Struggle for the Middle Sea

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Guys,

Thought I'd start a new thread regarding Vince's new book. I have read through the Red Sea chapter. The Red Sea chapter is especially interesting as it was a contained area with small forces and minimal air support. The small ship actions read like Hollywood screen plays.

A couple of thoughts here. Vince addresses the rebalancing of history regarding the campaign by later post war authors. Derisive terms such as Morrison's "Dago Navy" and incomplete narratives of Italian naval operations have distorted our view of that period, but I'm gonna go out on a limb and say the RN did have a "moral ascendancy" over the Italian Navy. Not in the racist and ethnic sense, though there were tinges of that, but with few exceptions, the RN could engage the Italian Navy with confidence of victory. You may argue the definition, but it's palpable. The desire to win and a willingness to risk all was evident through out the campaign on the British side. Despite air superiority and central placement, the Axis could never neutralize Malta by air or sea. Even when Malta was on the ropes in early 1942, Hitler and Mussolini were not willing to roll the dice on a seaborne invasion. While Hitler hoped Rommel would make such a step unecessary, the ghosts of Crete were all too evident in the background. Though the Italians fought bravely it was mainly ineffectively. The Italians had considerable success convoying supplies to North Africa unti the summer of 1942, but the Brtiish forces arrayed against them in that prior period were extremely weak. There is no better example than to compare Italian and British surface anti convoy operations. The Italians never hit with the skill or success as the RN did against Tarigo and Duisberg convoys or stopping the sea borne invasion of Crete. You can certainly argue the Italain Navy fought with a number of it's "hands tied behind it's back" such as a marginal industrial base to produce and repair warships and merchants. a precipitous jump into war that stranded 2/3s of it's merchant navy overseas, a balky uncooperative airforce, oil contraints, and a lack of radar and active sonar, but they were in their home waters fighting a navy involved world wide.

[paladin5]

I just started reading my copy today (brought it to work so I could start on it during my breaks) so I haven't gotten very far into it yet.

[Vince O'Hara]

Hi Mike. I’m glad you’re reading the book. I thought the Red Sea interlude was especially interesting to research and write. For me, a lot of it was virgin territory.

I consider “moral authority” a pretty amorphous concept and one that requires a definition. No navy sought combat merely for the sake of combat. The British, no less than anyone else, attempted to bring about combat under the most favorable conditions. A position of superiority was always the objective. Reading British memoirs written after the war you find a lot of that “expectation of victory” and confidence expressed. Reading the wartime reports and letters of Cunningham and Somerville the tone is quite different. They never took victory for granted and they avoided disadvantageous situations. They would have been irresponsible if they had done otherwise

Each navy had its own doctrines and mandates. To label the Italian doctrine and mandate as morally inferior to the British because it discouraged a fleet action in any but the most favorable of situations is counter-factual. In fact, over the course of the entire war, the Italian navy (as opposed to the government) accomplished its major objectives (to maintain communications with the Balkans and Africa and to close the Sicilian Channel to British traffic) and the British navy did not (to establish sea control over the central Mediterranean and halt enemy traffic to Africa). I question whether the British navy was given a reasonable mission in the first place, but that is another topic.


Vince

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike. I’m glad you’re reading the book. I thought the Red Sea interlude was especially interesting to research and write. For me, a lot of it was virgin territory.

I consider “moral authority” a pretty amorphous concept and one that requires a definition. No navy sought combat merely for the sake of combat. The British, no less than anyone else, attempted to bring about combat under the most favorable conditions. A position of superiority was always the objective. Reading British memoirs written after the war you find a lot of that “expectation of victory” and confidence expressed. Reading the wartime reports and letters of Cunningham and Somerville the tone is quite different. They never took victory for granted and they avoided disadvantageous situations. They would have been irresponsible if they had done otherwise

Each navy had its own doctrines and mandates. To label the Italian doctrine and mandate as morally inferior to the British because it discouraged a fleet action in any but the most favorable of situations is counter-factual. In fact, over the course of the entire war, the Italian navy (as opposed to the government) accomplished its major objectives (to maintain communications with the Balkans and Africa and to close the Sicilian Channel to British traffic) and the British navy did not (to establish sea control over the central Mediterranean and halt enemy traffic to Africa). I question whether the British navy was given a reasonable mission in the first place, but that is another topic.


Vince

Hi Vince,

Sorry Vince, I seem to have stepped in it again. I would agree it's hard to define, but it was palpable. As my regimental commander used to say, "You can't bleep with success". Or as Cunningham more aptly said about it taking two years for the navy to build a ship and two hundred years to build a tradition.

I don't believe Italian naval doctrine was morally inferior because they sought an effective use of their limited resources, but their tactics, training, ships, and ultimately their leadership was found wanting based upon the combat outcome. Part of what made that outcome possible was the ability of the RN to sustain operations on Italy's home ground in the face of air superiority and ship strength parity over a two year period while fighting a world war. Quality in terms of fighting spirit and tactical expertise. Certainly Cunningham could feel a little down over Calabria, but had Cape Spada, Spartivento, Taranto, and Matapan to buoy his spirits while his Italian counterparts had no such good news.

Certainly the Italian mandate for war was morally inferior, but again that's a different question also. : )

I'll go back to enjoying your book now.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Vince,

Sorry Vince, I seem to have stepped in it again. I would agree it's hard to define, but it was palpable. As my regimental commander used to say, "You can't bleep with success". Or as Cunningham more aptly said about it taking two years for the navy to build a ship and two hundred years to build a tradition.

I don't believe Italian naval doctrine was morally inferior because they sought an effective use of their limited resources, but their tactics, training, ships, and ultimately their leadership was found wanting based upon the combat outcome. Part of what made that outcome possible was the ability of the RN to sustain operations on Italy's home ground in the face of air superiority and ship strength parity over a two year period while fighting a world war. Quality in terms of fighting spirit and tactical expertise. Certainly Cunningham could feel a little down over Calabria, but had Cape Spada, Spartivento, Taranto, and Matapan to buoy his spirits while his Italian counterparts had no such good news.

Certainly the Italian mandate for war was morally inferior, but again that's a different question also. : )

I'll go back to enjoying your book now.

Hi Mike:
I don't believe that you "stepped in it". You made a statement, based on what you read. Most of your sources are secondary and tertiary ones. If those authors read the original documents, they probably interpreted the verbage, based on their own biases. Remember that "to the victor, go the spoils". One of those spoils, is the right due to being the victor, to write the history. Most of what we think happened in WWII was based on early writings by the combatants. It was based on their bias, not necessarily on facts from both sides. It takes many years for the losing side to begin to examine their own records and documents and finally develop their own history of the war. Finally, it also takes years for secret documents such as the Enigma story to be declassified. We now know that, in fact, it was Rommel's own communications that were being read by the British, not the Italians. In fact, the Italian codes were almost impossible to break. We also now can see, because logistics is now a byword in military science, that the Italians delivered over 70% of the supplies sent by the Reich to Naples. The problem was from Tunis/Bizerta to the front. We also now see that Malta was not the most important factor in Rommel's logistic problem. It was Rommel himself who says, that logistic was important, in his papers. Rommel won battles through superior tactics, but lost the campaign due to logistics. The British lost the battles due to poor tactics, but won the campaign due to better logistics.

We must also remember that the British were forced to move supplies to the Far East around the Horn of Africa, because the shorter route through the Suez Canal was blocked by the Italian fleet at the Straits of Sicily. Remember that the Italian fleet was a brown water fleet, with doctrine designed for that environment. Notice the number of effective torpedo boats and use of frogmen and mines. The Med is an enclosed sea or brown water environment, one that the US is now having to design ships to operate in.

So, we are all conditioned by what we have read. Post war authors lauded Rommel, yet we now know through further investigation that he was his own worst enemy. We also know that both the German General staff and the Italian General Staff tried to explain the African supply problem to Rommel and he did not heed their warning. The problem of Africa was the inadequate size of the ports. Tobruck, despite what the British will tell you was almost useless to the Germans due to its proximity to the British front lines and airfields and its small capacity. Bengazi was the same. Both were very small ports and inadequate to supply a large mechanized force.

The Med was lost, not because of the poor performance of the Italian fleet but through the failure to understand the logistics problem.

As for the issue of moral authority and the like, it was more British pride in their long history of naval accomplishments and less moral authority. The same pride in the Royal Navy which cost them Prince of Wales and Repulse in the face of the Japanese and possibly cost them the Pride of the British Fleet, HMS Hood. Pride can be valuable but, as my wife is always saying, pride goeth before the fall. That isn't the exact phrase but it conveys the point. Pride can blind us, to the realities of any situation. False pride probably blinded the Italian Navy as it did the British Navy. It cost the Italians at Taranto and it cost the British at Alexandria. I believe in that sense, Vince is correct. If we examine the goals of the Italian Fleet, to close the Straits to British commerce and shipping, then they certainly accomplished this, at least for a short period of time. If the British won the campaign in the Med, it was due to the deliveries of Sherman and Grant tanks, Priest self propelled guns, ammunition etc. from the US. It also stemmed from the deliveries of Spitfires to Malta, by the Wasp and Saratoga. They did not win Alamein alone, that's for certain. But that is another long story.

We need to analyze the efforts of both sides in this campaign, based on their geostrategic goals and whether they accomplished them. No more and no less.

[keschofield]

Vince,

I just ordered your newest book from Chris. Now I'll be checking the mail with great anticipation every day.

Do you ever do book signings or, if a reader ships a book to you would you be willing to sign it?

If you would prefer to reply privately, my email address is kschofie@bellsouth.net.

Thanks and have a great day,

[old_pop2000]

Just for informational purposes:

From Italy to Libya

Men lost - 8.5%
Material - 14%

From Italy to Tunisia

Men Lost - 7%
Material lost - 28%

They shipped 206,402 men from Italy to Libya, 77,741 to Tunisia.

They used 1210 convoys to Libya, in 2249 ships, with 1913 escorts

They used 515 convoys to Tunisia in 1781 ships with 521 escorts. That equals about 3.5 escorts per ship.

From 1940-1943, The Axis received 284,143 men and 2,678,550 tons of material. Rommel required 100,000 tons per month for his army, so he received about 26.7 months of supplies or 2 years and 2 months worth of supplies at his base in Libya and Tunisia. IMHO, the Italian Navy did a good job supplying Rommel.

Source:

Supplying War By Martin Van Creveld
The Italian Navy of WW IIby Marc'Antonio Bragadin via Regia Marina Italiana Website

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
I don't believe that you "stepped in it". You made a statement, based on what you read. Most of your sources are secondary and tertiary ones. If those authors read the original documents, they probably interpreted the verbage, based on their own biases. Remember that "to the victor, go the spoils". One of those spoils, is the right due to being the victor, to write the history. Most of what we think happened in WWII was based on early writings by the combatants. It was based on their bias, not necessarily on facts from both sides. It takes many years for the losing side to begin to examine their own records and documents and finally develop their own history of the war. Finally, it also takes years for secret documents such as the Enigma story to be declassified. We now know that, in fact, it was Rommel's own communications that were being read by the British, not the Italians. In fact, the Italian codes were almost impossible to break. We also now can see, because logistics is now a byword in military science, that the Italians delivered over 70% of the supplies sent by the Reich to Naples. The problem was from Tunis/Bizerta to the front. We also now see that Malta was not the most important factor in Rommel's logistic problem. It was Rommel himself who says, that logistic was important, in his papers. Rommel won battles through superior tactics, but lost the campaign due to logistics. The British lost the battles due to poor tactics, but won the campaign due to better logistics.

We must also remember that the British were forced to move supplies to the Far East around the Horn of Africa, because the shorter route through the Suez Canal was blocked by the Italian fleet at the Straits of Sicily. Remember that the Italian fleet was a brown water fleet, with doctrine designed for that environment. Notice the number of effective torpedo boats and use of frogmen and mines. The Med is an enclosed sea or brown water environment, one that the US is now having to design ships to operate in.

So, we are all conditioned by what we have read. Post war authors lauded Rommel, yet we now know through further investigation that he was his own worst enemy. We also know that both the German General staff and the Italian General Staff tried to explain the African supply problem to Rommel and he did not heed their warning. The problem of Africa was the inadequate size of the ports. Tobruck, despite what the British will tell you was almost useless to the Germans due to its proximity to the British front lines and airfields and its small capacity. Bengazi was the same. Both were very small ports and inadequate to supply a large mechanized force.

The Med was lost, not because of the poor performance of the Italian fleet but through the failure to understand the logistics problem.

As for the issue of moral authority and the like, it was more British pride in their long history of naval accomplishments and less moral authority. The same pride in the Royal Navy which cost them Prince of Wales and Repulse in the face of the Japanese and possibly cost them the Pride of the British Fleet, HMS Hood. Pride can be valuable but, as my wife is always saying, pride goeth before the fall. That isn't the exact phrase but it conveys the point. Pride can blind us, to the realities of any situation. False pride probably blinded the Italian Navy as it did the British Navy. It cost the Italians at Taranto and it cost the British at Alexandria. I believe in that sense, Vince is correct. If we examine the goals of the Italian Fleet, to close the Straits to British commerce and shipping, then they certainly accomplished this, at least for a short period of time. If the British won the campaign in the Med, it was due to the deliveries of Sherman and Grant tanks, Priest self propelled guns, ammunition etc. from the US. It also stemmed from the deliveries of Spitfires to Malta, by the Wasp and Saratoga. They did not win Alamein alone, that's for certain. But that is another long story.

We need to analyze the efforts of both sides in this campaign, based on their geostrategic goals and whether they accomplished them. No more and no less.


Hi Dennis,

Excellent summation and all true. I first ran across this when I got Sadkovich's "Italian Navy in World War II" about 6 years ago where he raises this issue by certain post war authors derisive of and presenting incomplete evaluations of Italian naval performance. His book and Massagnani's and Greene's do a lot to balance the picture. Vince's point came from his quote of a Cunningham letter where he wrote the RN had attained "moral ascendancy" over the Italians at sea. Vince mentioned this letter was written after Matapan and Cunningham was much less certain after the earlier battle of Calabria. The term "moral ascendancy" in connection the Mediterranean campaign has become an epithet. In the context under which Cunningham wrote it, I believe it is true. Not that the RN didn't make mistakes or sometimes have commander's that relied too much on "reputation" than planning, but in combat, the RN consistently out fought the Italians. There are many reasons for that, but I believe that element was one of the imponderables is that quality. I believe that same effect occurred during the Falklands War against Argentina. How much, very hard to quantify, but as I said, the impact is palpable. An example I read last night was the Italian sortie against the Force H 'Substance" convoy to Malta in September, 1941. Italian torpedo bombers had knocked the Nelson out of the escort leaving only P of W and Rodney to oppose Iachino's superior force of Littorio and Vittorio Veneto and a heavy cruiser division. Iachino closed to within 40 miles, but declined battle because of the murky situation. How much of his decision was based upon prior battle experience is unknown, but I'm sure it was part of his risk balancing. Any reasonable commander would do so.

There are certainly other similar situations such as the presence SS or panzer units could have on an opposing commander's mind. Or every tank being Tiger and every gun an 88mm. Call it shock and awe light. Fifth columns, National Redoubts, all imponderables that had a real impact on commander's actions and strategy in absence of better information.

Time, original sources, and new information can definitely illuminate and change our knowledge of events. That's what makes books like Vince's so interesting to read, new information and perspective. In fact a new tidbit I read last night was regarding Italian code breaking. In June, 1941, the Germans convinced the Italians to use a common code machine, the C38M. A cipher the British could read which allowed them the time table for North African convoys like a railroad schedule. Even with that information, the British had difficulty applying sufficient force to cut the supply lines. Loss of terrritory and attacks on Malta limited Britsh air reconnaissance. Surface groups and aircraft from Egypt couldn't intervene effectively and surface groups at Malta were logistically tied up and vulnerable to mines and aircraft. The U class boats at Malta had a very limited surface speed of 8 or 9 knots and had to be right on the money to intercept a convoy.

Malta provided the only platform which allowed the British to project power into the central basin for over two years and it's loss would have been significant. As you mention, we know now that it's loss on the long run may have made no difference. A perspective not available to the participants.

I still hope to get Vince to autograph his three books for me.......just capitalize dunderhead. : )

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Excellent summation and all true. I first ran across this when I got Sadkovich's "Italian Navy in World War II" about 6 years ago where he raises this issue by certain post war authors derisive of and presenting incomplete evaluations of Italian naval performance. His book and Massagnani's and Greene's do a lot to balance the picture. Vince's point came from his quote of a Cunningham letter where he wrote the RN had attained "moral ascendancy" over the Italians at sea. Vince mentioned this letter was written after Matapan and Cunningham was much less certain after the earlier battle of Calabria. The term "moral ascendancy" in connection the Mediterranean campaign has become an epithet. In the context under which Cunningham wrote it, I believe it is true.

The Report that you are referring to is the Report of an Action with the Italian Fleet off Calabria, 9th July 1940. It was submitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the 29th January, 1941 by Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham.

His complete statement was

16. The meagre material results derived from this brief meeting with the Italian Fleet were naturally very disappointing to me and all under
my command, but the action was not without value. It must have shown the Italians that their Air Force and submarines cannot stop our
Fleet penetrating into the Central Mediterranean and that only their main fleet can seriously interfere with our operating there. It established,
I think, a certain degree of moral ascendency, since although superior in battleships, our Fleet was heavily outnumbered in cruisers and
destroyers, and *the Italians had strong shore based air forces within easy range, compared to our few earner borne aircraft.

On our side the action has shown those without previous war experience how difficult it is to- hit with the gun at long range, and therefore the necessity of closing in, when this can be done, in order to get decisive results. It showed that high level bombing, even on the heavy and accurate scale experienced during these operations, yields few hits and that it is more alarming than dangerous.

I point out the second statement which most of us believe got Lancelot Holland into trouble with Bismarck.

Here is the complete report, published as a supplement in The London Gazette, dtd 27 April, 1948.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38273.pdf

With My Compliments

[Vince O'Hara]

Mike,

You didn't step in anything. I have my own interpretation of the Mediterranean campaign and I expressed it in the book. It's up to you to decide whether I make my point or not. I know going out of the gate that there'll be folks who disagree with some of my interpretations and some will disagree with most. I'll be interested to hear what you think after you finish the book.

In the meanwhile, I’d like to look at your perception that the British consistently defeated the Italians at sea. Now, I know this may seem strange coming from a guy who writes about naval battles as much as I do, but you have to look at the war as a whole, not in terms of victories, defeats, or goals scored.

Taranto was a British victory, but in terms of the exercise of sea control, its impact was relatively minor, demonstrated because the Italians retained a credible battleship deterrent and were able to exercise it within two weeks after the event. The loss of the two battleships at Alexandria was an Italian victory. It had a greater short term impact--in fact it ushered in a nine month period of Axis superiority. Matapan was a British victory. It cost the Italians a cruiser division. The destruction of Force K in an Italian minefield was an Italian victory. It cost a British cruiser division. The impact of each event can be debated but you can make a good point the Force K episode had the greater impact. There were three major convoy actions the British won. With the exception of the Duisburg (or Beta) convoy, the Italian tactic of running small and frequent convoys (necessary due to the limited port capacity in Africa as Dennis rightly pointed out) insured these defeats had a minor impact. The British ran fewer and generally larger convoys to Malta. The Italian defeat of the largest convoy of all, Vigorous (without firing a shot) should be considered a bigger defeat because the impact on Malta was much greater than the loss of one of the weekly four ship convoys to Africa.

Just another way to look at things.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Just something to think about.

Cunningham stated in item number 16 paragraph 2

On our side the action has shown those without
previous war experience how difficult it is
to- hit with the gun at long range, and therefore
the necessity of closing in, when this can be
done, in order to get decisive resultsHowever, in item #6, he states

It will be noted that the whole action took
place at very long range and that WARSPITE
was the only capital ship which got within
range of the enemy battleships. MALAYA
fired a few salvos which fell some 3,000 yards
short.Yet, in item# 9 he says


The enemy's gunnery seemed good at first
and he straddled quickly, but accuracy soon
fell off as his ships came under our fireNow, in the first item, he is observing that the action shows that you must close to decisive range, but the second, he tells us, that in fact, he did not do that, that the action was fought at very long range. He also states at the end that Royal Sovereign never got into action due to lack of speed.

Finally, in item 9, he credits the Italians with good gunnery, I am assuming at very long range. So, what is Cunningham saying? That you should close to decisive range, which he either couldn't accomplish due to slow ships or because the Italians maneuvered to stay out of decisive range of Cunningham's forces. So, anyone see a dichotomy in his thought process here? If closing to decisive range is vital, to get hits, then why didn't he do that and if he couldn't, then one could credit the Italian fleet for that. They might have just stayed out of range of British guns. However, in his own words, they straddled quickly so they weren't doing too bad. Moral ascendency? Where?

[old_pop2000]

In a few post war books and US Army historical documents, it is stated that part of the problem with supplies was that it took 2-5 days to unload a transport in Tunis or Tripoli. This was caused by the fact that the Arab stevedores did not stay around to be bombed or that the Tunisian Italians didn't either.

However, FM Kesselring states his memoirs that the unloading operation in Tunis broke all records because of a Luftwaffe supply staff. He states that in Benghazi and Tripoli it took two to five days, the same effort could be accomplished in half a day in Tunis or Bizerta.

We know that Benghazi and Tripoli had reduced capability in the area of unloading of shipping, so this might have contributed to the effort. Again, this goes a long way to explain some of the problems. I believe that Kesselring was stating the obvious fact, that material was reaching Africa and that in most cases, it was being unloaded quickly, depending on the organization of the port. For this, the Italians have to bear the responsibility.

[Vince O'Hara]

Dennis,

You make some very good points. I always thought that the main purpose of that report was political.

Cunningham wrote a letter to Admiral Pound dayed 13 July, when he returned to port after the Calabria Action. In his letter he complains for several paragraphs lists that he was out-matched and outranged. These are selective quotes (with my exigesis in parens)

"The brush with the Italian Fleet was most irritating and disappointing." (nothing was accomplished)

"I walked into the trap with my eyes open." (I knew what I was doing)

"My heart was in my mouth lest Royal Sovereign should be hit [by bombs] as, if she had taken one of the nests of bombs that were dropping about, I think she'd have gone to the bottom . . ." (stressing his danger)

"Don't think I am discouraged, I am not a bit." (trying to put a brighter spin on things)

"There is one thing on the bright side. I do not think we need to expect anything vey dashing from the Italian Fleet." (see above)

He goes on to list all his needs (modern carrier, heavy cruisers, an AA cruiser, escorts.

"I apologise for all these demands, but our position in the Middle East depends almost entirely on the fleet and I want to keep it active and able to go anywhere with moderate security."

I think this more accurately reflects Cunningham's thinking after Calabria than the report he wrote in nearly seven months later.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

You make some very good points. I always thought that the main purpose of that report was political.

Cunningham wrote a letter to Admiral Pound dayed 13 July, when he returned to port after the Calabria Action. In his letter he complains for several paragraphs lists that he was out-matched and outranged. These are selective quotes (with my exigesis in parens)

..

Thanks for the information because it did not make sense to me that Cunningham would make the obvious point that the RN had gained "moral ascendency" over an enemy, when he only got one known very long range shot that he, himself, stated was a very lucky shot. So, where is the "moral ascendency"? The action was a draw. A very inconsequential battle.

My issue is that in some books, this statement is frequently quoted without the information that you have just presented, which is what he actually believed.

Again, thanks for confirming my suspicions. Good research, my friend.

With My Compliments

[JMS]

Hi Dennis, you are wrong in a very important point:



We now know that, in fact, it was Rommel's own communications that were being read by the British, not the Italians. In fact, the Italian codes were almost impossible to break.


Italian codes, based on commercial Enigmas, were broken early in the war, enabling Matapan to happen. For a full history I recommend "Enigma: The Battle For the Code" by Hugh Sebag Montefiore, who goes beyond conventional wisdom to touch all efforts against the Enigma machines, from the Poles early success to the US taking over at the end of WW2 and finishing off the German submarine code.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis, you are wrong in a very important point:



Italian codes, based on commercial Enigmas, were broken early in the war, enabling Matapan to happen. For a full history I recommend "Enigma: The Battle For the Code" by Hugh Sebag Montefiore, who goes beyond conventional wisdom to touch all efforts against the Enigma machines, from the Poles early success to the US taking over at the end of WW2 and finishing off the German submarine code.


GC&CS was only able to read the unsteckered enigma code the Italians began using in 1939. It was, as you point out, a commercial enigma machine. However, it rarely carried any traffic and the British thought that it was just a deception. However, they were wrong and a message was broken from Rome to Rhodes that the Italian Fleet was preparing to sail under Admiral Angelo Iachino to go after a British convoy carrying troops and supplies from Alexandria to Greece. After 1940, the British had difficulty breaking Italian codes. Remember also, that was only one code, they did have trouble with the rest. In comparison to the reading of enigma codes of the Germans, the Italian code system was far harder than the German and that it was the German signals coming from Rommel's own signals section that were being read. Basically, after June 1940, the British essentially lost all intelligence on the RMI and in April 1941 could not read Italian Naval Cyphers. Even when the British captured the Uebi Scebil's codes on June 29, the Supermarina changed the submarine code on July 5th.

I've read and have in my library, six different books on code breaking including David Kahn's "The Code Breakers". However, I will look for that book as I think it might have some good information. Thx

With My Compliments

[Vince O'Hara]

Here' a quote from Hinsley's British Intelligence (Volume 1, 206).

"Italy's main naval book cyphers . . . used by her fleet for most of its important cummunications, were never read again after July 1940 except for brief intervals as a result of captures after the middle of 1940."

We don't have a good history of Italy's code breaking efforts and the operational successes Rome obtained as a result, but apparently, they were considerable.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Here' a quote from Hinsley's British Intelligence (Volume 1, 206).

"Italy's main naval book cyphers . . . used by her fleet for most of its important cummunications, were never read again after July 1940 except for brief intervals as a result of captures after the middle of 1940."

We don't have a good history of Italy's code breaking efforts and the operational successes Rome obtained as a result, but apparently, they were considerable.

Vince

I have Hinsley's book "Code Breakers" but I don't remember seeing anything like that. Thanks very much. The information I presented came from Budiansky's book and David Kahn's. I suspect your source is their source.

With My Compliments

[Mike Malanaphy]

Just something to think about.

Cunningham stated in item number 16 paragraph 2
However, in item #6, he states
Yet, in item# 9 he says

Now, in the first item, he is observing that the action shows that you must close to decisive range, but the second, he tells us, that in fact, he did not do that, that the action was fought at very long range. He also states at the end that Royal Sovereign never got into action due to lack of speed.

Finally, in item 9, he credits the Italians with good gunnery, I am assuming at very long range. So, what is Cunningham saying? That you should close to decisive range, which he either couldn't accomplish due to slow ships or because the Italians maneuvered to stay out of decisive range of Cunningham's forces. So, anyone see a dichotomy in his thought process here? If closing to decisive range is vital, to get hits, then why didn't he do that and if he couldn't, then one could credit the Italian fleet for that. They might have just stayed out of range of British guns. However, in his own words, they straddled quickly so they weren't doing too bad. Moral ascendency? Where?

Hi Dennis,

I don't see a dichotomy. Cunningham was frustrated throughout his time in the Med by not having a battle line that could force the Italians to battle. Only Renown with Force H had the speed to catch them. Most if not all Italian battleships outranged his as well. Hits at that range were rare and RN doctrine was to close to 16,000 yards to obtain a decisive rate of hitting. You can make the same argument re the Italians not using their superior speed to defeat in detail the fastest British battleship that pulled ahead, such as Warspite at Calabria and Renown at Teulada, four months later. Certainly Vittorio Veneto was more than a match for Renown. In both cases, the Italians had local superiority and failed to press home their attacks.

Reading his report is interesting, but I think you can find the basis for his "moral ascendancy" comment in Item 7:

"Warpite's hit on one of the enemy battleships at 26,000 yards range might be perhaps be described as luck. It's tactical effect was to induce the enemy to turn away and break off the action, which was unfortunate, but strategically it probably had an important effect on the Italian mentality."

Written after Calabria, Teulada, Taranto, and Matapan, his comments are congruent and reasonable based upon his actions and experience with the Italian battle fleet. I believe it was Peter C. Smith that mentioned in "The Great Ships Pass" about that comment that never again did Italian battleships stand up to British battleships. There is also a story attributed to Cunningham that when his staff objected to him wanting to send a destroyer division to sink a small ship they thought was not worth the effort, he told them he wanted the enemy to feel safe nowhere in the theater.

At least Vince found an Italian that agrees with me. : ) He quotes Count Ciano after the Battle of Cape Bon where British DDs sank two gasoline laden light cruisers. Ciano mentions "What is happening in the Navy is baffling, unless what Somgli says is true, and that is, that our general staffs are obsessed by an inferiority complex that paralyzes all of their activites".

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I don't see a dichotomy. Cunningham was frustrated throughout his time in the Med by not having a battle line that could force the Italians to battle. Only Renown with Force H had the speed to catch them. Most if not all Italian battleships outranged his as well. Hits at that range were rare and RN doctrine was to close to 16,000 yards to obtain a decisive rate of hitting. You can make the same argument re the Italians not using their superior speed to defeat in detail the fastest British battleship that pulled ahead, such as Warspite at Calabria and Renown at Teulada, four months later. Certainly Vittorio Veneto was more than a match for Renown. In both cases, the Italians had local superiority and failed to press home their attacks.

...

Cunningham's view was that if you don't fight me, I have "moral ascendency". But fighting sea battles is not always the way to succeed in achieving your objective. Cunningham even states at the beginning that the Italians were probably just trying to cover a convoy. The Italians had accomplished their purpose, they had engaged the British, came out with a draw and had protected the convoy.

The "moral ascendency" crack, was for public consumption. It was to show the admiralty the Mediterranean Fleet under his command had achieved superiority over the Italians so now when I request more ships, you have to give them to me. I am winning. Vince's has already shown on this thread, that privately his words were different.

The Battle of Punta Stilo or Calabria, despite the attempt by the British to propaganize about their moral ascendency, was a draw. The engagement was meeting engagement between two forces that were not attempting to find each other. They were engaged in protecting convoys. The Italians had finished their job, the British had posponed it. Why fight the battle, just to be fighting. I believe that there is sufficient evidence that the Supermarina had already forwarded a message to Campioni ordering him to converge on a particular lat-long position to engage the British. He was not running away. The actual battle, IIRC, lasted only seven minutes. Cunningham, disengaged due to Cesare's finding Warspite's range. Cunningham had far more to lose if Warspite had been sunk. If Campioni had stayed to fight, Royal Sovereign would have been able to engage, so it seems that Campioni realized that he had to leave the area. In fact, Campioni stated that he was opening the way for a torpedo attack by destroyers, a textbook tactic, used by the British themselves. This was the smoke that Cunningham claims to have thought was covering the Italian retreat.

That is the dicotomy that I see. His attitude that he somehow won the battle and the Italians would be scared from then on. I remind you, it was the British who could no longer run convoys through the Med so the Italians accomplished their mission of sea control.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Cunningham's view was that if you don't fight me, I have "moral ascendency". But fighting sea battles is not always the way to succeed in achieving your objective. Cunningham even states at the beginning that the Italians were probably just trying to cover a convoy. The Italians had accomplished their purpose, they had engaged the British, came out with a draw and had protected the convoy.

The "moral ascendency" crack, was for public consumption. It was to show the admiralty the Mediterranean Fleet under his command had achieved superiority over the Italians so now when I request more ships, you have to give them to me. I am winning. Vince's has already shown on this thread, that privately his words were different.

The Battle of Punta Stilo or Calabria, despite the attempt by the British to propaganize about their moral ascendency, was a draw. The engagement was meeting engagement between two forces that were not attempting to find each other. They were engaged in protecting convoys. The Italians had finished their job, the British had posponed it. Why fight the battle, just to be fighting. I believe that there is sufficient evidence that the Supermarina had already forwarded a message to Campioni ordering him to converge on a particular lat-long position to engage the British. He was not running away. The actual battle, IIRC, lasted only seven minutes. Cunningham, disengaged due to Cesare's finding Warspite's range. Cunningham had far more to lose if Warspite had been sunk. If Campioni had stayed to fight, Royal Sovereign would have been able to engage, so it seems that Campioni realized that he had to leave the area. In fact, Campioni stated that he was opening the way for a torpedo attack by destroyers, a textbook tactic, used by the British themselves. This was the smoke that Cunningham claims to have thought was covering the Italian retreat.

That is the dicotomy that I see. His attitude that he somehow won the battle and the Italians would be scared from then on. I remind you, it was the British who could no longer run convoys through the Med so the Italians accomplished their mission of sea control.

Hi Dennis,

Your quite right that Cunningham's comments just after the battle were more subdued. That's why his words written later are congruent with his actions to beat the Italian Navy and combat successes to date. I don't agree with your assesment of Cunnigham's definition of "moral ascendency" being the Italians unwilling to fight.

Campioni and Cunningham had exactly the same objective at Calabria, fight each other. The Italian Benghazi convoy was already safe and Campioni concentrated with Palladini to look for Cunningham. On the evening of the 8th, Campioni was told by no less than Mussolini himself to give the Regia Aeronautia a chance at the British. Cunnigham was aware of the convoy but wanted to interpose himself between the Italian battle fleet and Taranto.

Supermarina's orders to Campioni were: "Your action today is inspired by the following concepts: do not go beyond the range of our aero-naval bases so as to permit simultaneous preemptive aerial actions against the enemy. Contact is allowed against main armored groups while they remain seperate. Delay gun action to permit disabling of enemy forces by aerial bombardment. At sunset, return with larger units to base. If conditions are favorable, make nocturnal contact with torpedo boats."

Your question of why fight just to flight is moot.

Campioni was aware that British carrier planes were present and had catapulted six float planes to scout Cunningham. Campioni ordered the turn away after the damage to Cesare by Warspite's hit as he understandably didn't want to face three undamaged British battleships. Cunnningham did not claim victory, but his asessment that Warspite's hit was the cause of Campioni's withdrawal is correct. The Italian destroyers were ordered to cover his withdrawal.

At Teulada in November, Campioni's orders from Supermarina were much more conservative:

"Avoid action with the enemy if he enjoys an evident superiority; try to fight near base; be animated by a highly aggressive spirit at all times and remember that the material difficulty in replacing our warships losses during the war dictates that we must cooly examine the convenience of any action. However, the possibility of any losses is not justification to refuse an encounter or to interrupt the fighting after the beginning of an action." As Vince concludes, "As for Campioni. although he had a mandate to be conservative, he presided over the loss of Italy's best opportunity to deal the British a sharp set back in a fleet action."

So what happened to Supermarina's offensive spirit in those four months? I suggest that:

-The hit on Caesare at Calabria.
-The Loss of Coelleoni at Cape Spada ends tip and run raids.
-Force H bombards Caligari.
-Cunningham shells Bardia.
-Malta successfully resupplied by Cunningham.
-Force H bombards Caligari again.
-Cape Passero: Ajax surprised at night by 4 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats. Sinks two TBDs and one destroyer.
-Taranto.
-Night action in Strait of Otranto: British cruiser/destroyer force attack Italian convoy at night sinking all four merchants.

all weighed on Supermarina's risk/loss assesment in terms of engaging the RN. It's not a question of scaring the Italians into not fighting, but causing them to not aggressively use their strategic postion for fear of losses. That seems perfectly in line with Cunningham's use of the term "moral ascendancy" over the Italian Navy. He had caused a numerically superior opponent to give pause about engaging.

[old_pop2000]

Your quite right that Cunningham's comments just after the battle were more subdued. That's why his words written later are congruent with his actions to beat the Italian Navy and combat successes to date. I don't agree with your assesment of Cunnigham's definition of "moral ascendency" being the Italians unwilling to fight.



Then what was Cunningham's definition of "moral ascendency"? Psychological ascendancy? Where's the case proving that? Cunningham was never able to interdict Italian traffic to Libya. He was also never able to protect the British sea lanes through the Mediterranean to Alexandria. It wasn't until the British Army using US equipment, won at El Alamein and eliminated the Italians from North Africa by pushing them all the way back to Tunis, did the British ultimately gain ascendancy. This mostly due to the British AF and the bases they occupied along the NA coast. The Regia Marina fought without adequate ammunition, low fuel supplies and a dirth of knowledge of advanced sonar and radar technology. We all know that those two technologies were the downfall of both the Japanese and the Italians. Couple this with a lack of adequate air support from the Regia Aeronautica, and one can get a sense of why the morale of the Italian fleet probably diminished over time.

We know that Cunningham called off the pursuit of the Italians because they were attempting to lure him through a smokescreen onto a massed torpedo attack, a line of submarines and maybe a mine barrage. The chance of slowing down the faster Italian fleet was close to nil and the closer he got to the Italian coast, the more chances he would take in sustaining losses on his already outnumbered Mediterranean Fleet. Keep in mind that , the two battleships that he had with him, were the only capital ships currently available to the Italians. In this case, it wasn't "moral ascendancy" but more discretion is the better part of valour. He who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day. The Italian's were not going to allow themselves to be ground up by carrier and submarine attacks then destroyed in detail by the British battle fleet.

In August 1941, Cunningham told Admiral Kelly, 'I hate this being cooped up in the Eastern Mediterranean and very nearly go into a frenzy when I hear of Italian surface ships being at sea in the Central Mediterranean.'

Was this the man who claimed "moral ascendancy" over the Italian fleet? He did not have escorts for this capital ships and carriers, so he was pinned at Alexandria. Had Rommel taken it, he would have had to abandon the Med and move through the canal to another fleet base, most likely Trincomalee.

Sorry, but no one can convince me that he ever could claim ' moral ascendancy' over an Italian fleet just because of the few battles when they, accomplished their strategic goals and he did not.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Then what was Cunningham's definition of "moral ascendency"? Psychological ascendancy? Where's the case proving that? Cunningham was never able to interdict Italian traffic to Libya. He was also never able to protect the British sea lanes through the Mediterranean to Alexandria. It wasn't until the British Army using US equipment, won at El Alamein and eliminated the Italians from North Africa by pushing them all the way back to Tunis, did the British ultimately gain ascendancy. This mostly due to the British AF and the bases they occupied along the NA coast. The Regia Marina fought without adequate ammunition, low fuel supplies and a dirth of knowledge of advanced sonar and radar technology. We all know that those two technologies were the downfall of both the Japanese and the Italians. Couple this with a lack of adequate air support from the Regia Aeronautica, and one can get a sense of why the morale of the Italian fleet probably diminished over time.

We know that Cunningham called off the pursuit of the Italians because they were attempting to lure him through a smokescreen onto a massed torpedo attack, a line of submarines and maybe a mine barrage. The chance of slowing down the faster Italian fleet was close to nil and the closer he got to the Italian coast, the more chances he would take in sustaining losses on his already outnumbered Mediterranean Fleet. Keep in mind that , the two battleships that he had with him, were the only capital ships currently available to the Italians. In this case, it wasn't "moral ascendancy" but more discretion is the better part of valour. He who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day. The Italian's were not going to allow themselves to be ground up by carrier and submarine attacks then destroyed in detail by the British battle fleet.

In August 1941, Cunningham told Admiral Kelly, 'I hate this being cooped up in the Eastern Mediterranean and very nearly go into a frenzy when I hear of Italian surface ships being at sea in the Central Mediterranean.'

Was this the man who claimed "moral ascendancy" over the Italian fleet? He did not have escorts for this capital ships and carriers, so he was pinned at Alexandria. Had Rommel taken it, he would have had to abandon the Med and move through the canal to another fleet base, most likely Trincomalee.

Sorry, but no one can convince me that he ever could claim ' moral ascendancy' over an Italian fleet just because of the few battles when they, accomplished their strategic goals and he did not.

Hi Dennis,

I think your making this much too complicated. Here is a descripton from Cornelli Barnett's "Engage the Enemy More closely":

"Cunningham believed that moral dominance over the enemy was fundamental to success. Soon after the Calabria action, when ships' companies were tired and and boilers due for cleaning, a report came in that a very old and feeble torpedo boat was on passage from Taranto to Tobruk in Libya. Cunningham ordered : "Send out a division of destroyers and sink her." When his staff protested on the grounds the destroyers should be cleaning boilers and that anyway the torpedo boat presented no threat, Cunningham replied, We must never let the enemy think that it is safe to go to sea; we must make him think that he is only safe in harbour. Contrarywise, our fleet must feel that it is natural for them to be at sea . Go on, send the destroyers and sink the poor inoffensive bugger!"

The only strategic goal the Italian Navy succeeded at was the first years of convoying supplies to Africa. Despite a central position and superior numbers of ships and aircraft, she could not prevent the passage of convoys to an enemy base on her front door step nor prevent the bombardment of her cities at will.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I think your making this much too complicated. Here is a descripton from Cornelli Barnett's "Engage the Enemy More closely":

"Cunningham believed that moral dominance over the enemy was fundamental to success. Soon after the Calabria action, when ships' companies were tired and and boilers due for cleaning, a report came in that a very old and feeble torpedo boat was on passage from Taranto to Tobruk in Libya. Cunningham ordered : "Send out a division of destroyers and sink her." When his staff protested on the grounds the destroyers should be cleaning boilers and that anyway the torpedo boat presented no threat, Cunningham replied, We must never let the enemy think that it is safe to go to sea; we must make him think that he is only safe in harbour. Contrarywise, our fleet must feel that it is natural for them to be at sea . Go on, send the destroyers and sink the poor inoffensive bugger!"

The only strategic goal the Italian Navy succeeded at was the first years of convoying supplies to Africa. Despite a central position and superior numbers of ships and aircraft, she could not prevent the passage of convoys to an enemy base on her front door step nor prevent the bombardment of her cities at will.

By the time Torch and the Sicilian invasion occurred, the Italian fleet was pretty much out of fuel and with the USAF on the NA coast bombing Italy, what could that fleet do without adequate air support? When the Italo-German Army was fighting in NA, the Italian fleet maintained the sea lanes to Libya and prevented the British convoys from transiting through the Straits of Sicily.

The Italian moral on all fronts did deteriorate but not due to the 'moral ascendancy' of the British fleet.

[Vince O'Hara]

Mike, I'm with Dennis on this one. Making a list of British victories does not address the question. How did the U.S. Navy do in its first six months of war against Japan. What was the balance-sheet of ships sunk or victories verses defeats? It was a lot worse than what the Italians accomplished against the British. Was the U.S. Navy morally inferior to the Japanese, or defeated? Of course not.

There was a similar dynamic at play with Italy and Great Britain. Look at it from the Italian point of view. They were pleased with their naval preformance over the war's first six months. They had stood toe to toe with the world's largest navy--supposedly the best--one with ten months of war experience under its belt. They had suffered set-backs, but they had also enjoyed victories (remember also, that navies at war generally overstate their successes, so the Italians thought they had inflicted more damage than was the case). The only two fleet engagements had been draws. The fleet's admirals Camponi, Sansonetti, Bergamini were champing at the bit to get at the British.

I take Cunningham's public pronouncements with a grain of salt and focus instead on his actions. At Matapan he chased the Italian fleet. Why not, he had three battleships and a carrier and Iachino had one. In operation Hats in August 1940 he steered away from the Italian battle fleet bearing down on him. As well he should have. He only had two battleships and Campioni had five. What I find interesting about this episode was that in his memoirs, Cunningham said he turned south at dusk that and made it seem that the Italians had avoided contact with him. Actually, he turned three hours before dusk.

Vince

[Mike Malanaphy]

By the time Torch and the Sicilian invasion occurred, the Italian fleet was pretty much out of fuel and with the USAF on the NA coast bombing Italy, what could that fleet do without adequate air support? When the Italo-German Army was fighting in NA, the Italian fleet maintained the sea lanes to Libya and prevented the British convoys from transiting through the Straits of Sicily.

The Italian moral on all fronts did deteriorate but not due to the 'moral ascendancy' of the British fleet.

Hi Dennis,

We'll have to agree to disagree here on this one old friend. : ) I had to break for dinner before finishing the last post. In Webster's dictionary one of the definitions of moral is "perceptual or psychological rather than tangible or practicable in nature or effect." What convinces me is the change in attitude from July, 1940 to November, 1940 as shown in Supermarina's orders to Campioni. At Calabria, he was willing to risk engaging Cunningham despite having one less battleship under orders that gave him wide discretion. At Teulada, he declined to strike at Renown with Vittorio Veneto and Cesare letting a golden opportunity to restore the psychological balance slip through his hands. Spada cured the Italians of using surface strike groups to interdict British supply routes and force them to be at sea more than necessary. The experiences of those four months caused Supermarina to be cautious. If the Italians believed they were as giving as good as they got, why the change of heart? You can argue it was a maturing of judgement based upon tactical experience, but what was that experience? Cunningham gained the psychological edge over his opponent, it's as simple as that. You may not be able to quantify it, but you can see when it is present or not present.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike, I'm with Dennis on this one. Making a list of British victories does not address the question. How did the U.S. Navy do in its first six months of war against Japan. What was the balance-sheet of ships sunk or victories verses defeats? It was a lot worse than what the Italians accomplished against the British. Was the U.S. Navy morally inferior to the Japanese, or defeated? Of course not.

There was a similar dynamic at play with Italy and Great Britain. Look at it from the Italian point of view. They were pleased with their naval preformance over the war's first six months. They had stood toe to toe with the world's largest navy--supposedly the best--one with ten months of war experience under its belt. They had suffered set-backs, but they had also enjoyed victories (remember also, that navies at war generally overstate their successes, so the Italians thought they had inflicted more damage than was the case). The only two fleet engagements had been draws. The fleet's admirals Camponi, Sansonetti, Bergamini were champing at the bit to get at the British.

I take Cunningham's public pronouncements with a grain of salt and focus instead on his actions. At Matapan he chased the Italian fleet. Why not, he had three battleships and a carrier and Iachino had one. In operation Hats in August 1940 he steered away from the Italian battle fleet bearing down on him. As well he should have. He only had two battleships and Campioni had five. What I find interesting about this episode was that in his memoirs, Cunningham said he turned south at dusk that and made it seem that the Italians had avoided contact with him. Actually, he turned three hours before dusk.

Vince

Hi Vince,

Thanks for taking the time to discuss this. I'm about 2/3s of the way through your book and I haven't peeked at your conclusions yet. Dennis is always engaging, thoughtful, and logical in his arguments. Me, less so. : ) Which explains my interest in the psychological aspect of military operations in an incrasiningly technical age. No, I would agree the IJN did not gain moral ascendacy over the USN, but you can argue the the Japanese Army in Malaya did over a British Army three times it's size. Not always as obvious as the Panzer panic which overtook the French Army in 1940, but the psychological element is always part of the mix. Like luck, never predictable but always pleasant to have in your favor.


The Italian Navy fought a long and brave war with many handicaps, I don't believe ascribing a psychological edge to the RN dishonors or denigrates their efforts. Through this period the RN fought in three oceans, adding a fourth in December, 1941, giving the Axis numerous opportunites to gain local superiority despite their handicaps.

One of the more interesting aspects of the campaign in the Med was the protracted period where the forces were in relative balance, making different outcomes poissible and the number of tipping points more numerous and less obvious.

[Vince O'Hara]

I told an Italian friend about this topic. He checked it out and remarked to me how civilized the discussion on this forum is, as opposed to some others that shall go nameless.

It would be pretty pointless if everyone agreed on everything. There'd be nothing to talk about.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

I told an Italian friend about this topic. He checked it out and remarked to me how civilized the discussion on this forum is, as opposed to some others that shall go nameless.

It would be pretty pointless if everyone agreed on everything. There'd be nothing to talk about.

Vince

Vince:
I would agree that without disagreement, there would be no discussion. I would also state, for the record, that discussions with Mike are always intelligent, civilized and informative. They are also very challenging. This can be said of everyone on this forum.

In actual fact, I don't disagree that the Italian moral probably diminished as the war progressed. But not from British prowess, but due to the lack of oil, poor conditions and concern for their families at home. I believe that Cunningham's comment was due to his perception of his enemy, that the opponent had abandoned the field to him. He attrituted it to a 'moral ascendancy', but I believe his opponent was simply a little more clever than he surmised. His comment was not based on facts, but more on wishful thinking.

To my buddy, Mike; I am a believer in the Napoleonic observation that the moral is to the physical as three is to one. ;)

[Vince O'Hara]

Cunningham's comment about establishing moral ascendency and the way it has been repeated as an established truth by about fifteen authors I could list if anyone were curious, has always been a pet peeve of mine. Propanganda is an effective tool and Cunningham used it artfully, but it shouldn't be mistaken for history, especially after so many years.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Cunningham's comment about establishing moral ascendency and the way it has been repeated as an established truth by about fifteen authors I could list if anyone were curious, has always been a pet peeve of mine. Propanganda is an effective tool and Cunningham used it artfully, but it shouldn't be mistaken for history, especially after so many years.

Vince

Hi Vince:
I believe that psychological warfare and propanda are an important tool for any government or military force. But after the war, it is the job of historians to separate the truth from the propanda. I feel in this and other cases, it was never done. Possibly because of their choice of sources; almost entirely British.

IMHO, Cunningham's statement is not supportable by the facts. It was propaganda for the masses, not historical fact.

[keschofield]

Gee! Great Britain messing with the facts to suit their purposes? ;) Shocking, absolutely shocking!

Next you'll tell me that the Lusitania was carrying ammunition just like the Germans said she was. :rolleyes:

[old_pop2000]

Gee! Great Britain messing with the facts to suit their purposes? ;) Shocking, absolutely shocking!

Next you'll tell me that the Lusitania was carrying ammunition just like the Germans said she was. :rolleyes:

Now, now Kurt. The British aren't any different than any other nation, they have just been doing it longer than the rest of us and have learned its value.

[keschofield]

Now, now Kurt. The British aren't any different than any other nation, they have just been doing it longer than the rest of us and have learned its value.

Well said Mike. :D

[old_pop2000]

Well said Mike. :D

Ahem, it's Dennis. Don't tell me you have senior moments? I thought I was the only one.:p

[keschofield]

Ahem, it's Dennis. Don't tell me you have senior moments? I thought I was the only one.:p

Ooops! Sorry about that Dennis. I seem to be having more senior moments every week!:eek:

But then my kids would tell you that I've been having them for years. :rolleyes:

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Guys,

Just finished Vince's book last night. A great read. As usual, he has crammed a ton of really useful information into his book. In addition to the battles, he keeps you abreast of the strategic and politcal situations that provide context to both sides' actions, including vital information about code breaking. Of special interest is the amount of naval activity post armistice. Collecting a hodge podge of small warships and auxillairies, the Germans were able to hold off the British in the eastern Med and maintain air cover in the western Med to cover shore traffic well into the war.

Lots of small skirmishes with DDs and even the French super destroyers. A tremendous reference for the naval buff and scenario maker. Highly recommended.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Now, now Kurt. The British aren't any different than any other nation, they have just been doing it longer than the rest of us and have learned its value.

Dennis:

They're also better at it. Who else could get Shakespeare to paint the Tudors as the saviors of England against the wicked Richard III?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Guys,

Just finished Vince's book last night. A great read. As usual, he has crammed a ton of really useful information into his book. In addition to the battles, he keeps you abreast of the strategic and politcal situations that provide context to both sides' actions, including vital information about code breaking. Of special interest is the amount of naval activity post armistice. Collecting a hodge podge of small warships and auxillairies, the Germans were able to hold off the British in the eastern Med and maintain air cover in the western Med to cover shore traffic well into the war.

Lots of small skirmishes with DDs and even the French super destroyers. A tremendous reference for the naval buff and scenario maker. Highly recommended.

Mike:

Sounds like another winner from Vince O'Hara. I get to get me a copy for my vacation reding.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

They're also better at it. Who else could get Shakespeare to paint the Tudors as the saviors of England against the wicked Richard III?

'And thereby hangs a tale' :p

[Ed Rotondaro]

'And thereby hangs a tale' :p

"We few, we happy few, we band of NWS Forum Brothers!":D

[old_pop2000]

"We few, we happy few, we band of NWS Forum Brothers!":D

We few, we happy few, we band of forum brothers;
For he to-day that types upon this forum with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition;
And gentlemen in England now-a-bed
Shall think themselves accurs'd they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That writes with us upon Saint Crispin's day.:p

Now, back to our regularly scheduled programming.

[Vince O'Hara]

Hi Guys,

Just finished Vince's book last night. A great read. As usual, he has crammed a ton of really useful information into his book. In addition to the battles, he keeps you abreast of the strategic and politcal situations that provide context to both sides' actions, including vital information about code breaking. Of special interest is the amount of naval activity post armistice. Collecting a hodge podge of small warships and auxillairies, the Germans were able to hold off the British in the eastern Med and maintain air cover in the western Med to cover shore traffic well into the war.

Lots of small skirmishes with DDs and even the French super destroyers. A tremendous reference for the naval buff and scenario maker. Highly recommended.

Thanks for the nice comments Mike. Feel free to express them on places like Amazon. I guess I didn't completely sway you when it came to the question of moral superiority, but so it goes. I like the French "super destroyers" the contre torpilleurs. If I had to pick one of my favorite classes of warships, it would be them. Considering the situations they found themselves in, I'd to rate them one of the most successful as well. Another type of warship I find fascinating is the German Uj subchasers. Talk about a hodge-podge.

Vince

[Mike Malanaphy]

Thanks for the nice comments Mike. Feel free to express them on places like Amazon. I guess I didn't completely sway you when it came to the question of moral superiority, but so it goes. I like the French "super destroyers" the contre torpilleurs. If I had to pick one of my favorite classes of warships, it would be them. Considering the situations they found themselves in, I'd to rate them one of the most successful as well. Another type of warship I find fascinating is the German Uj subchasers. Talk about a hodge-podge.

Vince

Hi Vince,

Not a problem, a great piece of work. It's nice to be able to use them in Fighting Steel. I've always had a soft spot for Dunkerque and Strabourg. Though primarily designed to catch and destroy the German Panzerschiffes, I think they would have held their own against the old Italian battleships. With the exception of the Littorio's, they could catch and sink any Italian battleship or cuiser (at fighting weight). An even up match against the Scharnhorst.

[Vince O'Hara]

Sorry for dragging up this old topic, but I would like to call attention to an interview posted on the Naval Institute Blog on the 19th of October.

The url is http://blog.usni.org/

Vince

[Ed Rotondaro]

Thanks for the nice comments Mike. Feel free to express them on places like Amazon. I guess I didn't completely sway you when it came to the question of moral superiority, but so it goes. I like the French "super destroyers" the contre torpilleurs. If I had to pick one of my favorite classes of warships, it would be them. Considering the situations they found themselves in, I'd to rate them one of the most successful as well. Another type of warship I find fascinating is the German Uj subchasers. Talk about a hodge-podge.

Vince

Vince:

I have always wondered how the super destroyers would have fared against the Fletcher class or the later Sumner/Gearings. Size wise the US DDs are pretty about the same as the contre torpilleurs while carrying more torpedoes. The guns about the same with the US 5" DP being far more versatile and I believe having a better rate of fire. Then factor in superior US radar and fire control and I'm not sure those French ships would like to face an equal number of US DDs. Since I have not acquired your most recent book (shame on me) does it have an examples of US versus French ships?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Vince,

Not a problem, a great piece of work. It's nice to be able to use them in Fighting Steel. I've always had a soft spot for Dunkerque and Strabourg. Though primarily designed to catch and destroy the German Panzerschiffes, I think they would have held their own against the old Italian battleships. With the exception of the Littorio's, they could catch and sink any Italian battleship or cuiser (at fighting weight). An even up match against the Scharnhorst.

Mike:

The only real question mark for the Strasbourg class is the quad turrets. We really don't know if they were more reliable than the British examples of this type of gun mounting. There simply isn't enough operational data to make an informed decision. Still they certainly were well protected and fast.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

The only real question mark for the Strasbourg class is the quad turrets. We really don't know if they were more reliable than the British examples of this type of gun mounting. There simply isn't enough operational data to make an informed decision. Still they certainly were well protected and fast.

Hi Ed,

Your quite right about the lack of operational experience with these ships. The turrets were electrically powered rather than hydraulically operated. One of the features for the quad turrets was a bulhead between the pairs of guns to lmit damage. This bulkhead appeared to work when Dunkerque took a 15' hit from Hood to the top of Turret I at Mers El Kabir and the other half of the mounting continued to fire. The guns were high velocity and have excellent performance in the tabular tables, but again no real world experience as to their accuracy and the effectiveness of their fire control system. What was tested in combat was their side protective system which worked very well.

I believe against the Italians, the ships would have performed well nd were perfectly cast for their roles as panzer schiff killers. On paper, the Italian cruisers could out run her, but in service they were effectively the same speed. Strausbourg was modified and carried about 10% more armor.

I had just spent my monthly allowance when I noticed that John Jordan has a new book on French battleships. A well respected author on the Navy, I can't wait until next month to order it. I didn't check to see who the publisher was or if available through NWS.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Ed,

Your quite right about the lack of operational experience with these ships. The turrets were electrically powered rather than hydraulically operated. One of the features for the quad turrets was a bulhead between the pairs of guns to lmit damage. This bulkhead appeared to work when Dunkerque took a 15' hit from Hood to the top of Turret I at Mers El Kabir and the other half of the mounting continued to fire. The guns were high velocity and have excellent performance in the tabular tables, but again no real world experience as to their accuracy and the effectiveness of their fire control system. What was tested in combat was their side protective system which worked very well.

I believe against the Italians, the ships would have performed well nd were perfectly cast for their roles as panzer schiff killers. On paper, the Italian cruisers could out run her, but in service they were effectively the same speed. Strausbourg was modified and carried about 10% more armor.

I had just spent my monthly allowance when I noticed that John Jordan has a new book on French battleships. A well respected author on the Navy, I can't wait until next month to order it. I didn't check to see who the publisher was or if available through NWS.

There are some real structural problems with quad turrets. The turret ring has to be so wide, that it can reduce the structural strength of the bow. The means the designers have to increase the bulkheads and distance between the outer hull and turret ring and lengthen the ship. I am not a naval architect, but quad turrets do present some unique structural problems for such ships. Other issues like ease of maintenance, electrical power requirements, and the just the basic increased weight of the turret and structure necessary to support all presented problems.

[Vince O'Hara]

Ed, the only time the French contre-torpilleurs went against USN destroyers was at Casablanca on 8 November 1942. They faced a couple of squadrons of mostly Benson class vessels (and cruisers and a battleship). Albatross hit Ludlow from around 15,000 yards in the early stages of the action. I wouldn't take the French ships over Fletchers in a night action, but during the day . . .

About John Jordan's French Battleships, I got a copy. I'm going to start a new discussion

Vince

[Mike Malanaphy]

There are some real structural problems with quad turrets. The turret ring has to be so wide, that it can reduce the structural strength of the bow. The means the designers have to increase the bulkheads and distance between the outer hull and turret ring and lengthen the ship. I am not a naval architect, but quad turrets do present some unique structural problems for such ships. Other issues like ease of maintenance, electrical power requirements, and the just the basic increased weight of the turret and structure necessary to support all presented problems.

Hi Dennis,

Over stressing the hull can cause serious, but subtle issues. As you mention, the quad turret requires a wider turret ring in the deck, ie part of the ship's structural girder. Many of the issues with KG V's balky quad gun mounts were traced to shifting between the turret itself and the surrounding hull structure caused by structural stresses interfering with amunition and powder transfer arrangements.

[JMS]

Finished reading this books, great coverage of surface actions, Vince, much better than any other source I have read, although I was a bit disappointed that submarines only get a passing mention and although you reckon that the RN devoted too much effort for the results it got, you forget that the same happened to the Germans who "lost" 30+ U-boats in an unproductive theater of war when they were ravaging the Atlantic convoys.

I also think you leave the Italians off the hook, after all they failed the most basic mission of a Navy, defending its own coast.

But it's a great book and definitely worth having.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Finished reading this books, great coverage of surface actions, Vince, much better than any other source I have read, although I was a bit disappointed that submarines only get a passing mention and although you reckon that the RN devoted too much effort for the results it got, you forget that the same happened to the Germans who "lost" 30+ U-boats in an unproductive theater of war when they were ravaging the Atlantic convoys.

I also think you leave the Italians off the hook, after all they failed the most basic mission of a Navy, defending its own coast.

But it's a great book and definitely worth having.

Hi JMS,

Vince chose to focus on surface actions and includes much new information not found in older sources. Highly recommended as well. Two other books you might enjoy which cover the submarine effort in the Med are Greene and Massagnani's "The Naval War in the Mediterranean" and Padfield's "War Beneath the Sea". Both are exellently written and expertly researched. Another interesting book is Sadkovich's "The Italian navy in World War II". Greene and Massagnani label him almost an apologist for the italians, but he touches on a number of intersting areas, especially submarine operations and convoy statistics to support the Italian war effort. There needs to be a good evaluation of Italian submarine operations to be found in English.

[Vince O'Hara]

JMS, thank you for the nice words. You'll have to clarify for me what you're thinking of when you say that the Italian navy failed in its basic task: to defend the Italian coast. As for submarines, there isn't much about the Italians, unless you read Italian. Padfield's book is okay. Check out Hezlet's British and Allied Submarine Operations in World War II as well. Jack Greene is working on a revised edition of Naval War in the Mediterranean that will be published by Seaforth. I'm working on a campaign history that will look at the impact of Allied submarines on Italian traffic to Africa in much greater detail, although that will not be the book's main subject. The chapter on the Italian navy that Enrico Cernuschi and I co-authored for On Seas Contested (out in October) discusses Italian submarine operations and some of the reasons they were generally ineffective.

Vince

[JMS]

JMS, thank you for the nice words. You'll have to clarify for me what you're thinking of when you say that the Italian navy failed in its basic task: to defend the Italian coast. As for submarines, there isn't much about the Italians, unless you read Italian. Padfield's book is okay. Check out Hezlet's British and Allied Submarine Operations in World War II as well. Jack Greene is working on a revised edition of Naval War in the Mediterranean that will be published by Seaforth. I'm working on a campaign history that will look at the impact of Allied submarines on Italian traffic to Africa in much greater detail, although that will not be the book's main subject. The chapter on the Italian navy that Enrico Cernuschi and I co-authored for On Seas Contested (out in October) discusses Italian submarine operations and some of the reasons they were generally ineffective.

Vince

What I mean is that, in the end, after fighting it out for the Lybian sands, they stayed in port during the Sicily invasion and practically handled the country over to the Germans. Not the fault of the individual seaman, certainly, but a systemic failure of the High command.

I read some Italian but the theme is treated in Spanish works in some depth, after all they were our co-non-beligerents in WW2 and the post-war fleet counted with 2 Italian boats.

[old_pop2000]

What I mean is that, in the end, after fighting it out for the Lybian sands, they stayed in port during the Sicily invasion and practically handled the country over to the Germans. Not the fault of the individual seaman, certainly, but a systemic failure of the High command.

I read some Italian but the theme is treated in Spanish works in some depth, after all they were our co-non-beligerents in WW2 and the post-war fleet counted with 2 Italian boats.

JMS:
The Italian's did not have any information until the night before Husky was executed, that Sicily was going to be invaded. The ships were at Taranto and Spezia, so they could have offered battle to the covering force. However, remember that prior to the invasion, the Allied air forces were bombing Italian naval bases almost continuously, Sicilian naval yards and shore installations were mostly destroyed. In the first half of 1943, almos a 400 Italian merchant ships were sunk.

For the Doria and Duilio, Cadorna and two old destroyers in Taranto, it would take ten hours to reach Sicilian waters and this had to be accomplished without air cover. The two new BBs at Spezia were readied for sailing but it would have taken about 25 hours, again without air cover, IIRC, to reach the area.

Admiral Weichold, German Naval commander in Italy, put it succinctly. "... if there had been an efficient naval air arm of either Axis parner, the Italian naval forces would have had positive operational possibilities.... The air force available in Med, for the Axis was not a naval air force. Remember also, the Italians did not have radar. I can appreciate their position. Any sortie by the Italian navy would have been more than a calculated risk, it would have been a death ride. I don't recall entirely, but I believe that there was a fuel shortage for the fleet and they would have to sail with what was in the tanks. The trip from Specia is about 600 miles one way. That would indicate that the total fuel requirement would not be excessive, depending on fuel consumption per nm based on speed. However, the battleships would not be the problem, it would be the destroyers. For an 1800 ton US destroyer sailing at 30 knots, it would have a range of about 1410 nm. This is about the size of an Italian destroyer of the same period. 30 knots is the speed that would be necessary to reach the operational area with 24 hrs notice. However, for the destroyers, it means half of their fuel supply is now gone. Once battle commences they will increase to 34 knots, most likely, using even more fuel since destroyers use fuel exponentially at higher speeds. So, the DDs might not make it home. OTOH, they probably wouldn't survive the battle, so who cares.

http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text.asp?nid=125&lid=1

[JMS]

JMS:
The Italian's did not have any information until the night before Husky was executed, that Sicily was going to be invaded. The ships were at Taranto and Spezia, so they could have offered battle to the covering force. However, remember that prior to the invasion, the Allied air forces were bombing Italian naval bases almost continuously, Sicilian naval yards and shore installations were mostly destroyed. In the first half of 1943, almos a 400 Italian merchant ships were sunk.

For the Doria and Duilio, Cadorna and two old destroyers in Taranto, it would take ten hours to reach Sicilian waters and this had to be accomplished without air cover. The two new BBs at Spezia were readied for sailing but it would have taken about 25 hours, again without air cover, IIRC, to reach the area.

Admiral Weichold, German Naval commander in Italy, put it succinctly. "... if there had been an efficient naval air arm of either Axis parner, the Italian naval forces would have had positive operational possibilities.... The air force available in Med, for the Axis was not a naval air force. Remember also, the Italians did not have radar. I can appreciate their position. Any sortie by the Italian navy would have been more than a calculated risk, it would have been a death ride. I don't recall entirely, but I believe that there was a fuel shortage for the fleet and they would have to sail with what was in the tanks. The trip from Specia is about 600 miles one way. That would indicate that the total fuel requirement would not be excessive, depending on fuel consumption per nm based on speed. However, the battleships would not be the problem, it would be the destroyers. For an 1800 ton US destroyer sailing at 30 knots, it would have a range of about 1410 nm. This is about the size of an Italian destroyer of the same period. 30 knots is the speed that would be necessary to reach the operational area with 24 hrs notice. However, for the destroyers, it means half of their fuel supply is now gone. Once battle commences they will increase to 34 knots, most likely, using even more fuel since destroyers use fuel exponentially at higher speeds. So, the DDs might not make it home. OTOH, they probably wouldn't survive the battle, so who cares.

http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text.asp?nid=125&lid=1

I guess I am being a bit sanguine here, but I contrast the Italian way vs the Germans (fight to the end with everything that could sail - ended up the war with just 2 cruisers), Japanese (who sent their fleet to the Philippines), the Soviets (which Stalin forbade going on fighting in 1944 and who fought vs overwhelming odds to supply Sevastopol) or the ABDA force, and in my book they come up short. Sure, they had plenty of good excuses but so did others and they went on fighting.

[old_pop2000]

I guess I am being a bit sanguine here, but I contrast the Italian way vs the Germans (fight to the end with everything that could sail - ended up the war with just 2 cruisers), Japanese (who sent their fleet to the Philippines), the Soviets (which Stalin forbade going on fighting in 1944 and who fought vs overwhelming odds to supply Sevastopol) or the ABDA force, and in my book they come up short. Sure, they had plenty of good excuses but so did others and they went on fighting.

Hi JMS:
The Italian geostrategic situation was far different from the Japanese or the Germans. The Germans are and were, a continental power who, after their early conquests, were almost immune to blockade. You had to invade the continent, to get at them unless you are Russia. Japan had the safety, if you want to call it that, of the wide Pacific ocean. The Italians were in a narrow, brown water sea and geostrategy is entirely different. Once they became involved in combat operations in North Africa, the Italian navy immediately began to be attrited. According to Italian statistics, they ran 896 convoys to Libya with 1789 ships for a loss rate of 8.4%. They also ran 378 convoys with 1279 ships for a loss rate of 16%. By the end of 1942, with the oil shortage and a new enemy, the Italian navy was pretty well spent. Geostrategically, there were three dominoes; North Africa, Sicily and the Italian peninsula. Once NA fell, this, along with Malta gave the Allies Naval bases but more importantly, air bases from which to gain air supremacy over the Central Mediterranean. Without a naval air force, the Italian navy was doomed. The loss of Sicily was just a forgone conclusion; it was the second domino. Finally, with Allied air bases on Sicily, it was just a matter of time before combat operations moved to the Italian peninsula.

I believe that the Italians made a simple realistic appraisal of their situation and realized that continued resistance was pointless. Who is the smarter? The side that realizes the end is coming and puts the welfare of the nation first, or the side that fights to the bitter end, with no thoughts about how their people will cope. I don't believe that sanguinity has much to do with it. It's a simple matter of numbers. Which the Italians did not have.

[Vince O'Hara]

The big difference is that the Italian government came to an armistice with the Allied governments eariler than the German and Japanese governments did. That had no relation to how well the Italian navy defended the national coast. In fact, the battle fleet including the three modern battleships had weighed anchor to attack the Allied invasion fleets off Salerno when they recieved notice of the armistice. It came as a complete surprise to them.

In any case, neither the Japanese nor Germans fought their fleets to the end. In the case of the Japanese they had no fuel and were hunted down and sunk at anchor. The Germans maintained a fleet in the Baltic. Except for the Yamato sortie neither the Germans nor Japanese engaged in suicide heroics against the vastly superior Allied fleets.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Why was Italy first? She was the economically weakest for sure, but I believe more importantly, it was her geographic location on a narrow sea. Combat operations in such areas are now getting the attention from Naval war colleges since modern navy's are returning to those traditional areas. Narrow seas like the Med, North Sea and the Black Sea have always been the main area of naval combat, not areas like the Pacific. The Axis controlled both sides of the Med initially, which forced the British to use the 12,000 distance around the Cape, instead of the 2400 mile trip across the Med. This was an intolerable situation for the British, one that had to be rectified.

The Med from Gibraltar to Beirut is about 2015 nm while Malta is about 1005 nm between them. The sea distance from Marseilles to Tunis or Algiers is about 410 Miles, from Napoli, its about 345 miles. From the shore of the Med, to any point in the Med is a little over 230 miles. These distances represent short flying times, allowing more sorties and longer flights. This fact severely restricts the side with the inferior air force in the use of surface combatants. They must have strong air cover. Without that cover, they are forced to operate in poor weather or darkness. To operate in either, you must have an electronic sensor system like radar, which the Italians did not have, nor did they have experience in night operations, IIRC. They also, did not have close cooperation between the Air Force and the Navy. However, there were advantages like being able to strike multiple targets with quick redeployments.

However, even with these limitations, they were able to fend off the British for over 39 months, before attrition forced an end. I believe that the Italians did a credible job of maintaining control from their central position in the Med. It was these geographic reasons that really gave the Allies a need to eliminate the Italians first, from the Axis powers.

BTW, one of reasons that the italian coastline is hard to defend is due to two factors, IMHO. It is over 4710 miles long and there are few, if any off shore islands to provide a defense in depth. Off shore islands can provide early warning of an impending attack. They can also hide surface vessels. Without the islands, and with the loss of air supremacy, your coasts are vulnerable especially with the short distances in the Med. An invasion force can sortie and be on your coast in a short time preventing any interference.

Sources: Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas by Milan N. Vego
The Leverage of Sea Power by Colin Gray
Various monographs and reports on combat operations in littoral zones and enclosed seas.

PS I didn't want to give the impression that I was that smart, I am not. :)　

[old_pop2000]

It was after reading Vince's book "Struggle for the Middle Sea" that I decided to do more in depth research on Littoral and enclosed sea operations both future and historically. I am still researching and investigating since, as stated, it is a subject of much scrutiny by Naval forces around the world. I am still looking for more books and monographs on this operational area.

Thanks, Vince..... I think:p

[Mike Malanaphy]

Why was Italy first? She was the economically weakest for sure, but I believe more importantly, it was her geographic location on a narrow sea. Combat operations in such areas are now getting the attention from Naval war colleges since modern navy's are returning to those traditional areas. Narrow seas like the Med, North Sea and the Black Sea have always been the main area of naval combat, not areas like the Pacific. The Axis controlled both sides of the Med initially, which forced the British to use the 12,000 distance around the Cape, instead of the 2400 mile trip across the Med. This was an intolerable situation for the British, one that had to be rectified.

The Med from Gibraltar to Beirut is about 2015 nm while Malta is about 1005 nm between them. The sea distance from Marseilles to Tunis or Algiers is about 410 Miles, from Napoli, its about 345 miles. From the shore of the Med, to any point in the Med is a little over 230 miles. These distances represent short flying times, allowing more sorties and longer flights. This fact severely restricts the side with the inferior air force in the use of surface combatants. They must have strong air cover. Without that cover, they are forced to operate in poor weather or darkness. To operate in either, you must have an electronic sensor system like radar, which the Italians did not have, nor did they have experience in night operations, IIRC. They also, did not have close cooperation between the Air Force and the Navy. However, there were advantages like being able to strike multiple targets with quick redeployments.

However, even with these limitations, they were able to fend off the British for over 39 months, before attrition forced an end. I believe that the Italians did a credible job of maintaining control from their central position in the Med. It was these geographic reasons that really gave the Allies a need to eliminate the Italians first, from the Axis powers.

BTW, one of reasons that the italian coastline is hard to defend is due to two factors, IMHO. It is over 4710 miles long and there are few, if any off shore islands to provide a defense in depth. Off shore islands can provide early warning of an impending attack. They can also hide surface vessels. Without the islands, and with the loss of air supremacy, your coasts are vulnerable especially with the short distances in the Med. An invasion force can sortie and be on your coast in a short time preventing any interference.

Sources: Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas by Milan N. Vego
The Leverage of Sea Power by Colin Gray
Various monographs and reports on combat operations in littoral zones and enclosed seas.

PS I didn't want to give the impression that I was that smart, I am not. :)　



Hi Dennis,

Italy was certainly the weakest link the Axis chain and a logical next step after North Africa had been secured. Operation Huskey also provided an excellent opportunity to test techniques developed after Torch and prior to D Day. Based upon it's success in the Aleutians, a dedicated B-17 Bomber squadron was sent to North Africa to ferret out electronic signals from the enemy. The 16th Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy) eventually numbered 5 aircraft. Flights in May and June, 1943 established there was plenty of German radars in Sicily including Freya, Wurzburg, Wasserman, and Seetakt. A full on EW effort went to support the invasion with shipboard jammers, 18 RAF Wellingtons and Wellingtons with RAF Mandrel jammers covered the airborne landings while four USAAF B-17s carrying Mandrel and the APT-2 Carpet targeted Freya and Wurzburg specifically to suppress radar controlled gunfire.

Holding out for 39 months was no small feat for the Italian Navy, especially considering it's surprise war. Despite their skill and bravery, it was only the lack of Allied resources that allowed them to survive so long. The British paucity of ships, subs, and aircraft prevented the effective use of priceless Ultra information against Italian suply lines to North Africa. Even with Italy knocked out of the war, the Allies were unable to establish air superiority over that area for a number of months.

[JMS]

It was after reading Vince's book "Struggle for the Middle Sea" that I decided to do more in depth research on Littoral and enclosed sea operations both future and historically. I am still researching and investigating since, as stated, it is a subject of much scrutiny by Naval forces around the world. I am still looking for more books and monographs on this operational area.

Thanks, Vince..... I think:p

Look for "The Last Year of the Kriegsmarine: May 1944 - May 1945" by V. E. Tarrant.

In its death throes the Germans launched a littoral submarine campaign with their Type XXIIIs and of course fought to the end in the Baltic to evacuate the East.

Look also for the 2 volumes on ALLIED COASTAL FORCES OF WWII, although they are more of a ship design books.

[old_pop2000]

Look for "The Last Year of the Kriegsmarine: May 1944 - May 1945" by V. E. Tarrant.

In its death throes the Germans launched a littoral submarine campaign with their Type XXIIIs and of course fought to the end in the Baltic to evacuate the East.

Look also for the 2 volumes on ALLIED COASTAL FORCES OF WWII, although they are more of a ship design books.

Thanks, JMS. I will certainly put those on my reading list.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Italy was certainly the weakest link the Axis chain and a logical next step after North Africa had been secured. Operation Huskey also provided an excellent opportunity to test techniques developed after Torch and prior to D Day. Based upon it's success in the Aleutians, a dedicated B-17 Bomber squadron was sent to North Africa to ferret out electronic signals from the enemy. The 16th Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy) eventually numbered 5 aircraft. Flights in May and June, 1943 established there was plenty of German radars in Sicily including Freya, Wurzburg, Wasserman, and Seetakt. A full on EW effort went to support the invasion with shipboard jammers, 18 RAF Wellingtons and Wellingtons with RAF Mandrel jammers covered the airborne landings while four USAAF B-17s carrying Mandrel and the APT-2 Carpet targeted Freya and Wurzburg specifically to suppress radar controlled gunfire.

Holding out for 39 months was no small feat for the Italian Navy, especially considering it's surprise war. Despite their skill and bravery, it was only the lack of Allied resources that allowed them to survive so long. The British paucity of ships, subs, and aircraft prevented the effective use of priceless Ultra information against Italian suply lines to North Africa. Even with Italy knocked out of the war, the Allies were unable to establish air superiority over that area for a number of months.

Hi Mike:
Sorry, did not see this post. Apologies. I will have to research that information about the EW effort. That's up my alley.

When you examine the record with the new information from Vince and others, the Italians did a commendable job and the British should be a little embarrassed. Their vaunted RN didn't do so good against a navy with no radar, no naval support aircraft and limited resources, plus the British were reading their mail. Battle don't always tell the story, the Italian navy performed its function of sea denial and protection of sea lanes for a long time until we entered the picture.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
Sorry, did not see this post. Apologies. I will have to research that information about the EW effort. That's up my alley.

When you examine the record with the new information from Vince and others, the Italians did a commendable job and the British should be a little embarrassed. Their vaunted RN didn't do so good against a navy with no radar, no naval support aircraft and limited resources, plus the British were reading their mail. Battle don't always tell the story, the Italian navy performed its function of sea denial and protection of sea lanes for a long time until we entered the picture.


Hi Dennis,

Unfortunately, the EW effort didn't cover Allied radar as a number of troop carriers were shot down as they overflew Allied naval vessels off shore enroute to the drop zones. One of the bigger friendly fire goofs of the war. The information on jamming came from Price's "Instruments of Darkness". I checked his later work, "The History of US Electronic Warfare" Volume I and found the additional information that the American portion of the jamming plan called for the use of 35 modified B-17s. Whe the aircraft arrived in North Africa, depot maintenace crews did not recognize the secret jaming equipment and stripped it out of all but four aircraft. In his research, Price could find no mention in German records regarding the effectiveness of the jamming operation on German radar. It was the first coordinated US EW effort of the war and laid the foundatioin for the much larger effort which would support D Day landings.

[JMS]

Marginally related, but very interesting information on the "silent war" over signals, the NSA FOIA site:

http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/european_axis_sigint.shtml

[old_pop2000]

Marginally related, but very interesting information on the "silent war" over signals, the NSA FOIA site:

http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/european_axis_sigint.shtml

Hi JMS:
Good information and appreciated. Thanks for providing the link.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Unfortunately, the EW effort didn't cover Allied radar as a number of troop carriers were shot down as they overflew Allied naval vessels off shore enroute to the drop zones. One of the bigger friendly fire goofs of the war. The information on jamming came from Price's "Instruments of Darkness". I checked his later work, "The History of US Electronic Warfare" Volume I and found the additional information that the American portion of the jamming plan called for the use of 35 modified B-17s. Whe the aircraft arrived in North Africa, depot maintenace crews did not recognize the secret jaming equipment and stripped it out of all but four aircraft. In his research, Price could find no mention in German records regarding the effectiveness of the jamming operation on German radar. It was the first coordinated US EW effort of the war and laid the foundatioin for the much larger effort which would support D Day landings.

Hi Mike:
I will have to research that in my copy of "The history of US Electronic Warfare Vol 1". Remember? ;)

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:
I will have to research that in my copy of "The history of US Electronic Warfare Vol 1". Remember? ;)

Hi Dennis,

Yes, I do.....couldn't think of a better home for it. : ) The other two volumes are good too...amazed my wife got them for me for Christmas.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Yes, I do.....couldn't think of a better home for it. : ) The other two volumes are good too...amazed my wife got them for me for Christmas.

Hi Mike:
I will have to get those editions, EW was one of my areas of specialty in electronics.

BTW here is an interesting link that shows the equipment arrangements in a Ferret B-24 from an old Flight magazine.

http://www.airlandsea.info/2010/02/b-24-ferret-aircraft.html

It looks like the fuselage of an E2C except the three scope dopes were sitting sideways facing the right side of the bird. Not anywhere near as roomy, either. It was hell trying to get an MDU or Main Display Unit in the door, turn right, duck your head to avoid bangining into the fuel tanks, ease by the computer, then through the hatch way(hopefully someone has lifted the seats out, or at least turned them facing the front), then in one fell swoop, lift and slide in onto the rails. Loading the damn plane before doing the complete mission ready procedures was the hardest part. I didn't do that much, left that to the big guys.

Here is a link to a picture down the page of the scope dopes. The first picture encountered is of the older version, but the room is still the same. There is another with the latest group 2 equipment. Same bird, newer engines.

http://www.spyflight.co.uk/hawkeye.htm

[old_pop2000]

I was just examining a bathymetric map of the Med and the choke points. For the British, they had control of Gibraltar, one of the main choke points. However, they did not have control of two more important choke points.

One is from Sardinia to Tunisia, length of about 116.96 miles. The other, is of course the Straits of Sicily. From Sicily to Cape Bon extending out near Tunis is about 95 miles. Now, it isn't a choke point for just surface ships. Those two straits are also choke points for submarines, IMHO. The first choke point becomes progressively shallower from the trough off of the coast of Sardinia to the Tunisian coast. The variance is from 1982 meters near Sardinia to around 50-87 meters near Tunisia with frequent areas even shallower.

The second choke point is worse. It has two banks on either edge; the Adventure bank at an average depth of less than 20 meters and the Tunisian bank which rises from the Pantelleria Valley to 100 meters and then even faster up to 20 meters.

Something to consider; if the Italians had had a surface search radar with an average range of about 100 miles, depending on the height of the antenna, they could have kept that last strait under surveillance around the clock.

Now, as you move through the Sicilian straits near Malta, the depth deepens averaging about 300-700 meters in depth but the width is still about 100 miles.

Interesting to contemplate and understand how they could choke off supplies to NA for the British.

[old_pop2000]

Examining the losses by British submarines, they lost 81 total during the war, with 46 total in the Mediterranean. The two biggest causes were minefields and apparently, Italian torpedo boats. Here is a list, how accurate is unknown. It seems to agree with two other lists by British sources.

http://comandosupremo.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=268&start=0

Many of the losses were by ramming, gunfire etc. Losses attributable to surface action. The question then is why? Was it lack of attention which allowed them to be surprised or was it due to the depth of the water, especially around Sicily. Examing the straits leading to the Adriatic, we have another choke point between Otranto and the Eastern European coast. There is the Otranto Valley but that is very narrow. The continental shelf is wide at this point. This would be a dangerous spot for submarines especially with Bari up north and Taranto on the other side of the heel of Italy.

The Aegean and Crete have many ridges and valleys, sort of a basin and range area. This is great for submarines and bad for sonar and hydrophones.

Just some interesting features.:p

[JMS]

Examining the losses by British submarines, they lost 81 total during the war, with 46 total in the Mediterranean. The two biggest causes were minefields and apparently, Italian torpedo boats. Here is a list, how accurate is unknown. It seems to agree with two other lists by British sources.

http://comandosupremo.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=268&start=0

Many of the losses were by ramming, gunfire etc. Losses attributable to surface action. The question then is why? Was it lack of attention which allowed them to be surprised or was it due to the depth of the water, especially around Sicily. Examing the straits leading to the Adriatic, we have another choke point between Otranto and the Eastern European coast. There is the Otranto Valley but that is very narrow. The continental shelf is wide at this point. This would be a dangerous spot for submarines especially with Bari up north and Taranto on the other side of the heel of Italy.

The Aegean and Crete have many ridges and valleys, sort of a basin and range area. This is great for submarines and bad for sonar and hydrophones.

Just some interesting features.:p

Surface action usually was brought about by depth charging first. Vince makes it clear that the Italians were good enough in ASW.

[old_pop2000]

Surface action usually was brought about by depth charging first. Vince makes it clear that the Italians were good enough in ASW.

The British losses attributed to torpedo boats were probably depth charged first, forcing them to the surface. However, I am still attempting to find more detail information. In looking at a picture of an Alcione class torpedo boat, it resembles a destroyer and I wonder if they were not interchangeable. The boat that sank the Tempest is reported to have ASDIC of German manufacture. One example of TB attacking a submerged British sub is on 16 June 1940, Grampus was in the Ionian Sea, east of Sicily and her periscope was sighted by three Italian MBs. Apparently they depth charged her, lost with all hands. Plotting her location on Google Earth places the action about 12.7 miles ESE of Siracusa, well within MTB patrol ranges and aircraft. Bathymetrically, there are a series of north-south ridges in that region of the sea, where the Malta plateau falls off rapidly. The floor of the sea is fairly deep in that location, the Italians were lucky she didn't get deep then hide near the underwater escarpment which would have played hell with ASIC.

Here is a link to the NAVWEAPs page on Italian ASW weapons. It shows stern tube racks for depth charges.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMIT_ASW.htm

[Mike Malanaphy]

The British losses attributed to torpedo boats were probably depth charged first, forcing them to the surface. However, I am still attempting to find more detail information. In looking at a picture of an Alcione class torpedo boat, it resembles a destroyer and I wonder if they were not interchangeable. The boat that sank the Tempest is reported to have ASDIC of German manufacture. One example of TB attacking a submerged British sub is on 16 June 1940, Grampus was in the Ionian Sea, east of Sicily and her periscope was sighted by three Italian MBs. Apparently they depth charged her, lost with all hands. Plotting her location on Google Earth places the action about 12.7 miles ESE of Siracusa, well within MTB patrol ranges and aircraft. Bathymetrically, there are a series of north-south ridges in that region of the sea, where the Malta plateau falls off rapidly. The floor of the sea is fairly deep in that location, the Italians were lucky she didn't get deep then hide near the underwater escarpment which would have played hell with ASIC.

Here is a link to the NAVWEAPs page on Italian ASW weapons. It shows stern tube racks for depth charges.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMIT_ASW.htm

Hi Dennis,

Perhaps Vince found more with his Italian sources. In checking Sadkovich' "The Italian Navy in World War II", Greene and Massagnani's "The Naval War in the Mediterranean, Padfield's "War under the Seas" and Hackman's "Seek & Strike"; information is sketchy on Italian sonar.

As early as 1931, the italians experimented with the French made Safar 2000 and had developed their own sonar set by 1939. At the outbreak of the war in June, 1940, only three destroyers and a torpedo boat were equipped with active sonar. Production was so slow, that at the end of 1941, the Germans suppled 40 S-Anlage mobilization sets to the Italians. By June 1942, there were 12 destroyers, 18 torpedo boats, and 16 subchasers equipped with sonar. Massagnani and Greeene say only 101 ships were so equipped during the entire war period, a hand full. Sadkvoich points to a lack of serviceability as well, saying that in March 1943 there were 64 sonar equipped escorts, bit only 32 ready for sea. Hackman's book which is a treatise on British sonar says the German S-Anlage mobilization set was designed as a stop gap and the best Italian sonar, the Safar 600 was introduced in 1942. Too little too late.

British submarines suffered a number of disadvantages in the Mediterranean. Operational diving depths were generally 200 feet except for a few boats. Most were rivetted and leaked oil from ballast tanks used to extend range. Padfield mentions that British submarines used magnetic compasses and required bronze periscope tubes and conning towers (Never saw that anywhere else) to prevent magnetic deflection of the compass which made periscpoe depth 10-15 feel shallower than other submarines and a consequent depth limitation. Depth control was less forgiving and they easily broached when firing torpedoes.

British submarines often operated against ports, natural choke points, but often heavily mined as were the waters around Sicily. Italian convoys were small and generally well escorted and stayed in shallow waters making attacks risky. Lacking any kind of fire control computer, British captains had to make close approaches to ensure hits.

Italian ASW made a credible effort against British submarines. One torpedo boat, Scirce, is credited with three British subs sunk. Sadkovich mentions that the Italians used German depth charges as well.

[JMS]

One other factor is that visibility in the waters of the Med is usually good, so the air escort can actually see a dived submarine if at periscope depth. The Spanish navy experimented in the 20s with hidroplanes and Holland type subs and decided to camouflage the decks.

[old_pop2000]

One other factor is that visibility in the waters of the Med is usually good, so the air escort can actually see a dived submarine if at periscope depth. The Spanish navy experimented in the 20s with hidroplanes and Holland type subs and decided to camouflage the decks.

Hi JMS:
Based on the Aerology report conducted for the invasion of Sicily, overcast was about 24% based on 100% being total overcast, rain every 2-7 days, mean wind velocity was 7.3 knts from the NW. General opinion was that there wasn't a better spot, Aerologically for an invasion. Main weather controller was the Azores High pressure which could extend over Spain and the western Med, blocking the storms and sending them northward. This type of semipermanent high pressure is termed a blocking high. It and the Arctic low have much to do with upper atmosphere wind patterns. FYI, the Med sits in what climatologists call the sub-tropical high pressure belt ranging from around 30 degrees North and south of the equator. Sailors used to call them the "horse latitudes". they were noted for their decending and relatively calm winds. Two of the high pressure cells exist in the summer; one in the eastern Pacific and one in the eastern Atlantic( Azores high).

Now, to the question. Why were they called the horse latitudes? Because during the sailing ship eras, sailors would be becalmed in such latitudes for days and the horses carried on board for the new world would die and thrown overboard. During some calm periods, the seas were littered with dead horses. Consequently, they were titled the "horse latitudes" Interesting note, San Diego, my home, is situated in exactly the same latitude 32 degrees 17 minutes north as the Mediterranean. This is one reason why we had an influx of Italian immigrants from Sicily almost all who were fisherman. Same weather conditions and same fish; Tuna. I know, more than you ever wanted to know.

[Vince O'Hara]

On Italian ASW weapons and doctrine.

Italy's belief in a short war led to a reliance on improvised rather than specialized ASW units in the war's first year. However, the modern torpedo boats proved adequate ASW platforms. On 1 August the RM formed a specialized ASW command, Ispettorato Antisom. This command greatly increased the number of personnel trained to use hydrophones and sonar equipment and drafted the first modern tactical ASW doctrine.

Depth charges were the major ASW weapon. There was a pneumatic DC thrower with a 100m range, but it was hard to reload and was replaced in late '42 by a weapon with a shorter range, but faster reload cycle. Also in late 42 a multi-launch rack system called a scaricabombe Gatteschi appeared on the Gabbiano class corvettes. This allowed a saturation attack of up to 48 DCs in a single pass.

As for sonar, Italy developed an effective set (ecogoniometro) in 1939, but production was postponed. Thus hydrophones were the major tool for underwater detection in the war’s first year. There were only two echo-detection sets in operation in June 1940 and the only operational one was aboard Italy’s only operational ASW vessel, Albatross. German sonars were acquired in late 1941 and Italian-made sets the next year. By Sept 1943 the navy had 36 Italian and 31 German sonar sets in operation.

Italian navy forces sank 33 of the British subs lost in the Mediterranean up through Sept. 43. (Some sources credit the Italian air force with singing HMS Urge on 29 April 42 but this is not certain). Italian depth charges sank at least 12 British subs and maybe another three. Three British boats were rammed and one was sunk in a surface action with an Italian sub. Mines accounted for at least eleven.

I pulled this from On Seas Contested, which Naval Institute has just begun to ship. It has similar information, I should add, about ASW for the French, British, US, Soviet, Japanese and German navies. It covers Mission/Organization/Doctrine/Material/Infrastructure and Wartime Evolution for these seven navies in a parallel format. Chapter authors include Make Peattie (Japan), Trent Hone (USN), John Jordan (France), Dr. Peter Schenk (Germany), Enrico Cernuschi and me (Italy), Stephen McLaughlin (USSR) and David Wragg (RN and Commonwealth).

I looked at the list on Comando Supremo that Dennis referenced and there are errors in dates and causes (Rainbow was sunk on 15 October 1940 in a collision with the freighter Antonella Costa, for example, not sunk in a surface action with Tito on 19 October 1940). I'd have to double check totals.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

On Italian ASW weapons and doctrine.

Italy's belief in a short war led to a reliance on improvised rather than specialized ASW units in the war's first year. However, the modern torpedo boats proved adequate ASW platforms. On 1 August the RM formed a specialized ASW command, Ispettorato Antisom. This command greatly increased the number of personnel trained to use hydrophones and sonar equipment and drafted the first modern tactical ASW doctrine.

Depth charges were the major ASW weapon. There was a pneumatic DC thrower with a 100m range, but it was hard to reload and was replaced in late '42 by a weapon with a shorter range, but faster reload cycle. Also in late 42 a multi-launch rack system called a scaricabombe Gatteschi appeared on the Gabbiano class corvettes. This allowed a saturation attack of up to 48 DCs in a single pass.

As for sonar, Italy developed an effective set (ecogoniometro) in 1939, but production was postponed. Thus hydrophones were the major tool for underwater detection in the war’s first year. There were only two echo-detection sets in operation in June 1940 and the only operational one was aboard Italy’s only operational ASW vessel, Albatross. German sonars were acquired in late 1941 and Italian-made sets the next year. By Sept 1943 the navy had 36 Italian and 31 German sonar sets in operation.

Italian navy forces sank 33 of the British subs lost in the Mediterranean up through Sept. 43. (Some sources credit the Italian air force with singing HMS Urge on 29 April 42 but this is not certain). Italian depth charges sank at least 12 British subs and maybe another three. Three British boats were rammed and one was sunk in a surface action with an Italian sub. Mines accounted for at least eleven.

I pulled this from On Seas Contested, which Naval Institute has just begun to ship. It has similar information, I should add, about ASW for the French, British, US, Soviet, Japanese and German navies. It covers Mission/Organization/Doctrine/Material/Infrastructure and Wartime Evolution for these seven navies in a parallel format. Chapter authors include Make Peattie (Japan), Trent Hone (USN), John Jordan (France), Dr. Peter Schenk (Germany), Enrico Cernuschi and me (Italy), Stephen McLaughlin (USSR) and David Wragg (RN and Commonwealth).

I looked at the list on Comando Supremo that Dennis referenced and there are errors in dates and causes (Rainbow was sunk on 15 October 1940 in a collision with the freighter Antonella Costa, for example, not sunk in a surface action with Tito on 19 October 1940). I'd have to double check totals.

Vince

Hi Vince:
Italy and Japan both believed in a short war and neither really developed a dedicated ASW platforms or had a surface escort group. I tend to believe it was doctrine and economic factors that led to that policy. Battleships and all capital ships require more funding and raw materials, leaving little for such ships as escorts and dedicated ASW platforms. I suspect that Il Duce's three pronged plan of attacking in Eritrea, along the NA coast toward Alexandria and into Greece was planned to defeat the British, who it was assumed would be too busy or did not have enough troops or ships for the Mediterranean. He also did not believe the Greeks would fight and that was a mistake. He also make the cardinal error of overestimating his opponent; Wavell and how many troops he had and could use in the Middlel East. Neither the Germans, nor the Italians had pre-war plans for NA. Especially in the case of the Germans, it would be interesting to determine the percentage of supplies shipped to NA that were for German forces, not Italian forces. This does play a big role in the requirements for the navy and air force. The Italians, IMO, planned for a colonial war, not a mechanized European style war that is a war of movement and logistics. Its attritional, and the Italians were not prepared for that type of operation.

As far as British subs lost, I've read two or three, maybe more sources and none seem to agree on the exact numbers other than the total lost. I would suspect that cross-referencing Italian records of sinkings or sighting with British last known positions could be tricky.

Thanks for the research. I hope we can continue this discussion. :D

[old_pop2000]

I am currently rereading Correspondent Alan Moorehead's excellent personal account of the North African campaign titled, variously, The Desert War. It is a trilogy, now combined into one volume. It was written and published in 1944 or thereabouts, soon after his experiences. I've had a copy, under another name, in my collection for over forty years and continue to read sections. Now to the point of this post. In January 1940, he was given the priviledge of accompanying the Warspite and Sir Alan Cunningham on a sortie from Alexandria. It's first task was to meet the Illustrious and her escorts moving through Gibraltar after being assigned to the Med. Warspite was the flagship, in company with Eagle and Malaya with Goucester, Liverpool, Orion, Sydney and Ajax in escort. Illustrious is met, along with Valiant, Coventry and Calcutta escorting. Illustrious has 44 Fairy Fulmar fighters on board. Second task is to attack airfields and ports in the Dodecanese especially Rhodes. I am not going to bore you with details, but want to share some comments he makes after the voyage, at the end of the chapter. Remember that these are just his comments on the combined operations during the period 1940-1943. He states:
Matapan was the Mediterranean's last great naval battle. ....... German dive-bombers off Greece and Crete put an end to Cunningham's brief but brilliant anachronism that capital ships and aircraft-carriers can operate in a land locked sea. The Italians never really believed in that principle. ..... It relied on numerous convenient air bases in Sardinia, Sicily, Libya, the dodecanese and Italy itself. For the rest it put its faith in E-boats, submarines, fast light torpedo-boats and destroyers...... The Italian navy suffered deeply from inexperience and the Italian high command knew it. ...Moorehead goes on to comment that Cunningham performed brilliantly until forced to convoy to and from Crete and Greece and elsewhere and came at last against overwhelming air power overwhelming pressed home, that he lost one good ship after another. From Crete onward it became blindingly obvious that sea and air would have to go together. The Fleet could not put to sea without air protection..... the purely sea period was over..... Fleets alone cannot act offensively and get away with it. Neither the Bismarck nor any other battleship could range the seas, raiding, hunting down its foes, bombarding up the Main. Remember, this man is a correspondent, not a trained military officer with any real experiences. These are interesting and accurate comments, IMO. I would like to hear others, and their comments.

[Mike Malanaphy]

On Italian ASW weapons and doctrine.

Italy's belief in a short war led to a reliance on improvised rather than specialized ASW units in the war's first year. However, the modern torpedo boats proved adequate ASW platforms. On 1 August the RM formed a specialized ASW command, Ispettorato Antisom. This command greatly increased the number of personnel trained to use hydrophones and sonar equipment and drafted the first modern tactical ASW doctrine.

Depth charges were the major ASW weapon. There was a pneumatic DC thrower with a 100m range, but it was hard to reload and was replaced in late '42 by a weapon with a shorter range, but faster reload cycle. Also in late 42 a multi-launch rack system called a scaricabombe Gatteschi appeared on the Gabbiano class corvettes. This allowed a saturation attack of up to 48 DCs in a single pass.

As for sonar, Italy developed an effective set (ecogoniometro) in 1939, but production was postponed. Thus hydrophones were the major tool for underwater detection in the war’s first year. There were only two echo-detection sets in operation in June 1940 and the only operational one was aboard Italy’s only operational ASW vessel, Albatross. German sonars were acquired in late 1941 and Italian-made sets the next year. By Sept 1943 the navy had 36 Italian and 31 German sonar sets in operation.

Italian navy forces sank 33 of the British subs lost in the Mediterranean up through Sept. 43. (Some sources credit the Italian air force with singing HMS Urge on 29 April 42 but this is not certain). Italian depth charges sank at least 12 British subs and maybe another three. Three British boats were rammed and one was sunk in a surface action with an Italian sub. Mines accounted for at least eleven.

I pulled this from On Seas Contested, which Naval Institute has just begun to ship. It has similar information, I should add, about ASW for the French, British, US, Soviet, Japanese and German navies. It covers Mission/Organization/Doctrine/Material/Infrastructure and Wartime Evolution for these seven navies in a parallel format. Chapter authors include Make Peattie (Japan), Trent Hone (USN), John Jordan (France), Dr. Peter Schenk (Germany), Enrico Cernuschi and me (Italy), Stephen McLaughlin (USSR) and David Wragg (RN and Commonwealth).

I looked at the list on Comando Supremo that Dennis referenced and there are errors in dates and causes (Rainbow was sunk on 15 October 1940 in a collision with the freighter Antonella Costa, for example, not sunk in a surface action with Tito on 19 October 1940). I'd have to double check totals.

Vince

Hi Vince,

Thanks for the info. I perused Sadkovich and H. T Lenton's volume. A little tricky with Lenton as some of the landmarks are obscure.

Sadkovich says the Italians sank 41 British submarines in the Mediterranean prior to the armistice and lost 84 of their own. His breakdown of Italian submarine losses attributed:

11 to naval gunfire

41 to torpedoes

9 to bombs

3 to mines

20 to other causes

I found 44 in Lenton prior to the Armistice credited to the Italians. Loss by cause:

2 by ramming

2 by gunfire

13 by depth charges

3 by mines

14 by unknown cause most likely by mines

1 by aircraft

In addition Germand DDs sank two by depth charges and two were sunk by German aircraft prior to the armistice.

The fight between Rainbow and the Enrico Toti has to be unique...almost out of Hollywood.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I am currently rereading Correspondent Alan Moorehead's excellent personal account of the North African campaign titled, variously, The Desert War. It is a trilogy, now combined into one volume. It was written and published in 1944 or thereabouts, soon after his experiences. I've had a copy, under another name, in my collection for over forty years and continue to read sections. Now to the point of this post. In January 1940, he was given the priviledge of accompanying the Warspite and Sir Alan Cunningham on a sortie from Alexandria. It's first task was to meet the Illustrious and her escorts moving through Gibraltar after being assigned to the Med. Warspite was the flagship, in company with Eagle and Malaya with Goucester, Liverpool, Orion, Sydney and Ajax in escort. Illustrious is met, along with Valiant, Coventry and Calcutta escorting. Illustrious has 44 Fairy Fulmar fighters on board. Second task is to attack airfields and ports in the Dodecanese especially Rhodes. I am not going to bore you with details, but want to share some comments he makes after the voyage, at the end of the chapter. Remember that these are just his comments on the combined operations during the period 1940-1943. He states:Moorehead goes on to comment that Cunningham performed brilliantly until forced to convoy to and from Crete and Greece and elsewhere and came at last against overwhelming air power overwhelming pressed home, that he lost one good ship after another. From Crete onward it became blindingly obvious that sea and air would have to go together. The Fleet could not put to sea without air protection..... the purely sea period was over..... Fleets alone cannot act offensively and get away with it. Neither the Bismarck nor any other battleship could range the seas, raiding, hunting down its foes, bombarding up the Main. Remember, this man is a correspondent, not a trained military officer with any real experiences. These are interesting and accurate comments, IMO. I would like to hear others, and their comments.

Hi Dennis,

Moorehead's account is a classic and I read it in high school. I think you could start a lively argument with his assessment. I would argue that the only two times that occurred is when the Luftwaffe committed Fliegerkorps X in early 1941 and Luftwaffe units in early 1942 for the assault on Malta by air. After Crete, they were transferrred to support Barbarossa. Ditto in 1942. Fligerkorps X was particularly deadly at Crete.

A handful of Stukas were allocated to the Italians and they met with some success as did the Aerosiluranti torpedo bombers. Sadkovich criticizes the Germans for not supplying more Stukas and torpedoes to be carried by the SM 79s and, tangentially, the inability of the weak Italian industrial base to produce their own. British AA power was pathetic as was the ability of the Fleet Air Arm to provide effective fighter support, but the convoys to Malta continued to sail. The Royal Italian air force never amassed the striking power of the Luftwaffe.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Moorehead's account is a classic and I read it in high school. I think you could start a lively argument with his assessment. I would argue that the only two times that occurred is when the Luftwaffe committed Fliegerkorps X in early 1941 and Luftwaffe units in early 1942 for the assault on Malta by air. After Crete, they were transferrred to support Barbarossa. Ditto in 1942. Fligerkorps X was particularly deadly at Crete.

A handful of Stukas were allocated to the Italians and they met with some success as did the Aerosiluranti torpedo bombers. Sadkovich criticizes the Germans for not supplying more Stukas and torpedoes to be carried by the SM 79s and, tangentially, the inability of the weak Italian industrial base to produce their own. British AA power was pathetic as was the ability of the Fleet Air Arm to provide effective fighter support, but the convoys to Malta continued to sail. The Royal Italian air force never amassed the striking power of the Luftwaffe.

Hi Mike:The X Fliegerkorps was first assigned from Norway in January 1941. The long range bombers consisted of 80 Ju-88 A-4s at Catania, 49 He-111 H-3s at Comiso. Long range recon had 12 Ju-88 D-1s at Catania with 34 BF-110 D-3s at Palermo. The Stukas were Ju-87 R-1s with 80 stationed at Trapani. In Feb 1941, 14 BF 109 E-7s were added as day fighters at Gela and 7 BF 110 E-3s as Nachtflieger. 22 March 1941 saw the addition of 48 BF 110 D-3 fighters to NA and Sicily with some of the Stuka's(68) moving to NA. Also some 77 Ju-52/3m were moved to Sicily. The total strength of Fliegerkorps X on March 22,1941 was 520 est. with about 348 actually operationally.On 21 June 1941, they were titled Fliegerfuhrer Afrika. On 17 January 1942, all of Luftflotte 2 was moved to the Med and North Africa theatre. This fliegerkorps training and mission was to attack British convoys and protect Axis convoys, along with attacking Malta. With the Royal Italian AF, there would seem to be sufficient aircraft and organization to accomplish that mission. I don't see the Germans putting more torpedoes or anything else in the area. I do see a real deficiency in a unified command with unified objectives, but not a lack of tools. Question: With all the stats about subs, torpedo boats, aircraft etc. What does this all mean? What does it tell us about operations in an encloses sea especially during the NA campaign. Stats alone tell us nothing. What were the problems that led to the failure is the key question in any failed operational plan.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:The X Fliegerkorps was first assigned from Norway in January 1941. The long range bombers consisted of 80 Ju-88 A-4s at Catania, 49 He-111 H-3s at Comiso. Long range recon had 12 Ju-88 D-1s at Catania with 34 BF-110 D-3s at Palermo. The Stukas were Ju-87 R-1s with 80 stationed at Trapani. In Feb 1941, 14 BF 109 E-7s were added as day fighters at Gela and 7 BF 110 E-3s as Nachtflieger. 22 March 1941 saw the addition of 48 BF 110 D-3 fighters to NA and Sicily with some of the Stuka's(68) moving to NA. Also some 77 Ju-52/3m were moved to Sicily. The total strength of Fliegerkorps X on March 22,1941 was 520 est. with about 348 actually operationally.On 21 June 1941, they were titled Fliegerfuhrer Afrika. On 17 January 1942, all of Luftflotte 2 was moved to the Med and North Africa theatre. This fliegerkorps training and mission was to attack British convoys and protect Axis convoys, along with attacking Malta. With the Royal Italian AF, there would seem to be sufficient aircraft and organization to accomplish that mission. I don't see the Germans putting more torpedoes or anything else in the area. I do see a real deficiency in a unified command with unified objectives, but not a lack of tools. Question: With all the stats about subs, torpedo boats, aircraft etc. What does this all mean? What does it tell us about operations in an encloses sea especially during the NA campaign. Stats alone tell us nothing. What were the problems that led to the failure is the key question in any failed operational plan.

Hi Dennis,

Like Japan, Italy rolled the dice on a short, quick war and earning a share of the spoils.

Italy had a number of advantages:

A central position in the Mediterranean for it's fleet and airforce.

A relatively efficient navy helped by it's major opponent, France being out of the war.

A weakened, distracted foe that was almost alone agaist Italy and Germany for 2 years plus. During that period there was relative military parity between Italy and England including such technical areas as radar. England had vital intersts to defend and had to venture out to protect them.

The Italians had an effective long range maritme reconnaissance ability with little or no fighter opposition in most areas as well as a large submarine force to assist.

The assistance of the German military despite there being no common strategy.

On the flip side:

Like her axis partners, interservice cooperation and a unified strategy were almost non existent.

Her poor industrial base was unable to provide new aircraft, tanks, and ships in any quantites to combat those of the Allies. Her electronics capabilities were almost non existent, increasingly essential for modern warfare.

A poor ability to wage sustained, attritional warfare.

1/3 of her merchant navy caught outside the Mediterranean at the start of the war.

A shortage of fuel and a stingy German supplier.

A dufus for a leader and a less than enthusiastic populace.

One of the compelling factors in the Mediterranean is the first two years where both powers were essentially well matched. The British had to use the Central Mediterranean and was committed to holding Malta. While strengths fluctuated, the Italians had difficulties denying use of the sea to Britain. A concentration of submarines and aircraft could have produced decisive results. Effective use of reconnaissance would allow early warning and concentration of force on Sicily with the navy in support. Fliegerkorps X showed what could be done with local superiority and the right tactics.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Like Japan, Italy rolled the dice on a short, quick war and earning a share of the spoils.

Italy had a number of advantages:

A central position in the Mediterranean for it's fleet and airforce.

A relatively efficient navy helped by it's major opponent, France being out of the war.

A weakened, distracted foe that was almost alone agaist Italy and Germany for 2 years plus. During that period there was relative military parity between Italy and England including such technical areas as radar. England had vital intersts to defend and had to venture out to protect them.

The Italians had an effective long range maritme reconnaissance ability with little or no fighter opposition in most areas as well as a large submarine force to assist.

The assistance of the German military despite there being no common strategy.

On the flip side:

Like her axis partners, interservice cooperation and a unified strategy were almost non existent.

Her poor industrial base was unable to provide new aircraft, tanks, and ships in any quantites to combat those of the Allies. Her electronics capabilities were almost non existent, increasingly essential for modern warfare.

A poor ability to wage sustained, attritional warfare.

1/3 of her merchant navy caught outside the Mediterranean at the start of the war.

A shortage of fuel and a stingy German supplier.

A dufus for a leader and a less than enthusiastic populace.

One of the compelling factors in the Mediterranean is the first two years where both powers were essentially well matched. The British had to use the Central Mediterranean and was committed to holding Malta. While strengths fluctuated, the Italians had difficulties denying use of the sea to Britain. A concentration of submarines and aircraft could have produced decisive results. Effective use of reconnaissance would allow early warning and concentration of force on Sicily with the navy in support. Fliegerkorps X showed what could be done with local superiority and the right tactics.

Hi Mike:I agree with some statements, confused by others and not sure I agree with some.I agree, of course that she had a central position but I am confused by the term "efficient" navy. She can thank Germany for the elimination of France as her principal foe in the Med. As far as parity, I am not entirely certain of that, I believe that she had an advantage in numbers at the beginning in area of naval and air forces, but used them poorly. I would give Cunningham the nod in aggressiveness in the use of his forces. Same goes for RAF in the Med, they were not the best equipped but used their weapons aggressively especially in Wavell's raid which eventually turned into a full scale offensive. I am going to have to investigate her long range maritime reconnaissance efforts. She had a good geostrategic position with Albania, the Dodecanese, Sicily and NA for maritime patrol but that is not the total picture. I agree that her industrial base was not capable of sustaining combat operations for long. IMO, she was a colonial power, whose forces reflected that. She did have a fuel issue, but then so did Japan. I would not agree that the Italians had difficulties denying the use of the Med to the British. By the mere fact that they had to use the long route around the horn of Africa, tells me that with Fliegerkorp X assistance, they were able to seal off the Med from British convoy use. She accomplished that for 39 months until we entered the war, began supplying aircraft to Malta, tanks to the Eigth army and then invaded Tunisia. As far as a concentration of submarines and aircraft, the failure to occupy Malta could have assisted in the problems of keeping the sea lanes open and performing sea denial to the British Fleet. But this was not the Italians fault, it was Hitler and his generals. Rommel volunteered to use his own forces to invade and occupy the island. However, with adequate naval and air forces deployed around Malta, the Italians were effective at getting 70% of Rommel's logistical requirements to Bizerte and Tunis. We can say that it was Rommels fault that NA was lost due to his disregard for logistics. With that loss, the Axis lost a vital area for closing off the Med. It gave the Allies bases to fly from and sail from to begin to put pressure on the italians who were fatally weakened by the effort to maintain convoys to the NA theatre. This is an inescapable fact that German authors tend to gloss over, in addition to the fact that it was their own signal encryption system that was giving away the convoys. I believe that there is room for a small amount of revisionist ideas in the story of the Italian war effort. I do agree that the Italians were not really enthusiastic about the war and had real trouble discerning good information about the conduct of the war from the Fascist propaganda.

[Vince O'Hara]

To Mike: I'm starting to get more curious about the submarine counts. I know that the eariler tallys are less accurate as there is ongoing research on the subject. Maybe I'll get together with Enrico and look at this more closely, if our time permits. To Dennis. There is one aspect about the use of airpower off Crete that needs mention and that is how the British naval units were misemployed and in some cases exposed to excessive risk. The Formidiable and the battleships never needed to be at sea to accomplish the stated mission. The fact that Cunningham ordered Formidiable to raid a German airfield with six Albacores and two Fulmars demonstrated his basic failure to grasp the essence of airpower. (The battleships were at sea to guard against a sortie by the Italian battle fleet.) In another instance, Admiral King was forced to sail his cruiser/destroyer squadron nearly all the way to Milos and was only 25 miles off a German airfield at dawn. The ability of the Malta convoys to stand off coordinated air attacks by forces of more than 100 torpedo, high-level and dive bombers provides an example of what naval forces could do in the face of heavy and sustained air attacks.Vince

[old_pop2000]

To Mike: I'm starting to get more curious about the submarine counts. I know that the eariler tallys are less accurate as there is ongoing research on the subject. Maybe I'll get together with Enrico and look at this more closely, if our time permits. To Dennis. There is one aspect about the use of airpower off Crete that needs mention and that is how the British naval units were misemployed and in some cases exposed to excessive risk. The Formidiable and the battleships never needed to be at sea to accomplish the stated mission. The fact that Cunningham ordered Formidiable to raid a German airfield with six Albacores and two Fulmars demonstrated his basic failure to grasp the essence of airpower. (The battleships were at sea to guard against a sortie by the Italian battle fleet.) In another instance, Admiral King was forced to sail his cruiser/destroyer squadron nearly all the way to Milos and was only 25 miles off a German airfield at dawn. The ability of the Malta convoys to stand off coordinated air attacks by forces of more than 100 torpedo, high-level and dive bombers provides an example of what naval forces could do in the face of heavy and sustained air attacks.Vince

Hi Vince:I would like to see how your research on the submarine issue turns out. It's interesting that there is so much disagreement on the numbers.As far as Cunningham and his use of his forces, I am certain much needed to be learned at this stage of the war about the use of carrier based air power and surface forces. The US and Japanese were the only navies that developed a doctrine of offensive use of carrier air power. The British carriers doctrine, if my memory serves me, was to protect the surface forces. As to the use of high level bombers against maneuvering ships, we and the Japanese learned early about that aspect of level bombing... it doesn't work. Bombing from 10,000 feet on a moving target was almost impossible. Dive bombers are another matter. I would have to research the specific attacks, but the numbers are meaningless. The composition of the attacking force is what is important. Fliegerkorp X probably never had more than 80 stukas in the beginning. In Feb 1941, that number had dwindled to 71. The serviceable figures are even less. In that same period, only 55 were serviceable. In March, the figures increased with the addition of a staff flight of ST. G. 3 to Trapani, but some of ST. G. 2 were moved to NA for ground support. By April, the figures available for maritime use had dwindle even more, most Stukas were now in NA. After that date, I don't see any St.G available in Sicily or Italy for maritime use. This would mean the BF 110s and SM 79 would have to do the bulk of the anti-shipping operations at low level using torpedoes or glide bombing attacks. So, the question then is; was the RN's AAA that effective, or was it a matter of poor tactics due to lack of the proper type of attack method?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike:I agree with some statements, confused by others and not sure I agree with some.I agree, of course that she had a central position but I am confused by the term "efficient" navy. She can thank Germany for the elimination of France as her principal foe in the Med. As far as parity, I am not entirely certain of that, I believe that she had an advantage in numbers at the beginning in area of naval and air forces, but used them poorly. I would give Cunningham the nod in aggressiveness in the use of his forces. Same goes for RAF in the Med, they were not the best equipped but used their weapons aggressively especially in Wavell's raid which eventually turned into a full scale offensive. I am going to have to investigate her long range maritime reconnaissance efforts. She had a good geostrategic position with Albania, the Dodecanese, Sicily and NA for maritime patrol but that is not the total picture. I agree that her industrial base was not capable of sustaining combat operations for long. IMO, she was a colonial power, whose forces reflected that. She did have a fuel issue, but then so did Japan. I would not agree that the Italians had difficulties denying the use of the Med to the British. By the mere fact that they had to use the long route around the horn of Africa, tells me that with Fliegerkorp X assistance, they were able to seal off the Med from British convoy use. She accomplished that for 39 months until we entered the war, began supplying aircraft to Malta, tanks to the Eigth army and then invaded Tunisia. As far as a concentration of submarines and aircraft, the failure to occupy Malta could have assisted in the problems of keeping the sea lanes open and performing sea denial to the British Fleet. But this was not the Italians fault, it was Hitler and his generals. Rommel volunteered to use his own forces to invade and occupy the island. However, with adequate naval and air forces deployed around Malta, the Italians were effective at getting 70% of Rommel's logistical requirements to Bizerte and Tunis. We can say that it was Rommels fault that NA was lost due to his disregard for logistics. With that loss, the Axis lost a vital area for closing off the Med. It gave the Allies bases to fly from and sail from to begin to put pressure on the italians who were fatally weakened by the effort to maintain convoys to the NA theatre. This is an inescapable fact that German authors tend to gloss over, in addition to the fact that it was their own signal encryption system that was giving away the convoys. I believe that there is room for a small amount of revisionist ideas in the story of the Italian war effort. I do agree that the Italians were not really enthusiastic about the war and had real trouble discerning good information about the conduct of the war from the Fascist propaganda.

Hi Dennis,

I don' think were that far off in our assessments. The Italians didn't have the ability to take Malta alone granted, but they could have focussed their air and submarine effort to isolate it. The Italian subs in the Atlantic contributed little to the tonnage war, but could have made a difference in the western Med. I don't know if you can pin NA on Rommel. He had to come in and rescue the Italians from losing their colonial holdings and protect Europe's southern. The Italians would have had to supply North Africa to support their forces and civillian population in any case.

Your right that the British rerouted convoys around the Mediterranean, the British were still able to supply Malta and exchange warships between Gibraltar and Alexandria. In other words, the British could use the central Mediterranean when they needed to.

I think the Italian oil situation was more precarious than Japan. Oil use was a drag on operations from the start with the Italians and hampered the ability of the fleet to take advantage of British weakness. Italian Cant flying boats were effective scouts and had the range to check Gibraltar and Alexandria, but were under air force control.

An unsung Italian effort were XMAS units which sank or damaged over 200,000 tons of shipping including Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, and the heavy cruiser York. They were able to successfully penetrate Gibraltar and Alexandria.

The SIGINT issue was a serious flaw, but it affected the whole AXIS effort, not just the Mediterranean. But it's clear that the war in the Mediterranean was winnable up until June, 1942 when the British were finally able to throttle the Italian convoy route to North Africa at a critical point. I think Sadkovich puts the delivery percentage into the 80's, but timing is everything.

Your comment about the RAF triggered a memory from Moorehead's account. Early on, an RAF airfiield was tasked to scout and harrass an Italian border fort. The planes were old bi planes with limited ordinance. One intrepid pilot built a impromtu "dustbin" bomb using odds and ends and placed it in theh observer's seat. He flew over the fort at night and rolled the plane inverted to drop it. There was a satisfactory bang. A large percentage of the garrison came out when they heard the aircraft and were killed by the explosion.

[JMS]

Oddly enough, the Axis was sitting in a unique position in early 1942 to force the issue in the Med, Malta was being bombed to pieces and its fighters were proving inadequate, the Germans had Gneisenau/Scharnhorst/Prinz Eugen sitting at Brest and they could have sailed in the Atlantic as well as doing the Channel dash, the Tirpitz/pocket battleships in Norway over the USSR convoys, while the Japanese were running roughshod over Asia.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I don' think were that far off in our assessments. The Italians didn't have the ability to take Malta alone granted, but they could have focussed their air and submarine effort to isolate it. The Italian subs in the Atlantic contributed little to the tonnage war, but could have made a difference in the western Med. I don't know if you can pin NA on Rommel. He had to come in and rescue the Italians from losing their colonial holdings and protect Europe's southern. The Italians would have had to supply North Africa to support their forces and civillian population in any case.

.......

HI Mike:
The reason I place much of the blame on the German High command and Rommel is their lack of adequate planning both pre-war and during the conflict. The German GHQ sent Thoma to NA to assess the situation and his report carefully stated that the logistics and infrastructure of the theatre could only support four mechanized divisions. Rommel sacrificed operational level goals for tactical level goals by ignoring the orders from the German GHQ not to conduct an offensive They were patently aware of the logistical limitations of the theatre. He had one full panzer division and one light division, along with several motorized units that would eventually be combined into the 90th Light division. That's three almost fully motorized divisions. Now, add in Ariete and Trieste, the number is now five mechanized divisions. This was far more than could be supported. The Italian army in Libya was a colonial, foot based army. The logistics developed in NA for this army was tailored to its needs. It could be fully supported because it was not motorized. One of the reasons that the O'Connor raid was successful was because the British forces were mechanized and introduced European doctrine to the theatre, but the Italian forces were not trained or equipped for European blitzkrieg style of warfare. However, that kind of war is attrition in nature and requires a substantial logistics trail to support it. The OKH had agreed that to take Cairo would require four German armored divisions and that would require, by themselves, 20,000 tons of supplies per month. That was far beyond the port capacity on the NA coast or the Italian navy to maintain the supply lines. Von Brauchitsch and Halder in discussions stated that Rommel was limited to Cyrenaica, and no further. That was as far as the logistics could support him. By moving to invest Tobruck, and take Capuzzo, Bardia and Sidi Barrani, he dangerously overextended his forces and threatened to lose the strategic objective for which he was sent. This all has a bearing on the naval situation. This is why I still believe that the failures in NA were partly Rommels fault. You cannot separate land operations from naval. They are interlocked. The job of navies is the facilitate land operations. You cannot separate the Naval war in the Mediterranean from the land operations. They each affected the other.

[Mike Malanaphy]

HI Mike:
The reason I place much of the blame on the German High command and Rommel is their lack of adequate planning both pre-war and during the conflict. The German GHQ sent Thoma to NA to assess the situation and his report carefully stated that the logistics and infrastructure of the theatre could only support four mechanized divisions. Rommel sacrificed operational level goals for tactical level goals by ignoring the orders from the German GHQ not to conduct an offensive They were patently aware of the logistical limitations of the theatre. He had one full panzer division and one light division, along with several motorized units that would eventually be combined into the 90th Light division. That's three almost fully motorized divisions. Now, add in Ariete and Trieste, the number is now five mechanized divisions. This was far more than could be supported. The Italian army in Libya was a colonial, foot based army. The logistics developed in NA for this army was tailored to its needs. It could be fully supported because it was not motorized. One of the reasons that the O'Connor raid was successful was because the British forces were mechanized and introduced European doctrine to the theatre, but the Italian forces were not trained or equipped for European blitzkrieg style of warfare. However, that kind of war is attrition in nature and requires a substantial logistics trail to support it. The OKH had agreed that to take Cairo would require four German armored divisions and that would require, by themselves, 20,000 tons of supplies per month. That was far beyond the port capacity on the NA coast or the Italian navy to maintain the supply lines. Von Brauchitsch and Halder in discussions stated that Rommel was limited to Cyrenaica, and no further. That was as far as the logistics could support him. By moving to invest Tobruck, and take Capuzzo, Bardia and Sidi Barrani, he dangerously overextended his forces and threatened to lose the strategic objective for which he was sent. This all has a bearing on the naval situation. This is why I still believe that the failures in NA were partly Rommels fault. You cannot separate land operations from naval. They are interlocked. The job of navies is the facilitate land operations. You cannot separate the Naval war in the Mediterranean from the land operations. They each affected the other.

Hi Dennis,

Sadkovich essentially agrees with that assessment. Hitler had balked at C.3, the invasion of Malta, unwilling to commit before mid July 1942. The Italians were concerned should Rommel push east from Tobruk, valuable resources would be diverted from the invasion to supporting Rommel. Mussolini asked Hitler to halt Rommel and take up the invasion of Malta on June 20, but Hitler told Mussolini to let Rommel have his head. Mussolini demurred. The resurgent Malta forced convoys to swing wide of the island, increasing time at sea, delaying deliveries, using more fuel, and making the ships more vulnerable at sea.

Italian supply shipments to Africa picked up in June, July and August. In addition, cargo handling at Tobruk and Mersa Matruh had be speeded up ( Up to 1,000 and 500 tons a day respectively), but there were no cranes at either and the shallow water prevented docking of larger ships. All cargo having to be off loaded into lighters while the ships anchored outside of the port, vulnerable to atack. A rail line from Benghazi to Matruh had just been completed and 8 locomotives delivered to begin moving supplies to supplant the convoys of self propelled lighters that moved supplies forward along the coast.

Even so, the amounts needed were very large. In May, 1941, the Italian chief of staff said supporting levels in North Africa would require 140,000 tons a month to support, German and Italian combat troops, 20,000 Libyan and 100,00 Italian families in North Africa...an estimated 30 ships per month.

In 1942, 84.2% of supplies dispatched to North Africa arrived, but in the critical months of August, September, and October only 66.9, 78.3, and 55.8 respectively arrived safely.

In hindsight, it seems clear. But the German high command from Hitler down believed that Rommel was now within a hairsbreadth of taking Egypt.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Sadkovich essentially agrees with that assessment. Hitler had balked at C.3, the invasion of Malta, unwilling to commit before mid July 1942. The Italians were concerned should Rommel push east from Tobruk, valuable resources would be diverted from the invasion to supporting Rommel. Mussolini asked Hitler to halt Rommel and take up the invasion of Malta on June 20, but Hitler told Mussolini to let Rommel have his head. Mussolini demurred. The resurgent Malta forced convoys to swing wide of the island, increasing time at sea, delaying deliveries, using more fuel, and making the ships more vulnerable at sea.

Italian supply shipments to Africa picked up in June, July and August. In addition, cargo handling at Tobruk and Mersa Matruh had be speeded up ( Up to 1,000 and 500 tons a day respectively), but there were no cranes at either and the shallow water prevented docking of larger ships. All cargo having to be off loaded into lighters while the ships anchored outside of the port, vulnerable to atack. A rail line from Benghazi to Matruh had just been completed and 8 locomotives delivered to begin moving supplies to supplant the convoys of self propelled lighters that moved supplies forward along the coast.

Even so, the amounts needed were very large. In May, 1941, the Italian chief of staff said supporting levels in North Africa would require 140,000 tons a month to support, German and Italian combat troops, 20,000 Libyan and 100,00 Italian families in North Africa...an estimated 30 ships per month.

In 1942, 84.2% of supplies dispatched to North Africa arrived, but in the critical months of August, September, and October only 66.9, 78.3, and 55.8 respectively arrived safely.

In hindsight, it seems clear. But the German high command from Hitler down believed that Rommel was now within a hairsbreadth of taking Egypt.

Mike:

Here is some information from Wolf Heckmann's book "Rommel's War in Africa". In the chapter, To Cairo for Coffee, Heckmann relates the tale about the famous statement made by Cavallero to Rommel; "You can go on with the battle. Fuel is on its way. " According to Heckmann, archives show that remark was never made. However, Wehrmacht documents clearly show that the council of marshals; Cavallero, Rommel and Kesselring agreed that Rommel judged the tactical and operative, but not the supply situation, to be particularly favorable. Fuel stocks were not adequate for either Germans or Italians. However, Cavallero gave assurances that every measure has been taken to bring fuel over to Africa; but in view of the present shipping situation he could not guarantee that would be delivered on time or in adequate quantity.

On 20 August 1942 Kesselring had taken part in a conference, without Rommel about the Italian shipping difficulties. It was learned from German Admiral Weichold that Italy had so little fuel oil that either shipping or convoy escort work must be reduced. Kesselring was to learn that the situation was deteriorating. All the tankers carrying the 6000 tons of fuel were sunk, one right in the mouth of Tobruk harbor. Kesselring had promised himself, to bring the fuel in Ju-52 but that never occurred.

Despite Rommel's upbeat communiques to OKH, it was clearly doubtful that he could have taken Cairo with the forces at his disposal. Even with the 6000 tons of fuel and the ammunition he had requested, his forces were spent and situation in Russia was getting worse. Between August 1st and 12 September, over 6126 tons of fuel, 1246 tons of ammunition, 1141 tons of food and 651 tons of sundries were sunk. Landed was 9403 tons of fuel, 2586 tons of ammo, 1338 tons of food and 1492 tons of sundries. It appears that FM Rommel, should have been more than aware of the coming supply crisis. General Rintelen in Rome, had been warning of such a crisis.

It would seem to the casual observer that the situation had to be obvious to Rommel. Mobile warfare that had won him so many battles, was out of the question considering the lack of fuel and ammunition. Much of his infantry was on foot and not mobile. In fact, he had a lack of good infantry and one Italian and one German parachute unit had to be flown, without their vehicle to NA. With that, was it really that unclear to OKW or Rommel that the task before Rommel was just out of his logistical reach?

[JMS]

It would seem to the casual observer that the situation had to be obvious to Rommel. Mobile warfare that had won him so many battles, was out of the question considering the lack of fuel and ammunition. Much of his infantry was on foot and not mobile. In fact, he had a lack of good infantry and one Italian and one German parachute unit had to be flown, without their vehicle to NA. With that, was it really that unclear to OKW or Rommel that the task before Rommel was just out of his logistical reach?

But this question goes straight to Erwin's generalship. His greatest achievements before Africa had been with others supplying him, or against enemies that have become so disorganised as to be unable to react in the depth available to them.

Africa was different, everything had to be shipped to the front through a long and tenous lifeline liable to be cut for the several reasons, so supplies were just as lost if sunk in the Med or destroyed in a truck or undeliverable for lack of fuel.

The same terrain that played in his ability to conduct sweeping mobile tactics was undoing him in supplying his needs, and he only got that far because its opponents understood logistics much better than mobile warfare and built up their supply dumps for him to capture.

Since OKW had grown accostumed to operate on logistical shoestring (Norway, Russia or France), Rommel's situation was likely deemed as bad but not critical.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

Here is some information from Wolf Heckmann's book "Rommel's War in Africa". In the chapter, To Cairo for Coffee, Heckmann relates the tale about the famous statement made by Cavallero to Rommel; "You can go on with the battle. Fuel is on its way. " According to Heckmann, archives show that remark was never made. However, Wehrmacht documents clearly show that the council of marshals; Cavallero, Rommel and Kesselring agreed that Rommel judged the tactical and operative, but not the supply situation, to be particularly favorable. Fuel stocks were not adequate for either Germans or Italians. However, Cavallero gave assurances that every measure has been taken to bring fuel over to Africa; but in view of the present shipping situation he could not guarantee that would be delivered on time or in adequate quantity.

On 20 August 1942 Kesselring had taken part in a conference, without Rommel about the Italian shipping difficulties. It was learned from German Admiral Weichold that Italy had so little fuel oil that either shipping or convoy escort work must be reduced. Kesselring was to learn that the situation was deteriorating. All the tankers carrying the 6000 tons of fuel were sunk, one right in the mouth of Tobruk harbor. Kesselring had promised himself, to bring the fuel in Ju-52 but that never occurred.

Despite Rommel's upbeat communiques to OKH, it was clearly doubtful that he could have taken Cairo with the forces at his disposal. Even with the 6000 tons of fuel and the ammunition he had requested, his forces were spent and situation in Russia was getting worse. Between August 1st and 12 September, over 6126 tons of fuel, 1246 tons of ammunition, 1141 tons of food and 651 tons of sundries were sunk. Landed was 9403 tons of fuel, 2586 tons of ammo, 1338 tons of food and 1492 tons of sundries. It appears that FM Rommel, should have been more than aware of the coming supply crisis. General Rintelen in Rome, had been warning of such a crisis.

It would seem to the casual observer that the situation had to be obvious to Rommel. Mobile warfare that had won him so many battles, was out of the question considering the lack of fuel and ammunition. Much of his infantry was on foot and not mobile. In fact, he had a lack of good infantry and one Italian and one German parachute unit had to be flown, without their vehicle to NA. With that, was it really that unclear to OKW or Rommel that the task before Rommel was just out of his logistical reach?


Hi Dennis,

I may have to get his book for my vacation next month. The Germans were operating totally in the dark regarding the true state of British forces. At at same time, Ultra was providing decrypts of what was being shipped and what actually arrived at each port in Africa. Cavallero and Sansonetti believed they were turning the tide in the logistics war with the increased capacity of ports and the train line having been completed. A lack of tankers led them to want to use barrels to ship fuel being stored in Bengazi in other ships moving east along the coast, but most had been disposed of. The success against the supply routes and knowledge of their material state gave the British time to build up their forces and use a comprehensive tactical cover and deception plan to mask the build up.

Rommel's instincts told him to retain the initiative to keep the British off balance, but his strength and logistics support were an open book to the British. Even so, the RN was prepared to move from Alexandria to Palestine just in case. But, the tipping point had been reached.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

I may have to get his book for my vacation next month. The Germans were operating totally in the dark regarding the true state of British forces. At at same time, Ultra was providing decrypts of what was being shipped and what actually arrived at each port in Africa. Cavallero and Sansonetti believed they were turning the tide in the logistics war with the increased capacity of ports and the train line having been completed. A lack of tankers led them to want to use barrels to ship fuel being stored in Bengazi in other ships moving east along the coast, but most had been disposed of. The success against the supply routes and knowledge of their material state gave the British time to build up their forces and use a comprehensive tactical cover and deception plan to mask the build up.

Rommel's instincts told him to retain the initiative to keep the British off balance, but his strength and logistics support were an open book to the British. Even so, the RN was prepared to move from Alexandria to Palestine just in case. But, the tipping point had been reached.

Mike:
I hope you enjoy it, I've had it around for many years. I am considering getting the I.S.O. Playfair series of books. I don't know much about them, maybe Vince will get on here and give us a review.

I am currently reading a monograph about Rommel and his "sustainment". The author was a quartermaster attached to the School of Advanced Military Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff College. He discusses "tactical sustainment" and "operational sustainment". He defines the former as being designed to meet immediate support requirements. the Latter determines the bounds within which operations can succeed--"If it does not provide a solid foundation the outcome of the operation is placed in jeopardy". His paper is concerned with operational sustainment. His stated goal is to speculate about how Rommel might have improved the linkage between operational planning and sustainment. One interesting phrase is "improved understanding of the tension between operational design and sustainment". It's about forty-four pages in length, and uses many of the sources I have, except the Playfair source. Hopefully, I will learn more about logistics and sustainment of operations.

[old_pop2000]

To JMS, Mike, Vince:

Here is something to consider. We know that the Allies seemed have conquered the problems of a unified command for combat operations, at least eventually. So now the question is this: Was the problem in North Africa a simple matter of the lack of a good unified command structure. One that might have someone like Kesselring, Rundstedt as the Field Marshal of an Army Group, with an adequate staff along with an attached Luftflotte commander like Sperrle. Could a structure like in the Battle of France have overcome some of the operational sustainment problems and reigned in Rommel like Von Kluge did during the Battle of France? It would have meant a far larger commitment by Hitler and the OKW, which might have distracted from the Russian campaign even more. Another consideration would have been that this overall command, could have had a positive effect on the Italians and their navy, but providing them at least a chance to improve the supply stocks in Tunisia and improve the infrastructure.

[Vince O'Hara]

I said before that this forum goes too fast for me. Some time back Dennis made a comment about the damage to Formidable off Crete to the effect that the British did not have carrier experience and I got the impression that it was a justification of Cunningham’s use of his most valuable asset in sending her to attack a German airbase. Even as early as July 1940 Somerville knew enough not to conduct attacks with Ark Royal in situations where Italian aircraft could counterattack in daylight—despite pressure from Cunningham to do exactly that.

About I.S.O Playfair’s Mediterranean and the Middle East series, I recommend it highly. You can get relatively cheap reprint paperbacks from Naval and Military Press, but I like the original editions if you can find them (the maps really suffer in the reprints).

About supply to North Africa I think most everyone, except for the diehard Rommel apologist, agrees these days that Rommel tried to do more than the logistical situation permitted, which is not to take anything away from what he did accomplish. (No one has talked about how the materiel captured at Tobruk played a large role in his last big advance). I don’t see how he could have taken Cairo unless the British rolled over and played dead, and they had too many Commonwealth and Indian troops for that to happen.

About a unified command . . . in theory there was a unified command. One problem was the Germans didn’t respect it. Another problem was that the Italian leadership was uninspired (at best). Maybe a German led unified command would have been more effective, but politically I don’t see how that would have been possible.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

I said before that this forum goes too fast for me. Some time back Dennis made a comment about the damage to Formidable off Crete to the effect that the British did not have carrier experience and I got the impression that it was a justification of Cunningham’s use of his most valuable asset in sending her to attack a German airbase. Even as early as July 1940 Somerville knew enough not to conduct attacks with Ark Royal in situations where Italian aircraft could counterattack in daylight—despite pressure from Cunningham to do exactly that.

About I.S.O Playfair’s Mediterranean and the Middle East series, I recommend it highly. You can get relatively cheap reprint paperbacks from Naval and Military Press, but I like the original editions if you can find them (the maps really suffer in the reprints).

About supply to North Africa I think most everyone, except for the diehard Rommel apologist, agrees these days that Rommel tried to do more than the logistical situation permitted, which is not to take anything away from what he did accomplish. (No one has talked about how the materiel captured at Tobruk played a large role in his last big advance). I don’t see how he could have taken Cairo unless the British rolled over and played dead, and they had too many Commonwealth and Indian troops for that to happen.

About a unified command . . . in theory there was a unified command. One problem was the Germans didn’t respect it. Another problem was that the Italian leadership was uninspired (at best). Maybe a German led unified command would have been more effective, but politically I don’t see how that would have been possible.

Vince

HI Vince:
The question I would have is whether Somerville resisted for the reason that he feared daylight attacks by Italian aircraft and knew his carriers did not carry enough defensive fighters to protect him or for some other reason. If I remember, part of 1940 was spent escorting convoys from Gibraltar to Malta, which did put her within range of Italian aircraft in Sicily. Her air wing complement would be about 30 Fairy Swordfish, 12 Blackburn Skua's and 12 Fulmars. The Fulmars are the only aircraft that could have remotely been considered for CAP over the fleet. I can sympathize with Somerville's reluctance. In 1941, the Skua's were eliminated and more Swordfish added, along with six more Fulmars. However, this is still not a capable air wing for fleet protection when the opponent can send 80-100 torpedo carrying bombers against you or even German dive bombers and such. But I still asked the question: Did Somerville resist because he knew that a fleet in an enclosed sea is at risk without adequate air cover? 12-18 Fulmars are certainly not adequate air cover.

I will, based on your recommendation, get copies of I.S.O. Playfairs volumes. Any recommendations on which ones? I am on a retirement budget, you know.;)

The supply issue is pretty well known by all later historians and military analyst. Rommel definitely exceeded his sustainment and never did operational level planning that included logistical support for the pursuit portion of any offensive.

I just thought it would be interesting to consider how a change in overall command structure might have affected the administration side of the theatre. Possibly a German field command with Rundstedt's experience in staff work and large scale operations, situated in Tunis could have resolved the administrative issues that Rommel would not address. Possibly a person of that caliber could have been able to improve the infrastructure along the coast, off loaded and moved more supplies and built a better defensive structure using a Luftflotte to defend Benghazi. Benghazi's problem was a lack of air cover, which could have prevented the British Desert air force from continuing to damage the port facilities. This kind of officer might have been able managed the business side, keeping Rommel in check until the supply system could be improved.

Sorry we moved so fast. You snooze, you loose around here.:p

[Vince O'Hara]

Here are some quotes from Somerville’s report to Pound dated 13 July 1940. “Calling off the attack on Cagliari was a most distasteful decision to make, but I felt it was most improbable you would want Ark Royal put out of action in view of our limited objective.” “Ark Royal must operate within 90 to 100 miles of the target and flying off could not commence before 0215. This meant that flying on could not be completed before 0615. In view of the easterly wind it involved flying on towards the land and would bring Force H and Ark Royal under air attack for a period of 9 or 10 hours.”

If you’re looking to spend money on books, the Somerville and Cunningham papers by the Navy Records Society are worth every cent. As for Playfair, it depends on the period you’re interested in. The first three volumes make a nice set. If you want to browse, they're available in several local libraries.

You’re right that a unified command led by the right person with a good staff helps almost any situation, but it was nearly unthinkable in a Mediterranean context. Jack Greene quotes an article by Gerhard Schreiber (one of the authors of the official German history of the war) that in early 1942 the Kriegsmarine wanted to “gain control of the Mediterranean ports and thus influence the command and employment of the Italian Navy, with this control being exercised by the German liaison officers aboard Italian ships . . . as some compensation for the German blood split in the Mediterranean war.” However, several Italian admirals stated, “they would sooner scuttle their ships or surrender them to the Allies than have the Germans take control of them.” (Naval War in the Mediterranean, 232)

Vince

[Campy]

However, several Italian admirals stated, “they would sooner scuttle their ships or surrender them to the Allies than have the Germans take control of them.”

Always remember that Italy and Germany fought a brutal war (WWI) not that long before. Allies are not necessarily your friend. I doubt the Americans and the Soviets could have worked out a joint command structure, if the need had arisen.

Frank

[old_pop2000]

Here are some quotes from Somerville’s report to Pound dated 13 July 1940. “Calling off the attack on Cagliari was a most distasteful decision to make, but I felt it was most improbable you would want Ark Royal put out of action in view of our limited objective.” “Ark Royal must operate within 90 to 100 miles of the target and flying off could not commence before 0215. This meant that flying on could not be completed before 0615. In view of the easterly wind it involved flying on towards the land and would bring Force H and Ark Royal under air attack for a period of 9 or 10 hours.”

If you’re looking to spend money on books, the Somerville and Cunningham papers by the Navy Records Society are worth every cent. As for Playfair, it depends on the period you’re interested in. The first three volumes make a nice set. If you want to browse, they're available in several local libraries.

You’re right that a unified command led by the right person with a good staff helps almost any situation, but it was nearly unthinkable in a Mediterranean context. Jack Greene quotes an article by Gerhard Schreiber (one of the authors of the official German history of the war) that in early 1942 the Kriegsmarine wanted to “gain control of the Mediterranean ports and thus influence the command and employment of the Italian Navy, with this control being exercised by the German liaison officers aboard Italian ships . . . as some compensation for the German blood split in the Mediterranean war.” However, several Italian admirals stated, “they would sooner scuttle their ships or surrender them to the Allies than have the Germans take control of them.” (Naval War in the Mediterranean, 232)

Vince

Hi Vince:
I assume that that report was after the action off Spartimento when he was protecting a convoy headed towards Malta and Alexandria code named Collar. Two Italian battleships and other forces were engaged and Somerville attempted to pursue but, as his report suggest, decided that coming into range of Sardinian and Sicilian Air fields was not a prudent step especially with only one carrier and few defending fighters. Probably a good idea. Both the US and Japan, early in the war realized that surface fleets sailing near land based air is quite hazardous. This was why we increased our defensive fighter strength on board the Essex class carriers before attempting island hopping and always used a carrier task force to soften up the land bases prior to invasions. I believe that British carrier air wings evolved into a more defensive fighter arrangement with the addition of the Martletts and Hellcats.

As to the idea of a unified command, I don't see a need to take over the Italian fleet, but a German Field command at the Army Group level to guide logistics and operational planning for the theatre would have provided Rommel with the necessary backing for the sustainment of his operations. It might have gone a long way to helping the Italian fleet cope with the supply requirements. The Italian armed force command and doctrine was aimed at coping with colonial operations, not mechanized, European style mobile warfare. It is my belief that they needed the assistance of German experience in these kinds of operations and their requirements.

[JMS]

About supply to North Africa I think most everyone, except for the diehard Rommel apologist, agrees these days that Rommel tried to do more than the logistical situation permitted, which is not to take anything away from what he did accomplish. (No one has talked about how the materiel captured at Tobruk played a large role in his last big advance). I don’t see how he could have taken Cairo unless the British rolled over and played dead, and they had too many Commonwealth and Indian troops for that to happen.


I did, although did not quantify it.



About a unified command . . . in theory there was a unified command. One problem was the Germans didn’t respect it. Another problem was that the Italian leadership was uninspired (at best). Maybe a German led unified command would have been more effective, but politically I don’t see how that would have been possible.

Just who will Rommel respect other than himself, who was too junior when he got to Africa?.
Insofar as Rommel has unfettered access to the Führer and does what he pleases himself to do, unified command is not going to solve anything.

[Vince O'Hara]

JMS. Sorry, you did mention it. About unified command the trick is the right person and I agree that person wasn’t Rommel.

Dennis. The report date was 13 July 1940, and refers to Force H’s operation in support of the Mediterranean Fleet’s movement that led to the Action off Calabria. Somerville thought first and last that a carrier had no business operating within range of enemy airfields unless the stakes were very high. He refused to release his two fleet carriers for the June 1942 Malta convoy operations saying that 120 aircraft had no business going up against 1,200.

I made the comment about Germany asserting control over the Italian fleet as an illustration of what their idea of unified command looked like and why it was not palatable to the Italians.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

......

Dennis. The report date was 13 July 1940, and refers to Force H’s operation in support of the Mediterranean Fleet’s movement that led to the Action off Calabria. Somerville thought first and last that a carrier had no business operating within range of enemy airfields unless the stakes were very high. He refused to release his two fleet carriers for the June 1942 Malta convoy operations saying that 120 aircraft had no business going up against 1,200.

I made the comment about Germany asserting control over the Italian fleet as an illustration of what their idea of unified command looked like and why it was not palatable to the Italians.

Vince

Vince:
Thanks for the clarification. His assessment was correct. I don't think, at this time, the British were in a position to deal with the airfields on both Sardinia and Sicily along with those near Tunisia. British carrier doctrine and hence, airwings and carrier design were based on the carriers providing scouting, spotting and attack elements with passive defense like armoured decks and heavy AA support to protect the carriers. Heavy armoured decks have some real problems. The armoured deck is part of the hull, not a light superstructure which raises the GM of the ship. The enclosed armoured sides eliminates openings for edge elevators and evacuation of gas fumes. It makes fire fighting much more difficult and a 500 lb AP bomb, dropped from 2000 feet, can probably pierce a good 2.5 inches of steel deck. With the elevators grouped around the midship area, one good bomb hit can warp or damage all three elevators. Fire fighting is much harder in enclosed hangers. It also reduces the size of the airwing even with deck parks and folding wings. Carrier launch and recovery operationas are slower. In looking at the airwings in 1940 through about 1941, there was an emphasis on two seaters. Even when the problem was recognized, they used land based aircraft as stopgaps like the sea hurricanes and spitfires. Neither had folding wings and both had fragile landing gears. Both were in-line engine aircraft. But, it was a recognition that fleet defense needed to be offensive with single engined fighters for CAP and radar. With the addition of the Martlets and then the Hellcats, they reached the level of the US carrier forces which by that time, had over 60 single seat fighters for fleet defense. The war in air for navies, evolved from the beginning to the end. These facts to me, make it apparent that the British Navy was not really prepared for naval combat in a narrow, enclosed sea especially against a Fliegerkorp although Somerville probably recognized that. One last comment. After the action off of Calabria or the Battle of Punta Stilo, did not Cunningham report to Pound that "We needed also an armoured aircraft-carrier like Illustrious, with fighters, an anti-aircraft cruiser like the Carlisle and a couple of convoy sloops". He felt he could dominate the Eastern Med with such a force. Force H only had Ark Royal which did not have armoured decks, neither did Eagle. The Italians did attack with forty-six S79s and managed splinter damaged on the carrier. It was at this time, before attacking Cagliari, that he decided, rightly, to return to Gibraltar and not risk Ark Royal. It would appear, that both Admiral's realized their carrier problems and both were lucky that Fliegerkorp X was not in the area. I wonder how Ark Royal and Force H would have faired, had the SM 79s conducted a low level torpedo attack. As I stated in another post, high level bombing attacks on fast moving targets at sea is a waste of bombs.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Vince:
Thanks for the clarification. His assessment was correct. I don't think, at this time, the British were in a position to deal with the airfields on both Sardinia and Sicily along with those near Tunisia. British carrier doctrine and hence, airwings and carrier design were based on the carriers providing scouting, spotting and attack elements with passive defense like armoured decks and heavy AA support to protect the carriers. Heavy armoured decks have some real problems. The armoured deck is part of the hull, not a light superstructure which raises the GM of the ship. The enclosed armoured sides eliminates openings for edge elevators and evacuation of gas fumes. It makes fire fighting much more difficult and a 500 lb AP bomb, dropped from 2000 feet, can probably pierce a good 2.5 inches of steel deck. With the elevators grouped around the midship area, one good bomb hit can warp or damage all three elevators. Fire fighting is much harder in enclosed hangers. It also reduces the size of the airwing even with deck parks and folding wings. Carrier launch and recovery operationas are slower. In looking at the airwings in 1940 through about 1941, there was an emphasis on two seaters. Even when the problem was recognized, they used land based aircraft as stopgaps like the sea hurricanes and spitfires. Neither had folding wings and both had fragile landing gears. Both were in-line engine aircraft. But, it was a recognition that fleet defense needed to be offensive with single engined fighters for CAP and radar. With the addition of the Martlets and then the Hellcats, they reached the level of the US carrier forces which by that time, had over 60 single seat fighters for fleet defense. The war in air for navies, evolved from the beginning to the end. These facts to me, make it apparent that the British Navy was not really prepared for naval combat in a narrow, enclosed sea especially against a Fliegerkorp although Somerville probably recognized that. One last comment. After the action off of Calabria or the Battle of Punta Stilo, did not Cunningham report to Pound that "We needed also an armoured aircraft-carrier like Illustrious, with fighters, an anti-aircraft cruiser like the Carlisle and a couple of convoy sloops". He felt he could dominate the Eastern Med with such a force. Force H only had Ark Royal which did not have armoured decks, neither did Eagle. The Italians did attack with forty-six S79s and managed splinter damaged on the carrier. It was at this time, before attacking Cagliari, that he decided, rightly, to return to Gibraltar and not risk Ark Royal. It would appear, that both Admiral's realized their carrier problems and both were lucky that Fliegerkorp X was not in the area. I wonder how Ark Royal and Force H would have faired, had the SM 79s conducted a low level torpedo attack. As I stated in another post, high level bombing attacks on fast moving targets at sea is a waste of bombs.

Hi Guys,

Somerville was orginally urged by Cunningham to attack Naples, Trappani, Messina, or Palermo with Ark Royal's air group of 12 Fulmars, 12 Skuas, and 30 Swordfish. Somerville countered with the attack on Caligari placing Cunningham's suggestion in a category he described as "wild adventures". However, Somerville was so heavily bombed on the way in that he felt risking Ark Royal in this diversion was needless.

In Hats, Somerville was chasing a superior Italian force into land based air range and felt the higher priority was to fall back to protect the convoy, his prime mission. Even before he had submitted his report, Churchill, irked over his handling of the French Fleet, had Pound convene an Admiralty board of inquiry on his actions.

Somerville was not averse to using Ark Royal offensively in the face of land based air as on 9 February, 1941 he had Ark Royal make antishipping strikes while Renown and Malaya bombarded Genoa.

On May 25th, 1941, Cunnigham sent Formidable to launch an air strike against an airfield in Greece with 4 Fulmars and 4 Swordfish. Over 35 Ju 87s and Ju 88s attacked her hitting her twice with 250 Kg bombs. She was very forunate to have survived.

It's an interesting comparison between Ark Royal and the Illustrious. Ark Royal lacked an armored deck but had the advantage of a radar picket for air warning and a larger fighter complement. Illustrious featured an armor deck, but it was not proof against the German bombs that struck her. The hangar was designed to act as an armored magazine and may have contained fire and explosions better than the Ark's open hangar spaces might have. A hard to define quality is the competency of her damage control teams. She was lost due to a single torpedo hit that analysis showed simple counterflooding woudld have saved the ship.

As you mention, high level bombing by the Italians showed little effectiveness. Fortunately, Italian SM 79 squadrons were used piecemeal and were few in number while the Luftwaffe was unable to conduct a sustained effort against the RN in the theater. Cunigham got his ships and did dominate the eastern Mediterranean.

[old_pop2000]

I've been attempting to move my analysis of the Med war backward in time, to the mid-thirties. Apparently, the British did not really begin to contemplate war with the Italians until the Abyssinian crisis around 1935. I am certain that the British naval authorities could read a map and understood how important Italy's geostrategic position was, since they sat astride the 3500 mile shortcut for British sustainment for any action in the Far East. I am also certain, that if the British diplomats could have had their wish, no war with Italy, would have been their obvious choice.

However, the Admiralty does not appear to have that same view of the Italians. They had a complete lack of respect for the Italians and their armed forces, commenting that they should go back to monkeys and music boxes. "Italy's total lack of battleship capability and the limited operational value of its air force render the possibility of war against Britain an extremely onerous undertaking." This was the view of the Supreme High Command of the Italian armed forces. Admiral Cavagnari warned against prolongation of a war with Britain. Seems even the Italian forces agreed with the British Admiralty that any conflict would be detrimental to the Italians given the state of their economy and reliance on shipping.

This reliance on shipping and the British geostrategic positioning at either end of the Med seems to have taught the British that any war with the Italians would be easy and short. Unfortunately, how short or long was never really determined. However, in 1935, as I said, the British had to start planning for such a conflict and had some startling discoveries. They did not have a secure base in the middle of the Med, so their fleet would have to operate from somewhere else. Alexandria was the obvious choice but not a good one. It was undefended and had poor docking and repair facilities. At least, in 1935. If you examine a map, it isn't well place either. It's over 969 miles from Malta and the fleet had to pass close to the Dodencanese Island (Rhodes) italian territory. It also has to pass close to Crete and the Italian Libyan coast. It would seem that the British would have to find another base, closer to Malta and not close to the Italian coast. Unfortunately, with the capture of Albania, that becomes even more difficult. However, it was always assumed that the posture for the RN was offensive. The British never had much respect for the Italians and always felt that they were an irresolute bunch. As a sea power of the first order, the British RN strategy would be sea control and denial by economic blockade. To the British navy, the weak Italian economy could be strangled easily.

One part that was problematic was the British Army and Air Force in Egypt. If they lost Egypt or at least there was an Italian movement toward Egypt, there would be nothing the RN could really do about it. With Italian aircraft and ships along the Libyan and in Egypt, Alexandria becomes untenable and the fleet has to move to the Red Sea. Game is over in the Eastern Med in that case.

Here is an assessment by Sir Dudley Pound, circa 1938: I am only providing the total ships, not individual numbers.
Italy - 177
Britain -74

Clearly, the fleet assembled in Alexandria would have had, as its goal, the interdiction of supplies headed to Libya through Tripoli and Tunis. However, I can't believe the British ever really believed that they could sever that supply line. I also believe that the intervention of the Germans was a total surprise, never gamed in the halls of the Admiralty. I know it wasn't gamed in the Halls of Wehrmacht.

So, the British had about four years to plan for a conflict with the Italians, knowing that a conflict with the Japanese was a certainty. It was a question then, of too much to defend with too little resources. The Axis seemed to have figured that out, very quickly. Now one can see why Hitler and Mussolini might have shuttered when told of the Pearl Harbor attack. ;)

[old_pop2000]

Interesting to think about the course of history. Before the Abyssinian crisis, the Italians and French had good relations. They had pulled their forces away from the frontier and there were even plans for Italy to allow the French to move through their territory to secure and assist Austria in case of the Anschluss. The British were definitely on the side of the Ethiopians but the French had to pick a side. They chose the British. This action pushed the Italians towards the Germans and thereby hangs a tale.