Carrier TF organization

[old_pop2000]

We've been looking at the battles of the Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Midway, Coral Sea as of late. We been examining the Japanese Zero, radios etc. So, let's look at the evolution of carrier task force organization.

As we know, there are two schools of thought.

A. Place all carriers in one task force, in a box formation, protected by screening battleships, cruiser and destroyers.

B. Place each carrier in its own task force, with its own screens. Separate the individual task forces by 10-20 miles maintaining them close enough for CAP or inner patrols but far enough apart, to avoid the detection of one, if the other is discovered.

So, what is the best formation, best screening formations, best screening ships. How should the screens be configured. What are the best ships for screens. Best tactics.

[Ed Rotondaro]

We've been looking at the battles of the Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Midway, Coral Sea as of late. We been examining the Japanese Zero, radios etc. So, let's look at the evolution of carrier task force organization.

As we know, there are two schools of thought.

A. Place all carriers in one task force, in a box formation, protected by screening battleships, cruiser and destroyers.

B. Place each carrier in its own task force, with its own screens. Separate the individual task forces by 10-20 miles maintaining them close enough for CAP or inner patrols but far enough apart, to avoid the detection of one, if the other is discovered.

So, what is the best formation, best screening formations, best screening ships. How should the screens be configured. What are the best ships for screens. Best tactics.

Dennis:

From the standpoint of the USN, I would say that experience demonstrated that the carriers be grouped in to task groups of at least two carriers with screening ships. Probably the penultimate best screening ship was a modern fast battleship with its multitude of light and medium AA and its superb fire control. Then I would say newer cruisers like the Baltimores and Clevelands with their excellent AA outfits. Destroyers certainly are useful and can form the outer ring of defense. The formations used at Philppines Sea certainly speak for themselves.

[Kyle Holgate]

We've been looking at the battles of the Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Midway, Coral Sea as of late. We been examining the Japanese Zero, radios etc. So, let's look at the evolution of carrier task force organization.

As we know, there are two schools of thought.

A. Place all carriers in one task force, in a box formation, protected by screening battleships, cruiser and destroyers.

B. Place each carrier in its own task force, with its own screens. Separate the individual task forces by 10-20 miles maintaining them close enough for CAP or inner patrols but far enough apart, to avoid the detection of one, if the other is discovered.

So, what is the best formation, best screening formations, best screening ships. How should the screens be configured. What are the best ships for screens. Best tactics.

First - if we don't have effective radar (or any radar) then maintaining cap at various altitudes becomes more problematical. Second - if we're Japanese then while our long range AA may be of some use defending other ships (5") our 25MM AAA are virtually useless for that - and almost useless in self defense for that matter. To gain any mutual benefit from the light AA ships would have to be very close. I often wonder if they'd gotten more of their Akitsuki class ships AND had a one on each side - close in to their CV's - if that wouldn't have helped at least some.

As for splitting up the groups - This one takes some thinking. On one hand, IF you are sure only one of your taskforces has been spotted you could theoretically move the cap from unspotted groups over to cover those that have been sighted. This strikes me as an awful risk, but then again maybe at times would be worth it. Further - an unspotted carrier is an un-attacked carrier. Cap, screen, asw, etc - if the enemy can't find it then all those forces aren't doing it any good (or harm). I guess it all depends on how sure you are that 'they' don't know where you are. Once again radar comes into play - you should be able to spot the spotters and have a very good idea as to whether or not they've spotted all your forces or not.

[Warship NWS]

Note, CS, ES, and Midway.. our CVs were acting in pairs.. at SC they were split and so the Hornet absorbed the bulk of the punishment and was sunk. Cooperative CAP is also easier if the CVs are operating together. Working in pairs proved to be the most mutually beneficial for survival of at least some of the CV force and it also offered better survivability for the returning aircraft if their home CV was damaged. 4 CVs for the IJN operated together at Midway however their CAP proved ineffective for their heavy numbers due to poor coordination and the inability of the Zeke to retain good combat endurance which kept the decks constantly occupied. Point being it all ties in together as one integrated system for carrier ops and the devil is very much in the details.

[old_pop2000]

Careful in ascribing the causes for the disaster at Midway, to the TF organization. In fact, poor reconnaissance, inadequate numbers of fighters available for CAP, indecision on the part of senior commanders, conflicting orders as to the priority of tasks for the 1st Striking Fleet, lack of technology such as radar, all played a more important role in the losses. Couple this with the poor design of the carriers which contributed to the slow turnaround time for arming and refueling, and you have a disaster waiting to happen. With some or all of those failures or deficiencies corrected or ameliorated, the TF organization might not have been a problematic area. In fact, for the purposes of maintaining coordination of strike groups and internal communications, it served them well.

[Warship NWS]

Careful in ascribing the causes for the disaster at Midway, to the TF organization. In fact, poor reconnaissance, inadequate numbers of fighters available for CAP, indecision on the part of senior commanders, conflicting orders as to the priority of tasks for the 1st Striking Fleet, lack of technology such as radar, all played a more important role in the losses. Couple this with the poor design of the carriers which contributed to the slow turnaround time for arming and refuleling, and you have a disaster waiting to happen. With some or all of those failures or deficiencies corrected or ameliorated, the TF organization might not have been a problematic area. In fact, for the purposes of maintaining coordination of strike groups and internal communications, it served them well.

I never said what I described were the only problems.. I was just describing how the formation effected the final attacks on the CVs. 4 CVs should have been able to more then adequately protect each other with a proper CAP of 40+ fighters -- if, they were better coordinated and the fighters had better qualities. This is but one part of the puzzle but an important one.

[old_pop2000]

First - if we don't have effective radar (or any radar) then maintaining cap at various altitudes becomes more problematical. Second - if we're Japanese then while our long range AA may be of some use defending other ships (5") our 25MM AAA are virtually useless for that - and almost useless in self defense for that matter. To gain any mutual benefit from the light AA ships would have to be very close. I often wonder if they'd gotten more of their Akitsuki class ships AND had a one on each side - close in to their CV's - if that wouldn't have helped at least some.

As for splitting up the groups - This one takes some thinking. On one hand, IF you are sure only one of your taskforces has been spotted you could theoretically move the cap from unspotted groups over to cover those that have been sighted. This strikes me as an awful risk, but then again maybe at times would be worth it. Further - an unspotted carrier is an un-attacked carrier. Cap, screen, asw, etc - if the enemy can't find it then all those forces aren't doing it any good (or harm). I guess it all depends on how sure you are that 'they' don't know where you are. Once again radar comes into play - you should be able to spot the spotters and have a very good idea as to whether or not they've spotted all your forces or not.
What about the design of the screen ships? Size, AA guns, radar, ASW etc. What about a fighter carrier instead of a ready deck carrier. In the Japanese instance, say Shokaku, Zuikaku and a faster Ryujo class carrier with 30 to 35 fighters and 8 or 9 torpedo bombers carrying depth charges and trained in ASW search. The two fleet carriers would have a deck load of 18 dive bombers, 9 torpedo bombers and 18 fighters for escort. In the hanger would be a second strike group of equal amount. Each carrier would contribute to the first strike group. Total aircraft:

40 A6M2's for escort

36 Aichi Dive Bombers

18 B5N Kate torpedo bombers

The remaining Kates would be used for inner patrols with the battleships and heavy cruisers providing the long range scouting capability.

[old_pop2000]

How can a properly designed carrier, contribute to the effectiveness of the TF organization. Some suggestions:

1. Large air group of 90 aircraft including dedicated search and scouting types?

2. AA support. Should there be turrets on the flight deck?

3. Integrated CIC area, well protected, below the armoured flight deck or in the island?


4. Speed and maneuverability of the carrier?


5. Radar, radios etc. How many? What about the separation of functions on different channels. I.E. air to air channel, fighter director channel, surface or fleet channel etc.?

6. Should TF commander be aboard the carrier or on a battleship or heavy cruiser?


Remember to think 1940's, not 2008.

[Kyle Holgate]

What about the design of the screen ships? Size, AA guns, radar, ASW etc. What about a fighter carrier instead of a ready deck carrier. In the Japanese instance, say Shokaku, Zuikaku and a faster Ryujo class carrier with 30 to 35 fighters and 8 or 9 torpedo bombers carrying depth charges and trained in ASW search. The two fleet carriers would have a deck load of 18 dive bombers, 9 torpedo bombers and 18 fighters for escort. In the hanger would be a second strike group of equal amount. Each carrier would contribute to the first strike group. Total aircraft:

40 A6M2's for escort

36 Aichi Dive Bombers

18 B5N Kate torpedo bombers

The remaining Kates would be used for inner patrols with the battleships and heavy cruisers providing the long range scouting capability.

Ideally for the Japanese - we get to change over to the 40mm AA that they captured and get better medium AA than they actually had. A "fighter carrier" wouldn't be a bad idea for them, problem being as Chris mentioned, the Zero needed constant re-arming to be at peak performance (meaning have 20mm ammo). Radar of course would be nice too - but for once I wasn't thinking of what if's - was intead thinking of what to do with what they had.
ASW patrol really isn't a vital issue when at sea in open water. Granted you can't assume no subs will be around, but in open water how are they going to find you unless you just stumble across them? Even then speed trumps subs. I'd gamble a bit with this and have only minimal ASW and instead be more concerned with my Cap and spotter aircraft.
Speaking of CAP too - at Midway it strikes me that even so called expert pilots made very poor decisions. A high cap should have been available that didn't go down after torpedo bombers except in the most dire of circumstances. What were they thinking? They knew full well that American carriers had Dive bombers as well, and if they had not been seen yet I think it would have been a very safe bet to predict that they're lurking around somewhere! Now the Zero wasn't great at downing Dauntless as mentioned previously, but I dare say a few Zero's swarming around the dive bombers would not improve their aim! As a Japanese Admiral I'd absolutely insist on a Hi CAP, and woe be it to any Fighter pilot that came down for a kill on a torpedo plane and left is post guarding against SBD's!!!

[Warship NWS]

They knew full well that American carriers had Dive bombers as well, and if they had not been seen yet I think it would have been a very safe bet to predict that they're lurking around somewhere! Now the Zero wasn't great at downing Dauntless as mentioned previously, but I dare say a few Zero's swarming around the dive bombers would not improve their aim!


Tell that to the CVL Zuiho (smaller target then a full fleet CV) that was hit with 3-6 out of 11 bombs from SBDs at SC, 14 SBDs vs 20 Zekes was the matchup. I think that speaks alot for the ineffectiveness of the Zekes at attempting to disrupt our dive bomber attacks. Since they did not attack the SBDs in a coordinated effort their effect was minimal. The Fulmars in the Med were in fewer numbers and far more effective at breaking up larger formations of Stukas as a comparison and they only had .303s vs the fairly well protected German aircraft. Now I will add with that the SBD pilots were pretty damn good at formation flying and coordination tactics and could put up a wall of lead from those rear gunners and SBDs were more maneuverable then the Stukas.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

Speaking of CAP too - at Midway it strikes me that even so called expert pilots made very poor decisions. A high cap should have been available that didn't go down after torpedo bombers except in the most dire of circumstances.


The Japanese were far more afraid of torpedoes then bombs, for good reason. Torpedoes would sink your CV.. bomb damage could possibly be repaired, but the catch is that your CV ops might be knocked out -just a question of how long. Remember also that torpedoes could slow a CV down, if not disable it all together, and without forward speed, good flight deck or not, you cannot launch planes. I do not think they realized how pathetic the Mk13 was at the start of the war but the Shoho did get slammed by torpedoes at CS. However, I do agree that a better coordination of CAP was in order but that would not happen without good radio communications with the CVs below and better coordination with whoever was handling their fighter direction. Their system and doctrine was crippled even without the pilots trying to figure out who or what to go after IMHO. Point being their entire system was faulty, not just the pilot CAP training.

[old_pop2000]

Ideally for the Japanese - we get to change over to the 40mm AA that they captured and get better medium AA than they actually had. A "fighter carrier" wouldn't be a bad idea for them, problem being as Chris mentioned, the Zero needed constant re-arming to be at peak performance (meaning have 20mm ammo). Radar of course would be nice too - but for once I wasn't thinking of what if's - was intead thinking of what to do with what they had.
ASW patrol really isn't a vital issue when at sea in open water. Granted you can't assume no subs will be around, but in open water how are they going to find you unless you just stumble across them? Even then speed trumps subs. I'd gamble a bit with this and have only minimal ASW and instead be more concerned with my Cap and spotter aircraft.
Speaking of CAP too - at Midway it strikes me that even so called expert pilots made very poor decisions. A high cap should have been available that didn't go down after torpedo bombers except in the most dire of circumstances. What were they thinking? They knew full well that American carriers had Dive bombers as well, and if they had not been seen yet I think it would have been a very safe bet to predict that they're lurking around somewhere! Now the Zero wasn't great at downing Dauntless as mentioned previously, but I dare say a few Zero's swarming around the dive bombers would not improve their aim! As a Japanese Admiral I'd absolutely insist on a Hi CAP, and woe be it to any Fighter pilot that came down for a kill on a torpedo plane and left is post guarding against SBD's!!!
There is a difference between combat air patrols and escorts. In the incident that you speak off, the fighters wanted to maintain altitude advantage, but were never called down by the torpedo bombers for assistance. It wasn't wise for the fighters to give up the altitude for close escort of the TB's. They adopted the techniques of indirect support. That always got the Japanese in trouble especially at Guadalcanal. The land attack bombers would be jumped before the indirect support from the Zero's could intervene. Many bombers were shot down on the first or second passes by F4F's before the Zero's could see and come down to assist.

Combat air patrols move out into sectors, flying at designated altitudes to about 50 miles from the carriers.

[Kyle Holgate]

Regardless of whether you are more worried about torpedo attack - you know your enemy has at least one carrier + an island. You know he's attacked with torpedo planes from the CV(s). Someone should be thinking - where are the dive bombers? Even if torpedo planes are more dangerous (and I'm not entirely convinced they are) - dive bombers can at least destroy your flight deck even if we assume (in error) that they aren't a direct threat to the ships themselves. Personally I think part of the Midway CAP issue was the "every Samurai for himself" mind set. Why didn't any of them ask where the dive bombers were?

[old_pop2000]

Ideally for the Japanese - we get to change over to the 40mm AA that they captured and get better medium AA than they actually had. A "fighter carrier" wouldn't be a bad idea for them, problem being as Chris mentioned, the Zero needed constant re-arming to be at peak performance (meaning have 20mm ammo). Radar of course would be nice too - but for once I wasn't thinking of what if's - was intead thinking of what to do with what they had.
ASW patrol really isn't a vital issue when at sea in open water. Granted you can't assume no subs will be around, but in open water how are they going to find you unless you just stumble across them? Even then speed trumps subs. I'd gamble a bit with this and have only minimal ASW and instead be more concerned with my Cap and spotter aircraft.
Speaking of CAP too - at Midway it strikes me that even so called expert pilots made very poor decisions. A high cap should have been available that didn't go down after torpedo bombers except in the most dire of circumstances. What were they thinking? They knew full well that American carriers had Dive bombers as well, and if they had not been seen yet I think it would have been a very safe bet to predict that they're lurking around somewhere! Now the Zero wasn't great at downing Dauntless as mentioned previously, but I dare say a few Zero's swarming around the dive bombers would not improve their aim! As a Japanese Admiral I'd absolutely insist on a Hi CAP, and woe be it to any Fighter pilot that came down for a kill on a torpedo plane and left is post guarding against SBD's!!!
The story of the escorts and the TBD needs to be clarified.

VF-6 under Jim Gray with 10 F4F's, were climbing out up to their escort altitude of 22000 ft. with Waldron and VT-8 insight at 1500 ft during the climb. The F4F's had to make S turns to stay with the TBD's. Unfortunately, Waldron never knew Jim Gray was above him. After an hour, Waldron noticed a seaplane, Tone's #4, returning from their reconnaissance mission on a reciprocal course. They warned Nagumo of the TBD's approach. Waldron deployed the TBD's in a spread formation to facilitate search. Gray was watching Waldron but within a few minutes, Waldron and VT-8 entered a cloud bank and Gray never saw them again. Waldron discovered the carriers and sent his squadron in, never realizing Gray was above him. Gray determined that Waldron should be able to use the clouds to disguise his approach, but never called or went down to assist. His squadron stayed up at 22,000 ft to protect the dive bombers.

I am guessing, but it is possible that each carrier air wing was using a different frequency on the command sets, and if they did not know each others frequency and were under radio silence, that would explain why no contact was made by Waldron or Gray.

Source: First Team by Lundstrom

[john964]

The Japanese were far more afraid of torpedoes then bombs, for good reason. Torpedoes would sink your CV.. bomb damage could possibly be repaired, but the catch is that your CV ops might be knocked out -just a question of how long. Remember also that torpedoes could slow a CV down, if not disable it all together, and without forward speed, good flight deck or not, you cannot launch planes. I do not think they realized how pathetic the Mk13 was at the start of the war but the Shoho did get slammed by torpedoes at CS. However, I do agree that a better coordination of CAP was in order but that would not happen without good radio communications with the CVs below and better coordination with whoever was handling their fighter direction. Their system and doctrine was crippled even without the pilots trying to figure out who or what to go after IMHO. Point being their entire system was faulty, not just the pilot CAP training.

Chris, The IJN knew how pathetic our air dropped torpedoes were there standerd tactic was to turn away from the attack and crank up the speed and out run them. The Mk13 had a max speed of 34kt with a range of 6000yds. The only way we could make a succesful attack was to attack off both bows at the same time. This is what happend to Shoho at CS.

[Warship NWS]

Chris, The IJN knew how pathetic our air dropped torpedoes were there standerd tactic was to turn away from the attack and crank up the speed and out run them. The Mk13 had a max speed of 34kt with a range of 6000yds. The only way we could make a succesful attack was to attack off both bows at the same time. This is what happend to Shoho at CS.

I do not believe they knew how bad they were in terms of fragility (water impact), depth/gyro issues, and sometimes fuzing problems. They may have known about the speed and range to some degree but not the other problems, we didn't even recognize many of those problems before combat experience with them and even then not until the BuOrd tested 100 Mk13s after the Battle of Midway. If not, then why did they fear torpedos and actually, by doctrine, prioritize attacking torpedo bombers?

[Kyle Holgate]

The story of the escorts and the TBD needs to be clarified.

VF-6 under Jim Gray with 10 F4F's, were climbing out up to their escort altitude of 22000 ft. with Waldron and VT-8 insight at 1500 ft during the climb. The F4F's had to make S turns to stay with the TBD's. Unfortunately, Waldron never knew Jim Gray was above him. After an hour, Waldron noticed a seaplane, Tone's #4, returning from their reconnaissance mission on a reciprocal course. They warned Nagumo of the TBD's approach. Waldron deployed the TBD's in a spread formation to facilitate search. Gray was watching Waldron but within a few minutes, Waldron and VT-8 entered a cloud bank and Gray never saw them again. Waldron discovered the carriers and sent his squadron in, never realizing Gray was above him. Gray determined that Waldron should be able to use the clouds to disguise his approach, but never called or went down to assist. His squadron stayed up at 22,000 ft to protect the dive bombers. Keep in mind, Gray was from the Enterprise along with the Dive Bombers, while Waldron was from the Hornet. Both sets of aircraft might have been on different channels, so Waldron could not contact him, unless he knew he was up above and the frequency that he was on. I am not certain whether CV6 aircraft and CV8 aircraft would be on the same fighter to fighter frequency. That would make for a very busy frequency.

Source: First Team by Lundstrom

I'm a bit confused. How does the esorts of the TBD's have anything to do with the Japanese CAP not keeping some fighters at altitude over the CV's spcifically to keep watch for the dive bombers that they should know are likely to be around somewhere?
Perhaps it's my perception, but when I see a quote followed by the reply I expect it to have something to add to or debate with the original. In this case ya lost me.
I need a bit more clarification of the point or counterpoint you're making ol' buddy.

[old_pop2000]

I'm a bit confused. How does the esorts of the TBD's have anything to do with the Japanese CAP not keeping some fighters at altitude over the CV's spcifically to keep watch for the dive bombers that they should know are likely to be around somewhere?
Perhaps it's my perception, but when I see a quote followed by the reply I expect it to have something to add to or debate with the original. In this case ya lost me.
I need a bit more clarification of the point or counterpoint you're making ol' buddy.
Sorry, misunderstood, my friend. I thought you were talking about US cap and escorts. Another senior moment.:confused:

To answer your question, they had limited CAP fighters, all were involved with the torpedo bombers as there were two separate groups of around 18 per group. Also, with no combat information center and FIDO's, there was no coordination between the carriers and fighters. Lack of good radios hampered any chance of coordinating the different CAP fighter groups.

[Warship NWS]

Regardless of whether you are more worried about torpedo attack - you know your enemy has at least one carrier + an island. You know he's attacked with torpedo planes from the CV(s). Someone should be thinking - where are the dive bombers? Even if torpedo planes are more dangerous (and I'm not entirely convinced they are) - dive bombers can at least destroy your flight deck even if we assume (in error) that they aren't a direct threat to the ships themselves. Personally I think part of the Midway CAP issue was the "every Samurai for himself" mind set. Why didn't any of them ask where the dive bombers were?

Remember, their flight ops were based on "respond to threats" with more CAP aircraft on the deck ready to take off in sets of 3 at a time, and to cycle the Zekes in terms of reloading and refueling. That was their doctrine anyway.. obviously it didn't work out very well for them in this case. This is where the difference in communications doctrine greatly effected CAP management. If the CVs could have talked effectively to the CAP aircraft and the CAP management was more efficient in terms of who handled what part of the operations then the 40 Zekes flying around could have been put to much better use rather then "bunching up" on various threats. Midway was a classic example of how all the little faults in their system of CAP management added up to a disaster.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

I do not believe they knew how bad they were in terms of fragility (water impact), depth/gyro issues, and sometimes fuzing problems. They may have known about the speed and range to some degree but not the other problems, we didn't even recognize many of those problems before combat experience with them and even then not until the BuOrd tested 100 Mk13s after the Battle of Midway. If not, then why did they fear torpedos and actually, by doctrine, prioritize attacking torpedo bombers?

I don't know what the Japanese knew of the American air launched torpedoes at the point in the war when the Midway battle was happening. I'm not sure they're wrong in general though, if I'm a Carrier Captain and have to take a 1000 bomb or torpedo - which would I choose? I know it would depend on the status of my deck - aircraft there or not, etc - but in general? Which would you prefer to get nailed by?

[old_pop2000]

I am going to investigate their training and carrier development in Kaigun, this afternoon. Maybe I can explain more of what they had learned and developed compared to what we learned. Apparently, they were doing more doctrinal development earlier than I have been led to believe.

[Warship NWS]

I don't know what the Japanese knew of the American air launched torpedoes at the point in the war when the Midway battle was happening. I'm not sure they're wrong in general though, if I'm a Carrier Captain and have to take a 1000 bomb or torpedo - which would I choose? I know it would depend on the status of my deck - aircraft there or not, etc - but in general? Which would you prefer to get nailed by?

Kyle.. you cannot launch planes from a sunk or disabled CV.. no matter how operational your flight deck is, no catapults so they had to move into the wind to launch aircraft. Remember, CVs were not as anti-torpedo resiliant as BBs were. If you slow a CV down enough that will make it much harder to launch planes.. another problem, if you intend to save that CV you have slow down the entire task force to keep it protected. If it is disabled, or has lost speed, your entire task force is an easier target. The last thing you want to be is an easy target for enemy dive bombers due to lack of speed which in turn aids maneuverability. Dive bombers.. can mess up your flight deck, torpedo bombers.. can sink you or make you an easier target. In the end being hit by either one was bad news but most ships could still retain enough speed after being bombed, depending on where they were hit of course and the secondary effects, to get the hell out of the area if needed. If torpedoed, that issue became a lot more problematic. Now in the case of our torpedos vs bombs.. well at least our bombs worked! ;)

[Kyle Holgate]

Kyle.. you cannot launch planes from a sunk or disabled CV.. no matter how operational your flight deck is, no catapults so they had to move into the wind to launch aircraft. Remember, CVs were not as anti-torpedo resiliant as BBs were. If you slow a CV down enough that will make it much harder to launch planes.. another problem, if you intend to save that CV you have slow down the entire task force to keep it protected. If it is disabled, or has lost speed, your entire task force is an easier target. The last thing you want to be is an easy target for enemy dive bombers due to lack of speed which in turn aids maneuverability. Dive bombers.. can mess up your flight deck, torpedo bombers.. can sink you or make you an easier target. In the end being hit by either one was bad news but most ships could still retain enough speed after being bombed, depending on where they were hit of course and the secondary effects, to get the hell out of the area if needed. If torpedoed, that issue became a lot more problematic. Now in the case of our torpedos vs bombs.. well at least our bombs worked! ;)

I know my decision on this - I was asking yours (well, other's). I have no doubt in my mind which I'd choose if I had to choose one. You're preaching to the choir here, at least from a wargaming standpoint I've quite formed a view of what worrys me more in general, bomber craft or torpedo craft!

[old_pop2000]

I know my decision on this - I was asking yours (well, other's). I have no doubt in my mind which I'd choose if I had to choose one. You're preaching to the choir here, at least from a wargaming standpoint I've quite formed a view of what worrys me more in general, bomber craft or torpedo craft!
Neither, both will seriously hamper combat operations. A flooded ship with a list cannot be landed on. A ship with broken steam lines, fuel lines, water hoses is also a useless ship. All aircraft have to be ejected over the side or land on another carrier deck.

It really does not make a difference. However, small bomb hits can be patched or covered over, depending on the location of the hit.

A carrier is a mobile landing field. Once the landing field is damaged, or the hangers, the ship is essentially mission killed. I can't see what anyone is arguing about here. Look at the record of damaged carriers.

[Kyle Holgate]

I am going to investigate their training and carrier development in Kaigun, this afternoon. Maybe I can explain more of what they had learned and developed compared to what we learned. Apparently, they were doing more doctrinal development earlier than I have been led to believe.

And me up here without my books! I wonder if they really considered CV vs CV combat when coming up with their doctrine? For that matter did we or the RN? For a long time post WW1 when carriers were first gracing the seas with their homely, boxed looking presences the aircraft were thought more of as scouting craft than attack craft likely to really do much damage to enemy forces that had not already been hit by something or other.
As a Zero pilot or any fighter pilot - it would be hard to stay put at 20,000 feet (or whatever) knowing that down there at 2,000 enemy torpedo craft were attacking your bird farm. Also - I am somewat assuming that they knew that enemy dive bombers hadn't been sighted. Still - there is an entire type of enemy aircraft you know to be in the area - and have not yet seen. Don't you take some precaution against them?

[Warship NWS]

Neither, both will seriously hamper combat operations. A flooded ship with a list cannot be landed on. A ship with broken steam lines, fuel lines, water hoses is also a useless ship. All aircraft have to be ejected over the side or land on another carrier deck.

It really does not make a difference. However, small bomb hits can be patched or covered over, depending on the location of the hit.

A carrier is a mobile landing field. Once the landing field is damaged, or the hangers, the ship is essentially mission killed. I can't see what anyone is arguing about here. Look at the record of damaged carriers.

I don't think its an arguement rather then looking for various perspectives and opinions as to why Kyle is discussing the "bomb vs torpedo" context.

However, you did hit a very critical point with your response Dennis.. listing of the CV. Enterprise suffered a list during the battle of ES after taking 3 bomb hits.. 1 went through several decks and caused some minor flooding due to the outward buckling of the hull. Bombs going off near the hull, near misses, could also cause enough of an underwater pressure wave to punch in the hull, not nearly as much as a torpedo but it still a threat. Now obviously a list caused by a torpedo hit is a serious threat as now you have hull deformation (higher drag), you may have to slow down to reduce flooding, and torpedo holes are quite a bit more difficult to repair at sea.

I think it is easy to understand why CV commanders were sweating bullets wondering "Are they going to hit us before we hit them!". Glen Ford, acting as Admiral Spruance in the movie "Midway", said it best.. "I would give my retirement pay to know what Nagumo is doing right now!".. reply.. "Sweating it out", Charlton Heston as Capt Garth. To know that every move you make could mean thousands of lives lost in a few short seconds.. that is more pressure then any of us would ever want over our heads I would think. Any one of those CV battles during 1942 could have changed the course of a battle, a campaign, and even the war with just one bomb or torpedo hit at the right space and time.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

I don't think its an arguement rather then looking for various perspectives and opinions as to why Kyle is discussing the "bomb vs torpedo" context.

However, you did hit a very critical point with your response Dennis.. listing of the CV. Enterprise suffered a list during the battle of ES after taking 3 bomb hits.. 1 went through several decks and caused some minor flooding due to the outward buckling of the hull. Bombs going off near the hull, near misses, could also cause enough of an underwater pressure wave to punch in the hull, not nearly as much as a torpedo but it still a threat. Now obviously a list caused by a torpedo hit is a serious threat as now you have hull deformation (higher drag), you may have to slow down to reduce flooding, and torpedo holes are quite a bit more difficult to repair at sea.

I think it is easy to understand why CV commanders were sweating bullets wondering "Are they going to hit us before we hit them!". Glen Ford, acting as Admiral Spruance in the movie "Midway", said it best.. "I would give my retirement pay to know what Nagumo is doing right now!".. reply.. "Sweating it out", Charlton Heston as Capt Garth. To know that every move you make could mean thousands of lives lost in a few short seconds.. that is more pressure then any of us would ever want over our heads I would think. Any one of those CV battles during 1942 could have changed the course of a battle, a campaign, and even the war with just one bomb or torpedo hit at the right space and time.

Thanks.

Unlike the battleship where one hit may not really make much difference, a CV is comparatively quite vulnerable. They are as powerful as their aircraft are, and if they loose the ability to launch then they are instantly a liability that has to scoot home for yard work. In contrast a bomb or two on a BB probably isn't going to do much. A torpedo however is always worth a little bit of worry.
As for the CAP - Their job is not so much to shoot down enemy aircraft as it is to disrupt enemy air attacks. If that dive bomber misses due to my fighter, even if it never hit with a single shot - then I've mission killed the dive bomber - good enough in a pinch.

[Warship NWS]

Unlike the battleship where one hit may not really make much difference, a CV is comparatively quite vulnerable. They are as powerful as their aircraft are, and if they loose the ability to launch then they are instantly a liability that has to scoot home for yard work. In contrast a bomb or two on a BB probably isn't going to do much. A torpedo however is always worth a little bit of worry.
As for the CAP - Their job is not so much to shoot down enemy aircraft as it is to disrupt enemy air attacks. If that dive bomber misses due to my fighter, even if it never hit with a single shot - then I've mission killed the dive bomber - good enough in a pinch.

I would add this quick point.. I would much rather blast the bomber out of the sky as that way he cannot simply go back to his CV (or land base), rearm, take off, and attack again. Mission kills are only as effective as the length of time it takes to recover for a new engagement.

[Kyle Holgate]

I would add this quick point.. I would much rather blast the bomber out of the sky as that way he cannot simply go back to his CV (or land base), rearm, take off, and attack again. Mission kills are only as effective as the length of time it takes to recover for a new engagement.

True - but you have to wonder - the Dive bomber you chase and pump bullets into until it goes down may mean that another dives in and drops a bomb un harrassed by a fighter. Sometimes disrupting an attacking formation would be more important than downing individual aircraft - or potentially so at least. Of course this leads toward more like strategic bombing with B-17's than carrier bombing with SBD's or Val's.
I agree, downing the enemy has a number of advantages, but if you can break up an entire attack? It may be worth it to miss any kills at all.

[Warship NWS]

True - but you have to wonder - the Dive bomber you chase and pump bullets into until it goes down may mean that another dives in and drops a bomb un harrassed by a fighter. Sometimes disrupting an attacking formation would be more important than downing individual aircraft - or potentially so at least. Of course this leads toward more like strategic bombing with B-17's than carrier bombing with SBD's or Val's.
I agree, downing the enemy has a number of advantages, but if you can break up an entire attack? It may be worth it to miss any kills at all.

The catch is which one can you count on more? 20 Zekes jumped 15 SBDs and had little effect even with shooting down 4 of them. 7 Fulmars disrupted 40 Stukas and caused some effect on their attack by causing their pattern of attack to be more disoriented. It depends on a lot of factors. Vs naval aircraft they will not have immediate replacements.. vs land based aircraft that might be a different story. Interesting to contemplate however. The critical key here is.. a) to reduce their chances of scoring hits and b) reduce their chances to reattack.

[Kyle Holgate]

As a CAP pilot my job is to protect the ships - obviously with the Carrier being the most important. If that means I get to shoot down enemy aircraft then that is a bonus, but I should be as aware of the overall situation as I can be - and if I have to stop chasing a few Vals in order to break up some Kates that are lining up a hammer/Anvil attack - then so be it. I can have a good day and land back on my carrier even though I've not shot anything down.
What about an escort fighter - once more are they supposed to down the enemy planes or keep their bombers alive? Best of both worlds of course is free escort - once the bombers are safe or if you know you have enough escorts remaining with the bombers to keep them out of trouble - then you get to be freed up to chase the enemy fighters as long as you want/can - shooting down as many as you can too.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I don't know what the Japanese knew of the American air launched torpedoes at the point in the war when the Midway battle was happening. I'm not sure they're wrong in general though, if I'm a Carrier Captain and have to take a 1000 bomb or torpedo - which would I choose? I know it would depend on the status of my deck - aircraft there or not, etc - but in general? Which would you prefer to get nailed by?

Hi Kyle,

Considering what happened when they took bombs, a Mk 13 might be preferrable.

[Kyle Holgate]

Hi Kyle,

Considering what happened when they took bombs, a Mk 13 might be preferrable.

Shokaku and Zuikaku took some considerable bomb punishment over their lifetimes. It's probable that at least the big carriers at Midway (Akagi and Kaga) could take several "normal" hits without being put in major danger. Hiryu and Soryu were not as big - hard to tell what sort of hits they could handle. My point is - barring aviation fuel hits or ordinance magazine hits - carriers aught to be able to take a few bombs - and many did.
Torpedoes are another matter - even crappy Mk 13's can punch holes in CV's I would expect - and some had little in the way of a side protection system/Torpedo protection system (SPS or TPS).

[Kyle Holgate]

The Situation: You are the task force commander of the Japanese carrier force tasked with supporting a landing on Guadalcanal. You have Zuikaku and Shokaku + Junyo and Zuiho. Escorts include 4 BB's (Kongo class) and several cruisers and destroyers - enough to potentially form a surface attack force or screen more than one carrier group.

Now - USING 20/20 hindsight, knowing the US has radar and you don't. Knowing about US fighter direction, the weaknesses and strengths of your aircraft.
How do you conduct your searches? Finding US carreirs, how do you conduct your attacks (assuming you can change tactics or doctrine a bit on the fly)? If you have a choice - do you prefer to add more protection to your Kates or Val's in the way of escort fighters? What groupings of ships do you choose - attempting to maximize your own AA fire and CAP effectiveness?

[Mike Malanaphy]

The Situation: You are the task force commander of the Japanese carrier force tasked with supporting a landing on Guadalcanal. You have Zuikaku and Shokaku + Junyo and Zuiho. Escorts include 4 BB's (Kongo class) and several cruisers and destroyers - enough to potentially form a surface attack force or screen more than one carrier group.

Now - USING 20/20 hindsight, knowing the US has radar and you don't. Knowing about US fighter direction, the weaknesses and strengths of your aircraft.
How do you conduct your searches? Finding US carreirs, how do you conduct your attacks (assuming you can change tactics or doctrine a bit on the fly)? If you have a choice - do you prefer to add more protection to your Kates or Val's in the way of escort fighters? What groupings of ships do you choose - attempting to maximize your own AA fire and CAP effectiveness?

Hi Kyle,

Interesting question. I would use and advance force of destroyers supported by a couple of cruuisers to begin bomabrding Henderson at night and continuing into the day to suppress the Catus airforce for an extrended period. With the exception of a small CAP over the bombarding force, I would keep the carriers together and search extensively for the American carriers as their priority target. The transport to hold short of the island to protect them from air attacks until the situation around Guadalcanal was secured. Establishing local air superiority would be a key to the success of the landings as would be isolating the Marines from resupply.

Hopefully, knowledge of American radar and communications strengths and weakensses would hopefully be exploited. Doesn't appear that the USN shared the RNs concern over being detected by radar emanations so they could be exploited to locate the carriers and to exploit tequipments faults by approaching at low level.

[Kyle Holgate]

Hi Kyle,

Interesting question. I would use and advance force of destroyers supported by a couple of cruuisers to begin bomabrding Henderson at night and continuing into the day to suppress the Catus airforce for an extrended period. With the exception of a small CAP over the bombarding force, I would keep the carriers together and search extensively for the American carriers as their priority target. The transport to hold short of the island to protect them from air attacks until the situation around Guadalcanal was secured. Establishing local air superiority would be a key to the success of the landings as would be isolating the Marines from resupply.

Hopefully, knowledge of American radar and communications strengths and weakensses would hopefully be exploited. Doesn't appear that the USN shared the RNs concern over being detected by radar emanations so they could be exploited to locate the carriers and to exploit tequipments faults by approaching at low level.

I've often thought that keeping a surface force around off Henderson into the daytime would possibly be benificial. Bombard the crap out of it as best you can at night, then about when daylight is coming have a second force relieve the first, launch spotter planes and keep the pressure on. The spotter could tell you if Henderson is being patched and if planes are about to launch - if so - blast them again!

[Mike Malanaphy]

I've often thought that keeping a surface force around off Henderson into the daytime would possibly be benificial. Bombard the crap out of it as best you can at night, then about when daylight is coming have a second force relieve the first, launch spotter planes and keep the pressure on. The spotter could tell you if Henderson is being patched and if planes are about to launch - if so - blast them again!

Hi Kyle,

I know we loked at these a while back as an opption to the inability of the Japanese to suppress Henderson flyiing from Rabaul and teh success of their several cruiser and BB bombardments. Smaller ones doen by destroyers workiing just offshore might be less spectacular, but more efficient and make the Japanese less risk averse. Certainly risky, but perhaps a better option than expending all your Bettys.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The Japanese were far more afraid of torpedoes then bombs, for good reason. Torpedoes would sink your CV.. bomb damage could possibly be repaired, but the catch is that your CV ops might be knocked out -just a question of how long. Remember also that torpedoes could slow a CV down, if not disable it all together, and without forward speed, good flight deck or not, you cannot launch planes. I do not think they realized how pathetic the Mk13 was at the start of the war but the Shoho did get slammed by torpedoes at CS. However, I do agree that a better coordination of CAP was in order but that would not happen without good radio communications with the CVs below and better coordination with whoever was handling their fighter direction. Their system and doctrine was crippled even without the pilots trying to figure out who or what to go after IMHO. Point being their entire system was faulty, not just the pilot CAP training.

Chris:

Yet until late 1943, they lost more carriers to dive bombers than torpedoes. I think it was easier to hit a carrier with a bomb than a torpedo and with all that avgas and other combustibles on board, even one bomb could kill. Parshall has made the case that Akagi only took one bomb hit.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I don't know what the Japanese knew of the American air launched torpedoes at the point in the war when the Midway battle was happening. I'm not sure they're wrong in general though, if I'm a Carrier Captain and have to take a 1000 bomb or torpedo - which would I choose? I know it would depend on the status of my deck - aircraft there or not, etc - but in general? Which would you prefer to get nailed by?

Kyle:

If prior experience was a guide, then I would say that the IJN had to fear a torpedo attack more than a bombing attack. The first carrier they lost, was the Shoho and that was primarily to an anvil torpedo attack as you have mentioned. The dive bomber attacks wrecked the other carriers decks and put them out of action, but didn't sink them. Again the matter of timing and what the status of the ship's planes were makes all the difference was we see at Midway. I guess as Kurt would say "Location, location, location".

[Ed Rotondaro]

Kyle.. you cannot launch planes from a sunk or disabled CV.. no matter how operational your flight deck is, no catapults so they had to move into the wind to launch aircraft. Remember, CVs were not as anti-torpedo resiliant as BBs were. If you slow a CV down enough that will make it much harder to launch planes.. another problem, if you intend to save that CV you have slow down the entire task force to keep it protected. If it is disabled, or has lost speed, your entire task force is an easier target. The last thing you want to be is an easy target for enemy dive bombers due to lack of speed which in turn aids maneuverability. Dive bombers.. can mess up your flight deck, torpedo bombers.. can sink you or make you an easier target. In the end being hit by either one was bad news but most ships could still retain enough speed after being bombed, depending on where they were hit of course and the secondary effects, to get the hell out of the area if needed. If torpedoed, that issue became a lot more problematic. Now in the case of our torpedos vs bombs.. well at least our bombs worked! ;)

Chris:

The slowing down is a good point. Look what happens to Yorktown once she is slowed down? And her escorting destroyer gets sunk too.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Neither, both will seriously hamper combat operations. A flooded ship with a list cannot be landed on. A ship with broken steam lines, fuel lines, water hoses is also a useless ship. All aircraft have to be ejected over the side or land on another carrier deck.

It really does not make a difference. However, small bomb hits can be patched or covered over, depending on the location of the hit.

A carrier is a mobile landing field. Once the landing field is damaged, or the hangers, the ship is essentially mission killed. I can't see what anyone is arguing about here. Look at the record of damaged carriers.

Dennis:

Yet look at how many times a damaged US carrier was able to get back into action and land planes? Better damage control perhaps?

[Ed Rotondaro]

I don't think its an arguement rather then looking for various perspectives and opinions as to why Kyle is discussing the "bomb vs torpedo" context.

However, you did hit a very critical point with your response Dennis.. listing of the CV. Enterprise suffered a list during the battle of ES after taking 3 bomb hits.. 1 went through several decks and caused some minor flooding due to the outward buckling of the hull. Bombs going off near the hull, near misses, could also cause enough of an underwater pressure wave to punch in the hull, not nearly as much as a torpedo but it still a threat. Now obviously a list caused by a torpedo hit is a serious threat as now you have hull deformation (higher drag), you may have to slow down to reduce flooding, and torpedo holes are quite a bit more difficult to repair at sea.

I think it is easy to understand why CV commanders were sweating bullets wondering "Are they going to hit us before we hit them!". Glen Ford, acting as Admiral Spruance in the movie "Midway", said it best.. "I would give my retirement pay to know what Nagumo is doing right now!".. reply.. "Sweating it out", Charlton Heston as Capt Garth. To know that every move you make could mean thousands of lives lost in a few short seconds.. that is more pressure then any of us would ever want over our heads I would think. Any one of those CV battles during 1942 could have changed the course of a battle, a campaign, and even the war with just one bomb or torpedo hit at the right space and time.

Thanks.

Chris:

Carrier warfare in 1942-43 reminds me of tank combat and figher combat. Whoever hit first usually won. By 1944, with better radar, better AA and stronger fighters, the USN could weather a full deck load strike from the IJN whereas the IJN couldn't.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

Yet until late 1943, they lost more carriers to dive bombers than torpedoes. I think it was easier to hit a carrier with a bomb than a torpedo and with all that avgas and other combustibles on board, even one bomb could kill. Parshall has made the case that Akagi only took one bomb hit.

This is true.. but remember the reasons.. a) dive bombers are harder to stop when on the attack then torpedo bombers on average (especially SBDs vs TBDs) when engaged by CAP, b) our SBDs could carry 1000lb bombs compared to Vals of only 500lbs, c) our torpedos were very poor until 1943. Now flip it.. the Kates killed our CVs much easier then their Vals did. Better torpedoes and a good torpedo plane, even though it was not as well protected as our Avengers it was still a damn site better then the TBDs. Arguably, the Japanese easily had the best single engined torpedo bomber at the start of the war.

End result.. our SBD was the match for their Kate lethality vs CVs... but the Japanese still had to fear the entering of water into a hull from a torpedo hit.

[old_pop2000]

The Situation: You are the task force commander of the Japanese carrier force tasked with supporting a landing on Guadalcanal. You have Zuikaku and Shokaku + Junyo and Zuiho. Escorts include 4 BB's (Kongo class) and several cruisers and destroyers - enough to potentially form a surface attack force or screen more than one carrier group.

Now - USING 20/20 hindsight, knowing the US has radar and you don't. Knowing about US fighter direction, the weaknesses and strengths of your aircraft.
How do you conduct your searches? Finding US carreirs, how do you conduct your attacks (assuming you can change tactics or doctrine a bit on the fly)? If you have a choice - do you prefer to add more protection to your Kates or Val's in the way of escort fighters? What groupings of ships do you choose - attempting to maximize your own AA fire and CAP effectiveness?
Battle Plan

Junyo and Zuiho will provide 20 each, A6M2's for CAP, 10 B5n's for a 2 plane search with the long range reconnaissance aircraft from the cruisers.

Search will be a 180 degree, two plane search with the first plane leaving at 0430 hrs. and reaching its farthest extent by 0600. The second will depart about 7:00 and reach the same extent at 0900 hrs.

Zuikaku and Shokaku will each provide a strike group of 20 Zero's and 18 Dive Bombers, with 5 torpedo bombers, awaiting information from the two plane search.

That should give the Japanese adequate protection of 40 CAP Zero's, and the strike groups over 40 Zeros for escort.

[john964]

Chris:

The slowing down is a good point. Look what happens to Yorktown once she is slowed down? And her escorting destroyer gets sunk too.
Ed, Yorktown was under tow at the time top speed 6kt if that more likely 3-4kt. Not exactly a speed demon. Also it was a submarine that sank her. IIRC Yorktown had all kinds of problems, first off the unrepaired damage she took during Coral Sea plus 3 bombs and 2 torpedos during Midway.

[Warship NWS]

During 1942 we had 4 major CV battles with the Japanese.. CS, Midway, ES, and SC.. now here is the interesting part,

a) At CS Lexington was ultimately lost due to a AVGAS fuel line explosion.

b) At Midway the Yorktown was ultimately lost due to a IJN submarine.

c) At ES no CV was lost.

All of the above were under Fletchers command. Fletcher was relieved of command after Saratoga was torpedoed by a sub.

d) At SC the Hornet was ultimately lost due to air attack.

The above was under Kinkaids command.. of which he was relieved of command after the battle.

It is interesting to note that NONE of the CVs lost in the battles that were commanded by Fletcher were due to direct air attacks alone. The Lexington was damaged but would not have been lost if not for the improper handling of the AVGAS fuel lines - this was corrected after the battle. The Yorktown would have survived if not for the torpedo attack from the submarine - note they were very limited on ASW DDs. In all of Fletchers battles the CVs operated in pairs (the only exception was Yorktown at Midway due to having to catch up with the Hornet and Enterprise after rapid repairs at Pearl Harbor). At SC Kinkaid did NOT operate the CVs in a pair and the result was the loss of the Hornet as she took the brunt of the IJN repeated attacks that finally forced her abandonment.

IMHO, Fletcher was a fine admiral trying to keep his CVs as safe as possible with a somewhat inexperienced USN set of doctrines at the time regarding CAP management and yet being up against the best the IJN had to offer. The IJN had more experienced pilots, better torpedo aircraft (up until SC), better torpedoes, and greater attack ranges. Yet, due to direct air attack ALONE he did not lose a single CV but in turn cost the Japanese 4 CVs and 2 CVLs .. and the one thing the IJN could not afford whatsoever at a far greater attrition rate then his own.. pilot losses.

Just some thoughts to consider regarding Fletchers carrier battles.

[Warship NWS]

That should give the Japanese adequate protection of 40 CAP Zero's, and the strike groups over 40 Zeros for escort.

Interesting to note.. 40+ Zeros covered the IJN CVs at Midway and 20 Zeros could not do enough to stop 15 SBDs at ES which in turn caused the loss of a CVL. For those Zeros to be truely effective they would need better combat endurance, better durability vs rear gunners, and good CV to CAP coordination. The A6M5 would have covered 2 of these attributes.. but not the 3rd. Just some side thoughts on this topic.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, Yorktown was under tow at the time top speed 6kt if that more likely 3-4kt. Not exactly a speed demon. Also it was a submarine that sank her. IIRC Yorktown had all kinds of problems, first off the unrepaired damage she took during Coral Sea plus 3 bombs and 2 torpedos during Midway.

John:

She was definitely a sitting duck and the IJN submarine to its credit made a bold attack.

[john964]

John:

She was definitely a sitting duck and the IJN submarine to its credit made a bold attack. I also forgot that Hammon was alongside providing electircal power and portable pumps, IIRC Yorktown was surrounded by 6-8 DD's at the time and from what I understand ASW conditions were lowsey.

[Kyle Holgate]

Interesting to note.. 40+ Zeros covered the IJN CVs at Midway and 20 Zeros could not do enough to stop 15 SBDs at ES which in turn caused the loss of a CVL. For those Zeros to be truely effective they would need better combat endurance, better durability vs rear gunners, and good CV to CAP coordination. The A6M5 would have covered 2 of these attributes.. but not the 3rd. Just some side thoughts on this topic.

Thanks.

As the admiral in charge - I'd make sure that some of my cap was specifically charged with "Hi CAP" duty - and were not to drop down against attacking American torpdo planes. These Hi CAP planes are there to break up and ideally destroy enemy dive bombers.
As for point 3 above - In no case in WW2 have I heard that it was very difficult for a fighter to avoid the arc of fire from a rear gunner. The arc of fire is limited much more than the potential angle of attack. No, this won't fix the problem of relative flimsyness of the Zero, but it does allow for SBD's to be attacked. Tactical changes on the part of the Japanese could have helped quite a bit.

[old_pop2000]

Interesting to note.. 40+ Zeros covered the IJN CVs at Midway and 20 Zeros could not do enough to stop 15 SBDs at ES which in turn caused the loss of a CVL. For those Zeros to be truely effective they would need better combat endurance, better durability vs rear gunners, and good CV to CAP coordination. The A6M5 would have covered 2 of these attributes.. but not the 3rd. Just some side thoughts on this topic.

Thanks.
That is true, and what I proposed was best the Japanese would have been able to do. They needed to many additions to their fleet defenses to adequately protect their carriers. Without radar, adequate radios and IFF, more ammunition etc. Without a fleet defense doctrine, they were always at a disadvantage.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I also forgot that Hammon was alongside providing electircal power and portable pumps, IIRC Yorktown was surrounded by 6-8 DD's at the time and from what I understand ASW conditions were lowsey.

John:

I think that the USN was still getting up to speed in ASW. The IJN submarines still managed some successes against warships, especially big ones like carriers and battleships. By success here I don't necessarily mean sunk, but attacked. Saratoga and North Carolina come to mind off Guadalcanal.

[Warship NWS]

John:

I think that the USN was still getting up to speed in ASW. The IJN submarines still managed some successes against warships, especially big ones like carriers and battleships. By success here I don't necessarily mean sunk, but attacked. Saratoga and North Carolina come to mind off Guadalcanal.

IMHO, I think you would have to look at the circumstances a bit more carefully before making this broad of an assumption. Remember, we were helping the British in the Atlantic prior to 1942 when these attacks occurred. I do not have the time right now to dig further into these specific incidents in detail but I think it would be good if someone did.

Thanks.

[Kyle Holgate]

That is true, and what I proposed was best the Japanese would have been able to do. They needed to many additions to their fleet defenses to adequately protect their carriers. Without radar, adequate radios and IFF, more ammunition etc. Without a fleet defense doctrine, they were always at a disadvantage.

One big lacking the Japanese had was for a good automatic AA gun that could fire out to medium ranges. Their 5" guns, while not as rapid fire as the US 5"/38 were not bad by any means. Without VT of course they were limited to the accuracy of their fire direction equipment and having their burst ranges set correctly. Typically their next smaller AA weapon was the various mountings of 25mm AAA. These may have been barely OK if they were shooting at less protected aircraft, but didn't do the trick.

I've frequently heard from US ships that when the 20mm start to fire, it's time to duck.

The Japanese really needed some medium AA likt the 40mm. Then at least their BB's and CV's would sport fairly good AA - THEN they can work on their CAP.

[Ed Rotondaro]

IMHO, I think you would have to look at the circumstances a bit more carefully before making this broad of an assumption. Remember, we were helping the British in the Atlantic prior to 1942 when these attacks occurred. I do not have the time right now to dig further into these specific incidents in detail but I think it would be good if someone did.

Thanks.

Chris:

There seems to have been a time period where the USN either wasn't absorbing the RN's knowledge or was doing things their own way. If you recall the successes of a handful of German U-boats off the US coast in 1942, it is obvious that the USN's ASW doctrine was not as well developed as the British. I believe we learned fast, but it still took some time. I don't how well developed US sonar was at the time, but I would assume it was on par with the Brits due to the exchanges of technology.

[Kyle Holgate]

Chris:

There seems to have been a time period where the USN either wasn't absorbing the RN's knowledge or was doing things their own way. If you recall the successes of a handful of German U-boats off the US coast in 1942, it is obvious that the USN's ASW doctrine was not as well developed as the British. I believe we learned fast, but it still took some time. I don't how well developed US sonar was at the time, but I would assume it was on par with the Brits due to the exchanges of technology.

What exactly are we discussing now? How good or bad was Japanese Submarine operations and/or Japanese ASW? I got into ASW and WW2 Sub ops wayyyy back in 1978 before I got interested in Battleships and what not. Very interesting area of study.

[Mike Malanaphy]

John:

I think that the USN was still getting up to speed in ASW. The IJN submarines still managed some successes against warships, especially big ones like carriers and battleships. By success here I don't necessarily mean sunk, but attacked. Saratoga and North Carolina come to mind off Guadalcanal.

HI Guys,

A number of components to this issue. Sonars or ASDIC is still a relatively short range instrument where searcinging is done manaully by the operator on a very narrow bearing unlike the PPI like displays we see in the movies. Effective range is generally less than 1500 yards and the ability to search at moderate speed above like 14 knots problematic. High value warships are likely to be travelling faster. The British lost Ark Royal, Barham, and Eagle in the fall of 1941 to submarines in the fall of 1941.

It is more a function of increasing the number of escorts with experienced operators. Convoys or an invasion area are much easier to protect such as off North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy. Successful ASW effortsd required a huge number of escorst and aircraft to provide a significant degree of protection.

[Ed Rotondaro]

What exactly are we discussing now? How good or bad was Japanese Submarine operations and/or Japanese ASW? I got into ASW and WW2 Sub ops wayyyy back in 1978 before I got interested in Battleships and what not. Very interesting area of study.

Kyle:

Actually this is a fork from the discussion on carrier vulnerability. John and I were going back and forth on how the Yorktown got torpedoed. He had mentioned that even with a DD screen, ASW conditions were lousy. I assume that means sonar was not working as well as you would like?

[Ed Rotondaro]

HI Guys,

A number of components to this issue. Sonars or ASDIC is still a relatively short range instrument where searcinging is done manaully by the operator on a very narrow bearing unlike the PPI like displays we see in the movies. Effective range is generally less than 1500 yards and the ability to search at moderate speed above like 14 knots problematic. High value warships are likely to be travelling faster. The British lost Ark Royal, Barham, and Eagle in the fall of 1941 to submarines in the fall of 1941.

It is more a function of increasing the number of escorts with experienced operators. Convoys or an invasion area are much easier to protect such as off North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy. Successful ASW effortsd required a huge number of escorst and aircraft to provide a significant degree of protection.

Mike:

So essentially if the sub can sneak by the escorts, it would be hard to detect until it makes the attack?

[Kyle Holgate]

In WW2 average range of submarine detecting was 1350 metres (from a destroyer). For the moment let's just assume that this is the range at which the US destroyers could detect the Japanese. That means that sometime in the approach at least one DD has to get in range - not necessarily an easy thing to do!
Now add on a number of factors that may include water conditions, sonar operator skill, submarine reflectiveness, speed of the DD and several more - and you've got and iffy proposition when it comes to defending a stationary target from a sub that can come in from any direction.
At least with a moving target - even a slow one like a freighter or Tanker - your threat axis changes somewhat to being more forward of the ship and less behind it (for underwater attacks at least).

[Ed Rotondaro]

In WW2 average range of submarine detecting was 1350 metres (from a destroyer). For the moment let's just assume that this is the range at which the US destroyers could detect the Japanese. That means that sometime in the approach at least one DD has to get in range - not necessarily an easy thing to do!
Now add on a number of factors that may include water conditions, sonar operator skill, submarine reflectiveness, speed of the DD and several more - and you've got and iffy proposition when it comes to defending a stationary target from a sub that can come in from any direction.
At least with a moving target - even a slow one like a freighter or Tanker - your threat axis changes somewhat to being more forward of the ship and less behind it (for underwater attacks at least).

Kyle:

Thanks for the insights.