Pearl Harbor Warning

[old_pop2000]

On the Military History Media, we've begun to enter into the ageless discuss of what was known about the attack on Pearl Harbor. So, let's discuss what was known, what should have been known and what was not possible to be known.

Please, no politics. If you are a revisionist and believe that FDR somehow, somewhere, knew, keep it to yourself. Let's stick to good historiography and accurate facts about the pre-war intel.

Two defining facts:

A. The Purple code was a diplomatic code, not an operational naval code. It could not and did not betray or reveal any data about any operations under consideration by the IJN. Only due to 20/20 hindsight, do we see indications clearly, after the event, revealed or hinted in the Magic intelligence.

B. The only code that would have had the possibility of revealing any operational data, was JN25B, which we did not break until February of 1942.


So, let's have a good, intelligent discussion about the issue based on what was accurately known in the days, weeks and months leading up to the Pearl Harbor Attack.

I don't know about the economic factors leading to the war, Chris might want us to stay clear of that minefield.

[Mike Malanaphy]

On the Military History Media, we've begun to enter into the ageless discuss of what was known about the attack on Pearl Harbor. So, let's discuss what was known, what should have been known and what was not possible to be known.

Please, no politics. If you are a revisionist and believe that FDR somehow, somewhere, knew, keep it to yourself. Let's stick to good historiography and accurate facts about the pre-war intel.

Two defining facts:

A. The Purple code was a diplomatic code, not an operational naval code. It could not and did not betray or reveal any data about any operations under consideration by the IJN. Only due to 20/20 hindsight, do we see indications clearly, after the event, revealed or hinted in the Magic intelligence.

B. The only code that would have had the possibility of revealing any operational data, was JN25B, which we did not break until February of 1942.


So, let's have a good, intelligent discussion about the issue based on what was accurately known in the days, weeks and months leading up to the Pearl Harbor Attack.

I don't know about the economic factors leading to the war, Chris might want us to stay clear of that minefield.

Hi Dennis,

Pretty good summation of the facts regarding code breaking and the Japanese attack. Any examination of our preparedness or the lack of it also has to take into account the Japanese. Once the decision was made for war, the Japanese crafted a simple, elegant plan and executed it with precision. They concentrated decisive force at critical point and had an excellent deception plan to cloak their movements.

Retrospect also shows that the attack was national suicide despite it's tactical success. At a tactical level, Yamamoto missed the American carriers and failed to inflict significant damage on the infrastructure of the base that supported fleet operations. As prescient as Yamamoto was abvout the vulnerability of Pearl, he forgot about how vulnerable Japan was to a similar attack by Doolittle only 5 months later.

I know Chris wants to steer clear of politics, but it is difficult as wars are often the result of failed diplomatic efforts. Roosevelt was using diplomatic and economic pressure to force Japan to change course in SE Asia short of war. He expected that her leaders would react in a rational way, but they didn't. Instead of deciding to talk, they launched an attack that destroyed them. Perhaps loosening the embargo or moving the fleet back the the west coast might have placated the Japanese, but I supect that it wouldn't. With the military in the throes of reorganization and the foundation of Germany first in place, it's hard to see what military help of signifcance could have been sent to Kimmmel and Short.

What other options did Roosevelt have other than to try and deter an enemy already set upon war?

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Pretty good summation of the facts regarding code breaking and the Japanese attack. Any examination of our preparedness or the lack of it also has to take into account the Japanese. Once the decision was made for war, the Japanese crafted a simple, elegant plan and executed it with precision. They concentrated decisive force at critical point and had an excellent deception plan to cloak their movements.

Retrospect also shows that the attack was national suicide despite it's tactical success. At a tactical level, Yamamoto missed the American carriers and failed to inflict significant damage on the infrastructure of the base that supported fleet operations. As prescient as Yamamoto was abvout the vulnerability of Pearl, he forgot about how vulnerable Japan was to a similar attack by Doolittle only 5 months later.

I know Chris wants to steer clear of politics, but it is difficult as wars are often the result of failed diplomatic efforts. Roosevelt was using diplomatic and economic pressure to force Japan to change course in SE Asia short of war. He expected that her leaders would react in a rational way, but they didn't. Instead of deciding to talk, they launched an attack that destroyed them. Perhaps loosening the embargo or moving the fleet back the the west coast might have placated the Japanese, but I supect that it wouldn't. With the military in the throes of reorganization and the foundation of Germany first in place, it's hard to see what military help of signifcance could have been sent to Kimmmel and Short.

What other options did Roosevelt have other than to try and deter an enemy already set upon war?

While that is true, Mike. Did the Roosevelt Administration even understand what was transpiring in the inner circles of the IJN and Naval Ministry? Can Magic intel or JN25B give you that information or even Joseph Grew or the Peruvian Ambassador?

[bridav58]

[quote=Mike Malanaphy;2063]Hi Dennis,


Retrospect also shows that the attack was national suicide despite it's tactical success. At a tactical level, Yamamoto missed the American carriers and failed to inflict significant damage on the infrastructure of the base that supported fleet operations. As prescient as Yamamoto was abvout the vulnerability of Pearl, he forgot about how vulnerable Japan was to a similar attack by Doolittle only 5 months later.


Well as far as being surpirised also remember that time & again during the war our CV forces launched raids that caught the Japanese flat-footed like you mentoned by the Doolittle Raid just as they did in raiding Darwin & the Indian Ocean. Nothing really surprising by the fact a carrier raid going undetected especially in absence of a declaration of war. You don't need a conspiracy theory to explain the surprise.

[old_pop2000]

Retrospect also shows that the attack was national suicide despite it's tactical success. At a tactical level, Yamamoto missed the American carriers and failed to inflict significant damage on the infrastructure of the base that supported fleet operations. As prescient as Yamamoto was about the vulnerability of Pearl, he forgot about how vulnerable Japan was to a similar attack by Doolittle only 5 months later.

Well as far as being surpirised also remember that time & again during the war our CV forces launched raids that caught the Japanese flat-footed like you mentoned by the Doolittle Raid just as they did in raiding Darwin & the Indian Ocean. Nothing really surprising by the fact a carrier raid going undetected especially in absence of a declaration of war. You don't need a conspiracy theory to explain the surprise.

Point 1- Yoshikawa had radioed to Tokyo, who had relayed the information to Nagumo, that the carriers were not in the harbor. This information was received, IIRC, by 0200 hrs, on the morning of the 7th of December. When the first wave took off, they were fully briefed that the primary target was not in the harbor. So, it wasn't a complete mystery to anyone, once the attack was launched.

Point 2 - It wasn't only the Doolittle Raid that surprised the Japanese, in fact, Halsey's raids on the Marshall Island at the beginning gave CincPac and Cominch the idea that the Japanese were vulnerable to lightning carrier raids. Fletcher's raid on Rabaul before Coral Sea was another raid that was unexpected.

The question however, is whether anyone in the military or civilian authority could have assessed the situation rationally, and determined that Pearl Harbor, being our main naval base in the Pacific would be a target. All the military experts in the war department and the administration determined that the first attack would come in the Philippines, but why not Pearl Harbor.

Was it simply that we could not believe that a carrier force could sail that far, without detection or was it something else?

[Saffron]

Was it simply that we could not believe that a carrier force could sail that far, without detection or was it something else?


Did America learn anything from the British attack on Taranto? Or was there still a lot of resistance to the idea that aircraft really could sink battleships ... especially in a harbor that was too shallow for torpedoes?

[asnrobert]

I think our racial bias at the time may also have had an effect. Americans saw the Japanese as a bunch of bucktoothed, thick eyeglass wearing runts. The US expected them to attack the Philippines or Guam, but I think few in leadership positions believed they would have the audacity or skill to sail halfway across the Pacific and attack our main naval base (although I recall reading somewhere that R.K. Turner predicted an attack on Pearl Harbor, but was ignored).

[clacton2]

Did America learn anything from the British attack on Taranto? Or was there still a lot of resistance to the idea that aircraft really could sink battleships ... especially in a harbor that was too shallow for torpedoes?

Hi,
I'm not sure the U.S. learnt anything from it, but the Japanese sure as hell did.
Jon:rolleyes:

[old_pop2000]

Did America learn anything from the British attack on Taranto? Or was there still a lot of resistance to the idea that aircraft really could sink battleships ... especially in a harbor that was too shallow for torpedoes?

The issue of the torpedo and the water depth is not as clear as always presented. After Taranto, the CinCPac staff requested new torpedo nets that were lighter and easier to remove, if it became necessary. They had studied the British use of special fins to ensure the torpedo does not dive deep, as usual. Unfortunately, the new torpedo nets were not forthcoming. The staff in Hawaii was aware that the depth of the harbor would not deter an attacker. However, intel coming from Op-20-G in Washington gave no hint of any possible action on Pearl, all indications and planning was for an attack on the Philippines.

[Mike Malanaphy]

While that is true, Mike. Did the Roosevelt Administration even understand what was transpiring in the inner circles of the IJN and Naval Ministry? Can Magic intel or JN25B give you that information or even Joseph Grew or the Peruvian Ambassador?

Hi Dennis,

True as well, but the operation was a very closely kept secret within the government. Then, once you get the information, will people believe it. The Sorge spy ring in Japan gave Stalin the information on Barbarrosa, but he chose to ignore it.

It is interesting to specualte what we would have done has we gotten a warning? Fire off a sharp diplomatic note, try to ambush Nagumo ala Midway, withdraw the fleet ot San Diego, or loosen the embargo to avoid war? And do you go public to rally support ofr war? If surprise is lost, do the Japanese cancel the strike or the move south? I suspect had information hinting at an attack been developed, it would not have been used in a timely manner with no concensus. Would have taken a pretty bold decision to act decisively.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

True as well, but the operation was a very closely kept secret within the government. Then, once you get the information, will people believe it. The Sorge spy ring in Japan gave Stalin the information on Barbarrosa, but he chose to ignore it.

It is interesting to specualte what we would have done has we gotten a warning? Fire off a sharp diplomatic note, try to ambush Nagumo ala Midway, withdraw the fleet ot San Diego, or loosen the embargo to avoid war? And do you go public to rally support ofr war? If surprise is lost, do the Japanese cancel the strike or the move south? I suspect had information hinting at an attack been developed, it would not have been used in a timely manner with no concensus. Would have taken a pretty bold decision to act decisively.

It's not a question of the getting the information on the attack, the question is and always was, would the State Department, Op-20-G, CinCUS, Frank Knox or FDR actually believe the Japanese capable of organizing and executing such a daring plan or would they simply believe it to be a red herring to draw our attention away from the real target that we always figured, the Philippines?

[Ed Rotondaro]

It's not a question of the getting the information on the attack, the question is and always was, would the State Department, Op-20-G, CinCUS, Frank Knox or FDR actually believe the Japanese capable of organizing and executing such a daring plan or would they simply believe it to be a red herring to draw our attention away from the real target that we always figured, the Philippines?

Dennis:

In the book "Defenseless; Command Failure at Pearl Harbor" authors Norman Polmar and Jack Lambert argue that it was as much the inability of Kimmel and Short to take seriously the growing tensions and imminent warnings of war as it was the failures of their superiors to adequately state the need to be on a war footing.

Basically while everyone in the military knew war was coming, nobody felt it was coming to Pearl Harbor even though Admiral King had years earlier conducted a fleet problem using the carriers to launch such an attack in the exact same direction that the IJN used. Sadly enough unless your nation is the aggressor, you're not a war until you are at war. Nothing can change the peacetime mindset and routine until the shooting starts.

As you have pointed out, strict radio silence made a signals intercept impossible until the last minute. I believe that a Russian ship did sight the IJN task force early on and radioed this to Moscow. What they made of it I don't know. About the only thing that I can say that the US should have done differently is either deploy submarines on patrol way out in the Pacific starting in November and fly more routine patrols out from Hawaii. Kimmel and Short made poor use of their aviation assets as well as their radar. The above mentioned book demonstrates that a relatively sophisticated early warning system on the British model was developed and even managed to avoid inter-service wrangling. But neither commanding officer ever really got on board with its use. Simply put the US was not ready for war and could not conceive of it in Hawaii. The focus was always on the overseas possessions in the Central Pacific. That's where the war would begin. Interesting to note that the carriers were out ferrying aircraft to Wake Island etc., so somebody in the Joint Chiefs was getting worried enough to start strengthening the defenses.

This makes me wonder, what would the US have done if the war broke out first in the Philippines etc. No attack on Pearl Harbor and the fleet is undamaged. We both agree that War Plan Orange was pretty much not going to be used especially in light of the revisions that resulted in Rainbow. Do you gather the fleet and set sail? Do you try to relieve Wake Island? Do you put to sea and aggressively patrol the area around Midway?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Dennis:

In the book "Defenseless; Command Failure at Pearl Harbor" authors Norman Polmar and Jack Lambert argue that it was as much the inability of Kimmel and Short to take seriously the growing tensions and imminent warnings of war as it was the failures of their superiors to adequately state the need to be on a war footing.

Basically while everyone in the military knew war was coming, nobody felt it was coming to Pearl Harbor even though Admiral King had years earlier conducted a fleet problem using the carriers to launch such an attack in the exact same direction that the IJN used. Sadly enough unless your nation is the aggressor, you're not a war until you are at war. Nothing can change the peacetime mindset and routine until the shooting starts.

As you have pointed out, strict radio silence made a signals intercept impossible until the last minute. I believe that a Russian ship did sight the IJN task force early on and radioed this to Moscow. What they made of it I don't know. About the only thing that I can say that the US should have done differently is either deploy submarines on patrol way out in the Pacific starting in November and fly more routine patrols out from Hawaii. Kimmel and Short made poor use of their aviation assets as well as their radar. The above mentioned book demonstrates that a relatively sophisticated early warning system on the British model was developed and even managed to avoid inter-service wrangling. But neither commanding officer ever really got on board with its use. Simply put the US was not ready for war and could not conceive of it in Hawaii. The focus was always on the overseas possessions in the Central Pacific. That's where the war would begin. Interesting to note that the carriers were out ferrying aircraft to Wake Island etc., so somebody in the Joint Chiefs was getting worried enough to start strengthening the defenses.

This makes me wonder, what would the US have done if the war broke out first in the Philippines etc. No attack on Pearl Harbor and the fleet is undamaged. We both agree that War Plan Orange was pretty much not going to be used especially in light of the revisions that resulted in Rainbow. Do you gather the fleet and set sail? Do you try to relieve Wake Island? Do you put to sea and aggressively patrol the area around Midway?

Hi Ed,

I would agree that the peace time mind set was a large factor in the options that Short and Kimmel had. Rotating portions of the fleet to sea had been proposed but a lack of tankers and escorts ruled it out in peace time. I'll double check, but it seems that the two radars at Pearl had only arrived in July or August and the operations center for air defense had been established, but personnel were still being trained at the time of the attack. Perhaps the biggest lapse was Short's belief that he had more to fear from local saboteurs than strafing enemy fighters and that could esaily be the outgrowth of Pearl harbor seen as an unlikeky target. Peace time routine was in place and on Sunday morning, no pilots standing by to exploit the warning the Opana radar might have given had it been used to alert the island.

An attack on the Phillipines would require a huge logistical effort unless just the carriers were used. Troops would have to be brought from the US to relieve the Phillipines and that doesn't seem likely. An appearance by the carriers probably would not have affected the outcome as they couldn't have intervened to stop the main landings.

[old_pop2000]

Every historical event has a confluence of characters and unrelated factors. Pearl Harbor had many.

1. France had fallen to the Axis and this left Indochina open to occupation by the Japanese and put them within flight range of Malaya.

2. Ditto with Holland and the Dutch East Indies

3. The Japanese had moved southward closer to SE asia, allowing aircraft to reach Burma and Siam.

4. IJN had an aggressive leader as Combined Fleet

5. Germany had invaded Russia, distracting them from Asia.

6. In 1940, a new Navy Minister in Oikawa, who was not against the Tripartite Treaty, which alienated Japan from the US and led them directly to the Pacific War.

I am certain we can identify more personages and factors that contributed to Pearl harbor, but what about 1937. We have a whole new set of factors and personages. How will they react, how will they plan and what outside factors will affect the war in the Pacific.

How does Japan proceed southward, with a free France and Holland blocking the way? The Marco Polo Bridge episode which pushed the Japanese to send Marines to Hainan and Shanghai has just occurred. How does this play out? With the sudden war thrust upon them, how will the Japanese stockpile natural resources, they don't have enough oil in tanks for the IJN for the first years of the war, like they did in 1941.

How many other factors affected the final decision to embark on war? How many of those factors were present in 1937? Which ones were different, giving us a different set of leading events and would have affected how the Japanese proceeded to execute the war in 1937?

There are a lot of hard questions that need to be explored, before charting the course of a global war in 1937.

[Kyle Holgate]

Far be it for me to derail a thread, but I wonder too, what were the odds for Peace to break out in 1937-1941? Hirohito and others certainly did not want war. Of course it's always suggested that Yamamoto or anyone else that spoke out against the war would be assasinated - but I wonder. Hirohito, having heard that his country has virtually no chance to win a war with the west - speaks out in public against the war to save his country. He did it historically in 1945 - to save his country and people, so he did have it in him to do so.

[djcyclone]

Out of all of the post regarding this discussion, I am amazed that no one has mentioned the depth difference between Pearl Harbor and San Diego. I personally believe that it was simply an act of GOD that led to everything involved with Pearl Harbor. I do not believe that FDR was conspiring to get the U.S. involved in a war and therefore purposely left our back door open. I say this because WW II was not a clear victory. If you watch the movie FLAGS OF OUR FATHERS, you will get a better understanding that even after Germany surrendered, we still did not know if we were going to win or simply give up. This is why I doubt the whole conspiracy theory that was invented after the war ended.

Back to the act of GOD, I say this because there was just so many coincidences that helped us in the long run. The Carriers where supposed to be in Pearl Harbor, but where delayed by a Storm. Military leaders had suspected that Pearl Harbor was a target, and they said that it could be done long before it happened, but everyone ignored the warnings. This was a blessing in disguise, because it led to a patriotic backing of the war. As Yamamotto so famously said “I fear that we have only awakened a sleeping giant” and he was right. The biggest blessing in disguise was the fact of how shallow Pearl Harbor actually was. If we had moved the Battleships to San Diego we would have been shooting ourselves in the back. San Diego is too deep and all of the Battleships would have been unrecoverable. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, we began picking up the pieces and by the time the war was over, all of the Battleships (except for two or three) had been repaired and where back in service. If the fleet had been in San Diego then this would have been impossible and the fleet would have been mostly lost.

Another thing to consider is that Military leaders and experts have since said that the Japanese would have attacked San Diego just as easily as they had attacked Pearl Harbor. Once they made up their mind on the attack, there was no stopping them.

Another blessing was the fact that the newly installed Radar did in fact catch the Japanese approach, but due to a scheduled arrival of U.S. bombers, the Radar Operator failed to report the contacts. You can also look at the Destroyer that spotted and sunk a Japanese Midget Submarine only ½ hour before the attack, but the message did not get to the commanders in time. Everything that happened seems to have happened for a reason, and seems to have been of a divine nature. All of these things eventually led to us winning the war and putting the Japanese flat on their hind ends.

That is just my opinion.

[john964]

Out of all of the post regarding this discussion, I am amazed that no one has mentioned the depth difference between Pearl Harbor and San Diego. I personally believe that it was simply an act of GOD that led to everything involved with Pearl Harbor. I do not believe that FDR was conspiring to get the U.S. involved in a war and therefore purposely left our back door open. I say this because WW II was not a clear victory. If you watch the movie FLAGS OF OUR FATHERS, you will get a better understanding that even after Germany surrendered, we still did not know if we were going to win or simply give up. This is why I doubt the whole conspiracy theory that was invented after the war ended.

Back to the act of GOD, I say this because there was just so many coincidences that helped us in the long run. The Carriers where supposed to be in Pearl Harbor, but where delayed by a Storm. Military leaders had suspected that Pearl Harbor was a target, and they said that it could be done long before it happened, but everyone ignored the warnings. This was a blessing in disguise, because it led to a patriotic backing of the war. As Yamamotto so famously said “I fear that we have only awakened a sleeping giant” and he was right. The biggest blessing in disguise was the fact of how shallow Pearl Harbor actually was. If we had moved the Battleships to San Diego we would have been shooting ourselves in the back. San Diego is too deep and all of the Battleships would have been unrecoverable. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, we began picking up the pieces and by the time the war was over, all of the Battleships (except for two or three) had been repaired and where back in service. If the fleet had been in San Diego then this would have been impossible and the fleet would have been mostly lost.

Another thing to consider is that Military leaders and experts have since said that the Japanese would have attacked San Diego just as easily as they had attacked Pearl Harbor. Once they made up their mind on the attack, there was no stopping them.

Another blessing was the fact that the newly installed Radar did in fact catch the Japanese approach, but due to a scheduled arrival of U.S. bombers, the Radar Operator failed to report the contacts. You can also look at the Destroyer that spotted and sunk a Japanese Midget Submarine only ½ hour before the attack, but the message did not get to the commanders in time. Everything that happened seems to have happened for a reason, and seems to have been of a divine nature. All of these things eventually led to us winning the war and putting the Japanese flat on their hind ends.

That is just my opinion.

The radar contact was reported but the operators were told that it was the approching squadron of B-17's by the message center and to ignore it and the midget sub sunk by USS Ward was almost 2 hours before the attack but was discounted by the 14th Naval District HQ mostly because of the preceved lack of experence and biase of the crew and CO of the Ward. The Ward's CO and a large percentage of the crew were Navy Reservests.

[djcyclone]

I have read things that say the CO at Pearl Harbor never recieved word about the midget submarine. He said that he might have reacted differently if he had known. He might have said that simply to save his hind end from being relieved of duty, but that is just what I read. That is why I put that the message never got through.

[old_pop2000]

Out of all of the post regarding this discussion, I am amazed that no one has mentioned the depth difference between Pearl Harbor and San Diego. I personally believe that it was simply an act of GOD that led to everything involved with Pearl Harbor. I do not believe that FDR was conspiring to get the U.S. involved in a war and therefore purposely left our back door open. I say this because WW II was not a clear victory. If you watch the movie FLAGS OF OUR FATHERS, you will get a better understanding that even after Germany surrendered, we still did not know if we were going to win or simply give up. This is why I doubt the whole conspiracy theory that was invented after the war ended.

Back to the act of GOD, I say this because there was just so many coincidences that helped us in the long run. The Carriers where supposed to be in Pearl Harbor, but where delayed by a Storm. Military leaders had suspected that Pearl Harbor was a target, and they said that it could be done long before it happened, but everyone ignored the warnings. This was a blessing in disguise, because it led to a patriotic backing of the war. As Yamamotto so famously said “I fear that we have only awakened a sleeping giant” and he was right. The biggest blessing in disguise was the fact of how shallow Pearl Harbor actually was. If we had moved the Battleships to San Diego we would have been shooting ourselves in the back. San Diego is too deep and all of the Battleships would have been unrecoverable. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, we began picking up the pieces and by the time the war was over, all of the Battleships (except for two or three) had been repaired and where back in service. If the fleet had been in San Diego then this would have been impossible and the fleet would have been mostly lost.

Another thing to consider is that Military leaders and experts have since said that the Japanese would have attacked San Diego just as easily as they had attacked Pearl Harbor. Once they made up their mind on the attack, there was no stopping them.

Another blessing was the fact that the newly installed Radar did in fact catch the Japanese approach, but due to a scheduled arrival of U.S. bombers, the Radar Operator failed to report the contacts. You can also look at the Destroyer that spotted and sunk a Japanese Midget Submarine only ½ hour before the attack, but the message did not get to the commanders in time. Everything that happened seems to have happened for a reason, and seems to have been of a divine nature. All of these things eventually led to us winning the war and putting the Japanese flat on their hind ends.

That is just my opinion.

Just a few salient features:

First, the primary fleet base was moved from San Pedro to Pearl Harbor, not San Diego. That was the only consideration in the location of the attack. Had the Pacific Fleet been kept at its fleet bases, that would have added another 2552 nautical miles or more to the Japanese sailing distance. At the rate of 22 knots which was the sailing speed of Kido Butai, that is another five days across some of the most heaviliy travelled shipping lanes in the Pacific. I doubt Yamamoto would have considered the US Fleet a threat, with an additional five days of sailing added to their sailing time to interdict any actions the Japanese would have taken in the South Pacific Islands

Second, the Ward attack on a suspected submarine could not be confirmed other than by the Ward and the ship that reported being followed. We have only recently found the submarine. The warning time from the Ward report was one full hour.

Three, Opana point radar did report the sighting to Lt. Kermit Tyler at the makeshift fighter direction center and he, not they, decided the bogie was the incoming B-17 group. Tyler had no information to the contrary, so it was a logical assumption on his part.

The depth of the harbor's had nothing to do with the proposed attack. By the way, the average depth of the harbor in San Diego, currently is not more than 25 to 30 feet at low water, this after years of constant dredging. Pearl Harbor was 45 at Ford Island.


Just consider this. The actual author of the attack, in fact, could be considered the US Navy. In Fleet problem XIII, Admiral Harry Yarnell actually demonstrated in this 1932 exercise how an opponents fleet could destroy a fleet in Pearl Harbor with an aerial assault. The results were dismissed by the Navy. Saratoga and Lexington in Fleet Exercise XIII and Grand Joint Exercise 4 were led by Admiral Yarnell, in a successful attack on Pearl Harbor on Febrary 7, 1932. Admiral Yarnell then presented specific warnings and suggestions for strategies to defend Pearl Harbor. However, just because you can attack a target and prove the concept, does not mean that your opponent will have the skill, daring and bravery to attempt such a mission. Yarnell had been a believer that the Fleet carrier should be the main battle arm of the US navy. In the 1932 exercise, he got his chance to demonstrate.

The weather was stormy in the Northern Pacific in Feb. 1932. The TF was 60 miles north of Oahu in heavy seas. Yarnell launched 153 fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers from the two carriers. The weather cleared over Pearl Harbor. It was 0800 on a Sunday morning. The fighters strafed the airfields, the DB and TB simulated an attack on battleship row. Flour bags were dropped to simulate bombs and they hit the US ships. No defending fighters were able to rise to intercept. Army Headquarters was also attacked. All the ships in the harbor were sunk or damaged. All 153 aircraft returned to their carriers.

There were NY times correspondents on scene to cover the exercises and they reported the US fleet aircraft arrived and attacked, unopposed. The umpires, after the exercise, reported "it is doubtful if air attacks can be launched against Oahu in the face of strong defensive aviation without subjecting the attacking carriers to the danger of material damage and considquatnt great losses in the attack air force." So much for learning exercises. There were Japanese naval observers on the exercise who did provide a detailed report . In 1936, a detailed report on such exercises and their results were circulated at the Japanese War College.

Another point. Movies are not usually good sources of evidentiary material to support an argument. No criticism intended, just a simple point.

Anyway, just some facts and information to enlighten and inform. Keep posting and let's discuss the issue more in detail with factual material.

[djcyclone]

Maybe it was San Pedro that I read about. Anyway I read about how if the ships had been anywhere other than Pearl Harbor, it would have been nearly impossible to repair and refloat them with the technology that exsisted at the time.

The reason I used that movie was to highlight the economic problems that we had at the time, and simply to say why I do not believe in the conspiracy theory.

Also I have seen reports that say Yamamotto would have attacked the fleet regardless of where they where. His hopes where to get the Carriers and the Battleships with one punch. It was not a matter of where they where, but a matter of not having to deal with them later. Actually I take that back, because Yamamotto did not want to attack the U.S. at all, but rather his supieriors would have ordered the attack.

[old_pop2000]

I have read things that say the CO at Pearl Harbor never recieved word about the midget submarine. He said that he might have reacted differently if he had known. He might have said that simply to save his hind end from being relieved of duty, but that is just what I read. That is why I put that the message never got through.
The report from the Ward was received an hour AFTER the attack. It got lost in the shuffle.

[old_pop2000]

Maybe it was San Pedro that I read about. Anyway I read about how if the ships had been anywhere other than Pearl Harbor, it would have been nearly impossible to repair and refloat them with the technology that exsisted at the time.

The reason I used that movie was to highlight the economic problems that we had at the time, and simply to say why I do not believe in the conspiracy theory.

Also I have seen reports that say Yamamotto would have attacked the fleet regardless of where they where. His hopes where to get the Carriers and the Battleships with one punch. It was not a matter of where they where, but a matter of not having to deal with them later. Actually I take that back, because Yamamotto did not want to attack the U.S. at all, but rather his supieriors would have ordered the attack.
Ok, no problem. I was just pointing out that in a discussion, movies do not carry much weight.

As to whether Yamamoto would have attacked the fleet, no matter where it was. That isn't true. The whole reason for the attack was to protect the left flank of the Japanese advance southward into the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Philippines and Rabaul. With the fleet based at Pearl, it was within a five days of sailing to the Mandates and this would have caused problems in the protection of the supply lines. With the battleships on the Pacific Coast and a cruising speed of 16 knots, they were an additional seven days sailing from Pearl. Couple this with fueling issues, and they were essentially no threat to Yamamoto. Remember, however, the BB's were not the primary target of that attack, the carriers were. The Japanese knew by 0200 hrs on the morning of the 7th that the carriers were not in the harbor. They could have just turned around and headed home.

[old_pop2000]

Just some more details of the Ward attack.

The attack was conducted at 0645 hrs on the morning of December 7th. All fleet actitivies and the US, as a whole were on peacetime procedures, not wartime. There was also an aircraft on scene, which dropped bombs and made a report. The Ward, after the action, had to create a report, encode that report, transmit that report to headquarters. Headquarters had to decode the report and collate that report with the report from the aircraft. The officer of the day has to ask for reverification of the position of both attacks and confirmation that there is only one sub not two. Remember, this is sunday. Remember, the Ward personnel are reservist, not regular navy. No one was at battle stations at the Headquarters of the 14th Naval District. Finally, at some point, someone has to make a decision to do something. Unfortunately by the time all this was accomplished, the Japanese had already bombed Pearl Harbor and the message of a submarine attack in the defensive zone outside the entrance was probably not the most important bit of information that everyone was concerned about.

One final bit, if you don't mind. The real problem was not that we did not know that war was coming, we did. We were just looking in the wrong direction. After the Argentia Conference, the front lines of the Pacific were shifted from Pearl to the Philippines. This was the fundamental flaw. Pearl simply dropped off our radar. Evidence abounds to prove this. The B-17's sent to the Philippines, ships to the Asiatic fleet to protect British and Dutch interests. On and on, we see valuable assets needed to patrol and protect Pearl Harbor, sent out to the Philippines when Naval War planners had all but decided that that area was indefensible.

[djcyclone]

Just a quick update. When you said that San Diego Harbor was only 25 feet, I suspected that you had bad information. The reason for this is because I used to be a Quartermaster in the Navy and my Destroyer had a draft of 32 feet. Being that San Diego is a military harbor it would have to be deeper. Otherwise ships at peer would be grounded during low tide.

I just looked at a digital updated chart of San Diego, and their are some areas that are 40+ feet. While probably not deep enough to loose a ship, I suspect that the bay has changed over the past 70 years. It could have been deeper in 1941. I will do further research into the other Harbor to see if this was the one that was mentioned in the report that I read.

[old_pop2000]

Just a quick update. When you said that San Diego Harbor was only 25 feet, I suspected that you had bad information. The reason for this is because I used to be a Quartermaster in the Navy and my Destroyer had a draft of 32 feet. Being that San Diego is a military harbor it would have to be deeper. Otherwise ships at peer would be grounded during low tide.

I just looked at a digital updated chart of San Diego, and their are some areas that are 40+ feet. While probably not deep enough to loose a ship, I suspect that the bay has changed over the past 70 years. It could have been deeper in 1941. I will do further research into the other Harbor to see if this was the one that was mentioned in the report that I read.

San Diego Bay is 14 miles long with an a depth of 55 feet at the entrance, 42 feet at the Carrier turning basin near the Quay Wall at North Island. The channel was dredged to 800 feet out to mile marker 2.4, 600 feet out to mile marker 3.0, continuing to the Carrier turning basin. The central bay channel is 40 feet out to the mile marker 7.0 and 8.84 with a 35 foot depth through the South Bay channel.

If you examine a bottom chart, you will see that the South section, averages from 1 foot to 7 ft. The other sections near 32nd street are around 25 ft. The center of the channel is 42 ft. This is all based on the San Diego Marine Information System from the Port Of San Diego. The average from 1ft in the south to 55 ft at the entrance is 27.5 ft.

Keep this in mind. The Hawaiian Islands are the tops of submarine mountains created by the Pacific Plate moving over a hot spot in the Mantle. The side of those submarine mountains are steep. San Diego Bay is on a coastal shelf. In fact, Pearl harbor, at an average depth of 45 feet, is actually one of the shallowest areas, whereas some channels are 109 up to 260 ft in depth. Kaiwi Channel between Molokai and Oahu is 2300 ft. maximum.

[Ed Rotondaro]

While that is true, Mike. Did the Roosevelt Administration even understand what was transpiring in the inner circles of the IJN and Naval Ministry? Can Magic intel or JN25B give you that information or even Joseph Grew or the Peruvian Ambassador?

Dennis and Mike:

Richard Frank in his outstanding book "Downfall" comes closest to examining the Byzantine world of Japanese politics in the hands of the generals and admirals. They act like a bunch of Samurai daimyos, all competing for the attention and subsequent influence on the Emperor. Japanese decision making was hinged on consensus. Even a bad decision supported by all was better than a rational one that was opposed by someone in power. Japan may have appeared to be a modern nation in 1941, but it was still a feudal one.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Point 1- Yoshikawa had radioed to Tokyo, who had relayed the information to Nagumo, that the carriers were not in the harbor. This information was received, IIRC, by 0200 hrs, on the morning of the 7th of December. When the first wave took off, they were fully briefed that the primary target was not in the harbor. So, it wasn't a complete mystery to anyone, once the attack was launched.

Point 2 - It wasn't only the Doolittle Raid that surprised the Japanese, in fact, Halsey's raids on the Marshall Island at the beginning gave CincPac and Cominch the idea that the Japanese were vulnerable to lightning carrier raids. Fletcher's raid on Rabaul before Coral Sea was another raid that was unexpected.

The question however, is whether anyone in the military or civilian authority could have assessed the situation rationally, and determined that Pearl Harbor, being our main naval base in the Pacific would be a target. All the military experts in the war department and the administration determined that the first attack would come in the Philippines, but why not Pearl Harbor.

Was it simply that we could not believe that a carrier force could sail that far, without detection or was it something else?


Dennis:

The level command failure at Pearl Harbor reaches right up to Marshall and Leahy. Nobody put real pressure on Kimmel and Short to demonstrate "What are your plans and preparations for war?" They accepted the bland assurances that all was well and in hand. The US was not in a war mindset in 1941, just as Britain and France weren't in 1939.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi,
I'm not sure the U.S. learnt anything from it, but the Japanese sure as hell did.
Jon:rolleyes:

Jon:

Yamamoto made his staff examine Taranto in detail to create the Pearl Harbor attack. They already understood the need to find a way to deal with the shallow harbor and torpedo attacks. Tactical brilliance but strategic madness. How's it going?:)

[clacton2]

Jon:

Yamamoto made his staff examine Taranto in detail to create the Pearl Harbor attack. They already understood the need to find a way to deal with the shallow harbor and torpedo attacks. Tactical brilliance but strategic madness. How's it going?:)

Ed,
Busy with some work projects at the moment, so not getting so much time as usual for leisure. Hopefully the pressure will ease in a week or so's time, so will have a bit more time to follow and post on the forum.
Take care
Jon:D

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

The level command failure at Pearl Harbor reaches right up to Marshall and Leahy. Nobody put real pressure on Kimmel and Short to demonstrate "What are your plans and preparations for war?" They accepted the bland assurances that all was well and in hand. The US was not in a war mindset in 1941, just as Britain and France weren't in 1939.

The failures at Pearl Harbor are wide and varied. The Roosevelt administration's change of focus from Pearl to the Philippines was a basic strategic error, fostered on the military to protect the Allied interests in the far east. Stark's failure to provide all the intelligence available from Op-20-G to Kimmel and Short was a basic operational error. Kimmel and Short's failure to fully cooperate in the defense of the fleet and the base. On scene commanders cannot maintain their forces on high alert, during peacetime forever. They must be given a warning from their superiors, based on the available information provide by intelligence. This was not done. Kimmel and Short were never informed about how close war actually was and where the first strike might be. They were led to believe that it would be in the Philippines. Admiral Kimmel was told exactly to what degree, US intelligence could provide data, and should have expected more information and warning. Kimmel and Short should have had more long range, land based air surveillance capability, but much of that had gone to the Philippines, where it sat, for 7 hours between the time Pearl was hit and the Philippines. If you want to blame a commander, put it on General MacArthur. Adequate land based search aircraft might have given the fleet a chance. Adequate warning from intelligence decrypts could have allowed Kimmel some time to put the fleet on alert, setup the torpedo nets or even sortie the fleet.

There is much more this debacle than just bureaucratic bungling.

[Ed Rotondaro]

[FONT=Calibri][SIZE=3]Back to the act of GOD, I say this because there was just so many coincidences that helped us in the long run. The Carriers where supposed to be in Pearl Harbor, but where delayed by a Storm. Military leaders had suspected that Pearl Harbor was a target, and they said that it could be done long before it happened, but everyone ignored the warnings. This was a blessing in disguise, because it led to a patriotic backing of the war. As Yamamotto so famously said “I fear that we have only awakened a sleeping giant” and he was right. The biggest blessing in disguise was the fact of how shallow Pearl Harbor actually was. If we had moved the Battleships to San Diego we would have been shooting ourselves in the back. San Diego is too deep and all of the Battleships would have been unrecoverable. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, we began picking up the pieces and by the time the war was over, all of the Battleships (except for two or three) had been repaired and where back in service. If the fleet had been in San Diego then this would have been impossible and the fleet would have been mostly lost[FONT=Calibri][SIZE=3]That is just my opinion.

Hi DJ:

Do you honestly believe that the total loss of old dreadnoughts would have affected the course of the war in the Pacific? The war was won by fast carriers. Those old 21 knot anchors were so unneeded that it is amazing that the USN tied up as much time and resources into getting them back into service. For all intents and purposes they were sunk and didn't even make an impression on the war effort until 1943. The loss of the three carriers would have been far greater than the loss of the entire battleline.

But the point remains, the IJN could have sunk the whole damn Pacific Fleet and by 1943 would face a totally brand new one. The USN fought WWII with two navies, the pre-war navy and the one built after Pearl Harbor. I recommend the book "The Unsinkable Fleet" to you.

[john964]

Hi DJ:

Do you honestly believe that the total loss of old dreadnoughts would have affected the course of the war in the Pacific? The war was won by fast carriers. Those old 21 knot anchors were so unneeded that it is amazing that the USN tied up as much time and resources into getting them back into service. For all intents and purposes they were sunk and didn't even make an impression on the war effort until 1943. The loss of the three carriers would have been far greater than the loss of the entire battleline.

But the point remains, the IJN could have sunk the whole damn Pacific Fleet and by 1943 would face a totally brand new one. The USN fought WWII with two navies, the pre-war navy and the one built after Pearl Harbor. I recommend the book "The Unsinkable Fleet" to you.
Good point Ed, If you look at the USN's ship losses pre 43 they are all pre war built ships after 43 except for a few CVE's all ship losses are DD's

[old_pop2000]

Hi DJ:

Do you honestly believe that the total loss of old dreadnoughts would have affected the course of the war in the Pacific? The war was won by fast carriers. Those old 21 knot anchors were so unneeded that it is amazing that the USN tied up as much time and resources into getting them back into service. For all intents and purposes they were sunk and didn't even make an impression on the war effort until 1943. The loss of the three carriers would have been far greater than the loss of the entire battleline.

But the point remains, the IJN could have sunk the whole damn Pacific Fleet and by 1943 would face a totally brand new one. The USN fought WWII with two navies, the pre-war navy and the one built after Pearl Harbor. I recommend the book "The Unsinkable Fleet" to you.
I caution all of you about the attitude that the old battleships performed no functions. They were very useful in escorting convoys from the states to Australia. In this function, their lack of speed was not important, but the presence of their guns could have been important. Now, I only bring this up to point out they, without those ships, how do we escort those convoys. It's entirely true, that no Japanese forces ever challenged those convoys, but it does not matter, that is 20/20 hindsight. For King, Nimitz and the other senior commanders, it was a matter of what if the Japanese challenged the convoys. So, in that sense, along with protection of the Pacific Coast, the ships did a modicum of work they were capable of handling.

[asnrobert]

Dennis and Mike:

Richard Frank in his outstanding book "Downfall" comes closest to examining the Byzantine world of Japanese politics in the hands of the generals and admirals. They act like a bunch of Samurai daimyos, all competing for the attention and subsequent influence on the Emperor. Japanese decision making was hinged on consensus. Even a bad decision supported by all was better than a rational one that was opposed by someone in power. Japan may have appeared to be a modern nation in 1941, but it was still a feudal one.

In a post elsewhere on this forum (I believe in my Shattered Sword thread), Dennis made the comment that the Japanese had a 20th century military but a 16th century mindset.

[asnrobert]

The failures at Pearl Harbor are wide and varied. The Roosevelt administration's change of focus from Pearl to the Philippines was a basic strategic error, fostered on the military to protect the Allied interests in the far east. Stark's failure to provide all the intelligence available from Op-20-G to Kimmel and Short was a basic operational error. Kimmel and Short's failure to fully cooperate in the defense of the fleet and the base. On scene commanders cannot maintain their forces on high alert, during peacetime forever. They must be given a warning from their superiors, based on the available information provide by intelligence. This was not done. Kimmel and Short were never informed about how close war actually was and where the first strike might be. They were led to believe that it would be in the Philippines. Admiral Kimmel was told exactly to what degree, US intelligence could provide data, and should have expected more information and warning. Kimmel and Short should have had more long range, land based air surveillance capability, but much of that had gone to the Philippines, where it sat, for 7 hours between the time Pearl was hit and the Philippines. If you want to blame a commander, put it on General MacArthur. Adequate land based search aircraft might have given the fleet a chance. Adequate warning from intelligence decrypts could have allowed Kimmel some time to put the fleet on alert, setup the torpedo nets or even sortie the fleet.

There is much more this debacle than just bureaucratic bungling.

According to The Eagle and the Rising Sun by Allan Schom, Admiral R.K. Turner wrote a report to Admiral Stark in June 1941 predicting that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. He wrote another memorandum in October to Admiral Stark stating there was a distinct possibility that Japan would attack. However, when Stark forwarded this in an official communique to senior commanders, he toned it down, saying Japan "might" attack.

[Warship NWS]

I caution all of you about the attitude that the old battleships performed no functions. They were very useful in escorting convoys from the states to Australia. In this function, their lack of speed was not important, but the presence of their guns could have been important. Now, I only bring this up to point out they, without those ships, how do we escort those convoys. It's entirely true, that no Japanese forces ever challenged those convoys, but it does not matter, that is 20/20 hindsight. For King, Nimitz and the other senior commanders, it was a matter of what if the Japanese challenged the convoys. So, in that sense, along with protection of the Pacific Coast, the ships did a modicum of work they were capable of handling.

Personally, I think the IJN would have had a hard time trying to defend the captured locations and still have the naval units to attack convoys (especially capital ships which they only had a few of).. with the exception of sub attacks or land based air (naval air only if they could neutralize our CVs with certainty) of which the BBs would have been little more then targets. I would think that the shortage of oil supplies for its ships and trying to organize forces to attack convoys while also trying to conserve fuel for its other naval units intended to react to our movements would have been questionable. It would have made far more sense, IMHO, for the USN to not rebuild the old 20 knot battlewagons and instead use all of those resources to build more 1940s cruisers, DDs, and CVEs for convoy escorting which proved FAR more valuable and versatile in all naval theaters -- even when compared to the 1940s battleships which were vast improvements ovver the old 1920s-1930s battleships. In the end run, I believe their only assets that could have proven threatening to our convoys were their subs but then our reaction to such a threat would have been interesting especially if we could read their codes, however, their anti-convoy sub doctrines were immature at best - if existent at all. The IJN completely ignored the lessons shown in the Atlantic.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

In a post elsewhere on this forum (I believe in my Shattered Sword thread), Dennis made the comment that the Japanese had a 20th century military but a 16th century mindset.

I believe that understanding that point, is important to understanding the how and why of the Pacific War. The question that runs through minds, after examiningg the timeline of events that led to the war is; Why didn't the Japanese simply not invade Southern Indochina and leave mainland China? Why did they join the alliance with the Germans? Even many Japanese intellectuals and military officers agreed that this was the first big mistake? All of these errors in judgment forced them into a corner where, in their feudal minds, war was the only course? Why proceed to war against an opponent that your own military has proved in war games, they cannot defeat?

The answer is lies in understanding the feudal, oriental mind.

[old_pop2000]

Personally, I think the IJN would have had a hard time trying to defend the captured locations and still have the naval units to attack convoys (especially capital ships which they only had a few of).. with the exception of sub attacks or land based air (naval air only if they could neutralize our CVs with certainty) of which the BBs would have been little more then targets. I would think that the shortage of oil supplies for its ships and trying to organize forces to attack convoys while also trying to conserve fuel for its other naval units intended to react to our movements would have been questionable. It would have made far more sense, IMHO, for the USN to not rebuild the old 20 knot battlewagons and instead use all of those resources to build more 1940s cruisers, DDs, and CVEs for convoy escorting which proved FAR more valuable and versatile in all naval theaters -- even when compared to the 1940s battleships which were vast improvements ovver the old 1920s-1930s battleships. In the end run, I believe their only assets that could have proven threatening to our convoys were their subs but then our reaction to such a threat would have been interesting especially if we could read their codes, however, their anti-convoy sub doctrines were immature at best - if existent at all. The IJN completely ignored the lessons shown in the Atlantic.

Thanks.
With the clarity of 20/20 hindsight and over 66 years of time, I would tend to agree with you. It would have made more sense to move immediately to building bases and runways on Munda and Guadalcanal from which to launch land based Naval bomber attacks on Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia and establish long range seaplane bases on Tulagi to keep a close eye on the waters between the Solomons and the island arcs to the southeast. The establishment of a submarine base on Tulagi would have been beneficial to interdicting the traffic from the West Coast via Fiji to Australia. However, this would have required the sophistication of mind that coordinated military action and economic action together. It would have required the Japanese military to understand that the sinews of war are not just battleships but tankers, cargo ships etc. Unfortunately, they did not, so it never really was a high priority to them. But the US naval and civilian planners did not have the benefit of that clarity of vision, that we do. They had to proceed on the worst case scenario which was a possible attempt to interdict the movement of supplies to Australia. It is really amazing how much we did not know or understand about the Japanese prior to and in the initial years of the war.

[old_pop2000]

According to The Eagle and the Rising Sun by Allan Schom, Admiral R.K. Turner wrote a report to Admiral Stark in June 1941 predicting that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. He wrote another memorandum in October to Admiral Stark stating there was a distinct possibility that Japan would attack. However, when Stark forwarded this in an official communique to senior commanders, he toned it down, saying Japan "might" attack.
Joint letter dispatched on January 25,1941 by Admiral Richardson(outgoing CinCPacFlt) and Admiral Kimmel(Incoming CinCPacFlt) excerpt:


"(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (b) war with Japan
imminent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may
take any form_even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian
flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be
considered German or Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected
against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on
Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible. "


As you can see, even the on scene commanders were aware of the possibilities. The question is then, what was the level of priority placed on this possibility. It's one thing for everyone to say, "yes, it is possible to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor" , it is another to actually prepare for this eventuality. Since the Fleet exercise of 1932, everyone, including the Japanese knew the base was vulnerable.

[asnrobert]

Joint letter dispatched on January 25,1941 by Admiral Richardson(outgoing CinCPacFlt) and Admiral Kimmel(Incoming CinCPacFlt) excerpt:



As you can see, even the on scene commanders were aware of the possibilities. The question is then, what was the level of priority placed on this possibility. It's one thing for everyone to say, "yes, it is possible to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor" , it is another to actually prepare for this eventuality. Since the Fleet exercise of 1932, everyone, including the Japanese knew the base was vulnerable.

I wonder if our racist stereotypes of the Japanese affected our perception of the threat. If it had been the Germans we were facing off against, would we have taken the danger more seriously? When SecNav Knox heard of the attack at Pearl, he thought they were mistaken and that it was the Philippines or elsewhere that had been attack.

With regards to Pearl Harbor, it appears that NO preparations were made, aside from bunching the planes up to guard against sabotage. I realize that it would be difficult to remain on alert constantly in peacetime, and that so many "war warnings" had been issued they were seen as crying wolf, but it seems that no deviation from peacetime routine occurred. The fleet put to sea every Monday, and every Friday they returned to port. Couldn't they have staggered ops so that half the fleet was at sea at any one time? Plus all the ammunition was locked up nice and safe (another sabotage precaution, I presume). Also, what kind of air patrols (if any) were conducted prior to December 7?

[djcyclone]

In the end the Battleships did prove to be more than just effective escorts. There was in fact a single engagement between the U.S.S. Washington, and the (I believe) U.S.S. South Dakota against a Japanese Battleship or Battle cruiser as well as a few destroyers on both sides. The Washington had some form of electrical failure and was unable to fight at all. The Japanese ship pulled alongside, and began broad siding the Washington with everything that it had. The Japanese where unaware of the other Battleship as it was dark. The other American ship slipped behind the Japanese without notice and opened fire on the other side of the ship. Within a few minutes the Japanese ship had sunk from the American fire. The Washington on the other hand although extremely damaged was able to towed to port, and repaired. A true testament to American design over Japanese design.

Despite the fact that only one actual engagement between Battleships occurred, I believe that USN was scared to death of the I.J.N. Yamoto. It did have 18 inch guns (the first Battleship to have that), and the experts in that day still did not see how aircraft could beat Battleships. There was the case of the Bismarck being disabled by aircraft, and a British Battleship had been sunk in the Pacific by aircraft alone, plus all of the Battleships at Pearl Harbor, but the experts still thought that Battleships where important.

The biggest use of Battleships was their ability to shoot at land installations before an amphibious assault. This was priceless in the efforts of the Pacific, when the island hoping strategy began. Perhaps this is why the USN was so willing to spend fortunes on refloating the Battleships. Just a thought.

[old_pop2000]

[FONT=Calibri][SIZE=3]Despite the fact that only one actual engagement between Battleships occurred, I believe that USN was scared to death of the I.J.N. Yamoto. It did have 18 inch guns (the first Battleship to have that), and the experts in that day still did not see how aircraft could beat Battleships. .

US Navy scared of the Yamato and her sister? No, but a good healthy respect for your opponent is always a safe attitude to have. The size of the guns is not always the most important factor, its the fire control that really gives the ship its capability. Without radar, they had to use optical fire control which was accurate, no doubt. But compared to radar controlled guns, the Yamato would have been a sitting duck. Couple this with the problem of control of the air around the fleet, due to a lack of fast attack carriers to protect her, without adequate or capable ASW, the Yamato was, like all surface ships, just overgrown targets. Our signal intelligence teams in Hawaii and Australia kept a pretty close eye on Yamato's whereabouts and movements. Generally, she spent most of the war in Hashirajima, the Fleet anchorage in southern Japan. She participated, from a distance, in Operation MI, spent some time at Truk but generally was really just a floating hotel for the CinC, Combined Fleet.

[Mike Malanaphy]

In the end the Battleships did prove to be more than just effective escorts. There was in fact a single engagement between the U.S.S. Washington, and the (I believe) U.S.S. South Dakota against a Japanese Battleship or Battle cruiser as well as a few destroyers on both sides. The Washington had some form of electrical failure and was unable to fight at all. The Japanese ship pulled alongside, and began broad siding the Washington with everything that it had. The Japanese where unaware of the other Battleship as it was dark. The other American ship slipped behind the Japanese without notice and opened fire on the other side of the ship. Within a few minutes the Japanese ship had sunk from the American fire. The Washington on the other hand although extremely damaged was able to towed to port, and repaired. A true testament to American design over Japanese design.

Despite the fact that only one actual engagement between Battleships occurred, I believe that USN was scared to death of the I.J.N. Yamoto. It did have 18 inch guns (the first Battleship to have that), and the experts in that day still did not see how aircraft could beat Battleships. There was the case of the Bismarck being disabled by aircraft, and a British Battleship had been sunk in the Pacific by aircraft alone, plus all of the Battleships at Pearl Harbor, but the experts still thought that Battleships where important.

The biggest use of Battleships was their ability to shoot at land installations before an amphibious assault. This was priceless in the efforts of the Pacific, when the island hoping strategy began. Perhaps this is why the USN was so willing to spend fortunes on refloating the Battleships. Just a thought.

Hi Cyclone,

Welcome aboard. I think you pretty much stated the value of battleships in WW II for the USN. In your analysis of the battle with Kirishima, you have the Washington and South Dakota mixed up. South Dakota sufferd an electrical failure prior to engaging and lost her radar. In the confusion, she was extremly lucky not to have been torpedoed and seriously damaged. All of the 23 or so shell hits she sustained were above her main belt in the superstructureand caused little damage. The ship had trained with radar and the loss of it was a considerable detriment to her fighting ability.

The USN had a healthy respect for Yamato, but were unaware of her true size and capabilities till almost the end of the war. They certainly took no chances when they attacked them with aircraft.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I wonder if our racist stereotypes of the Japanese affected our perception of the threat. If it had been the Germans we were facing off against, would we have taken the danger more seriously? When SecNav Knox heard of the attack at Pearl, he thought they were mistaken and that it was the Philippines or elsewhere that had been attack.

With regards to Pearl Harbor, it appears that NO preparations were made, aside from bunching the planes up to guard against sabotage. I realize that it would be difficult to remain on alert constantly in peacetime, and that so many "war warnings" had been issued they were seen as crying wolf, but it seems that no deviation from peacetime routine occurred. The fleet put to sea every Monday, and every Friday they returned to port. Couldn't they have staggered ops so that half the fleet was at sea at any one time? Plus all the ammunition was locked up nice and safe (another sabotage precaution, I presume). Also, what kind of air patrols (if any) were conducted prior to December 7?

Hi Robert,

That's an interesting question, there is no doubt there was a tinge of racism on both sides, but the effect is very subtle and may have balanaced each other out. The Germans had no capabilities against Pearl harbor, but they were a credible threat to out shipping which we were not prepared to cope with. I think it's fair to say our leaders saw the threats, there were just to many of them to cope with as we mobilized to meet the coming war.

Short and Kimmel made requests for adequate B-17s for 360 degree searches, but the number virtually exceeded all of them in existence.

The other side of the coin is to not to underestimate the Japanese. The plan was crafted in extreme secrecy on relatively short notice and executed precisely as planned. The Japanese had an extensive cover and deception plan in place and we knew about the convoys sailing southward, tghat's why out attention was focussed in the SW Asia area because that's where they were fighting and had last made an aggressive move.

[old_pop2000]

.

Short and Kimmel made requests for adequate B-17s for 360 degree searches, but the number virtually exceeded all of them in existence.



Actually, it was General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. He submitted his requirement for 180 B-17 bombers, but only 148 had been produced by November 1941 by Boeing. In May, 1941 21 B-17's were ferried over to Hawaii, but 9 were sent on to the Philippines on the 6th of September, 12 more were scheduled to leave, but were retained for training pilots and crews. On December 7th, only 24 B-17's were available in the Hawaiian Air Force.

Just for reference, one hour before the attack, a PBY reported dropping a depth charge on a submarine in entrance to the harbor. This would be the same sub attacked by the Ward. The PATWing could not believe the report, and ask for clarification because it knew that Friendly subs were due to arrive. The report was deemed inconclusive. In the process of checking the report, four enemy aircraft strafed the control tower on the hill at Kaneohe, where the Patwing was stationed.

There were 69 patrol planes available on December 7th, out of a TO&E calling for 185. 61 were ready for use on the December 7th.

7 planes were conducting air search from VP-21, on a track of 120-170 degrees, out to 450 miles. These planes were out of Midway.

4 planes were on the ground at Midway, loaded with ordance on 10 minute notice.

12 Planes on the ground, ready for flight from VP-11

12 planes on the ground, ready for 30 and 4 hours notice from VP-12

3 planes in the air on morning patrol from VP-14 armed with depth charges

3 planes on 30 minute notice from VP-14

4 planes on 4 hour notice from VP-14

12 planes on 4 hour notice from VP-22

12 planes ready from VP-23

4 planes in the air conducting training with Subs

1 plane available on 30 minute notice.

TOTALS

14 PBY's in the air with 11 from Midway

58 PBY's on the surface, available on 30 minute to 4 hour notice

9 PBY's down for maintenance.


All in all, there were no, repeat no, aircraft on search from Pearl Harbor itself. Only 7 were on search southeast to south of Midway Island. For your own reference, it is over 1021 miles, southeast to Oahu, from Midway.

Have a nice day!!:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

In a post elsewhere on this forum (I believe in my Shattered Sword thread), Dennis made the comment that the Japanese had a 20th century military but a 16th century mindset.


Robert:

I believe I made that post more than once old son.:rolleyes:

[Warship NWS]

Ok.. if there is a problem with how or what someone posts on our forums it is to be taken up with me in private via email.. not in public on the forums.

Back to your discussions.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

The biggest use of Battleships was their ability to shoot at land installations before an amphibious assault. This was priceless in the efforts of the Pacific, when the island hoping strategy began. Perhaps this is why the USN was so willing to spend fortunes on refloating the Battleships. Just a thought.


There was nothing in the Pacific that required a battleships guns for bombardment that a good heavy cruiser, air power, or destroyer could not do nearly as well or possibly even better.. this was even proven after WW2. Shore bombardment was a huge waste of a very expensive to operate per hour battleship when there were, and are, far cheaper methods of destroying, or going around, such targets and plus you don't have to have entire engineer platoons to go in afterwards to fill up all the big craters left behind from all the misses that make great places for the enemy to hide after the bombardment is over and that also impede your own forces from moving forward. I may be the minority but bombardment missions for very very expensive battleships was a sheer waste of resources. DDs and CRs could get in closer and fire faster and you could operate several of them in comparison to what it took to escort, maintain, and use a single capital ship for bombardments. Personally, after the PH BBs were raised, which to me was more for prestige then practicality or necessity, that is all they ever really did and all they could really do effectively in the Pacific second only to being slow AA naval platforms.

[Warship NWS]

A note to consider.. the war in the Pacific would have been won if we had battleships or not, and likely it would not have taken any longer. It could not have been won without cruisers or destroyers as primary surface combatants. That alone, IMHO, speaks volumes. I love the awe inspiring designs of capital ships as much as anyone.. but during WW2 they did squat in comparison to other major naval combatants in the overall scheme of naval warfare. I would not be surprised if even the pewny torpedo armed patrol craft caused more naval casualties then battleships did -- they sure as hell fought a lot more battles then battleships did all over the globe.

[asnrobert]

Robert:

I believe I made that post more than once old son.:rolleyes:

Sorry Ed, if I slighted you. :o It's just that Dennis's post was the most recent and therefore the one that stuck in my memory.

[Smiffy]

A note to consider.. the war in the Pacific would have been won if we had battleships or not, and likely it would not have taken any longer. It could not have been won without cruisers or destroyers as primary surface combatants. That alone, IMHO, speaks volumes. I love the awe inspiring designs of capital ships as much as anyone.. but during WW2 they did squat in comparison to other major naval combatants in the overall scheme of naval warfare. I would not be surprised if even the pewny torpedo armed patrol craft caused more naval casualties then battleships did -- they sure as hell fought a lot more battles then battleships did all over the globe.


It's all about perception and prestige. Battleships had for a long time been seen as symbols of national strength and pride, this made their actions far more newsworthy than their actual effect warranted. Almost nightly there were clashes between small craft in the English Channel and the North Sea, but the press wrote this off as minor naval activity. Any story about a battleship was a big story. The big ships held the public imagination, everyone that I know in this country, who is old enough, can tell me exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard of the loss of HMS Hood.

Then again, even to this day, capital ships have an awesome beauty about them. (Well most of them). I have been to Battleship Cove, I seem to remember a couple of PT Boats, a submarine and a destroyer, but the USS Massachusetts is an unforgettable sight. Even my wife, who has been dragged around more naval, military and aero-space museums than any wife should, was suitably impressed. Prior to that she had thought that HMS Belfast was a big ship.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Robert,

That's an interesting question, there is no doubt there was a tinge of racism on both sides, but the effect is very subtle and may have balanaced each other out. The Germans had no capabilities against Pearl harbor, but they were a credible threat to out shipping which we were not prepared to cope with. I think it's fair to say our leaders saw the threats, there were just to many of them to cope with as we mobilized to meet the coming war.

Short and Kimmel made requests for adequate B-17s for 360 degree searches, but the number virtually exceeded all of them in existence.

The other side of the coin is to not to underestimate the Japanese. The plan was crafted in extreme secrecy on relatively short notice and executed precisely as planned. The Japanese had an extensive cover and deception plan in place and we knew about the convoys sailing southward, tghat's why out attention was focussed in the SW Asia area because that's where they were fighting and had last made an aggressive move.

Mike:

I think you may have underestimated the effects of racism on both sides of the war in the pacific. If you have not read it, I recommend "War without Mercy, Race and Power in the Pacific" by John Dower. Racism colored both sides perceptions and strategies during the war. The Allies couldn't believe that the Japanese could build a modern warplane which is why the Zero was such a shock at first. The Japanese assumed and had this belief reinforced after early successes that the West was weak and not equal to them in fighting spirit. The US kept grizzly trophies of skulls, ears etc. of dead Japanese, something you didn't see in Europe.

[Ed Rotondaro]

There was nothing in the Pacific that required a battleships guns for bombardment that a good heavy cruiser, air power, or destroyer could not do nearly as well or possibly even better.. this was even proven after WW2. Shore bombardment was a huge waste of a very expensive to operate per hour battleship when there were, and are, far cheaper methods of destroying, or going around, such targets and plus you don't have to have entire engineer platoons to go in afterwards to fill up all the big craters left behind from all the misses that make great places for the enemy to hide after the bombardment is over and that also impede your own forces from moving forward. I may be the minority but bombardment missions for very very expensive battleships was a sheer waste of resources. DDs and CRs could get in closer and fire faster and you could operate several of them in comparison to what it took to escort, maintain, and use a single capital ship for bombardments. Personally, after the PH BBs were raised, which to me was more for prestige then practicality or necessity, that is all they ever really did and all they could really do effectively in the Pacific second only to being slow AA naval platforms.

Chris:

The only problem with both cruisers and destroyers were that many of the pillboxes and other defensive structures were tough nuts to crack, even capable of resisting battleship fire. The biggest problem with shore bombardment is accuracy. If you have a forward observer to correct the fall of shot and to direct it to target, it can be very effective. but all too often the pre-invasion bombardment was just keeping the enemy underground and as you state, making a lot of craters. Once you got a naval gunfire party ashore, the fire support finally could become effective. As could close air support. The biggest thing that shore bombardment taught the Japanese was to not try and oppose the landing at waters edge where the ships could smash the defenders. If you examine the shift in strategy that occurred after Tarawa, the Japanese let the US land and then set up a layered defense in depth further inland to tie up the invading troops and inflict maximum casualties.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A note to consider.. the war in the Pacific would have been won if we had battleships or not, and likely it would not have taken any longer. It could not have been won without cruisers or destroyers as primary surface combatants. That alone, IMHO, speaks volumes. I love the awe inspiring designs of capital ships as much as anyone.. but during WW2 they did squat in comparison to other major naval combatants in the overall scheme of naval warfare. I would not be surprised if even the pewny torpedo armed patrol craft caused more naval casualties then battleships did -- they sure as hell fought a lot more battles then battleships did all over the globe.

But nothing equalled a fast battleship as an AA platform. No cruiser or destroyer had that kind of firepower. Only the Atlanta class comes close.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Sorry Ed, if I slighted you. :o It's just that Dennis's post was the most recent and therefore the one that stuck in my memory.

Robert:

I'm only teasing ya!:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

It's all about perception and prestige. Battleships had for a long time been seen as symbols of national strength and pride, this made their actions far more newsworthy than their actual effect warranted. Almost nightly there were clashes between small craft in the English Channel and the North Sea, but the press wrote this off as minor naval activity. Any story about a battleship was a big story. The big ships held the public imagination, everyone that I know in this country, who is old enough, can tell me exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard of the loss of HMS Hood.

Then again, even to this day, capital ships have an awesome beauty about them. (Well most of them). I have been to Battleship Cove, I seem to remember a couple of PT Boats, a submarine and a destroyer, but the USS Massachusetts is an unforgettable sight. Even my wife, who has been dragged around more naval, military and aero-space museums than any wife should, was suitably impressed. Prior to that she had thought that HMS Belfast was a big ship.

Smiffy:

I agree. Having visited Battleship Cove with my wife and sons last summer, the Massachusetts was quite impressive, all the more so when you realize that the Iowa class were even bigger. One thing that struck me was even with all the size, there was very little wasted space on the ship. The shell handling rooms and powder rooms were a tight fit as were the main and secondary turrets.

I think it is important to keep in mind that you could not always operate carrier aircraft, especially in the North Sea. So you still needed battleships to tackle other battleships. Also most of the surface combat in the Pacific took place at night which totally negated the aircraft carrier as a combatant. If anything it became a target.

[old_pop2000]

There was nothing in the Pacific that required a battleships guns for bombardment that a good heavy cruiser, air power, or destroyer could not do nearly as well or possibly even better.. this was even proven after WW2. Shore bombardment was a huge waste of a very expensive to operate per hour battleship when there were, and are, far cheaper methods of destroying, or going around, such targets and plus you don't have to have entire engineer platoons to go in afterwards to fill up all the big craters left behind from all the misses that make great places for the enemy to hide after the bombardment is over and that also impede your own forces from moving forward. I may be the minority but bombardment missions for very very expensive battleships was a sheer waste of resources. DDs and CRs could get in closer and fire faster and you could operate several of them in comparison to what it took to escort, maintain, and use a single capital ship for bombardments. Personally, after the PH BBs were raised, which to me was more for prestige then practicality or necessity, that is all they ever really did and all they could really do effectively in the Pacific second only to being slow AA naval platforms.

I can't hear you, can you speak louder!:rolleyes::D:D

[old_pop2000]

But nothing equalled a fast battleship as an AA platform. No cruiser or destroyer had that kind of firepower. Only the Atlanta class comes close.
I am not certain I can sign on for the idea that the battleships were good AAA platforms. Fighter interception was the real key to good fleet defense, not AAA. The US Navy focused a lot of assets, training and budget on developing FIDO's, Radar, radios and IFF to improve fighter direction. It developed two excellent aircraft; namely the F6F or F4U with specific characteristics to improve fighter interception.

The first four carrier battles that were fought, went a long way to prove that the key to good fleet protection was early detection with PPI scan scopes, good height determination, lots of fighters at different altitudes, and separate radio channels for FIDO's and command sets. We learned that if the attack aircraft got within AAA range, we were in trouble. South Dakota was sailing on the Enterprise's port side. She hit many planes, but did not prevent Enterprise from getting hit. The only defense that could have prevented that damage and the loss of the Hornet was the CAP fighters, that were improperly placed at 10000 feet and could not climb fast enough to catch the incoming carrier attack bombers.

Santa Cruz was the last successful, full scale air attack conducted by Kido Butai. This was due to many factors, including the effectiveness of our fighter interception techniques that were improving. As the war progressed, the improvements we made significantly improved fleet defense. But it was never possible to prevent damage to the ships. We vastly improved the effectiveness of the AAA with radar control, proximity fuses, more light and medium weapons with high rates of fire but we could still not completely protect the fleet. Even battleships were targets, unable at times to protect themselves. I am not certain that smaller, faster more maneuverable ships were not better AAA platforms. Fast moving carriers, maneuvering at high speed to make torpedo attacks and dive bomber attacks difficult, were hard to maintain a close AAA pattern around, as SD found.

The battleships did put up a high volume of fire, but how really effective was that high volume. Again, perception is maybe different from reality. Just like the shore bombardment, was the battleships the best AAA platform. Was it the most cost effective. Would a light carrier with more fighters, more AAA cruisers, faster and more maneuverable have been better. Or was it simply, that the threat from Japanese carrier attacks diminished so quickly at the end of 1942, that we were lulled into a false sense of security until the first kamikaze attacks at Leyte. Then we had to use every ships we had.

[Warship NWS]

To respond, mid 1940s USN BBs were excellent AAA platforms (very stable for one thing).. there is no doubt there, but they were nowhere close to being as cost effective as a good CVE with fighters, several Atlantas (for the same cost), Baltimores (bombardment and AAA), nor as versitale as CRs mixed with DDs. Ed, I am also quite aware of the Japanese tactics at some of the islands.. all the more reason why the CRs/DDs came in handy as they could get in closer for more direct fire support, as happened at Normandy where they were firing at point blank range directly into major fortifications. The main point here is that the Pacific War would have been won with or without BBs and a lack of them would likely have been a small, if any, hinderance at best and in turn more CVEs, CVs, CRs, and DDs would have been built. We would have found ways to defeat big bunkers if the BBs were not there, compensation was not one of our problems... any static defense can be overcome one way or another, or simply avoided and then neutralized from behind.

[old_pop2000]

To respond, mid 1940s USN BBs were excellent AAA platforms (very stable for one thing).. there is no doubt there, but they were nowhere close to being as cost effective as a good CVE with fighters, several Atlantas (for the same cost), Baltimores (bombardment and AAA), nor as versitale as CRs mixed with DDs. Ed, I am also quite aware of the Japanese tactics at some of the islands.. all the more reason why the CRs/DDs came in handy as they could get in closer for more direct fire support, as happened at Normandy where they were firing at point blank range directly into major fortifications. The main point here is that the Pacific War would have been won with or without BBs and a lack of them would likely have been a small, if any, hinderance at best and in turn more CVEs, CVs, CRs, and DDs would have been built. We would have found ways to defeat big bunkers if the BBs were not there, compensation was not one of our problems... any static defense can be overcome one way or another, or simply avoided and then neutralized from behind.

No doubt they were excellent AAA platforms with their stability and protection. This is probably true of bombardment. The real question is; were they the most cost effective AAA and bombardment packages? Could smaller, lighter, faster and more maneuverable ships have performed the same function, used less fuel, risked less men and actually given use more numbers in terms of AAA ships.

This whole issue of fleet defense in WWII might be an interesting one to discuss and investigate. Maybe when I come back, I will initiate one, or someone can today.

I wonder what the cost per shot was for an Iowa class battleship versus an Atlanta Class AAA cruiser. Using the cost of operating per hour versus the number of shots it could place in the air. It might be revealing.

[Warship NWS]

I think it is important to keep in mind that you could not always operate carrier aircraft, especially in the North Sea. So you still needed battleships to tackle other battleships. Also most of the surface combat in the Pacific took place at night which totally negated the aircraft carrier as a combatant. If anything it became a target.


At night a BB without blind fire radar lost its most important naval dominance advantage, it has but only one purpose in life, naval artillery, and as such...engagement range - which was the real main reason why they carried such big guns. The Hiei found that out the hard way vs CRs and DDs. Lee would have found that out the hard way had either of his battleships had been hit by torpedoes. As to "tackling" other battleships.. they were not needed vs the Bismarck, nor the Scharnhorst - which was mission killed before the DoY could even fire at her. The KM was a navy with little purpose, in a strategic sense, when compared to the U-boats and merchant raiders. Why? Because the RN had land based air and CVs... not because they had BBs. There were single U-boats that sank more ships then all of the KM major warships combined as an example until air coverage crossed the entire Atlantic via long range aircaft and escort CVs. The RN CRs could simply shadow major warships and track them for air attacks when the weather permitted - as happened with the Bismarck. End result - CVs dominated and dictated how naval wars were fought in every theater of WW2 during daylight and CRs and DDs proved they could be deadly at close range at night. The only result the KM capital ships had was drawing the wolves out to hunt them down or air power to bottle them up. The end result.. BBs never fought a strategic battle during WW2 in any theater at any time.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

At night a BB without blind fire radar lost its most important naval dominance advantage, it has but only one purpose in life, naval artillery, and as such...engagement range - which was the real main reason why they carried such big guns. The Hiei found that out the hard way vs CRs and DDs. Lee would have found that out the hard way had either of his battleships had been hit by torpedoes. As to "tackling" other battleships.. they were not needed vs the Bismarck, nor the Scharnhorst - which was mission killed before the DoY could even fire at her. The KM was a navy with little purpose, in a strategic sense, when compared to the U-boats and merchant raiders. Why? Because the RN had land based air and CVs... not because they had BBs. There were single U-boats that sank more ships then all of the KM major warships combined as an example until air coverage crossed the entire Atlantic via long range aircaft and escort CVs. The RN CRs could simply shadow major warships and track them for air attacks when the weather permitted - as happened with the Bismarck. End result - CVs dominated and dictated how naval wars were fought in every theater of WW2 during daylight and CRs and DDs proved they could be deadly at close range at night. The only result the KM capital ships had was drawing the wolves out to hunt them down or air power to bottle them up. The end result.. BBs never fought a strategic battle during WW2 in any theater at any time.

Thanks.

Chris:

I might disagree here. The sinking of the Kirishima was both a tactical victory and a strategic one in that the IJN never tried to land troops on Guadalcanal after that. They had in effect surrendered the initiative to the US after that night battle. Most historians consider it the turning of the campaign.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

I think you may have underestimated the effects of racism on both sides of the war in the pacific. If you have not read it, I recommend "War without Mercy, Race and Power in the Pacific" by John Dower. Racism colored both sides perceptions and strategies during the war. The Allies couldn't believe that the Japanese could build a modern warplane which is why the Zero was such a shock at first. The Japanese assumed and had this belief reinforced after early successes that the West was weak and not equal to them in fighting spirit. The US kept grizzly trophies of skulls, ears etc. of dead Japanese, something you didn't see in Europe.

Hi Ed,

Perhaps so, I was thinking more in terms of how it affected the strategies on both sides. The Japanese believed that Pearl Harbor would work to their benefit instead of infuriating America to total war based upon their perspective we lacked the martial spirit. Views held about the poor quality of Japanese weapons or aviators may have tinged the American view of their capabilities in attacking western powers. The impact would be subtle and hard to discern from the routine horrors of war.

We certainly prosecuted the CBO against German civilians just as ferociuosly as we did against the Japanese. The level of atrocities was probably higher in the Pacific with the executions of Allied prisoner of wars from the start and Mush Morton's uncriticized sinking of lifeboats and the killing of survivors. But it's still hard to see it as a major factor especially considering the enlightened post war occupation of Japan.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I might disagree here. The sinking of the Kirishima was both a tactical victory and a strategic one in that the IJN never tried to land troops on Guadalcanal after that. They had in effect surrendered the initiative to the US after that night battle. Most historians consider it the turning of the campaign.

Had they won that battle what strategic significance would it have had? They were still not going to get the island back and they could not maintain more troops even if they did land them.

Thanks.

[Mike Malanaphy]

But nothing equalled a fast battleship as an AA platform. No cruiser or destroyer had that kind of firepower. Only the Atlanta class comes close.

Hi Ed,

I remember reading a key point a long time ago in one of H.T. Lenton's volumes on WW II warships. Fast battleships not only carried more guns, but were more effective beause they carried twice as many, four, directors for their 5" guns. This gave them the ability to fire at more targets and increased teh chance that a director was covering the sky arc the attack comes from. The Mk 37 and the VT fuze were a deadly combination in addition to the hordes of 40mm and 20mm.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Had they won that battle what strategic significance would it have had? They were still not going to get the island back and they could not maintain more troops even if they did land them.

Thanks.

Chris:

If there was a time for the Japanese to re-take Guadalcanal, that was it. The US forces were stretched very thin and it was a near run thing. In the grand scheme, losing Guadalcanal wouldn't really affect the US. Japan was no longer in a position to really threaten Port Moresby or Australia after Midway. But once the IJN was driven back, the Marines continued to get stronger and Army units were landed to beef up the US position. After Novemeber it was clear that the US was not going to be dislodged.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

I remember reading a key point a long time ago in one of H.T. Lenton's volumes on WW II warships. Fast battleships not only carried more guns, but were more effective beause they carried twice as many, four, directors for their 5" guns. This gave them the ability to fire at more targets and increased teh chance that a director was covering the sky arc the attack comes from. The Mk 37 and the VT fuze were a deadly combination in addition to the hordes of 40mm and 20mm.

Mike:

Exactly. The fire control on a fast battleship was second to none and the ability to bring massive amounts of 5" AA on targets made them priceless for protecting carriers. I think the first recorded kill with a proximity fused 5" round was recorded in early 1943 by the USS Helena a light cruiser.

[djcyclone]

I am sure that Battleships where good AA platforms, but one can easily argue that the size of a BB was an equal disadvantage to the how much of an advantage the extra guns, and stability of the ship was. If the pilot can hit the target with greater ease, then you had better be shooting the plane down, before it gets to you.

One thing to remember about Destroyers being more cost effective. It is very true that Destroyers where far more effective and far more capable than Battleships where. This is why the only ship with armor plating built after WWII was the Soviet Nuke Cruisers. We completely gave up on our Battleships after WWII, and even left the U.S.S. Kentucky sitting in dry-dock unfinished. My point is that Destroyers where not proven yet, and WWII is what proved them as being the better choice. Aircraft were also unproven, and had only been used with limited success in WWI.

The first Carriers the H.M.S. Vindictive, Furious, and Argus where not launched until after WWI was finished. This means that experts of the day where going off of what had been proven to work. There is no doubt that the Battleships at Pearl Harbor where raised simply for the bonus of prestige, but the US was also doing what it thought was best to win the war. Trial by error, and you have to make mistakes in order to learn how to do it the right way.

[old_pop2000]

Iowa- Cost- $100,000,000 per ship

Armament AA - 20 x 5 inch 38, 80 x 40mm 56, 49 x 20mm 70

Total AA armament - 149 AA guns

Cost per AA gun, $671,000

Note: This does not include the cost of the 16 inch guns but cost of the ship is spreadout over all the weapons it has to carry.


Oakland subtypes CLAA Cruisers - $23,261,500

AA weapons - 12 x 5 inch 38, 32 x 40 mm, 16 x 20 mm

Total AA armament - 60 AA guns

Cost per AA gun - $394,595

Cost for the four Iowa's was over $400,000,000.

You could have built 17 Oakland subtypes for the cost of those four Iowa class battleships.

This would have given you, 204 x 5 inch 38's, 544 x 40 mm, 272 x 20 mm guns.

Note: the armament figures are not for the initial deployment of the Atlanta and Juneau but for later upgraded ships like the USS Oakland. To those of you who want to pick at the details, knock yourself out. I am using this simple method to illustrate a point. Naval vessels are designed to carry weapons and the cost of carrying those weapons to the battle is important. If you have better figures, then provide them in a some format that compares the cost of the AA on these ships. I am not including the cost of the gun directors. I have serious doubts the AA gun directors, on the Iowa's were any better than those directors on the Oakland's. With stable platforms, I am not convinced that battleships were any better at AA than the Oaklands. The objective of stable platforms is to isolate the sighting system from the roll, pitch and yaw motions of the vessel.

Light AA gun directors were the Mark 51 which was superceded by the Mark 52. The final system was the more sophisticated Mark 57 system. This system used either the Mark 28 or Mark 34 radar which had the Mark 19 antenna, A Mark 21 Radar Scope along with a Mark 17 computer. Gunners could track targets optically or electronically. The Mark 57 added blind fire capability and was functionally equivalent to its competitor; the Mark 63.

Link to picture of Mark 51 FCS: http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-049.htm -

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-074.htm

PS: Largest quantity of 40mm guns carried was the USS Saratoga -100 40mm/56 cal weapons in 25 quad mounts. Essex class had 10-18 quad mounts. Iowa's, as stated had 20 quad mounts.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I am sure that Battleships where good AA platforms, but one can easily argue that the size of a BB was an equal disadvantage to the how much of an advantage the extra guns, and stability of the ship was. If the pilot can hit the target with greater ease, then you had better be shooting the plane down, before it gets to you.

One thing to remember about Destroyers being more cost effective. It is very true that Destroyers where far more effective and far more capable than Battleships where. This is why the only ship with armor plating built after WWII was the Soviet Nuke Cruisers. We completely gave up on our Battleships after WWII, and even left the U.S.S. Kentucky sitting in dry-dock unfinished. My point is that Destroyers where not proven yet, and WWII is what proved them as being the better choice. Aircraft were also unproven, and had only been used with limited success in WWI.

The first Carriers the H.M.S. Vindictive, Furious, and Argus where not launched until after WWI was finished. This means that experts of the day where going off of what had been proven to work. There is no doubt that the Battleships at Pearl Harbor where raised simply for the bonus of prestige, but the US was also doing what it thought was best to win the war. Trial by error, and you have to make mistakes in order to learn how to do it the right way.


DJ:

With all due respect, DDs had far more stability issues than any battleship. As additional AA and radars were added, these ships became top heavy. In fact only battleships had the built in stability to absorb all the increases in light AA as well as different radars. I'll give you an example:

The Iowa class were originally designed with a complement of 1900 officers and men. They actually went to war with 2800. Yet they remained stable even though lots of additional light AA was added.

I will allow that a DD was more versatile than a battleship in that it could perform escort work, ASW, AA support and shore bombardment as well launching torpedo attacks. No navy ever seemed to have enough of them and it's one reason why the US kept many older classes of DDs in service.

Regarding battleship vulnerability due to its size, it also had the ability to take more damage than a smaller ship could. There are many instances of single torpedo hit snapping a DD in half. Battleships could take far more punishment than that. The same goes for bomb hits.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Iowa- Cost- $100,000,000 per ship

Armament AA - 20 x 5 inch 38, 80 x 40mm 56, 49 x 20mm 70

Total AA armament - 149 AA guns

Cost per AA gun, $671,000

Note: This does not include the cost of the 16 inch guns but cost of the ship is spreadout over all the weapons it has to carry.


Oakland subtypes CLAA Cruisers - $23,261,500

AA weapons - 12 x 5 inch 38, 32 x 40 mm, 16 x 20 mm

Total AA armament - 60 AA guns

Cost per AA gun - $394,595

Cost for the four Iowa's was over $400,000,000.

You could have built 17 Oakland subtypes for the cost of those four Iowa class battleships.

This would have given you, 204 x 5 inch 38's, 544 x 40 mm, 272 x 20 mm guns.

Note: the armament figures are not for the initial deployment of the Atlanta and Juneau but for later upgraded ships like the USS Oakland. To those of you who want to pick at the details, knock yourself out. I am using this simple method to illustrate a point. Naval vessels are designed to carry weapons and the cost of carrying those weapons to the battle is important. If you have better figures, then provide them in a some format that compares the cost of the AA on these ships. I am not including the cost of the gun directors. I have serious doubts the AA gun directors, on the Iowa's were any better than those directors on the Oakland's. With stable platforms, I am not convinced that battleships were any better at AA than the Oaklands. The objective of stable platforms is to isolate the sighting system from the roll, pitch and yaw motions of the vessel.

Light AA gun directors were the Mark 51 which was superceded by the Mark 52. The final system was the more sophisticated Mark 57 system. This system used either the Mark 28 or Mark 34 radar which had the Mark 19 antenna, A Mark 21 Radar Scope along with a Mark 17 computer. Gunners could track targets optically or electronically. The Mark 57 added blind fire capability and was functionally equivalent to its competitor; the Mark 63.

Link to picture of Mark 51 FCS: http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-049.htm -

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-074.htm

PS: Largest quantity of 40mm guns carried was the USS Saratoga -100 40mm/56 cal weapons in 25 quad mounts. Essex class had 10-18 quad mounts. Iowa's, as stated had 20 quad mounts.

Dennis:

I allow that the CLAAs of the USN were certainly a better bargain for AA work, but what Mike was saying is that the Iowa and the other battleships carried more MK 37 Fire Control Directors. In this instance 4 versus 2. The one advantage that I will give the Atlanta class is the arcs of fire of their guns were better for AA. They could bring a broadside of 14 5" guns versus 10 5" guns on the fast battleships.

[Warship NWS]

Dennis:

I allow that the CLAAs of the USN were certainly a better bargain for AA work, but what Mike was saying is that the Iowa and the other battleships carried more MK 37 Fire Control Directors. In this instance 4 versus 2. The one advantage that I will give the Atlanta class is the arcs of fire of their guns were better for AA. They could bring a broadside of 14 5" guns versus 10 5" guns on the fast battleships.

If you could operate 4 CLAAs for every 1 Iowa then the FC directors will be 8 vs 4. Plus... you can cover 4 points of the formation rather then 1 which gives greater area of AA sky coverage. This is not even counting the cost to build 1 CVE with its airwing of around 18 F6F fighters which is far better then any Iowa ever built for anti-aircraft defenses.

[keschofield]

A couple of points to throw into the discussion that may not have come up yet (my apologies to those involved if these were discussed earlier):

* It is very easy to criticize the resources spent on rebuilding the PH BB's from our modern point of view and knowing what we now know. But in 1941, the carrier vs. batteship as queens of the fleet discussion was still ongoing and did not have the benefit of the experience gained in 1942-45. Battleships were considered the heart of the fleet by many naval professionals and certainly by most civilians. Images of Jutland were still dancing in people's minds.

* The Japanese submarine service ended up being a great disappointment due to the Japanese doctrine of preferring military targets to civilian targets. Great prestige and warrior honor was gained by an IJN sub commander who torpedoed an enemy major fleet unit. Little or no honor was gained for that commander by sinking a troopship, tanker, or merchant ship. Just one more case of 1940's pseudo Bushido code crap that bit the Japanese in the butt.

The Japanese navy did not understand the importance of a campaign against convoys the way the Germans and the US did. Of course, the US expected the Japanese to act just like the Germans did and was surprised when they did not. In many cases, rather than realizing that the Japanese had a different doctrine, we simply assumed that the Japanese were technically unable to do what we expected them to. This overconfidence regards Japanese subs cost us quite a few warships.

[Warship NWS]

A couple of points to throw into the discussion that may not have come up yet (my apologies to those involved if these were discussed earlier):

* It is very easy to criticize the resources spent on rebuilding the PH BB's from our modern point of view and knowing what we now know. But in 1941, the carrier vs. batteship as queens of the fleet discussion was still ongoing and did not have the benefit of the experience gained in 1942-45. Battleships were considered the heart of the fleet by many naval professionals and certainly by most civilians. Images of Jutland were still dancing in people's minds.



I do not disagree that CVs had not proven their full worth in combat yet which is evidence that no BBs or BCs were built after 1945 except for the Kirov BCGN. The late 1930s to early 1940s was the ultimate turning point of the CV vs BB concept. Looking at it realistically we did not need anything larger then CRs .. looking at it historically at that time it was still a proving time for the CVs. If war had not taken place in that time frame it would be interesting to contemplate if BB/BCs would have still been built for at least 10-20 more years and how jet propulsion or missiles would have altered their place in the world navies.

[djcyclone]

DJ:

With all due respect, DDs had far more stability issues than any battleship. As additional AA and radars were added, these ships became top heavy. In fact only battleships had the built in stability to absorb all the increases in light AA as well as different radars. I'll give you an example:

The Iowa class were originally designed with a complement of 1900 officers and men. They actually went to war with 2800. Yet they remained stable even though lots of additional light AA was added.

I will allow that a DD was more versatile than a battleship in that it could perform escort work, ASW, AA support and shore bombardment as well launching torpedo attacks. No navy ever seemed to have enough of them and it's one reason why the US kept many older classes of DDs in service.

Regarding battleship vulnerability due to its size, it also had the ability to take more damage than a smaller ship could. There are many instances of single torpedo hit snapping a DD in half. Battleships could take far more punishment than that. The same goes for bomb hits.



In the end, you have to admit, that Destroyers are the better choice. When you mention a single torpedo hit blowing a Destroyer in half you are probably reffering to the Wicks and Clemson Class Four stackers. These ships where considered obsolete even before they where finished building them. This is what was believed to have happened to the Reuben James before the war even began.

By the time the US Navy was back on its feet, we where designing Destroyers like the Fletcher Class and Summner Class. These ships where held in comparison to Light Cruisers, and could easily take two or three torpedoes before sercuming to their wounds. There was a case that I recently saw on the History channel of a Destroyer taking 3 Kamikazie Hits and continueing to fight on. The Destroyer had lost its Rudder control, but the Captain simply changed the ships speed to increase or decrease the turn of the ship. The ship claimed nearly 30 aircraft kills and survived to be repaired.

The biggest weekness of the Destroyer was the Depth Charge Racks. However their is only one case that I know of in which an Aircraft was able to set the Depth Charges off by straffing the Destroyer. The Destroyer of course exploded and went under in a few seconds. A Destroyer is simply too small and too fast for a pilot to keep up with.

A Destroyer is also far cheaper too replace when you loose it, and less lives are lost. Plus a Destroyer can respond to any situation. If you have a Submarine, then a Destroyer can move in and destroy it, if you need shore bombardment, then a Destroyer can play that game also, and if you need air cover, then a Destroyer can shoot down enemy planes with less chance of being damaged its self. A destroyers biggest weekness in WWII was surface combat. This is why they traveled in packs of 4 to 8 destroyers. Multiple targets makes a rough day for the enemy. The reason they had a weekness for suface combat, is because all it takes is a few 6 inch or heavier guns and a Destroyer is turning into a Submarine.

In the end however, it all comes down to the cost. Congress has never changed, and if you offer a cheep solution, they will take it without blinking. This is why we have 30 Arleigh Burk Class Destroyers today, that where built without a Helo Hanger. This makes them nothing but floating tagets in almost every situation of modern combat. My Destroyer (U.S.S. McFaul DDG 74) even lost a War Game with a Canadian Destroyer simply because we could not use our Radar, and the enemy had a Chopper. They found us on the second day and we recieved the message that we had been killed.

[old_pop2000]

The MK 37 Gun Director was used mostly on the 5 inch, 6 inch and 8 inch guns but could be used for the AA weapons such as 40mm 56 guns. Since the AA cruisers only had six mounts, the forward MK 37 controlled the the forward mounts, while the aft controlled the aft mounts. On battleships, a selected number of 5 inch 38 mounts were assigned to each director.

Usually the Mark 51 FCS was used for the quad 40 mm guns. From October 1944 to February 1945, half of all Japanese shot down were credited to the 40mm/Mk 51 gun mount/FCS combination.

[old_pop2000]

If I can put four more CLAA around each carrier, then I can have more gun directors and more guns covering more points of the compass. I can get a better and more complete layered fleet defense system with the radar picket destroyers on the outer edge and successive layers of CLAA. Also, what happens when the battleships are formed into a separate TF for shore bombardment and move in closer. The carriers now lose that protection. What takes their place?

Some other points to remember. When an Essex class carrier is under air attack, it usually begins to zig zag and increase speed to 32 knots. An Essex can out turn a battleship easily and hence, the BB has to stay miles away from the carrier. This was a problem for SD during Santa Cruz. The smaller, faster and more maneuverable CLAA were usually able to stay tucked into the carriers and maneuver with them easier. During air attacks, the fleet, IIRC, closes up, not spreads out. I might be mistaken.

[asnrobert]

* It is very easy to criticize the resources spent on rebuilding the PH BB's from our modern point of view and knowing what we now know. But in 1941, the carrier vs. batteship as queens of the fleet discussion was still ongoing and did not have the benefit of the experience gained in 1942-45. Battleships were considered the heart of the fleet by many naval professionals and certainly by most civilians. Images of Jutland were still dancing in people's minds.



I have a book titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team," written by VADM Joseph Taussig (ret) that was published in 1943. In the chapter on battleships, he still considers them the main units of the fleet, and claimed that until battleships arrived in the Solomons, "we were being beaten just as we had been beaten elsewhere." He also thought that canceling the next class after the Iowas (I believe he was referring to the Montana class) was "regrettable, for the need for them is bound to come...". Of course, they were canceled because many others knew what he didn't- that the battleship's days were numbered.

[Warship NWS]

I have a book titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team," written by VADM Joseph Taussig (ret) that was published in 1943. In the chapter on battleships, he still considers them the main units of the fleet, and claimed that until battleships arrived in the Solomons, "we were being beaten just as we had been beaten elsewhere." He also thought that canceling the next class after the Iowas (I believe he was referring to the Montana class) was "regrettable, for the need for them is bound to come...". Of course, they were canceled because many others knew what he didn't- that the battleship's days were numbered.

Well, I won't agree with him. The IJN was not "beating" us that badly as they were taking heavy losses also even with the problems we had with the Mk15 torpedoes - point being, we were certainly not losing every tactical battle - no major strategic battles were fought at night. Battleships or not, would not have made that big a difference at night yet as we were still learning how to use the radars and we still lacked proper DD operational doctrines and if we had lost a battleship at night due to torpedo attack I think it would have raised some serious questions about their vunlerability to close ranged combat - IMHO Lee at the 2nd Battle of Guadalcanal got damned lucky he was not hit after the DDs were blown out of the water. The entire purpose to having big guns was not so much to do more damage but to hit targets further away.. this is greatly negated at night without good radar and it gets FAR worse if the DDs are not operated in a "screening" or "mess with the enemy" divisional doctrine. Our DDs would not have taken as serious losses as they did and would have inflicted more damage if (a) their torpedoes worked and (b) if they operated independently as they were designed for since the age of WW1 when torpedo boats became "destroyers". Just correction of one of these failures could have made a difference in several of the night engagements, both would have made a serious difference as Burke and Mooresburger proved in other DD skirmishes.

Tactics.. tactics.. tactics... and it helps to have reliable weapons.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Part of my personal problem with some of these discussions about the almighty battlewagons is that many forget how critical their escorts were and the doctrines they operated with. No CV/BB commander wanted to go anywhere without those pesky tin cans covering their ass ends and CRs definitely didn't hurt either in case they needed some bigger guns or more AAA firepower. Point being we need to be carefull not to use that old magifying glass approach to naval combat by focusing only on the big gunned ships -- they never went anywhere without being escorted by CRs and DDs so those smaller ships cannot be ignored.

[john964]

In the end the Battleships did prove to be more than just effective escorts. There was in fact a single engagement between the U.S.S. Washington, and the (I believe) U.S.S. South Dakota against a Japanese Battleship or Battle cruiser as well as a few destroyers on both sides. The Washington had some form of electrical failure and was unable to fight at all. The Japanese ship pulled alongside, and began broad siding the Washington with everything that it had. The Japanese where unaware of the other Battleship as it was dark. The other American ship slipped behind the Japanese without notice and opened fire on the other side of the ship. Within a few minutes the Japanese ship had sunk from the American fire. The Washington on the other hand although extremely damaged was able to towed to port, and repaired. A true testament to American design over Japanese design.

Despite the fact that only one actual engagement between Battleships occurred, I believe that USN was scared to death of the I.J.N. Yamoto. It did have 18 inch guns (the first Battleship to have that), and the experts in that day still did not see how aircraft could beat Battleships. There was the case of the Bismarck being disabled by aircraft, and a British Battleship had been sunk in the Pacific by aircraft alone, plus all of the Battleships at Pearl Harbor, but the experts still thought that Battleships where important.

The biggest use of Battleships was their ability to shoot at land installations before an amphibious assault. This was priceless in the efforts of the Pacific, when the island hoping strategy began. Perhaps this is why the USN was so willing to spend fortunes on refloating the Battleships. Just a thought.
As to the salvage of the battleships at Pearl Harbor only 2 required extencive repairs namely California and West Verginia, they were back in action in Jan 44 and June 44 respectivly Nevada was back in mid 43 the rest Pennsylvnia was was back at the end of Jan 42 Tennessee was back in early Jan 42 and Maryland by March 42 though Penn and Tenn went in for major refits in late 42 IIRC sept for Tenn and Nov for Penn.

[Spook046]

Well, I won't agree with him. The IJN was not "beating" us that badly as they were taking heavy losses also even with the problems we had with the Mk15 torpedoes - point being, we were certainly not losing every tactical battle - no major strategic battles were fought at night. Battleships or not, would not have made that big a difference at night yet as we were still learning how to use the radars and we still lacked proper DD operational doctrines and if we had lost a battleship at night due to torpedo attack I think it would have raised some serious questions about their vunlerability to close ranged combat - IMHO Lee at the 2nd Battle of Guadalcanal got damned lucky he was not hit after the DDs were blown out of the water. The entire purpose to having big guns was not so much to do more damage but to hit targets further away.. this is greatly negated at night without good radar and it gets FAR worse if the DDs are not operated in a "screening" or "mess with the enemy" divisional doctrine. Our DDs would not have taken as serious losses as they did and would have inflicted more damage if (a) their torpedoes worked and (b) if they operated independently as they were designed for since the age of WW1 when torpedo boats became "destroyers". Just correction of one of these failures could have made a difference in several of the night engagements, both would have made a serious difference as Burke and Mooresburger proved in other DD skirmishes.

Tactics.. tactics.. tactics... and it helps to have reliable weapons.

Thanks.

The premise of allowing more independent operation of the destroyer divisions is well covered in Ken Jones' "Destroyer Squadron 23", citing not only the engagements of the titled unit (including Desdivs 45 & 46) but also the Savo and Tassafaronga naval battles of 1942. The Tassafaronga battle in fact makes up the book's first chapter, with it noted that had Cole's destroyers been allowed to engage and launch torpedoes at their discretion, that might well have undercut the ability of Tanaka's own IJN DD's to have set up their own torpedo counterattack against the US cruisers with as daunting effectiveness.

[old_pop2000]

I do not disagree that CVs had not proven their full worth in combat yet which is evidence that no BBs or BCs were built after 1945 except for the Kirov BCGN. The late 1930s to early 1940s was the ultimate turning point of the CV vs BB concept. Looking at it realistically we did not need anything larger then CRs .. looking at it historically at that time it was still a proving time for the CVs. If war had not taken place in that time frame it would be interesting to contemplate if BB/BCs would have still been built for at least 10-20 more years and how jet propulsion or missiles would have altered their place in the world navies.
It might be good to remember that by the time of the Night action around Guadalcanal involving Washington and SD, the Japanese had three targets to shoot at, not just one. Henderson had become the bomber field, there was fighter 1 to the SE and Fighter 2 or Kukum was to the NW. In fact, when they did bombard the field at night, in November as a prelude to reinforcement moving in, they completely missed Fighter 2. They damaged some P-38's but not much else, IIRC. By this date, the situation in and around Lunga Point had changed. The Japanese fired 989 shells on that occasion, and had little to show.

[djcyclone]

I have a book titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team," written by VADM Joseph Taussig (ret) that was published in 1943. In the chapter on battleships, he still considers them the main units of the fleet, and claimed that until battleships arrived in the Solomons, "we were being beaten just as we had been beaten elsewhere." He also thought that canceling the next class after the Iowas (I believe he was referring to the Montana class) was "regrettable, for the need for them is bound to come...". Of course, they were canceled because many others knew what he didn't- that the battleship's days were numbered.



I remember playing a game based on WW II Naval Combat, and in the game I read about the Montana Class Super Battleship, as the player was able to build them. Now I do not know how accurate the information was, but that is the only source I have ever been able to find on the Montana Class. I do have a Jane's Combat Ships Of The World eddition from the WW II time period, but it makes no mention of the Montana.

The information that I read on the ship, was that if built as planned it would have had a draft that would have prevented it from passing through the Panama Canal. This means that it would have been stuck in the Pacific or Atlantic, and would have had to travel around Argentina in order to switch.

From the notes in the game (and I again do not know how accurate they are) the ship would have been nearlly indistructable. Of course today we know that a MK 48 ADCAP torpedo could have split in two if it worked properly, or maybe one of the Nuke Torpedoes that the Soviet Union was accused of creating. Ultimatly I think it would have been nothing but a waste of money. I have not been able to find anything else on the Montana other than the notes I read in that game.

[Spook046]

BTW, coming back to the original topic of Pearl Harbor and what might have existed in pre-raid intel (yeah, I'm being a battleship killjoy here ;) )..........

John Costello, in his sizable work "The Pacific War" (1981), hinted towards the end of his appendix chapter on Pearl Harbor (pgs 657-659) that British codebreaking had made its own inroads. Mr Costello further states:

"Still more significant are the hints given by the official history British wartime intelligence which states that from Sept 1939 the Royal Navy cryptanalysts had been able to penetrate Japan's fleet cypher---the operational code traffic that defied the Americans until after Pearl Harbor. Moreover, we know that not only was there a massive British signals intelligence operation mounted in Singapore, but the Far Eastern Combined Bureau of the three services was continuously evaluating Japan's war preparations."

The rest of Costello's discussion on this matter tails off into speculation of what might have been known or unknown by the British before Pearl Harbor, adding the assertion that "key reports dealing with Japan in the Prime Minister's records have been removed and remain closed for seventy-five years."

This poses two fundamental questions:

a) How well founded was Costello's assertion (in the 1980's) of possible IJN code-cracking by British intelligence? Was there much to substantiate at that time?

b) Since then, have any new findings come to light to reveal more on what the British did or didn't know regarding the Japanese naval codes before Pearl?

[Warship NWS]

The premise of allowing more independent operation of the destroyer divisions is well covered in Ken Jones' "Destroyer Squadron 23", citing not only the engagements of the titled unit (including Desdivs 45 & 46) but also the Savo and Tassafaronga naval battles of 1942. The Tassafaronga battle in fact makes up the book's first chapter, with it noted that had Cole's destroyers been allowed to engage and launch torpedoes at their discretion, that might well have undercut the ability of Tanaka's own IJN DD's to have set up their own torpedo counterattack against the US cruisers with as daunting effectiveness.

What I think many fail to realize is that the DDs were not just about screening and firing torpedoes but were also very effective "mess with the enemy" warships if used properly. The first and foremost thing you do NOT want to lose in a naval engagement is cohesion and DDs in a naval engagement could seriously mess with the cohesion of enemy naval divisions. Moving tons of shipping around with the navigational challenges was hard enough .. add in combat, C&C, and DDs racing around trying to line up for a torpedo shot or firing rapid fire 4-5" guns and it can get problematic real quick. They were naval units you flat could not ignore by the 1930s with the advent of more powerful armaments and better torpedoes, IMHO this when the DDs truely came of age. The side that could retain better cohesion in a naval battle could maintain a decisive advantage even when up against a more powerful force - tactics are only functional with workable cohesion and NO weapon platform has ever won a major battle by operating on its own - example the battleship.

[old_pop2000]

....This poses two fundamental questions:

a) How well founded was Costello's assertion (in the 1980's) of possible IJN code-cracking by British intelligence? Was there much to substantiate at that time?

b) Since then, have any new findings come to light to reveal more on what the British did or didn't know regarding the Japanese naval codes before Pearl?

A) In his book " And I was There" Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Head of intelligence for the Pacific Fleet throughout the war, states:


The five-digit operational cipher we knew as JN-25 had also been extensively penetrated by the British and the Dutch. Britain's attack on JN-25 was concentrated at their Far East Combined Bureau, based in Singapore , with an outpost ..... in Hong Kong.

The Dutch also maintained a remarkably efficient but much smaller code-breaking operation attached to their military headquarters on Java. Cited reference is Page 206, Paragraph 2-4.

The Dutch apparently had decoded intelligence reports that showed Japanese naval concentrations near the Kuriles.

B)Layton's book was co-written with John Costello and Captain Roger Pineau.

Does that answer the question. ;)

Suggest reading "British Intelligence in the Second World War" By F.H. Hinsley and Hawkins. I believe it has some information on that subject.
The last book was written in 2000, and has detailed information on the cooperation between the British FECB, US code breakers, Dutch in Java and the Australian codebreakers on JN-25.

[asnrobert]

I remember playing a game based on WW II Naval Combat, and in the game I read about the Montana Class Super Battleship, as the player was able to build them. Now I do not know how accurate the information was, but that is the only source I have ever been able to find on the Montana Class. I do have a Jane's Combat Ships Of The World eddition from the WW II time period, but it makes no mention of the Montana.

The information that I read on the ship, was that if built as planned it would have had a draft that would have prevented it from passing through the Panama Canal. This means that it would have been stuck in the Pacific or Atlantic, and would have had to travel around Argentina in order to switch.

From the notes in the game (and I again do not know how accurate they are) the ship would have been nearlly indistructable. Of course today we know that a MK 48 ADCAP torpedo could have split in two if it worked properly, or maybe one of the Nuke Torpedoes that the Soviet Union was accused of creating. Ultimatly I think it would have been nothing but a waste of money. I have not been able to find anything else on the Montana other than the notes I read in that game.

The Yamato and Musashi were considered unsinkable, and we know how that worked out...:rolleyes:

[old_pop2000]

The Yamato and Musashi were considered unsinkable, and we know how that worked out...:rolleyes:
Let's qualify that "unsinkable" idea. They were unsinkable provided they were not attacked by over 300 carrier planes, and not accompanied by a single friendly combat air patrol. The TB could only attack, after the fighters and DB knocked out the AAA.

[Warship NWS]

Let's qualify that "unsinkable" idea. They were unsinkable provided they were not attacked by over 300 carrier planes, and not accompanied by a single friendly combat air patrol. The TB could only attack, after the fighters and DB knocked out the AAA.

Some ships were attacked by far less and sank or knocked completely out of a naval campaign or war. End result however, no ship was unsinkable and sinking a ship was hardly a requirement to take it out of a war. I think even if the Yamato class was attacked by an Iowa and not sunk it would have never fought another naval battle again.. even a squadron of SBDs could knock it out of the war with a few well placed hits. I seriously doubt the IJN had the facilities/resources, or at the least, the time to do major repairs on that oversized bomb and torpedo sponge. Just like the Bismarck and Tirpitz.. a pair of worthless warships based on outdated and obsolete thinking. Granted this is 20/20 but one could argue a case that all major navies that had CVs had more modern carriers then battleships by the start of WW2.. that might say something in itself depending on how you interperate the production of CVs vs BBs between the 1920s and 1940s.

Thanks.

[asnrobert]

Well, I won't agree with him. The IJN was not "beating" us that badly as they were taking heavy losses also even with the problems we had with the Mk15 torpedoes - point being, we were certainly not losing every tactical battle - no major strategic battles were fought at night. Battleships or not, would not have made that big a difference at night yet as we were still learning how to use the radars and we still lacked proper DD operational doctrines and if we had lost a battleship at night due to torpedo attack I think it would have raised some serious questions about their vunlerability to close ranged combat - IMHO Lee at the 2nd Battle of Guadalcanal got damned lucky he was not hit after the DDs were blown out of the water. The entire purpose to having big guns was not so much to do more damage but to hit targets further away.. this is greatly negated at night without good radar and it gets FAR worse if the DDs are not operated in a "screening" or "mess with the enemy" divisional doctrine. Our DDs would not have taken as serious losses as they did and would have inflicted more damage if (a) their torpedoes worked and (b) if they operated independently as they were designed for since the age of WW1 when torpedo boats became "destroyers". Just correction of one of these failures could have made a difference in several of the night engagements, both would have made a serious difference as Burke and Mooresburger proved in other DD skirmishes.

Tactics.. tactics.. tactics... and it helps to have reliable weapons.

Thanks.

You're preaching to the choir. As you pointed out, our problems were not that we had no BBs, but due to inexperience, lousy torpedoes, and keeping the DDs in line with the cruisers instead of sending them ahead. Despite this, were still able to win at Cape Esperance, and in spite of the shellacking we took during the Friday the 13th battle we were able to bag the Hiei and without any BBs of our own.

[asnrobert]

Some ships were attacked by far less and sank or knocked completely out of a naval campaign or war. End result however, no ship was unsinkable and sinking a ship was hardly a requirement to take it out of a war. I think even if the Yamato class was attacked by an Iowa and not sunk it would have never fought another naval battle again.. even a squadron of SBDs could knock it out of the war with a few well placed hits. I seriously doubt the IJN had the facilities/resources, or at the least, the time to do major repairs on that oversized bomb and torpedo sponge. Just like the Bismarck and Tirpitz.. a pair of worthless warships based on outdated and obsolete thinking. Granted this is 20/20 but one could argue a case that all major navies that had CVs had more modern carriers then battleships by the start of WW2.. that might say something in itself depending on how you interperate the production of CVs vs BBs between the 1920s and 1940s.

Thanks.

In Shattered Sword, the Japanese carrier crews referred to the battleships as the "Hashirajima Fleet" (Hashirajima being the main fleet anchorage in the Inland Sea)- while the carriers were out doing all the work, the battlewagons were swinging at anchor, or at most engaging in gunnery practice.

[bridav58]

Well, I won't agree with him. The IJN was not "beating" us that badly as they were taking heavy losses also even with the problems we had with the Mk15 torpedoes - point being, we were certainly not losing every tactical battle - no major strategic battles were fought at night. Battleships or not, would not have made that big a difference at night yet as we were still learning how to use the radars and we still lacked proper DD operational doctrines and if we had lost a battleship at night due to torpedo attack I think it would have raised some serious questions about their vunlerability to close ranged combat - IMHO Lee at the 2nd Battle of Guadalcanal got damned lucky he was not hit after the DDs were blown out of the water. The entire purpose to having big guns was not so much to do more damage but to hit targets further away.. this is greatly negated at night without good radar and it gets FAR worse if the DDs are not operated in a "screening" or "mess with the enemy" divisional doctrine. Our DDs would not have taken as serious losses as they did and would have inflicted more damage if (a) their torpedoes worked and (b) if they operated independently as they were designed for since the age of WW1 when torpedo boats became "destroyers". Just correction of one of these failures could have made a difference in several of the night engagements, both would have made a serious difference as Burke and Mooresburger proved in other DD skirmishes.

Tactics.. tactics.. tactics... and it helps to have reliable weapons.

Thanks.

his ships just following good torpedo evasive manuvering? Remember that IJN torpedos normally didn't do that well after US ships started thier evasive manuvering. Tassafaronga & Savo are very good examples where evasive manuvering wasn't started soon enough.

[asnrobert]

his ships just following good torpedo evasive manuvering? Remember that IJN torpedos normally didn't do that well after US ships started thier evasive manuvering. Tassafaronga & Savo are very good examples where evasive manuvering wasn't started soon enough.

I think at Savo we were caught napping- we didn't even know the Japanese were there until ships started getting hit.
Also, with the Long Lance, it only takes one or two to ruin your day...

[Ed Rotondaro]

If you could operate 4 CLAAs for every 1 Iowa then the FC directors will be 8 vs 4. Plus... you can cover 4 points of the formation rather then 1 which gives greater area of AA sky coverage. This is not even counting the cost to build 1 CVE with its airwing of around 18 F6F fighters which is far better then any Iowa ever built for anti-aircraft defenses.

Chris:

I'm not sure that the F6F Hellcat could operate off of CVEs, the USN operated Wildcats off of them. But the RN was able to operate Corsairs off of CVEs, so Hellcats probably shouldn't have been impossible. Usually the CVLs found themselves in the dedicated CAP role since they only carried about 9 Avengers, but 30 fighters.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In the end, you have to admit, that Destroyers are the better choice. When you mention a single torpedo hit blowing a Destroyer in half you are probably reffering to the Wicks and Clemson Class Four stackers. These ships where considered obsolete even before they where finished building them. This is what was believed to have happened to the Reuben James before the war even began.

By the time the US Navy was back on its feet, we where designing Destroyers like the Fletcher Class and Summner Class. These ships where held in comparison to Light Cruisers, and could easily take two or three torpedoes before sercuming to their wounds. There was a case that I recently saw on the History channel of a Destroyer taking 3 Kamikazie Hits and continueing to fight on. The Destroyer had lost its Rudder control, but the Captain simply changed the ships speed to increase or decrease the turn of the ship. The ship claimed nearly 30 aircraft kills and survived to be repaired.

The biggest weekness of the Destroyer was the Depth Charge Racks. However their is only one case that I know of in which an Aircraft was able to set the Depth Charges off by straffing the Destroyer. The Destroyer of course exploded and went under in a few seconds. A Destroyer is simply too small and too fast for a pilot to keep up with.

A Destroyer is also far cheaper too replace when you loose it, and less lives are lost. Plus a Destroyer can respond to any situation. If you have a Submarine, then a Destroyer can move in and destroy it, if you need shore bombardment, then a Destroyer can play that game also, and if you need air cover, then a Destroyer can shoot down enemy planes with less chance of being damaged its self. A destroyers biggest weekness in WWII was surface combat. This is why they traveled in packs of 4 to 8 destroyers. Multiple targets makes a rough day for the enemy. The reason they had a weekness for suface combat, is because all it takes is a few 6 inch or heavier guns and a Destroyer is turning into a Submarine.

In the end however, it all comes down to the cost. Congress has never changed, and if you offer a cheep solution, they will take it without blinking. This is why we have 30 Arleigh Burk Class Destroyers today, that where built without a Helo Hanger. This makes them nothing but floating tagets in almost every situation of modern combat. My Destroyer (U.S.S. McFaul DDG 74) even lost a War Game with a Canadian Destroyer simply because we could not use our Radar, and the enemy had a Chopper. They found us on the second day and we recieved the message that we had been killed.

DJ:

Regarding the Sumner class you again have tremendous stability issues. It was merely a Fletcher class with twin turrets and putting two of them up front caused the ships to plow under in even mild seas, let alone stormy weather. Also remember what happened to Halsey's 3rd Fleet when it encountered two typhoons. It lost three DDs with most of their crews due to capsizing. Also no US DD could take three torpedo hits, Most cruisers couldn't. The Fletcher class was strong, but not that strong. Don't compare kamikaze damage with torpedo damage, they are not even in the same ballpark. The old saying is "If you want to let light into a ship hit it with a shell or a bomb. If you want to let water into it and cause it to sink, use a torpedo or a mine". Superstructure damage will mission kill a warship, but it can survive to fight another day as you demonstrated. Lose floatation and you lose your ship.

I am not by any means knocking destroyers. They have obviously become the premier surface warfare unit in most navies. And the lack of helo hangers on the first batch of Arleigh Burke DDGs was a classic example of penny wise and pound foolish. I believe the succeeding Burkes have hangers now.

As far a cheap goes, the navy made that mistake with the Oliver Perry class FFGs and ended up with a warship that really didn't meet their needs. I believe they are all out of service.

In closing I merely was attempting to demonstrate that battleships in WWII still had many strengths and missions to perform. I certainly agree that destroyers were the most versatile ships in any navy.

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

I'm not sure that the F6F Hellcat could operate off of CVEs, the USN operated Wildcats off of them. But the RN was able to operate Corsairs off of CVEs, so Hellcats probably shouldn't have been impossible. Usually the CVLs found themselves in the dedicated CAP role since they only carried about 9 Avengers, but 30 fighters.
Carriers trials for the Hellcat were carried out on the USS Sangamon Bay, a CVE. So, yes, it was possible to operate them off of the CVE's. 28 to be exact.

[Ed Rotondaro]

If I can put four more CLAA around each carrier, then I can have more gun directors and more guns covering more points of the compass. I can get a better and more complete layered fleet defense system with the radar picket destroyers on the outer edge and successive layers of CLAA. Also, what happens when the battleships are formed into a separate TF for shore bombardment and move in closer. The carriers now lose that protection. What takes their place?

Some other points to remember. When an Essex class carrier is under air attack, it usually begins to zig zag and increase speed to 32 knots. An Essex can out turn a battleship easily and hence, the BB has to stay miles away from the carrier. This was a problem for SD during Santa Cruz. The smaller, faster and more maneuverable CLAA were usually able to stay tucked into the carriers and maneuver with them easier. During air attacks, the fleet, IIRC, closes up, not spreads out. I might be mistaken.

Dennis:

I would imagine that if the BBs were tasked with shore bombardment, then the USN would have achieved local air superiority. That or they would use the older slower BBs like Spruance did at Saipan while retaining the faster modern ones for escort. That was the method used at Philippines Sea. Also don't knock the maneuverability of fast battleships, at least the North Carolina and Iowa class. The Iowa could turn inside of a destroyer depending on speed. The SD's problem was her class had shortened hulls to increase armor protection on a 35,000 ton displacement. This resulted in reduced manueverability.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The premise of allowing more independent operation of the destroyer divisions is well covered in Ken Jones' "Destroyer Squadron 23", citing not only the engagements of the titled unit (including Desdivs 45 & 46) but also the Savo and Tassafaronga naval battles of 1942. The Tassafaronga battle in fact makes up the book's first chapter, with it noted that had Cole's destroyers been allowed to engage and launch torpedoes at their discretion, that might well have undercut the ability of Tanaka's own IJN DD's to have set up their own torpedo counterattack against the US cruisers with as daunting effectiveness.

Ed:

I finished that book over the holidays and found it to be very interesting, especially the evolution of DD doctrine. Still you don't see a real improvement until Cape St. George. Even Empress Augusta Bay demonstrated some clumsiness in handling a task force at night.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I remember playing a game based on WW II Naval Combat, and in the game I read about the Montana Class Super Battleship, as the player was able to build them. Now I do not know how accurate the information was, but that is the only source I have ever been able to find on the Montana Class. I do have a Jane's Combat Ships Of The World eddition from the WW II time period, but it makes no mention of the Montana.

The information that I read on the ship, was that if built as planned it would have had a draft that would have prevented it from passing through the Panama Canal. This means that it would have been stuck in the Pacific or Atlantic, and would have had to travel around Argentina in order to switch.

From the notes in the game (and I again do not know how accurate they are) the ship would have been nearlly indistructable. Of course today we know that a MK 48 ADCAP torpedo could have split in two if it worked properly, or maybe one of the Nuke Torpedoes that the Soviet Union was accused of creating. Ultimatly I think it would have been nothing but a waste of money. I have not been able to find anything else on the Montana other than the notes I read in that game.

DJ:

Good sources for information on the never built Montana class are Norman Friedman's "US Battleships, A Design History" and "US Battleships" by Garzke and Dulin. Both are available from the Naval Institute Press and are rather expensive. You can also order them via NWS.

There was a proposal to add a third set of locks to the Panama Canal to accomodate larger warships. It would have taken at least five years to construct them, hence the operation was never undertaken. Montana was not the only class that couldn't use the Canal. Certain of the old slow US battleships had torpedo blisters added which made them too wide to use the canal. I think Tennessee was one of them.

[Ed Rotondaro]

BTW, coming back to the original topic of Pearl Harbor and what might have existed in pre-raid intel (yeah, I'm being a battleship killjoy here ;) )..........

John Costello, in his sizable work "The Pacific War" (1981), hinted towards the end of his appendix chapter on Pearl Harbor (pgs 657-659) that British codebreaking had made its own inroads. Mr Costello further states:

"Still more significant are the hints given by the official history British wartime intelligence which states that from Sept 1939 the Royal Navy cryptanalysts had been able to penetrate Japan's fleet cypher---the operational code traffic that defied the Americans until after Pearl Harbor. Moreover, we know that not only was there a massive British signals intelligence operation mounted in Singapore, but the Far Eastern Combined Bureau of the three services was continuously evaluating Japan's war preparations."

The rest of Costello's discussion on this matter tails off into speculation of what might have been known or unknown by the British before Pearl Harbor, adding the assertion that "key reports dealing with Japan in the Prime Minister's records have been removed and remain closed for seventy-five years."

This poses two fundamental questions:

a) How well founded was Costello's assertion (in the 1980's) of possible IJN code-cracking by British intelligence? Was there much to substantiate at that time?

b) Since then, have any new findings come to light to reveal more on what the British did or didn't know regarding the Japanese naval codes before Pearl?

Ed:

The problem is that the Japanese maintained very good radio silence. so I doubt that the British would have known the Pearl Harbor attack was on. They might have noticed when the carriers received their sailing orders. Another problem with this is that Churchill in his meetings with FDR stressed that he was counting on the US, particularly their navy to protect Britain's Asian colonies. Would he let this force be attacked in hope that the US would go to war not only with Japan, but Germany as well? As it was, FDR never asked for a declaration of war against Germany, just Japan. It was Germany and Italy's declaration of war against the US that prompted American to respond in kind.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Some ships were attacked by far less and sank or knocked completely out of a naval campaign or war. End result however, no ship was unsinkable and sinking a ship was hardly a requirement to take it out of a war. I think even if the Yamato class was attacked by an Iowa and not sunk it would have never fought another naval battle again.. even a squadron of SBDs could knock it out of the war with a few well placed hits. I seriously doubt the IJN had the facilities/resources, or at the least, the time to do major repairs on that oversized bomb and torpedo sponge. Just like the Bismarck and Tirpitz.. a pair of worthless warships based on outdated and obsolete thinking. Granted this is 20/20 but one could argue a case that all major navies that had CVs had more modern carriers then battleships by the start of WW2.. that might say something in itself depending on how you interperate the production of CVs vs BBs between the 1920s and 1940s.

Thanks.

Chris:

One key reason for having more modern CVs than BBs is obviously the naval limitation treaties. If you can't build battleships, you build carriers and cruisers. It would be interesting to see what would have happened if more navies had built carriers during the inter-war period. That possibly might have caused a de-emphasis on battleship construction. The carrier might have been seen as the capital much more earlier on.

I realize that the carrier had not proved itself in the pre-war period, but at least in the USN and the IJN, the more farsighted officers understood its potential and were developing the techniques such as dive bombing and torpedo attack to make the carrier supreme. Look at how many old admirals got their wings (Halsey, Mitscher, even King)? All navies were scrambling for AA solutions. I think what was not realized was twofold:

The power of massing carriers which the IJN poineered.
The difficulties in defending ships with AA alone.

[john964]

DJ:

Good sources for information on the never built Montana class are Norman Friedman's "US Battleships, A Design History" and "US Battleships" by Garzke and Dulin. Both are available from the Naval Institute Press and are rather expensive. You can also order them via NWS.

There was a proposal to add a third set of locks to the Panama Canal to accomodate larger warships. It would have taken at least five years to construct them, hence the operation was never undertaken. Montana was not the only class that couldn't use the Canal. Certain of the old slow US battleships had torpedo blisters added which made them too wide to use the canal. I think Tennessee was one of them.Ed, the first ships designed not to be able to go through the canal were the Montana's all the old BB's could in fact go through it evan after there rebuilds. IIRC the Essex class had to fold up there port elivator in order to go through.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You're preaching to the choir. As you pointed out, our problems were not that we had no BBs, but due to inexperience, lousy torpedoes, and keeping the DDs in line with the cruisers instead of sending them ahead. Despite this, were still able to win at Cape Esperance, and in spite of the shellacking we took during the Friday the 13th battle we were able to bag the Hiei and without any BBs of our own.

Robert:

Actually Cape Esperance had the makings of a disaster. It was more of a case of the IJN making more mistakes than the USN did. We could have lost the USS Boise if seawater had not put out fires in her magazines. Also Scott chose the a cruiser with older radar for his flagship and this resulted in delays in identifying the IJN. Communications were also spotty.

Regarding Hiei, we really got lucky. The shell that damaged her steering gear was a dud fired most likely by the CA Portland. It was carrier and land based air that actually sank her.

[Ed Rotondaro]

his ships just following good torpedo evasive manuvering? Remember that IJN torpedos normally didn't do that well after US ships started thier evasive manuvering. Tassafaronga & Savo are very good examples where evasive manuvering wasn't started soon enough.


At Savo, the US ships didn't even have full steam up until well into the battle.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Carriers trials for the Hellcat were carried out on the USS Sangamon Bay, a CVE. So, yes, it was possible to operate them off of the CVE's. 28 to be exact.


Dennis:

Thanks, but some reason they usually used Wildcats. I guess since their mission was ASW and close air support, they didn't feel the need for Hellcats. Or were Hellcats in short supply?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, the first ships designed not to be able to go through the canal were the Montana's all the old BB's could in fact go through it evan after there rebuilds. IIRC the Essex class had to fold up there port elivator in order to go through.

John:

I'm not so sure on that. Several months back, Mike Synder had commented on the torpedo blisters on some old battleships precluding their ability to fit thru the Canal. Mike's very thorough in his research, so unless I misunderstood himI would be inclined to believe this.

[old_pop2000]

Just a few comparisons.

The Sumner's were 376 ft long, 40 ft wide and had a 14 ft draught.

The Oakland CLAA were 541 ft long, 53 ft wide and had a 26 ft. draught.

Without running through the design program, I can only guess that the Oakland's were a much more stable gun platform for the AA weapons. Couple this with the stable element present in all FCS on board Navy ships, and I suspect that they were excellent gun platforms, to a point. However, a battleship is a much more stable platform, but it is cost per performance issue. Sorry, but cost per performance is a valid quality of any weapon, we cannot disassociate weapon's cost from the equation.

The battleship's performed a convoy escort and shore bombardment function, along with being a stable, armoured AA platform. Many were already built or 90% constructed by the time the Navy realized that battleship's functions could be cost effectively executed by other ships. I would say that by the end of 1942, possibly early 1943, the Navy realized that the battleship's were not the primary strike weapon. After the first four conclusive carrier battles of the war from May, 1942 to November, 1942, I suspect that the Navy realized the fate of the BB's. Note, the Montana's were suspended in 1942 and cancelled in 1943. The timing cannot be a coincidence. Note also that the Montana's reverted a slower speed, which might also be a factor in their cancellation. The battleship was a majestic weapon, but was not a cost effective weapons platform. As Naval aircraft improved, as the submarine's range, speed and lethality improved, it became apparent that the battleship was just another expensive floating target.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Thanks, but some reason they usually used Wildcats. I guess since their mission was ASW and close air support, they didn't feel the need for Hellcats. Or were Hellcats in short supply?
They did not have enough F6F Hellcat's produced to fill out the CVE's, so they augmented them with the much improved FM-2's. Later in the war, as production ramped up and the F4U became carrier qualified, they began to put F6F's on the CVE's.

[Ed Rotondaro]

They did not have enough F6F Hellcat's produced to fill out the CVE's, so they augmented them with the much improved FM-2's. Later in the war, as production ramped up and the F4U became carrier qualified, they began to put F6F's on the CVE's.

Dennis:

Ahh, the mystery is solved! What improvements were made to the FM-2s? Larger engines? Supercharging?

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I'm not sure that the F6F Hellcat could operate off of CVEs, the USN operated Wildcats off of them. But the RN was able to operate Corsairs off of CVEs, so Hellcats probably shouldn't have been impossible. Usually the CVLs found themselves in the dedicated CAP role since they only carried about 9 Avengers, but 30 fighters.

I was being somewhat generalized.. the main point was that a CVE/L with fighters was cheaper and far more effective in the AAA role then a BB ever was.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Ahh, the mystery is solved! What improvements were made to the FM-2s? Larger engines? Supercharging?

1. Built by Eastern Aircraft- Originally designated the XF4F-8

2. R-1820 engine was used in place of the R-1830, this gave the FM-2, 150 more horsepower and this engine was lighter.

3. Total structure was lighter with the engine changed.

4. Taller tail to counteract engine torque and provide better directional control

5. Aircraft reverted back to 4 x .50 cal. Machine guns with HVAR rockets additionally installed for use against ship and ground targets.

Faster, lighter and more maneuverable than previous versions.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I was being somewhat generalized.. the main point was that a CVE/L with fighters was cheaper and far more effective in the AAA role then a BB ever was.

Chris:

I agree, until the advent of the guided missile, a plane was the best defense against another plane.

[Ed Rotondaro]

1. Built by Eastern Aircraft- Originally designated the XF4F-8

2. R-1820 engine was used in place of the R-1830, this gave the FM-2, 150 more horsepower and this engine was lighter.

3. Total structure was lighter with the engine changed.

4. Taller tail to counteract engine torque and provide better directional control

5. Aircraft reverted back to 4 x .50 cal. Machine guns with HVAR rockets additionally installed for use against ship and ground targets.

Faster, lighter and more maneuverable than previous versions.

Dennis:

Excellent information. Who says you can't teach an old bird new tricks? Did Wright make the engines?

[old_pop2000]

Costs:

Commencement Bay Class CVE -$11,000,000 each - not including 28 aircraft

For the cost of $400,000,000 dollars for four Iowa's, I can build 36 CVE which could carry a grand total of 1008 FM-2 and TBF aircraft.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I agree, until the advent of the guided missile, a plane was the best defense against another plane.

Even with advent of SAMs.. the best defense against a plane is another plane.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Excellent information. Who says you can't teach an old bird new tricks? Did Wright make the engines?
Yes, they were Wright R-1820 cyclone engines.

[old_pop2000]

Even with advent of SAMs.. the best defense against a plane is another plane.
Yup, that is true. Imagine the Fifth fleet with 17 Essex class carriers and 36 CVE's. The Essex class had squadrons of over 36-40 F6F Hellcats, the CVE's could carry over 20-25 FM-2's. Numberwise, that is a rough estimate of over 1332 fighters, give or take about a couple of hundred. Imagine being the fleet FIDO and having 1332 fighters to protect the fleet. Who said it wasn't a battle of numbers?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Costs:

Commencement Bay Class CVE -$11,000,000 each - not including 28 aircraft

For the cost of $400,000,000 dollars for four Iowa's, I can build 36 CVE which could carry a grand total of 1008 FM-2 and TBF aircraft.

Dennis:

Yes, but don't forget they are slow and very vulnerable. CVE=Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable. AKA "Kaiser Coffins" from the shipbuilder who also built Liberty ships.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Yes, but don't forget they are slow and very vulnerable. CVE=Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable. AKA "Kaiser Coffins" from the shipbuilder who also built Liberty ships.
Commencement Bay class ships had a speed of 20 knots. The FM-2's had a speed of 332 MPH at 28,000 feet. In a static positioin like off the coast of an island or when protecting a fleet of AKA's, the speed of the CVE/CVL did not mattered much. This would relieve the fleet carriers from the responsibility and they could deploy away from the island, staying mobile to interdict any opponents fleet.

[Warship NWS]

Dennis:

Yes, but don't forget they are slow and very vulnerable. CVE=Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable. AKA "Kaiser Coffins" from the shipbuilder who also built Liberty ships.

Yes.. but they can defend themselves far better then any BB could against air attack (fighters), sub attack (A/C with rockets or depth charges), or even surface attack (if carrying anti-shipping aircaft and ordnance) and were often fairly well escorted and/or operated in groups - if you could build multiple CVEs and airgroups per cost of one BB then grouping them was cheaper and far more effective. Unless you caught one at night and it has no chance to escape you may take more damage trying to attack it then you will dish out against it especially since they seldom operated alone. Either way.. would you rather lose a CVE or a BB? Costwise and prestigewise.. I would rather lose the CVE that can be replaced rather quickly compared to a BB.

[old_pop2000]

Yes.. but they can defend themselves far better then any BB could against air attack (fighters), sub attack (A/C with rockets or depth charges), or even surface attack (if carrying anti-shipping aircaft and ordnance) and were often fairly well escorted and/or operated in groups - if you could build multiple CVEs and airgroups per cost of one BB then grouping them was cheaper and far more effective. Unless you caught one at night and it has no chance to escape you may take more damage trying to attack it then you will dish out against it especially since they seldom operated alone. Either way.. would you rather lose a CVE or a BB? Costwise and prestigewise.. I would rather lose the CVE that can be replaced rather quickly compared to a BB.
CVE's could carry radar equipped TBF Avengers for night actions. The TBF would launch first, the FM-2's could accompany and carry out night interception missions. The first night action test occurred with Butch O'Hare on November 26-27, 1943. The night fighter teams would launch, the carrier's FIDO would ID the incoming bogies and the Avengers would locate and guide the Hellcats to the target. This procedure was extended to the CVE/CVL.

Note: Butch O'hare volunteered for this first attempt, and was lost. Probably shot down by the Avenger's gunner who was taking plinks at an incoming Zero. Butch probably got in the way.

[djcyclone]

DJ:

Regarding the Sumner class you again have tremendous stability issues. It was merely a Fletcher class with twin turrets and putting two of them up front caused the ships to plow under in even mild seas, let alone stormy weather. Also remember what happened to Halsey's 3rd Fleet when it encountered two typhoons. It lost three DDs with most of their crews due to capsizing. Also no US DD could take three torpedo hits, Most cruisers couldn't. The Fletcher class was strong, but not that strong. Don't compare kamikaze damage with torpedo damage, they are not even in the same ballpark. The old saying is "If you want to let light into a ship hit it with a shell or a bomb. If you want to let water into it and cause it to sink, use a torpedo or a mine". Superstructure damage will mission kill a warship, but it can survive to fight another day as you demonstrated. Lose floatation and you lose your ship.

I am not by any means knocking destroyers. They have obviously become the premier surface warfare unit in most navies. And the lack of helo hangers on the first batch of Arleigh Burke DDGs was a classic example of penny wise and pound foolish. I believe the succeeding Burkes have hangers now.

As far a cheap goes, the navy made that mistake with the Oliver Perry class FFGs and ended up with a warship that really didn't meet their needs. I believe they are all out of service.

In closing I merely was attempting to demonstrate that battleships in WWII still had many strengths and missions to perform. I certainly agree that destroyers were the most versatile ships in any navy.



Yes the later half of Arleigh Burks do have Helo Hangers. I believe they are refered to as Block II Arleigh Burks (I may be mistaken on that). As for the Perry Class FFG, I believe we have about 10 or so still in service. They normally do not do anything but float in the Carribean. That is if they leave port, because many of the one's that we do have are being broken down for sale. I remember in Norfolk always seeing a new FFG every 3 or 4 months and seeing crews from other countries (South America) prepare the ship for being purchased. That was just one harbor, so I cannot vouge for the rest of the ports.

I do believe that the FFG proved itself. I forget the name of the ship, but I read an article of an FFG that was struck with two Anti Surface Missiles, about 15 years ago. The Captain got into alot of trouble, because the CIWS was deactivated, and radar was down, so the ship was not ready for anything. The point is that the ship was able to survive the attack (I believe it was an Iranian Pilot that was responsible). Just another act of war commited against us, and we did not respond. It is becoming a regular thing today. The Captain was relieved of duty and retired from the service shortly after. The ship was repaired and made a few more tours.

[old_pop2000]

It would be interesting for someone to develop a scenario in a naval game, with the Iowa's replaced by CLAA's and CVE's with the correct amount of aircraft, to get some idea of how they could have improved fleet defense at Okinawa, Leyte and/or Philippine Sea.;)

[Warship NWS]

This should make for an interesting debate;

http://forums.navalwarfare.net/showthread.php?t=188

[asnrobert]

Ed:

The problem is that the Japanese maintained very good radio silence. so I doubt that the British would have known the Pearl Harbor attack was on. They might have noticed when the carriers received their sailing orders. Another problem with this is that Churchill in his meetings with FDR stressed that he was counting on the US, particularly their navy to protect Britain's Asian colonies. Would he let this force be attacked in hope that the US would go to war not only with Japan, but Germany as well? As it was, FDR never asked for a declaration of war against Germany, just Japan. It was Germany and Italy's declaration of war against the US that prompted American to respond in kind.

Costello in his book also stated that the Japanese transferred the call signs of the carriers to destroyers headed for Indonesia or NEI (I forget exactly) to further confuse any American eavesdroppers. About a week or so before Pearl Harbor, Edwin Layton informed Admiral Kimmel that he did not know the locations of the Japanese carriers. Kimmel asked him "You mean they could be rounding Diamond Head and we wouldn't know about it?"

[asnrobert]

Yes the later half of Arleigh Burks do have Helo Hangers. I believe they are refered to as Block II Arleigh Burks (I may be mistaken on that). As for the Perry Class FFG, I believe we have about 10 or so still in service. They normally do not do anything but float in the Carribean. That is if they leave port, because many of the one's that we do have are being broken down for sale. I remember in Norfolk always seeing a new FFG every 3 or 4 months and seeing crews from other countries (South America) prepare the ship for being purchased. That was just one harbor, so I cannot vouge for the rest of the ports.

I do believe that the FFG proved itself. I forget the name of the ship, but I read an article of an FFG that was struck with two Anti Surface Missiles, about 15 years ago. The Captain got into alot of trouble, because the CIWS was deactivated, and radar was down, so the ship was not ready for anything. The point is that the ship was able to survive the attack (I believe it was an Iranian Pilot that was responsible). Just another act of war commited against us, and we did not respond. It is becoming a regular thing today. The Captain was relieved of duty and retired from the service shortly after. The ship was repaired and made a few more tours.

When I was in Charleston in the late '80s, I saw some of the Brooke and Garcia class FFs being handed over to the Pakistani Navy.

The FFG that was hit was the Stark. In 1987 she was hit by two Exocets fired from Iraqi fighter that had made a couple passes over the ship before firing. IIRC, the Captain was in the head at the time of the attack, and his career went there afterward. :rolleyes:

There was another FFG, the Samuel Roberts (named after the DE sunk at Samar) that hit a mine in the Persian Gulf around the same time. She too survived.

[Spook046]

Ed:

I finished that book over the holidays and found it to be very interesting, especially the evolution of DD doctrine. Still you don't see a real improvement until Cape St. George. Even Empress Augusta Bay demonstrated some clumsiness in handling a task force at night.

Actually, I'd say that Vella Gulf, preceding Cape St. George by a few months, was a rather impressive night-engagement performance by the participating US DD's.

Granted, there were still missteps and errors at Empress Augusta Bay by the US DD divisions. On the flip side, the IJN warship units that were supposed to be more proficient in night maneuvers and fighting committed even worse errors in that battle, including a couple of collisions. Personally, I think that many parallels exist between this battle and the Java Sea battle of early 1942, but with the results being an arguable flip side of the coin.

I'm not altogether surprised that US surface warships still had "teething" issues not only in late 1943, but on into 1944, regarding night maneuvers and cohesion. Many of those US ships had been newly in commission for less than a year's time, including the average service time of their crews, before committed to battle. Even the US BB's had a few collisions with each other in 1944.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Yes the later half of Arleigh Burks do have Helo Hangers. I believe they are refered to as Block II Arleigh Burks (I may be mistaken on that). As for the Perry Class FFG, I believe we have about 10 or so still in service. They normally do not do anything but float in the Carribean. That is if they leave port, because many of the one's that we do have are being broken down for sale. I remember in Norfolk always seeing a new FFG every 3 or 4 months and seeing crews from other countries (South America) prepare the ship for being purchased. That was just one harbor, so I cannot vouge for the rest of the ports.

I do believe that the FFG proved itself. I forget the name of the ship, but I read an article of an FFG that was struck with two Anti Surface Missiles, about 15 years ago. The Captain got into alot of trouble, because the CIWS was deactivated, and radar was down, so the ship was not ready for anything. The point is that the ship was able to survive the attack (I believe it was an Iranian Pilot that was responsible). Just another act of war commited against us, and we did not respond. It is becoming a regular thing today. The Captain was relieved of duty and retired from the service shortly after. The ship was repaired and made a few more tours.

DJ:

That was the USS Stark that was hit by two Exocet missiles. This occurred in 1987 during the Iraq Iran War. Stark was part of the force that was keeping the Persian Gulf open to neutral shipping. The question becomes were the Stark's standing orders to assume a more aggressive defensive posture?

[Ed Rotondaro]

It would be interesting for someone to develop a scenario in a naval game, with the Iowa's replaced by CLAA's and CVE's with the correct amount of aircraft, to get some idea of how they could have improved fleet defense at Okinawa, Leyte and/or Philippine Sea.;)

Dennis:

I sincerely doubt that you would see the CVEs operating with the rest of the fleet. Historically they rarely did because they would slow down the rest of the faster carriers. It's the same reason that DEs rarely did and instead operated with the CVEs. The CVEs were mainly intended for two roles: Escorting convoys (hence the E designation) and supporting amphibious invasions. In the Pacific they were grouped into the 7th Fleet (aka MacArthur's navy) along with the old slow battleships and DEs.

The Navy recognized the need for DEs that could operate with the fleet, so the last class of them had a higher top speed and more potent firepower (2 5"/38 mounts as opposed to 3" guns that earlier classes carried).

CLAAs certainly were appreciated and effective in their anti-aircraft role. This is borne out by the large numbers that were built (11). Would the navy have been better off with more of them at the expense of the Iowa class? In the AA role yes. In the shore bombardment role and surface combat role no. You pays your money you takes your chances as they say.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Costello in his book also stated that the Japanese transferred the call signs of the carriers to destroyers headed for Indonesia or NEI (I forget exactly) to further confuse any American eavesdroppers. About a week or so before Pearl Harbor, Edwin Layton informed Admiral Kimmel that he did not know the locations of the Japanese carriers. Kimmel asked him "You mean they could be rounding Diamond Head and we wouldn't know about it?"

Robert:

Thanks. I have Costello's book, but have not yet read it. If Kimmel made a statement like that and didn't raise the security levels at Pearl Harbor then his is guilty of neglect.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Actually, I'd say that Vella Gulf, preceding Cape St. George by a few months, was a rather impressive night-engagement performance by the participating US DD's.

Granted, there were still missteps and errors at Empress Augusta Bay by the US DD divisions. On the flip side, the IJN warship units that were supposed to be more proficient in night maneuvers and fighting committed even worse errors in that battle, including a couple of collisions. Personally, I think that many parallels exist between this battle and the Java Sea battle of early 1942, but with the results being an arguable flip side of the coin.

I'm not altogether surprised that US surface warships still had "teething" issues not only in late 1943, but on into 1944, regarding night maneuvers and cohesion. Many of those US ships had been newly in commission for less than a year's time, including the average service time of their crews, before committed to battle. Even the US BB's had a few collisions with each other in 1944.

Ed:

I had forgotten Vella Gulf, that was an impressive win by the DDs. Frederick Moosbrugger was in command and performed superbly.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I sincerely doubt that you would see the CVEs operating with the rest of the fleet. Historically they rarely did because they would slow down the rest of the faster carriers. It's the same reason that DEs rarely did and instead operated with the CVEs. The CVEs were mainly intended for two roles: Escorting convoys (hence the E designation) and supporting amphibious invasions. In the Pacific they were grouped into the 7th Fleet (aka MacArthur's navy) along with the old slow battleships and DEs.

The Navy recognized the need for DEs that could operate with the fleet, so the last class of them had a higher top speed and more potent firepower (2 5"/38 mounts as opposed to 3" guns that earlier classes carried).

CLAAs certainly were appreciated and effective in their anti-aircraft role. This is borne out by the large numbers that were built (11). Would the navy have been better off with more of them at the expense of the Iowa class? In the AA role yes. In the shore bombardment role and surface combat role no. You pays your money you takes your chances as they say.
If we examine Philippine Sea, we see that Mitscher was not allowed to pursue the IJN fleet because of the requirement to provide air cover to the invasion fleet. With the added CVE's and CLAA's in place of the battleships, Admiral Spruance would have been able to relieve Mitscher of a stationary mission, and allow him to use the mobility and striking power of the Fifth Fleet Carriers.

Admiral Mitscher's TF 58.1 had only 8 CVL's and 4 CLAA ships in his force, but he had 7 battleships. He had 7 attack carriers. If we used the conservative estimate of replacing one battleship with two CVL's, replacing only five battleships, we can add 10 CVL's with fighters. 10 CVL's carrying conservatively 28 fighters, like FM-2's, would add an addition 280 fighters to the force of 8. Total estimated FM-2's then available could have been, 504 FM-2 fighters. The Independence class CVL's had a top speed of 32 knots.

It would seem to me, that if TF 58.1 had been divided into two forces; one a mobile striking force of 7 fast attack carriers carrying about 90 aircraft and escorts with it's potential force of aircraft of 630 and an amphibious fleet protection force of the CVL's, with 580 fighters and bombers, this might have been adequate to meet the threat.

Mitscher could have been relieved of staying stationary and given the freedom to search out and seek battle with the approaching Japanese carrier force far from the immediate area of the invasion.

Is this alternate history? Well, yes, it is. And we do it all the time. However, these were ships that we produced, the plans were there. Their value had already been determined during the Guadalcanal operation with the use of the USS Long Island to bring the MAW to the island. It isn't a stretch to think of the US not producing the BB's. There were springstyle drawings of conversions to carriers.

The unknown factors to accomplish this are:

Are there enough aircraft in the pipeline to provide the necessary 500 extra aircraft

Could ten more Independence class light carriers have been produced in place of the battleships? Was their enough slip space in the shipyards to construct them?

As for shore bombardment, with a force of two to four older battleships in the Amphibious force that could have provided sufficient large caliber naval support and the use of the TBM's on board the CVL's to drop 2000 pound bombs, I believe that shore bombardment could have been properly supported. Note also, that the TBM's could carry depth charges and provide more ASW support to relieve and assist the destroyers.

[Ed Rotondaro]

If we examine Philippine Sea, we see that Mitscher was not allowed to pursue the IJN fleet because of the requirement to provide air cover to the invasion fleet. With the added CVE's and CLAA's in place of the battleships, Admiral Spruance would have been able to relieve Mitscher of a stationary mission, and allow him to use the mobility and striking power of the Fifth Fleet Carriers.

Admiral Mitscher's TF 58.1 had only 8 CVL's and 4 CLAA ships in his force, but he had 7 battleships. He had 7 attack carriers. If we used the conservative estimate of replacing one battleship with two CVL's, replacing only five battleships, we can add 10 CVL's with fighters. 10 CVL's carrying conservatively 28 fighters, like FM-2's, would add an addition 280 fighters to the force of 8. Total estimated FM-2's then available could have been, 504 FM-2 fighters. The Independence class CVL's had a top speed of 32 knots.

It would seem to me, that if TF 58.1 had been divided into two forces; one a mobile striking force of 7 fast attack carriers carrying about 90 aircraft and escorts with it's potential force of aircraft of 630 and an amphibious fleet protection force of the CVL's, with 580 fighters and bombers, this might have been adequate to meet the threat.

Mitscher could have been relieved of staying stationary and given the freedom to search out and seek battle with the approaching Japanese carrier force far from the immediate area of the invasion.

Is this alternate history? Well, yes, it is. And we do it all the time. However, these were ships that we produced, the plans were there. Their value had already been determined during the Guadalcanal operation with the use of the USS Long Island to bring the MAW to the island. It isn't a stretch to think of the US not producing the BB's. There were springstyle drawings of conversions to carriers.

The unknown factors to accomplish this are:

Are there enough aircraft in the pipeline to provide the necessary 500 extra aircraft

Could ten more Independence class light carriers have been produced in place of the battleships? Was their enough slip space in the shipyards to construct them?

As for shore bombardment, with a force of two to four older battleships in the Amphibious force that could have provided sufficient large caliber naval support and the use of the TBM's on board the CVL's to drop 2000 pound bombs, I believe that shore bombardment could have been properly supported. Note also, that the TBM's could carry depth charges and provide more ASW support to relieve and assist the destroyers.

Dennis:

Every one of those CVLs you build cost the US a Cleveland class light cruiser. You have to have some kind of escorts other than CLAAs which were lousy surface combatants against anything bigger than another CL. At least the Clevelands could and did take on IJN CAs with success. Also those ten CVLs are going to require escorts of their own which means cruisers and DDs. What would you consider as an adequate escort per CVL? I'm not sure outside of stripping the USN of its Atlantic assets that were enough ships available. Remember we were still supporting the invasion of France and preparing for the invasion of Southern France.

I'm not very impressed with the USN's scouting during Philippine Sea. Even Mitscher can be taken to task for this as well as the US submarines. You're going to need those BBs if heaven forbid a night time surface action occurs. And one almost did, Spruance asked Lee about trying it and Lee wisely said not to because the fleet was not experienced enough for it.

Spruance was more worried about being out of position should the IJN make an end around and pounce on the invasion fleet. He faced the same problem that Halsey did a few months later at Leyte. Halsey chose to try and chase the carriers and hope that the 7th fleet (which was much larger by that time than what Spruance had at Philippines Sea) could take care of itself. We all know how that decision turned out.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

Every one of those CVLs you build cost the US a Cleveland class light cruiser. You have to have some kind of escorts other than CLAAs which were lousy surface combatants against anything bigger than another CL. At least the Clevelands could and did take on IJN CAs with success. Also those ten CVLs are going to require escorts of their own which means cruisers and DDs. What would you consider as an adequate escort per CVL? I'm not sure outside of stripping the USN of its Atlantic assets that were enough ships available. Remember we were still supporting the invasion of France and preparing for the invasion of Southern France.

I'm not very impressed with the USN's scouting during Philippine Sea. Even Mitscher can be taken to task for this as well as the US submarines. You're going to need those BBs if heaven forbid a night time surface action occurs. And one almost did, Spruance asked Lee about trying it and Lee wisely said not to because the fleet was not experienced enough for it.

Spruance was more worried about being out of position should the IJN make an end around and pounce on the invasion fleet. He faced the same problem that Halsey did a few months later at Leyte. Halsey chose to try and chase the carriers and hope that the 7th fleet (which was much larger by that time than what Spruance had at Philippines Sea) could take care of itself. We all know how that decision turned out.
Oh c'mon Ed- There were 29 Cleveland class light cruisers built, with 9 becoming CVL's. Are you telling me that the US Navy, once the decision was made to produce more light carriers in place of the Iowa's could not build a few more to use as hulls for the light carriers. Once the funds were reallocated to the CVL project, don't you think someone would have ordered a few more hulls maybe even designed a new one for the entire project. You are a trained historian, what do you think, based on your reading?

[asnrobert]

Robert:

Thanks. I have Costello's book, but have not yet read it. If Kimmel made a statement like that and didn't raise the security levels at Pearl Harbor then his is guilty of neglect.

It appears on page 122. After Kimmel made his remark, Layton replied "I hope they would be sighted before that."

[JMS]

Robert:

Thanks. I have Costello's book, but have not yet read it. If Kimmel made a statement like that and didn't raise the security levels at Pearl Harbor then his is guilty of neglect.

Don't forget that there was a naval search scheme going on with PBYs on the most likely sector, the Southwest, so some precautions were taken.

What was unexpected was having the Japanese coming from the North, something they couldn't have done but for their use of converted fast civilian tankers, which were taken in hand in autumn 1941 for conversion, something easily missed by western intelligence.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Oh c'mon Ed- There were 29 Cleveland class light cruisers built, with 9 becoming CVL's. Are you telling me that the US Navy, once the decision was made to produce more light carriers in place of the Iowa's could not build a few more to use as hulls for the light carriers. Once the funds were reallocated to the CVL project, don't you think someone would have ordered a few more hulls maybe even designed a new one for the entire project. You are a trained historian, what do you think, based on your reading?

Dennis:

My point here is that the CVL was an attempt (albeit it successful) to augment the carrier force at time when it was dangerously low. Once the USN was in full gear, they stopped building them and concentrated on Clevelands and Essex classes because both were more valuable. The same goes for CVEs, they were a wartime emergency measure and were never meant to be part of the main fleet. Again they also disappeared quickly from service once the war ended. Cost wise the CVL is a better buy than a battleship, I'm not arguing that, but from a mission standpoint the USN wanted a balanced fleet which included CLs and some BBs.

[Ed Rotondaro]

It appears on page 122. After Kimmel made his remark, Layton replied "I hope they would be sighted before that."

Robert:

I will definitetly move it up the reading schedule. The other day I was at my son's Little League practice which is held this time of year indoors. There is a very good used book store right next door, so I went over and spent about a half hour checking out titles. The store has always had a very good military history section and I snagged two near mint hard covers. One is Ronald Spector's "Eagle Against the Sun; The American War with Japan" and the other was "The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War 1941-1943" by Alan Schom. Spector's book is one of the most highly regarded studies of the war in the Pacific and ranks up there with Costello's book. Schom's book is more recent and has generated both interest and controversy so I'm looking forward to comparing all three.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Don't forget that there was a naval search scheme going on with PBYs on the most likely sector, the Southwest, so some precautions were taken.

What was unexpected was having the Japanese coming from the North, something they couldn't have done but for their use of converted fast civilian tankers, which were taken in hand in autumn 1941 for conversion, something easily missed by western intelligence.

JMS:

It is interesting to observe that during one of the annual Fleet problems in the 1930s, Admiral King led a carrier task force that launched a successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor following the same route that the Japanese used. Apparently nobody paid attention.

[john964]

Dennis:

My point here is that the CVL was an attempt (albeit it successful) to augment the carrier force at time when it was dangerously low. Once the USN was in full gear, they stopped building them and concentrated on Clevelands and Essex classes because both were more valuable. The same goes for CVEs, they were a wartime emergency measure and were never meant to be part of the main fleet. Again they also disappeared quickly from service once the war ended. Cost wise the CVL is a better buy than a battleship, I'm not arguing that, but from a mission standpoint the USN wanted a balanced fleet which included CLs and some BBs.Ed, some CVE's lasted in service as AKV's.

[Smiffy]

JMS:

It is interesting to observe that during one of the annual Fleet problems in the 1930s, Admiral King led a carrier task force that launched a successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor following the same route that the Japanese used. Apparently nobody paid attention.

Was it not the case that at that time no one believed that an aerial torpedo attack could work in a shallow harbour?

[asnrobert]

Robert:

I will definitetly move it up the reading schedule. The other day I was at my son's Little League practice which is held this time of year indoors. There is a very good used book store right next door, so I went over and spent about a half hour checking out titles. The store has always had a very good military history section and I snagged two near mint hard covers. One is Ronald Spector's "Eagle Against the Sun; The American War with Japan" and the other was "The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War 1941-1943" by Alan Schom. Spector's book is one of the most highly regarded studies of the war in the Pacific and ranks up there with Costello's book. Schom's book is more recent and has generated both interest and controversy so I'm looking forward to comparing all three.


I've read Schom's book (picked it up for $5 at a Borders outlet), and wasn't that impressed with it. The second chapter where he discusses the Japanese outlook in the 20s and 30s (as well as their germ warfare experiments) was interesting, but the book had a lot of errors. Plus, in writing about the various leaders there is rarely any middle ground- he either idolizes them or dismisses them as incompetent (although I'm not sure how he felt about King). For example he pillories MacArthur for his defense of the Philippines as well as Kimmel and Short for the Pearl Harbor disaster (and rightly so), but he has nothing good to say about Fletcher- he often compares him to Mitscher, but doesn't explain why he thought Mitscher was the better admiral. He wasn't too impressed with Spruance (which surprised me) but idolized Nimitz, as well as Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins.

I haven't read Costello's book in a couple years. I think I'll bring it along with me on my trip for some 'light' reading.

[djcyclone]

I've read Schom's book (picked it up for $5 at a Borders outlet), and wasn't that impressed with it. The second chapter where he discusses the Japanese outlook in the 20s and 30s (as well as their germ warfare experiments) was interesting, but the book had a lot of errors. Plus, in writing about the various leaders there is rarely any middle ground- he either idolizes them or dismisses them as incompetent (although I'm not sure how he felt about King). For example he pillories MacArthur for his defense of the Philippines as well as Kimmel and Short for the Pearl Harbor disaster (and rightly so), but he has nothing good to say about Fletcher- he often compares him to Mitscher, but doesn't explain why he thought Mitscher was the better admiral. He wasn't too impressed with Spruance (which surprised me) but idolized Nimitz, as well as Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins.

I haven't read Costello's book in a couple years. I think I'll bring it along with me on my trip for some 'light' reading.



What does the book say about Admiral Halsey? I have seen things on the History Channel and also in movies that say Halsey was a fool, and simply got lucky in the menuvers and plans that he made. I do not have an opinion on it one way or the other, but I was just curiouse as to how you guys felt about that.

[Kyle Holgate]

What does the book say about Admiral Halsey? I have seen things on the History Channel and also in movies that say Halsey was a fool, and simply got lucky in the menuvers and plans that he made. I do not have an opinion on it one way or the other, but I was just curiouse as to how you guys felt about that.

I don't personally have a very high opinion of Halsey. There is such a thing as being too "gung ho" and he alway struck me as just that. Attack repeat attack is fine when the US could afford it late in the war but I strongly suspect he'd have gotten his butt kicked had his skin condition not kept him from Midway!

[JMS]

JMS:

It is interesting to observe that during one of the annual Fleet problems in the 1930s, Admiral King led a carrier task force that launched a successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor following the same route that the Japanese used. Apparently nobody paid attention.

Yes, but with the limited resources available to Kimmel what would you have done without the benefit of hindsight?

- torpedo nets for what? the harbour is too shallow and the fleet may need to sail in short notice.
- Search patterns for PBYs? sent on the most likely direction.
- Air defence in harbour was the responsibility of the Army, who had lot's of fighters and AA guns just for that.
- Destroyers were already patrolling the entrance to defend from submarine attack.

In addition, poor intelligence on the capabilities of the Japanese (i.e. fleet oilers were few, small and slow, or the capabilities of the Zero) means that the analysis of what they can do is going to show that they cannot do such a raid.

To top it up, deception signals and the very obvious objectives of the IJN in South Asia means that the focus is going to be away from Pearl Habour anyway.

[asnrobert]

What does the book say about Admiral Halsey? I have seen things on the History Channel and also in movies that say Halsey was a fool, and simply got lucky in the menuvers and plans that he made. I do not have an opinion on it one way or the other, but I was just curiouse as to how you guys felt about that.

I think he was favorable towards Halsey, but then the book doesn't cover the later part of the war where Halsey had more problems (Leyte Gulf, the typhoons).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Was it not the case that at that time no one believed that an aerial torpedo attack could work in a shallow harbour?


Smiffy:

I would not be surprised if that was part of the "reasoning" at the time. but if the umpires thought it was possible, then the admirals should have paid attention. Perhaps the so-called "Big Gun Club" i.e. Battleship admirals still had too much of a say in the way the USN was run.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I've read Schom's book (picked it up for $5 at a Borders outlet), and wasn't that impressed with it. The second chapter where he discusses the Japanese outlook in the 20s and 30s (as well as their germ warfare experiments) was interesting, but the book had a lot of errors. Plus, in writing about the various leaders there is rarely any middle ground- he either idolizes them or dismisses them as incompetent (although I'm not sure how he felt about King). For example he pillories MacArthur for his defense of the Philippines as well as Kimmel and Short for the Pearl Harbor disaster (and rightly so), but he has nothing good to say about Fletcher- he often compares him to Mitscher, but doesn't explain why he thought Mitscher was the better admiral. He wasn't too impressed with Spruance (which surprised me) but idolized Nimitz, as well as Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins.

I haven't read Costello's book in a couple years. I think I'll bring it along with me on my trip for some 'light' reading.

Robert:

That's pretty much what a close friend of mine whose is also a mentor to me on the Pacific War states. But I feel that I need to read it myself to fairly analyze Schom's point of view which may be driven by his own politics.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Yes, but with the limited resources available to Kimmel what would you have done without the benefit of hindsight?

- torpedo nets for what? the harbour is too shallow and the fleet may need to sail in short notice.
- Search patterns for PBYs? sent on the most likely direction.
- Air defence in harbour was the responsibility of the Army, who had lot's of fighters and AA guns just for that.
- Destroyers were already patrolling the entrance to defend from submarine attack.

In addition, poor intelligence on the capabilities of the Japanese (i.e. fleet oilers were few, small and slow, or the capabilities of the Zero) means that the analysis of what they can do is going to show that they cannot do such a raid.

To top it up, deception signals and the very obvious objectives of the IJN in South Asia means that the focus is going to be away from Pearl Habour anyway.

JMS:

In the book "Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor" by John Lambert and Norman Polmar, the authors demonstrate that Kimmel and Short had at their command, resources that could have been used to more aggressively scout and prepare for a sneak attack. The Douglas B-18 was the mainstay of the Hawaii airforce and while it lacked the range of the B-17, it could have provided a 500 mile search capability to the USN. An air search command modelled on the one used by Britain in 1940 was being set up but both Kimmel and Short gave it little attention. Compare how Halsey conducted his reinforcement mission of fighters to Wake Island when he had combat air patrols up and out scouting ahead of his task force even before the war began. Kimmel and Short had the planes parked wing tip to wing tip and disarmed. I don't fully blame Kimmel and Short, Admiral Stark and General Marshall share the blame for not demanding detailed information on how Pearl Harbor was to be defended. They would issue warnings about war ready to break out and not ask for what the plans should it happen.

[JMS]

JMS:

In the book "Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor" by John Lambert and Norman Polmar, the authors demonstrate that Kimmel and Short had at their command, resources that could have been used to more aggressively scout and prepare for a sneak attack. The Douglas B-18 was the mainstay of the Hawaii airforce and while it lacked the range of the B-17, it could have provided a 500 mile search capability to the USN. An air search command modelled on the one used by Britain in 1940 was being set up but both Kimmel and Short gave it little attention. Compare how Halsey conducted his reinforcement mission of fighters to Wake Island when he had combat air patrols up and out scouting ahead of his task force even before the war began. Kimmel and Short had the planes parked wing tip to wing tip and disarmed. I don't fully blame Kimmel and Short, Admiral Stark and General Marshall share the blame for not demanding detailed information on how Pearl Harbor was to be defended. They would issue warnings about war ready to break out and not ask for what the plans should it happen.


I agree with what you say, but the blame for that falls mainly on Short. Land based bombers weren't Kimmel's nor under his command. After much study on Pearl, I feel that, while he could have done better, Kimmel is the fall guy in the story. With the resources he commanded and the fleet he had, he did as well as could be expected of anyone. On the other hand, Short apparently assumed that Hawaii couldn't be attacked at all, so planes were left in vulnerable positions and ammo was not available for the AA batteries, despite Oahu being turned into a training camp.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I agree with what you say, but the blame for that falls mainly on Short. Land based bombers weren't Kimmel's nor under his command. After much study on Pearl, I feel that, while he could have done better, Kimmel is the fall guy in the story. With the resources he commanded and the fleet he had, he did as well as could be expected of anyone. On the other hand, Short apparently assumed that Hawaii couldn't be attacked at all, so planes were left in vulnerable positions and ammo was not available for the AA batteries, despite Oahu being turned into a training camp.


JMS:

Not only were the bombers under Short's command, so was the radar and it would only operate a few hours a day. Bottom line was despite all the various warnings from the Joint Chiefs, Pearl Harbor never went to a state of war until it was attacked. No matter who well you train and plan, you're not at war until you get attacked. The entire US military was guilty of this and it took several months to start acting like it was in a war. Peacetime leaders rapidly get shuffled out of the way for those who command and lead in combat. Examples: both Admiral Mitscher and Admiral Lee were captains at the time of Pearl Harbor as was Admiral Clifton Sprague. Mitscher was still a captain at Midway. Once these guys started to prove themselves, they shot up the ranks and bypassed many senior officers.

[asnrobert]

JMS:

Kimmel and Short had the planes parked wing tip to wing tip and disarmed. I don't fully blame Kimmel and Short, Admiral Stark and General Marshall share the blame for not demanding detailed information on how Pearl Harbor was to be defended. They would issue warnings about war ready to break out and not ask for what the plans should it happen.

The planes were parked lose together because Short interpreted the war warnings to guard against sabotage (which is also why the ammo was under lock and key).
Of course there was no sabotage, or any evidence that the Hawaiian natives were assisting the Japanese. I recall watching an old WW2 movie, Air Force, about the adventures of a B-17 in the Pacific. It arrives at Pearl Harbor during the attack (which was true enough), but after it lands at an isolated airfield, the crew spends the night protecting the plane from would-be saboteurs, which was bogus. The film had a few other howlers as well, but then, the movie was about boosting the morale of the home front.

[asnrobert]

Robert:

That's pretty much what a close friend of mine whose is also a mentor to me on the Pacific War states. But I feel that I need to read it myself to fairly analyze Schom's point of view which may be driven by his own politics.

Yes, it's good to read reviews (sometimes), but it's always good to read/see things for your self. I once read a rather negative review of a movie, but decided to go see it anyway. I enjoyed the movie immensely, and came to the conclusion that the reviewer must have had a severe case of constipation when he saw the film. :rolleyes: