Japan retakes Guadalcanal

[Kyle Holgate]

Suppose that the Enterprise is sunk and a major effort on the part of Yamamoto and the Japanese army manages to capture Henderson field. Does the US now switch sides - bombarding by night and scooting by day? Henderson would be a good spot for G4M bombers once supplies and fuel are brought in, and the bombers would have enough range to cause plently of mischief. Does the US evacuate and try again with a different island later or does the US come back with the Sara and Hornet and a bunch of troops and make a maximum effort?

[old_pop2000]

Suppose that the Enterprise is sunk and a major effort on the part of Yamamoto and the Japanese army manages to capture Henderson field. Does the US now switch sides - bombarding by night and scooting by day? Henderson would be a good spot for G4M bombers once supplies and fuel are brought in, and the bombers would have enough range to cause plently of mischief. Does the US evacuate and try again with a different island later or does the US come back with the Sara and Hornet and a bunch of troops and make a maximum effort?
The Japanese have had many problems logistically maintaining their bases at Lae and Rabaul. Food, aircraft techs, parts even replacement aircraft have been hard to send to the bases. Guadalcanal is now 560 miles from Rabaul, making it even more difficult to maintain with supplies. Moving supplies down the eastern side of the Solomon's will be difficult if the US can move submarines into the area and begin to interdict the supply train.

US aircraft are now at Espiritu Santo, only 593 miles away. There are, at least, 25 B-17's available and more can be moved. Henderson Field and the other two, are very vulnerable to air attack. The Japanese don't have good ground radar sets. They don't have a long chain of coast watchers available to warn them. In fact, there are no islands along a chain to provide a warning. The only warning would have to come from a line of picket submarines that might be placed in the straits.

If the Japanese place bombers on the island, they might be able to control the straits between the Solomon's, there is no doubt of that. But they will have the same problems of security that we faced both during the day and at night. They don't have Australia and New Zealand to provide a base of supply or our logistical capability. Logistics are the key to taking and holding the island.

If the Japanese managed to take the island using the 6000 men of the Kawaguchi Army Brigade, that brigade will be badly damaged, taking about 60% casualties. The Japanese army had to scrape the bottom of the barrel to get that brigade together, equip it and move it. The completed operation probably will around the end of September. The Japanese are notoriously slow in building and rebuilding.

So, by October 1st, 1942 the Japanese will have around 2000 Army soldiers on the island, they will begin setting up a defensive system to protect the island. They will move a seaplane unit to Tulagi to provide long range reconnaissance. They will move one bomber unit and one fighter unit to the island, almost immediately. However, the fighters will be the A6M3 Model 32. It will not have the range to escort the bombers to Espiritu Santo, it too far. So, the bombers will be used to maintain control over the eastern, southern and western waters around Guadalcanal and San Cristobal.

The IJN will be in a bad way, at this time. They will have Shokaku and Zuikaku but both carriers will be back at Hashirajima to replace their air wings. The other smaller carriers are not designed as carriers, are slow, and cramped. They are vulnerable to submarines. I see not carrier support for the island for many months, except to bring more naval land based fighters and possibly attack aircraft. Guadalcanal does not have a good anchorage for the IJN, like Rabaul. The IJN will not maintain a sizeable set of ships in the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal. Maybe some destroyers or patrol boats, but nothing larger, for any length of time.

So, Guadalcanal can be taken and held, but as time moves along, it will be a growing cancer on the Japanese supply system. The Japanese are struggling to take Port Moresby and Milne Bay, now they have an even longer supply problem at Guadalcanal.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Suppose that the Enterprise is sunk and a major effort on the part of Yamamoto and the Japanese army manages to capture Henderson field. Does the US now switch sides - bombarding by night and scooting by day? Henderson would be a good spot for G4M bombers once supplies and fuel are brought in, and the bombers would have enough range to cause plently of mischief. Does the US evacuate and try again with a different island later or does the US come back with the Sara and Hornet and a bunch of troops and make a maximum effort?

Hi Kyle,

That opens a can of worms. The Japanese G4M force was not in the greatest of shape and likely would have been severely attrtited unless juduciously used against convoys. Their long range would give teh Jpanese exceptional reach and the ability attack aways from land based air. If the 1st Marine Division was in bad shape, there was little in the way of ground forces in the SW Pacific area to reinforce or reinvade the island.

The loss of Guadalcanal would not significantly hamper Allied fortunes as the Japanese had no real desire to expand farther south, but would give them a years breathing space before the ALlied offensive began in late 1943. Even escaping teh attrtion of teh Solomons campaign, the Japanese Navy would find itself outnumbered and overpowered as the weight of the American war effort ame into play.

The Japanese only tried cruiser warfare once in the Indian Ocean. That same sized force with perhaps a light carrier out of Rabaul would force the Americans to divert her carriers to escorting convoys across the Pacific to Australia.

[old_pop2000]

What about the US position?

This depends on how we evacuate the island. If we lose Enterprise, but her aircraft land on Saratoga or Guadalcanal, they can be moved from Henderson back to Espiritu Santo and operate from there. We still have Saratoga and Hornet available with full air wings, but they will have to return and operate out of New Caledonia. Ghormley will remove these carriers from harms way, immediately to protect them.

As to land forces, the Army has some infantry units at New Zealand and Australia, the 2nd Marine division is getting trained to replace or augment the 1st, so by february 1943, we should have one complete Marine division, a second rebuilding plus one or two Army divisions along with Army P-38's send to Espiritu Santo to replace the P-400's.

All in all, I suspect that we will be ready to retake Guadalcanal by January at the earliest with the 2nd Marine division, two carriers, plus P-38's and B-17's stationed at Espiritu Santo. The retaking of the island will not be as easy as the first time, but if we use the North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota and possibly the Indiana as shore bombardment, along with the heavy cruisers, we should be able to silence most of their artillery and render the airfields inoperable.

[Warship NWS]

Guadalcanal was not really worth the risk of resources to invest in for the Japanese IMHO. 2 things would kill it most of all.. subs and long range bombers, as Dennis stated above. Japanese Zekes had enough trouble bringing down our single engined aircraft, especially SBDs in formation, so shooting down a 4 engined armored bomber or 2 engined tactical bombers, in formation would have proved problematic at best especially when being fired back at by .50 cal gunners - yet another ugly attrition rate for the ill protected and low combat endurance Zekes, the A6M5 would have been a bit better if they could build enough of them in time to make a significant difference. The Germans hated attacking our bombers with far better aircraft from 1943 onwards and relied on ballistically better and longer range cannons and R4M rockets to keep out of the range of the gunners as an example.

End result.. Guadalcanal would have been a cancer as Dennis stated.. one the Japanese could ill afford to maintain and hold onto for any worthy amount of time. It would have just been a matter of waiting for the Essex to come along and the game is still over.. just takes a little longer, but we had time, they did not.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

All in all, I suspect that we will be ready to retake Guadalcanal by January at the earliest with the 2nd Marine division, two carriers, plus P-38's and B-17's stationed at Espiritu Santo. The retaking of the island will not be as easy as the first time, but if we use the North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota and possibly the Indiana as shore bombardment, along with the heavy cruisers, we should be able to silence most of their artillery and render the airfields inoperable.

Tie the SD/NC classes with the Essex and you have a quantum leap advantage compared to what the IJN had with the exception of the Shokaku, Zuikaku, and Yamato classes. IJN CVs in building would have been devalued considerably without quality pilots. Again, it was just a matter of time.

[old_pop2000]

One more advantage was the failure of the New Guinea campaign by the Japanese. By the autumn of 1942, the Australian's were on the offensive. With the distraction of Guadalcanal, supplies and air support for the New Guinea operation may begin to deteriorate. This maybe an opportunity to retake the offensive, move over the mountains and retake Lae from the japanese. Keeping the japanese on the defensive in both Guadalcanal and New Guinea can definitely stretch an overworked Japanese supply system.

One caveat: Yamamoto will not be killed, but will still be in command. A force to be reckoned with.

Remember that time is on the side of the Allies. We can sustain a logistics war of attrition, far better than the Japanese. By early 1943, our submarine campaign against their supply lines is beginning to have its effect.

[Kyle Holgate]

I agree that Guadalcanal would not be worth the material or manpower investment for the Japanese - but they seem to have missed that in their struggle for the island and apparently were trying to re-take it for more of a face-saving reason than anything else.

The loss of Enterprise would have been more of a moral blow than a material one to the US - what with Saratoga, Hornet and Wasp still "kicking". If the US gets their act together these 3 are a match - or more than a match for the Zuikaku and Shokaku backed up by medium (Junyo/Hiyo) or light carriers with their dated aircraft and degrading pilot quality.

So much like with Midway - if the Japanese grabbed it in June, their attempts to keep it supplied and manne would have been a material "dump" they could not afford. Guadalcanal would serve the same purpose if they'd gotten it back as it was with them trying constantly to re-take it: A means for the US to whittle down the IJN and AAF bit by bit.

[Warship NWS]

To Kyle,

What all has been stated above is exactly why I call the Solomons Campaign for the Japanese the equivelant to the Stalingrad campaign for the Germans. Neither side could keep what they gained and neither side could afford such a terrible rate of attrition. The Russians were just getting geared for war much like we were so it was a last ditch effort to, as you stated, "save face".. in the end it blew up in their faces.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Guadalcanal was not really worth the risk of resources to invest in for the Japanese IMHO. 2 things would kill it most of all.. subs and long range bombers, as Dennis stated above. Japanese Zekes had enough trouble bringing down our single engined aircraft, especially SBDs in formation, so shooting down a 4 engined armored bomber or 2 engined tactical bombers, in formation would have proved problematic at best especially when being fired back at by .50 cal gunners - yet another ugly attrition rate for the ill protected and low combat endurance Zekes, the A6M5 would have been a bit better if they could build enough of them in time to make a significant difference. The Germans hated attacking our bombers with far better aircraft from 1943 onwards and relied on ballistically better and longer range cannons and R4M rockets to keep out of the range of the gunners as an example.

End result.. Guadalcanal would have been a cancer as Dennis stated.. one the Japanese could ill afford to maintain and hold onto for any worthy amount of time. It would have just been a matter of waiting for the Essex to come along and the game is still over.. just takes a little longer, but we had time, they did not.

Thanks.

Chris:

If by some means, the Japanese re-took Guadalcanal, the butchers bill (to use a graphic term) would have prevented any further movement southward. The entire campaign was predicated on preventing the Japanese from taking Port Moresby and threatening Australia. Japan would have probably shot their bolt just to recapture Guadalacanal. Strategically the Allies didn't need it as much as Japan did, although it did allow for a war of attrition to be fought at a time when the US was not ready for a full blown offensive.

[Kyle Holgate]

We concentrate so much on the material, tactical and strategic sides of war I think the emotional and morale sides are often neglected. Hitler and his "no retreat" orders, Japan and their "hold at all cost" mentality. Only Allied major bad move I can think of that was a result of morale/emotional impact would be the surrender of Singapore - but I am sure there are more. I think even the order to go ahead with the D-day landing at Normandy was more of an emotional decision than one based on facts - it ended up working out for the Allies, but a freak storm could have ruined their day.

[old_pop2000]

We concentrate so much on the material, tactical and strategic sides of war I think the emotional and morale sides are often neglected. Hitler and his "no retreat" orders, Japan and their "hold at all cost" mentality. Only Allied major bad move I can think of that was a result of morale/emotional impact would be the surrender of Singapore - but I am sure there are more. I think even the order to go ahead with the D-day landing at Normandy was more of an emotional decision than one based on facts - it ended up working out for the Allies, but a freak storm could have ruined their day.
Psychological aspects of advances and retreats are important. How would a retreat from Guadalcanal affect US moral and planning?

[Kyle Holgate]

Psychological aspects of advances and retreats are important. How would a retreat from Guadalcanal affect US moral and planning?

I should think that a defeat and retreat from Guadalcanal would give US forces a more "Monty" approach. By that I mean don't do $*#*!! unti you have overwhelming forces and virtually assured air cover, then make your attack.
So next time, no half baked invasion (not saying it was by the way, just sometime seems that way). Next time you invade you go in with way more troops than you need, more protection as far as air and surface forces than you really need, and plenty of logistics already lined up than you would theoretically need.