Naval Operations in the Norwegian Campaign....Was it worth it to both sides

[old_pop2000]

I've expanded a requested new thread to include the whole Norwegian campaign. But Narvik is really the area of interest. So the questions

Was the Norwegian campaign worth the losses on both sides? Were the strategic goals valid and met? Were the operational goals met? What were the mistakes made by both sides? Would you have recommended the operation to Hitler, had you been the chief of staff?

Enjoy

[asnrobert]

I believe the British were planning to invade Norway in order to threaten Germany's supply of iron ore from Sweden, which the Germans couldn't allow. Plus it gave them naval bases which made it easier for their fleet to break out into the Atlantic (attacks on convoys making the Murmansk run was something that occurred later in the war).

[old_pop2000]

I believe the British were planning to invade Norway in order to threaten Germany's supply of iron ore from Sweden, which the Germans couldn't allow. Plus it gave them naval bases which made it easier for their fleet to break out into the Atlantic (attacks on convoys making the Murmansk run was something that occurred later in the war).

The British were considering a plan to stop the German Norwegian coastal trade. The plan was to mine the route used by the coastal steamers at three spots, to force them out beyond territorial waters and into the arms of the contraband control service who would seize the ships and allow only neutrals to pass. However, a military expedition was readied in case of the expected German reaction.

Mining operations were to begin on the 8th of April off of the southern shore of Vestfjord and near Statlandet along with a dummy field off Bud. The northern group was the mine laying destroyers Esk, Impulsive, Icarus and Ivanhoe. They were escorted by the 2nd Destroyer flotilla. The dummy field was simulated by Hero. The whole force would sail with the Renown along with Greyhound and Glowworm.

[Kyle Holgate]

I think asnrobert hit the nail on the head. If we can determine how vital the ore from Sweden was to the German war effort we can accurately gauge how important the Norway operation was to Germany. If no ore = no war, then the sacrifice of the navy is acceptable - and of course you do get the bases as mentioned earlier.

[old_pop2000]

I think asnrobert hit the nail on the head. If we can determine how vital the ore from Sweden was to the German war effort we can accurately gauge how important the Norway operation was to Germany. If no ore = no war, then the sacrifice of the navy is acceptable - and of course you do get the bases as mentioned earlier.

Based on "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze, Page 381, over one half of all iron ore was imported into Germany as of 1940, of that, 83% was from Sweden. Tooze's comment is "Swedish iron ore was simply too important to the German war economy for Scandanavia to be allowed to remain neutral. If Swedish ore deliveries had stopped in September 1939, German armaments production would have been subject to a drastic squeeze from the autumn of 1940 at the latest. "

I hope this puts the Narvik operation into better light. The German's did not have enough merchant ships to carry six divisions to Norway, so they put the initial 8600 or so, on destroyers protected by S & G. Interestingly, the Renown, and her two destroyers along with the minelayers were approximately 35 miles behind the German's as they headed toward Narvik. Apparently on the Admiralty in London understood where they were headed and finally had to order the English admiral to intercept.

[JMS]

Not for the allies (the French were in there too), but certainly for the Germans. Without Norway more resources could have been devoted to bringing the war to Germany.

[Kyle Holgate]

Based on "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze, Page 381, over one half of all iron ore was imported into Germany as of 1940, of that, 83% was from Sweden. Tooze's comment is "Swedish iron ore was simply too important to the German war economy for Scandanavia to be allowed to remain neutral. If Swedish ore deliveries had stopped in September 1939, German armaments production would have been subject to a drastic squeeze from the autumn of 1940 at the latest. "

I hope this puts the Narvik operation into better light. The German's did not have enough merchant ships to carry six divisions to Norway, so they put the initial 8600 or so, on destroyers protected by S & G. Interestingly, the Renown, and her two destroyers along with the minelayers were approximately 35 miles behind the German's as they headed toward Narvik. Apparently on the Admiralty in London understood where they were headed and finally had to order the English admiral to intercept.

I think that settles it then. Even the loss of the entire surface fleet would have been acceptable to keep the iron mines and shipping channels open. Norway neutral would have been OK, but there were signs that the British were going to do something up there - I hate to agree with Hitler on anything, but It looks like it was a good call.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Based on "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze, Page 381, over one half of all iron ore was imported into Germany as of 1940, of that, 83% was from Sweden. Tooze's comment is "Swedish iron ore was simply too important to the German war economy for Scandanavia to be allowed to remain neutral. If Swedish ore deliveries had stopped in September 1939, German armaments production would have been subject to a drastic squeeze from the autumn of 1940 at the latest. "

I hope this puts the Narvik operation into better light. The German's did not have enough merchant ships to carry six divisions to Norway, so they put the initial 8600 or so, on destroyers protected by S & G. Interestingly, the Renown, and her two destroyers along with the minelayers were approximately 35 miles behind the German's as they headed toward Narvik. Apparently on the Admiralty in London understood where they were headed and finally had to order the English admiral to intercept.

Dennis:

The entire Norwegian Campaign was a rare example of strategic and operational success by the Germans. It was possibily their finest combined arms operation with army, navy and air force working together. But it demonstrated that the German Navy was still not up to the task of going one on one with the British navy.

[steel_selachian]

Not to mention a good illustration of the risks inherent in putting capital ships close to shore. The shellacking the Blucher took at the hands of what were essentially pre-WWI vintage shore guns and torpedo emplacements was one heck of a welcome for the German force trying to take Oslo.

[Warship NWS]

We need to stay focused on the detailed key elements here.. were the operations of the KM warships themselves of value, compared to risk, to the campaign? For their losses what did the KM actually accomplish? Did the KM use proper and logical tactics?

This is the key to this entire thread.

[Kyle Holgate]

We need to stay focused on the detailed key elements here.. were the operations of the KM warships themselves of value, compared to risk, to the campaign? For their losses what did the KM actually accomplish? Did the KM use proper and logical tactics?

This is the key to this entire thread.

As it turned out the KM possibly could have stayed at the docks, but there is no way they could have known that prior to the operation. The KM was badly damaged for not too much gain (Glorious and some lighter ships) as it turned out.
In the planning of the operation I'd probably risk my ships too, though certainly not in any kind of direct challenge to the RN! At the very least I'd want to escort my troopships and provide threat to any British troopships. It's very hard to quantify the impact just being there had as compared to what the British would have done had the entire KM stayed in port. The U-boats could have had quite a good number of kills had their torpedoes been working right too. Of course they found the problem the hard way, but luring out all those RN ships wasn't a bad idea. Warspite, Rodney, Nelson, Ark Royal and others may have been sunk or damaged with very little risk on the part of the Germans.
As for tactics - not so much. The KM never did use particularly good tactics for their surface fleet IMO. Sailing Blucher up a Fjord and hoping a known fort won't fire on her... yup, that's good tactics :rolleyes:.

[john964]

As it turned out the KM possibly could have stayed at the docks, but there is no way they could have known that prior to the operation. The KM was badly damaged for not too much gain (Glorious and some lighter ships) as it turned out.
In the planning of the operation I'd probably risk my ships too, though certainly not in any kind of direct challenge to the RN! At the very least I'd want to escort my troopships and provide threat to any British troopships. It's very hard to quantify the impact just being there had as compared to what the British would have done had the entire KM stayed in port. The U-boats could have had quite a good number of kills had their torpedoes been working right too. Of course they found the problem the hard way, but luring out all those RN ships wasn't a bad idea. Warspite, Rodney, Nelson, Ark Royal and others may have been sunk or damaged with very little risk on the part of the Germans.
As for tactics - not so much. The KM never did use particularly good tactics for their surface fleet IMO. Sailing Blucher up a Fjord and hoping a known fort won't fire on her... yup, that's good tactics :rolleyes:.Kyle the germans heading for Oslo were mostly banking on suprise. IIRC Oskarberg fortress was only parshialy manned with a large percentage of newly arrived drafties(they had been drafted a week earlier) only 2 of the 3 11inch guns were manned and the torpedo tubes of which there were 3 batteries of 2 tubes of which only 2 were manned.

[old_pop2000]

We need to stay focused on the detailed key elements here.. were the operations of the KM warships themselves of value, compared to risk, to the campaign? For their losses what did the KM actually accomplish? Did the KM use proper and logical tactics?

This is the key to this entire thread.

In answer to the first question; Were the operations of the KM of value? I would answer categorically in the affirmative. The national strategic goal was the securing of the supply line to the Swedish Iron ore fields by capturing Narvik and Norway as a whole. For the prosecution of the war, Swedish iron ore was absolutely important to German steel production and the war effort.

The naval strategy was to use available ships, to capture Narvik, Oslo and Trondheim. Since they did not have sufficient transports, they were forced to use destroyers. The problem for Bronte was one of his tankers was sunk and the other's pumping equipment was defective. This delayed his refueling in Narvik. This delay gave the British Captain Warburton-Lee sufficient time to get into the fjord and sink all seven ships. Was this forseeable, maybe, with the limited resources at hand, what was the German commander going to do? However, the mission itself, was a success. The loss of Blucher and the seven destroyers, while tragic, was acceptable losses. We also have Koln, Konigsberg, Lutzow, Karlsruhe, all sunk or badly damaged.

Now, as to the use of proper and logical tactics? We must account for the limited resources of the Kriegsmarine. We must account for the terrible weather with heavy seas and snow, reducing visibility. We must account for the fact that the Norwegians were not going to help the Germans, but the British. We must consider their opponent-the Royal Navy. Considering these factors, I believe, overall, the German Naval force did the best that could be hoped for.

I would say that the loss of Blucher was avoidable. However, the loss of the destroyers was acceptable. This was a naval action in a littoral zone, with all the attendent problems associated with this type of action. Refueling in the open ocean, with the heavy seas was definitely out of the question and probably beyond the capability of Kriegsmarine. So, they had to refuel in Narvik. There was always a chance, that the British Royal Navy would find them before they could depart. Could the luftwaffe have provided better air cover? Possibly. That would have been the only protection available.

[bridav58]

In the context of 1939 & 1940 the Swedish iron ore was very important HOWEVER just one month later the Germans overran Luxemburg,Belguim and France all with very large iron ore deposits furthermore this also opened up an overland route with which to access the large iron ore deposits in Spain. So the question begs ,albiet in handsight, didn't Germany have large enough stocks to last the 1-2 months between the Norwiegion & Low Countries campaigns?

[old_pop2000]

In the context of 1939 & 1940 the Swedish iron ore was very important HOWEVER just one month later the Germans overran Luxemburg,Belguim and France all with very large iron ore deposits furthermore this also opened up an overland route with which to access the large iron ore deposits in Spain. So the question begs ,albiet in handsight, didn't Germany have large enough stocks to last the 1-2 months between the Norwiegion & Low Countries campaigns?

Simple answer to that:

1940 - Sweden 39.5%
Other countries - 5.4 %
Domestic - 55.1%

1941- 1938 boundaries - 14.%
End-1940 - 31.9% ( Austria, Bohemia and Moravia, Poland, Lorraine)
Sweden -26.9%
Occupied -14.2%

The occupied countries never produced greater than 18% that in year 1943. Swedish production decreased from 39% to 23.9% in 1944 when it was stopped.

Note also, that Swedish Iron ore was a much higher grade and used for ball bearing.

Okay.

[JMS]

In the context of 1939 & 1940 the Swedish iron ore was very important HOWEVER just one month later the Germans overran Luxemburg,Belguim and France all with very large iron ore deposits furthermore this also opened up an overland route with which to access the large iron ore deposits in Spain. So the question begs ,albiet in handsight, didn't Germany have large enough stocks to last the 1-2 months between the Norwiegion & Low Countries campaigns?

large deposits in Spain? not anymore....

There was no way the Germans could bank on quickly defeating the French, they themselves were surprised at the speed the French unraveled in May.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Not to mention a good illustration of the risks inherent in putting capital ships close to shore. The shellacking the Blucher took at the hands of what were essentially pre-WWI vintage shore guns and torpedo emplacements was one heck of a welcome for the German force trying to take Oslo.

Steel:

Good point. It does make the RN's wllingness to risk the Warspite in such constricted waters all the more gutsy.

[JohnT]

Based on "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze, Page 381, over one half of all iron ore was imported into Germany as of 1940, of that, 83% was from Sweden. Tooze's comment is "Swedish iron ore was simply too important to the German war economy for Scandanavia to be allowed to remain neutral. If Swedish ore deliveries had stopped in September 1939, German armaments production would have been subject to a drastic squeeze from the autumn of 1940 at the latest. "

The only thing to add was that the Baltic route where open most of the time, average 8 months a year due to ice conditions. So Narvik wasn't the only way to get Swedish Iron ore to Germany.



I hope this puts the Narvik operation into better light. The German's did not have enough merchant ships to carry six divisions to Norway, so they put the initial 8600 or so, on destroyers protected by S & G.
Disagree, The use of warships as troop carriers where due to
1. - "Safety of speed" as the German navy never could have escorted merchants to Trondheim and Narvik without being intercepted by RN.

2. the Forced entry through Norwegian coastal defences, merchants would hardly been able to break through. Now it cost one Hvy cruiser in Oslo and one Light cruiser Out of action i Bergen.

Cheers
/John T

[JohnT]

We need to stay focused on the detailed key elements here.. were the operations of the KM warships themselves of value, compared to risk, to the campaign? For their losses what did the KM actually accomplish? Did the KM use proper and logical tactics?

This is the key to this entire thread.
The German way of establish a base within hours where the deciding factor. (IMHO)

So paras seized Sola airfield, air transport flew in further troops and Luftwaffe ground troops,
a few small german tankers with avgas happened to be in the closest port.
During the next days Combat aircrafts flew in and ammo where bot airlifted and recieved from merchants entering the harbours seized by KM during the first few hours.
They even had Radar coverage for their fighters within three days.

As a one liner:
KM got the germans to Norway before RN reacted and LW keept the Allies out of Norway.
(at least south of Narvik and if LW did not deny the entry they did deny the force build up of the Allies)

And this proved the German use of a tri-service staff to plan the operation was far more advanced than anything the Allies managed to do.

The Germans used radios to make the forward elements to ask for support from higher level. While the British highest staffs used Radios to ensure that the Operational commanders where unable to plan and conduct operations in a consistent way.

Cheers
/John T

[old_pop2000]

The only thing to add was that the Baltic route where open most of the time, average 8 months a year due to ice conditions. So Narvik wasn't the only way to get Swedish Iron ore to Germany.




According several sources, the Swedish iron mines are in Northern Sweden. The iron ore was sent by railroad to a port on the Baltic named Lulea. During the winter months, that port was frozen over, so the iron ore had to go north, by rail to Narvik. This was in 1940. They have a regular ice breaking service now and I have read the reports. But I don't see any indications of that service in 1940. That service only started about twenty years ago, IIRC.

The Railroad ran from Lulea north to Malmberget to Kiruna where the mines were located then into Norway ending at Narvik. There was an alternate route through a town south of Stockholm named Oxelosund. That port was for the ore coming from the mines in the area of Bergslagen. Also near Stockholm.

Now, it is possible that Hitler realized that when he attack Russia, that would put those lines of communication in jeopardy from Russia subs and surface craft not to mention aircraft. Especially after their invasion of Finland.

[JohnT]

According several sources, the Swedish iron mines are in Northern Sweden. The iron ore was sent by railroad to a port on the Baltic named Lulea. During the winter months, that port was frozen over, so the iron ore had to go north, by rail to Narvik. This was in 1940. They have a regular ice breaking service now and I have read the reports. But I don't see any indications of that service in 1940. That service only started about twenty years ago, IIRC.

No problem with your sources.
My comment where based on the notion often used in Allied sources that stopping Narvik would stop Swedish Iron ore to reach Germany.
It looks like The Bristish decision making in 1940 where based to that assumption,
or a implicit assumtion that British Air force operating from the Narvik area could disrupt the traffic from Luleå too.

Regarding Icebreaker, it was the last 20 years or so that 365-day's a year service have been available in Luleå and the Northernmost Baltic (Gulf of Bothnia).
The first "non - Harbour" Swedish Icebreaker where built in 1924 and the spring of 1940 both available where down south keepning the ferry lanes Sweden-Germany open.
So In general -The Icebreakers started their season In Luleå in November/December and where pushed south as ice conditions worsened and then ended their season back in Luleå again.
Still Luleå had exported 186 000 tons of Iron Ore in December 1939,
and started operations last days of May 1940 again.




Now, it is possible that Hitler realized that when he attack Russia, that would put those lines of communication in jeopardy from Russia subs and surface craft not to mention aircraft. Especially after their invasion of Finland.

Dear Sir
That comment did open up a train of thought in me!
Obvious when seen but not that obvious when ones mind are blinded by hindsight.

The German decision to attack Norway where made during the Winter war and I have no indications that Germany at that time knew that USSR was NOT aiming for a complete occupation of the whole of Finland.

Why have I no noted that fact earlier, or have I read it but not understood it's implications? :o
It has been noted that Sweden and Luleå disapeared from Weserübung planning late February 1940, but no one have found any explicit reasoning why. The number of German Paras and Luftlande units where reduced from the earlier planning requests.



Cheers
/John T.

[old_pop2000]

......
Regarding Icebreaker, it was the last 20 years or so that 365-day's a year service have been available in Luleå and the Northernmost Baltic (Gulf of Bothnia).
The first "non - Harbor" Swedish Icebreaker where built in 1924 and the spring of 1940 both available where down south keeping the ferry lanes Sweden-Germany open.
So In general -The Icebreakers started their season In Luleå in November/December and where pushed south as ice conditions worsened and then ended their season back in Luleå again.
Still Luleå had exported 186 000 tons of Iron Ore in December 1939,
and started operations last days of May 1940 again.

That comment did open up a train of thought in me!
Obvious when seen but not that obvious when ones mind are blinded by hindsight.

The German decision to attack Norway where made during the Winter war and I have no indications that Germany at that time knew that USSR was NOT aiming for a complete occupation of the whole of Finland.

Why have I no noted that fact earlier, or have I read it but not understood it's implications? :o
It has been noted that Sweden and Luleå disappeared from Weserübung planning late February 1940, but no one have found any explicit reasoning why. The number of German Paras and Luftlande units where reduced from the earlier planning requests.

Cheers
/John T.

From what you are relating, then. Lulea was closed from December through to May, when it opened again. That is the information that I have derived. Is that correct?

As we read more history, we begin to get blinders. We are guided by the ideas and writings of others. Hitler, even in Mein Kampf, was always against the Russia and always spoke of getting living space for the Germans in the East. I believe that it was a foregone conclusion that he would invade that country. With that in mind, the invasion of Norway makes perfect sense especially after the blockade of Germany in WWI by the Grand Fleet. Norway would be the key to the north and a way of opening up the route to the North Atlantic.

Thanks

[old_pop2000]

I discovered a graph of ice coverage in the Baltic.

In 1940 era, ice coverage was average. Somewhere around 120,000 to 180,000 square Km. However, it jumps in the early '40s to severe. The graph is hard to get detailed years. I've provided the link for anyone to examine and verify my results.

http://www.helcom.fi/environment2/ifs/ifs2007/en_GB/iceseason/

[JMS]

I discovered a graph of ice coverage in the Baltic.

In 1940 era, ice coverage was average. Somewhere around 120,000 to 180,000 square Km. However, it jumps in the early '40s to severe. The graph is hard to get detailed years. I've provided the link for anyone to examine and verify my results.

http://www.helcom.fi/environment2/ifs/ifs2007/en_GB/iceseason/

1939/1940 and 1941/42 winters were very severe.

[JohnT]

From what you are relating, then. Lulea was closed from December through to May, when it opened again. That is the information that I have derived. Is that correct?

As we read more history, we begin to get blinders. We are guided by the ideas and writings of others. Hitler, even in Mein Kampf, was always against the Russia and always spoke of getting living space for the Germans in the East. I believe that it was a foregone conclusion that he would invade that country. With that in mind, the invasion of Norway makes perfect sense especially after the blockade of Germany in WWI by the Grand Fleet. Norway would be the key to the north and a way of opening up the route to the North Atlantic.

Thanks


Yes, Luleå closed four to six months a year.
I did not find any historical data but if you care to get the Ice situation : http://www.smhi.se/cmp/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=7820&l=en



Cheers
/John T

[old_pop2000]

Yes, Luleå closed four to six months a year.
I did not find any historical data but if you care to get the Ice situation : http://www.smhi.se/cmp/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=7820&l=en


Thanks, I did find some empirical data from coastal ice observations that confirmed the closing of Lulea in the months from Dec-May. However, Operation Weseruebung had its origins with Admiral Rolf Carls. Apparently, the Kriegsmarine had been eyeing the Norwegian problem for years precisely for the reasons, I suspected. To eliminate the blockade of German ports, as per the WWI. In fact, the Army high command was never even consulted. Carls started to "pepper" Raeder with letters suggesting " the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany". This is from Raeder's testimony at Nuremburg. The main report was on October 10th on Naval operations, where Raeder suggested the importance of the Norwegian bases. Two months later, Hitler got back to Raeder on that subject.

The two main reasons for Hitler returning to the subject were; The closure of the Baltic during winter; the British/French expeditionary force expected to come to the assistance of the Finns in their war with the Soviet Union. Hitler expected that the only avenue for that expeditionary force was through Norway and Sweden. This would give Churchill a reason to close Narvik and interdict the coastal steamers moving Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany. It would also give the Allies a chance to outflank the Germans through the Scandanavian countries.

This information is directly from William L. Shirer's book "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" Page 673, Chapter 20- The Conquest of Denmark and Norway.

[old_pop2000]

From the Avalon Project, Nuremburg testimony of Admiral Erich Raeder:

Brief Excerpt:

The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn Jones, considers the attack against Norway a special case in the series of aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of this himself but rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event exactly, and therefore I ask you first of all: When was the first conversation about this matter between you and Hitler?
RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself concerning the question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that was at my request. The reason for this was that we had received reports at various times during the last week of September through our intelligence service of the offices of Admiral Canaris that the British intended to occupy bases in Norway.

I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several times Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion-something he did in very important cases only. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he gave me a coherent explanation concerning the intelligence reports which had been received. In this connection air bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the south of Norway. Stavanger was mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, and Trondheim was usually mentioned and occasionally Christiansand.

During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation with Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy Group North and was therefore in charge of operations in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North Sea. This man had obviously received similar reports. He informed me that he had composed a private letter addressed to me, in which he dealt with the question of the danger of Norway's being occupied by British forces and in which he was in a general way dealing with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also what advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway-that is, of the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases-by our forces would have.
Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian question at all, except for the fact I had received these reports. The arrival of this letter at the end of September or the beginning of October, it must have been about then, impelled me to show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal with all dispatch with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases by England, and the other questions which Admiral Carls had dealt with, and to have the questions discussed in the SKL. The advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards the North had to be considered, not only of an expansion on our part but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; what value, what advantage would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages would result if we had to defend the Norwegian coast?
The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, GB-82, where the questions were asked: What places were to be used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports would have to be developed further; and also, what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned?
These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral Doenitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the report on 10 October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, that it was entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these bases we would violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of 2 September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding sentence, in this aide memoirs, which is Document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939.


Link to full testimony on Norway at Nuremburg:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/05-17-46.asp

[Ed Rotondaro]

That comment did open up a train of thought in me!
Obvious when seen but not that obvious when ones mind are blinded by hindsight.

The German decision to attack Norway where made during the Winter war and I have no indications that Germany at that time knew that USSR was NOT aiming for a complete occupation of the whole of Finland.

Why have I no noted that fact earlier, or have I read it but not understood it's implications? :o
It has been noted that Sweden and Luleå disapeared from Weserübung planning late February 1940, but no one have found any explicit reasoning why. The number of German Paras and Luftlande units where reduced from the earlier planning requests.



Cheers
/John T.

Hi:

A thing to keep in in mind is that Germany drew from her WWI experiences whereby the RN had cut off her access to Swedish iron ore by the distant blockade. Point being that in WWII Germany by seizing Norway, France and the lowlands granted herself access to more avenues to the sea and more ways to harass England.

[Warship NWS]

Ok.. I went through and refreshed my information on Operation Weserubung.

I will stand corrected that the KM did play a significant role in the operation - albeit at terrible losses. The sad part is that the German auxiliary fleet was in such poor shape and numbers that they had to resort to using warships to land 8,850 troops at key locations. However, one must never guage an armed force until one compares the operations of the enemy. The Norwegians had ample opportunity to prepare their defenses after a Polish sub sank a KM troop ship prior to the invasion but all intel gathered from German survivors was utterly dismissed by the Norwegian government.

Now here is where it gets interesting, it is a fact that the bulk of the iron ore shipped out of Narvik - a danger Germany should have considered before going to war as if the British were as aggressive with their blockading of Germany at the start of WW2 as they were during WW1 they could have easily cut off Narvik or destroyed the port - but there was much fear of provoking the Norwegians into siding with the Germans. Instead, too little was done too late. The KM however, DID NOT, force a strategic victory on its own IMHO. Narvik was fought over between allied and Norwegian forces and they had defeated the German attacks - the first allied victory vs the Wehrmacht. The problem was that the allies pulled out during Operation Alphabet and left Narvik wide open for German capture.

In the end run the KM did participate in a strategic amphibious operation by default due to lack of transports and paid a high price in lost ships and sailors. In many ways, IMHO, it was a pyrrhic victory that cost the KM the bulk of their operational surface ships. The end result was that the iron ore supplies were kept intact for the time being but had the British or Norwegians been more responsive to the potential of this critical supply line they could have caused great dismay for the impending invasion and very possibly catastrophic casualties - especially when comparing the losses that were inflicted even with mostly unprepared defenses. Personally, I think the allies severely fumbled the ball in regards to Norway.

Interesting topic.

[old_pop2000]

If we examine prewar documents, we see that the intention was to have a short war. Whether that was viable, is not the question. It is a fact. Hitler wanted a short war. That being true, why throw away your already feeble navy for a decidedly secondary objective. In a short war, iron ore from Sweden and how it arrives at Germany, isn't a major problem to solve. If you are planning a short war, why worry about outflanking the British blockade by occupying Norway? However, there is more to this complicated story.

Hitler anticipated British intervention in Norway. The German invasion was geostrategically, a very sensible move. Considering that he was planning to attack Russia and was aware of British truculency toward Germany, it made perfect sense to occupy the country that lay astride a valuable choke point in the path to the North Atlantic. Couple that with the naval and air bases that placed his forces, at least, 500 miles closer to England, and you have a winning case. However, any assessment must include an analysis of how Germany could exploit the success gained by the operation. Sea power was the only tool that could exploit that success, and that was thrown away in gaining it.

So, is it possible, that this secondary objective for a short war, might have cost him the long war he ended up fighting? Why? Because soon after, he invaded France. Then was faced with the prospect of invading England. Yet, he had thrown away, one of the most valuable tools, he might have used to ensure the viability of any planned invasion. An invasion, that must occur, or risk having England, again, sitting astride his only paths to the North Atlantic. If the failure to invade and occupy England was a war turning event, and if the lack of a navy was a major aspect of that failure, then the Norwegian campaign, has to be the lynch pin of that failure.

Thanks

[Warship NWS]

To Dennis, now you know why I felt that the Germans squandered their navy on the Norwegian campaign. Much of this was due to lack of pre-war planning and anticipating a "short war" - thus the Germans did not have enough transports to get the job done and ended up using their warships as adhoc amphibious ships. They may have gained access to the iron ore but the price they paid cost them dearly in terms of potential naval operations and any chance of further water crossing invasions. They basically brought upon themselves a self-inflicted naval blockade.

[old_pop2000]

To Dennis, now you know why I felt that the Germans squandered their navy on the Norwegian campaign. Much of this was due to lack of pre-war planning and anticipating a "short war" - thus the Germans did not have enough transports to get the job done and ended up using their warships as adhoc amphibious ships. They may have gained access to the iron ore but the price they paid cost them dearly in terms of potential naval operations and any chance of further water crossing invasions. They basically brought upon themselves a self-inflicted naval blockade.


The really interesting point here is that this was an all Kriegsmarine operation, insofar as it was their idea and they planned it. Yet, they had initial success, but eventually the Army had to go in and retake Narvik. The execution was terrible as some points, along with the lack of resources for such seaborne invasion. To have attempted such an operation against one of the greatest sea powers in the world, right in their own backyard, was foolhardy. It was audacious, a trademark of the German navy in both wars, but seems to have failed to take into account any reaction by the British and how to deal with that reaction.

[Warship NWS]

The really interesting point here is that this was an all Kriegsmarine operation, insofar as it was their idea and they planned it. Yet, they had initial success, but eventually the Army had to go in and retake Narvik. The execution was terrible as some points, along with the lack of resources for such seaborne invasion. To have attempted such an operation against one of the greatest sea powers in the world, right in their own backyard, was foolhardy. It was audacious, a trademark of the German navy in both wars, but seems to have failed to take into account any reaction by the British and how to deal with that reaction.

I agree. I can understand why they did it but I think they failed to realize what it takes to launch an amphibious invasion and the risks involved, not even stating the required logistical support afterwards. I mean, heck, they lose 10 DDs due to lack of ammo and fuel??? Pretty poor planning on that part. Note, I think that was the ONLY large scale, and rather complex, amphibious invasion the Germans ever launched in their modern naval history - at least that I can remember. The ironic part is that the British and Norwegians could have adverted the entire invasion very easily but in the end run parking KM warships in Norway was no better then parking them in France or Germany... they were all in bomber range, and even more accessible to CV naval aircraft due to lack of any port defenses to keep CVs out of air strike range, plus the Norweigens would report their operations in port. One really has to wonder what they were thinking when some genius thought up Operation Sealion.. I think that would have destroyed whatever was left of the KM.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I agree. I can understand why they did it but I think they failed to realize what it takes to launch an amphibious invasion and the risks involved, not even stating the required logistical support afterwards. I mean, heck, they lose 10 DDs due to lack of ammo and fuel??? Pretty poor planning on that part. Note, I think that was the ONLY large scale, and rather complex, amphibious invasion the Germans ever launched in their modern naval history - at least that I can remember. The ironic part is that the British and Norwegians could have adverted the entire invasion very easily but in the end run parking KM warships in Norway was no better then parking them in France or Germany... they were all in bomber range, and even more accessible to CV naval aircraft due to lack of any port defenses to keep CVs out of air strike range, plus the Norweigens would report their operations in port. One really has to wonder what they were thinking when some genius thought up Operation Sealion.. I think that would have destroyed whatever was left of the KM.

Chris:

I don't believe that the KM even at full strength was powerful enough to have launched Sealion unless the Luftwaffe totally dominated the skies over the channel.

[Warship NWS]

Chris:

I don't believe that the KM even at full strength was powerful enough to have launched Sealion unless the Luftwaffe totally dominated the skies over the channel.

Probably true, but that was never going to happen for the Luft. except maybe at best temporarily as the only thing Britain was short on was pilots.

[old_pop2000]

Probably true, but that was never going to happen for the Luft. except maybe at best temporarily as the only thing Britain was short on was pilots.

The KMs primary responsibility was to seal off the eastern entrance to the channel by engaging the Home Fleet and stopping her from interdicting. That would have taken a reasonably sized fleet, with air support to accomplish. The losses at Norway probably made that already difficult task, impossible.

[Warship NWS]

The KMs primary responsibility was to seal off the eastern entrance to the channel by engaging the Home Fleet and stopping her from interdicting. That would have taken a reasonably sized fleet, with air support to accomplish. The losses at Norway probably made that already difficult task, impossible.

Add to that, considering the KM was not up to par for ASW ops and just lost 10 DDs.. I think the British subs would have had some serious fun. Either way, I agree.. after Norway the KM was in no shape to hold off the RN. Another problem, the RAF might have been temporarily suppressed but what about the RN CV aircraft causing problems? The Luft. could not be everywhere at once.

[old_pop2000]

Add to that, considering the KM was not up to par for ASW ops and just lost 10 DDs.. I think the British subs would have had some serious fun. Either way, I agree.. after Norway the KM was in no shape to hold off the RN. Another problem, the RAF might have been temporarily suppressed but what about the RN CV aircraft causing problems? The Luft. could not be everywhere at once.

Assessing KM strengths after Norway, seems to indicate that unless U-boats could operate in the North Sea along any path the Home fleet might take to interdict, and successfully cause some damage to escorts and such, this already difficult task, maybe next impossible. No invasion, to my knowledge, was successful without overwhelming naval support. The Germans just did not have that capability.