Battle of the Eastern Solomon's

[old_pop2000]

Recently on the History Channel, Battle 360 depicted the Enterprise in the Battle of The Eastern Solomon's. She, along with Saratoga were involved in this battle as a part of TF 61, led by Admiral Frank Fletcher.

For Guadalcanal, the invasion had only occurred, seventeen days before and Henderson Field had only recently been completed and the Marine Air Wing installed. This was the first time that the Japanese reorganized First Striking Fleet of Pearl Harbor and Midway fame, had given battle.

For me, it is an interesting battle for many reasons, one of which was that my dad was in one of the dive bomber squadrons on board Saratoga during the battle. He did not fly, but did remember the action, which he once characterized as "busy". My dad was a man of few words.

This battle is not studied much, when compared to Coral Sea, Midway and others, but may have been one of the most important for the future of Guadalcanal and the Allied offensive in the Southwest Pacific.

One of my reasons for choosing this battle, was because of our discussion about radios and battle management. This battle was an example of the effect of poor communications, overloaded radio circuits and poor fighter direction. Failure to receive contact reports in a timely manner, failure to direct attack groups to those targets that presented a greater threat along with the inability of the Fido's to direct the CAP fighters to the proper targets all contributed.

Hope we can generate some interest and good information.

[Warship NWS]

For me, it is an interesting battle for many reasons, one of which was that my dad was in one of the dive bomber squadrons on board Saratoga during the battle. He did not fly, but did remember the action, which he once characterized as "busy". My dad was a man of few words.

This battle is not studied much, when compared to Coral Sea, Midway and others, but may have been one of the most important for the future of Guadalcanal and the Allied offensive in the Southwest Pacific.

One of my reasons for choosing this battle, was because of our discussion about radios and battle management. This battle was an example of the effect of poor communications, overloaded radio circuits and poor fighter direction. Failure to receive contact reports in a timely manner, failure to direct attack groups to those targets that presented a greater threat along with the inability of the Fido's to direct the CAP fighters to the proper targets all contributed.

Hope we can generate some interest and good information.

The apple definitely landed far from the tree on the "man of few words part", .. Gotta pick on you old friend. ;)

I agree that this campaign, versus a single battle, is underrated compared to the previous naval engagements of Coral Sea and Midway which both proved to be strategic victories for the USN.. the first stopped the IJN cold and the second punched them square in the face and made them realize why Admiral Yamamoto warned everyone after Pearl Harbor that they were in for a hell of a fight. The Solomons CV battles were the 3rd round to see who would make the knock out blow for the Pacific War to retain the offensive or stay on the defensive. Before the USN was reacting to the IJN strategic maneuvers.. now it was the other way around. In the end the Solomons ended up being the European version of Stalingrad.. the clash of 2 titans in a deadly war of attrition where the nation that could pour more resources into the campaign would change the final course of the war. It also ironically showed how we would learn some kicks in teeth lessons when we started to batter down the door of our most lethal opponent in the worlds oceans. Very good topic of discussion when you look at the entire campaign for the Solomons. Nice work Dennis.

[old_pop2000]

The apple definitely landed far from the tree on the "man of few words part", .. Gotta pick on you old friend. ;)

I agree that this campaign, versus a single battle, is underrated compared to the previous naval engagements of Coral Sea and Midway which both proved to be strategic victories for the USN.. the first stopped the IJN cold and the second punched them square in the face and made them realize why Admiral Yamamoto warned everyone after Pearl Harbor that they were in for a hell of a fight. The Solomons CV battles were the 3rd round to see who would make the knock out blow for the Pacific War to retain the offensive or stay on the defensive. Before the USN was reacting to the IJN strategic maneuvers.. now it was the other way around. In the end the Solomons ended up being the European version of Stalingrad.. the clash of 2 titans in a deadly war of attrition where the nation that could pour more resources into the campaign would change the final course of the war. It also ironically showed how we would learn some kicks in teeth lessons when we started to batter down the door of our most lethal opponent in the worlds oceans. Very good topic of discussion when you look at the entire campaign for the Solomons. Nice work Dennis.

Yeah, I took after my Italian mother.

As for Eastern Solomons, it is interesting for a couple of reasons.

1. Both sides had learned some important facts about the conduct of carrier warfare. Both sides increased the number of fighters on their carriers. Both learned the value of good reconnaissance and scouting. The Japanese learned that they should put all the dive bombers in the first wave to soften up the enemy, then the second wave would contain the torpedo bombers. This was why there were no torpedo bombers in the first attack on Enterprise. That is what was missing in the History Channel program depiction, no torpedo bombers.

2 For the first time, in the war, the Japanese were operating as the underdog in carrier based aircraft. They had also lost many of their most experienced leaders. The US pilots now recognized a decided drop in the competancy of Japanese pilots.

This battle was probably the nail in the coffin for Fletcher. He had released Noyes and Wasp to head toward refueling, because he did not figure on Nagumo and the 1st Striking Fleet advancing, even though he had intel to the contrary. He also left the area, instead of pursuing the beaten foe. I suspect, this probably decided the issue for King. With the US on the offense, it was time to find a carrier admiral who would be more aggressive than Fletcher.

[Warship NWS]

Yeah, I took after my Italian mother.

That would also explain why you and Ed are our two forum hounds, he is part Italian also..;)



As for Eastern Solomons, it is interesting for a couple of reasons.

1. Both sides had learned some important facts about the conduct of carrier warfare. Both sides increased the number of fighters on their carriers. Both learned the value of good reconnaissance and scouting. The Japanese learned that they should put all the dive bombers in the first wave to soften up the enemy, then the second wave would contain the torpedo bombers. This was why there were no torpedo bombers in the first attack on Enterprise. That is what was missing in the History Channel program depiction, no torpedo bombers.

That is an interesting note because most CV operations preferred to have all 3 elements, torpedo, dive bombing, and fighters, coordinating their strikes to help overwhelm and divide up the defending CAP. This alone could be a conversation in the positive vs negative effects of coordinated air assaults on enemy CVs and how well they could be accomplished with the team work/communications of the time frames.


2 For the first time, in the war, the Japanese were operating as the underdog in carrier based aircraft. They had also lost many of their most experienced leaders. The US pilots now recognized a decided drop in the competency of Japanese pilots.

It was starting on the decline depending on the air crews still operating on the Shokaku and Zuikaku which did not take part at Midway. We will leave that part open for discussion as my time is limited.


This battle was probably the nail in the coffin for Fletcher. He had released Noyes and Wasp to head toward refueling, because he did not figure on Nagumo and the 1st Striking Fleet advancing, even though he had intel to the contrary. He also left the area, instead of pursuing the beaten foe. I suspect, this probably decided the issue for King. With the US on the offense, it was time to find a carrier admiral who would be more aggressive than Fletcher.

Fletcher I think did what he could for the initial months of the war, but of course he is a controversial figure to many. He was in a "damned if you do damned if you don't" situation IMHO. The Essex class was not yet available and 2 CVs were already sunk of the initial 6 that started in the Pacific War - Lexington and Yorktown however in turn the IJN had lost 4 CVs at Midway.

Again bear with me if I am not as detailed as usual as again my time is short this weekend. I would definitely like to hear from others on this topic however.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

That is an interesting note because most CV operations preferred to have all 3 elements, torpedo, dive bombing, and fighters, coordinating their strikes to help overwhelm and divide up the defending CAP. This alone could be a conversation in the positive vs negative effects of coordinated air assaults on enemy CVs and how well they could be accomplished with the team work/communications of the time frames.

...

Fletcher I think did what he could for the initial months of the war, but of course he is a controversial figure to many. He was in a "damned if you do damned if you don't" situation IMHO. The Essex class was not yet available and 2 CVs were already sunk of the initial 6 that started in the Pacific War - Lexington and Yorktown however in turn the IJN had lost 4 CVs at Midway.



I was just reviewing what occurred as a result of Fletcher's actions in Eastern Solomons. I think he did his best, with the communications problems that he had. He also had a lame duck in Enterprise, a carrier with sick engines in Wasp and only the Sara as a fully operational carrier. Sara's torpedoing should have convinced everyone of the dangers lurking in the area.

[Rick]

I think Fletcher kinda gets a bad rap. The poor guy bore the weight of the fighting for the first nine months of the war, and he was pretty gun shy by August. No suprise he was in bad shape seeing as how he lost a Carrier in each battle prior to Guadalcanal.

Looking back at Midway and Coral Sea, I think he could analyze the situation and say that tactics, personel, weapons had not changed significantly... on either side yet. AAA and fighter CAP could not stop an incoming raid, and that raid always managed to sink a carrier. Guy was probably thinking "I've got 3 of our 4 remaining decks, and im probably gonna lose one, no matter how well i fight"

Best thing to do would have been to relieve him soon after Midway, get fresh blood in there (Im thinking Nimitz could put Spruance in there)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Yeah, I took after my Italian mother.

As for Eastern Solomons, it is interesting for a couple of reasons.

1. Both sides had learned some important facts about the conduct of carrier warfare. Both sides increased the number of fighters on their carriers. Both learned the value of good reconnaissance and scouting. The Japanese learned that they should put all the dive bombers in the first wave to soften up the enemy, then the second wave would contain the torpedo bombers. This was why there were no torpedo bombers in the first attack on Enterprise. That is what was missing in the History Channel program depiction, no torpedo bombers.

2 For the first time, in the war, the Japanese were operating as the underdog in carrier based aircraft. They had also lost many of their most experienced leaders. The US pilots now recognized a decided drop in the competancy of Japanese pilots.

This battle was probably the nail in the coffin for Fletcher. He had released Noyes and Wasp to head toward refueling, because he did not figure on Nagumo and the 1st Striking Fleet advancing, even though he had intel to the contrary. He also left the area, instead of pursuing the beaten foe. I suspect, this probably decided the issue for King. With the US on the offense, it was time to find a carrier admiral who would be more aggressive than Fletcher.

Dennis:

I know that you've read "Black Shoe Admiral". Does Lundstrom show any evidence that Nimitz also felt that Fletcher was exhausted anyway and deserved a rest? In other words some sympathy towards him, or was he of the same mindset as King that Fletcher just wasn't up to the job? I have to read that book sometime soon.

[Ed Rotondaro]

That would also explain why you and Ed are our two forum hounds, he is part Italian also..;)


That is an interesting note because most CV operations preferred to have all 3 elements, torpedo, dive bombing, and fighters, coordinating their strikes to help overwhelm and divide up the defending CAP. This alone could be a conversation in the positive vs negative effects of coordinated air assaults on enemy CVs and how well they could be accomplished with the team work/communications of the time frames.



It was starting on the decline depending on the air crews still operating on the Shokaku and Zuikaku which did not take part at Midway. We will leave that part open for discussion as my time is limited.



Fletcher I think did what he could for the initial months of the war, but of course he is a controversial figure to many. He was in a "damned if you do damned if you don't" situation IMHO. The Essex class was not yet available and 2 CVs were already sunk of the initial 6 that started in the Pacific War - Lexington and Yorktown however in turn the IJN had lost 4 CVs at Midway.

Again bear with me if I am not as detailed as usual as again my time is short this weekend. I would definitely like to hear from others on this topic however.

Thanks.

Chris:

Thanks for the compliment (I think);)

Fletcher remains a man painted perhaps unjustly by the brown shoe admirals, yet he and Spruance won more carrier battles than Halsey the aviator ever did.

Regarding carrier tactics, it would seem that against a fully functional carrier with a good screen and full maneuverability, a torpedo attack would not be as successful as a dive bomber attack. Of all the ships I can think of, carriers and subs are most vulnerable to a dive bomber attack. Once slowed down, then the torpedo bombers can come in for the kill. The decrease in Japanese pilot skill was definitely noted in the number of attacks that missed the Hornet at Santa Cruz. She eventually had to be scuttled by Japanese DD torpedoes.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I know that you've read "Black Shoe Admiral". Does Lundstrom show any evidence that Nimitz also felt that Fletcher was exhausted anyway and deserved a rest? In other words some sympathy towards him, or was he of the same mindset as King that Fletcher just wasn't up to the job? I have to read that book sometime soon.
King had been trying to get Nimitz to fire him before, but Nimitz resisted. After Eastern Solomons, I think he finally just decided Fletcher was tired and needed a rest.

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

Thanks for the compliment (I think);)

Fletcher remains a man painted perhaps unjustly by the brown shoe admirals, yet he and Spruance won more carrier battles than Halsey the aviator ever did.

Regarding carrier tactics, it would seem that against a fully functional carrier with a good screen and full maneuverability, a torpedo attack would not be as successful as a dive bomber attack. Of all the ships I can think of, carriers and subs are most vulnerable to a dive bomber attack. Once slowed down, then the torpedo bombers can come in for the kill. The decrease in Japanese pilot skill was definitely noted in the number of attacks that missed the Hornet at Santa Cruz. She eventually had to be scuttled by Japanese DD torpedoes.

I think it is probable, that Japanese carrier doctrine was based on attacking an opponent without radar. The key was that a torpedo bomber, flying below 1000 ft. was difficult to spot from a CAP fighter at 10,000 to 20000 ft. If the dive bombers went in first, then the defending fighter and AA would be drawn up high and the level bombers would be invisible until they passed between the screening ships, after their gentle dives. Japanese level attack doctrine for launching torpedoes was to split into chutai's of three, and fly between the screening ships. To ships without radar, the torpedo bombers would be almost undetectable until with 25 miles or less of the targets. At 100 miles per hour, it only take less than 15 minutes to be on target. That is a conservative estimate. I am guessing that to the Japanese training exercises, it seemed a good plan.

A CXAM radar on a 100 ft mast, could detect a reasonable size target at 1000 ft. at 30 miles. The torpedo bombers would normally fly much higher and prior to the attack climb to 10000 ft. then do a gentle glide down to their attack altitude. That climb in altitude, betrayed their existance, azimuth, range and altitude to the CXAM at well over 50 miles.

A set piece attack is easy to coordinate. Simply firing a one flare for dive bombers first, or two flares for torpedo bombers first. Since the strike leader is usually in a torpedo bomber or a dive bomber, launching a set piece attack is not difficult. However, if the formation is detected early, and attacked, then the plan has to be modified quickly to adjust. This is where poor radio communications might cause numerous problems.

Another issue is the probability that the opponent will attack first, disrupting the launch of the Japanese first wave. This occurred at Coral Sea.

Reconnaissance is vital in carrier versus carrier battles. If the Japanese were near land bases like the Shortlands or Tulagi, they could launch twin engined or four engined seaplanes to scout for the opponent fleet. The carriers and their escorts could also use level bombers and float planes to augment. But the Japanese showed a weakness in good reconnaissance and scouting. It failed them at Coral Sea, Midway. Failure to detect your opponent early and launch early, has been shown by Captain Wayne Hughes to be why the side that launched and attacked first, usually was the victor in the battle.

Signal intelligence played a role also. We had cryptanalyst and sig intel personnel on board our carriers to detect radio traffic from opponent ships and scouting aircraft. This allowed us to know when a scouting aircraft had spotted the fleet. This was very important and not figured into the Japanese equations during prewar exercises.

All in all, it showed a definite lack of realism in Japanese prewar training exercises. The old adage of " you fight like you train" maybe at work here. By Eastern Solomons, the Japanese had awakened to the idea of more fighters on carriers, more radar and better attack coordination and the possibility of early detection by the CAP and radar. Unfortuately, they had lost valuable carriers, lead pilots and planes to really take advantage of their new information. Couple this with our improvement in training of our combat information teams, CAP pilots and the increase in fighters in a squadron from 18 at Coral Sea, to 36 at Eastern Solomons and you have a fatal outcome, that, had our communications been better, might have led to the loss of Shokaku and Zuikaku, instead of Ryujo alone.

[Warship NWS]

King had been trying to get Nimitz to fire him before, but Nimitz resisted. After Eastern Solomons, I think he finally just decided Fletcher was tired and needed a rest.

I think we need to stick to the battle here.. otherwise we will lose our focus regarding the campaign at hand. ;)

[old_pop2000]

I think we need to stick to the battle here.. otherwise we will lose our focus regarding the campaign at hand. ;)
I agree, but at Eastern Solomon's, command decisions by senior officers almost led to the loss of Enterprise and quite possibly to the torpedoing of Saratoga. I think that studying the battle's timeline and lessons learned can be instructive as well as the command decisions that put the ships into the positions that they did.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I agree, but at Eastern Solomon's, command decisions by senior officers almost led to the loss of Enterprise and quite possibly to the torpedoing of Saratoga. I think that studying the battle's timeline and lessons learned can be instructive as well as the command decisions that put the ships into the positions that they did.

Dennis:

I agree, battles don't happen in a vaccum, there are underlying reasons for tactical decisions. Chris this is not political, we have to see the big picture OK?

[old_pop2000]

It is instructive to examine briefly, signal intelligence, cryptologic information gathered and disseminated to the TF commanders prior to the battle. It affected their decisions made prior to the events of August 23-24th, 1942.

Admiral Nagumo sailed with the reorganized Kido Butai on August 16th from Japan headed toward Truk, then to the eastern edge of the Solomons.

CINCPAC intelligence summaries continued to show this force in the waters near Japan for five days afterword. Date is now August 21st, 1942.

On this date, CINCPAC intelligence summaries now showed Nagumo either on the way or at Truk. August 22, Ryujo is reported to be in dry dock.

August 23, 1942, two days before the Battle of Eastern Solomons, this error in placement was corrected by another fleet intelligence summary. Ryujo, Shokaku and Zuikaku were now place together, at Truk.

Ghormley's intelligence information states that
"indications point strongly to enemy attack in force on Cactus area 23-26 August, from available intelligence.... presence of carriers possible but not confirmed.... important fueling be conducted soonest possible and if practicable one carrier task force at a time retiring for that purpose."

From this brief information that was passed to Admiral Fletcher from two sources of intelligence, its seems the concensus was that the Japanese would attempt to retake Guadalcanal and that it could be expected that carriers might be present. However, the conflicting reports tended to downplay any possibility of that occurring.

From August 9th to the 23rd, CINCPAC was dismayed at the ease with which the Japanese cruisers and destroyers were able to move down the slot and bombard Guadalcanal and Tulagi. It was not understood by CINCPAC including Admiral Sherman why the carriers hadn't attacked the small groups of Japanese ships.

Fletcher's actions were to husband his forces especially his carriers for the carrier battle he and his staff had decided was probably in the future. He did not believe stationing cruisers and destroyers statically off of the coast was safe, nor was bringing the carriers closer to Guadalcanal. He had taken aircraft losses on the 7th -9th of August and could not afford more. The key was for our carriers to be within striking distance to ward off any major Japanese attempt retake the island. This was Fletcher's strategy.

Fletcher's decision to comply with Ghormley's order to release one carrier TF to refuel due to inactivity seems to be a proper decision. The signal intelligence received from PH and ComSouthWestPac seemed to agree that the enemy carrier force was, at least 1000 miles away in waters near Truk, this was as recent as the 22 August, 1942.

On the 23 of August, 1942, Fletcher received updated intel that placed the carriers definitely at Truk. It was this intelligence information from War Plans Section in Pearl Harbor that confirmed to Fletcher that releasing Wasp to refuel was the proper decision.

On August 24, 1942, the situation had changed as by 0900, PBY's from Espiritu Santo had spotted Kido Butai and Enterprise copied the message sent at 0935 by 5V37, as one carrier, two light cruisers and one destroyer headed south.

This timeline shows that 20/20 hindsight by Morison in criticising Fletcher for releasing Wasp is unfounded. Up to this time, CINCPAC intelligence summaries had been accurate and led to victories, however, there was no way for Fletcher to know that the Japanese, while reorganizing Kido Butai, had also change to a new code. While it would have been advantageous to have Wasp available, no one could have forseen the events that transpired. If we examine the communications failures, it would seem that the air groups sent to attack Ryujo might have been vectored toward the other carrier group instead. Again, poor communications affects battle management.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

I agree, battles don't happen in a vaccum, there are underlying reasons for tactical decisions. Chris this is not political, we have to see the big picture OK?
Ed:
I don't think the political aspects of Nimitz and King need to be brought into this, in that sense I agree with Chris. However, my question is cuts more to the question of whether after the episodes of 7 August throught the 9th, when Fletcher left the area ahead of schedule, at this point, King was ready to remove him from command. Would it have been better to have relieved him, and send Halsey or Spruance to take command of the carrier task forces in the area.

Another question? Why was Hornet kept at PH, instead of being sent southward earlier than the 17th. Was it as we all have been led to believe, to protect PH from another attack? Wouldn't concentration of forces have dictated that if, Guadalcanal was that important, Nimitz should have sent Hornet, since Wasp did have weak engines. Hornet did not arrive until the 29th of August. Is it possible, that with Hornet, Wasp, Saratoga and Enterprise together, they could have finished off, Nagumo and sunk all the carriers. This would have removed the threat and the Battle of Santa Cruz might never have happened and Hornet sunk. Lot's of speculation and lot's of blame to go around for poor judgment by all commanders. If Guadalcanal was the linchpin of the Allied movement to retake the Southwestern Pacific, should we have committed everything to protect it, knowing its importance to the Japanese.

[Warship NWS]

Ed:
I don't think the political aspects of Nimitz and King need to be brought into this, in that sense I agree with Chris.

My point exactly. Focusing only on Fletcher alone will not allow for a constructive discussion covering the entire campaign. Fletcher was only one piece of the big picture. The cause and effects the decisions that all commanders had on the overall campaign should be discussed along with the weapons and doctrines deployed in the battle.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed:
I don't think the political aspects of Nimitz and King need to be brought into this, in that sense I agree with Chris. However, my question is cuts more to the question of whether after the episodes of 7 August throught the 9th, when Fletcher left the area ahead of schedule, at this point, King was ready to remove him from command. Would it have been better to have relieved him, and send Halsey or Spruance to take command of the carrier task forces in the area.

Another question? Why was Hornet kept at PH, instead of being sent southward earlier than the 17th. Was it as we all have been led to believe, to protect PH from another attack? Wouldn't concentration of forces have dictated that if, Guadalcanal was that important, Nimitz should have sent Hornet, since Wasp did have weak engines. Hornet did not arrive until the 29th of August. Is it possible, that with Hornet, Wasp, Saratoga and Enterprise together, they could have finished off, Nagumo and sunk all the carriers. This would have removed the threat and the Battle of Santa Cruz might never have happened and Hornet sunk. Lot's of speculation and lot's of blame to go around for poor judgment by all commanders. If Guadalcanal was the linchpin of the Allied movement to retake the Southwestern Pacific, should we have committed everything to protect it, knowing its importance to the Japanese.

Dennis and Chris:

With all due respect I think you misuse the concept of politics. We're not discussing gun control, the war in Iraq or abortion here. We are discussing how a command decision was made and what factored into it. If that is not so, what we will discuss? Just the tactics? While that's interesting, it's one dimensional. I guess we better not have anymore discussions on why Japan went to war, or why Germany switched to night time bombing since they all involve reviewing actions and intentions. We recently discussed factors that influenced Japan's decision to go to war in 1941. Now that discussion definitely entered the realm of political, yet I don't recall anyone preventing the debate from going forward. My only interest was in the factors leading up to Fletcher's relief from duty and since I assumed Dennis was in the best position to comment on it that it would be good to bring up how this occurred.

If my opinion on this topic of open and free debate is a problem please feel free to contact in private and we can discuss it.:(

[old_pop2000]

In the area of weapons, the aircraft used at Eastern Solomon's was the same except that this was the first carrier battle where the VT squadrons were equipped exclusively with TBF Avenger level bombers. But, due to the new squadron organization, there were only 12 TBF's on board. The extra aircraft were taken up by more fighters. The squadron organization was now 36 fighters, 18 dive bombers, 18 scout-bombers and 12 torpedo bombers. For the Japanese, the same aircraft with additional fighters replacing many of the torpedo bombers.

The biggest change in weaponry would be the inclusion of the USS North Carolina as an antiaircraft platform. She sailed next to Enterprise, and provided excellent AAA support during the air battle on the 24th. There was also the inclusion of the USS Atlanta, an antiaircraft light cruiser. She had 16 x 5 inch 38, 24 x 40 mm in 4 mounts and 15 x 20mm.

Of course, in this battle, we now had a Marine Air Group present on Guadalcanal to provide additional air support and long range reconnaissance PBY's available to augment the TF61's carrier scout aircraft.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis and Chris:

With all due respect I think you misuse the concept of politics. We're not discussing gun control, the war in Iraq or abortion here. We are discussing how a command decision was made and what factored into it. If that is not so, what we will discuss? Just the tactics? While that's interesting, it's one dimensional. I guess we better not have anymore discussions on why Japan went to war, or why Germany switched to night time bombing since they all involve reviewing actions and intentions. We recently discussed factors that influenced Japan's decision to go to war in 1941. Now that discussion definitely entered the realm of political, yet I don't recall anyone preventing the debate from going forward. My only interest was in the factors leading up to Fletcher's relief from duty and since I assumed Dennis was in the best position to comment on it that it would be good to bring up how this occurred.

If my opinion on this topic of open and free debate is a problem please feel free to contact in private and we can discuss it.:(
I am not certain what, if any political considerations were involved in the decision to maintain Fletcher or King's animosity towards Fletcher. King simply did not believe that Fletcher was aggressive enough and that prevented him from gaining bigger victories.

Maybe we could continue to discuss the tactical and strategical aspects of the battle, and as a summary later, decide about whether Fletcher should have been relieved before the battle or after as he was. I am not entirely certain.

[Warship NWS]

To Ed, ok let me try this again..regarding Fletcher and how and why he was dismissed has been argued over countless times yet almost noone has discussed the entire Solomons campaign as a whole and why it took place and how it effected the rest of the war much less the evolution of the tactics and weapons involved. Fletcher was one person in a big campaign. How his decisions, and OTHER commander's decisions, is what needs to be discussed.. not just getting fixated on Fletcher being dismissed and nothing else regarding the campaign. Hopefully this clears up my personal stance regarding this thread.

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

I am not certain what, if any political considerations were involved in the decision to maintain Fletcher or King's animosity towards Fletcher. King simply did not believe that Fletcher was aggressive enough and that prevented him from gaining bigger victories.

Agreed. Personaly I think the only reason King relieved him was due to either (a) personality differences and/or (b) differences in opinion regarding naval strategy. Considering the fact that 2 CVs were lost AFTER King relieved Fletcher compared to 2 before he was relieved even though he was faced against the best of the best the IJN could throw at him says something I think. Again though, let's move back to the Solomons Campaign and not get fixated on how or why Fletcher was removed from the command of the CVs.

What about the other commanders involved such as Ghormley, Nagumo, and Yamamoto? How did their decisions effect the campaign?

Thanks.

[Warship NWS]

In the area of weapons, the aircraft used at Eastern Solomon's was the same except that this was the first carrier battle where the VT squadrons were equipped exclusively with TBF Avenger level bombers. But, due to the new squadron organization, there were only 12 TBF's on board. The extra aircraft were taken up by more fighters. The squadron organization was now 36 fighters, 18 dive bombers, 18 scout-bombers and 12 torpedo bombers. For the Japanese, the same aircraft with additional fighters replacing many of the torpedo bombers.

The biggest change in weaponry would be the inclusion of the USS North Carolina as an antiaircraft platform. She sailed next to Enterprise, and provided excellent AAA support during the air battle on the 24th. There was also the inclusion of the USS Atlanta, an antiaircraft light cruiser. She had 16 x 5 inch 38, 24 x 40 mm in 4 mounts and 15 x 20mm.

Of course, in this battle, we now had a Marine Air Group present on Guadalcanal to provide additional air support and long range reconnaissance PBY's available to augment the TF61's carrier scout aircraft.

The TBFs marked a major upgrade in versitility and tactical options for the CV air groups including better range, lower drag, and improved cruising speeds then the previous obsolete Devastators they replaced. Improvements in screening ship AAA was another major factor in the losses the IJN strikes suffered during their attacks. These factors were the initial steps towards the beginning of the end for the IJN as our technology and improvements in aircraft designs were starting to be brought more into play. Surface actions though were still catching up in comparison but SG radar made its first introduction on the Altanta and newer battleships. The 5"/38 in dual mounts were starting to be produced in greater numbers as well.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To Ed, ok let me try this again..regarding Fletcher and how and why he was dismissed has been argued over countless times yet almost noone has discussed the entire Solomons campaign as a whole and why it took place and how it effected the rest of the war much less the evolution of the tactics and weapons involved. Fletcher was one person in a big campaign. How his decisions, and OTHER commander's decisions, is what needs to be discussed.. not just getting fixated on Fletcher being dismissed and nothing else regarding the campaign. Hopefully this clears up my personal stance regarding this thread.

Thanks.

Chris:

I'll try one last time here. I wasn't ignoring the discussion of the battle, which as far as I can see is just being conducted by two people. I have not posted much on the thread about Fletcher's relief, I merely brought it up and was curious about the circumstances surrounding it. Since I had not read the book, I was hoping for some insights from someone who did. As far as I'm concerned I'll leave this discussion to the rest of you.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I'll try one last time here. I wasn't ignoring the discussion of the battle, which as far as I can see is just being conducted by two people. I have not posted much on the thread about Fletcher's relief, I merely brought it up and was curious about the circumstances surrounding it. Since I had not read the book, I was hoping for some insights from someone who did. As far as I'm concerned I'll leave this discussion to the rest of you.

You can Dennis can kick around the part of why he was relieved after the Solomons campaign is discussed in more detail and if the results of the campaign lead King to believing that Fletcher needed to be relieved of command. With a good healthy look at the campaign as a whole I think that would add greatly to your understanding of how the events played out, including that important part of Fletcher's career as a commanding officer. You have personaly stuided the results of Leyte Gulf and how that campaign effected various commanders.. now is your chance to do the same with Fletcher and his command.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

You can Dennis can kick around the part of why he was relieved after the Solomons campaign is discussed in more detail and if the results of the campaign lead King to believing that Fletcher needed to be relieved of command. With a good healthy look at the campaign as a whole I think that would add greatly to your understanding of how the events played out, including that important part of Fletcher's career as a commanding officer. You have personaly stuided the results of Leyte Gulf and how that effected various commanders.. now is your chance to do the same with Fletcher and his command.

Thanks.

Chris:

I'll see what I can learn about this battle in the context of the entire campaign for the Solomons and Guadalcanal in particular.

[old_pop2000]

For Admiral Fletcher, Ghormley provided these tasks to Admiral Fletcher

Primary mission was to destroy enemy carriers

Protect the Espiritu Santo-Noumea Line of Communications

Support Guadalcanal and Tulagi against enemy ships

Cover the movement of friendly ships to Guadalcanal


For Admiral Yamamoto, the goal was to eject the US forces in the Solomons. For this he had Admiral Kondo's 2nd Fleet and the new 3rd Fleet under Admiral Nagumo.

First task was to land 6000 men of General Kawaguchi's Army Brigade and retake Guadalcanal.

Second task was to neutralize Henderson Field

Third task was to destroy any US ships attempting to infer with the landings.

Kondo's fleet was to provide surface ships to destroy any US ships attempting to come close the the carriers and the landings.

Nagumo's force was to provide air cover and destroy Henderson Field. They were to attack any US carriers that came within range.

These were the strategic goals of both sides.

[Warship NWS]

For Admiral Fletcher, Ghormley provided these tasks to Admiral Fletcher

Primary mission was to destroy enemy carriers

Protect the Espiritu Santo-Noumea Line of Communications

Support Guadalcanal and Tulagi against enemy ships

Cover the movement of friendly ships to Guadalcanal


For Admiral Yamamoto, the goal was to eject the US forces in the Solomons. For this he had Admiral Kondo's 2nd Fleet and the new 3rd Fleet under Admiral Nagumo.

First task was to land 6000 men of General Kawaguchi's Army Brigade and retake Guadalcanal.

Second task was to neutralize Henderson Field

Third task was to destroy any US ships attempting to infer with the landings.

Kondo's fleet was to provide surface ships to destroy any US ships attempting to come close the the carriers and the landings.

Nagumo's force was to provide air cover and destroy Henderson Field. They were to attack any US carriers that came within range.

These were the strategic goals of both sides.

Pretty tall and ultimately complex set of goals to accomplish in the fog of war 1940s for both sides with all things considered.

[Warship NWS]

Battle of Eastern Solomons information;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Eastern_Solomons

[old_pop2000]

Pretty tall and ultimately complex set of goals to accomplish in the fog of war 1940s for both sides with all things considered.
I wonder if anyone see's similarities between Nagumo's situation at Midway, Fletcher's at Guadalcanal and Halsey's at Leyte Gulf.

Protect the landings- stay where you are

Destroy enemy carriers - move away from the landing zones and attack.


Two diametrically opposed sets of orders, requiring two tactical strategies.

[Warship NWS]

I wonder if anyone see's similarities between Nagumo's situation at Midway, Fletcher's at Guadalcanal and Halsey's at Leyte Gulf.

Protect the landings- stay where you are

Destroy enemy carriers - move away from the landing zones and attack.


Two diametrically opposed sets of orders, requiring two tactical strategies.

Quite true.. CV forces are intended to be offensive maneuver elements while not being easy targets to detect and attack. It is also interesting to note that the 3 first major CV battles could have easily been lost or won by either side .. it makes one wonder if tactics, technology, or luck played the greater role of us stopping the IJN from accomplishing their objectives at Coral Sea, Midway, and Eastern Solomons. All naval battles after that were fairly one sided.. but those three battles would dictate the events to follow through the lessons learned or due to the losses suffered.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

My sources:

Black Shoe, Carrier Admiral by Lundstrom

Guadalcanal, By Frank

Combined Fleet Decoded by Prados

The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign by Lundstrom

The Cactus Air Force by Miller

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons by Office of Naval Intelligence, Combat Narrative

Battle of the Eastern Solomons by the CV6.org website including Action and Damage Reports


Just thought it would be proper to provide my sources to all

[old_pop2000]

Quite true.. CV forces are intended to be offensive maneuver elements while not being easy targets to detect and attack. It is also interesting to note that the 3 first major CV battles could have easily been lost or won by either side .. it makes one wonder if tactics, technology, or luck played the greater role of us stopping the IJN from accomplishing their objectives at Coral Sea, Midway, and Eastern Solomons. All naval battles after that were fairly one sided.. but those three battles would dictate the events to follow through the lessons learned or due to the losses suffered.

Thanks.
The key was the side that detected and struck first.

Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons - US detected the Japanese fleet first and struck first. At Eastern Solomons it was simultaneously, but we were attacking their fleet first.

[Warship NWS]

The key was the side that detected and struck first.

Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons - US detected the Japanese fleet first and struck first. At Eastern Solomons it was simultaneously, but we were attacking their fleet first.

Granted that is true but the losses for both sides in all 3 battles were interesting to compare,

CS = 1 US CV vs 1 IJN CVL
Midway = 1 US CV vs 4 IJN CV
ES = 1 US CV (dmg) vs 1 IJN CVL

In the end for the 3 engagements we lost 2 CVs to their 4 CVs and 2 CVLs. What was far more critical to them though was their pilot ranks were being attrited at an alarming rate in all of these battles, much higher then our own pilot losses in all 3 battles.

Thanks.

[old_pop2000]

Granted that is true but the losses for both sides in all 3 battles were interesting to compare,

CS = 1 US CV vs 1 IJN CVL
Midway = 1 US CV vs 4 IJN CV
ES = 1 US CV (dmg) vs 1 IJN CVL

In the end for the 3 engagements we lost 2 CVs to their 4 CVs and 2 CVLs. What was far more critical to them though was their pilot ranks were being attrited at an alarming rate in all of these battles, much higher then our own pilot losses in all 3 battles.

Thanks.

It is true about the losses, but the real question is; why did they lose those carriers?

Poor antiaircraft defenses and emphasis on offensive strikes and not enough on defensive CAP and AAA?

Poor Fleet organization. We kept our fleet carriers within 15 miles of each other, but in separate TF's. They were within CAP control of each other.

Poor reconnaissance and scouting with carrier based aircraft and other fleet assets?

Was poor communications between the aircraft and the ships a possible source of problems in command and control?

Lack of flying experience in senior fleet commanders and carrier captains?

Slow deck procedures and inadequate hanger space?

Poor signal intelligence and cryptographic intelligence?

Lots to think about here.:eek:

[Ed Rotondaro]

I wonder if anyone see's similarities between Nagumo's situation at Midway, Fletcher's at Guadalcanal and Halsey's at Leyte Gulf.

Protect the landings- stay where you are

Destroy enemy carriers - move away from the landing zones and attack.


Two diametrically opposed sets of orders, requiring two tactical strategies.

Dennis:

I believe you could say the same thing about Spruance at Saipan during the battle of Philippines Sea. Indeed that's why he chose to the IJN come to him rather than chance being pulled away covering the landings.

[Ed Rotondaro]

In the area of weapons, the aircraft used at Eastern Solomon's was the same except that this was the first carrier battle where the VT squadrons were equipped exclusively with TBF Avenger level bombers. But, due to the new squadron organization, there were only 12 TBF's on board. The extra aircraft were taken up by more fighters. The squadron organization was now 36 fighters, 18 dive bombers, 18 scout-bombers and 12 torpedo bombers. For the Japanese, the same aircraft with additional fighters replacing many of the torpedo bombers.

The biggest change in weaponry would be the inclusion of the USS North Carolina as an antiaircraft platform. She sailed next to Enterprise, and provided excellent AAA support during the air battle on the 24th. There was also the inclusion of the USS Atlanta, an antiaircraft light cruiser. She had 16 x 5 inch 38, 24 x 40 mm in 4 mounts and 15 x 20mm.

Of course, in this battle, we now had a Marine Air Group present on Guadalcanal to provide additional air support and long range reconnaissance PBY's available to augment the TF61's carrier scout aircraft.

Dennis:

When used in the scout bomber role, did the SBD carry less or no bombs than in the dive bomber role?

[Kyle Holgate]

Dennis:

When used in the scout bomber role, did the SBD carry less or no bombs than in the dive bomber role?

Ryujo was a decoy according to some accounts - and though I'm sure they'd prefer not to have lost it, better that then either of the big CV's sunk. It was a near thing - almost trading the CVL for Enterprise which at that point in the war could have meant retaking Guadalcanal.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

When used in the scout bomber role, did the SBD carry less or no bombs than in the dive bomber role?
When an SBD flew, it always carried a bomb. Usually a 500 lb. HE.

[Kyle Holgate]

Dennis - I'm away from my books (covering again up in Sultan WA. for work) but earlier you mentioned that the Japanese added fighters, replacing torpedo planes. Just trying to clarify.
At Coral Sea the Kaku sisters had 18,18,18 (fighters, bombers and torpedo planes) IIRC - later the mix was switched to 27,18,18 I thought. Just this once not trying to nit pick ;) but instead trying to update the ol' memory bank.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis - I'm away from my books (covering again up in Sultan WA. for work) but earlier you mentioned that the Japanese added fighters, replacing torpedo planes. Just trying to clarify.
At Coral Sea the Kaku sisters had 18,18,18 (fighters, bombers and torpedo planes) IIRC - later the mix was switched to 27,18,18 I thought. Just this once not trying to nit pick ;) but instead trying to update the ol' memory bank.
Actually, they subtracted six carrier attack bombers, The original complement of carrier planes at Midway was 18 fighters, 18 dive bombers and 24 B5N's on each carrier for a total of 96 torpedo planes. A Eastern Solomons, Zuikaku carried 27 fighters, 27 Dive Bombers and 18 Torpedo bombers. As you can see, a greater emphasis on fighters and dive bombers. Captain Wayne Hughes called the torpedo bombers "unintentional kamikazes" because of the losses the planes took on both sides.

[old_pop2000]

Ryujo was a decoy according to some accounts - and though I'm sure they'd prefer not to have lost it, better that then either of the big CV's sunk. It was a near thing - almost trading the CVL for Enterprise which at that point in the war could have meant retaking Guadalcanal.
I've read that idea, but it was not a decoy. Her task was to move ahead and launch strikes against Henderson Field. She launched two, before being detected and bombed by Saratoga's Scouting Three and Bombing Three.

[Kyle Holgate]

I've read that idea, but it was not a decoy. Her task was to move ahead and launch strikes against Henderson Field. She launched two, before being detected and bombed by Saratoga's Scouting Three and Bombing Three.

I have never seen anything conclusive to indicate that there was any thought of her as being a decoy - but the description seems to persist in many accounts of the battle. It is more likely that in this one time the tendancy of the Japanese to split up their fleet paid off. The fact that she acted as a decoy, even if not intentional doesn't help either. Personally I would think that major strikes from all 3 carriers would be better to use on Henderson than little puny Ryujo strikes, but then again I tend to consolodate forces more when gaming than the Japanese did!

[old_pop2000]

I have never seen anything conclusive to indicate that there was any thought of her as being a decoy - but the description seems to persist in many accounts of the battle. It is more likely that in this one time the tendancy of the Japanese to split up their fleet paid off. The fact that she acted as a decoy, even if not intentional doesn't help either. Personally I would think that major strikes from all 3 carriers would be better to use on Henderson than little puny Ryujo strikes, but then again I tend to consolodate forces more when gaming than the Japanese did!In the reorganization of the 1st Striking fleet, Ryujo was given 24 A6M2 fighters and reduced to 9 B5N attack aircraft.

Understand that the Ryujo was not the primary strike weapon against Henderson. It was the Rabaul Base Air Force which launched an airstrike consisting of 24 Type 1 land attack bombers covered by 14 Zero's. Ryujo was a contingency plan.

As it was, she launched two strikes: Strike one consisting of six B5N's carrying 312 lb bombs escorted by six Zero's. The second strike consisted of nine Zero's. This force was not much of a striking force to knock out the defenses of Henderson Field.

The strike cost the Ryujo three B5n's out of nine and three Zero's. The Rabaul Base Air Force was forced to turn back due to bad weather. This left Ryujo in a serious position, stuck out by herself, reduced CAP and required to stay in position to await the return of the air group. Her attack, of course, would betray her position to the US carriers. Sure enough, three Saratoga TBF's sighted Ryujo and three destroyers at 1440 hours. The Ryujo probably had eight Zero's left for CAP, two of which had to be scrapped due to problems. She only had three Zero's of one Shotai in the air, plus one B5N on ASW patrol. Saratoga's strike group had 29 SBD's alone when they found Ryujo along with 7 TBF's against 7 CAP Zero's.

It might this series of events which causes most historians to believe she was a decoy. But to have a decoy, you must be decoying something and the Japanese had no firm information that our carriers were in the area, just feelings by Nagumo and Kondo. So I have real problems with the decoy idea.

[Warship NWS]

When an SBD flew, it always carried a bomb. Usually a 500 lb. HE.

This was also depicted in Carrier Strike by Gary Grigsby. You could arm it or not if you desired to do so in the game however. The only catch is you would have slightly less range but if the SBDs found a target of opportunity they could try and sneak in for a quick hit, catching a CV with planes on the deck was just too much to let get away if you got that shot. A big fat juicy tanker could be lit up nicely as well. Of course they would make sure to radio back a spotting report before attacking.

It would be interesting to note however that we got lucky to some degree at both ES and Midway.. at Midway the scouting plane that spotted the US CVs was running 30 minutes late and then failed to immediately report the USN CVs, at ES the scouting plane that spotted the CVs the first time was shot down before it could signal the report so they were not spotted until another scout found the CVs later.

Thanks.

[Rick]

So I have real problems with the decoy idea.

I think it did give the IJN the idea to try Zuiho as a decoy at Santa Cruz tho.

[Ed Rotondaro]

When an SBD flew, it always carried a bomb. Usually a 500 lb. HE.

Dennis:

So besides the "mission" there really isn't much difference between the dive bomber SBD and the scout SBD?

[Warship NWS]

Dennis:

So besides the "mission" there really isn't much difference between the dive bomber SBD and the scout SBD?

Correct. It was more of organizational and training doctrine then anything else. The planes however were the same. The scouts were dual role - attack or recon.

[Warship NWS]

As a follow up.. 2 SBD "scouts" planted bombs on the Zuiho flight deck during Santa Cruz knocking out her ability to land aircraft.

[Warship NWS]

I think what is most interesting about all of the 4 major 1942 carrier battles .. CS, Midway, ES, and now SC .. is how critical it was to get in whatever hits were possible on the enemy flattops.. even a single bomb hit could turn an entire battle around instantly. It is even noted that during the SC battle when the IJN CVs were spotted the first attacks launched were broken up so as to get planes to the target as fast as possible.

Quick note about how hard it was for Zekes to take on formations of SBDs. During SC 20 Zekes jumped 15 unescorted SBDs.. they only managed to knock down 4 of them. The remaining 11 planted 3-6 bombs into Shokaku making her nothing more then a target for the rest of the battle. It is interesting to note how hard it was for the IJN CAP Zekes to defend against these tough aircraft even when unescorted.

[old_pop2000]

I think what is most interesting about all of the 4 major 1942 carrier battles .. CS, Midway, ES, and now SC .. is how critical it was to get in whatever hits were possible on the enemy flattops.. even a single bomb hit could turn an entire battle around instantly. It is even noted that during the SC battle when the IJN CVs were spotted the first attacks launched were broken up so as to get planes to the target as fast as possible.

Quick note about how hard it was for Zekes to take on formations of SBDs. During SC 20 Zekes jumped 15 unescorted SBDs.. they only managed to knock down 4 of them. The remaining 11 planted 3-6 bombs into Shokaku making her nothing more then a target for the rest of the battle. It is interesting to note how hard it was for the IJN CAP Zekes to defend against these tough aircraft even when unescorted.

It was certainly not lost on US commanders that getting in the first strike was important. Our carriers had three different launches; emergency, normal and delay. In an emergency launch, the idea was simply to get the strike headed toward the target ASAP, with no rendevous. Midway is probably an example. However, the most effective was the delayed where all the strike aircraft rendevoused and headed toward the target. This was the best and most effective. If the opponent would give you the time to perform it.

With the Battle of Santa Cruz, the best torpedo pilots including the premier leader, Murata, were decimated. After that, torpedo bombers were relegated to scouting and ASW.

Dive bombers early in the war, proved the idea that it really did not take many aircraft to disable carriers, so you can see the reduction in the number Dive bombers used in each strike and the number fighters sent with them. To the Japanese defenders, having to deal with the SBD's and the escorts could be a daunting task. Once the SBD dropped its ordnance, it was a difficult aircraft to defeat. It was nimble, but not fast. A sloppy fighter pilot could get himself killed against an experienced dive bomber pilot and gunner. More than once, a group of Zero's decided not to attack a close formation of SBD's until they began their dives and pulled out.

[old_pop2000]

I think it did give the IJN the idea to try Zuiho as a decoy at Santa Cruz tho.
Actually, it was Kondo's force of two BB's, four cruisers and some destroyers that were the bait and designed to absorb the bombs, not Zuiho. Japanese did not have many carriers to be using them as decoy's.

[Warship NWS]

Actually, it was Kondo's force of two BB's, four cruisers and some destroyers that were the bait and designed to absorb the bombs, not Zuiho. Japanese did not have many carriers to be using them as decoy's.

Considering the fact that they were losing front line pilots at higher ratio then the USN pilot losses per each major CV battle I would have to agree. It was not until late in the war when the pilots were barely able to do much more then crash their planes that the CVs became "bait" for our CVs.. as happened at Leyte Gulf for example.

[Warship NWS]

Dive bombers early in the war, proved the idea that it really did not take many aircraft to disable carriers, so you can see the reduction in the number Dive bombers used in each strike and the number fighters sent with them. To the Japanese defenders, having to deal with the SBD's and the escorts could be a daunting task. Once the SBD dropped its ordnance, it was a difficult aircraft to defeat. It was nimble, but not fast. A sloppy fighter pilot could get himself killed against an experienced dive bomber pilot and gunner. More than once, a group of Zero's decided not to attack a close formation of SBD's until they began their dives and pulled out.

I would also note that the SBDs had the only, that I know of, rear gunner aces of the entire war for single engined attack aircraft. This can be contributed to the fact that the Zeke could not take much damage, it was running into the incoming fire when attacking SBDs, they often did not attack them using coordinated attack patterns, the robust design of the SBDs tied with a good ability to side slip, the SBDs could be armed with 2 rear .30 guns (most single engined attack aircraft of the war only had one), and their often very tight formations giving good rear gunner coverage.

Thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Correct. It was more of organizational and training doctrine then anything else. The planes however were the same. The scouts were dual role - attack or recon.

Chris:

That's pretty much what I thought, but wanted to make sure. Sounds like the current usage of the F/A-18 eh? My oldest son already knows about the F-35 Joint Strike bird. Not bad for a ten year old. Oh and he still wants you to make a carrier game LOL!

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

That's pretty much what I thought, but wanted to make sure. Sounds like the current usage of the F/A-18 eh? My oldest son already knows about the F-35 Joint Strike bird. Not bad for a ten year old. Oh and he still wants you to make a carrier game LOL!

Not exactly, regarding the F/A-18. The F/A-18 can act in all roles for a CV if needed including tanker, recon, strike, CAP, escort, interdiction, etc. with one exception, ASW. The most versitale single engined aircraft we ever built duiring the war was the Grumman Avenger which could act as anything except a fighter in WW2 terms. It would not dive bomb but would shallow or level bomb fairly well, as could fighter bombers like the F6F and F4U.

As to a 10 yr old wanting to get into warships.. never anything wrong with that. ;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

It was certainly not lost on US commanders that getting in the first strike was important. Our carriers had three different launches; emergency, normal and delay. In an emergency launch, the idea was simply to get the strike headed toward the target ASAP, with no rendevous. Midway is probably an example. However, the most effective was the delayed where all the strike aircraft rendevoused and headed toward the target. This was the best and most effective. If the opponent would give you the time to perform it.

With the Battle of Santa Cruz, the best torpedo pilots including the premier leader, Murata, were decimated. After that, torpedo bombers were relegated to scouting and ASW.

Dive bombers early in the war, proved the idea that it really did not take many aircraft to disable carriers, so you can see the reduction in the number Dive bombers used in each strike and the number fighters sent with them. To the Japanese defenders, having to deal with the SBD's and the escorts could be a daunting task. Once the SBD dropped its ordnance, it was a difficult aircraft to defeat. It was nimble, but not fast. A sloppy fighter pilot could get himself killed against an experienced dive bomber pilot and gunner. More than once, a group of Zero's decided not to attack a close formation of SBD's until they began their dives and pulled out.

Dennis:

I would observe that while aircraft carriers were the most deadly combatants along with submarines, they were and still are the most vulneerable ships to air attack. Floating airfields with tons of high combustibles, they lack the defensive structure of most surface combatants. Doctrine, damage control, CAP and good AA were their best defense.

[Warship NWS]

Dennis:

I would observe that while aircraft carriers were the most deadly combatants along with submarines, they were and still are the most vulneerable ships to air attack. Floating airfields with tons of high combustibles, they lack the defensive structure of most surface combatants. Doctrine, damage control, CAP and good AA were their best defense.

I would agree with this point... with the emphasis on CAP. CAP could far better disrupt and disorganize a group of bandits then AA could .. even a few fighters could accomplish this vs larger groups of bandits as occurred in the Med theater on several occassions. A lot depends on the discipline of the bandit formations however and their doctrines as well though. It is not cut and dry but the CAP is the foremost defense of any CV formation.

[old_pop2000]

I would agree with this point... with the emphasis on CAP. CAP could far better disrupt and disorganize a group of bandits then AA could .. even a few fighters could accomplish this vs larger groups of bandits as occurred in the Med theater on several occassions. A lot depends on the discipline of the bandit formations however and their doctrines as well though. It is not cut and dry but the CAP is the foremost defense of any CV formation.
I totally agree and so would Fletcher, Spruance, Kinkaid, Murray, Halsey and every other senior commander in the Pacific. This probably explains much of Fletcher's tendency to move away from Guadalcanal, at the first sign of Japanese aircraft and submarines.

This is also why combat information centers were put in place, FIDO teams trained at Pearl Harbor, SC-1 radars developed with auto rotating antennas and PPI scan display scopes, F4F-4's with two 58 gallon fuel tanks and 36 fighters in place of the original 18. All were put in place to protect a very vulnerable carrier deck.

[old_pop2000]

Something to consider about the carrier battles around Guadalcanal.

In the 1929 Fleet exercises near the Panama Canal, Saratoga made an end run at night, to launch her attack and succeeded. However, she was sunk three times by aircraft, torpedoes and surface ships. This was a preview and wakeup call as to how vulnerable carriers actually were.

[Spook046]

I would agree with this point... with the emphasis on CAP. CAP could far better disrupt and disorganize a group of bandits then AA could .. even a few fighters could accomplish this vs larger groups of bandits as occurred in the Med theater on several occassions. A lot depends on the discipline of the bandit formations however and their doctrines as well though. It is not cut and dry but the CAP is the foremost defense of any CV formation.

A recommended "milestone" engagement for review on this subject matter would have to be Armistice Day 1943 (11 November), when a task group framed around Essex, Bunker Hill and Independence, while conducting a raid on the port of Rabaul, came under a fairly severe retaliatory strike in turn. Given the number of IJN attacking planes and the very light carrier screen (DD's only), the premise boded on face value to threaten a result similar to Santa Cruz the previous year. That the strike was successfully deflected with no significant damage to the carriers probably did much to inspire confidence that bolder, farther-ranging offensive raids could be undertaken bythe fast carriers early next year.

[Ed Rotondaro]

A recommended "milestone" engagement for review on this subject matter would have to be Armistice Day 1943 (11 November), when a task group framed around Essex, Bunker Hill and Independence, while conducting a raid on the port of Rabaul, came under a fairly severe retaliatory strike in turn. Given the number of IJN attacking planes and the very light carrier screen (DD's only), the premise boded on face value to threaten a result similar to Santa Cruz the previous year. That the strike was successfully deflected with no significant damage to the carriers probably did much to inspire confidence that bolder, farther-ranging offensive raids could be undertaken bythe fast carriers early next year.

Spook:

That and having Hellcats to provide the CAP! Makes for a much more survivable carrier task force in my opinion.

[Spook046]

And that was the essence of the noted carrier group not being severely damaged; both the CAP and the fighter direction controlling the CAP proved up to the task (although expert ship handling to evade those bombs that were dropped helped too).

[Ed Rotondaro]

And that was the essence of the noted carrier group not being severely damaged; both the CAP and the fighter direction controlling the CAP proved up to the task (although expert ship handling to evade those bombs that were dropped helped too).

Ed:

Confidence is the best weapon a pilot has. You have to believe you're the best. As Adolph Galland said "Only the spirit of attack, born in a brave heart will bring success to a fighter pilot, no matter how sophisticated his plane".