CAS vs interdiction over Stalingrad,

[Warship NWS]

Was the Luftwaffe used effectively during the Battle of Stalingrad? If not, how could such air power been used more effectively? CAS vs interdiction? Have fun. ;)

[old_pop2000]

Was the Luftwaffe used effectively during the Battle of Stalingrad? If not, how could such air power been used more effectively? CAS vs interdiction? Have fun. ;)

Remember that interdiction was the isolation of a battle area by air support whereas close support was the direct intervention by aircraft under ground control over the immediate front area.

As far as the Luftwaffe support of the breakout operation, the Luftwaffe was very stretched in the Russian campaign and it was the dead of winter during which many luftwaffe fliegercorps were moved back to Germany or to Italy for a rest. On November 4th through the 7th 1942 the temperature at KG 55 was 15 degrees below zero, damp warm air streamed in causing zero temperatures and dense fog alternating with sleet and snow. The ice on the ground meant that the majority of Luftwaffe aircraft were completely iced up and immobilized. Only a few brave fliers attempted to take off, none survived the Russian ack-ack over the target.

I am not certain how effective either increased interdiction or close air support would have been. The greatest threat to either was not increased Soviet fighters but the increased proliferation of AAA. It was responsible for the greater bulk of the losses. Couple this with the terrible weather and I am not certain anything except the Fourth Panzer Army attacking toward the 6th Army and the 6th Army itself attacking southwestward would have managed save the 6th.

[Kyle Holgate]

Chris, are you asking about the overall battle or the end game - what Dennis has touched on? As the battle progressed the Luftwaffe did supply close air support to the attacking troops. Could they have spent more effort attacking the Soviet supply lines and less on CAS? Probably. My take on the battle is that they spent most of their effort on directly supporting the troops - less on supply line attacks.

[old_pop2000]

Chris, are you asking about the overall battle or the end game - what Dennis has touched on? As the battle progressed the Luftwaffe did supply close air support to the attacking troops. Could they have spent more effort attacking the Soviet supply lines and less on CAS? Probably. My take on the battle is that they spent most of their effort on directly supporting the troops - less on supply line attacks.

There were two Fliegerkorps supporting the Stalingrad operation. Fliegerkorp IV supporting AG A and Fliegerkorp VIII supporting AG B. The Luftwaffe did maintain local superiority over the the troops however, there were not enough assets to maintain close air support and isolate the west bank of the Volga through interdiction by attacking the Soviet Naval flotillas on the river. I strongly suggest that this was a German mistake. Close air support in an urban environment is difficult to manage and the assets could have been better used to interdict the men and material the Soviets were throwing into the battle.

One good tactic by Chuikov was to close up to the German unit to render close air support ineffective. This prevented the Luftwaffe from striking targets because of the risk of hitting their own troops. Once the 6th Army was surrounded in the urban area and winter set in, distinguishing between friendly and enemy troops became difficult.

My take is that interdiction was probably the most effective method of supporting the 6th Army, especially after being surrounded and 4th Panzer was heading toward its relief. However, 6th Army should have been released from holding the pocket and allowed to attack with all available units to the southwest to link up with Hoth. Then, CAS along with interdiction could have been more effectively used once out of the urban environment and in a mobile action.

Note that at Stalingrad, the new LA-5 and Yak-9 fighters made their first appearances, in significant numbers. This was a healthy shock to the Luftwaffe because it did not believe that the VVS could recover so quickly from the opening devastation of its forces of Barbarossa.

[Warship NWS]

During WW2 interdiction raids proved vastly more effective then killing a tank or two or a few troops per sortie on average. Simple math really, even planes with 30cal MGs could kill a row of trucks or carts on a road far easier then any plane could kill a single tank using cannons, bombs, or rockets. It was also much harder to defend every avenue of approach covering the logistical supply lines with AAA and fighters vs just known front lines of combat forces. What devastated the Germans, IMHO, more then any other weapon of WW2 was the vast numbers of allied fighters strafing, rocketing, and bombing any damn thing that moved more then foot speed on every road, trail, bridge, river, rail, etc.. that the Germans could move stuff around with during the later part of the war. The Germans may well have caused a FAR greater effect vs Russian forces defending Stalingrad by attacking the supply lines of bullets, food, fuel, weapons, and troops being shoved across the Volga river by the boatloads instead of moving the same piles of rubble around trying to swat a few pesky soldiers on the ground in the main city. My few cents anyways. ;)

[old_pop2000]

During WW2 interdiction raids proved vastly more effective then killing a tank or two or a few troops per sortie on average. Simple math really, even planes with 30cal MGs could kill a row of trucks or carts on a road far easier then any plane could kill a single tank using cannons, bombs, or rockets. It was also much harder to defend every avenue of approach covering the logistical supply lines with AAA and fighters vs just known front lines of combat forces. What devastated the Germans, IMHO, more then any other weapon of WW2 was the vast numbers of allied fighters strafing, rocketing, and bombing any damn thing that moved more then foot speed on every road, trail, bridge, river, rail, etc.. that the Germans could move stuff around with during the later part of the war. The Germans may well have caused a FAR greater effect vs Russian forces defending Stalingrad by attacking the supply lines of bullets, food, fuel, weapons, and troops being shoved across the Volga river by the boatloads instead of moving the same piles of rubble around trying to swat a few pesky soldiers on the ground in the main city. My few cents anyways. ;)

I would agree, from the perspective of 60 years. But I wonder how easy it was for the air commanders at Stalingrad to explain to the ground commander that they did not have any air resources for CAS because they had sent them out to shoot up barges on the Volga. While probably a much more worthwhile target in the long run, that does not help the ground commander who is lousy with T-34s, SU-85s, Soviet infantry, Soviet 122mm guns and BM-21 rockets. I am certain the ground commander would be adamant in his request that the Luftwaffe concentrate on destroying the Soviet forces in front of his troops and quit worrying about the barges since the barges aren't shooting at him right now. Short sighted at best, but perfectly understandable.:p

In fact, the ground commander would have been correct. In September, a Luftwaffe recon aircraft detected the Soviet build-up opposite Stalingrad. By the end of October, all the German air attacks against the Soviet supply routes had actually failed to prevent the gradual increase in Russian forces in Stalingrad, so the VII air corps employed all of its aircraft against the movement of troops. Again, this failed to stem the tide of enemy reinforcements. After October, into November, the weather deteriorated and further reduced operational capabilities of air units against the enemy. The Luftwaffe recon aircraft detected bridge building over the Don and heaviliy attacked those bridges. The capabilities of the Luftwaffe, due to its commitments in Africa and western Europe were beginning to draw assets away from the Russian front. It wasn't possible to maintain forces on the supply lines and provide the CAS necessary.

Source: The Luftwaffe Diaries by Cajus Bekker, Air Force Historical Document No. 153 German Air Force against Russia 1942 by Hermann Plocher

[old_pop2000]

As of 7 March 1942, the 4th AF area was down to 480 fighters, 26 reconnaissance aircraft, 149 bombers and 67 other aircraft at 40 airfields. Concentrations were at the Kerch Peninsula and east of Pavlovskaya.

Lack of CAS aircraft, necessitated the Luftwaffe to use bombers. This prevented them from use as strategic bombers against Russian transportation systems in the east or factories. At this time, it was still possible, from Luftwaffe bases to attack Russian tank and aircraft manufacturing plants.

This situation was never resolved. Aircraft were moved from the Balkan's to alleviate the situation.

An example of the attrition rates: As of 27 December 1941(Approx. 6 mnths after attack)

Bombers - 34.4% - 458 down from 754
Fighters - 45.6% - 670 down from 885
Dive Bomber - 50% - 163 down from 278

These numbers represent operational percentages for the whole Luftwaffe, not just the eastern front. As one can see, by the time of Stalingrad, with the additional requirements of the Tunisian campaign and Italy, the Luftwaffe was an expended force.

[Warship NWS]

Appreciate the input and info but I still feel the Luft. should have kept up whatever pressure possible on the supply lines to the Russians fighting in Stalingrad. It may not have won the battle but I would be pretty certain they would have caused more casualties and problems then trying to tag a few Russian troops on the ground and hoping not to hit their own troops in the process. Some better numbers would be to see how many enemy *military* casualties they caused against the supply lines vs what they achieved on the ground in the city in the front lines. Now granted there is something to be said for the "morale" effect on hitting troops in the front lines but the *bulk* of the strikes should have been to the rear assets and supplies. The Volga river is what saved Stalingrad.. not the troops in the rubble, IMHO.

[old_pop2000]

Appreciate the input and info but I still feel the Luft. should have kept up whatever pressure possible on the supply lines to the Russians fighting in Stalingrad. It may not have won the battle but I would be pretty certain they would have caused more casualties and problems then trying to tag a few Russian troops on the ground and hoping not to hit their own troops in the process. Some better numbers would be to see how many enemy *military* casualties they caused against the supply lines vs what they achieved on the ground in the city in the front lines. Now granted there is something to be said for the "morale" effect on hitting troops in the front lines but the *bulk* of the strikes should have been to the rear assets and supplies. The Volga river is what saved Stalingrad.. not the troops in the rubble, IMHO.

We are in agreement, but 'general weather' was taking control. Most Luftwaffe aircaft were grounded, even with the new information from a captured Soviet ground man about putting avgas in the oil to start the engines. The aircraft, with clearing weather and frost, could still fly, but that was not the case with foggy, misty and precipitation. This type of weather, which was frequent at this time of the year, simply made flying impossible at the most critical time. This would be from November-February 1943.

It boils down to the simple fact that, even though the air and ground commanders knew what needed to be done to stop the Russian forces from reinforcing across the Volga, it just simply wasn't possible. They understood that interdiction was the long term solution and a breakout to the SW by the 6th Army, however, CAS was still important to maintaining the front lines as ammunition for tanks and guns was used up and the air lift failed to replenish.

[Warship NWS]

Side note, I am aiming at the time frame prior to when it *should have* been realized that Stalingrad was a waste of manpower and effort for the Germans. Without the ability and/or desire to cause maximum damage to the production of weapons (a major strategic failure for the Germans) the ONLY viable choice to try and slow down the Russians was interdiction. Point being, the efforts for the Luft. should have been to cause as many problems and casualites as possible - whenever possible, anything else was almost a waste of sorties - especially in a meat grinder fight of attrition.

Again though, I think it would be interesting to see some numbers of sorties vs supply lines as compared to CAS strikes and the casualties caused - or at least rough estimates. If I had time I would dig further. ;)

How about some thoughts from other members of the forum.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

How 'bout that, Chris, Dennis and I all agree on this one! The end of the world MUST be coming soon as many predict...;).
I don't think I have more to add, chasing down supplies out on an open road or barges crossing a river would be a better use of ordinance than trying to hit the enemy in a town.
Back in the BOB - German fighters were kept as close escort and not allowed to roam very far from the bombers, even though that may have made them much more effective in spite of their limited fuel. Bomber crews wanted to see their escort. I wonder if the Stalingrad battle had some similar reasoning. Troops on the ground feel much better if the see the air force overhead helping out directly. If the planes are bombing and straffing supply lines it looks like there is no support and they start wondering where their air force is!

[old_pop2000]

Here is a question that should be answered when considering this question of CAS versus interdiction. What is the dividing line? CAS can look like interdiction. If I attack a position within rifle shot, that is CAS but if I attack a tank factory, that is not. However, the line gets gray in between. Possibly CAS is simply a substitute for artillery.

Any one have ideas?

:p

[Warship NWS]

I could answer your question Dennis.. but I will leave it open for discussion. Time for others to join in. ;)

[old_pop2000]

I could answer your question Dennis.. but I will leave it open for discussion. Time for others to join in. ;)

I agree. Even today, it is a difficult question to answer. ;)

[mcaryf1]

The key issue that determined the Battle of Stalingrad was the placing of Soviet forces on the flanks of the Stalingrad salient and their breaking through the poor quality troops defending those flanks.

The nearest operational railheads to Stalingrad for the Soviets were some 200 miles away. Between Nov 1 and Nov 20th the Soviets used a fleet of 27,000 trucks to move forward 160,000 men plus supplies. It is interesting to note that during 1942 the US shipped something like 28,000 trucks to the Soviets via Persia. I guess these trucks could have made a good target for interdiction.

The Soviet a/c strength in the Stalingrad battle was around 1400 - interestingly the US shipped around 700 bombers via Persia in 1942 so what part did they play?

80% of the Soviet plants producing explosives were overun in 1941 - shipments of explosives via Persia in 1942 were sufficient for about 3m artillery shells and shipments via Murmansk much more than that.

It is interesting that the old Soviet era government used to downplay the effect of lend lease but it was much more than a few dodgy British tanks.

Issues with logistics also impacted the Germans. 6th Panzer Division had been redirected from France to shore up the flanks of the Stalingrad salient (was this after they found out where the Torch convoy was headed?) but due to delays on the rail system in Russia it only arrived in time to be part of the the failed attempt at opening a corridor.

regards

Mike