Armored Thunderbolt

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi folks,

I just got a copy of "Armored Thunderbolt" by Steven Zaloga. An operational history of the Sherman tank in WWII. A gorgeous hard cover book 360 pages and hundreds of gorgeous photos. While not a technical history like Hunnicut's, Zaloga hits all of the technical highspots in the Sherman's evolution in American and foregin service. He deftly and clearly describes the interplay between the parties responsible for tank developement. Combat experience in North Africa had lead most to believe the 75mm in the Sherman was adequate. Contacts with Panthers and Tigers were few and intelligence believed they were specialized limited production vehicles, so Normandy was a shock and the 76 mm and the Pershing were playing catch up.

Among the nuggets well worthwhile are:

Dennis's earlier comments about the lack of molybdenum making German armor brittle is born out by a photo on page 178 showing a panther used for target practice.

Few large scale battle were fought between German and American armor, the average being 9 US versus 4 German tanks with Panthers never more than 28% of the German armored force in the west. One of the reasons the 75mm had a lot of adherrents was not only it's better HE round than the 76mm, but there was a white phosphorus round as well for smoke making.

HVAP amo was extremely lmited in supply with 2,000 rounds of the T4 HVAP airlifted to Normandy in August 1944. Tungsten shortages limited production and only 18,000 rounds were delivered to the ETO by wars end, equally divided between 76mm and 75 mm for the M 10 tank destroyer which worked out to an average of only 1 round per month per vehicle. Much like the original 76mm gun, stateside test performance was less in combat for HVAP also. It could not penetrate the front slope of a Panther, but could pentrate the mantlet at 800-1,000 yard as opposed to 300 yards fro the standard M62.

Most interesting of all was the documentation of four engagements between 4 April-22 April involving the one of a kind "Super Pershing" T15E1 90mm gun with HVAP. Three kills were awarded, one at 1800 yards. A fourth tank surrendered to the "Super Pershing" after running out of ammo.

Book is published through Stackpole publishing so NWS should be able to get it. A great book chock full of great pictures and information found nowhere else for a couple of bucks more than those $21.00 Osprey/Vanguard paperbacks of 40-50 pages. Highly recommended.

[old_pop2000]

<snip> Book is published through Stackpole publishing so NWS should be able to get it. A great book chock full of great pictures and information found nowhere else for a couple of bucks more than those $21.00 Osprey/Vanguard paperbacks of 40-50 pages. Highly recommended.

Doggonit, Mike. I just ordered the Ugaki Diaries. You, my friend, are going to run this old retired folk out of money. Sounds like a good book.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Doggonit, Mike. I just ordered the Ugaki Diaries. You, my friend, are going to run this old retired folk out of money. Sounds like a good book.

Hi Dennis,

Sorry about that, but every now and again a book comes by that has almost all the goodies in it and Zaloga's book is it for Shermans in WW II and tank warfare as well. Not to mention very reasonably priced. A couple of nits. Zaloga is a well respected and prolific armor writer and this book has an extensive bibliography, but no footnote sourcing. There is a tremendous amount information in this book on the scale of D.K. Brown or Friedman, but the sources are unknown unless quoted in the text itself not to mention those fact filled notes Brown and Friedman provide. The appendicies have a lot of statistical and production information. Especially interesting are strengths and loss information. Loss is not defined as knocked out or totally destroyed. For June-Aug 1944, First Army averaged a strength of 1,282 Shermans in August and suffered 666 Shermans lost in the three month period. Overall, 4,295 Shermans were lost in the ETO. Some of the independent tank battalions had extremely high losses. With a nominal strength of 54 tanks, the 191st lost 140, the 746th 124, the 756th 77. the 761st 71, and the 753rd 62. Losses for the Armored divisions is only by division with 3rd AD losing 632 with 7th AD the next highest with only 360 lost. There is a table on self propelled TD loses and February 1945 was the most dangerous month by far to be in an M-10 crew with 106 lost as opposed to only 62 in December 1944.

In teh PTO, two Shwermans were lost on Luzon due to two Japanes kamikaze tanks, tanks filled with explosives as their meager main guns could not pentrate Shermans.

Perhaps the most astonishing fact was that well into 1944 there wasn't even a manual for tank-infantry cooperation and tank vehicle and infantry radios were not compatible until the end of the war with field expedients providing the only relief.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi folks,

I just got a copy of "Armored Thunderbolt" by Steven Zaloga. An operational history of the Sherman tank in WWII. A gorgeous hard cover book 360 pages and hundreds of gorgeous photos. While not a technical history like Hunnicut's, Zaloga hits all of the technical highspots in the Sherman's evolution in American and foregin service. He deftly and clearly describes the interplay between the parties responsible for tank developement. Combat experience in North Africa had lead most to believe the 75mm in the Sherman was adequate. Contacts with Panthers and Tigers were few and intelligence believed they were specialized limited production vehicles, so Normandy was a shock and the 76 mm and the Pershing were playing catch up.

Among the nuggets well worthwhile are:

Dennis's earlier comments about the lack of molybdenum making German armor brittle is born out by a photo on page 178 showing a panther used for target practice.

Few large scale battle were fought between German and American armor, the average being 9 US versus 4 German tanks with Panthers never more than 28% of the German armored force in the west. One of the reasons the 75mm had a lot of adherrents was not only it's better HE round than the 76mm, but there was a white phosphorus round as well for smoke making.

HVAP amo was extremely lmited in supply with 2,000 rounds of the T4 HVAP airlifted to Normandy in August 1944. Tungsten shortages limited production and only 18,000 rounds were delivered to the ETO by wars end, equally divided between 76mm and 75 mm for the M 10 tank destroyer which worked out to an average of only 1 round per month per vehicle. Much like the original 76mm gun, stateside test performance was less in combat for HVAP also. It could not penetrate the front slope of a Panther, but could pentrate the mantlet at 800-1,000 yard as opposed to 300 yards fro the standard M62.

Most interesting of all was the documentation of four engagements between 4 April-22 April involving the one of a kind "Super Pershing" T15E1 90mm gun with HVAP. Three kills were awarded, one at 1800 yards. A fourth tank surrendered to the "Super Pershing" after running out of ammo.

Book is published through Stackpole publishing so NWS should be able to get it. A great book chock full of great pictures and information found nowhere else for a couple of bucks more than those $21.00 Osprey/Vanguard paperbacks of 40-50 pages. Highly recommended.

Mike:

Thanks for the review sir! I was wondering about that book. Zaloga is one of my favorite historians. His book on the Panther versus the Sherman 76mm in the Osprey Duel series touches on many of the topics raised including gun performance or lack thereof. HVAP was as you say in scarce supply with the priority given to tank destroyer units. Sherman crews frequently traded TD crews for HVAP and kept the round for the toughest targets like Tiger tanks and Panther tanks.

Zaloga mentions in several other Osprey titles that a real drawback for US tank and anti-tank guns was the operating pressure for their gun chambers. It was much lower than German or British guns of comparable calibers. The main reason being that the US Army wanted barrel life and swapped velocity for it. Zaloga compares amounts of propellant in US tank rounds to other armies and it is considerably lower. Small wonder that the Sherman was handicapped due to decisions that in hindsight were mistakes.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Dennis,

Sorry about that, but every now and again a book comes by that has almost all the goodies in it and Zaloga's book is it for Shermans in WW II and tank warfare as well. Not to mention very reasonably priced. A couple of nits. Zaloga is a well respected and prolific armor writer and this book has an extensive bibliography, but no footnote sourcing. There is a tremendous amount information in this book on the scale of D.K. Brown or Friedman, but the sources are unknown unless quoted in the text itself not to mention those fact filled notes Brown and Friedman provide. The appendicies have a lot of statistical and production information. Especially interesting are strengths and loss information. Loss is not defined as knocked out or totally destroyed. For June-Aug 1944, First Army averaged a strength of 1,282 Shermans in August and suffered 666 Shermans lost in the three month period. Overall, 4,295 Shermans were lost in the ETO. Some of the independent tank battalions had extremely high losses. With a nominal strength of 54 tanks, the 191st lost 140, the 746th 124, the 756th 77. the 761st 71, and the 753rd 62. Losses for the Armored divisions is only by division with 3rd AD losing 632 with 7th AD the next highest with only 360 lost. There is a table on self propelled TD loses and February 1945 was the most dangerous month by far to be in an M-10 crew with 106 lost as opposed to only 62 in December 1944.

In teh PTO, two Shwermans were lost on Luzon due to two Japanes kamikaze tanks, tanks filled with explosives as their meager main guns could not pentrate Shermans.

Perhaps the most astonishing fact was that well into 1944 there wasn't even a manual for tank-infantry cooperation and tank vehicle and infantry radios were not compatible until the end of the war with field expedients providing the only relief.

Mike:

Are losses broken out into missions kills versus total losses? Many Shermans were knocked out but recovered and either used to repair other tanks or returned to service themselves.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

Are losses broken out into missions kills versus total losses? Many Shermans were knocked out but recovered and either used to repair other tanks or returned to service themselves.

Hi Ed,

No he doesn't. I'm going to assume that he means total losses as mission kills can be can cover the gamut from a bogie destroyed by a mine to an out and penetration with no fire. There is a picture of a Sherman from Normandy with 6 frontal penetrations by Panthers and two Panzerschrek hits, but did not burn. Some damage can be repaired in a few hours to a day.

I haven't run across any discussion of gun chamber size, but it does make sense from a barrel life perspective. Even the 90mm on the M36 and Pershings was weaker than the L/56 88 on the Tiger I, two years after the Tiger entered service. In fairness, your looking at the paradigm shifting in just the matter of a few years. Concensus among commanders and troops in the field was not solid either. There were 200 76mm armed Shermans in storage on D Day in England as field commanders didn't want the added complication of a different caliber of ammunition. The British sent their lend-lease 76mm Shermans to Italy where the weaker gun was seen less of a draw back in the ETO.

I've been reluctant to buy many of the Osprey/Vanguard books because the quality seems hit or miss particularly in the case of naval titles. To me that's why this book is such a find as it is little more than the cost of an Osprey soft cover and any of Hunnicut's books are hard to find and pricey, I bought mine in the 70s when they first came out.