Tomahawk anti ship missile?

[Kyle Holgate]

http://www.azstarnet.com/allheadlines/300581

Interesting that there is now discussion about re-adding long range anti-ship capability to surface ships. Right now they are limited to Harpoon missiles with a range of somewhere around 100-120 miles as far as I can glean from reading pubs and what not. Giving anti-ship capability to the land attack tomahawks would increase their ability to "reach out and touch" an enemy by 10x.
Much like with the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile though, you still have to localize an enemy ship well enough to be within the range of whatever you use for terminal guidance - IR, radar, radar seeking, whatever. It looks like they'd have a radar detector and analyzer built in. Most interesting, at least to me as a former Electronics Warfare tech.

[old_pop2000]

http://www.azstarnet.com/allheadlines/300581

Interesting that there is now discussion about re-adding long range anti-ship capability to surface ships. Right now they are limited to Harpoon missiles with a range of somewhere around 100-120 miles as far as I can glean from reading pubs and what not. Giving anti-ship capability to the land attack tomahawks would increase their ability to "reach out and touch" an enemy by 10x.
Much like with the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile though, you still have to localize an enemy ship well enough to be within the range of whatever you use for terminal guidance - IR, radar, radar seeking, whatever. It looks like they'd have a radar detector and analyzer built in. Most interesting, at least to me as a former Electronics Warfare tech.

The Block IV TLAM-E already has the range at 1000 statute miles, but that is with the old warhead. If you are going to increase the size of the warhead, then there will be a drop off in range, so now that problem has to be solved. The guidance already has the capability, but will need to be expanded and the countermeasures will have to be expanded. Those are all do-able, but just take time and money. How much of an increased threat, is debateable.

[steel_selachian]

The Block IV TLAM-E already has the range at 1000 statute miles, but that is with the old warhead. If you are going to increase the size of the warhead, then there will be a drop off in range, so now that problem has to be solved. The guidance already has the capability, but will need to be expanded and the countermeasures will have to be expanded. Those are all do-able, but just take time and money. How much of an increased threat, is debateable.

In general it's sort of like how the SM-2 has become a dual-purpose antiair and antisurface weapon - the surface warriors can "neck down" their missile arsenals into four weapons, and the subs can carry long-range antiship weapons without sacrificing torpedoes or land-attack missiles.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=dti&id=news/ANTI050609.xml

As for warhead weight, Aviation Week states that it'll be a changeover from a blast-fragmentation warhead to a shaped charge. So it won't get heavier, it'll just be delivering a more focused blast. That might impact the land-attack function (one mode on the TLAM allows it to airburst over targets like SAM sites and exposed aircraft), but it'll be better for cracking hardened targets. Still remains to be seen how much weight the new guidance package will add, though.

[Warship NWS]

With miniaturized electronics capabilities I would not be a bit surprised if a package is developed to allow for land attack/naval attack dual role capability in the same missile - nice little "try and guess what we are shooting at" FOW tactic. Remember, there is no telling what we do NOT know since we are only given "public" intel.

In the future I see the serious possibility of multi-mission missiles attacking any target - sea, land, air and possibly even submerged.

[Kyle Holgate]

With miniaturized electronics capabilities I would not be a bit surprised if a package is developed to allow for land attack/naval attack dual role capability in the same missile - nice little "try and guess what we are shooting at" FOW tactic. Remember, there is no telling what we do NOT know since we are only given "public" intel.

In the future I see the serious possibility of multi-mission missiles attacking any target - sea, land, air and possibly even submerged.

I'd bet that multi-role is possible if not probable, but I do wonder about cost and whether a multi-role missile might not be less effective in some places than purpose built. A warhead meant to do more damage to a ship for example may be less effective against a land target and vice versa.
It's rather fun to guess what's really going on by reading between the lines of Aviation weekly, Janes and other publications. I don't get to find out how close I guessed until 20 years after the fact (if then), but enjoyable anyway!

[Warship NWS]

If we can slap an SM2 with a 137lb warhead into a ship using a contact fuze as easily as we can explode it in midair with a proximity fuze vs an aerial target then multi-targeting is not a problem. Even shells can be auto-fuzed before firing at a target - proximity, base, or point. Considering that we are using smaller blast "footprint" munitions now to reduce colatoral damage effects missiles with smaller, yet more effective, and/or multi-purpose warheads will have more targeting applications then ever before. In any case, mission killing is FAR easier then total destruction and that is the name of the game for future modern weapons - adaptability/flexibility, mission kill effectiveness, and cost effectiveness. If you have a weapon that can mission kill any target anywhere.. you have a serious tactical/logistical advantage vs specialized weapons - same argument applied for the F/A-18 vs specialized naval aircraft.

[old_pop2000]

I'd bet that multi-role is possible if not probable, but I do wonder about cost and whether a multi-role missile might not be less effective in some places than purpose built. A warhead meant to do more damage to a ship for example may be less effective against a land target and vice versa.
It's rather fun to guess what's really going on by reading between the lines of Aviation weekly, Janes and other publications. I don't get to find out how close I guessed until 20 years after the fact (if then), but enjoyable anyway!


According to a NAVAIR document dtd December 10th, 2007 Acquisition Program PMA-280 Tomahawk Multi Effects Warhead System (MEWS) was already awarded because the drop dead date was January 9th, 2008.

Objective: Develop a reactive shaped; charge warhead liner that will produce more damage in concrete and rock targets than alumininum.

http://www.navysbir.com/n08_1/N081-028.htm

That would indicate that the shaped charge liner against an aluminum ship was already available or NAVAIR would have added that to the title of the program.

Seems like the warhead issue is already solved. Guidance would be the last issue.

[Scott Chisholm]

Wowzer. I can think of so many reasons why this is a Bad Idea I don't even know where to start....

The first thing to remember is that every single AShM shot by anyone was within radar, if not visual, line of sight of the target. Nobody wants to be the one to be the first to hit a cruise ship with a cruise missile....:eek:

I can think of one time where an air (?) launched Harpoon shot OTH on a test range clobbered a foreign merchant that happened to stray into its path. We won't go into the fact the merchant was in a designated hot zone. Freedom of navigation and all that.

Has anyone given thought to the area of uncertainty of a target 1000 nm away? A missile travelling at 0.9 mach travels about 9 miles/minute at sea level. That's about 100 minutes of flight time. A contact moving at 15 kts can travel about 25 nm in that time. 25 squared times 3 is about 46,900 square miles. That is a whole lot of ocean for a missile to search for a target. You'd almost have to have continuous tracking of the target, or some way to keep the AOU down to something reasonable.

And, what are the chances of the missile clobbering something by accident on the way in?

We got rid of TASM in the first place because the 250nm range was something we'd never use. Now we want a 1000 nm missile? Who's the target? Chinese naval units invading Taiwan? Shoot the missiles from a Sea Base on the east side of Taiwan? Perhaps....

Good Lord, we've got better things to spend our money on. Like a replacement for the FFGs....

With a 5" gun, of course.:p

[Warship NWS]

Scott.. we have the ability to give missiles IR/Radar "signatures", IFF, target recognition, MITL terminal guidance, etc.. to help avoid "neutral" losses. The USN already has such targeting options for the SLAM-ER - thus making the Harpoon a land attack/naval attack dual missile. Point being, doing so with a Tomahawk is likely no major challenge. The technology available is much more advanced then the older TASMs using Harpoon radar homing seekers. I do agree though.. the USN needs to figure out a good FFG design - something more cost effective then being forced to always use floating missile battleships.

[old_pop2000]

The first thing to remember is that every single AShM shot by anyone was within radar, if not visual, line of sight of the target. Nobody wants to be the one to be the first to hit a cruise ship with a cruise missile....:eek:

I can think of one time where an air (?) launched Harpoon shot OTH on a test range clobbered a foreign merchant that happened to stray into its path. We won't go into the fact the merchant was in a designated hot zone. Freedom of navigation and all that.

Has anyone given thought to the area of uncertainty of a target 1000 nm away? A missile travelling at 0.9 mach travels about 9 miles/minute at sea level. That's about 100 minutes of flight time. A contact moving at 15 kts can travel about 25 nm in that time. 25 squared times 3 is about 46,900 square miles. That is a whole lot of ocean for a missile to search for a target. You'd almost have to have continuous tracking of the target, or some way to keep the AOU down to something reasonable.

And, what are the chances of the missile clobbering something by accident on the way in?

We got rid of TASM in the first place because the 250nm range was something we'd never use. Now we want a 1000 nm missile? Who's the target? Chinese naval units invading Taiwan? Shoot the missiles from a Sea Base on the east side of Taiwan? Perhaps....

...

I would agree on the point about hitting the wrong target. This is a problem that will have to be investigated and solved, however, capabilities must be always be explored and developed. The 1000 mile Tomahawk with a ship killing warhead must be designed and built, and deployed. If only to serve notice to our enemies that the capability of hitting their ships from long distance, accurately is available and under the correct circumstances, will be used. In almost every naval action in WWII, we can show that the side that struck first, usually won the battle. A ship killing missile can give you the first strike capability, which can decide future battles. It did in the past.

[Warship NWS]

There is also something to be said of a missile that has the hitting power of a 2000lb bomb slamming into a ship (not including missile fuel). Unless the ship has a top notch D/C team that ship might be burnt to the keel after just one hit - not even stating the fact that the Tomahawk BlockIV airframe is more "stealthy" then the Harpoon. Launch a multi-axis attack and the missile could clean house of an enemy naval formation - or be a major deterrent to an enemy wanting to operate a naval formation thus possibly reducing the cohesion of the enemy naval units. Most navies also have limitations to engaging a VLOW stealthy threat. Not all navies have AWACS, multi-function jammers, AEGIS, fully-networked and layered air defense systems, stealthy ships, effective CAPs with L/D capability, etc. Yes, I am all in favor of another way to screw with the enemy formations - if they attempt to deploy a formation of ships. Much cheaper, and damn harder to stop, then risking pilots in F/A-18s and allows the option to react faster then firing off a few Mk48s. A single DDG/CG could effectively be a serious anti-surface combatant deterrent or suppression system if it carried 50+ modernized TASM type weapons and lets not forget the SSGN conversions.. that would prove seriously nasty to an enemy fleet.

[steel_selachian]

I would agree on the point about hitting the wrong target. This is a problem that will have to be investigated and solved, however, capabilities must be always be explored and developed. The 1000 mile Tomahawk with a ship killing warhead must be designed and built, and deployed. If only to serve notice to our enemies that the capability of hitting their ships from long distance, accurately is available and under the correct circumstances, will be used. In almost every naval action in WWII, we can show that the side that struck first, usually won the battle. A ship killing missile can give you the first strike capability, which can decide future battles. It did in the past.

According to the article, the new seeker is a millimeter-wave radar, like the ones fitted on the Longbow Hellfire and AARGM. I imagine those things would have better target resolution than the old Harpoon seeker. Add in the ARM/ESM system plus the datalink and you should be able to pick your target out, especially if you have an asset such as a Global Hawk, P-8, or recon-equpped Super Hornet in the area to provide targeting info.

If nothing else, it is a deterrent weapon - now just one DDG or SSN and some recon assets is a potential threat to any surface target within 1000 miles. And in all likelihood, it wouldn't be used for antishipping work unless a) Mama CVN and the Air Force aren't around to help in dire straits or b) you want to shotgun a large enemy naval formation (carrier group or amphib convoy) with missiles in conjunction with an alpha strike. TOT strike of low-flying cruisers plus aircraft-launched Harpoons, AARGMs, and SLAM-ERs to saturate and confuse air defenses with multiple attack vectors, altitudes, and seeker modes.

EDIT: Jeez, I forgot about the Ohio SSGNs - just the suspicion that something quiet with 154 antiship-capable missiles in the area is lurking about would be a major pucker factor for any task force commander. Oscar-IIs are bad enough news.

[Warship NWS]

SS, I agree to a point on some parts but not on others,

a) Mixing SLAM-ERs, Imp. TASMs, and Harpoons would not be likely. Different attack patterns, seekers, TOT profiles, etc. It would be very difficult to coordinate such an attack - not including the potential waste of a lot of ordnance. An alpha-strike with Imp. TASM attack.. possibly, one used to cover the other. Keep the ships busy while the aircraft finish the job thus possibly allowing for timely battle damage intel which in turn would reduce the potential re-attack on same targets that are already effectively mission killed thus reducing valuable ordnance expenditure.

b) Imp. TASM (for lack of better terms) using a MMW is interesting but adding in HOJ would be counterproductive. I would wager a possible IIR seeker backup similar to the AGM-119 Penguin which is already calibrated for anti-shipping attacks.

c) I agree on the "shotgun" attack vs a surface naval group and thus a potential naval deterrent weapon and backup for surface ships in case the CVN deck is unavailable or if protecting an amphibious group from larger surface units that Harpoons may only damage but not always neutralize unless hit multiple times.

If targeting could be achieved for the launch via networked assets the SSGN, or even VLS SSN, could be deadly and stay out of range of ASW stand-off weapons and even ASW helos when attacking a surface group. The biggest trick is.. targeting accuracy for effective TOT engagements and avoiding neutral/freindly assets being attacked.

[steel_selachian]

SS, I agree to a point on some parts but not on others,

a) Mixing SLAM-ERs, Imp. TASMs, and Harpoons would not be likely. Different attack patterns, seekers, TOT profiles, etc. It would be very difficult to coordinate such an attack - not including the potential waste of a lot of ordnance. An alpha-strike with Imp. TASM attack.. possibly, one used to cover the other. Keep the ships busy while the aircraft finish the job thus possibly allowing for timely battle damage intel which in turn would reduce the potential re-attack on same targets that are already effectively mission killed thus reducing valuable ordnance expenditure.

b) Imp. TASM (for lack of better terms) using a MMW is interesting but adding in HOJ would be counterproductive. I would wager a possible IIR seeker backup similar to the AGM-119 Penguin which is already calibrated for anti-shipping attacks.

c) I agree on the "shotgun" attack vs a surface naval group and thus a potential naval deterrent weapon and backup for surface ships in case the CVN deck is unavailable or if protecting an amphibious group from larger surface units that Harpoons may only damage but not always neutralize.

If targeting could be achieved for the launch via networked assets the SSGN, or even VLS SSN, could be deadly and stay out of range of ASW stand-off weapons and even ASW helos when attacking a surface group. The biggest trick is.. targeting accuracy for effective TOT engagements and avoiding neutral/freindly assets being attacked.

I agree with your point a - that would be difficult and wasteful and unneccessary in 99.9% of situations. Ergo, it would only be an option if you're faced with a really tough nut to crack and have to kill a lot of well-armed AAW ships with no concern for missile expenditure. An unlikely scenario, but if China ever puts together some carriers and starts building a series-production follow-on to their recent classes of AAW DDGs with APARs and long-range SAMs it might be an option we'd want handy. As you said, any option to mess with the enemy's head is a good one. Using multiple weapons means if he lights off jammers and radars he becomes a target for the ARMs; if he stays quiet the radar seekers will find him; and while all this is going on the IIR weapons will be homing in passively, with no ESM emissions and a low RCS.

As for the MMW seeker option in the new Tomahawks, apparently that's currently in the AGM-88E AARGM as well, the idea being that it's a backup seeker if a mobile SAM site or ship kills its radars during the engagement. Likewise, it seems like on the Tomahawk it'll be used for terminal-phase homing while the ESM system will get the missile in the kill box and identify the right target. As far as I know, the Block IV doesn't have an IIR seeker and I haven't seen plans to add it in the new mod, but it does apparently have an LLTV camera for Bomb Damage Assessments, retargeting, and tracking moving targets. Which means that the bad guys will be hunted by a low-RCS missile that can be command-targeted by a datalink, and even if they manage to jam that they have to defeat a MMW seeker to boot. And of course, if they're jamming they're going to turn themselves into a big fat target anyway. If they're not jamming the datalink, the operator on the boat/aircraft controlling the weapons can VID targets and assign weapons as needed.

[Warship NWS]

Just remember SS.. all any of us can do is guess at what the final designs will be. It is all scuttlebutt until the money is paid, the weapon is designed, and then deployed - even then they could possibly mod it in someway that noone knows about except those with security clearance. ;)

[steel_selachian]

Exactly. "I'm just a civilian here ..."

[Kyle Holgate]

Nations the US is likely to "have words with" try hard and with an unknown rate of success to keep track of where the USN carriers are at. Clearly if they are going to make mischief, doing it when no carrier is in the area is a good idea. With this proposed TASM though, any large USN ship let alone submarine can reach out and touch them from a considerable distance. Something to worry about for any potential enemy, if nothing else.

I wonder at the effectiveness of this weapon. The Tomahawks and Harpoons for that matter are comparatively slow missiles. Sea skimming sub mach missiles have been around a long time now. How hard really are they to shoot down in this day and age? Even the Aegis system is what, 25 or more years old? If a potential nation is 25 years behind the USN in technology... the "slow" sea skimmers may not be quite the threat they once were.
I can understand why the mach 3 sea skimmers are being built.

[old_pop2000]

Nations the US is likely to "have words with" try hard and with an unknown rate of success to keep track of where the USN carriers are at. Clearly if they are going to make mischief, doing it when no carrier is in the area is a good idea. With this proposed TASM though, any large USN ship let alone submarine can reach out and touch them from a considerable distance. Something to worry about for any potential enemy, if nothing else.

I wonder at the effectiveness of this weapon. The Tomahawks and Harpoons for that matter are comparatively slow missiles. Sea skimming sub mach missiles have been around a long time now. How hard really are they to shoot down in this day and age? Even the Aegis system is what, 25 or more years old? If a potential nation is 25 years behind the USN in technology... the "slow" sea skimmers may not be quite the threat they once were.
I can understand why the mach 3 sea skimmers are being built.

So are F-18E's when loaded with three 480 gallon drop tanks, Sidewinder missiles and Harpoon missiles. In fact, they are slower than a sea skimming, subsonic missile. A block III/IV tomahawk has a speed of 550 MPH. A fully loaded F-18 might be able to attain that speed, but not maintain it without air refueling. So, it would have a speed probably in the 450-480 mph range. The F-18E has a much higher RCS than the missile and not as agile. So, IMO, the unmanned, lower RCS, faster sea skimmer is the better choice. High speed means a bigger missile to carry the fuel unless it does a steep climb to high altitude, shut off the engine and just glides down toward the target. Then you are susceptible to FLIR and radar tracking system detection.

[Warship NWS]

the "slow" sea skimmers may not be quite the threat they once were


And exactly how many TLAMS have been shot down? Now figure TASM 2s will fly lower, will have a "stealthy" airframe, and the enemy will not know when or from what direction they are fired from, do not usually have good AWACS running around to find them thus giving them maybe "seconds" to respond using usually standard types of SS radars, etc.. SS missiles are still a serious threat and of which is why there are still being built in significant numbers by a variety of nations. A TASM 2 *could* be arguably one of the most difficult to counter AShMs ever built counting on "stealth" rather then sheer speed as a way to penetrate the enemy defenses. Even the original TASM was *supposedly* a difficult missile to engage - I will stop there. Just remember, the people that build the TLAM/TASM are not completely oblivious to what the enemy might have to try and counter it.

[old_pop2000]

And exactly how many TLAMS have been shot down? Now figure TASM 2s will fly lower, will have a "stealthy" airframe, and the enemy will not know when or from what direction they are fired from, do not usually have good AWACS running around to find them thus giving them maybe "seconds" to respond using usually standard types of SS radars, etc.. SS missiles are still a serious threat and of which is why there are still being built in significant numbers by a variety of nations. A TASM 2 *could* be arguably one of the most difficult to counter AShMs ever built counting on "stealth" rather then sheer speed as a way to penetrate the enemy defenses. Even the original TASM was *supposedly* a difficult missile to engage - I will stop there. Just remember, the people that build the TLAM/TASM are not completely oblivious to what the enemy might have to try and counter it.

Practically speaking a force commander will use all his weapons to attack his enemy. He may launch an alpha type strike armed with Harpoon and at the same time or maybe a little later, launch a TASM strike. One group will compliment the other. The opponent may focus on the manned airstrike, and may miss the low level sea skimming missiles. Timing is everything. However, all of the weapons resources must be available. Short, medium and long ranged TASM's, air launched missiles and guided bombs. The long range TASM is just another weapon in the arsenal. Just like the knights of old, a lance, a sword and knife. Long range, medium range and short range weapons. Remember that the force commander will have civilian ROE to follow. He may not like them, but he must follow them. They might preclude him from using the long range weapons. Sound like Vietnam?

[Kyle Holgate]

And exactly how many TLAMS have been shot down? .

None have been fired at enemy ships to my knowledge - so it's got a perfect track record. Commendable.
I was just trying to discuss it, not take any side or open up a debate on the topic.

[old_pop2000]

None have been fired at enemy ships to my knowledge - so it's got a perfect track record. Commendable.
I was just trying to discuss it, not take any side or open up a debate on the topic.


Hi Kyle:
I think it is worth discussing. I believe that the enhancement of the Tomahawk into a long range ship killer, is worth the research and development. Whether it will ever be used is conjecture. But the topic is worth discussing.

With My Compliments

[john964]

Hi Kyle:
I think it is worth discussing. I believe that the enhancement of the Tomahawk into a long range ship killer, is worth the research and development. Whether it will ever be used is conjecture. But the topic is worth discussing.

With My Compliments
I personally agree with you Dennis. I tend to have the Marine philosophy of " Better to have it and not need it than to need and not have it". My guess most of teh R&D is software and maybe some off-the-shelf hardware.

[old_pop2000]

Something to consider about missiles and range. The longer the range to the target, the greater the chance of failure in the missile. Those failures can be in the motors, guidance, electromechanical systems for the fins, or just the fickle finger of fate. Let's not get enamored with the one thousand mile range. Even if the missile has that range, I would not necessarily be sanguine about using it at its maximum setting. I would bet that the designers and the Navy would be willing to accept a shorter range for increased reliability and accuracy. Just some thoughts

[Warship NWS]

Correct, the TLAM was not fired at ships, however, it had to fly higher over land and extremely few (IIRC only 1-2 if confirmed) - if any - were shot down. If it is that hard to shoot down for SAMs, AAA, etc.. then why would it be any easier to shoot down if stealthier, flying lower, and over water vs. ships? That was my point in case I was not clear enough, not trying to sound overly direct.

The concept of a stealthier TASM2 IMHO has definite merit and should be included in the USN arsenal as another tool of destruction rather then depending entirely on dual purpose SAMs, F/A-18s, scant few RGM-84s, maybe some gunfire, and torpedoes to kill naval units. We could use a rapid response sledge hammer that is a bitch to shoot down for most potential threatening navies and that carries a warhead that can mission kill most warships bigger then a corvette.

[Warship NWS]

Let's not get enamored with the one thousand mile range. Even if the missile has that range, I would not necessarily be sanguine about using it at its maximum setting. I would bet that the designers and the Navy would be willing to accept a shorter range for increased reliability and accuracy. Just some thoughts


100% agreed.. and any left over fuel would make a nice ship fire. The range *would* be nice to have IF needed .. but the thought that you have a wicked hammer for anything within 10-1000 miles radius would definitely give pause to even to the most careless enemy naval commander. Never know when one might pop-up a few seconds away from your nice big expensive ship.

[john964]

Correct, the TLAM was not fired at ships, however, it had to fly higher over land and extremely few (IIRC only 1-2 if confirmed) - if any - were shot down. If it is that hard to shoot down for SAMs, AAA, etc.. then why would it be any easier to shoot down if stealthier, flying lower, and over water vs. ships? That was my point in case I was not clear enough, not trying to sound overly direct.

The concept of a stealthier TASM2 IMHO has definite merit and should be included in the USN arsenal as another tool of destruction rather then depending entirely on dual purpose SAMs, F/A-18s, scant few RGM-84s, maybe some gunfire, and torpedoes to kill naval units. We could use a rapid response sledge hammer that is a bitch to shoot down for most potential threatening navies and that carries a warhead that can mission kill most warships bigger then a corvette.
Chris the advantage with flying over land with the TLAM is you can route it over less populated areas and between known defenses. During PG1 my ship fired several the first night of the air war. One of our targets was the Basara main telephone switching center. We fired from the central gulf but our missles were routed over western neutral zone.

Another thing to concider also with the 1000 mile range TASM is using one platform for a multi axis TOT attack.

[old_pop2000]

FYI

Source: NavSource.org - http://www.navsource.org/archives/01/57s1.htm




TASM

In November 1972 design began for the Tomahawk anti-ship missile.
It carried the same 1,000-pound high-explosive semi-armor-piercing warhead as the conventional land-attack Tomahawk.
It could penetrate a submarine's pressure hull or a large warship's hull plating.
Originally it was planned for a range of 140 nautical miles, which was adequate for underwater launch, since submarines find targets by sonar and are invulnerable to hostile cruise missiles during approach to target.
Surface warships needed a longer-range weapon to attack Soviet warships, which could fire their anti-ship missiles from 250 nautical miles.
Surface search radars cannot be used for long-range anti-ship targeting (over-the-horizon targeting) because of their inherent horizon-limited range, about 2—50 miles.
The challenge was not to build a 250-nautical-mile-range missile but to plan a targeting system for it.
Critics doubted that a task group would fire weapons over the horizon at targets that task group sensors could not locate, since the probability of missing the targets would seem to be high, making an over-the-horizon attack an act of unilateral disarmament.
The same critics accepted that the large Soviet anti-ship cruise missiles were threats from 250 nautical miles' range. Rear Admiral Walter Locke, the cruise missile project officer, asked the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the Harpoon seeker contractor, McDonnell Douglas, to investigate whether a Tomahawk could search for a target inside an area of uncertainty.
Replacing the Tomahawk anti-ship missile turbojet with the costlier land-attack Tomahawk turbofan engine could increase TASM range to over 300 nautical miles to allow the missile to fly search patterns. In 1975 the applied Physics Laboratory developed search patterns so that the Tomahawk anti-ship missile was capable of autonomous scouting and strike missions.

The next problem was how to get surveillance information to the launching ship for over-the-horizon targeting.
Opponents within OSD refused to authorize funds for research into over-the-horizon targeting, but the Naval Electronics Systems Command funded an experiment called Outlaw Shark.
For this experiment, a computer database was set up at the Submarine Operational Command Center in Naples, Italy and another computer was installed aboard a submarine.
The Naples Outlaw Shark system copied operational intelligence data being collected for later transmission to a Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier, condensed the data and relayed it without delay to the submarine over a computer-to-computer encrypted radio data link.
Sometimes the submarine received intelligence data only six minutes after the occurrence of the event being described. The submarine's computer correlated the intelligence data with its own contact data and prepared search patterns adequate for an immediate Tomahawk anti-ship attack.
In December 1976 the submarine used this system to generate search patterns for actual ships not held by its own sensors.
Analyses showed that the search patterns would result in Tomahawk hits on those ships.
The first test of a Tomahawk anti-ship missile was a launch at a target hulk 224 nautical miles away.
The Tomahawk flew 175 nautical miles to the target and began searching.
It then flew 173 nautical miles in search patterns and found the target.
This was the first long-range anti-ship cruise missile flight not to use a data link between the missile and a controller.
Tomahawk anti-ship missiles became operational in 1982.
In contrast to the procedure for early Tomahawk land-attack missiles, for the anti-ship mission the ship controlled all targeting and planned the entire strike mission.
Tomahawk weapons control systems were SWG-2 for armoured box launchers and SWG-3 for vertical launch systems. (http://navsource.org/archives/01/061/016100t.jpg)
Each provided track – and launch control functions.
The ship used the launch-control group to track the status of the Tomahawk missiles and to fire them.
The Tomahawk anti-ship missile used the Harpoon active radar guidance section with a passive seeker for identification and direction finding.
The missile classified and prioritized targets to attack the most valuable target.

As with Harpoon, Tomahawk anti-ship missiles could fly dogleg courses so that they could attack from unexpected directions and in such a way that missiles from one or more ships arrived on target simultaneously.
The ship kept a database of surface ships in her assigned patrol area on the track-control group computer.
In the initial Tomahawk weapons control system, each ship kept her own track database.
With newer versions, one ship was the force over-the-horizon track coordinator (FOTC) for a task group.
Track data came from the ship's own sensors, NTDS data links and intelligence sources.
General surveillance information came from surveillance satellites and aircraft, from SOSUS and from shore-based (Outboard) radio direction finding.
Each ship's Tomahawk weapon control system was linked to tactical information exchange satellite radio broadcasts (TADIXS and OTCIXS) over the ship's radios.

A newer system, JOTS, recorded data from OTCIXS and TADIXS broadcasts and maintained a local picture as seen by off-ship sensors.
JOTS used commercial computers and was entirely passive.
The ship could get into Tomahawk range without revealing her presence to the target.
A Tomahawk anti-ship missile could be fired as a "wake-up call" or "screaming meemie" towards a radio-silent enemy battle group.
It the enemy ships would switch on their radars to target the actively searching Tomahawk, a follow-on strike could exploit the newly available locating information.
Spruance class destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers can use their long-range passive towed-array sonar to locate targets over the horizon.
Submarines have long used the same tactic.

BTW, firing a TASM at extended range, also give your opponent time to use countermeasures on it. Range is a double edged sword.;)

[Warship NWS]

Chris the advantage with flying over land with the TLAM is you can route it over less populated areas and between known defenses. During PG1 my ship fired several the first night of the air war. One of our targets was the Basara main telephone switching center. We fired from the central gulf but our missles were routed over western neutral zone.

Another thing to concider also with the 1000 mile range TASM is using one platform for a multi axis TOT attack.

Quite well aware of the USAF/USN uses of the TLAM..;) And yes, the long range could allow for multi-axis attacks, same as with the original TASM.

[Warship NWS]

FYI

Source: NavSource.org - http://www.navsource.org/archives/01/57s1.htm



BTW, firing a TASM at extended range, also give your opponent time to use countermeasures on it. Range is a double edged sword.;)

IF, and this is a big IF, the enemy knows they are even in flight. We have fired hundreds of TLAMs and damn few were ever detected and even if so, little to nothing could be done about them as it was often too late. This is where the "stealth", dog-legs, waypoints, terrain masking (still usefull over water in certain locations), etc.. to avoid detection comes into play. This is also why I addressed the requirement of a potential opponent to have good radars, AWACS (big difference here and damned expensive), LD/SD capable aircraft, etc.. I will just say that even the original TASM was NOT an easy target to find and kill - and that was over 20 years ago, imagine present electronic/stealth technology, hell 20 years ago we were screwing around with DOS and 386s - now we can pack that much technology in a cell phone.

[old_pop2000]

IF, and this is a big IF, the enemy knows they are even in flight. We have fired hundreds of TLAMs and damn few were ever detected and even if so, little to nothing could be done about them as it was often too late. This is where the "stealth", dog-legs, waypoints, terrain masking (still usefull over water in certain locations), etc.. to avoid detection comes into play. This is also why I addressed the requirement of a potential opponent to have good radars, AWACS (big difference here and damned expensive), LD/SD capable aircraft, etc.. I will just say that even the original TASM was NOT an easy target to find and kill - and that was over 20 years ago, imagine present electronic/stealth technology, hell 20 years ago we were screwing around with DOS and 386s - now we can pack that much technology in a cell phone.

I would be quick to point out that our only firings of TLAMs have been against the 4th rate air defense system in Iraq in 1991, Afghanistan, Sudan and the former Yugoslav states. We fired 45 in 1993 against Iraq and 325 in Desert Fox. We fired 13 against Serbian AD and 218 against Kosovo, with about 30 against Sudan and 60 plus in Afghanistan. We fired 288 against Iraq in 1991.

Now, to my knowledge, except for possibly the Serbians, none of the opponents had anything near what could be called a first rate air defense system. IMHO, the jury is still out on the issue of a first rate air defense system versus a long range TASM shot.

[Warship NWS]

Who would you consider a first rate air defense system vs the TLAM? ;) I would not knock the Iraqi air defenses down to a "4th rate" in 1991.. it was a fairly integrated network of SAMs/AAAs - I think it would have been closer to "2nd rate" depending on how you guage the entire "rating" system and specific location of air defense systems/networks. The Bosnians also had some reasonably good air defense units. We lost of lot of planes over Vietnam to non-radar guided weapons as an example.. so even those "4th raters" proved to be dangerous. However, this could be a very debateable topic as there are a LOT of variables when your talking about air defense systems.

At this point however, I need to bow out so I can get back to work here. Have fun with this interesting topic. :)

[Christian Schwietzke]

In Tom Clancy´s Red Storm Rising, ASMs are used at their maximum range once - to attack an amphibious force crammed into a the area around a known beachhead. I can see very long-ranged missiles being useful for that sort of thing, where missile targeting systems would have to search only a very limited area.
Ironically, in just that engagement, a disproportionate number of missiles are wasted because their seeker heads guide them into hot volcanic rock instead of ships...

On a related note, back when I was playing Harpoon 3, pretty much every time I launched an OTH strike with missiles at an entire group of ships, once the first ship got hit all or almost all the following missiles re-aimed themselves at the (now presumably burning) ship that was hit, which is probably not surprising as it is now the hottest thing in the area.


On the Iraqi air defense system... in Every Man a Tiger, General Horner states that, prior to being disrupted by the Allies in the opening hours of the war, the KARI system was pretty much as close as you could get to first-rate outside the US or Soviet Union (though I don´t think he used those exact words).

[old_pop2000]

In Tom Clancy´s Red Storm Rising, ASMs are used at their maximum range once - to attack an amphibious force crammed into a the area around a known beachhead. I can see very long-ranged missiles being useful for that sort of thing, where missile targeting systems would have to search only a very limited area.
Ironically, in just that engagement, a disproportionate number of missiles are wasted because their seeker heads guide them into hot volcanic rock instead of ships...

On a related note, back when I was playing Harpoon 3, pretty much every time I launched an OTH strike with missiles at an entire group of ships, once the first ship got hit all or almost all the following missiles re-aimed themselves at the (now presumably burning) ship that was hit, which is probably not surprising as it is now the hottest thing in the area.


On the Iraqi air defense system... in Every Man a Tiger, General Horner states that, prior to being disrupted by the Allies in the opening hours of the war, the KARI system was pretty much as close as you could get to first-rate outside the US or Soviet Union (though I don´t think he used those exact words).

The Iraqi Air Defense, by Horner and many others, including the author of the air plan, was fourth level Soviet system designed in the early 1960's against manned aircraft, not against low flying TLAM's. It akin to the air defense system used by the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. As a GAO document stated " Despite the numerious components of the IADS, its actual operating capabilities were quite limited. The system was designed to counter comparatively limited threats from Israel and Iran. It was never designed to cope with hundreds of aircraft and unmanned aerial decoys or missiles."

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gao/nsiad97134/app_06.htm

With My Compliments

[john964]

On a related note, back when I was playing Harpoon 3, pretty much every time I launched an OTH strike with missiles at an entire group of ships, once the first ship got hit all or almost all the following missiles re-aimed themselves at the (now presumably burning) ship that was hit, which is probably not surprising as it is now the hottest thing in the area.
Christian, I did much the same thing except I would stager my targets hitting the farthest targets first with the first missles and the closer targets with the last missles fired acciving somthing close to a TOT.

[Warship NWS]

It was never designed to cope with hundreds of aircraft and unmanned aerial decoys or missiles.



I do not want to get into a debate about air defense systems as that could last for weeks..;), however, it does not take a first rate system to kill missiles flying by. If one looks at any air defense system trying to deal with the meanest and baddest air force in the world with all of its toys and technology advancements I think any nation would be hard pressed to cope with such an onslaught. However, we did use AH-64s and F-117s to pave a "path" for the non-stealthy aerial armada so we did respect the Iraqi defenses. In any case, few nations on the planet could try and compute the odds of trying to engage one of the most difficult to detect missiles in the world.. the TLAM.. being fired at them in rapid succession from a wide range of attack profiles and flight paths - AKA threading the defenses and terrain. We even knew that our air defenses would have been pushed to the limit over Germany had a hot war started with our air superiority being under the gun to suppress thousands of Soviet aircraft being thrown into the mix. As my signature says - before one judges a military force one must judge their opposition - and this works both ways.

Man I wish I had the time to play along with this direction of the thread.. but I am sure all of you will have some fun with it. ;)

[Christian Schwietzke]

As my signature says - before one judges a military force one must judge their opposition - and this works both ways.

Sure. As air defense systems of 3rd-world countries go, KARI was probably a pretty good one. And I guess given what it was up against, shooting down some 40 or so aircraft is not a bad result. I mean, what would have been capable of stopping the Coalition attack, other than a force to match that of the Coalition?

[Warship NWS]

To CS, correct.. when the coalition was deployed the allied forces were in no way in hell going to fight fair. Every advantage in the arsenal was going to be used against the Iraqi forces - better to spend money on bigger better smarter bullets then lives - both for life saving reasons and for the "political" reasons, lose enough lives and the media will cost you the war. (Nuff said there)

To clarify my previous post of "it does not take a first rate system to kill missiles flying by." Air defenses should not always be guaged on "ratings" - why? To kill a threat it is more of a matter of having the right weapon in the right place at the right time. We lost aircraft to ALL types of weapons vs the Vietnamese - some weapons were over 20+ years old by the time the war started, didn't matter as they could still kill expensive jet planes if they hit them. The Isrealis got hammered by the Arab AD network covering the Suez until the Arabs got frisky and crossed over with tanks and moved beyond the SAM/AAA umbrella and in turn got slaughtered.

Point being.. air defenses are deployed in 3 layers.. local/organic, operational, and theater - depending on nationality, armed forces, etc. Any can kill a threat IF the weapon is in the right place at the right time and can acquire, track, and kill the target. A TLAM only flies at around 500 knots - where it gets to be a bitch to kill is that it flies VERY low to the ground, threads the terrain and known/probable AD defenses, and uses a "stealthy" airframe. This flight profile can make it difficult even for the best air defenses to know when and where the TLAM will arrive - thus the use of "waypoints". Can you kill it with even the 14.5 DShK or Zu-23mm? Sure.. if they can spot it and hit it - hardly 1st rate AAA guns but they can be anywhere and in large numbers as they are dirt cheap and easy to deploy. The better the weapon the more money it costs, the easier usually it is to detect (especially if it is a "fixed" weapon), and then improves the odds to "thread" by it.

So .. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th rate.. need to be carefull here. Bullets and missiles dont care about "ratings".. they just need to be able to find and kill the target. The TLAM was designed, and used, to make it HARD as hell to intercept them in flight - rating or no rating. This is my basic point, not in any way to sound argumentative - just a reality check IMHO. An entire defense network may be rated in a general way but each target can be defended with a different level of defensive systems and that is what matters most to that TLAM trying to hit a specific "surgical" target.

Thanks.. very interesting topic.

[Christian Schwietzke]

Speaking of ratings... the Serbians did manage to shoot down a F-117, didn´t they? I distinctly remember gleeful Serbs waving "Sorry - we didn´t know we weren´t supposed to see it!" signs at the cameras.

In war, as elsewhere, there aren´t really any certainties - only probabilities. Superior technologies, tactics and planning can optimize there probabilities in your favor, but you might catch some bad luck anyway, and eventually the law of large numbers is going to win anyway.

[djcyclone]

My two sense

A Military, or a Military System such as an air defense network, is only as good as can be proven. Therefore you can say that Iraq had a 2nd, or 4th rate defense, but we went right through it. Therefore it did not work.

Now the same goes for the old Soviet Union, and the United States today. We can say that we have a 1st rate air defense system, but until we are actually at war, and have planes and missiles attempting to penetrate that defense network, we really have no idea what its rating is. The Military is always going to claim that its currant technology is the best, but until the technology or strategy is put to the test (AKA,(proven) then the talk means nothing.

Anyone can talk the talk, but who can walk the walk?

[Warship NWS]

To DJ, saying it did not "work" is not always the same as circumventing and/or neutralizing an air defense network. Remember, we did what they could not easily counter.. used AH-64s, F-117s, and TLAMs to take out their radars, comms, AD command centers, etc.. thus causing a serious loss of AD network cohesion. In the end, we did not play into their game, we played our own using our technological and military advantages. Trust me when I say, we learned a LOT from the Isreali/Arab and Vietnam aerial campaigns about how NOT to take on an integrated AD system head on.

[john964]

Speaking of ratings... the Serbians did manage to shoot down a F-117, didn´t they? I distinctly remember gleeful Serbs waving "Sorry - we didn´t know we weren´t supposed to see it!" signs at the cameras.

In war, as elsewhere, there aren´t really any certainties - only probabilities. Superior technologies, tactics and planning can optimize there probabilities in your favor, but you might catch some bad luck anyway, and eventually the law of large numbers is going to win anyway.
The biggest factor in the loss of the F-117 was that the USAF got complacent and cockey. They made the mistake of useing the same ingress and egress points. The Serbs then stacked there AAA defenses and filled the sky with lead and got lucky with a golden BB.

[old_pop2000]

One vital lesson that was learned from the years 1965-1972 in the air war over Vietnam was that the heart of a Soviet IADS was the GCI centers. In North Vietnam, those were Bac Mai, Phuc Yen and Kep. After Rolling Thunder, the GCI system had improved and the controllers could control SAM's, MIG's and AAA in the same area. They also learned that if they saw a chaff corridor on the radar screen, it was like an arrow pointing to the target area. This gave the NVA almost 25 minutes warning. We also learned that when pilots announce "bingo" meaning I am in a low fuel state, they were engaged almost immediately by MIGs due to the monitoring of the radio frequencies. We learned that attacking an IADS was a cat and mouse game, that the control centers had to be eliminated immediately and the air bases destroyed.

If we examine the air plan for Desert Storm, I believe that you will see the lessons learned from Vietnam, executed to perfection.

Here is a term that many of you might recognize and many may not. It is the ' kill chain'. Simply put, the time it takes to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess a target. It is a term oft used in relation to the defense against cruise missiles.

[Christian Schwietzke]

The biggest factor in the loss of the F-117 was that the USAF got complacent and cockey. They made the mistake of useing the same ingress and egress points. The Serbs then stacked there AAA defenses and filled the sky with lead and got lucky with a golden BB.

Ah... yes, they failed to optimize their probabilities, perhaps because they thought that technology gave them enough of an edge.

In a way I think that is the same sort of mistake that doomed Prince of Wales and Repulse.

[john964]

Ah... yes, they failed to optimize their probabilities, perhaps because they thought that technology gave them enough of an edge.

In a way I think that is the same sort of mistake that doomed Prince of Wales and Repulse.
Nope, Force Z was lost to lack of aircover and the belief that ships manuvering at high speed
could avoid air attack.

[djcyclone]

To DJ, saying it did not "work" is not always the same as circumventing and/or neutralizing an air defense network. Remember, we did what they could not easily counter.. used AH-64s, F-117s, and TLAMs to take out their radars, comms, AD command centers, etc.. thus causing a serious loss of AD network cohesion. In the end, we did not play into their game, we played our own using our technological and military advantages. Trust me when I say, we learned a LOT from the Isreali/Arab and Vietnam aerial campaigns about how NOT to take on an integrated AD system head on.


But is that not the point of conflict? "No Plan ever survives contact with the enemy". The days of Gentleman Warfare have long since passed. Any enemy who is worth anything, will put everything they have into their strategy during an attack.

Therefore, the defense network has to be able to adapt to the situation quickly. That is what would determine the class or rating (in my opinion).

[Kyle Holgate]

I would point out that a missile attacking a ship at sea could have some disadvantages as compared to a land attack missile - depending on the terrain. Defensive radars don't have hills and what not at sea, and of course the target moves which is something the TLAM's did not have to deal with.

The radar cross section of a missile is already pretty small with many missiles simply due to the size of the weapon. Further enhanced it means that the thing could get closer to the target before (or without) being spotted. A good sea skimmer won't be spotted until it clears the radar horizon - which is fairly close to the target anyway depending on how high off the water the weapon is flying.
Not much time to react even with a "slow" missile (going at a plodding 500 MPH or so :rolleyes:). Couple minutes maybe. IF it has a reduced radar cross section (RCS) the time to react is further reduced by some amount.
How good are the defenses of the ships it's likely to be attacking? A good CIWS is reasonably hard to defeat without multiple weapons. Anti-missile missiles further improve the defenses of the target.
We don't know much about the RCS of a TLAM let alone the new TASM. We don't know much about the defense capability of most modern ships. Too many unknowns to even hazard a guess.

[Warship NWS]

Actually, we can make reasonably good guesses about a wide range of AD systems through the power of military simulators developed using the latest intel and weapon databases - not perfect but FAR better then not having them. The nations that can train using as accurate of data available about potential threats through an advanced technology base of simulations will have a distinct advantage in combat if used properly. This variable has been proven many times in combat.

We can also test weapons in various "simulated" combat environments and even under live fire conditions. Will anything match a real war? No. Can the enemy get complacent because we can't test our weapons in real war? Well.. considering the typical effectiveness of most of our well developed weapons that were used effectively through proper training.. I would think not. However, most nations can hardly afford to test, train, equip, and prepare to defend against a powerful threat that has a wide variety of tools in their toolbox to fight with and the tactical competence to use those tools effectively.

I would rather develop weapons with all of the available information to the best of our ability then to just assume that we cannot test them in combat and not even try. I would also rather be a member of a nation that has the ability to continually develop advanced weapons (along with advanced training) with "classified" capabilities instead of just counting on "buying" weapons on the market with widely known attributes and hoping that they will be enough to get the job done.

My thoughts anyways. ;)

[old_pop2000]

...

The radar cross section of a missile is already pretty small with many missiles simply due to the size of the weapon. ....
We don't know much about the RCS of a TLAM let alone the new TASM. We don't know much about the defense capability of most modern ships. Too many unknowns to even hazard a guess.

RCS of the typical cruise missile is on the order of .1 square meter. In the future, that figure could drop to .0001 square meter. Most aircraft have a radar cross-section of around 7 square meters. An E-3 AWAC could detect that aircraft, at about 250 miles. However, for that cruise missile, it could probably detect the missile at 130 miles. For a missile traveling at 550 mph, that's about 15 minutes, if they are lucky. :D

[Warship NWS]

But is that not the point of conflict? "No Plan ever survives contact with the enemy". The days of Gentleman Warfare have long since passed. Any enemy who is worth anything, will put everything they have into their strategy during an attack.

Therefore, the defense network has to be able to adapt to the situation quickly. That is what would determine the class or rating (in my opinion).

This is not really a matter of "Gentleman Warfare". Circumvention of a known threat has been a known tactic throughout the history of warfare.. example, the Germans going around the Maginot Line - they simply avoided it and still defeated France in record time. The USN/USMC circumvented strong points in the Pacific to let them "die on the vine" through the use of sub warfare and "island hopping". There are many more examples in the history of warfare. During DS91 we circumvented the Iraqi integrated air defenses by using weapons they could either (a) not detect easily and/or (b) had no viable defenses against. Why get shot at if you don't have to? Perfectly viable tactic - if you have the available technology and assets to make it work.

[old_pop2000]

Actually, we can make reasonably good guesses about a wide range of AD systems through the power of military simulators developed using the latest intel and weapon databases - not perfect but FAR better then not having them. The nations that can train using as accurate of data available about potential threats through an advanced technology base of simulations will have a distinct advantage in combat if used properly. This variable has been proven many times in combat.

We can also test weapons in various "simulated" combat environments and even under live fire conditions. Will anything match a real war? No. Can the enemy get complacent because we can't test our weapons in real war? Well.. considering the typical effectiveness of most of our well developed weapons that were used effectively through proper training.. I would think not. However, most nations can hardly afford to test, train, equip, and prepare to defend against a powerful threat that has a wide variety of tools in their toolbox to fight with and the tactical competence to use those tools effectively.

I would rather develop weapons with all of the available information to the best of our ability then to just assume that we cannot test them in combat and not even try. I would also rather be a member of a nation that has the ability to continually develop advanced weapons (along with advanced training) with "classified" capabilities instead of just counting on "buying" weapons on the market with widely known attributes and hoping that they will be enough to get the job done.

My thoughts anyways. ;)

There used to be a site called the MITRE Sensor Center that developed a computer program to calculate Radar Cross Section of complex target very accurately. It could perform the rapid calculations with different frequencies, polarizations and aspect angles of intercept as well as environmental conditions like land or sea. It was used to develop new radar systems and improve our old ones. I don't believe it was a government operation although I suspect it might have had some DARPA funding.

MITRE is the corporate name and it is a Not For Profit organization (yea, right). It's largest assistance went to DOD, FAA, EPA, NASA and FBI. Principal offices were in McLean, Virginia. (CIA Headquarters, IIRC) The former Sec. Of Defense was its chairman in the 1990's.

I wonder if DTIC has any interesting reports?:)

[Warship NWS]

RCS of the typical cruise missile is on the order of .1 square meter. In the future, that figure could drop to .0001 square meter. Most aircraft have a radar cross-section of around 7 square meters. An E-3 AWAC could detect that aircraft, at about 250 miles. However, for that cruise missile, it could probably detect the missile at 130 miles. For a missile traveling at 550 mph, that's about 15 minutes, if they are lucky. :D

The typical attack time for most navies, without AWACS as you need a platform that can detect and kill the missile and most navies dont have good AEW vs stealthy VLOW threats, would be less then 30-15 seconds - it can get worse vs low RCS missiles. The Russians, as an example, had good reason to be scared of the Harpoon and thus trucked their ships around with buckets of CIWS systems - some good, some not so good. I would be pretty certain the first TASM gave them cause for alarm.

[old_pop2000]

The typical attack time for most navies, without AWACS as you need a platform that can detect and kill the missile and most navies dont have good AEW vs stealthy VLOW threats, would be less then 30-15 seconds - it can get worse vs low RCS missiles. The Russians had good reason to be scared of the Harpoon and thus trucked their ships around with buckets of CIWS systems - some good, some not so good.

Airborne Warning and Control type aircraft are proliferating these days, probably for this reason and others. Their capability is still not apparent but I would expect that they would have the ability to detect cruise missiles at a range necessary, to give the ground based defense system's a chance to react. UAV are now being used for that purpose and I see those proliferating also. The best way to detect one of these ground skimming systems is to see it from above, so we are going to see more of this type of capability being developed.

[john964]

This is not really a matter of "Gentleman Warfare". Circumvention of a known threat has been a known tactic throughout the history of warfare.. example, the Germans going around the Maginot Line - they simply avoided it and still defeated France in record time. The USN/USMC circumvented strong points in the Pacific to let them "die on the vine" through the use of sub warfare and "island hopping". There are many more examples in the history of warfare. During DS91 we circumvented the Iraqi integrated air defenses by using weapons they could either (a) not detect easily and/or (b) had no viable defenses against. Why get shot at if you don't have to? Perfectly viable tactic - if you have the available technology and assets to make it work.I think Patton said it best, "Nobody ever won a war by dieing for his country, He won by making some other SOB die for his"

[Warship NWS]

Airborne Warning and Control type aircraft are proliferating these days, probably for this reason and others. Their capability is still not apparent but I would expect that they would have the ability to detect cruise missiles at a range necessary, to give the ground based defense system's a chance to react. UAV are now being used for that purpose and I see those proliferating also. The best way to detect one of these ground skimming systems is to see it from above, so we are going to see more of this type of capability being developed.

There is still the challenges of integrated systems, response times, etc..typical foreign AEW/Recon/Intel integration and sophistication is still not up to reasonable par vs serious AShM threats - note I do not mean a few inbounds vs some lightly defended targets. ;)

I agree though.. AEW is, and has been for sometime now, a prioritization for navies that can possibly afford them thus the reason for CVs of any type that can deploy such assets or localized land based AEW assets covering naval units - the question is, how fast can they react?

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I think Patton said it best, "Nobody ever won a war by dieing for his country, He won by making some other SOB die for his"

I completely agree.

[Warship NWS]

Again, time for me to split here guys - back to work for me.. have fun with the chat. Great topic. :)

[old_pop2000]

Currently, besides the US, 23 countries are operating AEW aircraft of some sort. Some are fielding the E2C, Boeing 707, E3 Sentry, modified 737s, E-767 and a few others. I know Fokker has developed an AEW platform. So, it is a proliferating capability and I am reasonably certain that the ability to detect CMs is either currently in the capability or soon will. The latest generation of the E2C is the Hawkeye 2000. It now has cooperative engagement capability, an antenna that can be stopped to illuminate a special target, SATCOM and a greatly improved ECM capability. (It's about darn time) It also has a better vapor cycle for the APS-145 Radar and now has the Advanced Control Indicator Set( Scopes, gents and I hope they are lighter). The ACIS is the UYQ-70 full color workstation.

http://www.q70.com/q70/products/e2c.pdf

[Warship NWS]

Currently, besides the US, 23 countries currently are operating AEW aircraft of some sort. Some are fielding the E2C, Boeing 707, E3 Sentry, modified 737s, E-767 and a few others. I know Fokker has developed an AEW platform. So, it is a proliferating capability and I am reasonably certain that the ability to detect CMs is either currently in the capability or soon will.

And if they operate AEWs, which are usually very expensive and few in number, we will know they are there and their likely training, comms/coordination levels, and estimated capabilities as well as response systems, ADs, etc.. and figure out ways to reduce their effectiveness, circumvent, or neutralize them. AEWs also cannot be everywhere at once. Going from possible detection to killing an inbound is still also in question. This is not even getting into multi-platform, weapon, and axis attacks vs more well defended targets. The USAF/USN relies on the AEWs - but not entirely on AEWs by themselves - to defend our assets, just as an example. USN recon/intel/aerial defenses have evolved multi-fold over just the last 10-20 years alone.

However, I will let all of you continue down this road.. ;)

[old_pop2000]

And if they operate AEWs, which are usually very expensive and few in number, we will know they are there and their likely training, comms/coordination levels, and estimated capabilities as well as response systems, ADs, etc.. and figure out ways to reduce their effectiveness, circumvent, or neutralize them. AEWs also cannot be everywhere at once. Going from possible detection to killing an inbound is still also in question. This is not even getting into multi-platform, weapon, and axis attacks vs more well defended targets. The USAF/USN relies on the AEWs - but not entirely on AEWs by themselves - to defend our assets, just as an example. USN recon/intel/aerial defenses have evolved multi-fold over just the last 10-20 years alone.

However, I will let all of you continue down this road.. ;)

First thing to consider is that we aren't everyones enemy. Each geographical region, in the world should be assessed based each nation and its primary, secondary and possibly tertiary opponent. Example might be that India's primary opponent is China, not the US. Secondary, it might be Pakistan. If we assess China, well, India, Russia and then the US might be the opponents.

With this assessment, then we can examine the weapons systems, sensors and all the paraphernalia of war based on that list of opponents. Those systems will be designed to deal with the primary opponents threats. So, possibly the Indian AEW does not have the capability necessary to detect, track our missiles or aircraft, but it probably doesn't need the capability.

In assessing world wide military technology, we have to keep in mind who the primary threat is to each country. It isn't always the US.

[Kyle Holgate]

Actually, we can make reasonably good guesses about a wide range of AD systems through the power of military simulators developed using the latest intel and weapon databases - not perfect but FAR better then not having them. The nations that can train using as accurate of data available about potential threats through an advanced technology base of simulations will have a distinct advantage in combat if used properly. This variable has been proven many times in combat.

We can also test weapons in various "simulated" combat environments and even under live fire conditions. Will anything match a real war? No. Can the enemy get complacent because we can't test our weapons in real war? Well.. considering the typical effectiveness of most of our well developed weapons that were used effectively through proper training.. I would think not. However, most nations can hardly afford to test, train, equip, and prepare to defend against a powerful threat that has a wide variety of tools in their toolbox to fight with and the tactical competence to use those tools effectively.

I would rather develop weapons with all of the available information to the best of our ability then to just assume that we cannot test them in combat and not even try. I would also rather be a member of a nation that has the ability to continually develop advanced weapons (along with advanced training) with "classified" capabilities instead of just counting on "buying" weapons on the market with widely known attributes and hoping that they will be enough to get the job done.

My thoughts anyways. ;)

Just to clarify as I wasn't sure if you understood me right from your reply - by "we" I meant us general public types that don't have access to much confirmable data. We can probably guess at speeds and perhaps flight altitude. RCS maybe, but then we get into the realm of radar capabilties vs low RCS targets and the really black arts of Electronic Warfare. I can make some fair guesses there, but even as a former EW - my "in the know" information is now over 20 years old.
The good thing about that is - if we assume our enemy is around 20 years behind in technology then maybe I'm somewhat current - just not on US suff :rolleyes:

[old_pop2000]

....The good thing about that is - if we assume our enemy is around 20 years behind in technology then maybe I'm somewhat current - just not on US suff :rolleyes:

I wouldn't assume that our prospective enemies are 20 years behind us. Many of our "friends" are selling advanced technology to these nations. It isn't just the Russian's and Chinese. Even technology that is 10-20 years behind, when used in sufficient numbers can be lethal to unsuspecting ships. I see some of these 'poor man's airforce' assets being used against commercial shipping. That is the real danger.

With My Compliments

[Kyle Holgate]

I was merely assessing my how useful my knowledge of 1989 USN electronics warfare and intel on weapons was likely to be in today's world.
One thing I did while in the Navy was to read as many publicly available magazines and what not - Janes, Aviation weekly, etc. I practiced reading between the lines - so to speak and found that one could get pretty close to what was not public information that way. I still do that, but have no way to confirm how close to the mark I am.

One thing we've not dealt with much yet is what sort of situation where a new and improved TASM would be used instead of other weapons (or in addition to). It seems like one of those weapons that would be used when more conventional attacks aren't likely to succeed or are too dangerous. By more conventional I mean air launched attacks mainly, though submarine attacks also counts. It seems like the TASM is something you fire when you really need that target out of the water sooner rather than later for some reason OR when air defenses are heavy enough to preclude an airstrike. Tactically it will be an interesting weapon system if developed..

[old_pop2000]

I was merely assessing my how useful my knowledge of 1989 USN electronics warfare and intel on weapons was likely to be in today's world.
One thing I did while in the Navy was to read as many publicly available magazines and what not - Janes, Aviation weekly, etc. I practiced reading between the lines - so to speak and found that one could get pretty close to what was not public information that way. I still do that, but have no way to confirm how close to the mark I am.

One thing we've not dealt with much yet is what sort of situation where a new and improved TASM would be used instead of other weapons (or in addition to). It seems like one of those weapons that would be used when more conventional attacks aren't likely to succeed or are too dangerous. By more conventional I mean air launched attacks mainly, though submarine attacks also counts. It seems like the TASM is something you fire when you really need that target out of the water sooner rather than later for some reason OR when air defenses are heavy enough to preclude an airstrike. Tactically it will be an interesting weapon system if developed..

We would probably need to start our analysis of the threats against our naval and commerical ships at points like the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, Cape of Good Hope, Cape Horn, Bosporus, along with the Panama and Suez Canal's. There are many littoral zone or brown water areas that are susceptible to these threats. Convoying operations in and around Africa and the Middle East could be affected by such weapons. The problem with most of our current defenses is that they are designed for blue water, not brown water. In brown water areas, reduced reaction time, ambiguous threat bearings and just uncertainty as to the nature of the target are just some of the problems. Screening operations for convoys is a subject that has to be examined and decisions made as to how best to accomplish it. We can't forget about pirates. They are getting richer and those riches could buy some of the older antiship missiles that might be hazardous to commercial ships.

The slower Harpoon and Exocet's are bad enough, giving the average defense about 2-3 minutes which is enough time to jam and launch a countermeasure or shoot it down, but a supersonic ramjet like the Moskit only gives you about 25-30 seconds to react. At Mach 2.2, this type of missile is going to be a real problem, if it proliferates.

With My Compliments

[old_pop2000]

Just for reference:

Strait of Hormuz - 16.5-17 Million BBL/d - 21 miles

Strait of Malacca - 15 Million BBL/d - 1.7 miles

Suez Canal/Pipeline - 4.5 Million BBL/d - 1000 feet

Bab el Mandab 3.3 Million BBL/d - 18 miles

Turkish straits 2.4 Million BBL/d - .5 miles

Panama Canal .5 million BBL/d - 110 feet

Last figure is the width at narrowest point

Figures are from the 2006 time frame but are accurate and very representative of the problem.

Just something to chew on. I don't believe that very sophisticated AshM would be needed in any of these cases. The Strait of Hormuz is the longest.

With My Compliments

[john964]

We would probably need to start our analysis of the threats against our naval and commercial ships at points like the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, Cape of Good Hope, Cape Horn, Bosporus, along with the Panama and Suez Canal's. There are many littoral zone or brown water areas that are susceptible to these threats. Convoying operations in and around Africa and the Middle East could be affected by such weapons. The problem with most of our current defenses is that they are designed for blue water, not brown water. In brown water areas, reduced reaction time, ambiguous threat bearings and just uncertainty as to the nature of the target are just some of the problems. Screening operations for convoys is a subject that has to be examined and decisions made as to how best to accomplish it. We can't forget about pirates. They are getting richer and those riches could buy some of the older anti-ship missiles that might be hazardous to commercial ships.

The slower Harpoon and Exocet's are bad enough, giving the average defense about 2-3 minutes which is enough time to jam and launch a countermeasure or shoot it down, but a supersonic ramjet like the Moskit only gives you about 25-30 seconds to react. At Mach 2.2, this type of missile is going to be a real problem, if it proliferates.

With My ComplimentsDennis I would not worry to much about the Drake Passage the weather in the passage sucks most of the time. During the summer the seas average Force 5 but during the winter the weather can exceed Force 12 and averages Force 10. The Passage is rarely used exept by the occasional CVBG and a few merchants supplying the settlelments in the Magellen Straits and a few military bases.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis I would not worry to much about the Drake Passage the weather in the passage sucks most of the time. During the summer the seas average Force 5 but during the winter the weather can exceed Force 12 and averages Force 10. The Passage is rarely used exept by the occasional CVBG and a few merchants supplying the settlelments in the Magellen Straits and a few military bases.

I would agree with you, but all choke points have to be observed and considered. However, in a prioritization, it would be at the bottom. Current surface winds in the passage are around 15-20 knts from the west. Wave heights are around 3-4 feet. Visibility is over 6 miles with little to no rain. So, the conditions around this time of the year are pretty good for the transit of commerce... and they would be good targets with unlimited visibility. Of the 600 mile width, over 200 miles of it are ice free and navigatable. Most US strategic planners down play the importance of the passage, however, any problems with the Panama Canal could make this passage vital. Remember that supertankers cannot use the canal, so this passage is vital for them. Just some things to consider.

With My Compliments

[john964]

I would agree with you, but all choke points have to be observed and considered. However, in a prioritization, it would be at the bottom. Current surface winds in the passage are around 15-20 knts from the west. Wave heights are around 3-4 feet. Visibility is over 6 miles with little to no rain. So, the conditions around this time of the year are pretty good for the transit of commerce... and they would be good targets with unlimited visibility. Of the 600 mile width, over 200 miles of it are ice free and navigatable. Most US strategic planners down play the importance of the passage, however, any problems with the Panama Canal could make this passage vital. Remember that supertankers cannot use the canal, so this passage is vital for them. Just some things to consider.

With My ComplimentsMost super tankers avoid the Drake Passage as it's not really usefull. 80-90% of super tanker traffic that can't go through the canals goes around Good Hope.

[old_pop2000]

Most super tankers avoid the Drake Passage as it's not really usefull. 80-90% of super tanker traffic that can't go through the canals goes around Good Hope.

While that is true of the older class of supertankers, the ULCC or Ultra Large Crude Carrier class of super tankers cannot pass through the Suez or Panama canals and are forced to move around the Horn of Africa and Drake Passage.

The scenario that is plausible is a strike or terrorist attack on the canal, forcing traffic to use the additional 8000 miles plus journey through the Drake Passage and around South America. So, while you are correct during normal operating days, we are speculating about AshM's and choke points. If the Panama Canal is disabled, then the Drake Passage is another choke point that must be considered. It would be very simple for a rogue submarine to station itself in a position in the area of the passage exit points and hit the tankers coming around. A 600,000 ton ULCC sinking could make an ecological disaster for the whole world.

Just my thoughts

With My Compliments

[john964]

While that is true of the older class of supertankers, the ULCC or Ultra Large Crude Carrier class of super tankers cannot pass through the Suez or Panama canals and are forced to move around the Horn of Africa and Drake Passage.

The scenario that is plausible is a strike or terrorist attack on the canal, forcing traffic to use the additional 8000 miles plus journey through the Drake Passage and around South America. So, while you are correct during normal operating days, we are speculating about AshM's and choke points. If the Panama Canal is disabled, then the Drake Passage is another choke point that must be considered. It would be very simple for a rogue submarine to station itself in a position in the area of the passage exit points and hit the tankers coming around. A 600,000 ton ULCC sinking could make an ecological disaster for the whole world.

Just my thoughts

With My ComplimentsI still wouldn't worry to much the passage is over 500 miles wide and Good Hope is twice that. It would be near impossable for a single submarine to cover either of them. Plus here's a thought how fast could you build a pipline or railway with no outside considerations ie enviromentalist to circumvent one or both canals.

[Kyle Holgate]

What is BBL/d?

[old_pop2000]

I still wouldn't worry to much the passage is over 500 miles wide and Good Hope is twice that. It would be near impossable for a single submarine to cover either of them. Plus here's a thought how fast could you build a pipline or railway with no outside considerations ie enviromentalist to circumvent one or both canals.

Let's briefly do an analysis of a possible scenario. Last year, 2008, there were 13,048 transits through the Panama Canal. That's an average of 35.7 per day for 365 days. We can assume that without the canal, those 35.7 ships would have had to use the Drake Passage to move east or west. I believe that is a safe assumption. Now, ships do move at different rates however, we can also assume that, at least 35 ships per day would enter and leave the Drake Passage. We also know that only 200 miles is ice free and navigable. So, we have 35 ships in a 200 mile area, or 5.76 ships/mile. Yes, I know it's a rough estimate, but it is based on valid data. So, is that a target rich environment? Are those fast ships? Could a rogue submarine or vessel, sow sea mines in the area, as they transit to disrupt traffic? Could one of those tankers, be a disguised terrorist ship, with AshM's on board and/or mines. You see the point? What are the probabilities? Well, there are choke points that are narrower and more highly congested. But those are also patrolled more heavily than the Drake Passage. We cannot assume a terrorist is going to attack at the easiest spot? Remember also that many of these terrorist groups are partially funded by oil states of the Persian Gulf. It is a sort of terrorist tax. Their attitude is, ' I will leave your ships alone for a small donation to my cause'. However, the topic is the Tomahawk Antiship Missile version, not choke points, so I guess we had better return to the main topic.

Interesting to consider, though

With My Compliments

[Ed Rotondaro]

According to a NAVAIR document dtd December 10th, 2007 Acquisition Program PMA-280 Tomahawk Multi Effects Warhead System (MEWS) was already awarded because the drop dead date was January 9th, 2008.

Objective: Develop a reactive shaped; charge warhead liner that will produce more damage in concrete and rock targets than alumininum.

http://www.navysbir.com/n08_1/N081-028.htm

That would indicate that the shaped charge liner against an aluminum ship was already available or NAVAIR would have added that to the title of the program.

Seems like the warhead issue is already solved. Guidance would be the last issue.

Dennis:

Sounds like using the Tomahawk as a long ranged anti-ship weapon would give surface ships the capabilties to attack at the sort of ranges that we currently use carrier aircraft for. You wouldn't even really need 1,000 miles. Hell 500 miles is more than enough providing you have accurately identified the target and can guide the missile there.

[old_pop2000]

What is BBL/d?

Barrels per day.

[john964]

Let's briefly do an analysis of a possible scenario. Last year, 2008, there were 13,048 transits through the Panama Canal. That's an average of 35.7 per day for 365 days. We can assume that without the canal, those 35.7 ships would have had to use the Drake Passage to move east or west. I believe that is a safe assumption. Now, ships do move at different rates however, we can also assume that, at least 35 ships per day would enter and leave the Drake Passage. We also know that only 200 miles is ice free and navigable. So, we have 35 ships in a 200 mile area, or 5.76 ships/mile. Yes, I know it's a rough estimate, but it is based on valid data. So, is that a target rich environment? Are those fast ships? Could a rogue submarine or vessel, sow sea mines in the area, as they transit to disrupt traffic? Could one of those tankers, be a disguised terrorist ship, with AshM's on board and/or mines. You see the point? What are the probabilities? Well, there are choke points that are narrower and more highly congested. But those are also patrolled more heavily than the Drake Passage. We cannot assume a terrorist is going to attack at the easiest spot? Remember also that many of these terrorist groups are partially funded by oil states of the Persian Gulf. It is a sort of terrorist tax. Their attitude is, ' I will leave your ships alone for a small donation to my cause'. However, the topic is the Tomahawk Antiship Missile version, not choke points, so I guess we had better return to the main topic.

Interesting to consider, though

With My Compliments
Dennis the 200 ice free and navagiable is the year round number during the summer and early fall the passage is almost ice free. As for mines most of the passage is farly deep. A submarine (most likly diesel powered) would have to contend with weather thats bad and changes on a frequent bases, various forms of ice from bergs to pans.

Also where do the worlds UULCC and ULCC originate and what are there destinations. Origins are easey its the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Java Sea. Now were are its destinations, destinations are Europe, East and West coasts of North and South America South and East Asia.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis the 200 ice free and navigable is the year round number during the summer and early fall the passage is almost ice free. As for mines most of the passage is fairly deep. A submarine (most likely diesel powered) would have to contend with weather that's bad and changes on a frequent bases, various forms of ice from bergs to pans.

Also where do the worlds UULCC and ULCC originate and what are there destinations. Origins are easy its the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Java Sea. Now were are its destinations, destinations are Europe, East and West coasts of North and South America South and East Asia.

The Drake Passage has icebergs and ship icing in the May-October time frame. The passage averages about 4000 feet in depth near Tierra Del Fuego and 5000 near the Shetland Islands. A submarine would not have to attack in the passage, simply wait outside the passage to catch an unsuspecting ship. However, it is the roughest area in the world to sail through, but there are few choices if the Canal is disabled.

[steel_selachian]

Dennis the 200 ice free and navagiable is the year round number during the summer and early fall the passage is almost ice free. As for mines most of the passage is farly deep. A submarine (most likly diesel powered) would have to contend with weather thats bad and changes on a frequent bases, various forms of ice from bergs to pans.

Also where do the worlds UULCC and ULCC originate and what are there destinations. Origins are easey its the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Java Sea. Now were are its destinations, destinations are Europe, East and West coasts of North and South America South and East Asia.

ULCC and VLCC are tanker designations - Ultra Large Crude Carrier and Very Large Crude Carrier. VLCCs carry about 160,000-320,000 tons of oil and ULCCs carry 320,000-550,000 tons fully loaded. One ULCC can pack over 3 million barrels of oil, which is more than the UK uses up in a day.

In short, it would really suck to have one of those babies take a Silkworm missile.

[john964]

ULCC and VLCC are tanker designations - Ultra Large Crude Carrier and Very Large Crude Carrier. VLCCs carry about 160,000-320,000 tons of oil and ULCCs carry 320,000-550,000 tons fully loaded. One ULCC can pack over 3 million barrels of oil, which is more than the UK uses up in a day.

In short, it would really suck to have one of those babies take a Silkworm missile.

Steel, I would not worry a UULCC has a large amount of tonnage to soak up damage. IIRC during the bigining of Operation Ernest Will the reflaging and escorting of tankers in the PG one of the tankers hit IIRC 3 sea mines. The tanker was MV Sea Isle City IIRC. The way the USN escorted the tankers was Tanker, Escort, Tanker, Escort and so on. Super tankers make great mine sweepers. IIRC during the PG tanker war, around 30 tankers were hit by ASM's and mines but none were sunk.

The size of super tankers is somthing like this
LCC 100,000t-150,000t the first super tankers
VLCC 150,000t-300,000t
ULCC 300,000t-450,000t
UULCC 450,000t-550,000t+

[old_pop2000]

Hey guys, this is a great discussion but let's move it to the new thread.