. At Coral Sea, the Japanese Mobile operations doctrine underwent its first trial by fire. It was the first time that the carrier force or any Japanese carrier force had been up against an opposing carrier force and the first time, it underwent an air attack. In that operation, Japanese air defense and reconnaissance by the mobile force was found to be wanting. However, the lessons were learned, not by Nagumo and his staff, but Hara. Due to the fact that Hara arrived back at Kure so near the departure date of the First Striking Fleet, there was no time to assimilate those lessons from Admiral Hara and use them to modify the plan for Operation MI. So, this is the first time, Nagumo and his staff have engaged US carriers and only the second time they have been attacked by aircraft. Both times by a land based threat. Even in the Indian Ocean operation, their reconnaissance was found wanting and their deployment of the air wings was poor. Fuchida mentions the problems encountered by a surprise land attack on the carriers. I believe this might have had some effect, possibly this made the land attack more important after the IO incident than it actually was.

I suspect the failure to assimilate the information from Admiral Hara and the incident in the IO played a significant part in the First Strikng Fleets rapid and in my opinion, faulty threat analysis and assessment of the threat Midway island posed.

Hi Dennis,

I totally agree. You would think that Nagumo and his staff as well as the Combined FLeet would be eager for first hand information about how the USN fhought, but there seems to be little professional curiousity on their part. Hara's after action could have been done after the battle and flown home within days of it happening for study. Just as the unwillingness to get Zuikaku ready for Midway shows a lack of concern or urgency, the professional lack of curiosity about Hara's experiences with the USN shows perhaps the worst side of the Japanese military...complacency of a high order.

old_pop2000

12-06-2009, 08:33 PM

Hi Dennis,

I totally agree. You would think that Nagumo and his staff as well as the Combined FLeet would be eager for first hand information about how the USN thought, but ther seems to be little professional curiousity on their part. Hara's after action could have been done after the battle and flown home within days of it happening for study. Just as the unwillingness to get Zuikaku ready for Midway shows a lack of concern or urgency, the professional lack of curiosity about Hara's experiences with the USN shows perhaps the worst side of the Japanese military...complacency of a high order.

Good phrase.... complacency of a high order. It is interesting that many historians criticize the Japanese command for continuing with a plan, long after conditions had changed. We see at Midway, they had planned for a possible second strike against the island if the first attack failed. But they also planned for the possibility of an unknown enemy arriving on the disengaged side of the battle area. Now, in actual practice, they continued with the original plan to strike the island a second time, if the strike leader had requested it. Without any consideration for whether the second strike was even necessary at this juncture, they continued with the plan. However, they went against their own best pre-operational planning and respotted the deck to launch that second attack, leaving them open to the very threat they had devised a strategy to thwart. It was a rush to judgment, based on the IO experience and a failure to assimilate the lessons from Coral Sea. We can call it complacency. A complacency that says, my opponent is not capable of beating me, no matter what he does. I can take risks and get away with them. Hara found out that was not true, that Japanese doctrine had some real problems, that we could exploit. Complacency which, IMO, led to a failure to perform a detailed threat analysis and assessment before taking the next step in the operation.

Good words, mate.

asnrobert

12-06-2009, 10:02 PM

old_pop2000

12-06-2009, 10:36 PM

I've also read Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword, and there is something about the Japanese that strikes me as odd. Before the battle, when the operation was being gamed out by the Japanese naval leaders, the officer controlling the American forces did what the Americans would do- come out of nowhere and catch the Japanese carriers by surprise, sinking two of them. The umpires decided that the carriers weren't sunk, since it wasn't believed the American fleet would be out. But later that day, the officers that would be leading the Midway mission were asked what they would do if the US fleet showed up, and they they gave a vague answer.
It seems to me that on the one hand, Nagumo and his staff were expected to know what to do it if the US fleet showed up, but on the other hand they were told they couldn't show up and weren't allowed to practice contingency plans to deal with that possibility.

That was a table top exercise held in May on board the Yamato. The Nagumo force underwent a bombing attack by land based aircraft while its aircraft were off attacking Midway and the judge ruled that both Akagi and Kaga were sunk. Admiral Ugaki arbitrarly reduced the number of hits and only Kaga was ruled sunk. It was later changed again and Kaga was resurrected in the next phase of the games to participate in the invasions of New Caledonia and Fiji. Fuchida states that the Nagumo force had little time to study the operations tested and that they were simply puppets for the Combined Fleet headquarters. The lack of preparation was noticed by Ugaki, when in the course of the table games, the US fleet did show up on the flank, the Nagumo force had no plans. Ugaki then cautioned them that they might give greater consideration to this possibility. They did and decided to maintain half of their air wing in antiship configuration. However, Ugaki never mentions the high-handed changing of the results in his diary. He states that limited table top maneuvers were performed.

Actual battle experienced showed that, in fact, the Nagumo force was not prepared for such a possibility and never performed an andequate threat assessment of the Midway air groups.