Forthcoming book

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi:

Vince O'Hara, a member of these forums, has a new book due out in April of this year. Entitled "Struggle For the Middle Sea", it covers the naval war in the Mediterrean Sea from 1940 to 1945. If it matches the quality of his earlier books (of which I have no doubt), it should be a great read. You heard it here first.

[old_pop2000]

Hi:

Vince O'Hara, a member of these forums, has a new book due out in April of this year. Entitled "Struggle For the Middle Sea", it covers the naval war in the Mediterrean Sea from 1940 to 1945. If it matches the quality of his earlier books (of which I have no doubt), it should be a great read. You heard it here first.

Actually, Ed, I think he told us he was working on a book about the Italian struggle in the Med. I am looking forward to it. That's an area that some good, non-partisan writing could help. Most of it is either Italian or British. I might see if I can get a signed copy. I got his other two signed.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Actually, Ed, I think he told us he was working on a book about the Italian struggle in the Med. I am looking forward to it. That's an area that some good, non-partisan writing could help. Most of it is either Italian or British. I might see if I can get a signed copy. I got his other two signed.

Dennis:

I agree that Vince told us about the book several months back. This is merely a heads up as to when it will be available (assuming the NIP maintains its publishing schedule). I would love to get a signed copy.When visiting the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum I had the chance to purchase and get signed a book entitled "Hell Hawks" by Robert Dorr and Thomas Jones. It was really nice to be able to talk to a genuine military history author at my leisure as well as some of the other folks who were also interested in air combat.

[Vince O'Hara]

Ed,

Thanks for mentioning the book. The proofs just went back to the publisher. Look for it in May. Dennis, your name is in it. You gave me your time and some good comments which it was my pleasure to acknowledge.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Ed,

Thanks for mentioning the book. The proofs just went back to the publisher. Look for it in May. Dennis, your name is in it. You gave me your time and some good comments which it was my pleasure to acknowledge.

Vince

Thanks, my friend.
I enjoyed the experience and mentioning my name was never needed, but it is appreciated.

[JMS]

Ed,

Thanks for mentioning the book. The proofs just went back to the publisher. Look for it in May. Dennis, your name is in it. You gave me your time and some good comments which it was my pleasure to acknowledge.

Vince

What sources have you used for the book?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed,

Thanks for mentioning the book. The proofs just went back to the publisher. Look for it in May. Dennis, your name is in it. You gave me your time and some good comments which it was my pleasure to acknowledge.

Vince

Vince:

Excellent! Glad to know it will be available for a birthday present (hint to wife). Gee know Dennis will think he's a published author LOL! His eog will just go through the roof!:D

[Vince O'Hara]

I'm responding to JMS' query regarding my sources for Struggle for the Middle Sea.
For the British I used most of the Battle Summeries (in the ADM 234 series), Staff histories, and assorted other Admiralty documents like Preliminary Narrative of the War at Sea, Fighting Instructions, Progress in Naval Gunnery. I had access to certain documents relating to specific actions from Archivio Centrale dello Stato della Marina della Marina and Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare. I used the official histories, including Playfair, Roskill, Hinsley, Gill, Schreiber, et al, and the La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale series. Also the London Gazette reports and the Cunningham and Somerville Papers and USN action reports where relevant. I used most secondary works published in English along with many memoirs and some in Italian, French and German. I likewise used many magazine articles in four languages that focused on specific actions, like a German account of the action off Pag Island in November 1944, or French accounts of the actions off Algeria in November 1942. The bibliography is long and pretty comprehensive.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Vince:

Excellent! Glad to know it will be available for a birthday present (hint to wife). Gee know Dennis will think he's a published author LOL! His eog will just go through the roof!:D

No fear of that happening, my wife provides a reality check for me everyday. ;)

[old_pop2000]

I'm responding to JMS' query regarding my sources for Struggle for the Middle Sea.
For the British I used most of the Battle Summeries (in the ADM 234 series), Staff histories, and assorted other Admiralty documents like Preliminary Narrative of the War at Sea, Fighting Instructions, Progress in Naval Gunnery. I had access to certain documents relating to specific actions from Archivio Centrale dello Stato della Marina della Marina and Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare. I used the official histories, including Playfair, Roskill, Hinsley, Gill, Schreiber, et al, and the La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale series. Also the London Gazette reports and the Cunningham and Somerville Papers and USN action reports where relevant. I used most secondary works published in English along with many memoirs and some in Italian, French and German. I likewise used many magazine articles in four languages that focused on specific actions, like a German account of the action off Pag Island in November 1944, or French accounts of the actions off Algeria in November 1942. The bibliography is long and pretty comprehensive.

Vince

Hey Vince:
Curiosity, did you have to do extensive traveling, to obtain the official ADM's and the Italian information or can it be ordered on line. I've seen the archival information from the British but was curious how it is obtained.

[Ed Rotondaro]

I'm responding to JMS' query regarding my sources for Struggle for the Middle Sea.
For the British I used most of the Battle Summeries (in the ADM 234 series), Staff histories, and assorted other Admiralty documents like Preliminary Narrative of the War at Sea, Fighting Instructions, Progress in Naval Gunnery. I had access to certain documents relating to specific actions from Archivio Centrale dello Stato della Marina della Marina and Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare. I used the official histories, including Playfair, Roskill, Hinsley, Gill, Schreiber, et al, and the La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale series. Also the London Gazette reports and the Cunningham and Somerville Papers and USN action reports where relevant. I used most secondary works published in English along with many memoirs and some in Italian, French and German. I likewise used many magazine articles in four languages that focused on specific actions, like a German account of the action off Pag Island in November 1944, or French accounts of the actions off Algeria in November 1942. The bibliography is long and pretty comprehensive.

Vince

Vince:

Is the Italian material available in translation? If not did you have it translated for you? Just curious, thanks.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hey Vince:
Curiosity, did you have to do extensive traveling, to obtain the official ADM's and the Italian information or can it be ordered on line. I've seen the archival information from the British but was curious how it is obtained.

Dennis:

I have always wondered about that stuff. My favorite history professor in college would spend his summers in England researching very dry material on the development of English Common Law. The language requirements made me chose Public Adminstration as a graduate program (which I regret to this day) as a more profitable course of study.

[Vince O'Hara]

Obtaining archival material can be expensive. Over the years I've ordered materials from the TNA (ex-PRO). You receive giant 11x17 sheets which makes storage inconvenient and reproduction even worse. On the other hand, at least the service exists. I’ve made several trips to Washington and the National Archives are good about finding material and making copies. I’ve had friends visit various archives and photograph documents for me. I also have friends who are generous and have shared materials they have collected.

With respect to Italy I’m fortunate to have a good friend (and sometimes collaborator) who has a large collection of materials he has shared with me. I purchased books directly from France and Italy. Tutto storia is the place to go for Italian works.

With respect to languages, I can wade my way through Italian and French. German is harder. I use machine translation when needed and then smooth that out. It’s worth the effort.

Vince

[JMS]

Just what I didn't want to hear, I don't mind parting with money, but where am I going to find the shelf space...?!?! :D

Where can they be bought (all of them)?

You got an article for this year's "Warship"?

[Ed Rotondaro]

Obtaining archival material can be expensive. Over the years I've ordered materials from the TNA (ex-PRO). You receive giant 11x17 sheets which makes storage inconvenient and reproduction even worse. On the other hand, at least the service exists. I’ve made several trips to Washington and the National Archives are good about finding material and making copies. I’ve had friends visit various archives and photograph documents for me. I also have friends who are generous and have shared materials they have collected.

With respect to Italy I’m fortunate to have a good friend (and sometimes collaborator) who has a large collection of materials he has shared with me. I purchased books directly from France and Italy. Tutto storia is the place to go for Italian works.

With respect to languages, I can wade my way through Italian and French. German is harder. I use machine translation when needed and then smooth that out. It’s worth the effort.

Vince

Vince:

Thanks for the dedication, we naval buffs are richer for your work.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Actually, Ed, I think he told us he was working on a book about the Italian struggle in the Med. I am looking forward to it. That's an area that some good, non-partisan writing could help. Most of it is either Italian or British. I might see if I can get a signed copy. I got his other two signed.


Hi Dennis,

Way to go, I have a couple of autographed books.....had mine signed by Dull in person before he died. Is Vince gonna get writer's cramp signing all those books? : )

[Mike Malanaphy]

I'm responding to JMS' query regarding my sources for Struggle for the Middle Sea.
For the British I used most of the Battle Summeries (in the ADM 234 series), Staff histories, and assorted other Admiralty documents like Preliminary Narrative of the War at Sea, Fighting Instructions, Progress in Naval Gunnery. I had access to certain documents relating to specific actions from Archivio Centrale dello Stato della Marina della Marina and Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare. I used the official histories, including Playfair, Roskill, Hinsley, Gill, Schreiber, et al, and the La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale series. Also the London Gazette reports and the Cunningham and Somerville Papers and USN action reports where relevant. I used most secondary works published in English along with many memoirs and some in Italian, French and German. I likewise used many magazine articles in four languages that focused on specific actions, like a German account of the action off Pag Island in November 1944, or French accounts of the actions off Algeria in November 1942. The bibliography is long and pretty comprehensive.

Vince

Hi Vince,

Can't wait to see your new book. Looking forward to seeing your analysis of Italian issues of the struggle. Many of the classic naval writers such as Anthony Preston, David Brown, D. K. Brown, and others have passed away and I'm glad to see you carry on the tradition.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Way to go, I have a couple of autographed books.....had mine signed by Dull in person before he died. Is Vince gonna get writer's cramp signing all those books? : )

I have Dull's book, it is excellent and wish I had a signed copy. However, I do have a prize copy of "Operation Crossroads" that was published after Bikini tests. I also have the script that was issued as money during the tests with signatures from all the admirals and scientist my dad carried into the lagoon. He plasticized it, which decreases its value, however, it is very fragile and I understand why. I may donate that stuff to the Air museum in Balboa Park. I am certain my son won't mind, but I will consult with him first.

[Vince O'Hara]

JMS: You can search catalogs and order documents online at the US and British archives. The British are at www.nationalarchives.gov.uk (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk) Also check out the Roosevelt library if you haven't already. They have digitized most of the daily war situation reports the British sent to Roosevelt before the US entered the war (and a lot more). Regarding Warship the second half of the MAS boat article, co-authored with Enrico Cernuschi and Erminio Bagnasco, will be in 2009. An article about Taranto and the salvage work will appear in 2010.

Ed, Mike. Thank you for your support. I'm afraid I've never suffered from writer's cramp signing books. I hope I won't be considered crassly commercial if I say that I'd be pleased to inscribe any of my books should one want. I'm also building up a little collection of my own. Signed books are neat. Mike, want to trade a Stephen Coonts for your Paul Dull?

Vince

[old_pop2000]

JMS: You can search catalogs and order documents online at the US and British archives. The British are at www.nationalarchives.gov.uk (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk) Also check out the Roosevelt library if you haven't already. They have digitized most of the daily war situation reports the British sent to Roosevelt before the US entered the war (and a lot more). Regarding Warship the second half of the MAS boat article, co-authored with Enrico Cernuschi and Erminio Bagnasco, will be in 2009. An article about Taranto and the salvage work will appear in 2010.

Ed, Mike. Thank you for your support. I'm afraid I've never suffered from writer's cramp signing books. I hope I won't be considered crassly commercial if I say that I'd be pleased to inscribe any of my books should one want. I'm also building up a little collection of my own. Signed books are neat. Mike, want to trade a Stephen Coonts for your Paul Dull?

Vince

I've used the FDR Safe files, many times. They make for interesting reading. I am not certain where the British stuff is, however, the British diplomacy items appear to be off line.

[Ed Rotondaro]

JMS: You can search catalogs and order documents online at the US and British archives. The British are at www.nationalarchives.gov.uk (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk) Also check out the Roosevelt library if you haven't already. They have digitized most of the daily war situation reports the British sent to Roosevelt before the US entered the war (and a lot more). Regarding Warship the second half of the MAS boat article, co-authored with Enrico Cernuschi and Erminio Bagnasco, will be in 2009. An article about Taranto and the salvage work will appear in 2010.

Ed, Mike. Thank you for your support. I'm afraid I've never suffered from writer's cramp signing books. I hope I won't be considered crassly commercial if I say that I'd be pleased to inscribe any of my books should one want. I'm also building up a little collection of my own. Signed books are neat. Mike, want to trade a Stephen Coonts for your Paul Dull?

Vince

Vince:

As always, thanks for the details and good luck with the sales of the new book.

[Mike Malanaphy]

JMS: You can search catalogs and order documents online at the US and British archives. The British are at www.nationalarchives.gov.uk (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk) Also check out the Roosevelt library if you haven't already. They have digitized most of the daily war situation reports the British sent to Roosevelt before the US entered the war (and a lot more). Regarding Warship the second half of the MAS boat article, co-authored with Enrico Cernuschi and Erminio Bagnasco, will be in 2009. An article about Taranto and the salvage work will appear in 2010.

Ed, Mike. Thank you for your support. I'm afraid I've never suffered from writer's cramp signing books. I hope I won't be considered crassly commercial if I say that I'd be pleased to inscribe any of my books should one want. I'm also building up a little collection of my own. Signed books are neat. Mike, want to trade a Stephen Coonts for your Paul Dull?

Vince

Hi Vince,

Very nice of you....be happy to send you the other two as well when your done with your book tour. : ) Dull was history professor at the University of Oregon in the early 70s. I got his book when it came out while I was overseas and made a point to go see him when I went home on leave. He was very ill, but graciously signed it for me.

It's the only one I have autographed to me. I have a copy of John C. Riely's "Operational History of Fast Battleships" autographed to someone else and a copys of the "Drama of the Scharnhorst" autographed to Bruce Fraser, Lord of North Cape" from his servants, but it does not mention his name. I missed getting an autographed copy of Preston's "Battleships of WW I" but beaten to the punch.

[Vince O'Hara]

For those of you who are interested, Struggle for the Middle Sea is now available. It took longer than expected, but the production values are higher so I consider it well worth the wait.

Vince

[Mike Malanaphy]

For those of you who are interested, Struggle for the Middle Sea is now available. It took longer than expected, but the production values are higher so I consider it well worth the wait.

Vince

Hi Vince,

Great news, can't wait to get mine. Is it available through NWS? : )

[William Miller]

Mike,

I put Vince's great book up on our NWS-Online store today :D

[paladin5]

Mike,

I put Vince's great book up on our NWS-Online store today :D


Looks like a neat book on a subject that I don't yet have much knowledge about. I might have to buy it since I will once again be gainfully employed as of 0630 on Monday. :)

[Mike Malanaphy]

Looks like a neat book on a subject that I don't yet have much knowledge about. I might have to buy it since I will once again be gainfully employed as of 0630 on Monday. :)

Hi Paladin5,

Glad to hear that, I know times are tough. As naval warfare afficianadoes, you will find Vince's books very useful resources for reading or creating scenarios. There was a series of small books published in the 70s called "Sea battles in Close Up" . Each book featured a single battle and examined them in depth and context. Especially useful were orders of battle, weather conditions, and technical details on gunnery and radar found nowhere else. I was unaware of the poor performance of the KGVs guns until I read the appendices which listed individual salvoes. At the time, they were a revelation over the standard written descriptions.

Vince's book follows in a similar vein, but details each surface engagment for that navy. The narratives are up to date on gunnery and radar and chock full of information on ships, personalities, tactics, and weapons. Most think of the USN in the Pacific as a carrier war, but Vince puts that back into perspective with the numerous surface engagements that occurred. This is a book for the naval wargamer, naval history buff, and the casual reader alike. If you are limited to a small library, his are must have references. Space prevents pictures and multiple charts, but the volumes are modestly priced and a great value.

[john964]

Hi Paladin5,

Glad to hear that, I know times are tough. As naval warfare afficianadoes, you will find Vince's books very useful resources for reading or creating scenarios. There was a series of small books published in the 70s called "Sea battles in Close Up" . Each book featured a single battle and examined them in depth and context. Especially useful were orders of battle, weather conditions, and technical details on gunnery and radar found nowhere else. I was unaware of the poor performance of the KGVs guns until I read the appendices which listed individual salvoes. At the time, they were a revelation over the standard written descriptions.

Vince's book follows in a similar vein, but details each surface engagment for that navy. The narratives are up to date on gunnery and radar and chock full of information on ships, personalities, tactics, and weapons. Most think of the USN in the Pacific as a carrier war, but Vince puts that back into perspective with the numerous surface engagements that occurred. This is a book for the naval wargamer, naval history buff, and the casual reader alike. If you are limited to a small library, his are must have references. Space prevents pictures and multiple charts, but the volumes are modestly priced and a great value.
Mike, It was a carrier war but in total there were 6 carrier Vs carrier battles in the entire war. There was about the same number of battleship Vs battleship battles.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike, It was a carrier war but in total there were 6 carrier Vs carrier battles in the entire war. There was about the same number of battleship Vs battleship battles.


Hi John,

Vince's point is that there were five major carrier battles (Vince doesn't count Leyte Gulf as a carrier clash) during the war with Santa Cruz in October 42 exhausting both sides. It was nearly two years before carriers clashed again. The 42 and 43 carriers were too few to sustain a continuous effort. In 1944 when the fast carrier forces boasted nearly a thousand planes, Kurita's surface forces were still able to get through. In the same period there were 49 surface clashes between the IJN and USN. Popular wisdom being that the carriers settled the war.

He contends that the decisive naval battle in the Pacific was a surface engagement, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. I'm not sure I agree with that as had we lost the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the odds of success were stacked against the Japanese in this attritional contest. I still believe Midway will remain the decisive because of the loss of those four carriers which were never replaced, but Vince's book certainly shows how prevalent surface engagements were.

[john964]

Hi John,

Vince's point is that there were five major carrier battles (Vince doesn't count Leyte Gulf as a carrier clash) during the war with Santa Cruz in October 42 exhausting both sides. It was nearly two years before carriers clashed again. The 42 and 43 carriers were too few to sustain a continuous effort. In 1944 when the fast carrier forces boasted nearly a thousand planes, Kurita's surface forces were still able to get through. In the same period there were 49 surface clashes between the IJN and USN. Popular wisdom being that the carriers settled the war.

He contends that the decisive naval battle in the Pacific was a surface engagement, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. I'm not sure I agree with that as had we lost the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the odds of success were stacked against the Japanese in this attritional contest. I still believe Midway will remain the decisive because of the loss of those four carriers which were never replaced, but Vince's book certainly shows how prevalent surface engagements were.To me except for Samar, the north and south battles of Leyte Gulf were target practice.

[Vince O'Hara]

The term “decisive battle” means different things to different people. I think it was H.P. Willmott who made the crack that Pearl Harbor was the decisive battle of the Pacific war because it was that battle that doomed Japan to defeat (by starting a war they had no chance to win). But wars have to be fought before victory can be declared. When I made the comment that the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was the Pacific’s decisive naval battle I was being a little provocative because I wanted people to view the war from a different angle. I was also thinking that it was the battle that put an end, once and for all, to Japan’s offensive operations against the Americans. Midway didn’t do that.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

The term “decisive battle” means different things to different people. I think it was H.P. Willmott who made the crack that Pearl Harbor was the decisive battle of the Pacific war because it was that battle that doomed Japan to defeat (by starting a war they had no chance to win). But wars have to be fought before victory can be declared. When I made the comment that the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was the Pacific’s decisive naval battle I was being a little provocative because I wanted people to view the war from a different angle. I was also thinking that it was the battle that put an end, once and for all, to Japan’s offensive operations against the Americans. Midway didn’t do that.

Vince

Hi Vince:
I believe we can say that Midway was the decisive battle of the war in the Pacific. It was the first decisive defeat, the Imperial Japanese Navy had ever suffered. Psychologically, this was important. At the height of their naval power, they lost the very battle that they had wanted. Interestingly, in 1921, the British government held a conference during which Admiral Richmond summarised the advantages of a decisive battle. He stated that a battle was decisive not just for the immediate danger and loss the victor inflicted on his opponent but much more importantly for what happened afterwards. He went on to say, that a battle decisively won could effectively confer upon the victor command of the sea, the ability to use the sea decisively for his own purposes and to prevent his enemy from doing the same. My question then is simple; would Guadalcanal have taken place, had Midway not turned out the way it did? We have to examine the strategic consequences of the naval battle, to decide if it was decisive. Examine the Battle of the Nile, decisive? What strategic consequences flowed from that battle? Mahan thought that decisive battles: decided the nature of future events at sea and indirectly determine events on the shore. Naval battles are fought in support of land operations. This is their importance. Without Midway, can we expect Guadalcanal? Catch my point?

As to Guadalcanal, it was the decisive campaign of the war in the Pacific. This is, IMO, how we should differentiate the two. Again, it was the psychological effect of the failure to dislodge the US from the island. Guadalcanal was the only island in the southern Solomons with enough flat area to build a series of runways. With these runways, most of the slot could be controlled and Rabaul could be threatened. It was not only the loss of ships and aircraft, but the loss of strategic position in the Southwest Pacific. Now, with the southern Solomons secured, we could begin to move across the central Pacific, like War Plan Orange had envisioned. Again, it is what followed from this decisive campaign afterwards, that probably makes it decisive.

It is my opinion that we can attribute to both Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign, the term "decisive".

Thanks

[Christian Schwietzke]

I was also thinking that it was the battle that put an end, once and for all, to Japan’s offensive operations against the Americans. Midway didn’t do that.

Vince

But, to use your phrase, Midway put a beginning to the US´ offensive operations against Japan, didn´t it?

But then, you could also make the point that Coral Sea was the decisive battle, because it showed that meeting the Japanese on more or less equal terms and stopping them was possible, and because it taught the USN some crucial lessons in carrier ops and, I think, damage control as well.

[old_pop2000]

...... I was also thinking that it was the battle that put an end, once and for all, to Japan’s offensive operations against the Americans. Midway didn’t do that.



Vince:
From a translation of Senshi Sosho, Army operations in the South Pacific area: Papua campaigns, 1942-1943 Chapter 3, cancellation of the FS Operation


The Operations Section of Navy General Staff summoned all staff officers at noon on 6 June and advised them that the four aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Sôryû, and Hiryû had sunk, and that the main strength of the Combined Fleet was assembled behind the engagement line some 2,500 kilometres to the west of Hawaii. They added the opinion that the FS Operation should be delayed by at least two months. ..... In light of the changed circumstances, such as the great reduction in our carrier strength, the Midway Operation will be postponed. Preparations for future operations that have been proposed, such as in the New Caledonia and Fiji areas, will also take some time. I would like decisions to be made based on further research.

This translation goes on to state that the FS operation aimed at New Caledonia, Fiji and Efate was cancelled due to the loss of the carriers and reduction of naval strength. From this source and others, it seems to me, that Midway, did in fact, stop offensive operations by the IJN and IJA. While the Guadalcanal occupation and construction continued, this was more of a defensive position to protect the SE approach up the Solomons chain to Rabaul.

Thanks

[Vince O'Hara]

Dennis
You can make that point. A person can regard the whole effort to retake Guadalcanal as a defensive operation—something like massive (and repeated) versions of the counter-landing operations that were attempted later in the war in the upper Solomons, off New Guinea and the Philippines. In my perspective they were more than that, not just in scale, but also intent. But none of that subtracts from the importance of Midway. Midway was a great victory. It was an important victory. In some respects, it was a war changing victory. The same thing can be said for a series of other victories. I don’t like to think of the naval war in terms of decisive moments, but I used the term “decisive victory” deliberately knowing it was full of special meaning for many people. My major goal, like I said, was to propose new ways of looking at the Pacific war by provoking debate. Having chosen that path, I suppose it’s my obligation to participate in the debate, huh? My big point was that the surface battles were critical as well . . . the war did not solely hinge on the carrier actions.
Chris,
Yes, Midway opened a window that King jumped through. You can argue that there were other factors at play, such as his desire to get something started in the Pacific before the obligation defeat Germany first sucked up all the resources. You can also argue that the pre-Midway raids and the attack on Tokyo, if they don't qualify as offensive operations, demonstrate offensive intent.
--Vince

[Christian Schwietzke]

Chris,
Yes, Midway opened a window that King jumped through. You can argue that there were other factors at play, such as his desire to get something started in the Pacific before the obligation defeat Germany first sucked up all the resources. You can also argue that the pre-Midway raids and the attack on Tokyo, if they don't qualify as offensive operations, demonstrate offensive intent.
--Vince


You can argue that - in fact I agree with you. But I think you´d also have to argue that they demonstrate a lack of offensive ability. The carriers always struck at where the enemy (Kido Butai, in particular) wasn´t.

[Ed Rotondaro]

For those of you who are interested, Struggle for the Middle Sea is now available. It took longer than expected, but the production values are higher so I consider it well worth the wait.

Vince

Vince:

Sounds like that will be one of my birthday gifts (my parents gave me a check and said buy whatever you want).

[Ed Rotondaro]

Mike,

I put Vince's great book up on our NWS-Online store today :D

Wiliam:

Smart man!;)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi Paladin5,

Glad to hear that, I know times are tough. As naval warfare afficianadoes, you will find Vince's books very useful resources for reading or creating scenarios. There was a series of small books published in the 70s called "Sea battles in Close Up" . Each book featured a single battle and examined them in depth and context. Especially useful were orders of battle, weather conditions, and technical details on gunnery and radar found nowhere else. I was unaware of the poor performance of the KGVs guns until I read the appendices which listed individual salvoes. At the time, they were a revelation over the standard written descriptions.

Vince's book follows in a similar vein, but details each surface engagment for that navy. The narratives are up to date on gunnery and radar and chock full of information on ships, personalities, tactics, and weapons. Most think of the USN in the Pacific as a carrier war, but Vince puts that back into perspective with the numerous surface engagements that occurred. This is a book for the naval wargamer, naval history buff, and the casual reader alike. If you are limited to a small library, his are must have references. Space prevents pictures and multiple charts, but the volumes are modestly priced and a great value.

Mike and Mike:

Yes I have those books on Sea Battles Up Close. They are quite good, but Vince is really doing his subject justice with the most up to date research and his attention to battles that most of us had never heard of.

Paladin, glad to hear that you found work. Good luck.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hi John,

Vince's point is that there were five major carrier battles (Vince doesn't count Leyte Gulf as a carrier clash) during the war with Santa Cruz in October 42 exhausting both sides. It was nearly two years before carriers clashed again. The 42 and 43 carriers were too few to sustain a continuous effort. In 1944 when the fast carrier forces boasted nearly a thousand planes, Kurita's surface forces were still able to get through. In the same period there were 49 surface clashes between the IJN and USN. Popular wisdom being that the carriers settled the war.

He contends that the decisive naval battle in the Pacific was a surface engagement, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. I'm not sure I agree with that as had we lost the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the odds of success were stacked against the Japanese in this attritional contest. I still believe Midway will remain the decisive because of the loss of those four carriers which were never replaced, but Vince's book certainly shows how prevalent surface engagements were.

Mike:

That's a tough one to make a call on. Midway determined that Japan would not win the war. Guadalcanal determined that she would lose the war. And the naval battle at Gaudalcanal was the definite turning point of the campaign. I've seen the same comparison made between Stalingrad and Kursk by the way.

[Ed Rotondaro]

To me except for Samar, the north and south battles of Leyte Gulf were target practice.

John:

What I find interesting about Leyte Gulf is that with the preponderence of American airpower, one would expect more damage to be done to the IJN. Yet despite the tremendous amount of air strikes that Kurita's Center Force was subjected to, relatively few ships were lost at Sibuyan Sea. Hell the Taffy CVEs did about as much damage assisted by Bogan's fast carrier task force. In many instances, carrier air ended up finishing off ships damaged in surface fights. Admiral DuBoise's cruiser task force ended up finishing off Ozawa's stragglers. I think the problem with the war in the Pacific as once it was over, the carrier admirals reigned supreme and they made sure they got the lion's share of the glory. Remember, Spruance initialed planned on intercepting the Yamato with a surface task force of battleships. Mitscher made sure that didn't happen because he wanted to cement the carrier's supremacy over the battleship once and for all.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Dennis
You can make that point. A person can regard the whole effort to retake Guadalcanal as a defensive operation—something like massive (and repeated) versions of the counter-landing operations that were attempted later in the war in the upper Solomons, off New Guinea and the Philippines. In my perspective they were more than that, not just in scale, but also intent. But none of that subtracts from the importance of Midway. Midway was a great victory. It was an important victory. In some respects, it was a war changing victory. The same thing can be said for a series of other victories. I don’t like to think of the naval war in terms of decisive moments, but I used the term “decisive victory” deliberately knowing it was full of special meaning for many people. My major goal, like I said, was to propose new ways of looking at the Pacific war by provoking debate. Having chosen that path, I suppose it’s my obligation to participate in the debate, huh? My big point was that the surface battles were critical as well . . . the war did not solely hinge on the carrier actions.
Chris,
Yes, Midway opened a window that King jumped through. You can argue that there were other factors at play, such as his desire to get something started in the Pacific before the obligation defeat Germany first sucked up all the resources. You can also argue that the pre-Midway raids and the attack on Tokyo, if they don't qualify as offensive operations, demonstrate offensive intent.
--Vince


Vince:

This does open a new thread that I should probably post elsewhere. What if the US postponed the Guadalcanal operation? Would Operation Torch have consumed too many resources? Would the USN have based its fleet closer to Australia and continued interdiction carrier raids on Rabaul and other parts of the Solomons? King definitely wanted to keep the Pacific theater viable and realistically the bulk of the UNS was better employed there than in the Atlantic or the Med.

[old_pop2000]

Premise: Navies fight at sea only for the strategic effect they can secure ashore, where people live. Sea battles, naval tactics, and ship design are all means, and only means, to gaining strategic leverage in conflict as a whole.

Source: The Leverage of Sea Power by Colin S. Gray

If we accept this premise, which BTW both Corbett and Mahan agreed with, then why was Midway and other naval battles at Guadalcanal decisive? Think about the IJN side of this equation.

Note: I suspect that this thread and discussion might get moved pretty soon.;)

[asnrobert]

I would agree that Midway was an important victory, but even after the battle, the IJN was still a potent naval force (although 4 carriers had been sunk, most of the valuable aircrews had been rescued), and the USN was still outnumbered. The US began the Guadalcanal campaign on a shoestring, and if the landings had failed (which might have happened if Mikawa had been a bit bolder), then it might have been a year or more before any more amphibious attacks were planned (remember, the Operation Torch landings were occurring around the same time, and the Allied focus was on defeating Hitler first). Both sides were bled white as a result of the Guadalcanal campaign: of the four US carriers available at the start of the campaign, only one, the twice-damaged Enterprise, was still present- Wasp and Hornet had been sunk and Saratoga had been sent home fore repairs; however, the cream of Japan's carrier aviation had been frittered away as a result of the campaign. The US could make could it's losses- by 1943 the Essex class CVs were arriving, while the IJN's carrier forces pretty much ceased to be a threat (the Marianas Turkey Shoot comes to mind).

[john964]

Remember, Spruance initialed planned on intercepting the Yamato with a surface task force of battleships. Mitscher made sure that didn't happen because he wanted to cement the carrier's supremacy over the battleship once and for all.Ed, I did not know about that. But I once ran a CaS game years ago were the Yamato was not detected untill it was spotted by a radar picket and the USN was forced to send in forces piecemeal and ad hoc. I set it up as roll the dice and what you rolled got you a pre-selected force.

IIRC it went somthing like this
1) 1 DESRON of 6 DD's pre-PH
2) 1 Old CA roll D10 for choice
3) 2 CL Roll D6 for choice
4) 2 DD 1 CL Players choice
5) 1 New CA ie Baltimore class
6) 1 Old BB roll D10 for Choice
7) 1 DESRON of 6 DD post PH
8) 1 New BB roll D6 for class
9) 1 CL players choice
10) 1 CA players choice

The players also had to roll to see which turn they started on the table.
Needless to say the players had a blast.

[Warship NWS]

IMHO, PH1941 was when the IJN built its own military coffin.. the lack of ASW and the Essex CV class were the nails that sealed the coffin. With no ability to disrupt the US industry that built the Essex class (and buckets of fighters/pilots to arm them), much less the fleet train of supplies, the Pacific War was over before it even began - and pissing us off at PH1941 didn't help matters. Note, I mention only fighters as naval air superiority was the most important asset of the Pacific War IMHO - all else simply accellerated their defeat. Naval fighters where what made defeat, within any logical reasoning, possible.

I always find it ironic that there is so much interest in the Pacific War which was for all intensive purposes a lost war of attrition the IJN could never win especially when one compares the war between Germany and Russia. For the Japanese it would have made FAR more sense to resort to a diplomatic war with the US - AKA never using the military against US assets. Intead they could try and gain as much ground in the Pacific as they could without crossing the line of going to war with an enemy they had no chance of defeating. Was this a possibility? I leave that question open to debate - with the reminder of keeping within historical, and respectfully/professionally worded, context in regards to any political references. An alternate thread may be required.

[old_pop2000]

.... An alternate thread may be required.

Warship:
Why can't we use the thread I posted awhile back; Naval warfare, battle tactics and cohesiveness (http://forums.navalwarfare.net/showthread.php?t=1307).

[djcyclone]

Actually we have already discussed that numerouse times.

We have had threads that discussed what if the Japanese never attacked the U.S., and we have had answers.

Eventually the U.S. would have been drug into the War, because by the time Pearl Harbor took place, German Subs where already attacking American Destroyers on Convoy Escort, and Roosevelt had already given the shoot on sight order.

We where already sick of the Germans, and it was only a matter of time before we would have joined in on the fight. With no Japanese to worry about, that would have made the War in Europe a vary quick venture.

But eventually we would have gone to War with Japan. And the idea of advancing peacfully does not really fit into the whole Samuri Logic, and that was the Logic that many Japanese used in those days.

[Warship NWS]

Sorry guys.. have not had time to watch all discussions, been kind of busy around here. ;) My comments were mostly in the context of all the curiosity over the Pacific War when, in the strategic sense, it was pretty much a no possible win scenario for the Japanese - especially when PH1941 happened. That is why I prefer tactical battle analysis work, on the strategic level the outcome if often easier to determine when you consider the overriding variables of a conflict on such a level - unless both sides have roughly equal assets and leadership to work with. Example, the Germans never stood a chance of winning WW1 after the economic embargo of their country was implemented by Britain, before WW1 even started, and even worse yet when they could not capture Paris after of which everyone simply fought a trench war of attrition. Either way, they were doomed to be starved out of the war long before they would run out of troops to fight it. Not knocking the discussions mind you.. just find them curiously ironic. ;)

Thanks, have fun. :)

[Ed Rotondaro]

Ed, I did not know about that. But I once ran a CaS game years ago were the Yamato was not detected untill it was spotted by a radar picket and the USN was forced to send in forces piecemeal and ad hoc. I set it up as roll the dice and what you rolled got you a pre-selected force.

IIRC it went somthing like this
1) 1 DESRON of 6 DD's pre-PH
2) 1 Old CA roll D10 for choice
3) 2 CL Roll D6 for choice
4) 2 DD 1 CL Players choice
5) 1 New CA ie Baltimore class
6) 1 Old BB roll D10 for Choice
7) 1 DESRON of 6 DD post PH
8) 1 New BB roll D6 for class
9) 1 CL players choice
10) 1 CA players choice

The players also had to roll to see which turn they started on the table.
Needless to say the players had a blast.

John:

I have seen two orders of battle for a US surface intercept of the Yamato death ride. One was based on the old pre-WWII battleships with supporting cruisers and destroyers, the other included two Iowa class and at least one Alaska class cruiser. Spruance actually had the call and when Mitscher asked him if his carriers should take the Yamato or the BBs he gave shortest operational order of the war "You take them". Sort of like Halsey's "Attack, repeat attack" during the Solomons campaign.

[Ed Rotondaro]

IMHO, PH1941 was when the IJN built its own military coffin.. the lack of ASW and the Essex CV class were the nails that sealed the coffin. With no ability to disrupt the US industry that built the Essex class (and buckets of fighters/pilots to arm them), much less the fleet train of supplies, the Pacific War was over before it even began - and pissing us off at PH1941 didn't help matters. Note, I mention only fighters as naval air superiority was the most important asset of the Pacific War IMHO - all else simply accellerated their defeat. Naval fighters where what made defeat, within any logical reasoning, possible.

I always find it ironic that there is so much interest in the Pacific War which was for all intensive purposes a lost war of attrition the IJN could never win especially when one compares the war between Germany and Russia. For the Japanese it would have made FAR more sense to resort to a diplomatic war with the US - AKA never using the military against US assets. Intead they could try and gain as much ground in the Pacific as they could without crossing the line of going to war with an enemy they had no chance of defeating. Was this a possibility? I leave that question open to debate - with the reminder of keeping within historical, and respectfully/professionally worded, context in regards to any political references. An alternate thread may be required.

Chris:

Strategically the war was unwinnable for Japan and they knew that. The mian problem was the inability to understand the mindset of the US. Japan's only conflicts with the West had been very successful from their viewpoint (Russo-Japanese War and their participation in WWI). They never had to face a prolonged war of attrition with a modern industrial power. They had the aadvantage of being close to the areas that they wished to seize and it made their operational planning very short sighted. Their best hope was that the US would fold the way Russia did in 1905, not knowing that Russia folded due to political unrest. Hitler felt the same way about the US. He thought that American men were more interested in baseball and cars than fighting. Throughout history, the US has been undersestimated by its opponents. About the only ones who figured it out and dug in for the long haul were the North Vietnamese (not trying to start a thread on that struggle).

[old_pop2000]

Chris:

Strategically the war was winnable for Japan and they knew that. The main problem was the inability to understand the mindset of the US. Japan's only conflicts with the West had been very successful from their viewpoint (Russo-Japanese War and their participation in WWI). They never had to face a prolonged war of attrition with a modern industrial power. They had the advantage of being close to the areas that they wished to seize and it made their operational planning very short sighted. Their best hope was that the US would fold the way Russia did in 1905, not knowing that Russia folded due to political unrest. Hitler felt the same way about the US. He thought that American men were more interested in baseball and cars than fighting. Throughout history, the US has been underestimated by its opponents. About the only ones who figured it out and dug in for the long haul were the North Vietnamese (not trying to start a thread on that struggle).

I would be careful, not to allow 20/20 hindsight to creep into our views. Yamamoto's famous quip about running wild for six months, should not be taken as a view that he felt the war was not winnable. Quite the contrary, it was only meant to convey the idea that as with most war's, you can't project out too far. The IJN pushed for war at that time, because the Navy bills would reduce and eliminate any advantage the Japanese had and that with the embargo, fuel reserves for the fleet would be dwindling. There was enough fuel for civilian and Army use, but only about a year and half's worth of fuel in reserve for the IJN. It was always assumed, that the Southern oil fields and production facilities in Borneo could be captured intact. Unfortunately, that was wrong. The Dutch managed to disable the cracking plants. This forced the Japanese to move the raw oil to Japan to be cracked. The Japanese had limited cracking capacity in Japan. This left them vulnerable to our submarines. The capture of Singapore was to deny the British a Naval facility in that region and allow the IJN to move part of their fleet closer to the oil fields.

The Japanese high command also based their decision on the results in Russia. The Japanese believed that the Russian's were on their last legs, and their Axis partner would prevail. This would have allowed much of the Kwantung Army to move away from the Siberian boarder, to be used in finishing off China and for use in Southwest Pacific operations. Again, this did not occur.

The failure of Japan to win the war, was never a foregone conclusion. It is by our 20/20 hindsight, but not at the time, with a two ocean war commencing and a one ocean navy, few army troops and a weak airforce. Did the Japanese realize how difficult this war would be? Yes, but in their mind, it was the only alternative. We know now, there were alternatives that were not considered, due to their national character.

This perception, that all we had to do is show up for the war in the Pacific diminishes the sacrifices of the men and women who fought it. Remember, that by Rainbow 5, the Pacific was not priority one. Only through the efforts of King and others, did the US Navy force the JCS to provide the necessary resources for King's offensive operations. This was also a surprise to the IJN.

The war, for the IJN, was full of surprises. But it wasn't through lack of understanding.

[Warship NWS]

Please do not misunderstand my thought process. ;) Obviously the Japanese could put up a serious fight and we had every reason to consider them a serious threat in the 1930s-1940s. Many nations misunderstood, underestimated, or undervalued their opponents throughout history. However, there is a certain level of known variables to consider. If you cannot disable the ability, or resolve, of the enemy to wage a strategic war you cannot win the war. This is where Japan had no chance to win.. they could only hope to force a mindset on the USA not to intervene with their military operations, at best. Nothing else could be done to stop their eventual defeat once the downhill snowball starting to pick up speed against them. Now, could one have realized that the US would virtually supply every major allied nation in the world at the time while building up a massive military force? Possibly not. But no country could ignore the fact that the US could NOT be militarily invaded and eliminated from the war either if the need ever required it for a strategic victory. That is my simplified, lack of time, short version of my stance. ;) Enjoy the chat.

[old_pop2000]

Please do not misunderstand my thought process. ;) Obviously the Japanese could put up a serious fight and we had every reason to consider them a serious threat in the 1930s-1940s. Many nations misunderstood, underestimated, or undervalued their opponents throughout history. However, there is a certain level of known variables to consider. If you cannot disable the ability, or resolve, of the enemy to wage a strategic war you cannot win the war. This is where Japan had no chance to win.. they could only hope to force a mindset on the USA not to intervene with their military operations, at best. Nothing else could be done to stop their eventual defeat once the downhill snowball starting to pick up speed against them. Now, could one have realized that the US would virtually supply every major allied nation in the world at the time while building up a massive military force? Possibly not. But no country could ignore the fact that the US could NOT be militarily invaded and eliminated from the war either if the need ever required it for a strategic victory. That is my simplified, lack of time, short version of my stance. ;) Enjoy the chat.

Actually, in Germany, a nation under constant day/night bombardment, the GDP was up from 1939. This was also true of steel production, tanks, aircraft etc. However, the economy was failing. But not from the bombardment, but from inflation due to war time spending. Something the German Reich Ministry did not account for. This is exactly what was happening in the US despite the War Production board and price controls. In July, 1944 Hans Kehrl's planning office in the Reichs Ministry stated " The German economy is threatening to fall into an anarchy, against which even an extended and improved system of economic controls will struggle in vain. " The erosion of purchasing power in the Reich was working counter to the needs of war production. The inflation was a direct result of the stresses from the war effort, not the bombing by the Allies. In 1944, it was simply a matter of what collapsed first; the Wehrmact or the economy due to inflation.

This would seem to refute any idea that economic warfare at that stage of military technology was really possible. Only the destruction of land, air and sea forces would have ended the conflict.

Just to note: In the period April 1942 to June 1946, inflation under the General Max system of price controls was 3.5%. It soared to 28% in the six months after June 1946. Although living standards increased in some areas, in most, it decreased due to the war effort. While we did come out of the war, as the strongest economic power in the world, the three years and seven months of war, did have a tremendous cost tempered only by the fact that we had won. We still carry national debt incurred from WWII.

[Warship NWS]

To Dennis, your point follows my stance.. Germany during WW2 could not be defeated until their military and industry could be neutralized completely. This was a measure no nation had a chance to achieve against the US.

Flip to WW1, Germany lost, IMHO, before the war ever started via the politicaly driven economic blockade of their country by Britain. This was a situation that their military could do nothing about, except maybe by defeating France - which was stopped at the Battle of the Marne, so in turn they would be eventually starved into defeat.

End result is the same.. unless a nation can be rendered unable to effectively wage war the nation cannot be defeated on a strategic level.

Here is a "strategic" discussion topic.. why could the economic blockade that worked against Germany during WW1 not work during WW2? (In case it has not been discussed recently already. ;))

Thanks.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Premise: Navies fight at sea only for the strategic effect they can secure ashore, where people live. Sea battles, naval tactics, and ship design are all means, and only means, to gaining strategic leverage in conflict as a whole.

Source: The Leverage of Sea Power by Colin S. Gray

If we accept this premise, which BTW both Corbett and Mahan agreed with, then why was Midway and other naval battles at Guadalcanal decisive? Think about the IJN side of this equation.

Note: I suspect that this thread and discussion might get moved pretty soon.;)

Hi Dennis,

That is similar to the aphroism about the RN being a cannon from which to launch the army as a projectile ashore. However, in the Pacific, power projection had come to rest upon carriers. The Japanese depended on land based air power to protect the Empire from incursions. This necessitated the USN bringing their own air with them in the form of carriers. Unlike Germany, sea power could defeat Japan with minimal need for land forces.

Midway was decisive for the Japanese because their industrial base could not replace those four hulls as their training base could barely replace the the attrtional losses of aircrew and maintenace personnel. Guadalcanal represented the first chink in their defensive perimeter by allowing the establishment of an air base with in range of their bastion at Rabaul. In addition, the loss of ships, planes and air crew over the next year could not be made up.

Unlike Japan which was going for all the marbles, the USN could have lost Midway and Guadalcanal without jepordizing the eventual outcome of the war. Even had Nagumo's force remained intact at Midway, the weight of US production would have far outstripped them by late 1943 and their air crews and air groups would have been committed to the crucible of Solomons.

Short of a negotiated peace, Japan was doomed from the start.

[old_pop2000]

.... Unlike Germany, sea power could defeat Japan with minimal need for land forces.

....

If that were true, why take Okinawa? Why plan Operation Downfall? If Japan could be defeated by naval power alone, then why was this massive invasion plan even considered?

The answer is probably that blockades are rarely effective. Naval power has always been used to further land operations, and that was true, even in the Pacific. It took a land invasion to retake the Philippines and much of the SW Pacific. The island hopping campaign was facilitated by naval power, but there was no escaping the requirement for land operations to move our forces closer to Japan for the final blow.

I agree that Midway removed the primary striking power of the Imperial Japanese fleet. But as I have stated, it's what followed Midway that made the battle "decisive". The loss of ships alone, did not make the battle decisive. It wasn't just the loss of over 269 aircraft mechanics, or the 300 aircraft. The battle probably was never considered decisive until analyst examine the whole whole and realized what Midway had meant.

[Ed Rotondaro]

If that were true, why take Okinawa? Why plan Operation Downfall? If Japan could be defeated by naval power alone, then why was this massive invasion plan even considered?

The answer is probably that blockades are rarely effective. Naval power has always been used to further land operations, and that was true, even in the Pacific. It took a land invasion to retake the Philippines and much of the SW Pacific. The island hopping campaign was facilitated by naval power, but there was no escaping the requirement for land operations to move our forces closer to Japan for the final blow.

I agree that Midway removed the primary striking power of the Imperial Japanese fleet. But as I have stated, it's what followed Midway that made the battle "decisive". The loss of ships alone, did not make the battle decisive. It wasn't just the loss of over 269 aircraft mechanics, or the 300 aircraft. The battle probably was never considered decisive until analyst examine the whole whole and realized what Midway had meant.

Dennis:

Each island re-taken meant the US was closer to being able to bring strategic airpower to bear on Japan. Downfall was planned simply because Japan would not surrender and would have had to have been defeated in a massive invasion. Seapower isolated Japan and was in the process of starving her (after the capitulation, the US had to ship almost a 1 million tons of food to Japan to avoid famine. The mining of the Inner Sea had been that effective). Still just like with airpower, the war isn't over until some poor bloody infantry forces the enemy out of his foxhole at the point of a bayonet and gets him to sign the peace treaty.

Regarding Midway, as we have seen, not as many aircrew were lost as once believed. Even the plane losses were made good fairly quickly. Far more damaging was the loss of trained mechanics and armorers, the men that kept the planes flying and fighting. The attritional airwar over Guadalcanal and the Solomons was what really broke the back of Japanese airpower.

[Mike Malanaphy]

If that were true, why take Okinawa? Why plan Operation Downfall? If Japan could be defeated by naval power alone, then why was this massive invasion plan even considered?

The answer is probably that blockades are rarely effective. Naval power has always been used to further land operations, and that was true, even in the Pacific. It took a land invasion to retake the Philippines and much of the SW Pacific. The island hopping campaign was facilitated by naval power, but there was no escaping the requirement for land operations to move our forces closer to Japan for the final blow.

I agree that Midway removed the primary striking power of the Imperial Japanese fleet. But as I have stated, it's what followed Midway that made the battle "decisive". The loss of ships alone, did not make the battle decisive. It wasn't just the loss of over 269 aircraft mechanics, or the 300 aircraft. The battle probably was never considered decisive until analyst examine the whole whole and realized what Midway had meant.

Hi Dennis,

Part of this is hindsight in the sense that the submarine campaign and the B-29 mining offensive of Japanese coastal waters had strangled Japan's economy and pushed her to the verge of starvation. It's effectiveness was not readily apparent then when measured against the ferocity of Japanese resistance and the percieved need to invade the Japaese home islands. You can persuasively argue in hindsight that neither the invasion of Japan or the use of the two atomic bombs was necessary to defeat Japan. To argue the participants should have known is definitely revisionist history.

But the Mahanian equivalent on land is the use of massive forces to confront the main enemy force as in the ETO and destroy it in battle. Compared to the ETO, the scale of land combat was quite small, primarily to secure forward operating bases. I think you can effectively argue that Japan was primarily defeated by sea power and the Germany's inability to do so left Britain, the other island empire, undefeated. Unable to defeat a handful of RAF fighters, Hitler had no realistic alternative to defeat Britain without having an effective navy.

I agree with you regarding the assesment of when a battle becomes decisive. The participants don't have the perspective to realize those turning points. That's why the Ardennes Offensive had such an huge psychological impact on the Allies completely out of proportion of it's military effect.

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

Part of this is hindsight in the sense that the submarine campaign and the B-29 mining offensive of Japanese coastal waters had strangled Japan's economy and pushed her to the verge of starvation. It's effectiveness was not readily apparent then when measured against the ferocity of Japanese resistance and the percieved need to invade the Japaese home islands. You can persuasively argue in hindsight that neither the invasion of Japan or the use of the two atomic bombs was necessary to defeat Japan. To argue the participants should have known is definitely revisionist history.

But the Mahanian equivalent on land is the use of massive forces to confront the main enemy force as in the ETO and destroy it in battle. Compared to the ETO, the scale of land combat was quite small, primarily to secure forward operating bases. I think you can effectively argue that Japan was primarily defeated by sea power and the Germany's inability to do so left Britain, the other island empire, undefeated. Unable to defeat a handful of RAF fighters, Hitler had no realistic alternative to defeat Britain without having an effective navy.

I agree with you regarding the assesment of when a battle becomes decisive. The participants don't have the perspective to realize those turning points. That's why the Ardennes Offensive had such an huge psychological impact on the Allies completely out of proportion of it's military effect.


Sea power and its application, did facilitate the final victory. It definitely played a greater part, in its own way. But sea power was equally effective in Northern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Again, the application of naval power allowed the Allies the freedom to move their forces and invade North Africa, Sicily, Southern Italy and finally, Southern France. In Northern Europe, the same is true. Naval power allowed the Allies the freedom to pick the time and place of the invasion, and provided the necessary naval surface fire support to allow the land forces to consolidate and advance. However, the Naval forces in and of themselves, could never attack the heart of Germany to defeat their land forces and occupy the country. Naval sea power has those limitations.

[old_pop2000]

Dennis:

....Regarding Midway, as we have seen, not as many aircrew were lost as once believed. Even the plane losses were made good fairly quickly. Far more damaging was the loss of trained mechanics and armorers, the men that kept the planes flying and fighting. The attritional airwar over Guadalcanal and the Solomons was what really broke the back of Japanese airpower.

That is certainly the point of my statements. Midway was the key to the Guadalcanal operation. Guadalcanal was where we broke the back of the Imperial Japanese Navy and it Naval air force. However, Midway is the battle that stopped their offensive operations and removed the mobile striking force. It gave us the breathing space to move on Guadalcanal but more importantly, the Southern Solomons. With the capture of Guadalcanal, Munda and the other islands in the southern ocean area, the flank of any Central Pacific operation against the Carolinas, Marshall's like Tarawa, Kwajalein, Ulithi was protected. But Midway was the key. The move against Guadalcanal also relieved the pressure on the vital Port Moresby and New Guinea area by forcing the Japanese to use the aircraft at Rabaul and the New Guinea airfields over the Slot. This allowed General Kenny to use his 5th AF more effectively to interdict Japanese supply lines. However, it was historical analysis that provided that insight into Midway's value. You are usually too busy fighting the war, to worry about such matters.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike,

I put Vince's great book up on our NWS-Online store today :D

Thanks NWS, just ordered my copy of Vince's new book....can't wait!

[old_pop2000]

Thanks NWS, just ordered my copy of Vince's new book....can't wait!

I am going to wait until my two home projects are completed, then purchase my copy.

[Mike Malanaphy]

I am going to wait until my two home projects are completed, then purchase my copy.


Hi Dennis,

New book shelves? : )

[old_pop2000]

Hi Dennis,

New book shelves? : )


No, I have plenty of book space. I am having my front grass removed and shredded bark placed in the area with creeping junipers on the sprinkler heads in the middle. In an area that only gets 3 inches of rain per year on average, grass is a luxury that is expensive to water and mow. So, the last of the grass is leaving. We will be under water restrictions in July and I am currently still below the levels that will generate surcharges, but with this project, I will reduce my water consumption by half. We also put the dishwater into a bucket and when it is full, put it on the fruit trees. I am gaining about six gallons per day with this method. The phosphates in the soap are good for trees and plants.

My second project is to redo one of the landscaped areas and move some of my wife's Iris's around. This is almost finished.

After that, I will probably get Vince's book. There are priorities. Actually, if I mention it to my family, they would probably buy it for me, but I don't like to do that. I'm sort of careful and frugal. First things first.

[keschofield]

No, I have plenty of book space. I am having my front grass removed and shredded bark placed in the area with creeping junipers on the sprinkler heads in the middle. In an area that only gets 3 inches of rain per year on average, grass is a luxury that is expensive to water and mow. So, the last of the grass is leaving. We will be under water restrictions in July and I am currently still below the levels that will generate surcharges, but with this project, I will reduce my water consumption by half. We also put the dishwater into a bucket and when it is full, put it on the fruit trees. I am gaining about six gallons per day with this method. The phosphates in the soap are good for trees and plants.

My second project is to redo one of the landscaped areas and move some of my wife's Iris's around. This is almost finished.

After that, I will probably get Vince's book. There are priorities. Actually, if I mention it to my family, they would probably buy it for me, but I don't like to do that. I'm sort of careful and frugal. First things first.


Dennis,

Watch out for those junipers my friend. After a year or two, they will have the space completely covered over and then you will start to have bug and critter problems. Especially in a hot climate, the varmints love to live under a canopy of junipers. Within a few years you won't be able to change your mind about junipers. They have incredible root systems. My neighbor finally had to use a chain and his four wheel drive pickup to pull his junipers up!

About the only thing junipers are good for here in Georgia is keeping open spaces from being overrun by kudzu.

Good luck,
Kurt

[old_pop2000]

Dennis,

Watch out for those junipers my friend. After a year or two, they will have the space completely covered over and then you will start to have bug and critter problems. Especially in a hot climate, the varmints love to live under a canopy of junipers. Within a few years you won't be able to change your mind about junipers. They have incredible root systems. My neighbor finally had to use a chain and his four wheel drive pickup to pull his junipers up!

About the only thing junipers are good for here in Georgia is keeping open spaces from being overrun by kudzu.

Good luck,
Kurt

Thanks, we have the same types on the area next to the garage, and they are expanding. We are probably going to have to trim them. These are ground huggers, not the tall kind. My father in law had the tall kind, and they were a real pain.

[keschofield]

Thanks, we have the same types on the area next to the garage, and they are expanding. We are probably going to have to trim them. These are ground huggers, not the tall kind. My father in law had the tall kind, and they were a real pain.

The ones that I've had some experience with are ground cover. They never get much over 4-6 inches high. But there's always room underneath for the varmints. Just keep a weather eye out.

Kurt

[old_pop2000]

The ones that I've had some experience with are ground cover. They never get much over 4-6 inches high. But there's always room underneath for the varmints. Just keep a weather eye out.

Kurt

Hmm! I will have to keep my eye on them. Thanks, I don't need more critters in the front. We have coyote, possums, skunks, raccoons, and squirrels in the back on the other side of our fence, that's enough for me.

[john964]

Dennis,

Watch out for those junipers my friend. After a year or two, they will have the space completely covered over and then you will start to have bug and critter problems. Especially in a hot climate, the varmints love to live under a canopy of junipers. Within a few years you won't be able to change your mind about junipers. They have incredible root systems. My neighbor finally had to use a chain and his four wheel drive pickup to pull his junipers up!

About the only thing junipers are good for here in Georgia is keeping open spaces from being overrun by kudzu.

Good luck,
KurtGot to watch out for Kudzu that stuff can be a real pain to get rid of. My uncle who lives outside of Moble AL lost a garden shed when it went nuts after Katrina.

[Vince O'Hara]

I am going to wait until my two home projects are completed, then purchase my copy.

Dennis, you don't have to buy a copy--you helped me on the manuscript. I'm trying to arrange a signing at the Maritime museum in July or August. I'll let you know when and I'll give you a copy. Or we can have lunch before then.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Dennis, you don't have to buy a copy--you helped me on the manuscript. I'm trying to arrange a signing at the Maritime museum in July or August. I'll let you know when and I'll give you a copy. Or we can have lunch before then.

Vince

Wow! I would love to come. Let me know the particulars. Thanks.

We can still have lunch, anytime. Let me know. I am looking forward to your book and asking some questions about the role of the Italian AF in Naval operations.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Dennis, you don't have to buy a copy--you helped me on the manuscript. I'm trying to arrange a signing at the Maritime museum in July or August. I'll let you know when and I'll give you a copy. Or we can have lunch before then.

Vince

Hey Vince, getting near Portland, Oregon? : )

[Vince O'Hara]

Hey Vince, getting near Portland, Oregon? : )

Hi Mike -- I wish!

[Mike Malanaphy]

Hi Mike -- I wish!


Hey Vince,

Too bad...love to get all three of my copies autographed. : )

[Ed Rotondaro]

No, I have plenty of book space. I am having my front grass removed and shredded bark placed in the area with creeping junipers on the sprinkler heads in the middle. In an area that only gets 3 inches of rain per year on average, grass is a luxury that is expensive to water and mow. So, the last of the grass is leaving. We will be under water restrictions in July and I am currently still below the levels that will generate surcharges, but with this project, I will reduce my water consumption by half. We also put the dishwater into a bucket and when it is full, put it on the fruit trees. I am gaining about six gallons per day with this method. The phosphates in the soap are good for trees and plants.

My second project is to redo one of the landscaped areas and move some of my wife's Iris's around. This is almost finished.

After that, I will probably get Vince's book. There are priorities. Actually, if I mention it to my family, they would probably buy it for me, but I don't like to do that. I'm sort of careful and frugal. First things first.

Dennis:

We got more rain in the last four days then we had most of the spring. I was fortunate to get my lawn mowed on Saturday before the heavy rains came. I will probably order some books in the near future, but I want to finish "Hellhawks" first.

[Ed Rotondaro]

Wow! I would love to come. Let me know the particulars. Thanks.

We can still have lunch, anytime. Let me know. I am looking forward to your book and asking some questions about the role of the Italian AF in Naval operations.

Dennis:

Some guys get all the breaks LOL!:D

[Ed Rotondaro]

Hey Vince,

Too bad...love to get all three of my copies autographed. : )

Mike:

At least we know the author LOL! We should have Vince autograph a bunch of labels and mail them out. Then we can stick them in our copies. Its the next best thing to meeting him in person.

[Mike Malanaphy]

Mike:

At least we know the author LOL! We should have Vince autograph a bunch of labels and mail them out. Then we can stick them in our copies. Its the next best thing to meeting him in person.

Hi Ed,

That will work for now. Perhaps when I retire and Vic writes his next book, I can be his gofer on his world wide book tour. : )

[paladin5]

Well I just ordered my copy from the NWS store :)

[Warship NWS]

Well I just ordered my copy from the NWS store :)

Got one here for you..;)

[paladin5]

Got one here for you..;)


w00t!

*excitedly waits for it to arrive*

:D

[old_pop2000]

I just checked and "Struggle for the Middle Sea" by Vince O'Hara is #7 on the Naval Institute Press Top Ten Best Selling Book list.

Atta Boy, Vince. :D

[Vince O'Hara]

Thanks Dennis That's the first time I've made the NIP top ten (at least to my knowledge). I'm still working on adate and venue for a book signing, but I'll post it here when I finalize things. The San Diego Martime Museum will be out, I think, because they would ask people to pay admission. It's a great place, but that would not encourge much of a turn-out. Also, thank you to everyone who has bought the book. I'm happy to field any questions or receive corrections.

Vince

[old_pop2000]

Thanks Dennis That's the first time I've made the NIP top ten (at least to my knowledge). I'm still working on adate and venue for a book signing, but I'll post it here when I finalize things. The San Diego Martime Museum will be out, I think, because they would ask people to pay admission. It's a great place, but that would not encourge much of a turn-out. Also, thank you to everyone who has bought the book. I'm happy to field any questions or receive corrections.

Vince

Well, then congrats are in order. But 7th is just the start, we want numero uno. I saw the book at a local book store in Santee today. I read the preface, thanks, that was a very nice thing to do. ;)

[Mike Malanaphy]

Thanks Dennis That's the first time I've made the NIP top ten (at least to my knowledge). I'm still working on adate and venue for a book signing, but I'll post it here when I finalize things. The San Diego Martime Museum will be out, I think, because they would ask people to pay admission. It's a great place, but that would not encourge much of a turn-out. Also, thank you to everyone who has bought the book. I'm happy to field any questions or receive corrections.

Vince

Hi Vince,

Well deserved, I'm lurking around my mailbox waiting for my copy from NWS. : )

[paladin5]

Hi Vince,

Well deserved, I'm lurking around my mailbox waiting for my copy from NWS. : )


Me to. How long does it usually take for stuff to arrive in the continental US?

[Mike Malanaphy]

Me to. How long does it usually take for stuff to arrive in the continental US?

Hi Mike,

Mine arrived this afternoon, shipped on 07/01/09, : )

[paladin5]

Hi Mike,

Mine arrived this afternoon, shipped on 07/01/09, : )


Hmm I should have it in the next 3-4 days then :)

[paladin5]

w00t! ITS HERE!!!!!