Mike Malanaphy
08-29-2009, 04:09 PM
Hi Everyone,
I have always had good luck on vacation finding nice books. I found a small book store in Idaho Falls which had "The Pearl Harbor Papers", "Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History", and "The Tank Killers" by Harry Yeide, a history of the Tank Destroyer Comand. Got all three dirt cheap.
I know we had some discussions a while back about the use of TDs. Yeide's book is primarily an over view of them in combat with a touch of doctrinal and technical details to provide some context. Unfortunately, he does not cover their first action in the Phillipines, but covers North Africa, Italy, and the ETO. There is no real discussion of vehicle to gun development details. His bibliography cites official AARs and unit histories, published and non published. One of the technical issues he raises that is intersting is the lack of compatibility between TD radios and those in infantry units. Doctrinally, TDs were to be handled in battalion size numbers and there was little need for radio contact outside of their command structure, but most of their wartime experience saw them parcelled out in platoon or section elements to infantry units, often out of contact with company or battalion HQ. There were several other mentions of the difficulty of logistics support as tose units usually ddin't have diesel fuel. I'll have to check, but I remember reading that the diesel powered M10A1 never left the states because of supply issues and was only used in training.
McNair wanted 220 TD battalions originally, reduced to 106 by April of 1943 by manpower shortages. 25 were deactivated to divert men as infantry replacements, so only 78 remained, but only 62 saw combat, 6 in the Pacific and and 56 in the ETO and Italy. There was tension between McNair who wanted towed guns as they were harder to spot and hit as opposed to Marshall who wanted the SP versions for mobility. On D Day, Eisenhower had 30 TD battalions, 19 SP and 11 towed. Eventually 48 battalions would serve in NW Europe. With limited experience, TD Command turned down the Ordinance Corps offer of accelerated M36 production with the 90MM gun in the spring of 1944, by July they had changed their minds. The first M36s didn't see combat until September. The more powerful 3" gun in the
M10 was seen as adequate until Panthers and Tigers appeared.
Experience in North Africa showed their value in indirect fire and in September, 1943, indirect fire training was added to the TD school curriculum. Personnel and equipment for a company level fire direction center was added to to unit's organiztion. Yeide cites several eamples of their constant use in this role. Typical was the 645th TD battalion which in November 1944 fired 8,899 rounds of HE in the indirect role and only 360 rounds of AP. In December, 1943, TD battalions in Italy were firing an average of 15,000 rounds in indirect fire missions.
Interestingly, TD casualties remained relatively low until the street and forest fighting of he fall of 1944. In Normandy, medium tank losses led to TDs being used in the tank role where they were at a severe disadvantage. TD scores are hard to pin down, but Yeide credits the 823rd TD battalion with 113 tanks,; 68 Panzer IVs, 27 Panthers. and 18 Tigers. Intially a towed battalion, it converted to M10s in November 1944. The 773rd claimed 113 also plus 25 SP guns and the 702nd 103 tanks, 51 SPs and 120 other vehicles.
He cites an Army study of 39 TD battalions that shows an average kill total of 34 tanks, 17 towed guns, and 16 pill boxes. Losses in teh ETO were 539 M10s, 215 M18s, 151 M36s, and 228 towed guns. The 703rd enjoyed a 10 to 1 kill ratio with their M10s and the 634th and and 628th around 4 to 1.
Yeide describes the TD Command as one of the most "successful failures" in American military history. He cites that where they fought docrinally such as at El Guettar, Salerno, Anzio, and Mortrain, they did well. But most of the war they fought in penny packets and in close terain. The 1943 decision to retain half of all battalions as towed was a problem as well. A number of senior officers were disillusioned with TDs after the end of the African campaign and Patton saw them little differently than tanks.
Despite it's lack of technical details, his book is a fascinating read of TD combat. Compelling yet without hyperbole. One intersting story deals with an M10 nicknamed "Jinx" of C/636th TD battalion at Salerno. Her crew won the Silver Star for a 25 minute action where they blunted a German counter attack on a US Ranger battalion destroying 6 tanks. In a "Saving Private Ryan" analogue, her crew contained the Tokes twins from Oklahoma.
Yeide has also written a similar book on US Army independent tank battalions I'll start looking for.
I have always had good luck on vacation finding nice books. I found a small book store in Idaho Falls which had "The Pearl Harbor Papers", "Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History", and "The Tank Killers" by Harry Yeide, a history of the Tank Destroyer Comand. Got all three dirt cheap.
I know we had some discussions a while back about the use of TDs. Yeide's book is primarily an over view of them in combat with a touch of doctrinal and technical details to provide some context. Unfortunately, he does not cover their first action in the Phillipines, but covers North Africa, Italy, and the ETO. There is no real discussion of vehicle to gun development details. His bibliography cites official AARs and unit histories, published and non published. One of the technical issues he raises that is intersting is the lack of compatibility between TD radios and those in infantry units. Doctrinally, TDs were to be handled in battalion size numbers and there was little need for radio contact outside of their command structure, but most of their wartime experience saw them parcelled out in platoon or section elements to infantry units, often out of contact with company or battalion HQ. There were several other mentions of the difficulty of logistics support as tose units usually ddin't have diesel fuel. I'll have to check, but I remember reading that the diesel powered M10A1 never left the states because of supply issues and was only used in training.
McNair wanted 220 TD battalions originally, reduced to 106 by April of 1943 by manpower shortages. 25 were deactivated to divert men as infantry replacements, so only 78 remained, but only 62 saw combat, 6 in the Pacific and and 56 in the ETO and Italy. There was tension between McNair who wanted towed guns as they were harder to spot and hit as opposed to Marshall who wanted the SP versions for mobility. On D Day, Eisenhower had 30 TD battalions, 19 SP and 11 towed. Eventually 48 battalions would serve in NW Europe. With limited experience, TD Command turned down the Ordinance Corps offer of accelerated M36 production with the 90MM gun in the spring of 1944, by July they had changed their minds. The first M36s didn't see combat until September. The more powerful 3" gun in the
M10 was seen as adequate until Panthers and Tigers appeared.
Experience in North Africa showed their value in indirect fire and in September, 1943, indirect fire training was added to the TD school curriculum. Personnel and equipment for a company level fire direction center was added to to unit's organiztion. Yeide cites several eamples of their constant use in this role. Typical was the 645th TD battalion which in November 1944 fired 8,899 rounds of HE in the indirect role and only 360 rounds of AP. In December, 1943, TD battalions in Italy were firing an average of 15,000 rounds in indirect fire missions.
Interestingly, TD casualties remained relatively low until the street and forest fighting of he fall of 1944. In Normandy, medium tank losses led to TDs being used in the tank role where they were at a severe disadvantage. TD scores are hard to pin down, but Yeide credits the 823rd TD battalion with 113 tanks,; 68 Panzer IVs, 27 Panthers. and 18 Tigers. Intially a towed battalion, it converted to M10s in November 1944. The 773rd claimed 113 also plus 25 SP guns and the 702nd 103 tanks, 51 SPs and 120 other vehicles.
He cites an Army study of 39 TD battalions that shows an average kill total of 34 tanks, 17 towed guns, and 16 pill boxes. Losses in teh ETO were 539 M10s, 215 M18s, 151 M36s, and 228 towed guns. The 703rd enjoyed a 10 to 1 kill ratio with their M10s and the 634th and and 628th around 4 to 1.
Yeide describes the TD Command as one of the most "successful failures" in American military history. He cites that where they fought docrinally such as at El Guettar, Salerno, Anzio, and Mortrain, they did well. But most of the war they fought in penny packets and in close terain. The 1943 decision to retain half of all battalions as towed was a problem as well. A number of senior officers were disillusioned with TDs after the end of the African campaign and Patton saw them little differently than tanks.
Despite it's lack of technical details, his book is a fascinating read of TD combat. Compelling yet without hyperbole. One intersting story deals with an M10 nicknamed "Jinx" of C/636th TD battalion at Salerno. Her crew won the Silver Star for a 25 minute action where they blunted a German counter attack on a US Ranger battalion destroying 6 tanks. In a "Saving Private Ryan" analogue, her crew contained the Tokes twins from Oklahoma.
Yeide has also written a similar book on US Army independent tank battalions I'll start looking for.