Thoughts on "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral"

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi:

I finally finished John Lundstrom's book "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral; Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal". I must say it does offer a more balanced look at an admiral who has been handled rather roughly by military historians.

There is always the problem of a historian separating their own opinions and biases to be objective. Lundstrom certainly points out the refusal of Samuel Morison to be objective. He also debunks the opinions of the Marine history of Guadalcanal. There seems to have been plenty of convenient hindsight and re-imagining the sequences of events by critics of Fletcher. Admiral Turner in particular has a very selective memory of what was agreed on and what promised from his amphibious troops and their unloading.

It was Fletcher's misfortune to be operating at time when US carrier doctrine was being tested in battle and found wanting in many respects. The air minded officers might have been bolder, but they certainly lacked ship handling experience. Some of them proved inept at times (Mitscher at Midway, McCain's poor handling of recon before Savo Island). Yet their reputations emerge untarnished while Fletcher is seen at best as overly cautious and not able to land the big blow.

The problem is they areas in which Fletcher operated where not the places that the USN would want to use carriers. They were very vulnerable to land based air and to submarines. As an example of the double standard, Fletcher was expected to remain close to Guadalcanal to provide air support until the airfield was up and running and sufficient planes were on hand. Yet he knew the vulnerabilities of his carriers to submarines and land based air. He also knew that fuel was being consumed at levels far greater than pre-war planning had anticipated. Finally he operated under the constraint of balancing risk with potential gain. When operating the Saratoga off Guadalcanal in October 1942, his ship was torpedoed and had to return to Pearl Harbor. He was criticised for operating in known sub infested waters. Essentially he was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. Yet this black shoe admiral managed to sink 6 IJN carriers for the loss of only two of his own in the three carrier battles he commanded. Post war, Admiral Spruance was given a draft copy of a history of the carrier battles that deified him and belittled Fletcher. He sent it back were the stern adminition to change the tone of the book. At least he knew the truth.

Fletcher's subsequent relief was handled badly. He never was invited to tell his side of the events and was shipped out to the North Pacific to coordinate the invasion of the Aleutian islands and to carry out harrassing attacks on the Kuriles. He handled this with skill and professionalism and won the admiration of the Canadians and the British, both of whom decorated him. Post war he served on the Navy General Board and acted as barrier between Nimitz and the Navy Secretary Forrestal. He gratefully retired in 1947 and gave a few interviews on his career, but it was clear that the official voices of the navy had decided to use him as a whipping boy.

Lundstrom's analyses of the campaigns of Fletcher are detailed and well researched. They offer a nice counter balance to the conventional wisdom that had been around since the end of WWII. I recommend this book highly if you would like to see the other side of the story.

[asnrobert]

I read that book very good. Morison also castigated Fletcher for the failure to relieve Wake- yet he was following the orders of Admiral Pye.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I read that book very good. Morison also castigated Fletcher for the failure to relieve Wake- yet he was following the orders of Admiral Pye.

Robert:

I've lost a lot of respect for Morison as a historian. His research is no where near as deep as modern historians. He was more like a reporter than a true historian. He wrote well but analyzed poorly.

[asnrobert]

Robert:

I've lost a lot of respect for Morison as a historian. His research is no where near as deep as modern historians. He was more like a reporter than a true historian. He wrote well but analyzed poorly.

Perhaps it was harder for Morison to analyse as he was closer to the events than historians several decades removed. He was trying to capture the events "as they happened." I think he even said that later historians might be able to analyse events later.

[keschofield]

..... Admiral Turner in particular has a very selective memory of what was agreed on and what promised ....

The more I read, and the more information that becomes declassified, the more I become convinced that Admiral Turner was the Navy's version of Douglas (God) MacArthur. Turner never met an inconvenient fact that he couldn't change. :mad: Read "And I Was There" sometime to get a good idea of Turner's shenanigans.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Perhaps it was harder for Morison to analyse as he was closer to the events than historians several decades removed. He was trying to capture the events "as they happened." I think he even said that later historians might be able to analyse events later.

Robert:

At least he was honest there. It's pity he had already made his mind up on Fletcher and influenced several other historians. One thing that worked against Fletcher is that he lost his operational files on both the Lexington and the Yorktown so his side of the story was harder to present. Also while on duty in the North Pacific, his files where never sent to him and where generally discarded by whoever got his former office.

[Ed Rotondaro]

The more I read, and the more information that becomes declassified, the more I become convinced that Admiral Turner was the Navy's version of Douglas (God) MacArthur. Turner never met an inconvenient fact that he couldn't change. :mad: Read "And I Was There" sometime to get a good idea of Turner's shenanigans.

Kurt:

Exactly. Lundtrom makes it clear that while Turner had no problem admitting a mistake, he rarely ever did so and he was famous for a nasty temper. I have Leyton's book and hope to read over the spring, but right now I taking a break on the Pacific and I'm reading more on the campaign in Northwest Europe. I'm just about done with Charles MacDonald's classic "Company Commander" which is excellent.

[asnrobert]

I'm just about done with Charles MacDonald's classic "Company Commander" which is excellent.

I read that years ago (I think when I was in high school, or thereabouts). Good read.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I read that years ago (I think when I was in high school, or thereabouts). Good read.

Robert:

What impressed the most was the matter of fact manner in which he describes his experiences and how he carried out his duties. Fall of 1944 in Europe was no place to be mainly outside and fighting a war.

[Vince O'Hara]

I admire Morison and generally I consider his research excellent. Sure, he makes his share of mistakes and some of his judgements have not stood the the test of time, but overall, there is no one like Morison and there never will be.

Fletcher was wearing two hats at Guadalcanal. Ghormley had made him commander of the Allied attack force and he was commander of the carrier force as well. The second job was the one he knew and liked best and he considered the needs of the carrier force paramount. I'm not going to argue whether that was correct, or whether the amphibious force's needs took priority. Morison's criticisms of Fletcher's actions have not held up, but there is no question in my mind that Fletcher was the wrong man to command the operation. It probably would have been better if Ghormley had gone to sea and commanded the operation. Nimitz expected him to. I also wonder why history has been so generous to Crutchley.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

I admire Morison and generally I consider his research excellent. Sure, he makes his share of mistakes and some of his judgments have not stood the the test of time, but overall, there is no one like Morison and there never will be.

Fletcher was wearing two hats at Guadalcanal. Ghormley had made him commander of the Allied attack force and he was commander of the carrier force as well. The second job was the one he knew and liked best and he considered the needs of the carrier force paramount. I'm not going to argue whether that was correct, or whether the amphibious force's needs took priority. Morison's criticisms of Fletcher's actions have not held up, but there is no question in my mind that Fletcher was the wrong man to command the operation. It probably would have been better if Ghormley had gone to sea and commanded the operation. Nimitz expected him to. I also wonder why history has been so generous to Crutchley.

Vince


Hi Vince:
I would agree, in most cases, with your assessment of Morison. I believe that he did set a standard for historical research on the subject. As for his analysis and conclusions, he was under the US Navy's authority in this project. So I think we are expecting him to be divorced from its accepted conclusions about the actions taken in WWII. I am hoping to acquire a complete set of his history of this period, in the future.

As for Fletcher being in overall command. This seems to be a precedent setting operation in that regard. In all of the Central Pacific operations, the overall command of the operation was in the hands of the fleet commander. The question would be, whether this was a Nimitz policy or a King policy?

In regards to Ghormley, this was an officer who really did not believe in this operation. I would not have expected him to be at sea, directing it. He should have been, but I would not expect it of him. This was our first amphibious operation. While we had developed the doctrine and some necessary equipment, our grasp of the logistic requirements such as the proper loading of the transports, left much to improve. But, there were constraints on Fletcher and I liken them to Nagumo's at Midway. He was to provide protection to the invasion force, yet he was under orders not to risk his carriers without adequate justification. Possibly Halsey might have been a much better choice for this operation, or Spruance.

Nice to hear from you.

[asnrobert]

I also wonder why history has been so generous to Crutchley.



Especially since the Solomons campaign seemed to be the graveyard of many careers.

[Vince O'Hara]

Hi Vince:
I am hoping to acquire a complete set of his history of this period, in the future.

In regards to Ghormley, this was an officer who really did not believe in this operation. I would not have expected him to be at sea, directing it. .


Dennis, NIP is going to republish the entire Morison series with all new introductions by prominent historians commenting on Morison's research, how he's held up, important lapses, etc. I think it will be worth waiting for.

Regarding Watchtower, I don't think anyone was much enthused about it, maybe except Turner, although I'd have to check that. Ghormley is an interesting case. He could use a champion like Fletcher has with Lundstrom.

Vince

[Ed Rotondaro]

I admire Morison and generally I consider his research excellent. Sure, he makes his share of mistakes and some of his judgements have not stood the the test of time, but overall, there is no one like Morison and there never will be.

Fletcher was wearing two hats at Guadalcanal. Ghormley had made him commander of the Allied attack force and he was commander of the carrier force as well. The second job was the one he knew and liked best and he considered the needs of the carrier force paramount. I'm not going to argue whether that was correct, or whether the amphibious force's needs took priority. Morison's criticisms of Fletcher's actions have not held up, but there is no question in my mind that Fletcher was the wrong man to command the operation. It probably would have been better if Ghormley had gone to sea and commanded the operation. Nimitz expected him to. I also wonder why history has been so generous to Crutchley.

Vince

Vince:

I'll reserve my judgement on Morison until I read his volume on Leyte Gulf. I've read a lot of books on that campaign and we'll see how Morison stands up.

The problem with who should have commanded the Guadalcanal operation is that outside of Fletcher who do you have? Halsey was apparently still recovering from his illness. Spruance while brillant was quite a bit junior to most admirals and was on Nimitz's staff at the time. Ghormley doesn't appear to have had much experience commanding task forces. Do you want to risk that or at least use an officer who has had success with carriers?

Crutchley I think takes some unfair criticism for Savo Island. While he should have returned to his flagship, the USN thought enough of him to let him try and intercept an IJN task force later on in the campaign. Admiral Carlton Wright in my opinion doesn't come off as that competent when compared to someone like Admiral Lee or Admiral Merrill.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Especially since the Solomons campaign seemed to be the graveyard of many careers.

Robert:

In more ways than one, the USN lost two admirals in combat there and the IJN lost and admiral at Cape Esperance.

[Vince O'Hara]

Vince:

The problem with who should have commanded the Guadalcanal operation is that outside of Fletcher who do you have?

Crutchley I think takes some unfair criticism for Savo Island. While he should have returned to his flagship, the USN thought enough of him to let him try and intercept an IJN task force later on in the campaign. Admiral Carlton Wright in my opinion doesn't come off as that competent when compared to someone like Admiral Lee or Admiral Merrill.

Hey Ed,

Who was to command Watchtower was Ghromley's decision and he had to select from the talent available to him. Perhaps he agreed that he wasn't the best qualified. It was not, in my opinion, fair to the amphibious force, or to Fletcher, for that matter, to make Fletcher the overall commander. I think a lot of the problems that occurred flowed from the fact that Fletcher had excessive (and mutually exclusive) responsibilities.

As for Crutchley, it's a mystery to me. I know that Hepburn, when he was doing his inquiry into the Savo disaster was expecting to come away with Crutchley's scalp when he first met him and instead came away singing his praises. Crutchley was an impressive person. He wore a Victoria Cross from the Great War and commanded Warspite at the battle of Narvik. Apparently he was extremely personable and articulate. On top of his credentials, he was the senior officer for the British/Commonwealth contingment and coalition politics dictates that you go easy on your partner's heroes. Still, I can't think of a similar case where an officer who had his command suffer such a diaster (in part as a consequence of questionable decisions and poor communication by said officer) escaped with, apparently, zero consequences. Perhaps the fact he didn't raise to greater responsibilities after Savo was the consequence. Most likely I don't know enough facts about the situation.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, NIP is going to republish the entire Morison series with all new introductions by prominent historians commenting on Morison's research, how he's held up, important lapses, etc. I think it will be worth waiting for.

Regarding Watchtower, I don't think anyone was much enthused about it, maybe except Turner, although I'd have to check that. Ghormley is an interesting case. He could use a champion like Fletcher has with Lundstrom.

Vince


Great, I will wait for that edition, might be much better.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hey Ed,

Who was to command Watchtower was Ghromley's decision and he had to select from the talent available to him. Perhaps he agreed that he wasn't the best qualified. It was not, in my opinion, fair to the amphibious force, or to Fletcher, for that matter, to make Fletcher the overall commander. I think a lot of the problems that occurred flowed from the fact that Fletcher had excessive (and mutually exclusive) responsibilities.

As for Crutchley, it's a mystery to me. I know that Hepburn, when he was doing his inquiry into the Savo disaster was expecting to come away with Crutchley's scalp when he first met him and instead came away singing his praises. Crutchley was an impressive person. He wore a Victoria Cross from the Great War and commanded Warspite at the battle of Narvik. Apparently he was extremely personable and articulate. On top of his credentials, he was the senior officer for the British/Commonwealth contingment and coalition politics dictates that you go easy on your partner's heroes. Still, I can't think of a similar case where an officer who had his command suffer such a diaster (in part as a consequence of questionable decisions and poor communication by said officer) escaped with, apparently, zero consequences. Perhaps the fact he didn't raise to greater responsibilities after Savo was the consequence. Most likely I don't know enough facts about the situation.

Vince

Vince:

The entire command structure for the war in the South Pacific is really puzzling. You have MacArthur trying to assume overall command of the area with King and Nimitz resisting him. Perhaps that's why Ghormley was sent there in the first place, to maintain a navy presence in the decision making. Once the war shifts to the Central Pacific, you don't see this kind of command structure anymore. You have 3rd or 5th fleet operating directly under Halsey or Spruance and reporting directly to Nimitz at Pearl.

When Halsey relieved Ghormley, he allowed the carrier forces to remain under Kincaid's direct at sea command, which based on Kincaid's record was a mistake. Halsey doesn't really return to sea until the campaign shifts to the Central Pacific.

Crutchley put forth his doubts about the command structure of the surface task force feeling that the differences between the RN and the USN would make for confusion, even though he had US ships under his command for several months. Here is a good link to an in depth examination of some of the individuals in positions of command at Savo Island. You may already be familiar with it:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/actc-10.html

Crutchley's comments are interesting.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Great, I will wait for that edition, might be much better.

Dennis:

I had planned on getting the paperback versions from I think it's University of Illinois press, but I'll wait for the NIP volumes if only for the commentaries.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I had planned on getting the paperback versions from I think it's University of Illinois press, but I'll wait for the NIP volumes if only for the commentaries.

I am going to wait until NWS can get copies, then maybe purchase them. Got to be loyal to the group.:D

[Warship NWS]

I am going to wait until NWS can get copies, then maybe purchase them. Got to be loyal to the group.:D

Thanks, just remind me when they are published. ;)

[Vince O'Hara]

Vince:

The entire command structure for the war in the South Pacific is really puzzling.

When Halsey relieved Ghormley, he allowed the carrier forces to remain under Kincaid's direct at sea command, which based on Kincaid's record was a mistake. Halsey doesn't really return to sea until the campaign shifts to the Central Pacific.

Crutchley put forth his doubts about the command structure of the surface task force feeling that the differences between the RN and the USN would make for confusion, .

Hi Ed,

Yeah, there were a lot of politics at work in the South Pacific command. Regarding Dyer's work, it has a lot of good information, but its very partisan. He also felt that Morison was unfair to the object of his study. Along with Crutchley, we could likewise debate Kinkaid's record and the way he's been treated by subsequent historians. If you're looking for an excellent work I recommend Gerald Wheeler's biography, Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet. I'd like to see someone produce a balanced bibliography of Ghormley.

Vince

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Ed,

Yeah, there were a lot of politics at work in the South Pacific command. Regarding Dyer's work, it has a lot of good information, but its very partisan. He also felt that Morison was unfair to the object of his study. Along with Crutchley, we could likewise debate Kinkaid's record and the way he's been treated by subsequent historians. If you're looking for an excellent work I recommend Gerald Wheeler's biography, Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet. I'd like to see someone produce a balanced bibliography of Ghormley.

Vince


Vince:

Thanks for the recommendations. I'm not sure what takes more time, an in depth biography or an in-depth history of a battle or campaign. One of the tough things about biogrpahies is that if the subject has been long departed, most likely so are his contemparies so you have to rely on written sources rather than verbal sources.