'Shattered Sword' questions

[asnrobert]

I’m currently reading Parshall and Tully’s “Shattered Sword” and find it very interesting. However, there are a couple things that puzzle me that perhaps the more knowledgeable folks on this forum could clarify for me.

1) The authors state that Yammamoto insisted that any war for resources in 1941 include war with the United States, and while other officers like Nagano insisted if the US was not atacked it would be more difficult for FDR to get Congress to declare war, Yammamoto got his way. While I’ve read elsewhere about Yammamoto threatening to resign unless his plan for the Pearl Harbor attack was followed through, I was under the impression that the impetus for war with America came from those higher up in the government (like Tojo), not naval officers like Yammamoto.
2) Yammamoto had visited the United States in the 20s and 30s (which the authors mention), so he would have been well aware of America’s resources and industrial potential. According to John Costello’s “The Pacific War,” Yammamoto told Prime Minister Konoye that if it came to war with the US, “I can put up a good fight for six months, but if it lasts for a year or two I can give no guarantees.” However, Parshall and Tully seem to paint Yammamoto as clueless in this regard.
3) Parshall and Tully write that the Kudo Butai’s strike on Pearl Harbor was a “daring raid that no other fleet in the world could have carried out at that time.” I find that statement rather sweeping, considering the British had already pulled off such a raid at Taranto a year earlier (indeed, a scarce two paragraphs earlier the authors mention that the Japanese had “observed keenly” the Taranto raid). While the Pearl Harbor raid was on a larger scale carried out over a longer distance than the British strike, it can be pointed out that the Taranto raid was carried out at night (at a time when nighttime carrier ops were virtually unknown), plus it was against an adversary that was already a belligerent and could be expected to be on its guard, unlike the fleet at Pearl which was still following peacetime routine.
4) In talking about Japan’s response to Midway’s message regarding her desalinization plant, the authors state that in their radio messages Japan referred to Midway “by its code word, MI.” From everything I’ve read, I though that ‘AF’ was their codeword for Midway in radio traffic (MI being the name of the operation). Was this a simple mis-statement by the authors?

I still find the book very informative. It also answered one question that always puzzled me. The Shokaku and Zuikaku were intended to participate in Operation MI, but during the battle of the Coral Sea, the Shokaku was badly damaged by bombs and Zuikaku while undamaged, lost most of her air wing. So, during the Midway operation the Shokaku was under repair and Zuikaku was training a new air wing. I always wondered why they simply didn’t transfer Shokaku’s surviving a/c and crew to Zuikaku (indeed, Zuikaku returned home with a number of Shokaku’s planes on board) so she could operate, then have the other ship train the new air wing once repairs were complete? As Parshall and Tully pointed out, unlike the USN, where squadrons were independent of the carriers and could be swapped out at will (the authors state that Yorktown embarked some squadrons for the Midway battle that had previously served on Saratoga), the Japanese squadrons were integral to the carriers they served on.

[john964]

I’m currently reading Parshall and Tully’s “Shattered Sword” and find it very interesting. However, there are a couple things that puzzle me that perhaps the more knowledgeable folks on this forum could clarify for me.

3) Parshall and Tully write that the Kudo Butai’s strike on Pearl Harbor was a “daring raid that no other fleet in the world could have carried out at that time.” I find that statement rather sweeping, considering the British had already pulled off such a raid at Taranto a year earlier (indeed, a scarce two paragraphs earlier the authors mention that the Japanese had “observed keenly” the Taranto raid). While the Pearl Harbor raid was on a larger scale carried out over a longer distance than the British strike, it can be pointed out that the Taranto raid was carried out at night (at a time when nighttime carrier ops were virtually unknown), plus it was against an adversary that was already a belligerent and could be expected to be on its guard, unlike the fleet at Pearl which was still following peacetime routine.



What they are talking about is the number of CV's involved. USN CV's operated most often in pairs or singlely the RN was the same way. The IJN was the first to train and operate in such a large group. At Pearl Harbor the IJN had 6 CV's while at Taranto the RN used only 2 CV's and IIRC attacked two sepperate times, that is sent out strike, strike returns and reloads and launch second strike. The IJN launched first strike then spotted second strike when first was on its way to target, then launched second strike when first was over target, second strike attacked while first was returning. The USN did not operate in larger than 2 CV groups untill mid 43 and in 44 it operated multiple CV's in multiple groups.

[old_pop2000]

I’m currently reading Parshall and Tully’s “Shattered Sword” and find it very interesting. However, there are a couple things that puzzle me that perhaps the more knowledgeable folks on this forum could clarify for me.

1) The authors state that Yammamoto insisted that any war for resources in 1941 include war with the United States, and while other officers like Nagano insisted if the US was not atacked it would be more difficult for FDR to get Congress to declare war, Yammamoto got his way. While I’ve read elsewhere about Yammamoto threatening to resign unless his plan for the Pearl Harbor attack was followed through, I was under the impression that the impetus for war with America came from those higher up in the government (like Tojo), not naval officers like Yammamoto.
2) Yammamoto had visited the United States in the 20s and 30s (which the authors mention), so he would have been well aware of America’s resources and industrial potential. According to John Costello’s “The Pacific War,” Yammamoto told Prime Minister Konoye that if it came to war with the US, “I can put up a good fight for six months, but if it lasts for a year or two I can give no guarantees.” However, Parshall and Tully seem to paint Yammamoto as clueless in this regard.
3) Parshall and Tully write that the Kudo Butai’s strike on Pearl Harbor was a “daring raid that no other fleet in the world could have carried out at that time.” I find that statement rather sweeping, considering the British had already pulled off such a raid at Taranto a year earlier (indeed, a scarce two paragraphs earlier the authors mention that the Japanese had “observed keenly” the Taranto raid). While the Pearl Harbor raid was on a larger scale carried out over a longer distance than the British strike, it can be pointed out that the Taranto raid was carried out at night (at a time when nighttime carrier ops were virtually unknown), plus it was against an adversary that was already a belligerent and could be expected to be on its guard, unlike the fleet at Pearl which was still following peacetime routine.
4) In talking about Japan’s response to Midway’s message regarding her desalinization plant, the authors state that in their radio messages Japan referred to Midway “by its code word, MI.” From everything I’ve read, I though that ‘AF’ was their codeword for Midway in radio traffic (MI being the name of the operation). Was this a simple mis-statement by the authors?

I still find the book very informative. It also answered one question that always puzzled me. The Shokaku and Zuikaku were intended to participate in Operation MI, but during the battle of the Coral Sea, the Shokaku was badly damaged by bombs and Zuikaku while undamaged, lost most of her air wing. So, during the Midway operation the Shokaku was under repair and Zuikaku was training a new air wing. I always wondered why they simply didn’t transfer Shokaku’s surviving a/c and crew to Zuikaku (indeed, Zuikaku returned home with a number of Shokaku’s planes on board) so she could operate, then have the other ship train the new air wing once repairs were complete? As Parshall and Tully pointed out, unlike the USN, where squadrons were independent of the carriers and could be swapped out at will (the authors state that Yorktown embarked some squadrons for the Midway battle that had previously served on Saratoga), the Japanese squadrons were integral to the carriers they served on.

Some interesting questions that require some background but I will attempt to answer them in order.

1. Yamamoto was an enigmatic figure in all of the pre-war maneuverings in the IJN senior commanders. When Admiral Nagano was replaced in 1941 as the Navy Minister, Yamamoto's name was considered, because everyone knew that he was against war with the US. But Admiral Shimada got the job. Shimada was weak, probably why he got the job. Yamamoto sent Shimada a note stating that "taking a larger view of the matter, it goes without saying that we must avoid a Japanese-American War and endure untold difficulties". These words characterize his view on the issue of going to war. Later, after the decision was made, he stated "To fight the United States is like fighting the whole world. But it has been decided. So I will fight the best I can. Doubtless I shall die on board Nagato. Meanwhile Tokyo will be burnt to the ground three times. Konoe and the other will be torn to pieces by the revengeful people, I shouldn't wonder". From these two statements, it should be evident that Yamamoto was against this war. In fact, he told the Navy minister that he and his staff had gamed out the Pacific war and could never beat the US. They stopped the games because they could find no way. However, he was a good samurai and if ordered to fight, he would do his best. I believe that tells it all.

2. Yamamoto was not clueless about his chances. As I stated, he had gamed out the results, and the Japanese never won. I believe he was perfectly aware, as was the rest of the IJN, the Army and the Konoe government, of the immense military and industrial power they were facing. I believe it was the middle echelon officers, the hot heads, that forced this situation on the senior officers.

3. Well, considering the opponent they were facing, the distance traveled, they were probably correct.

4. AF was the code word for Midway, MI was the code word for the Midway Operation. I cannot speak to the mistake.

5. Zuikaku's air group was pretty well spent and without replacement air groups like our carrier reserve air groups, the Japanese would have had to pull green pilots from the training schools to fill the airgroups out. So, Zuikaku was hors de combat. With the remnants from both air groups, Zuikaku only had 46 aircraft- 17 Zero's, 19 carrier bombers, 10 carrier attack aircraft. Usual complement was over 65 aircraft.

Hope that is sufficient.

[Mike Malanaphy]

What they are talking about is the number of CV's involved. USN CV's operated most often in pairs or singlely the RN was the same way. The IJN was the first to train and operate in such a large group. At Pearl Harbor the IJN had 6 CV's while at Taranto the RN used only 2 CV's and IIRC attacked two sepperate times, that is sent out strike, strike returns and reloads and launch second strike. The IJN launched first strike then spotted second strike when first was on its way to target, then launched second strike when first was over target, second strike attacked while first was returning. The USN did not operate in larger than 2 CV groups untill mid 43 and in 44 it operated multiple CV's in multiple groups.

Hi John,

Initially, Illustrious and Eagle were allocated to the operation, but Eagle devloped a major problem to her pertol supply system and could not particiapte. She transferred 5 of her Swordfish and 8 complete crews to Illustrious. The total strike force was 24 Swordfish from both air groups. The airstrike was in two waves launched about 1 1/2 hours apart. Only 12 of the Swordfish carried torpedoes the rest bombs and flares.

I would agree the Kido Butai was a powerful force and there was little before Midway that could stand before it. However, it's major defect along with the FAA was no depth in crews. British carriers were used aggressively against land targets early on, but the Swordfish and Albacores were extremely vulnerable to fighters.

[JMS]

"I always wondered why they simply didn’t transfer Shokaku’s surviving a/c and crew to Zuikaku (indeed, Zuikaku returned home with a number of Shokaku’s planes on board)"

In "Shattered sword" they mention that the air wing was considered part of the ship complement, rather than an independent unit based on the carrier, so the squadrons wouldn't be transferred to another carrier.

[asnrobert]

1. Yamamoto was an enigmatic figure in all of the pre-war maneuverings in the IJN senior commanders. When Admiral Nagano was replaced in 1941 as the Navy Minister, Yamamoto's name was considered, because everyone knew that he was against war with the US. But Admiral Shimada got the job. Shimada was weak, probably why he got the job. Yamamoto sent Shimada a note stating that "taking a larger view of the matter, it goes without saying that we must avoid a Japanese-American War and endure untold difficulties". These words characterize his view on the issue of going to war. Later, after the decision was made, he stated "To fight the United States is like fighting the whole world. But it has been decided. So I will fight the best I can. Doubtless I shall die on board Nagato. Meanwhile Tokyo will be burnt to the ground three times. Konoe and the other will be torn to pieces by the revengeful people, I shouldn't wonder". From these two statements, it should be evident that Yamamoto was against this war. In fact, he told the Navy minister that he and his staff had gamed out the Pacific war and could never beat the US. They stopped the games because they could find no way. However, he was a good samurai and if ordered to fight, he would do his best. I believe that tells it all.

2. Yamamoto was not clueless about his chances. As I stated, he had gamed out the results, and the Japanese never won. I believe he was perfectly aware, as was the rest of the IJN, the Army and the Konoe government, of the immense military and industrial power they were facing. I believe it was the middle echelon officers, the hot heads, that forced this situation on the senior officers.


I agree with you that Yammamoto had no illusions about what he was up against. But I wonder why Parshall and Tully seem to portray him as someone who was eager for war with the US and ignorant of US potential.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I agree with you that Yammamoto had no illusions about what he was up against. But I wonder why Parshall and Tully seem to portray him as someone who was eager for war with the US and ignorant of US potential.

Robert:

One thing to keep in mind when studying the Japanese in WWII is that they were capable of reconciling two mutually opposing points of view. They would rationalize that war with the US was unwinnable, then plan to win it. One of the admirals in diary before the start of the Leyte Gulf campaign lamented the state ot the fleet. Then he finished with bravado stating "Bring them on we will defeat them all". It's almost the defiance of an underdog refusing to face reality. Once Yamamoto accepted that war was inevitable, he became eager to fight. I've always felt that Japan fought WWII with modern weapons and the mindset of 16th. samurai.

As to some of the other questions, especially the code name for Midway, Parshall and Tully have been accused some small errors by those have studied the battle extensively. Some of these may just be editorial in nature. Remember that is a large book and having done some editing in my time, even small publications can be loaded with typos, paragraphs out of sequence, etc.

[old_pop2000]

I agree with you that Yammamoto had no illusions about what he was up against. But I wonder why Parshall and Tully seem to portray him as someone who was eager for war with the US and ignorant of US potential.
I have always believed that the occidental mind has problems reconciling the attitude of the oriental mind toward war and death. I am not well versed in the subtleties of the oriental mind. However, Yamamoto's rational side probably knew the end result but the warrior side was eager to fight. That's the dicotomy in most true warrior's.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I have always believed that the occidental mind has problems reconciling the attitude of the oriental mind toward war and death. I am not well versed in the subtleties of the oriental mind. However, Yamamoto's rational side probably knew the end result but the warrior side was eager to fight. That's the dicotomy in most true warrior's.

Dennis:

I agree, that's why I appreciate the availability of more studies of WWII done by Japanese scholars, if they attempt to be objective.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I agree, that's why I appreciate the availability of more studies of WWII done by Japanese scholars, if they attempt to be objective.
I agree with that also, I want to hear from scholar's on Japanese, German and Italian side. I want to understand their rationale for creating the conflicts.