Ernest King & Drumbeat..

[bridav58]

this how much of the debacle off the US coast in early 1942 was Admiral King's fault??

[old_pop2000]

this how much of the debacle off the US coast in early 1942 was Admiral King's fault??

Hmm. Been here before.


As per WPL-46, one of the major tasks assigned to Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier was the protection and routing of shipping. With these qualifications:

1.The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately upon the entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States areas.

2.The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of intra-district, intra-frontier, and inter-frontier shipping.

3. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping.

4. Intra-district shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval Districts under the direction of the Commander of the Naval Coastal Frontier.

5. The shipping of the associated powers, operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers and by the Commandants of Naval Coastal Frontiers and by the Commandants of the Naval Districts to the extent required by the existing situation and as may be practicable by the use of available forces.

This was the plan, prior to the war. However, one week after the start, an annex was added. Shipping control officers were established, there were five districts they covered. Additionally, the shipping Control Officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, would control shipping in the Western Atlantic area by directives to the Commanders of the North and South Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontiers, and to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet.

Now, the major issue was mathematics. Basically it was a numbers game. So many patrol aircraft, so many patrol craft to hunt down so many Uboats. The Eastern Sea Frontier Command stretched from below Wilmington, SC to Nova Scotia. A fer piece, as they say.

Who was at fault? How about everyone? How about no one? After Pearl Harbor, Admiral King was a little busy attempting to organize and keep the Pacific together. Maybe it was just a lack of available resources with hope the German's wouldn't notice us, until we could organize the coastal shipping. Hope does spring eternal.

Anyway, if you need more data, letters, statistics etc. let me know.

[bridav58]

Hmm. Been here before.


As per WPL-46, one of the major tasks assigned to Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier was the protection and routing of shipping. With these qualifications:

1.The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately upon the entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States areas.

2.The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of intra-district, intra-frontier, and inter-frontier shipping.

3. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping.

4. Intra-district shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval Districts under the direction of the Commander of the Naval Coastal Frontier.

5. The shipping of the associated powers, operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers and by the Commandants of Naval Coastal Frontiers and by the Commandants of the Naval Districts to the extent required by the existing situation and as may be practicable by the use of available forces.

This was the plan, prior to the war. However, one week after the start, an annex was added. Shipping control officers were established, there were five districts they covered. Additionally, the shipping Control Officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, would control shipping in the Western Atlantic area by directives to the Commanders of the North and South Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontiers, and to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet.

Now, the major issue was mathematics. Basically it was a numbers game. So many patrol aircraft, so many patrol craft to hunt down so many Uboats. The Eastern Sea Frontier Command stretched from below Wilmington, SC to Nova Scotia. A fer piece, as they say.

Who was at fault? How about everyone? How about no one? After Pearl Harbor, Admiral King was a little busy attempting to organize and keep the Pacific together. Maybe it was just a lack of available resources with hope the German's wouldn't notice us, until we could organize the coastal shipping. Hope does spring eternal.

Anyway, if you need more data, letters, statistics etc. let me know.


Dennis,
please send me all you can!!! If you don't mind!!!!! My e-mail address is bridav58@yahoo.com.


Take Care & Thanks in Advance!!!

Brian

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,
please send me all you can!!! If you don't mind!!!!! My e-mail address is bridav58@yahoo.com.


Take Care & Thanks in Advance!!!

Brian
I've sent you the link. You have to drill down into each separate category. It has a lot of information. This isn't like a narrative in a book, much of the material is original documentation, so you have to put it together, possibly with other sources. However, if you are diligent, you will get a good picture. It can be dry.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis,
please send me all you can!!! If you don't mind!!!!! My e-mail address is bridav58@yahoo.com.


Take Care & Thanks in Advance!!!

Brian

Brian:

King got a bad rap primarily from British historians and people not willing to research the entire story. His only error that I can see was thinking that a small escort was worse than no escort. he did realize the need for a convoy system but as Dennis mentioned he didn't have the resources he needed in 1942. Also he couldn't command cities to darken their lights and at the time he had no authority over civilian shipping. A lot of emergency powers were granted by FDR as the war went on. My late uncle was in the Coast Guard and served on wooden sub chasers. These were meant for coastal escort and for awhile they were just about the only escorts available until more DDs and DEs came on line.

[old_pop2000]

Brian:

King got a bad rap primarily from British historians and people not willing to research the entire story. His only error that I can see was thinking that a small escort was worse than no escort. he did realize the need for a convoy system but as Dennis mentioned he didn't have the resources he needed in 1942. Also he couldn't command cities to darken their lights and at the time he had no authority over civilian shipping. A lot of emergency powers were granted by FDR as the war went on. My late uncle was in the Coast Guard and served on wooden sub chasers. These were meant for coastal escort and for awhile they were just about the only escorts available until more DDs and DEs came on line.
Thanks Ed, because King did get a bad rap because he was an anglophobe. But, he had to make choices and he had to rely on the Commanders of the Sea Frontiers. Some blame Adolphus Andrews, why, I don't know. King wasn't the Cominch until after December 7th, and even then, did not officially take office until January 20th of 1942. The first attack by Drumbeat boats occurred on January 13, 1942 when all boats were in place. Actually, there were only 5 boats for Drumbeat. Those first boats returned to France in February 1942, but the second wave was already on their way. The convoy system was instituted in May, 1942. By the 19th of July, all boats were withdrawn. First six months of drumbeat, 397 ships were sunk with the loss of 7 boats.

Part of the problem as to why the US was short of ASW patrol boats was the shifting of 50 overage destroyers to the British to assist them in their ASW efforts. The British, to their credit, did detect via Ultra a concentration of Uboats along the coast of the US, but without resources there wasn't anything that could be done. The British had the boats that should have been covering the Atlantic and Eastern Sea Frontier region.

Its a question of too little resources and too much area. Fancy the British blaming Admiral King for not taking steps, when it was our giving them the 50 four stackers that might have caused the problem. Couple that with antagonism between the AAF control of heavy bombers and the US navy which needed the bombers for ASW patrols. Why not blame the AAF, not Admiral King.

But, in point of fact, Roosevelt, Churchill and RN, the AAF, The Navy etc. owned a piece of this problem. They had made plans in WPL-46 for this eventuality but never provided the necessary equipment and resources. The issue of the Navy and AAF should have been addressed by the Secretary of War Stimson, he ran both of them. All he had to do is tell the AAF to provide X number of bombers to the Navy, with crews and that would have been it. Why didn't he do that?

Let me add this, in looking in the FDR Safe files, one memorandum from Director of War Plans to Chief of Naval Operations concerns convoy's attacked in August 1941. The last item, is a statement that "accuracy of exact submarine locations received from London is doubtful". Does this indicate a trend? Possibly the US Navy department was beginning to lose confidence in the intelligence they were receiving from the English.

[old_pop2000]

FYI:



Op-12B-2-McC 10-11-40
SECRET

MEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S .FLEET

1. Mobilize U.S.Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
a.Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to
Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally
or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict 0RANGE trade and
protection of U.S.Shipplng. (use of South Amer. ports -by U.S.-would
greatly facilitate this operation.)

b.Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers
(from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing
locally or at Panama.

c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection
of U.S. Shipping as follows:-
9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
5 to San Francisco
4 to Hawaii
d.Move one aircraft carrier, ane light cruiser, two transports,
one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport,
plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new
submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.

e.Move PatWing 5 (____planes) with tenders to San Diego for local
coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).

3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:

a. Dispatch two submarines ant, small tender to Dutch Harbor.

b. Reenforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense

battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.

c. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender,

to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.

4. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area,

consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 9 DD, 4 AMD, (Desdiv 51), 1 AO, 1 AD. This force will

reenforce U.S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will

operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic

waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (NOTE:

If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to

departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will

have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the com-

pletion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the Mid-

Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force ex-

posed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.

5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of

carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii

and Aluetians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with

mobilization requirements.

6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reenforced

Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.

7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -

a. Reenforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrons,

4 OSS, 1 ASR.

b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.

c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patron with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND,

provide small Marine listening post.

d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 SS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.

e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.

f. Dispatch 2 Patrons of Patwing One to HAWAII (24 Planes) after

relief by Patwing FIVE.

8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (ApproxLmately 14 SS)

to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.

9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble fleet

in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.

l0. Assist in defense of U.S. Shipping by the detail of certain

Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. On the Pacific this will be

comprise: -
4 DM to HAWAII
3 0CL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.



Just to note, there is more, but these were some of the plans. Try counting the number of destroyers moving from the East coast to the south and the Pacific Coast, add that to the 50 overage destroyers sent to the British and you will know where all the ASW ships might gone.

[Kyle Holgate]

20/20 hindsight in full use: Aicraft were about the only thing King had and at the time didn't know to use them. Submarines are very skittish about planes, and even a few ol' Sopwith Camels flying around would have served to reduce the effectiveness of the subs - let alone something that could drop a bomb or deptch charge. He could have enlisted civil air perhaps to fly around and annoy subs. I don't know how much it would have helped, but considering the carnage any little bit would do.

[old_pop2000]

20/20 hindsight in full use: Aicraft were about the only thing King had and at the time didn't know to use them. Submarines are very skittish about planes, and even a few ol' Sopwith Camels flying around would have served to reduce the effectiveness of the subs - let alone something that could drop a bomb or deptch charge. He could have enlisted civil air perhaps to fly around and annoy subs. I don't know how much it would have helped, but considering the carnage any little bit would do.
Actually, the Civil Air Patrol did start flying ASW patrols off of the coast. AAF records show:

1st AF Commanding General ordered ASW patrols along both coastlines:


Effective this month, the following units begin flying ASW patrols:

1st Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy), I Bomber Command, from Westover Field, Massachusetts with B-17's until Oct 42.

3d Reconnaissance Squadron (Medium), 2d Bombardment Wing from Orlando AAB, Florida with B-18's and B-25's until Aug 43.

4th, 7th and 18th Bombardment Squadrons (Heavy), 34th Bombardment Group (Heavy) from Westover Field, Massachusetts with B-17's until Oct 42.

8th, 13th, 89th and 90th Bombardment Squadrons (Light), 3d Bombardment Group (Light) from Savannah AAB, Georgia with A-20's until Jan 42.

13th Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy), I Bomber Command, from Dow Field, Maine with A-29's and B-18's until Jan 42.

15th Bombardment Squadron (Light), V Air Support Command, from Ft Dix AAFld, New Jersey with A-20's until Jan 42.

20th and 96th Bombardment Squadrons (Heavy), 2d Bombardment Group (Heavy), from Mitchel Field, New York and Langley Field, Virginia with B-17's until Oct 42.

40th Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 13th Bombardment Group (Medium) from Orlando AAB, Florida with B-18's until Jun 43.

43d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 29th Bombardment Group (Heavy) from Pope Filed, North Carolina and MacDill Field, Florida with B-17's until Jun 42.

63d (LB-30), 64th (B-18) and 65th (B-17) Bombardment Squadrons (Heavy), 43d Bombardment Group (Heavy) from Dow Field, Maine until Feb 42.

101st Observation Squadron, 26th Observation Group, from Otis Field, Massachusetts with O-46's and O-47's until Aug 42.

126th Observation Squadron, 59th Observation Group, from Ft Dix AAFld, New Jersey with O-47's, O-49's, and O-59's until Oct


I 've deleted the Pacific Coast groups from the list and highlighted the groups that stopped ASW by January - March, during drumbeat.

[Smiffy]

Brian:

King got a bad rap primarily from British historians and people not willing to research the entire story.

To British historians Drumbeat was only a sideshow and, to their minds, not worth deep research. The whole "King the Anglophobe" thing built up through the entire war. It started with King's refusal of British ships to help out coastal defence at the beginning of 1942 and ended with King's efforts to keep the British out of the Pacific. In between it was fuelled by King's apparent preference for sending ships to the Pacific rather than Europe. Relationships were probably not helped when Mountbatten accidentally shot him at the Quebec Conference.

In King's defence, had he accepted British ships in January 1942 he would still have had to find crews and train them before they would be of any use. And, we must not forget how he actively encouraged his destroyer captains to engage U-boats in 1941.

Churchill's chief of staff, General Ismay said that King was, "...tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. He was blunt and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. At the start, he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the Royal Navy; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the American Army. War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese. He mistrusted Churchill's powers of advocacy, and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific."

We should probably be thankful that King and Montgomery had little contact with each other;).

[Ed Rotondaro]

FYI:



Just to note, there is more, but these were some of the plans. Try counting the number of destroyers moving from the East coast to the south and the Pacific Coast, add that to the 50 overage destroyers sent to the British and you will know where all the ASW ships might gone.

Dennis:

Good stuff. I'm going to do some research as to US DD strengths prior to Pearl Harbor. The emphasis will be on the more modern boats rather than the old 4 stackers.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thanks Ed, because King did get a bad rap because he was an anglophobe. But, he had to make choices and he had to rely on the Commanders of the Sea Frontiers. Some blame Adolphus Andrews, why, I don't know. King wasn't the Cominch until after December 7th, and even then, did not officially take office until January 20th of 1942. The first attack by Drumbeat boats occurred on January 13, 1942 when all boats were in place. Actually, there were only 5 boats for Drumbeat. Those first boats returned to France in February 1942, but the second wave was already on their way. The convoy system was instituted in May, 1942. By the 19th of July, all boats were withdrawn. First six months of drumbeat, 397 ships were sunk with the loss of 7 boats.

Part of the problem as to why the US was short of ASW patrol boats was the shifting of 50 overage destroyers to the British to assist them in their ASW efforts. The British, to their credit, did detect via Ultra a concentration of Uboats along the coast of the US, but without resources there wasn't anything that could be done. The British had the boats that should have been covering the Atlantic and Eastern Sea Frontier region.

Its a question of too little resources and too much area. Fancy the British blaming Admiral King for not taking steps, when it was our giving them the 50 four stackers that might have caused the problem. Couple that with antagonism between the AAF control of heavy bombers and the US navy which needed the bombers for ASW patrols. Why not blame the AAF, not Admiral King.

But, in point of fact, Roosevelt, Churchill and RN, the AAF, The Navy etc. owned a piece of this problem. They had made plans in WPL-46 for this eventuality but never provided the necessary equipment and resources. The issue of the Navy and AAF should have been addressed by the Secretary of War Stimson, he ran both of them. All he had to do is tell the AAF to provide X number of bombers to the Navy, with crews and that would have been it. Why didn't he do that?

Let me add this, in looking in the FDR Safe files, one memorandum from Director of War Plans to Chief of Naval Operations concerns convoy's attacked in August 1941. The last item, is a statement that "accuracy of exact submarine locations received from London is doubtful". Does this indicate a trend? Possibly the US Navy department was beginning to lose confidence in the intelligence they were receiving from the English.

Dennis:

The way some British historians spin the tale, King is made to appear as ignoring their advice on how to fight U-boats. Yet the picture that emerges is that he couldn't provide the level of ASW that the RN was used to until he sorted out his priorities. I believe that the late Clay Blair covers the topic in greater detail in his 2 volume study of the war against the U-boats.

The complexity of waging a two ocean war and the struggle for resources at least thru mid-1943 causes you to realize that there is no one person to blame for setbacks and the slow pace of the Allied advance. Then add in coalition warfare with one partner looking down its nose at the less experienced ally and one wonders how the Allies won at times.

[Kyle Holgate]

Actually, the Civil Air Patrol did start flying ASW patrols off of the coast. AAF records show:

1st AF Commanding General ordered ASW patrols along both coastlines:



I 've deleted the Pacific Coast groups from the list and highlighted the groups that stopped ASW by January - March, during drumbeat.

guess I should have said civilian air - I meant anyone with a plane paid to fly around off the coast, not just the "official" guys.

[asnrobert]

Things got so bad that Britain even deployed some of their armed trawlers to the East Coast to help out. Then there was the Civilian Picket Force, aka "Hooligan Navy," comprised of civilian volunteers manning yachts armed at most with a machine gun and a depth charge or two (one of the few of these vessels that actually encountered a U-boat was sunk, not surprisingly).

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Good stuff. I'm going to do some research as to US DD strengths prior to Pearl Harbor. The emphasis will be on the more modern boats rather than the old 4 stackers.

There were a total of 171 destroyers in the fleet as of December 7th, 1941

80 were assigned to the Pacific

13 were assigned to the Asiatic Fleet

43 were escorting convoys somewhere in the world

Total is 136 destroyers assigned to areas outside the Atlantic or on escort duty.

http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usf05.htm - accuracy unknown, but they have been good in the past

[john964]

Try this on for size, even if the USN had the escorts by taking mothballed DD's out and putting them back into service were are you going to get the presonel. If you walked into a Navy recruiting office on Dec 8th 1941 and are imeadatly processed that same day(unlikely). You are looking at at least a week before you can even start boot camp and then 6-8weeks for boot camp and then however long your AIT lasts, if you have one. So at the time of the start of Drumbeat you just about have the first basic trained personel coming out of boot camp or about to, then you have to get personel assingned to ships and get them trained or for new ships work ups. This would take 6-8 weeks miniumum more likely 12-16 weeks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Try this on for size, even if the USN had the escorts by taking mothballed DD's out and putting them back into service were are you going to get the presonel. If you walked into a Navy recruiting office on Dec 8th 1941 and are imeadatly processed that same day(unlikely). You are looking at at least a week before you can even start boot camp and then 6-8weeks for boot camp and then however long your AIT lasts, if you have one. So at the time of the start of Drumbeat you just about have the first basic trained personel coming out of boot camp or about to, then you have to get personel assingned to ships and get them trained or for new ships work ups. This would take 6-8 weeks miniumum more likely 12-16 weeks.


John:

Read any first person account from WWII and you'll see that is true. The system was even able to process the volunteers let alone the draftees. Yet by 1944 they had the drill down pat and could put a ship and crew into service quickly. Most of the DDs and DEs that fought so well at Samar (how long did you think Ed could go without a Leyte Gulf reference) were manily crewed by rookies with a thin crust of veterans to hold them together. Not too shabby eh?;)

[old_pop2000]

Something more psychological might be the real answer to this issue. The war in Europe had been raging for two years. We had been escorting convoys into the war zone, lost one old destroyer and had one torpedoed. But the German's had not attacked us without provocation. It was a long way from Germany to the East coast, and the happy time for Uboats was over.

The Japanese, on the other hand, had attacked our ships, sunk our battleships and killed 2400 men without a warning. They were perceived as the primary threat, not Adolf Hitler and his little type VII or type IX u-boats. Oh, we knew they could sink ships, but it was going to take a while for them to get across the Atlantic to setup shop on our coasts. We always perceived that distance gave us security from the Germans. They did not have a navy or carriers to worry about.

It is my belief that the Pearl Harbor attack stunned both the nation and our military. We had had distance to protect our shores, and now it looked like that was not good enough anymore. The highest priority threat was the Japanese with aircraft carriers and battleships, not Admiral Doenitz and his little U-boat.

Keep in mind, we know now, that the attack on Pearl was a raid only, not a full scale offensive against the West Coast. But, how many in Washington knew that, including Admiral Stark, later Admiral King. What happened on the Eastern Sea Front from January to April 1942, was the fact that the whole government apparatus was caught between a peacetime military and wartime military. King had to make the transition for the Navy quickly, due to the Japanese threat. Unfortunately, he had to rely on his commanders on the Atlantic Sea coastal commands, and they did not have enough resources. The same attitude could be said to have pervaded the minds of the AAF. They were moving their bombardment groups to the Southwest Pacific and to Iceland and England, to closer to the enemy. They were not thinking about ASW flights off of our coast.

This is why I state, everyone was at fault....and no one. It was the fault of Japanese and Germans.

[clacton2]

[QUOTE=old_pop2000;2322]
Part of the problem as to why the US was short of ASW patrol boats was the shifting of 50 overage destroyers to the British to assist them in their ASW efforts. The British, to their credit, did detect via Ultra a concentration of Uboats along the coast of the US, but without resources there wasn't anything that could be done. The British had the boats that should have been covering the Atlantic and Eastern Sea Frontier region.

Its a question of too little resources and too much area. Fancy the British blaming Admiral King for not taking steps, when it was our giving them the 50 four stackers that might have caused the problem. Couple that with antagonism between the AAF control of heavy bombers and the US navy which needed the bombers for ASW patrols. Why not blame the AAF, not Admiral King.

Hi,
Sorry to disagree , but I cannot see how the transfer of these 50 old tubs had any relevance to the problem. Even if the U.S. had retained them for their own use, they would not have had the available TRAINED manpower to have used them. Also, unfortunately, their use as ASW escorts was to say the least highly problematical, as they turned out to be almost useless in this role ( they would roll in a wet puddle, never mind the Atlantic, their turning circles were horrendous, and they were supremely unreliable mechanically, to name just some of their problems ).
I am sure it was just a slip of the pen, but they were hardly given to us, they were bought and paid for, not a gift. Whilst they were undoubtably gratefully received at the time, in the end it was probably their propoganda value that was worth more than their actual contribution to the war effort. HMS Campbeltown's self immolation at St Nazaire was, of course, an honourable exception.
Jon:confused:

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=old_pop2000;2322]
Part of the problem as to why the US was short of ASW patrol boats was the shifting of 50 overage destroyers to the British to assist them in their ASW efforts. The British, to their credit, did detect via Ultra a concentration of Uboats along the coast of the US, but without resources there wasn't anything that could be done. The British had the boats that should have been covering the Atlantic and Eastern Sea Frontier region.

Its a question of too little resources and too much area. Fancy the British blaming Admiral King for not taking steps, when it was our giving them the 50 four stackers that might have caused the problem. Couple that with antagonism between the AAF control of heavy bombers and the US navy which needed the bombers for ASW patrols. Why not blame the AAF, not Admiral King.

Hi,
Sorry to disagree , but I cannot see how the transfer of these 50 old tubs had any relevance to the problem. Even if the U.S. had retained them for their own use, they would not have had the available TRAINED manpower to have used them. Also, unfortunately, their use as ASW escorts was to say the least highly problematical, as they turned out to be almost useless in this role ( they would roll in a wet puddle, never mind the Atlantic, their turning circles were horrendous, and they were supremely unreliable mechanically, to name just some of their problems ).
I am sure it was just a slip of the pen, but they were hardly given to us, they were bought and paid for, not a gift. Whilst they were undoubtably gratefully received at the time, in the end it was probably their propoganda value that was worth more than their actual contribution to the war effort. HMS Campbeltown's self immolation at St Nazaire was, of course, an honourable exception.
Jon:confused:
At the beginning of the war, the Coast Guard was folded into the US Navy. Those fifty four stackers could have been manned by Naval Reservists and Coast Guard sailors and issued to the Eastern Sea Frontier and Gulf Coast Sea Frontier, and the Atlantic Sea Frontier as coastal patrol boats working with AAF bombers on ASW patrols off of the coast.

As to reliability, if based in the US at Charleston, Wilmington and Norfolk where we had excellent naval repair yards those 50 boats could have been maintained far better than in England. We built the ships and had the parts to maintain them. The British had excellent yards, but they did not build the ships.

Now as to the destroyers for bases deal, it is true that the Brits gave use land to build bases with 99 year leases. Let's see what land we are talking about; Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, Guiana, and a small parcel on NewFoundland, but only for bases. Wow, if we were setting up a cruise line, we would have been in good shape. But how really strategic were those small areas on the western side of those islands. Let's be realistic, it was a give a way program. Call it what it was. We were the "arsenal of democracy".

I just think it is ironic that the British have placed the blame on King, who actually did not have assets to adequately patrol the coastline and the partial reason was that the boats he needed, we gave to the British. Not the British fault, at the time, they needed help, so we helped them. But did it not seem a bit much, to castigate King, knowing you probably had some of the assets he could have used.

[old_pop2000]

Some more facts, which I have presented in previous discussion of Drumbeat:

1. Admiral King became Command In Chief of the US Fleet on 30 December, 1942.

2. He did not become Chief of Naval Operations until 18 March, 1942

3. On February 12, Cominch requested a convoy plan from the Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier. Within days, the district commanders replied that they did not recommend implementing that strategy due to lack of available resources. Formal reply did not come until February 26th. Note the italized statement, the naval districts themselves did not recommend the implementation due to lack of resources. So, it was left to King to find resources, and provide them. Which he actually did.

So the timeline is that King probably did not take command until January 1, 1942, more likely it was two weeks into January and within one month, had requested a plan for convoying. Why didn't the previous Cominch, Admiral Stark, request a plan prior to the war? Would that not have been a prudent step in war planning. I would say that King got a bad rap from all.

Link to WPL-46-

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html

See if you can find anything in the above document relating to or alluding to a convoy plan.

[asnrobert]

Now as to the destroyers for bases deal, it is true that the Brits gave use land to build bases with 99 year leases. Let's see what land we are talking about; Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, Guiana, and a small parcel on NewFoundland, but only for bases. Wow, if we were setting up a cruise line, we would have been in good shape. But how really strategic were those small areas on the western side of those islands. Let's be realistic, it was a give a way program. Call it what it was. We were the "arsenal of democracy".



Plus I've read that when the US actually tried to build bases in those areas, they got a lot of guff from the local authorities- I recall in one place, the local leader kept tried to have the US build its base in a nearby swamp!

[john964]

[QUOTE=clacton2;2368]
At the beginning of the war, the Coast Guard was folded into the US Navy. Those fifty four stackers could have been manned by Naval Reservists and Coast Guard sailors and issued to the Eastern Sea Frontier and Gulf Coast Sea Frontier, and the Atlantic Sea Frontier as coastal patrol boats working with AAF bombers on ASW patrols off of the coast.

The same problem trained personel the USCG already had its own ships and stations to man and IIRC they also took on the role of beach patrol because a large number of there rescue stations and lighthouses were in remote areas and were idealy placed for that, plus by PH a large percetage of the USNR had been called up.

[old_pop2000]

Realistically, unless the 50 flush decks were fitted out and manned at the beginning of the war, there is no real possibility of having them ready on day one. However, with reservist and coasties, some might have been readied for service within one or two months. I don't know the condition of many of those old boats. However, without a plan to convoy coastal shipping, in place, there are no requirements. The plan generates the requirements. The real question is this: If a detailed convoying plan had been developed as a part of WPL-46 in an annex to the overall plan, would the US government have approved of the sale of the 50 flush decks? Was it simply a case of no requirements, so no one saw a need?

[old_pop2000]

Some information on the flush decks. When the US government offered 50 flush decks, that left 120 still in service.

72 Destroyers with:

27 in the Atlantic - Desron 27,30,31

13 were with the Asiatic fleet

32 assigned other naval districts and tasks

Conversions:

32 - High speed transports or APD

14 - Sea Plane tenders

8 - Mine layers


At the beginning of 1940, there were 120 hulls remaining, with 101 in service and 18 conversions. By September of 1940, when the 50 lend lease boats were transferred, there were no more flush decks available. It would seem apparent, that the fifty flush decks transferred might have been those originally planned to augment the sea frontier command requirements.

Estimate of refit time for the boats would be about 1 to 1.5 months. USS Williams was recommissioned 6 November 1939, refit at Mare Island Naval Shipyard and sailed for Panama on 5 February, 1940. she was one of the fifty boats transferred.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=old_pop2000;2322]
Part of the problem as to why the US was short of ASW patrol boats was the shifting of 50 overage destroyers to the British to assist them in their ASW efforts. The British, to their credit, did detect via Ultra a concentration of Uboats along the coast of the US, but without resources there wasn't anything that could be done. The British had the boats that should have been covering the Atlantic and Eastern Sea Frontier region.

Its a question of too little resources and too much area. Fancy the British blaming Admiral King for not taking steps, when it was our giving them the 50 four stackers that might have caused the problem. Couple that with antagonism between the AAF control of heavy bombers and the US navy which needed the bombers for ASW patrols. Why not blame the AAF, not Admiral King.

Hi,
Sorry to disagree , but I cannot see how the transfer of these 50 old tubs had any relevance to the problem. Even if the U.S. had retained them for their own use, they would not have had the available TRAINED manpower to have used them. Also, unfortunately, their use as ASW escorts was to say the least highly problematical, as they turned out to be almost useless in this role ( they would roll in a wet puddle, never mind the Atlantic, their turning circles were horrendous, and they were supremely unreliable mechanically, to name just some of their problems ).
I am sure it was just a slip of the pen, but they were hardly given to us, they were bought and paid for, not a gift. Whilst they were undoubtably gratefully received at the time, in the end it was probably their propoganda value that was worth more than their actual contribution to the war effort. HMS Campbeltown's self immolation at St Nazaire was, of course, an honourable exception.
Jon:confused:


Jon:

With all due respect my friend, do you think the British corvettes and frigates were sea worthy? Please do some research old son, they were vomit comets. Those 50 old DDs may not have been game winners, but they certainly bolstered the RN in the dark dark days before additional Allied resources were available. No one doubts that the RN were the principal victors of the war in the North Atlantic, but it would have been far more costly and longer without the contributions of the US. Sorry to be blantantly nationalist here. Chris I am not trying to be political here.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some more facts, which I have presented in previous discussion of Drumbeat:

1. Admiral King became Command In Chief of the US Fleet on 30 December, 1942.

2. He did not become Chief of Naval Operations until 18 March, 1942

3. On February 12, Cominch requested a convoy plan from the Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier. Within days, the district commanders replied that they did not recommend implementing that strategy due to lack of available resources. Formal reply did not come until February 26th. Note the italized statement, the naval districts themselves did not recommend the implementation due to lack of resources. So, it was left to King to find resources, and provide them. Which he actually did.

So the timeline is that King probably did not take command until January 1, 1942, more likely it was two weeks into January and within one month, had requested a plan for convoying. Why didn't the previous Cominch, Admiral Stark, request a plan prior to the war? Would that not have been a prudent step in war planning. I would say that King got a bad rap from all.

Link to WPL-46-

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html

See if you can find anything in the above document relating to or alluding to a convoy plan.

Dennis:

Bingo! You've got this topic down pat. Good job old friend. And everybody thinks you're just an Airedale (spelled wrong)?

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Bingo! You've got this topic down pat. Good job old friend. And everybody thinks you're just an Airedale (spelled wrong)?
Well, we've been over this territory before, but it helps to redevelop the facts again, to ensure that we did not miss anything. I am not attempting absolve anyone for the debacle, including King. But to point the finger at an officer who had only take the job a month before, or less is ludicrous. He had been Commander, Atlantic Fleet, but that was in peacetime. He had no responsibility for planning convoys or anything else. There are a lot of failures and what ifs, and coulda, shoulda, woulda's in this. The most important principle here, is to gather the facts, and develop the timeline. Then we can assess what should have happened. Fixing blame nevers teaches anything.

[john964]

[QUOTE=clacton2;2368]


Jon:

With all due respect my friend, do you think the British corvettes and frigates were sea worthy? Please do some research old son, they were vomit comets. Those 50 old DDs may not have been game winners, but they certainly bolstered the RN in the dark dark days before additional Allied resources were available. No one doubts that the RN were the principal victors of the war in the North Atlantic, but it would have been far more costly and longer without the contributions of the US. Sorry to be blantantly nationalist here. Chris I am not trying to be political here.

Ed, I guess you have never been blue water in a serious storm (Force 5+) nearly everyone gets sick but by and large everyone gets used to it I got seasick on my first time at sea in a Force 4 storm off the coast of OR and did not get sick again untill we got caught in the front quadrant of a Cat 4 Cyclone in the IO and then only a little.

[Warship NWS]

My dad told me horror stories of how much mother nature could be a serious iron clad bitch at sea when he served on an Essex class CV the USS Hornet during the Vietnam War while on ASW patrols. They went through one storm that blew out 2 bulkheads, blew off the wind measuring gear, and knocked down several bunk racks. During that storm they went over one wave and through the next one. Another story I heard was from a bridge watch crewman that looked down from his Gearing DD and could not even see the surface of the water while the ship was riding a 20-30 foot wave. Many crewman were lost in the Atlantic, and other oceans, on all sizes of ships including battleships and CVs for a variety of reasons - especially from being blown or washed overboard.. or from injuries from being bashed around in their ships. You had to feel real sorry for those merchant ship crewman and converted ASW whalers. Imagine the misery of surface submarines at sea in a storm or patrol craft.

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=Ed Rotondaro;2387]

Ed, I guess you have never been blue water in a serious storm (Force 5+) nearly everyone gets sick but by and large everyone gets used to it I got seasick on my first time at sea in a Force 4 storm off the coast of OR and did not get sick again untill we got caught in the front quadrant of a Cat 4 Cyclone in the IO and then only a little.
My late father-in-law was in Halsey's typhoon. He was a machinist on a transport. He had some interesting stories to tell about losing LST's and destroyers.

[Warship NWS]

[quote=john964;2392]
My late father-in-law was in Halsey's typhoon. He was a machinist on a transport. He had some interesting stories to tell about losing LST's and destroyers.

According to one source 790 lives were lost during that typhoon.

[Kyle Holgate]

I realize it's derailing the thread, but being in a big storm at sea - catagory 3 in my case (I think) - seas were 35 feet or so IIRC - FF is NOT a big ship in that weather!
People get thrown around, you can't sleep well (if at all), bunch of sick people puking all over is usually what made the others sick, more than the sea motion. Ug, I may miss going to sea sometimes but not in THAT weather!
Trying to do serious ASW or anything else in that would be problematical. The sonar dome is crashing into and out of the water, the tail is useless if you could even stream it. No wonder the U-boats frequently just dove and rode the bigger storms out - kinda pointless as even if you found a convoy you can't do more than maybe shadow it.

[clacton2]

[QUOTE=clacton2;2368]


Jon:

With all due respect my friend, do you think the British corvettes and frigates were sea worthy? Please do some research old son, they were vomit comets. Those 50 old DDs may not have been game winners, but they certainly bolstered the RN in the dark dark days before additional Allied resources were available. No one doubts that the RN were the principal victors of the war in the North Atlantic, but it would have been far more costly and longer without the contributions of the US. Sorry to be blantantly nationalist here. Chris I am not trying to be political here.

Ed,
As you say, with all due respect, why would I want to research facts I am already well aware of. You completely missed my point, I agree that our corvettes especially were known for their ability to roll with the best, however they were built for the specific purpose of ASW, which by and large they fulfilled whereas the 50 old destroyers were completely unsuitable in that role.
Taking up Dennis's point about the bases we exchanged being suitable only for setting up a cruise line, I don't disagree, in fact the whole destroyers for bases was a bit of a red herring, used by both FDR and Churchill for their own purposes. As both the bases and the destroyers were unfit for purpose, perhaps we could have used the destroyers to ferry the passengers out to the cruise ships whilst berthing facilities were being built.
I am also aware that the U.S. was and still is "The arsenal of democracy" but as such, Europe's need enormously benefited the U.S. economy and almost bankrupted England whilst we were busy being "The bastion of democracy". Do you seriously think the Nazi's would have stopped at Europe? if we had not finally stood up to them, even though in effect, they had not directly attacked us.
As you say Ed, sorry to sound nationalistic, but I hate condescension ( bordering I felt, on insult ) and so this will regretably be my last post on these forums.
I have always admired the U.S. and will continue to do so and I wish you all well for the future.
Jon:(

[Warship NWS]

To Ed and Clacton,

Let's all back up a little here as I do not believe anyone is trying to be biased or insulting in their comments regarding the topic of destroyers or nationalism. In the end run.. it took both the efforts of the US and the UK to win the war in the Atlantic. Both sides made mistakes, both sides contributed greatly to the war effort, and both sides, lost many lives against the greatest threat at sea at the time.. the U-boats. Without both the UK and US working together the Atlantic war would have been lost before it began and the war in Europe would have been a far longer and uglier situation, if winnable at all. Let us all at least agree to that part.

To Clacton, even though Ed can be passionate in his comments I know for a fact he is in no way trying to be condescending on purpose and I would hope that you would not let one minor possible disagreement dissuade you from posting on our forums. We do consider all points of view important on these forums whether everyone agrees to each other or not. So long as everyone stays professional and constructive everyone has the right to agree or disagree with various points of view in a polite manner.

If someone says something that bothers you in some way please let them know in a polite manner and I am sure they will apologize if they have offended you in some way, in return, please do not take points of view that may not be intended as offensive personally if at all possible. If you wish to contact me in private, or Ed, please do not hesitate to do so and I will be happy to act as a mediator to help resolve any issues. I do not want to see people leave our forums over something that could be just a minor misinterpretation of one persons intentions. Forum postings can come across far more blunt then intended.. trust me on that point.

Thanks.

[Smiffy]

Just a quick comment from a newbie. When I first read these forums I was taken aback by the depth of knowledge and understanding of the subject. My first though was, be very careful when you post here, get it right, or at least have a reference to some authority that you can pass the buck back too. It looked like I had found a real gem. Then I saw this little flame war develop and thought, not again, thinking back to another forum when a discussion over the relative merits of WW2 submarine classes was taken over by a comment about the Boeing versus Airbus debate and it turned into The War of 1812 Part 2. Thankfully, on this forum all appears to have been resolved quickly and in a dignified manner, so I’ll be sticking around.


For the record, my view on the 50 destroyers is that whatever condition they were in and whatever price was paid is irrelevant. It was the gesture that counted. These Islands had never been in greater danger than they were in 1940 and Britain, and the Empire, stood alone. Public morale was a crucial factor in our ability to continue the war. FDR’s 50 destroyers told the British that they were not totally alone and that the United States was going to lend us a hosepipe. Many of my older relatives have mentioned this to me over the years, when talking about the war.

[old_pop2000]

Just a quick comment from a newbie. When I first read these forums I was taken aback by the depth of knowledge and understanding of the subject. My first though was, be very careful when you post here, get it right, or at least have a reference to some authority that you can pass the buck back too. It looked like I had found a real gem. Then I saw this little flame war develop and thought, not again, thinking back to another forum when a discussion over the relative merits of WW2 submarine classes was taken over by a comment about the Boeing versus Airbus debate and it turned into The War of 1812 Part 2. Thankfully, on this forum all appears to have been resolved quickly and in a dignified manner, so I’ll be sticking around.


For the record, my view on the 50 destroyers is that whatever condition they were in and whatever price was paid is irrelevant. It was the gesture that counted. These Islands had never been in greater danger than they were in 1940 and Britain, and the Empire, stood alone. Public morale was a crucial factor in our ability to continue the war. FDR’s 50 destroyers told the British that they were not totally alone and that the United States was going to lend us a hosepipe. Many of my older relatives have mentioned this to me over the years, when talking about the war.
Absolutely agree, and probably did not indicate that in my comments. They were valuable resources to us, and to have given them to our brethren across the seas was important. However, make no mistake. If they had been available, then they could have been used, if a convoying plan had been available on December 7th. But, even with a plan, there were not assets capable of escorting convoys on the open Atlantic Seaboard. King had to beg, borrow and steal assets from other areas to put together enough ships to commence convoying in May, 1942.

As to this forum, to his credit, the director runs a tight, but fair system on these forums. This is the only reason why I stay on here. I will reiterate this; in analysing history, put your nationalism in your pocket as it will impede your search for the correct answer.

[Warship NWS]

To Smiffy,

I have the full belief that any two educated professional parties can work out their differences as gentlemen - if you disagree shake hands and acknowledge that everyone has a right to their own opinion and then move on to the next topic. It is one thing to be passionate, it is another to get personal. None of us will learn anything if our egos, arrogance, or petty personality differences get in the way. Like chess players often say.. play it out like professional gentlemen and then go out for a beer afterwards. Life is far too short to squabble over something silly.

I will be quite clear on this part.. no person on this planet knows everything about military topics or warfare.. it is flat impossible. Warfare is mostly multi-dimensional theory to start with and the only absolute constants are that people and machines die violently so the best we can all ask for is hopefully educated guess work.

If all of the professional researchers, historians, engineers, analysts, etc.. in the world have not figured out all the answers regarding warfare.. the little ole few of us are not bound to do it either anytime soon. End result.. let us all discuss military history with the thought in mind that none of us will ever have all the answers no matter how many sources are available to us.

Thanks.

[Smiffy]

You can take this further by looking at just what it takes to set up a convoy system. You have to organise the merchant marine, you have to get the shipping companies to organise, you have to get instructions to the ships' masters. You have to reorganise your shipping insurance. Port facilities have to be found, or provided, to be able to handle ships arriving and departing by the dozen. The railroads have to be involved to ensure the supply to, and from, the ports. The list goes on and on. Britain had been able to do this quickly because of the false start of the Munich Crisis had given the time, and highlighted the problems, before hostilities actually started.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To British historians Drumbeat was only a sideshow and, to their minds, not worth deep research. The whole "King the Anglophobe" thing built up through the entire war. It started with King's refusal of British ships to help out coastal defence at the beginning of 1942 and ended with King's efforts to keep the British out of the Pacific. In between it was fuelled by King's apparent preference for sending ships to the Pacific rather than Europe. Relationships were probably not helped when Mountbatten accidentally shot him at the Quebec Conference.

In King's defence, had he accepted British ships in January 1942 he would still have had to find crews and train them before they would be of any use. And, we must not forget how he actively encouraged his destroyer captains to engage U-boats in 1941.

Churchill's chief of staff, General Ismay said that King was, "...tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. He was blunt and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. At the start, he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the Royal Navy; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the American Army. War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese. He mistrusted Churchill's powers of advocacy, and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific."

We should probably be thankful that King and Montgomery had little contact with each other;).

Smiffy:

Mountbatten accidently shot King? LMAO! I have to get my hands on a bio of King, I know that one is out there but out of print. King and Montgomery in a cage wrestling match. My money's on King, Monty was rather short (like me).

Blunt assement: King was a tough SOB. He had an attitude problem with the Brits stemming his Irish background (and he wasn't a Catholic from what I understand). His experiences in WWI serving under the RN with the US battleship squadron did not make it any better. He was also about the most brilliant mind in the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and despite what many historians say, able to adapt and utilitze whatever worked. It has been said half in jest that he shaved with a blowtorch. One of his own daughters said it best "My father is the most even tempered man I've ever met, he's always angry". He had a penchant for bourbon and other officers wives (at least chatting them up, I don't know how many he may have had affairs with, I won't comment on and since most of this is hearsay I won't damn him). King was no saint and he had his flaws, but many them were exxaggerated by officers who did not like him. He was also loyal to his own. He never criticised Spruance for his actions at Philippines Sea or Halsey for his performance at Leyte Gulf or for running into two typhoons. He even covered the actions of the COs at Savo Island. Abrasive yes, but he understood his navy. End of my defense of King.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=Ed Rotondaro;2387]

Ed, I guess you have never been blue water in a serious storm (Force 5+) nearly everyone gets sick but by and large everyone gets used to it I got seasick on my first time at sea in a Force 4 storm off the coast of OR and did not get sick again untill we got caught in the front quadrant of a Cat 4 Cyclone in the IO and then only a little.

John:

I believe I actually initiated a thread about that topic many months back. It's just that certain ships were a little more prone to bad handling in rough seas. Especially ships not designed as warships. I hope you can understand I'm not bashing the RN here, in fact the lack of seaworthiness of these RN ships come from a British writer. I will try and track it down and will post it to hopefully satisfy everyone. Respectfully,

[old_pop2000]

You can take this further by looking at just what it takes to set up a convoy system. You have to organise the merchant marine, you have to get the shipping companies to organise, you have to get instructions to the ships' masters. You have to reorganise your shipping insurance. Port facilities have to be found, or provided, to be able to handle ships arriving and departing by the dozen. The railroads have to be involved to ensure the supply to, and from, the ports. The list goes on and on. Britain had been able to do this quickly because of the false start of the Munich Crisis had given the time, and highlighted the problems, before hostilities actually started.
That is precisely it and to convoy ships along a coastline for short distances was even more difficult to organize. It was much easier(if you can believe that) to organize for the long voyage across the North Atlantic with one jumping off point. But along the Atlantic seaboard, it could be interesting. It's possible that King understood that problem, and waited to get his Sea Frontiers established, outfitted and then have them decide the best course. They did reply that they were against it, due to lack of resources. This gives us the indications that someone was or had been thinking about it. The German's were just a bit faster than we thought.

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=john964;2392]

John:

I believe I actually initiated a thread about that topic many months back. It's just that certain ships were a little more prone to bad handling in rough seas. Especially ships not designed as warships. I hope you can understand I'm not bashing the RN here, in fact the lack of seaworthiness of these RN ships come from a British writer. I will try and track it down and will post it to hopefully satisfy everyone. Respectfully,
Ed:
In my brief research, the Flower's corvette's were patterned after a prominent whale boat design; probably for expediency because they could be built in smaller shipyards that were available. They were too short for blue water sailing, but could be built in great quantities. They were really designed for coastal waters. The next class was a frigate, longer and wider with better seakeeping abilities.

Does any one have any detailed specs on the freeboard for the Flower's and other British corvettes. I would like to run some figures and get some idea of its abilities.

[Smiffy]

Smiffy:

Mountbatten accidently shot King? LMAO! I have to get my hands on a bio of King, I know that one is out there but out of print. King and Montgomery in a cage wrestling match. My money's on King, Monty was rather short (like me).



Mountbatten was trying to promote the crazy idea of floating airfields made of ice. Actually they were to be made of Pykrete, a mixture of sawdust and water which is frozen. It takes a very long time to melt and is very tough. Mountbatten demonstrated this to the Chiefs of Staff by placing a lump of Pykrete on the table and firing his revolver at it. According to a BBC documentary, the ricochet hit King in the hand, but, according to Wikipedia, it passed through King's trouser leg without hitting flesh.

As for Monty, he was a terrible man to fight. He was almost thrown out of the army when, during a fight with a fellow officer-cadet, he set fire to the other guy's shirt.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=Ed Rotondaro;2387]

Ed,
As you say, with all due respect, why would I want to research facts I am already well aware of. You completely missed my point, I agree that our corvettes especially were known for their ability to roll with the best, however they were built for the specific purpose of ASW, which by and large they fulfilled whereas the 50 old destroyers were completely unsuitable in that role.
Taking up Dennis's point about the bases we exchanged being suitable only for setting up a cruise line, I don't disagree, in fact the whole destroyers for bases was a bit of a red herring, used by both FDR and Churchill for their own purposes. As both the bases and the destroyers were unfit for purpose, perhaps we could have used the destroyers to ferry the passengers out to the cruise ships whilst berthing facilities were being built.
I am also aware that the U.S. was and still is "The arsenal of democracy" but as such, Europe's need enormously benefited the U.S. economy and almost bankrupted England whilst we were busy being "The bastion of democracy". Do you seriously think the Nazi's would have stopped at Europe? if we had not finally stood up to them, even though in effect, they had not directly attacked us.
As you say Ed, sorry to sound nationalistic, but I hate condescension ( bordering I felt, on insult ) and so this will regretably be my last post on these forums.
I have always admired the U.S. and will continue to do so and I wish you all well for the future.
Jon:(

Jon:

I'm sorry if in any way shape or form I have insulted you or the Royal Navy. I would hope that from our numerous exchanges on this forum that you would understand that I have complete respect for the UK and its navy (hell all of all its military for that matter). My points were simply that the DDs sent may have required some work, but it was a lot easier to refit an old DD than build a new ship, especially in the dark days of 1940-1941. No offense, but without US merchant ships replacing lost British ships it was game over old son. Also the poor seaworthiness of the RN's small escorts was not my observation, it came from a British source which I will try hunt down and post.

Again this topic has unfortunately shifted into "My country versus your country" and it should not have. If it was my fault for doing so, again I will apologize. But I was not being "condescending" or trying to insult (Trust me Jon I can insult far better than that ;)). I would hope that you understand me better than that. In the interests of keeping the forums clear of rancor I will withdraw from this debate if you wish. None of my opinions are meant to appear as the opinions of NWS which I am a member of and do not wish to embarrass.

[bridav58]

To Dennis,

I didn't take offence for what you posted in those other threads. I've posted on warships1.com & Bob Henneman's board and have seen some pretty fierce debates go on and been involved in them . I see nothing even close to that on here .

[old_pop2000]

I didn't take offence for what you posted in those other threads. I've posted on warships1.com & Bob Henneman's board and have seen some pretty fierce debates go on and been involved in them . I see nothing even close to that on here .
Thanks, your comments are appreciated. Let's now move on in the discussions.

[Warship NWS]

Ok.. to cool the waters, so to speak, around here I have deleted some posts that I personaly deemed not constructive to the conversation. Back up everyone, grab your favorite drink, and let's all get back to enjoying chatting about the topic at hand.

Thank you.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok.. to cool the waters, so to speak, around here I have deleted some posts that I personaly deemed not constructive to the conversation. Back up everyone, grab your favorite drink, and let's all get back to enjoying chatting about the topic at hand.

Thank you.

Chris:

Hopefully you will let Jon and anyone else with opposing opinions have their day in court so to speak. I certainly don't cringe from a good debate as you know.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok.. to cool the waters, so to speak, around here I have deleted some posts that I personaly deemed not constructive to the conversation. Back up everyone, grab your favorite drink, and let's all get back to enjoying chatting about the topic at hand.

Thank you.

Chris:

Hopefully you will let Jon and anyone else with differing opinions have their day in court so to speak. I certainly don't cringe from a good debate as you know.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Hopefully you will let Jon and anyone else with differing opinions have their day in court so to speak. I certainly don't cringe from a good debate as you know.

No one is being kept from posting.. I just want the air to be cleared and to continue to conversation on a constructive course.

Thanks.

[clacton2]

[QUOTE=clacton2;2407]

Jon:

I'm sorry if in any way shape or form I have insulted you or the Royal Navy. I would hope that from our numerous exchanges on this forum that you would understand that I have complete respect for the UK and its navy (hell all of all its military for that matter). My points were simply that the DDs sent may have required some work, but it was a lot easier to refit an old DD than build a new ship, especially in the dark days of 1940-1941. No offense, but without US merchant ships replacing lost British ships it was game over old son. Also the poor seaworthiness of the RN's small escorts was not my observation, it came from a British source which I will try hunt down and post.

Again this topic has unfortunately shifted into "My country versus your country" and it should not have. If it was my fault for doing so, again I will apologize. But I was not being "condescending" or trying to insult (Trust me Jon I can insult far better than that ;)). I would hope that you understand me better than that. In the interests of keeping the forums clear of rancor I will withdraw from this debate if you wish. None of my opinions are meant to appear as the opinions of NWS which I am a member of and do not wish to embarrass.

Ed, NWS and everbody else,
Please accept my apologies for my inflammatory remarks, I am somewhat ashamed of myself, and I assure you it will not happen again.
Thanks for your understanding
Jon:o

[old_pop2000]

[QUOTE=Ed Rotondaro;2429]

Ed, NWS and everbody else,
Please accept my apologies for my inflammatory remarks, I am somewhat ashamed of myself, and I assure you it will not happen again.
Thanks for your understanding
Jon:o
Ain't no big deal!;):D:D

[Warship NWS]

[quote=Ed Rotondaro;2429]

Ed, NWS and everbody else,
Please accept my apologies for my inflammatory remarks, I am somewhat ashamed of myself, and I assure you it will not happen again.
Thanks for your understanding
Jon:o

Just ratch it up as "poop happens".. welcome back friend. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=Ed Rotondaro;2429]

Ed, NWS and everbody else,
Please accept my apologies for my inflammatory remarks, I am somewhat ashamed of myself, and I assure you it will not happen again.
Thanks for your understanding
Jon:o

Jon:

No problem old friend. If you knew how many times Chris had to take me aside and give me the word back when I first came on board you would laugh. The limitations of email or any other form of written communication make it a wonder how we ever understand each other. I 'm glad we're back on the same page to discuss our love of all things naval. Stay well! Your friend,

[old_pop2000]

Well, I wasn't certain that this was the moment to bring up the Flower class Corvette, but What the heck! :D

When you really examine the ship and the requirements, it was a novel idea. You need coastal escorts and ASW ships, but your main shipyards are bogged down in repairing and building major warships. So, the next best thing, is to use local shipyards. Unfortunately, they only have the capacity to build smaller vessels like a whaler of 1000 tons, with a coal fired, steam reciprocating engine and one screw. To man such boats, you already have fisherman and sailors along with captains that are familiar with their handling characteristics. That's perfect. They aren' fast and they are lively in the water. Ok, we live with that because, in theory, they are only coastal ships. Yeah Right!!

So, you don't have to reinvent the wheel here, you already have these boats being built, just have the design converted to a warship. Add some stern racks for depth charges, asdic, a four inch gun, a couple of depth charge throwers, put an air search radar and you now have a small sized ASW patrol vessel with a moderate range of 3500 nm @ 12 knots. That speed is ok, because in ASW for that era, the faster you went, the more noise you made and most cargo ships were slower than 10 knots when loaded.

It was a great idea for a small, coastal patrol and ASW craft. The only problem is that a success breeds success. If it did such a good job at the local level, why not send it out escorting convoys. Well, not a good idea, although it worked. It is a lively craft in the water, which makes it a real pleasure to sail and has a short range for North Atlantic operations. But this is typical of all militaries( especially the US military, trust me), they take a good weapon and try to adapt it to everything, and well, sometimes they get lucky.

But overall, this solution was clever and used resources well at hand, including British coal and the good stock of knowledgeable steam engine mechanics.

[Smiffy]

The original whale catchers may have been coal fired but the corvettes were oil fired. To quote from the Flower Class Corvette Association website, " Two cylindrical boilers with a single shaft, vertical triple-expansion engine. The two boilers were oil fired, and had a capacity of 40 tons and a working steam pressure of 225lbs per sq/inch.
The engine was reciprocal vertical 4-cylinder, triple-expansion which drove a single screw. Cylinder sizes were 18.5", 31.0" and 38.5" with a strike length of 30".
Designed shaft horse-power was 2,750 at 185 rpm giving a maximum speedof 16/17 knots.
Fuel consumption was 0.5 tons per hour at 10 kts and the bunkers held 230 tons of oil fuel."

Although notoriously bad sea boats and very wet, there were very seaworthy. Not a single man was lost from one due to the violence of the sea. I served in "Ton" Class minesweepers at a time when the last of the WW2 veterans were leaving the RN. The "Tons" had a bad reputation for rolling but the old hands all assured me that it was nothing compared to a corvette.

The most frequent complaint about them seems to have been that they were slower than a surfaced U-boat.

[old_pop2000]

The original whale catchers may have been coal fired but the corvettes were oil fired. To quote from the Flower Class Corvette Association website, " Two cylindrical boilers with a single shaft, vertical triple-expansion engine. The two boilers were oil fired, and had a capacity of 40 tons and a working steam pressure of 225lbs per sq/inch.
The engine was reciprocal vertical 4-cylinder, triple-expansion which drove a single screw. Cylinder sizes were 18.5", 31.0" and 38.5" with a strike length of 30".
Designed shaft horse-power was 2,750 at 185 rpm giving a maximum speedof 16/17 knots.
Fuel consumption was 0.5 tons per hour at 10 kts and the bunkers held 230 tons of oil fuel."

Although notoriously bad sea boats and very wet, there were very seaworthy. Not a single man was lost from one due to the violence of the sea. I served in "Ton" Class minesweepers at a time when the last of the WW2 veterans were leaving the RN. The "Tons" had a bad reputation for rolling but the old hands all assured me that it was nothing compared to a corvette.

The most frequent complaint about them seems to have been that they were slower than a surfaced U-boat.

I am certain that the second batch from 1940 onward were oil fired, but I seem to remember that the 1939-1940 versions were coal fired. Hmm. I will have to check that.

[Smiffy]

It's too late here go digging through my library, but I think that you may find that a few converted whale catchers taken into the service may have been coal fired, as were many armed trawlers, but the purpose built ships were all oil fired. If the crews had to put up with the primitive living conditions in a "Flower" and then had to go through the misery of coaling ship, I'm sure they would have defected. :D

[old_pop2000]

It's too late here go digging through my library, but I think that you may find that a few converted whale catchers taken into the service may have been coal fired, as were many armed trawlers, but the purpose built ships were all oil fired. If the crews had to put up with the primitive living conditions in a "Flower" and then had to go through the misery of coaling ship, I'm sure they would have defected. :D

Excellent work, my resources on the flower's class is limited, as you can tell. Do you have any figures on the freeboard, I want to run some design studies and see what it says about her handling. Then play with it. Maybe I will make them coal fired and see how she runs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It's too late here go digging through my library, but I think that you may find that a few converted whale catchers taken into the service may have been coal fired, as were many armed trawlers, but the purpose built ships were all oil fired. If the crews had to put up with the primitive living conditions in a "Flower" and then had to go through the misery of coaling ship, I'm sure they would have defected. :D

Smiffy:

I've often seen references to sloops being used as escorts. How did they compare to a corvette?

[Smiffy]

Smiffy:

I've often seen references to sloops being used as escorts. How did they compare to a corvette?

Sloop is a very lose term in the RN. After the demise of the sailing sloop-of-war, the term was brought back in WW1 for various classes of small coastal patrol vessels. These quickly assumed the ASW role and were used on ocean as well as coastal routes. The most prolific class was the "Flowers". Slightly larger than their WW2 namesakes, and coal fired, they carried a slightly greater gun armament and, obviously, had less of an anti-sub capability. There were several sub-groups within the class and while the other groups had the look of warships about them, the last 12 or so were built to look more like merchantmen and deployed as "Q-ships".

Between the wars only a small number were built and employed. The larger (1000 ton) "Hastings" class were intended as local escorts but were found to be invaluable for "showing the flag" in the smaller ports of the more remote parts of the British Empire. The smaller (500 ton) "Kingfishers" were built on the lines of a scaled down destroyer and were only suitable for coastal escort work.

By the mid 1930's the need for better escorts and minesweepers was realised and two types of sloop were ordered, minesweepers and escorts. The escort sloops, best know being the "Black Swans", were about 1100 tons displacement, carried a fair armament, usually 6x4"dual purpose and a good AA armament that was increased as the war went on, maybe a couple 40mm and a dozen or so 20mm. The ASW armament was excellent, with a large capacity for depth charges. Obviously that was upgraded as hedgehog and then squid came along. Capable of 20 knots and a range of about 7,500 miles, they were good seaboats and served well in both the Royal Navy and Royal Indian Navy. 37 were built and they had 29 confirmed U-boat kills between them. HMS "Starling" was involved in no less than 11 kills. HMS "Amethyst" of the "Yangtze Incident" in 1949 was an "Improved Black Swan."

The minesweeping sloops had a reduced ASW capability but were still often used in the ASW escort role, especially the larger "Algerine" class. The smaller "Bangor" Class were reputedly worse seaboats than the "Flower" corvettes.

The "Black Swans" in particular were very good escort vessels but they were built to warship standards and, therefore, could not be produced as quickly as the merchant hulled corvettes. Hence the greater number of corvettes built.

One class of sloop worth special mention, is the "Banff" class. The sloop designation was given to this group of 10 USCG "Lake" class cutters that were supplied to the RN under Lend-Lease in 1941. Here's a couple of bits of trivia for you.

HMS "Lulworth" was the former USCGC "Chelan", on 31st October 1941 she attacked U-96. Lothar-Günther Buchheim, author of "Das Boot", was aboard U-96 at the time.

USCGC "Itasca", of Amelia Earhart fame, became HMS "Gorleston". A fact I mention only because I have good friends who live near Lake Itasca.

[john964]

HMS "Amethyst" of the "Yangtze Incident" in 1949 was an "Improved Black Swan."
Don't forget Able Seacat Simon. The ships Rodent Control Engineer. IIRC Simon was wounded twice and was awarded the Dickin Medal and the Blue Cross Medal for actions during the Yangtze Incident. FYI The Dickin medal is considered the animal VC.

[Mike Malanaphy]

It's too late here go digging through my library, but I think that you may find that a few converted whale catchers taken into the service may have been coal fired, as were many armed trawlers, but the purpose built ships were all oil fired. If the crews had to put up with the primitive living conditions in a "Flower" and then had to go through the misery of coaling ship, I'm sure they would have defected. :D

Hi Smiffy,

Your comments about oil firing are correct as confirmed in Lenton's and D.K. Brown's works. As you mentioned, a number of options for smaller ASW vessels that could be built to a commercial standard and be below the 600 ton standard set in the Washington Treaties. Trawlers were looked at also, but lacked the speed and compartmentation needed. Such vessels were initailly seen to be coastal escorts and endurance was not a factor intially. The Flowert Class was modified from the whaler "Southern Gem", lengthened slightly and substituted a flat plate keel for the whaler's bar keel.

Brown addresses sea keeping and motion effects in a couple of his books. He ascribes vertical motion as the primary cause for seasickness while rolling made phyiscal tasks such as maning a gun or reloading depth charges. Most vessles had the crews in the fos'cle, teh worst place for vertical movement. Post war escorts were redesigned for crew comfort. In WW II, the RN thought the crews could handle it and that a certain amount of discomfort was needed to keep the crew alert.

[Smiffy]

Don't forget Able Seacat Simon. The ships Rodent Control Engineer. IIRC Simon was wounded twice and was awarded the Dickin Medal and the Blue Cross Medal for actions during the Yangtze Incident. FYI The Dickin medal is considered the animal VC.

Simon was the only cat ever to receive the Dickin Medal.

[Smiffy]

I see we have come from a senior admiral to a ship's cat in this thread :D

[Ed Rotondaro]

Sloop is a very lose term in the RN. After the demise of the sailing sloop-of-war, the term was brought back in WW1 for various classes of small coastal patrol vessels. These quickly assumed the ASW role and were used on ocean as well as coastal routes. The most prolific class was the "Flowers". Slightly larger than their WW2 namesakes, and coal fired, they carried a slightly greater gun armament and, obviously, had less of an anti-sub capability. There were several sub-groups within the class and while the other groups had the look of warships about them, the last 12 or so were built to look more like merchantmen and deployed as "Q-ships".

Between the wars only a small number were built and employed. The larger (1000 ton) "Hastings" class were intended as local escorts but were found to be invaluable for "showing the flag" in the smaller ports of the more remote parts of the British Empire. The smaller (500 ton) "Kingfishers" were built on the lines of a scaled down destroyer and were only suitable for coastal escort work.

By the mid 1930's the need for better escorts and minesweepers was realised and two types of sloop were ordered, minesweepers and escorts. The escort sloops, best know being the "Black Swans", were about 1100 tons displacement, carried a fair armament, usually 6x4"dual purpose and a good AA armament that was increased as the war went on, maybe a couple 40mm and a dozen or so 20mm. The ASW armament was excellent, with a large capacity for depth charges. Obviously that was upgraded as hedgehog and then squid came along. Capable of 20 knots and a range of about 7,500 miles, they were good seaboats and served well in both the Royal Navy and Royal Indian Navy. 37 were built and they had 29 confirmed U-boat kills between them. HMS "Starling" was involved in no less than 11 kills. HMS "Amethyst" of the "Yangtze Incident" in 1949 was an "Improved Black Swan."

The minesweeping sloops had a reduced ASW capability but were still often used in the ASW escort role, especially the larger "Algerine" class. The smaller "Bangor" Class were reputedly worse seaboats than the "Flower" corvettes.

The "Black Swans" in particular were very good escort vessels but they were built to warship standards and, therefore, could not be produced as quickly as the merchant hulled corvettes. Hence the greater number of corvettes built.

One class of sloop worth special mention, is the "Banff" class. The sloop designation was given to this group of 10 USCG "Lake" class cutters that were supplied to the RN under Lend-Lease in 1941. Here's a couple of bits of trivia for you.

HMS "Lulworth" was the former USCGC "Chelan", on 31st October 1941 she attacked U-96. Lothar-Günther Buchheim, author of "Das Boot", was aboard U-96 at the time.

USCGC "Itasca", of Amelia Earhart fame, became HMS "Gorleston". A fact I mention only because I have good friends who live near Lake Itasca.

Hi:

Thanks for the information. I recall reading about minsweepers forming part of a convoy escort and used to wonder why. I believe there was one present at the Battle of the Barents Sea. I'll pull out my copies of Conways tonight and do some reading.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I see we have come from a senior admiral to a ship's cat in this thread :D

Smiffy:

Amazing what you can learn on these forums. What is the Dickin medal?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Excellent work, my resources on the flower's class is limited, as you can tell. Do you have any figures on the freeboard, I want to run some design studies and see what it says about her handling. Then play with it. Maybe I will make them coal fired and see how she runs.

Hi Dennis,

If I'm doing the math right off the plans for HMCS Agassiz, free board at the bow is 15 feet back to the break in the foc'sle ( about 30% length overall ), 7.5 feet amidships rising to 9 feet at the stern.

[Smiffy]

Hi:

Thanks for the information. I recall reading about minsweepers forming part of a convoy escort and used to wonder why. I believe there was one present at the Battle of the Barents Sea. I'll pull out my copies of Conways tonight and do some reading.

I once read an account by a guy who had served in minesweeping trawlers for a few years in the English Channel, he was eventually promoted to command an "Algerine" class minesweeping sloop, but never swept another mine as his ship was constantly used as as ASW escort.

The Royal Navy will use anything as an escort if needed. I served in "Ton" class minesweepers, an immediate post-war design. Although we had no anti-sub weapons we did have space for sonar, but we never shipped it. Towards the end of their effective life some of the "Tons" were equipped with mine hunting sonar.

[Smiffy]

Smiffy:

Amazing what you can learn on these forums. What is the Dickin medal?

It's known as the Animal VC and is awarded to military animals that save human life by acts of courage, often at the expense of their own. Most were awarded to homing pigeons for carrying distress messages from airmen downed at sea. Quite a few dogs have won them, some as recently as the current Iraq troubles. Simon got his for keeping up crew morale and protecting the ship's food supplies from rats. Simon died later due to complications to his wounds and an infection picked up while in quarantine on "Amethyst's" return to the UK. the entire ship's company attended his funeral.

The medal is issued by the People's Dispensary for Sick Animals, an animal charity. The civilian animal equivalent is the PDSA Gold Medal.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

If I'm doing the math right off the plans for HMCS Agassiz, free board at the bow is 15 feet back to the break in the foc'sle ( about 30% length overall ), 7.5 feet amidships rising to 9 feet at the stern.
Excellent, now I can add that to my specs. I want to duplicate its exact measurements first, then play with them. Does it give a bow slant? You know, something like 5 -10 degree bow rake

[keschofield]

[QUOTE=clacton2;2449]

Jon:

No problem old friend. If you knew how many times Chris had to take me aside and give me the word back when I first came on board you would laugh. The limitations of email or any other form of written communication make it a wonder how we ever understand each other. I 'm glad we're back on the same page to discuss our love of all things naval. Stay well! Your friend,

This is not the first time that the English language has been a barrier to conversation. :)

You know what Churchill said: "The English and the Americans are two peoples separated by a common language!"

[asnrobert]

[QUOTE=Ed Rotondaro;2469]

This is not the first time that the English language has been a barrier to conversation. :)

You know what Churchill said: "The English and the Americans are two peoples separated by a common language!"

I thought it was George Bernard Shaw who said that? :confused:

[john964]

It's known as the Animal VC and is awarded to military animals that save human life by acts of courage, often at the expense of their own. Most were awarded to homing pigeons for carrying distress messages from airmen downed at sea. Quite a few dogs have won them, some as recently as the current Iraq troubles. Simon got his for keeping up crew morale and protecting the ship's food supplies from rats. Simon died later due to complications to his wounds and an infection picked up while in quarantine on "Amethyst's" return to the UK. the entire ship's company attended his funeral.

The medal is issued by the People's Dispensary for Sick Animals, an animal charity. The civilian animal equivalent is the PDSA Gold Medal. The PDSA Gold Medal is also considered the animal George Cross which is the civilian Victoria Cross. Simon was also wounded at the same time the CO of the Amethyst was killed. From what I have read the ships medic removed 4 pieces of shrapnal from the cat. There is also Oscar aka Unsinkable Sam who has the distinction of surviving the sinkings KMS Bismark HMS Cossack and HMS Ark Royal.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Excellent, now I can add that to my specs. I want to duplicate its exact measurements first, then play with them. Does it give a bow slant? You know, something like 5 -10 degree bow rake

Hi Dennis,

My calibrated eye says 10 degrees.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

My calibrated eye says 10 degrees.
Ok, 10 degrees it is. After adding that figure, I still get a good sea boat, no matter how I do it. The boat will act like a cork in the waves, bobbing and weaving. That does not mean it is a bad sea boat. With the triple expansion reciprocating engines, the engineering spaces are large so the boat is cramped for accomodations. However, it is still a good sea boat, just not fun to sail in the North Atlantic.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ok, 10 degrees it is. After adding that figure, I still get a good sea boat, no matter how I do it. The boat will act like a cork in the waves, bobbing and weaving. That does not mean it is a bad sea boat. With the triple expansion reciprocating engines, the engineering spaces are large so the boat is cramped for accomodations. However, it is still a good sea boat, just not fun to sail in the North Atlantic.

Dennis:

I don't think there are any fun boats to sail in the North Atlantic outside of a really big nuclear carrier or super tanker and even then I wouldn't be eager.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It's known as the Animal VC and is awarded to military animals that save human life by acts of courage, often at the expense of their own. Most were awarded to homing pigeons for carrying distress messages from airmen downed at sea. Quite a few dogs have won them, some as recently as the current Iraq troubles. Simon got his for keeping up crew morale and protecting the ship's food supplies from rats. Simon died later due to complications to his wounds and an infection picked up while in quarantine on "Amethyst's" return to the UK. the entire ship's company attended his funeral.

The medal is issued by the People's Dispensary for Sick Animals, an animal charity. The civilian animal equivalent is the PDSA Gold Medal.

Smiffy:

Nothing like the service and combat to bond anybody or anything together eh? A tip of the whiskey glass to Simon!

[thevanderploegs]

...The limitations of email or any other form of written communication make it a wonder how we ever understand each other.

I guess that's why legal contracts and international treaties are so long and wordy. Imagine the problem with an international treaty when there are two languages involved (or three, or four). The inexactness of language is exactly the problem.

Regards,
Gary

[keschofield]

[QUOTE=keschofield;2514]

I thought it was George Bernard Shaw who said that? :confused:


Robert,

You may be right. I really don't know for certain. Having spent some time in London many years ago I DO know that the phrase describes the situation perfectly. ;) BTW - I loved London and would live there in a second if given the chance.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[QUOTE=asnrobert;2516]


Robert,

You may be right. I really don't know for certain. Having spent some time in London many years ago I DO know that the phrase describes the situation perfectly. ;) BTW - I loved London and would live there in a second if given the chance.

Kurt:

I visited London twice. First in 1981, about three weeks before Charles and the late Diana's wedding. The second time was with my wife who was five months pregnant at the time so we really didn't much pub crawling. A great time was had on each visit. Boy did I buy books!